

Latin American Labor Organizations

EDITED BY

Gerald Michael Greenfield

AND

Sheldon L. Maram



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2019 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

Latin American
Labor
Organizations



Latin American Labor Organizations

EDITED BY

Gerald Michael Greenfield

AND

Sheldon L. Maram



Greenwood Press

NEW YORK • WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT • LONDON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Latin American labor organizations.

Includes bibliographies and index.

1. Trade-unions—Latin America—History. 2. Labor and laboring classes—Latin America—History.

I. Greenfield, Gerald Michael. II. Maram, Sheldon L.

HD6530.5.L38 1987 331.88'098 86-33613

ISBN 0-313-22834-5 (lib. bdg. : alk. paper)

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Copyright © 1987 by Gerald Greenfield and Sheldon L. Maram

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 86-33613

ISBN: 0-313-22834-5

First published in 1987

Greenwood Press, Inc.

88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881

Printed in the United States of America



The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents _____

PREFACE	vii
INTRODUCTION	xi
1. Argentina <i>Lisbeth Haas</i>	1
2. Belize <i>William L. Cumiford</i>	25
3. Bolivia <i>Steven S. Volk</i>	37
4. Brazil <i>Gerald Michael Greenfield</i>	63
5. Chile <i>Brian Loveman</i>	129
6. Colombia <i>René de la Pedraja Toman</i>	179
7. Costa Rica <i>John A. Booth</i>	213
8. Cuba <i>Linda Fuller</i>	243
9. Dominican Republic <i>Martin F. Murphy</i>	265
10. Ecuador <i>Richard Lee Milk</i>	289
11. El Salvador <i>William Bollinger</i>	307
12. French Guiana <i>William L. Cumiford</i>	389
13. Guatemala <i>Hank Frundt and Norma Chinchilla</i>	395
14. Guyana <i>William L. Cumiford</i>	433
15. Haiti <i>Robert J. Alexander</i>	449

16. Honduras	<i>Neale J. Pearson</i>	463
17. Jamaica	<i>William L. Cumiford</i>	495
18. Mexico	<i>Rodney D. Anderson</i>	511
19. Nicaragua	<i>Richard Stahler-Sholk</i>	549
20. Panama	<i>Sharon Phillipps</i>	577
21. Paraguay	<i>Riordan Roett and Amparo Menendez-Carrión</i>	595
22. Peru	<i>William Bollinger</i>	607
23. Puerto Rico	<i>Frank P. LeVeness</i>	667
24. Suriname	<i>William L. Cumiford</i>	691
25. Uruguay	<i>Juan Rial Roade, translated by Lisa Ebener and Gerald Michael Greenfield</i>	701
26. Venezuela	<i>Steve Ellner</i>	727
APPENDIX 1: International Labor Organizations		761
APPENDIX 2: Chronologies		779
APPENDIX 3: Glossary of Terms, People, and Events		805
INDEX		831
ABOUT THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS		925

Preface

The labor movement in Latin America is more than a century old. Yet students and specialists often have to scour dozens of sources simply to acquire basic information on the history and activities of the movement's labor unions. Indeed, if one were to confine oneself to the secondary sources in the field, for many of the region's nations it would rarely be possible to identify even the principal unions. To be sure, several good historians of Latin American labor do exist, but these tend to be global rather than country specific. And even those focusing on individual nations concern themselves largely with outlining general patterns of labor development. Such mundane details as a comprehensive listing of their names and important activities—matters essential to students and scholars—remain largely uncovered. To put it baldly, Latin American labor history lacks a convenient, accessible, comprehensive reference work in English.

This book attempts to fill that gap by providing fundamental reference material on the region's most significant labor organizations. Each chapter concentrates on the history of a single nation's labor organizations. Chapters begin with general essays that place the labor movement within the context of the country's historical and sociopolitical development. Biographies on each of the nation's most important labor organizations follow, providing succinct discussions of their origins, development, and activities. Chapters also include a bibliography to provide suggestions for further study. Appendices include information on international labor organizations that have played an important role in Latin America, country-by-country time lines focusing on the development of organized labor, and a select glossary of terms and notable people.

Throughout this work, readers may note an asymmetry in coverage. Some chapters provide extensive listings of labor organizations, while others present relatively few. This same pattern appears within individual chapters, where biographies for some unions run to several pages and for others to only a few

sentences. In some cases this accurately reflects the importance of individual unions or the overall significance of organized labor within a country. Some chapter authors confronted a serious problem of selection, needing to make decisions about which organizations merited inclusion, while others wrestled with an opposite but equally difficult task, finding a sufficient number of labor unions to prepare an acceptable chapter.

But the type of coverage provided here also bespeaks the uneven development of labor history as a field of scholarly study. In general, more information exists with regard to the larger, more developed nations like Brazil and Mexico. But that pattern does not always hold true, as is indicated by the extensive listings for El Salvador. Readers should appreciate that the availability of sources also varies within countries. That is, plentiful information exists with regard to some organizations, but not to others, and the distinction does not always rest on a disparity of the relative importance of the unions in question. In a very real sense, then, this is a pioneering work, the first attempt at such a coordinated, comprehensive assessment of the development of unions in Latin America.

This book forms part of a series of reference works on labor organizations throughout the world to be published by Greenwood Press. Because of the standardized series format set by the publisher, regardless of the original national language (Spanish, French, Dutch, English, or Portuguese) biographies of individual labor organizations appear under an English name, with cross-references to the vernacular. The necessity of translating, however, creates some problems in that precise equivalents between different languages do not always exist. In Spanish, the dominant "foreign" language appearing in this book, the word *sindicato* is reserved for what the United States tradition properly terms a trade union. Many organizations, in the original Spanish, are not *sindicatos*; instead their names use the word *unión* which, as distinguished from a *sindicato*, partakes more of an associational than a strict trade union nature. Simply put, then, *sindicato* and *unión* are not perfectly synonymous. Yet in the main, chapter authors felt constrained to use them as such in translation. In turn, this produced an additional difficulty in that two names which were different in the original Spanish would translate as identical in English. To avoid confusion, therefore, chapter authors often altered syntax (e.g., workers of Colombia as opposed to Colombian workers) so as to produce different names. Latin American Spanish draws other distinctions, for example *obrero* as opposed to *trabajador* (both translated here as worker) whose rendering in English would prove cumbersome in a work of this nature.

Translation partakes more of art than of science, for the ordering and rendering of words reflect an individual, idiosyncratic appreciation for the languages involved. As such, the same Spanish name may produce several versions in translated form. For example, the Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú appears in U.S. publications as Confederation of Labor of Peru, Peruvian Confederation of Workers, Confederation of Peruvian Workers, Peruvian Confederation of Labor, as well as the version used here, Confederation of Workers of Peru.

English versions of one of the major regional organizations, the Organización Regional de Trabajadores (ORIT), include Regional Inter-American Organization of Workers, Inter-American Regional Labor Organization, and Regional Inter-American Workers Organization. Our individual chapter authors have produced translations they judged most appropriate, and we have let these stand. The surest guide for readers, and that followed by specialists in the field, is the original language or, in some special cases, like ORIT, an acronym. In this book, then, readers can find a union within a chapter or in the index by seeking its name in either the original language, its English translation, or, in some cases, by acronym. Within the individual chapter essays and biographies, an asterisk appears alongside the first citation of a labor organization to indicate that the chapter includes a biography on that particular union.

The nature of this work has mandated another organizational feature of which readers should be aware: a certain redundancy purposely built in to facilitate its use as a reference work. While the editors hope that students and researchers will read chapters in their entirety, we have had to allow for the very real possibility of persons consulting this book to secure information about one or another specific union. Therefore, each individual biography must be able to stand on its own as a separate entry. In turn, that requires repeated identification and repetition of information presented in the introductory essays as well as in the various union biographies. Inevitably, of course, some points cannot be identified adequately within the limits imposed by this form, so from time to time, the individual biographies refer readers directly to another union listing where that supplementary information finds fuller explanation. Similarly, the use of asterisks within the individual biographies to note unions that have their own individual entries will facilitate a search for additional relevant detail. Finally, the glossary might prove helpful in providing satisfactory definitions of terms encountered in the text.

In the interests of inclusiveness, the editors have used an unorthodox definition of "Latin America." Rather than adopting the traditional definition of those nations of the Americas which were colonized and remained—until independence—under the control of either Spain, Portugal, or France, we used a geographical criterion for continental Latin America and a combination of cultural factors and political interrelationships for the Caribbean. Thus, continental Latin America includes all nations from Mexico southward on the North and South American continents, including not only nations that gained their independence from Spain, Portugal, or France, but also the former colonies of Holland (Suriname) and England (Belize and Guyana) as well as one colony, French Guiana. For the Caribbean, we have included those places whose histories traditionally are taught in Latin American history surveys in the United States (Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico), as well as one whose history usually is not: Jamaica. We cover Jamaica because of its importance and because of the strong political interrelationships it has had with Latin America since the 1950s.

A project of this magnitude inevitably accumulates a large number of debts,

both scholarly and otherwise. To begin with, the editors extend their warm appreciation to the chapter authors for their solid scholarly work and willingness to respond to editorial suggestions. We also wish to express our gratitude—and apologies—to those authors who completed chapters at an early date and then with considerable patience and grace endured a long wait. At the same time, we must acknowledge the large number of scholars and specialists within the field of Latin American studies who suggested possible chapter authors and provided important encouragement to this project, as well as those whose commentary helped the chapter authors in their work. In view of the large number of individuals involved, directly acknowledging these various people would add several pages to an already massive work. The editors, therefore, on behalf of the chapter authors and themselves must remain content with noting the cooperation and helpfulness throughout the profession that facilitated the writing and editing of this book, and in this global fashion acknowledge our collective gratitude. Thanks are due as well to Greenwood Press for its strong support of this project and for its patience over its extended gestation. In this regard, we particularly wish to acknowledge Cynthia Harris, the project editor at Greenwood. Juanita Lewis' careful copy-editing saved us from many errors. The University of Wisconsin–Parkside's Committee on Research and Creative Activity provided generous support for typing the manuscript, while Josephine McCool worked long and hard at the seemingly endless stream of chapter revisions. Lisa Ebener, a Parkside senior, provided important help in translating the chapter on Uruguay. Finally, the editors express warm thanks to their spouses and families for their grace under fire throughout this project. For all these people, we hope this book provides some measure of satisfaction as a tangible product of their help and support.

Introduction ---

The earliest stage of labor development in Latin America dates to around the midpoint of the nineteenth century and witnessed the development of workers associations or societies. Mutualist in orientation, they reflected earlier forms of craft organization, notably the medieval guilds, and provided social and cultural benefits for their members. Generally absent from such associations was any strong sense of class consciousness vis-à-vis either capitalists or the state, nor did they express a sense of solidarity with a more broadly viewed working class. As such, strikes and other confrontational actions remained highly atypical, for the societies largely focused on providing protection to members and their families in the event of illness or death.

Despite the conservative nature of labor associations at that time, the ideological dimensions of labor organizing revealed a somewhat more radical bent. For where unionism was first implanted in the region, one finds the prominent role of intellectuals—largely middle class—expounding to both other members of their class and workers on the benefits of workers organizations and socialism. In writings and speeches, these early proponents of trade unionism and socialism reflected the contemporaneous writings and activities of the European labor movement. Often, in fact, they were themselves European immigrants who had participated in or observed labor's struggles firsthand.

A minor trend, though a portent for the future, was the efforts of a small number of politicians with nascent populist programs to develop working-class ties or even putative working-class parties. Their efforts came to naught in an environment where much of the working class was disfranchised and elections were more a display of supposed legitimacy and civilization than an exercise of the democratic process.

The actual organization of labor unions first occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These early unions emerged after a long compe-

tition to organize the workers by socialists, particularly those who viewed unionism as an offshoot and prop of party building; Catholic reformers, whose earliest, albeit abortive, efforts were designed to wean workers from dangerous, radical ideas; and adherents of the various forms of anarchism, especially anarcho-syndicalism. The leadership of socialist parties and incipient Catholic labor organizations was often of middle-class origins, while that of anarchism typically was composed of workers. Here again, the ideas and strategies of those attempting to gain the adherence of the working class were characteristically European imports.

The early victors in the ideological rivalry were the anarchists. By and large, they organized many of the early trade unions and labor federations. In part anarchist success was due to their leadership coming from the working class and their willingness to endure the repression endemic to early unionism. Another part of the answer is that the message of the anarchists, which eschewed both electoral politics and the pursuit of reformist legislation, seemed more to fit the reality the workers encountered than the approach of the reform socialists, whose ideas bore greater resemblance to the condition in West European countries than the Latin American nations to which they were attempting to graft them.

By the 1920s, however, adherents of Latin America's newly emerged Communist parties replaced anarchism as the dominant left-wing force in labor. After leading a series of strikes toward the end of World War I, the anarchists, along with the labor movement as a whole, faced in many Latin American countries a concerted campaign of repression, directed by the state and employer groups. The campaign included assaults by the police, massive arrests, and deportations of key foreign-born labor leaders. With the anarchist leadership of labor severely weakened by the repression, communists were able to attract adherents by pointing to what the anarchists lacked—a successful example. While the anarchists called on the workers to struggle for the new tomorrow, the communists could point to the new society in Russia as the example of what could be achieved.

Labor as a whole went into organizational decline in the 1920s. But in a number of countries a new Latin American elite, in some cases emerging from the middle class or in others better representing the aspirations of this class than their predecessors, saw the potential of labor developing the militancy and potency of its European counterparts. To undercut radicalism and to build support for their regimes from the growing proletariat, these new elite elements enacted legislation designed to provide minimal social welfare benefits for the masses. This legislation also provided protections and benefits for trade unions officially recognized by the state, a concept that usually meant trade unions that were willing to let their general policies be determined by the government or that were at least unwilling to develop strategies and tactics in conflict with state policy. To be sure, this tendency had its first manifestation earlier in Uruguay, but it was in Mexico in the 1920s and 1930s and Brazil in the 1930s that it reached its fullest expression. Nonetheless, the dominant elite response to labor

was not co-optation but repression. Still, this effort at co-optation was a harbinger of the actions of later, populist regimes.

Populism has been one of the most pervasive forces in twentieth-century Latin American political life. Whether in its democratic or authoritarian phases, the basic message, at least through the 1960s, has been the same. The nation's fundamental problems are caused by foreign domination of the economy and overdependence on commodity exports. End the domination and industrialize, and the nation will become strong and will have the wealth to take care of its social problems. Populist leaders, in attempting to cement working-class support to their movements, pounded home the message of the importance of the working class in building the new society. And they enacted social welfare legislation for favored sectors of the working class. At the same time, the populists were unable to satisfy the rising working-class expectations they had helped to create. To a considerable extent, this arose from the fact that populists attempted to reform the sociopolitical system, not radically change it.

The importance of organized labor in the body politic typically grew during populist regimes. But the failure of such regimes to satisfy the increasing expectations resulted in key portions of labor turning to more radical solutions. This radicalization heightened after the socialist revolution in Cuba.

The characteristic response to the failure of the populists to co-opt labor was authoritarian military regimes. Often backed by the United States, these military regimes sought not only to root out the threat of socialism but also to destroy the bases of support for populism and make labor quiescent. In essence, the authoritarian military regimes that overthrew populism attempted to reduce organized labor to a lobbying body, unable by law to strike and forced to accept benefits, however limited, provided by the regime.

In recent years there has been a movement away from authoritarian military regimes in Latin America. The reestablishment of civilian regimes has brought back many policies of populism. But the new regimes in nations like Argentina and Uruguay have yet to establish clearly defined policies toward organized labor.

This rapid global overview suggests the importance of several characteristics for understanding the course of organized labor in Latin America. One such feature is the strong role of authoritarian states, using various measures to repress or coerce labor, generally resulting in dependent rather than autonomous labor movements. Indeed, in several Latin American nations, labor received its definitive organization under the aegis of an authoritarian state seeking either to contain discontent, blunt challenges to its rule, or create a new, pliant constituency for supporting the regime against other power contenders. The highly politicized and, often, ideological nature of trade union development emerges as another salient characteristic. So-called bread-and-butter unionism typically formed a lesser current by contrast to the strong ties between labor organizations and political parties. In a very real sense, political parties used labor organizing

among the working class as a theater for competition. Labor organizations thus replicated that competition in their own activities, producing an organized working class that showed far more fragmentation than cohesiveness. Here, one notes the seemingly constant tension between conservative, pro-government unions, or those styled as “yellow” (referred to as *charros* in Mexico, *pelegos* in Brazil, and by other specific terms in various other countries), and those more radical or confrontationist. The latter group, however, typically split over questions of tactics and ideology. Into this already chaotic picture, the efforts of Christian-oriented unions added yet another note of diversity. Hence the search for “one big union,” a general labor central, remained an elusive goal, with rivalry among competing centrals proving by far the most common case. One final aspect of intraclass competition in the labor field relates to the role of international labor organizations, where communist, Christian, and capitalist bodies affiliated (and often sparked the formation of) rival groups. Especially following World War II and the onset of the Cold War, labor organization in Latin America became an important issue to the United States which through such organizations as the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) and Inter-American Regional Organization of Labor (ORIT) attempted to promote a “democratic” nonpolitical trade unionism as a counterpoise to leftist syndicalism (see appendix 1 for a discussion of major international organizations).

Developmental patterns common to much of Latin America also have played a formative role in structuring the labor movement. As a whole, industrialization came late, in many cases not until the 1950s, and both its depth and spread proved highly uneven. Traditional primary product export-based economies, often dominated by U.S. capital, remained the most common pattern, which in turn meant that industrial labor, in numerical terms, represented only a small fraction of the working class. An allied fact here is urban primacy, a pattern common throughout Latin America, in which one city, typically the capital, houses a disproportionate share of the national population and boasts most of the “modern” infrastructure and productive facilities. When coupled with the social organization of production in the the Latin American countryside, which witnesses an authoritarian, paternal control by large landholders over a rural proletariat, and a land tenure pattern marked by latifundia and minifundia, this has meant that much of the history of organized labor in any Latin American nation really is the history of a minority of the working class concentrated in one or a few cities. Only with the relatively recent spate of rural labor organizing has this situation begun to change. Finally, one must recognize that the powerful authoritarian state has played an important role in Latin American employment patterns in that the state bureaucracy becomes the primary national white-collar employer. These various features, albeit modified by particular national settings, receive extensive discussion within the individual country chapters.

Argentina

LISBETH HAAS

The labor movement that developed in Argentina in the late nineteenth century has been an important force in shaping the nation's political history. Since 1900 strikes have paralyzed the nation's industries and regions, and the organized working class has formed an important part of the opposition to the once politically dominant landed oligarchy and commercial bourgeoisie, and has helped to destabilize military regimes. The nation's economic and political life has long been centered around the port city of Buenos Aires. The growth of the export sector in the late nineteenth century and the rapid industrialization in the post-World War II period reinforced this centralization of national life, and produced an internal migration that formed and reshaped the working class in the port area in decisive periods of the nation's political history.

The centralization of the nation's economy around the port cities and pampas began in the late eighteenth century, when the Crown reversed its policy that had favored the colonization of Upper Peru (the principal mining center of the Spanish Colonies located in present-day Bolivia). Colonial Argentina initially developed in this upper Andean region, whose fertile valleys provided food, mules, and textiles to the mining centers. The pampas were settled as an extension of the conquest of Upper Peru; the interior dominated the economy of the coastal towns. The decline in silver production reduced Upper Peru's prominence in Spanish South America. In search of new revenue and to protect its southern access to the Atlantic, the Crown established the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata in 1776. Buenos Aires became the fiscal and administrative seat for present-day Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and part of Bolivia. Simultaneously, the development of the *saladero* (meat salting plant) and the opening of the ports of Buenos Aires to international trade severed the reliance of the coastal region on the interior.

Only a limited concept of national unity existed in Argentina between 1814,

when the region declared its independence from Spain, and 1852, when the administration of Juan Manuel de Rosas was overthrown. Rosas assumed the governorship in 1829, and in 1835 was elected formally as governor with "supreme and absolute powers." Under the political guise of regional autonomy and opposition to centralization, Rosas placed the Porteño elite (from the port city of Buenos Aires) in control of the divided nation. Civil wars grew out of regional strife, however, and the successful coup d'état against Rosas resulted from the rivalry between port cities and from the extension of cattle and sheep production in the pampas.

The 1852 coup d'état brought to power a liberal oligarchy intent on the economic modernization of the nation. National unification was attained in the following decades, while sheep production initiated the economic development of the pampas from the rudimentary production of hides, salted meat, and tallow, to a major agricultural and stock-raising area. An extermination campaign against the Araucanian Indian population in the early 1880s brought 150,000 square miles of land into agriculture production and grazing. During this decade the entire region was connected to the coastal export trade through the construction of a British railway system.

The transportation system provided the most obvious sign of the dominant position of the pampas in the modern economy, and of the subjugation of the interior to the coastal region. Sixty percent of the nation's railroad tracks were constructed within the pampas region. The tracks radiated from Buenos Aires and Rosário. Built without connecting or feeder lines, they further undermined the development of the internal market. The interior regions were relegated to the production of raw materials for the export industry. Even the factories that processed these products were predominantly located on the coast. While the railroads revived agriculture, mining, and forestry in the old colonial centers, a handful of national landowners and foreign companies monopolized the land, industry, and shipping.

By 1895 Argentina had entered the world market as a major producer of beef, mutton, wheat, and corn. Five million European immigrants, mainly from Italy and Spain, arrived in Argentina between 1869 and 1914, and in that time the nation's population rose from 1,800,000 to 8,000,000. Along the coast and in the pampas the foreign-born outnumbered native Argentines two to one; immigrants constituted three-fourths of the adult population of Buenos Aires. Many immigrants came with the intention of establishing themselves as small farmers. Instead, the majority of those who settled in the countryside found themselves relegated to tenant farming, peonage, and seasonal migratory labor. In the cities immigrant labor built the infrastructure for the export industry and sustained the processes of modernization and urbanization.

The agro-commercial oligarchy that came to power in the latter half of the nineteenth century remained the dominant political force in the nation until 1943. Resistance to their power came from the middle class and the urban and rural working class. A failed revolution by the reform-minded middle class in 1890,

led by the Civic Unity (Unión Cívica) marked the beginning of middle-class political agitation. In 1891 the Civic Union was reconstituted as the Unión Cívica Radical, or Radical Party. The Party built a broad political base and agitated for electoral reform, finally gained in the Saenz Peña law (1912) that provided for compulsory male suffrage and the secret ballot. In 1916 the Radical Party gained office under the administration of Hipólito Irigoyen. Despite three successive Radical Administrations (1916–22, 1922–28, 1928–30) and the election of Socialist Party representatives to the legislature, projects for social reform were repeatedly defeated or postponed. The brutal repression of workers during the Tragic Week (La Semana Trágica) in 1919, and the massacre of rural workers in the Patagonia in 1921, broke the weak ties that had developed between labor and the Radical Administration a decade before the Party was removed from power by a military coup d'état.

The period between the failed revolt of the Civic Union in 1890 and the opening of the electoral process in 1912 marked the formative phase of the labor movement, which was dominated by anarchists. Prior to 1890, craft-based mutual aid societies had developed to provide job, wage, and social welfare protection during the transition from artisanal to an industrial form of production. The Typographical Society of Buenos Aires* (La Sociedad Tipográfica Bonarense), founded in 1857, was the first such mutual aid society to form. Mutual aid societies, protection leagues, and generally short-lived unions grew in number during the 1880s. A new period of unionization began in 1890 with the attempt to form a labor federation to unite these organizations.

The first major federation was the Regional Argentine Labor Federation* (Federación Obrera Regional Argentino—FORA) founded in 1902. In 1905 the FORA formally declared its allegiance to anarcho-communism. Even while the majority of industrial workers remained concentrated in small shops of ten workers or less, and in unions that averaged 100 dues-paying members, federations and the use of the general strike contributed to create broad-based labor militance. Ten general strikes took place in Argentina between 1900 and 1910. Some of these paralyzed the cities of Buenos Aires and Rosario and even spread to the small urban centers. Working-class protest during this period incorporated social movements that formed outside the workplace. In 1907, for example, over 120,000 workers were involved in a rent strike in Buenos Aires that lasted for a good part of the year. Hence, while only a small percentage of the overwhelmingly immigrant working class was organized in unions prior to 1912, most had taken part in some form of collective action.

The period between 1912 and 1930 saw new sectors of the work force organized. Unions arose among white-collar and state workers, and rural and transportation workers. The transportation workers formed the most important and influential unions. The failure of a strike by The Brotherhood* (La Fraternidad) in 1912 brought that craft union of railroad engineers to support a broad-based unionization drive in the railroad industry. By the late 1920s railroad workers had won the first industry-wide contract. In 1912 workers in the coastal

trades formed the Federation of Maritime Workers* (Federación Obrera Marítima—FOM). Capable of paralyzing the export sector, the FOM used its pivotal position to support the unionization of workers in other industries. Between 1916 and 1924 over 90 percent of the FOM's strikes were called in solidarity with other workers.

Syndicalism became the most important tendency in the labor movement during this period. In 1915 the FORA reversed its adherence to anarcho-communism and assumed a syndicalist ideological stance and leadership. This majority tendency of the large labor federation became known as the FORA IX. While not discarding the general strike as a tactic, the syndicalists placed more importance on the mediation of labor conflict through official channels that brought labor, industrialists, and the government together to negotiate labor disputes. During the relatively prosperous decade of the 1920s, numerous federations were formed to unify the labor movement. The FORA IX dissolved to form the Argentine Syndical Union* (Unión Sindical Argentina—USA) and incorporate newly formed communist unions. In 1926 the railroad unions formed the Confederation of Argentine Workers* (Confederación Obrera Argentina—COA) and in 1929 communist-led unions previously affiliated with the USA formed the Committee of Class Based Trade Union Unity* (Comité de Unidad Sindical Clasista). Towards the end of the decade the USA, COA, and a number of independent unions formed the General Confederation of Labor* (Confederación General de Trabajadores—CGT), Argentina's first national central union. By 1937 the CGT incorporated over 70 percent of the nation's unions.

A period of rapid industrialization based on import substitution was initiated in 1930 in response to the economic crisis produced by the fall in demand for Argentine exports, the deterioration of the exchange rate, and the disequilibrium in the Argentine balance of payments that accompanied world depression. During the 1930s, 2,800 new factories opened annually in Argentina. World War II gave a new impetus to this industrialization; 5,000 new factories were built each year between 1940 and 1945. The value of goods produced by the industrial sector tripled between 1935 and 1945. Industry had become the leading contributor to the national income by the latter date. A significant level of foreign capital entered Argentina from continental Europe and the United States. The 1930 coup d'état had restored the political dominance of the landed oligarchy, and their policies favored foreign capital and subordinated the interests of the national industrial bourgeoisie. By 1935 foreign companies owned the majority of the large manufacturing establishments in Argentina and produced over 50 percent of the national industrial product. In contrast, national capital was invested in a multitude of small and medium enterprises. The depression and industrialization, however, produced a new climate for Argentine nationalism, which became an important political force among young military officers, the middle class, and labor.

Internal migration virtually replaced immigration after 1930. By 1947 between one-third and one-half of the working class in greater Buenos Aires was composed

of rural migrants who had established urban residence only after 1942. Following established patterns, industry was centered in the coastal region. By 1946, 57 percent of all industrial establishments and approximately 70 percent of all industrial workers were located in the capital and province of Buenos Aires.

The structure and organization of the union movement underwent major changes during the 1930s. The Communist Party led in the unionization of new sectors of the work force. Communist organizers founded industrial unions, often replacing long dominant craft-based organizations that had anarchist origins. The case of the National Federation of Construction Workers* (*Federación Obrera Nacional de la Construcción—FONC*), founded in 1936, illustrates this process. The building trades had been organized in numerous anarchist-dominated craft unions. The FONC reorganized the union locals to reflect workplace and geographic area instead of trade. By 1940 the FONC held the second highest number of union members in the nation. Communist-led unions joined the CGT in 1936. Socialists had won the leadership of the Confederation from the syndicalists in 1935, and retained control until 1943. Despite the surge of unionization led by communists and socialist party militants, and the ascension of a national labor central under the CGT, the period was marked by government repression, unemployment, and few gains for labor.

The military coup of 1943 marked the collapse of the political hegemony of the export-oriented landowning class and the commercial bourgeoisie. New alliances, forged among the working class, national industrialists, and the rural middle class, brought to power a populist government under the leadership of Juan Perón. Perón first entered the government as a member of the military junta, composed of officers with liberal and nationalist tendencies and committed to the development of a strong industrial economy within Argentina. Perón was assigned to the National Labor Department, an agency that mediated between unions and industry in labor disputes. He soon raised the Department to a Ministry, thus placing the labor bureaucracy in a central role in government. Perón used two tactics that proved decisive to build his base of support among labor. First, he attacked communism and socialism as foreign elements in the Argentine labor movement and closed the CGT No. 2 (composed of unions that favored these tendencies) as a step towards instituting a union bureaucracy that supported his policies. Second, he extended sustained support for the unionization of large sectors of the urban and rural working class, courted labor leaders, and encouraged strikes aimed at union recognition and the implementation of labor laws. After 1944 he supported the formation of parallel unions in industries that had socialist and communist leadership. The formation and rapid growth of the Association of Textile Workers* (*Asociación Obrera Textil—AOT*) is a case in point. Within six months after its formation in 1945 the union had 80,000 members, reducing the once large membership of the older Textile Workers Union* (*Unión de Obreros Textil—UOT*) to 7,000 members. Perón actively supported the formation of a labor bureaucracy that would work closely with the government. He built a strong following among the leadership of the CGT,

who formed the Labor Party (Partido Laborista) in 1945 and chose Perón as the party's presidential candidate. Perón's administration lasted from 1946 until 1955, and helped set in motion forces that still affect labor and industrial relations in Argentina.

Perón built an ample basis of popular support among the working class; the nation's gross national product was redistributed favorably among the working class through increased wages and social welfare benefits. Labor legislation was introduced that extended protection to the vast majority of Argentine workers. In 1944 Perón established a special Women's Division of Labor and Assistance that developed protective legislation for women workers and promoted a policy of equal pay for equal work. Women were politically mobilized in the Peronist Women's Party, and female suffrage was extended in 1951. Perón nationalized the telephones, gasworks, and railroads in the early years of his administration. In 1949 social welfare legislation was passed that amended the 1853 constitution. Neighborhood centers, or *unidades básicas*, were formed throughout Argentina to provide social services, cultural, and political programs at the local level.

This social revolution that occurred during the early years of Perón's administration was closely associated with the figure of Perón, who built a military and labor bureaucracy that supported his policies. Perón established a mixed economy governed by capitalist relations of production but including a strong public sector. The pace of economic growth began to slow after 1949, wages began to decline, and union autonomy was further restricted. The CGT received broad powers to intervene in unions and to replace their leadership; strikes had to be approved by the government; and national labor contracts were drawn up between business, the national government, and a centralized and increasingly subordinate union bureaucracy. In 1949 Perón formed the Peronist Party (Partido Peronista), and the CGT became its most important branch. Wildcat strikes were called more frequently after this date, as rank-and-file discontent with the union bureaucracy increased. By 1955, shortly before Perón was overthrown by a military coup, fifty-six labor leaders wrote a manifesto protesting the government's centralizing tendencies and calling for union autonomy. Labor's increasing disaffection with the labor policies of the Perón government never consolidated into a coherent opposition, but it did contribute to weaken the Peronist coalition.

The social pact between Perón and the nationalist sectors of the bourgeoisie, in alliance with organized labor, also began to weaken during the early 1950s, largely as a result of the economic crisis. Foreign capital continued to have a central place in the industrial sector, and inflation increased dramatically. The opposition to Perón within the oligarchy and military received strength as a result of the conflict between Perón and the Catholic Church. In 1954 Perón accused the Church of interference with the political process and enacted a series of anti-Catholic reforms that generated opposition among the Catholic laity. Perón convened a constitutional convention to reform the constitution and separate church and state, suppress religious education, legalize divorce, and give equal rights

to illegitimate children. The coup d'état that overthrew Perón in 1955 called itself the Liberating Revolution (Revolución Libertador) and presented itself as the standard-bearer of tradition, democracy, and Christianity.

The military administration established in 1955 was intent on eliminating the influence of the labor bureaucracy established by Perón and decreasing the political strength of labor in government. Military interveners were placed in the CGT (the Confederation did not regain full legal status until 1963), and Peronist political parties were outlawed. The resistance that followed the coup was aimed at the restoration of Peronist doctrines of social reform and the return to full trade union autonomy. Peronist union leaders, despite the intervention of the CGT and the incidence of exile or imprisonment, retained key posts in the unions, in tacit alliance with the communists. The number of strikes increased in the late 1950s. Rural guerrilla movements began in 1959, and urban guerrilla movements were organized in the early 1960s. Until the late 1960s the labor movement was divided largely between those who supported the political leadership of Perón and those who wanted social and workplace reform without Perón's leadership. However, revolutionary tendencies progressively gained support within the political opposition until Perón's return from exile in 1973.

The longest and most sustained period of political resistance began in 1966. Strikes were organized in the wake of government fiscal policies that devalued the peso, froze wages, and skyrocketed prices, while giving free reign to U.S. corporations in Argentine industry and the domestic market. By 1970 principal industries, such as meat packing and shipping, were in crisis; the peso was devalued drastically in what would be the first of a succession of major devaluations; and rampant inflation consumed the salaries of the middle and working class. Professionals and the middle class joined workers in social protest. The *Montoneros* became the largest organization of the left-wing Peronist opposition. They organized workers from all sectors of industry, slum dwellers, and women and formed neighborhood centers (*unidades básicas*), in the Peronist tradition of establishing a local basis of power in the community.

The military, in an attempt to end the political strife that was bringing the country to the point of civil war, brought Perón back from exile in 1973. Perón died the following year. Isabel Perón, his second wife, then took over and remained in the presidency until 1976, when her administration was overthrown by a military coup d'état. During the Perón's administration, their populist rhetoric brought promises of social change, while they fortified the union bureaucracy and increased repression against the left-wing and independent sectors of the labor movement.

The military dictatorship that overthrew the presidency of Isabel Perón ruled the country between 1976 and 1983. It closed the CGT, intervened in the most important unions, and supported full-scale repression against democratic and left-wing militants and citizens alike. While the resistance of organized labor brought death or exile, workers continued to strike. The first major strike, led by the electrical workers in 1977, initiated a wave of strike action that involved

hundreds of thousands of workers. In 1979 a general strike was called; in 1981 a second general strike took place. The strikes were an important destabilizing force for the military government. Moreover, unable to stabilize the economy, the military failed to generate popular support among the middle class. In a last attempt to gain support through an appeal to Argentine nationalism, the government took over the Malvinas Islands (called the Falklands by the British) in 1982, an act that began a war with England. Argentina lost the war, which so severely damaged the military's prestige that a civilian government was allowed to return to power in 1983.

Under the presidency of Luis Alfonsín, the nation entered a period of democratization. However, Argentina's economy continues in crisis, burdened by an exorbitant foreign debt, a weak national market, decades of inflation and devaluation, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressure to impose severe restrictions on national expenditure for social welfare and reform programs. The CGT retains an entrenched union bureaucracy, and the rank and file face the need to sustain their industries from economic collapse. Argentina is engaged in a process of national reevaluation; the influence of this process on the labor movement will become clear over the course of time.

Bibliography

- Abos, Alvaro. *La Columna Vertebral, Sindicatos y Peronismo*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Legasa, 1982.
- Bayer, Osvaldo. *La Patagonia Rebelde*. Mexico: Editorial Neuva Imágen, 1980.
- del Campo, Hugo. *Sindicalismo y Peronismo, Los Comienzos de un Vínculo Perdurable*. Buenos Aires: Consejo Latino-americano de Ciencias Sociales, 1983.
- Erickson, Kenneth, Patrick Peppe, and Hobart Spalding. "Research on the Urban Working Class and Organized Labor in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: What Is Left To Be Done?" *Latin American Research Review* 9, no. 2 (Spring 1974): 115-42.
- González, Senen. *El Sindicalismo Despues de Perón*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1971.
- Hodges, Donald Clark. *Argentina, 1943-1976: The National Revolution and Resistance*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976.
- Scobie, James R. *Argentina: A City and a Nation*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Spalding, Hobart. *La Clase Trabajadora Argentina, Documentos Para Su Historia, 1890-1912*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1970.
- . *Organized Labor in Latin America*. New York: Harper and Row, 1977.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

AGRARIAN FEDERATION OF ARGENTINA (Federación Agraria Argentina).

Formed in 1912, the Federation was organized in the midst of a wave of farm labor strikes. The strikes were called by tenant farmers against the contract

system and the high rental price of land. The strikes began in Alcorta, Santa Fé, and spread throughout the entire cereal region. The Federation dissolved shortly after the military repressed the region's strike activity in the 1940s.

AOT. *See* Association of Textile Workers.

ARGENTINE SYNDICAL UNION (Unión Sindical Argentine—USA).

Formed in 1922, the Argentine Syndical initially federated primarily unions that had been affiliated with the Regional Argentine Labor Federation* (FORA IX). Unions with a socialist and communist orientation were united by the USA; however, syndicalism remained the dominant tendency in the Union's leadership. The USA was the first federation to promote the industrial as opposed to the craft union. In 1929 the Union of Argentine Trade Unions dissolved to form part of the General Confederation of Labor* (CGT). In May of 1937 the USA was reformed by syndicalist unions who had left the CGT. It remained an important minority force within the union movement for a number of years. Its principal strength came from the maritime workers and the telephone employees. In 1946 the syndicalist tendency within these unions had diminished, and most affiliates joined the CGT.

ARGENTINE WORKERS COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS (Comité Obrero Argentino de Sindicatos Independientes—COASI).

The Committee was formed in 1945 by socialist and independent unions antagonistic to the leadership and policies of Juan Perón that between 1943 and 1945 had come to define the direction of the CGT, Argentina's largest labor confederation (see General Confederation of Labor). Perón was one of the young army officers that entered the military government during the 1943 coup d'état. As head of the National Labor Department he immediately opposed socialist and communist union leadership and began to establish a union bureaucracy that would support his own pro-union and nationalist labor reform policies. The Argentine Workers Committee of Independent Unions was backed by the AFL—CIO, which had broken relations with the CGT in 1944. Perón closed the Committee in 1949. It moved its operations to Montevideo, where it continued to organize the "democratic" forces within the Argentine labor movement. Funded heavily by the United States, the Committee generated voluminous propaganda against Perón and supported anti-Peronist forces in the 1955 coup d'état that removed Perón during his second term as president of Argentina.

ASOCIACIÓN OBRERA TEXTIL. *See* Association of Textile Workers.

ASSOCIATION OF TEXTILE WORKERS (Asociación Obrera Textil—AOT).

The Association of Textile Workers was formed in 1945 as a parallel union in the textile industry. Parallel unions were established in industries that had strong unions with a socialist or communist leadership after 1944, as part of

Juan Perón's policy of creating a union bureaucracy closely tied to his policies and objectives. As head of the National Labor Department, Perón was able to extend protection and promises to workers who joined the parallel unions, and most experienced rapid growth. In less than six months, the Association of Textile Workers had 80,000 members, reducing the older Textile Workers Union (Unión de Obreros Textil) to a membership of 7,000. From its inception, the Association espoused the policies of the government. The Association of Textile Workers remained strongly Peronist in tendency and maintained a membership of over 100,000 well into the 1960s.

BAKERY WORKERS RESISTANCE SOCIETY (Sociedad de Resistencia de Obreros Panaderos).

The Bakery Workers Resistance Society was formed in 1885; the Italian anarchist Enrique Malatesta drew up its declaration of principles. The Society was Argentina's first militant trade union and was an inspiration for other such organizations that developed throughout the country between 1885 and 1895. In 1894 the Society began to publish *The Bakery Worker (El Obrero Panadero)*, one of the many newspapers published by the anarchist trade union press in the late nineteenth century.

THE BROTHERHOOD (La Fraternidad).

Founded in 1887, this union of locomotive engineers and firemen was influenced by the international efforts of an American counterpart, the Brotherhood of Labor. The union early functioned as a mutual aid society; it charged high dues while it achieved good pay and working conditions for its members. Between 1887 and 1914 The Brotherhood grew to be one of the largest unions in the country, enrolling over 7,000 dues-paying members. It had a militant labor policy and conducted numerous strikes; however, The Brotherhood did not adhere to the anarchist tradition that predominated in the labor movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In 1912, after the failure of a major strike, The Brotherhood began to help organize other workers in the industry. In 1926 The Brotherhood formed the Confederation of Argentine Workers* together with the Railroad Workers Union.* The Confederation was disbanded in 1930 to form the General Confederation of Labor,* a national labor central. While The Brotherhood favored the nationalization of the railroads by Perón's administration in 1948, it continued to demand union autonomy and protested the control exerted by the Peronist union bureaucracy over the labor movement. The Brotherhood has remained an important force in the labor movement. The union's tradition of autonomy and conservative leadership placed it in opposition to Peronist leadership of the CGT after the 1955 coup d'état against Perón.

CGT. *See* General Confederation of Labor.

COA. *See* Confederation of Argentine Workers.

COASI. *See* Argentine Workers Committee of Independent Unions.

COMITÉ DE UNIDAD SINDICAL CLASISTA. *See* Committee of Class-Based Trade Union Unity.

COMITÉ OBRERO ARGENTINO DE SINDICATOS INDEPENDIENTES. *See* Argentine Workers Committee of Independent Unions.

COMMITTEE OF CLASS-BASED TRADE UNION UNITY (Comité de Unidad Sindical Clasista).

Formed in 1929, the Committee of Class-Based Union Unity was composed of unions that had a communist leadership or affiliation. These unions left the Argentine Syndical Union* in 1929, shortly before the latter disbanded to form the General Confederation of Labor* (CGT). During the 1930s the Communist Party led in the organizing of new sectors of the work force and developed unions with an industrial structure among workers who had traditionally been organized along craft union lines. In a moderate united front policy, the Committee disbanded in 1936 to form part of the CGT.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* General Confederation of Labor.

CONFEDERACIÓN OBRERA ARGENTINA. *See* Confederation of Argentine Workers.

CONFEDERATION OF ARGENTINE WORKERS (Confederación Obrera Argentina—COA).

Founded in 1926 by The Brotherhood,* the union of railroad engineers and firemen established in the late nineteenth century, and the Railroad Workers Union, an industrial union that incorporated railroad workers from virtually every job category on the railways, the Confederation also incorporated the Municipal Workers Union and smaller affiliates of socialist orientation. COA was the largest and most influential of the confederations that existed between 1926 and 1930. It was able to gain substantial wage increases and benefits for its member unions primarily through the dominant position of the large and strong railroad unions. The Confederation dissolved to form part of the General Confederation of Labor in 1930.

CONGRESO OBRERO REGIONAL ARGENTINO. *See* Regional Argentine Labor Congress.

CONSTRUCTION LABOR UNION OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. *See* National Federation of Construction Workers.

CORA. *See* Regional Argentine Labor Congress.

FE. *See* Federation of Longshoremen.

LA FEDERACIÓN. *See* The Federation.

FEDERACIÓN AGRARIA ARGENTINA. *See* Agrarian Federation of Argentina.

FEDERACIÓN DE ASOCIACIONES CATÓLICAS DE EMPLEADOS. *See* Federation of Catholic Employees Association.

FEDERACIÓN DE CÍRCULOS CATÓLICOS DE OBREROS. *See* Federation of Catholic Employees Association.

FEDERACIÓN DE ESTIBADORES. *See* Federation of Longshoremen.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA DE LA ALIMENTACIÓN. *See* Food Workers Federation.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA DE LA INDUSTRIA TEXTIL. *See* Textile Workers Union.

LA FEDERACIÓN OBRERA DE RÍO GALLEGOS. *See* Workers Federation of Río Gallegos.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA FERROCARRILERA. *See* Federation of Railroad Workers.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA MARÍTIMA. *See* Federation of Maritime Workers.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA NACIONAL DE LA CONSTRUCCIÓN. *See* National Federation of Construction Workers.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA POLIGRÁFICA ARGENTINA. *See* Federation of Argentine Typesetters.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA REGIONAL ARGENTINO. *See* Regional Argentine Labor Federation.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA TUCUMANA DE LA INDUSTRIAL AZUCARERA.
See Federation of Sugar Workers of Tucumán.

THE FEDERATION (La Federación).

First projected in 1890 by unions that had a predominantly socialist orientation, The Federation marked a new stage in the labor movement in Argentina. Four distinct attempts to unite the unions of the country under The Federation occurred between 1890 and 1900. The first congress met in 1891. The plan of the congress was to formulate a program that would be analogous to the workers parties in Europe. The first Federation ceased to function towards the end of 1892. The Federation reemerged in 1894 with an anarchist orientation. The 1894 Federation, like those that emerged in 1896 and again in 1900, was relatively short-lived.

FEDERATION OF ARGENTINE TYPESETTERS (Federación Obrera Poligráfica Argentina—FOPA).

Founded sometime between 1906 and 1916, the Federation of Argentine Typesetters was socialist in tendency but incorporated many anarchist unions that had developed among this highly skilled group of workers during the nineteenth century. By the 1920s the typesetters had received substantial wage and work benefits. The Federation was an important force in building the labor movement. In 1929 it called a meeting with the major labor confederations to form a united confederation and bring greater unity to the Argentine labor movement. *See* General Confederation of Labor.

FEDERATION OF CATHOLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (Federación de Asociaciones Católicas de Obreros).

Founded in 1895, the Federation of Catholic Employees Association was formed to guide and coordinate the activity of the Catholic workers circles, first established in Buenos Aires in 1892. It was organized by German immigrants who had been involved in the Catholic social movement in Europe. Between 1892 and 1895 the Catholic workers circles developed in many of the neighborhoods of Buenos Aires and in the interior provinces. The circles acted as mutual aid societies and provided instruction to children and professional classes to workers. They were politically conservative, and opposed to the anarchist and socialist movements prevalent during this period. In 1898 they held their first congress. Between 1902 and 1908 the Democratic Christian League (La Liga Democrática Cristiana), the Federation's political arm, worked on labor legislation and the organization of rural cooperatives.

FEDERATION OF LONGSHOREMEN (Federación de Estibadores).

The Federation of Longshoremen was founded in 1891, when labor unions of the ports established contacts with each other. The majority of the unions that adhered to the Federation were anarchist in tendency, and the leadership remained predominantly anarchist well into the 1940s. The Federation was an active mem-

ber of the Regional Argentine Labor Federation.* In 1904 the Federation of Longshoremen held a regional congress that was attended by members of twelve Argentine and Uruguayan port workers unions. The Federation also maintained contact with Brazilian dockers. Union representatives from these three countries signed a solidarity pact pledging reciprocal action during strikes. In 1906 sixteen Argentine ports had longshoremen's unions affiliated with the Federation. The Federation remained a stronghold of independent and anarchist tendencies within the labor movement; it resisted the labor movement dominance of Juan Perón, populist president of Argentina between 1946 and 1955. In 1950 the port and maritime workers struck for six weeks before retreating in the face of official pressure. The longshoremen continued to be tenaciously resistant to government control of their unions.

FEDERATION OF MARITIME WORKERS (Federación Obrera Marítima—FOM).

Founded in 1910, the Federation of Maritime Workers was syndicalist in tendency. The railroad workers and the maritime workers could paralyze the export trade, Argentina's chief source of revenue. The maritime workers used their pivotal position in the nation's economy to lend support to the labor movement. A militant organization, the Federation engaged in constant strikes between 1916 and 1924. Over 90 percent of the Federation's strikes during this period were called in solidarity with other workers. The Federation grouped together the unions of workers engaged in various aspects of trade along the coast, such as those of oar boat crews and of workers engaged in other port activities. The Federation of Maritime Workers was the backbone of the Regional Argentine Labor Federation* (FORA IX) and, later, of the Argentine Trade Union Unity, a Federation that developed out of the FORA IX. The Federation of Maritime Workers demonstrated strong solidarity with workers in the interior, supporting, for example, the general strikes called by workers in the Patagonia in 1920 and 1921. The Federation commonly used the boycott as a tactic to aid the labor struggles of workers in other industries.

FEDERATION OF RAILROAD WORKERS (Federación Obrera Ferrocarrilera—FOF).

Founded in 1912, the union was one of the better organized independent unions common among the railroad workers. The union was first organized when a major strike of the railway engineers failed, causing the long established union, The Brotherhood,* to aid in the organizing of other sectors of the industry. The Federation of Railroad Workers sustained strong and effective strikes and organizing drives during World War I. In 1920 the Union's craft-based locals reorganized to form the Union of Workshops (Sindicato de Talleres), making a major step in the process of building an industry-wide union, finally realized with the formation of the Railroad Workers Union* (Unión Ferroviaria) in 1922.

FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS OF TUCUMAN (*Federación Obrera Tucumana de la Industria Azucarera—FOTIA*).

The Federation of Sugar Workers of Tucumán was founded during a major strike of sugar workers that occurred in 1944. The strike was strongly supported by Juan Perón, then head of the National Labor Department, who subsequently encouraged the union's leaders to form a federation and coordinate strike activity throughout the northern sugar region. Despite the Federation's strong links to Peronist labor policies, the workers engaged in a major, unauthorized strike in 1949. In 1962, 50,000 workers remained within the Federation, constituting an important force in the Peronist bloc of the General Confederation of Labor.*

FEDERATION OF WORKERS IN THE MEAT INDUSTRY (*Federación Obrera de la Industria de Carne*).

The Federation of Workers in the Meat Industry was founded in 1930 by organizers from the Communist Party. Predominantly anarchist unions were active in the meat industry prior to the beginning of large-scale, foreign-dominated import-substitution industrialization in meat processing. A major strike of the meat workers in 1936 significantly enlarged the size of the union, and gave impetus to the formation of other unions in the food processing industry. See *Food Workers Federation*.

FEDERATION OF WORKERS IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY (*Federación Obrera de la Industria Textil*). *See* *Textile Workers Union*.

FOF. *See* *Federation of Railroad Workers*.

FOM. *See* *Federation of Maritime Workers*.

FONC. *See* *National Federation of Construction Workers*.

FOOD WORKERS FEDERATION (*Federación Obrera de la Alimentación*).

Founded in 1937, the Food Workers Federation was organized during a strike called by the Federation of Workers in the Meat Industry.* The food industry was one of the most important industries in Argentina's process of import-substitution industrialization that began during the 1930s. The Federation was initially dominated by communist leadership, as were many unions that formed during the 1930s. Union organizers closely affiliated with the populist politics of Juan Perón took over the leadership of the unions within the Federation during the 1940s.

FOPA. *See* *Federation of Argentine Typesetters*.

FORA. *See* *Regional Argentina Labor Federation*.

FOTIA. *See* Federation of Sugar Workers of Tucumán.

LA FRATERNIDAD. *See* The Brotherhood.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (Confederación General de Trabajadores—CGT).

Founded in 1930, the General Confederation of Labor was the first central labor confederation in Argentina, and since the late 1930s it has represented the vast majority of the nation's unions. The call to build the Confederation came from the Federation of Argentine Typesetters* in 1929. The two largest labor federations then, the Confederation of Argentine Workers* and the Argentine Syndical Union,* dissolved to form the CGT. Because of the military coup that overthrew the liberal government of Hipólito Irigoyen (president of Argentina, 1916–22 and 1928–30), the CGT did not hold its first convention until 1935; prior to that date syndicalists dominated the National Labor Committee. Tensions between the socialist and syndicalist leadership brought a split in the Confederation in 1935. Socialists gained dominance and retained their position in the union leadership until 1943. Between 1935 and 1937 the CGT was divided into two factions: CGT-Catamarca and CGT-Independiente. CGT-Catamarca represented unions with a syndicalist tendency. In 1937 this minority tendency within the CGT disbanded to reconstitute the Argentine Syndical Union. The communist unions abandoned the Committee of Class-Based Trade Union Unity* in 1936 to join the CGT, making it the largest confederation in Argentina.

In 1943 the Confederation split into two tendencies: CGT No. 1 and CGT No. 2. The former was composed of unions that had traditionally remained independent of political affiliation and included the large Railroad Workers Union. CGT No. 2 incorporated unions whose first loyalty was to the Socialist or Communist Party. The most important of these were the unions of commercial employees, the municipal workers, the printers, and state and construction workers. The military government that was established after the 1943 coup d'état declared CGT No. 2 illegal shortly after its formation. This act was part of a new labor politics being formulated under the direction of Juan Perón, part of the military junta and head of the National Labor Department between 1943 and 1945.

In 1944 Perón began to encourage the formation of parallel unions in industries with strong communist or socialist unions. Simultaneously, he supported the unionization of unorganized workers. In 1945 trade unions gained recognition under the law. The union with the single largest membership was recognized as the official bargaining agent of the workers. In practice, Perón recognized only those unions that were allied to his policies. Labor leaders who opposed Perón were exiled or jailed.

By 1945 the CGT was under Peronist leadership. The CGT remained dominated by Peronist leadership thereafter, despite minority opposition to Peronism within the Confederation. In October of 1946 the leadership of the CGT formed

the Argentine Labor Party (Partido Laborista Argentino). Perón was the party's presidential candidate and won the presidency. Between 1946 and 1955 national unions were increasingly subordinated to the centralized CGT leadership. The Confederation was given the right to intervene in union affiliates, to remove their leaders and replace them with appointed individuals. In 1950 the CGT became the most important branch of the recently formed Peronist Party (Partido Peronista).

In 1955, at the time of the military coup d'état against Perón, the CGT had a membership of three million. Approximately 70 percent of the union membership strongly identified with the person and policies of Perón. The divided opposition counted approximately 500,000 workers. The military government attempted to eradicate the Peronist leadership within the CGT, but without success. In 1958 the Frondizi government (1958–62), elected with Peronist votes, allowed the Confederation to hold a convention to elect new leadership. A broad cleavage developed in which two blocs formed: Bloc 62 represented unions with Peronist affiliation, and Bloc 32 was composed of unions that were non-Peronist. Unions of a predominantly communist tendency eventually split off from the two blocs and formed Bloc 19. Each bloc initially represented the number of affiliated unions and federations.

Despite the opening provided by the Frondizi government, the leadership structure of the CGT was not formally reconstituted until 1961, and the Confederation was only restored to full legal status in 1963, under an agreement that purported to assure the restoration of union autonomy. However, the agreement specified that Peronist-oriented unions and independent unions were to have equal representation in union bureaucracy. Communist-oriented unions were restricted from participation in the leadership.

The struggles within the CGT during the 1960s took place around the question of union leadership. The Peronists continued to represent the majority tendency within the Confederation. In 1968 the Confederation split into two groups, both of which represented distinct branches within the Peronist tradition. The CGT–Paseo Colón formed in opposition to the dominant tendency represented by CGT–Azopardo; the latter hoped for legal recognition and eschewed direct control of the Confederation by Perón from Madrid. Perón's return from exile and assumption of the presidency in 1973 reinforced the strength of an entrenched labor bureaucracy. After the military coup d'état against the government of his wife and successor, Isabel Perón (1974–76), the CGT was outlawed and the principal unions were intervened by the military. The two factions that formed the "CGT de la resistencia" (of the resistance) openly reappeared in 1981 as CGT (of Brazil, "de Brasil," later of the Argentine Republic, "de la Republica Argentina") and CGT de Azopardo, despite continued legal suppression of the Confederation. By 1983 the two factions had cooperated in two general strikes and were moving towards unity.

GENERAL UNION OF WORKERS (Unión General de Trabajadores—UGT).

The General Union of Workers was formed in 1902 by unions of socialist,

syndicalist, and independent tendencies that withdrew from the Regional Federation of Argentine Workers.* Socialists initially dominated the UGT leadership. A schism grew between the socialist and syndicalist leadership. In 1906 the socialist union affiliates withdrew from the federation. The UGT syndicalist leadership continued to attempt to form a federation that would unify workers across ideological tendencies. In 1909 the UGT was dissolved to form a broader based labor federation, the Regional Congress of Argentine Workers.*

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF CONSTRUCTION WORKERS (Federación Obrera Nacional de la Construcción—FONC).

Founded in 1936, the National Federation of Construction Workers was the most important union under communist leadership that developed during the 1930s. The growth of the union accounted for 58 percent of the total growth of unions between 1938 and 1941. By 1941 the union had 40,000 affiliated members and was second only to the Railroad Workers Union* in number of affiliates. At its inception, the Federation incorporated trade unions that had a long history of anarchist affiliation and leadership. The union grew by incorporating thousands of previously unorganized workers. The organizational nucleus of the Federation was the Union of Building, Cement, and Excavation Workers* organized in 1935 under Communist Party leadership.

Unlike the trade federation, the FONC was organized along industrial principles. It incorporated workers occupied in all sectors of the construction trade and those engaged in the extraction and preparation of material for the construction industry. The union locals were organized according to workplace or geographic area. The industry-wide local of construction workers was prevalent in Buenos Aires by 1938; however, the old division of workers by trade reappeared to a large degree within the locals.

The FONC carried on some of the most important strikes that were organized between 1936 and 1943. In the latter years there were series of strikes, supported by the National Labor Department, to encourage unionization. In 1941 the Federation drew up a plan which emphasized the development and enforcement of industry-wide regulatory laws and demanded negotiations with the government over the rights of the unemployed. Together with other unions affiliated with or led by Communist and Socialist Party members, the National Federation of Construction Workers formed part of CGT No. 2 in 1943 (see General Confederation of Labor).

The Federation was the subject of persecution after the military took power in 1943. Between 1943 and 1945, 1,200 of the Federation's militants were put in jail, and 130 locals were closed. A parallel union of Peronist tendency was founded in September of 1943, and by 1946 the Peronist Construction Labor Union of the Argentine Republic (Unión Obrera de la Construcción de la República Argentina) had 36,000 affiliated members while the FONC retained 58,000 members. The National Federation of Construction Workers was one of the unions that proved most resistant to the influence of Perón. The Federation

continued to hold militant strikes during the Peronist administration. In 1951 the government intervened and suppressed the union leadership. The Communist Party retained an important basis of support in the FONC after 1955.

RAILROAD WORKERS UNION (Unión Ferroviaria—UF).

Founded in 1922, the Union incorporated the majority of railroad workers, some of whom had been previously organized through the Railroad Workers Confederation (Confederación Ferrocarrilera, 1902–1908), the Railroad Workers League (Liga Ferroviaria, 1909–1916), the Railroad Workers Federation (Federación Obrera Ferrocarrilera, 1912–1920), and the Union of Workshops (Sindicatos de Talleres, 1920–1922). The Railroad Workers Union (UF) was the first and largest union to organize along industrial principles in the 1920s. It represented all railroad workers excluded from The Brotherhood,* a craft-based union of railroad engineers and firemen.

The Railroad Workers Union adhered to a nonrevolutionary syndicalist position. The union established commissions that included company representatives, governmental representatives, and workers to solve labor conflict. The union long boasted the single largest membership of any Argentine labor union, ranging from between 50,000 members in the late 1920s to 150,000 members in 1950. The workers represented all political affiliations. In 1943 the Railroad Workers Union formed part of CGT No. 1, which remained independent of political parties (see General Confederation of Labor). During the 1940s and 1950s the leadership of the UF was divided between liberal leaders who demanded union autonomy from government direction or interference and those who supported the close ties formed between the unions and the government of Juan Perón (1946–55).

The rank and file of the union remained strong advocates of union autonomy. During a strike in 1950–51, the rank-and-file members of the union formed an Emergency Committee to supersede the union leadership. The workers organized a strike that was declared illegal; the CGT intervened in the union and Perón drafted the workers into the army, thereby forcing them back to work. In the decades subsequent to 1955, Peronist and anti-Peronist tendencies vied for union leadership. The anti-Peronist opposition was divided between liberals and Communist Party members.

REGIONAL ARGENTINE LABOR CONGRESS (Congreso Obrero Regional Argentino—CORA).

Founded in 1909, the Regional Congress of Argentine Workers represented one of a succession of attempts to unite the labor movement across ideological tendencies. Forty-eight unions participated in the first convention, held in September 1909. The majority of these unions were led by syndicalists and had belonged to the General Union of Workers.* In forming the Regional Congress, the syndicalist unions were joined by some anarchist unions formerly federated under the Regional Federation of Argentine Workers* (FORA) and independent

unions. Under the syndicalist principles of the Regional Congress, each union had complete liberty to adhere to a particular ideological tendency. The syndicalist leadership of the Regional Congress had an important influence on the ascension of syndicalism as a tendency in the Argentine labor movement. In 1914 the Regional Congress of Argentine Workers voted to join the FORA. Upon the entrance of the syndicalists into the FORA, the latter changed its ideological stance and assumed a syndicalist position.

REGIONAL ARGENTINE LABOR FEDERATION (Federación Obrera Regional Argentina—FORA).

Founded in 1901, the Regional Argentine Labor Federation remained the single most important federation of workers to 1922. At its Fifth Congress, convened in 1905, the unions within the Federation voted fifty to two in favor of adherence to anarcho-communist principles. Between 1901 and 1915 the growth of the Federation reflected the dominance of anarchism in the Argentine trade union movement. In 1915, at the Ninth Congress, the Federation rejected its earlier adherence to anarchism in favor of revolutionary syndicalism, a policy change that reflected the ascension of syndicalist leadership and principles in the Argentine labor movement. Fifteen unions left the FORA IX (FORA of the Ninth Congress) in 1915, and remained federated as the FORA V, in allegiance to the anarcho-communist principles declared during the Fifth Congress. In 1922 the FORA IX disbanded to form the Argentine Syndical Union* and incorporated unions that had a communist leadership. FORA V remained the longtime representative of anarchism in the Argentine labor movement until outlawed in 1946. The Federation never affiliated with the General Confederation of Labor.*

In 1905 the FORA had more unions than any other federation in Argentina, with forty-one union affiliates and five regional federations. FORA received its greatest support from artisans who worked in small firms, in close personal contact with their employers. Its most important affiliates prior to World War I were craft unions, including dockworkers, tailors, cigar workers, shed workers, shoemakers, bakers, carpenters, and tanners. To 1912, the great majority of the general strikes that took place in Argentina were led and widely supported by the FORA.

In 1915 the FORA adopted a revolutionary syndicalist position that prohibited the Federation to adhere to any single ideology. FORA IX formulated a “workers politics” that involved the mediation of labor conflict through political bargaining. At its inception, FORA IX contained mostly craft unions, but under the conditions of rapid industrialization during World War I the Federation expanded to include industrial and rural workers and made temporary alliances with tenant farmers. In 1918 FORA IX had 350 affiliated groups; the membership doubled by 1922, when the federation had 734 union affiliates. FORA IX formed a broader coalition of unions in 1922, by incorporating unions of a communist tendency, and changed its name to the Argentine Syndical Union.*

The unions that adhered to the anarcho-communist tradition remained orga-

nized in the FORA V. The Federation declined in importance in the labor movement between 1915 and 1946. The most important unions within the Federation during that period were the Federation of Ship Builders, the Union of Hotel and Restaurant Workers, the Plumbers Union, and the Taxi-Drivers Union of Buenos Aires. In 1946 the FORA was driven underground and ceased to play any significant role in the Argentine labor movement.

SINDICATO DE OBREROS ALBAÑILES, CEMENTO ARMADO Y ANEXOS. *See* Union of Building, Cement, and Excavation Workers.

SINDICATO OBRERO DE LA INDUSTRIA METALÚRGICA. *See* Union of Workers in the Metallurgic Industry.

SINDICATOS DE TALLERES (Union of Workshops). *See* Federation of Railroad Workers.

SINDICATO ÚNICO DE OBRERA EN MADERA. *See* Sole Union of Wood Workers.

SOCIEDAD DE RESISTENCIA DE OBREROS PANADEROS. *See* Bakery Workers Resistance Society.

LA SOCIEDAD OBRERA DE RÍO GALLEGOS (Labor Society of Río Gallegos). *See* Workers Federation of Río Gallegos.

SOCIEDAD TIPOGRÁFICA BONARENSE. *See* Typographical Society of Buenos Aires.

SOIM. *See* Union of Workers in the Metallurgic Industry.

SOLE UNION OF WOOD WORKERS (Sindicato Único de Obrera en Madera).

Founded in 1930, the union incorporated workers from diverse occupations within the wood industry. The communist organizers had initially formed the Union of Workers in the Furniture Industry (Sindicato Obrero de la Industria del Mueble) earlier in the year. Prior to 1930, workers in this industry had been organized into predominantly anarchist (and a minority of socialist) craft-based unions. The Sole Union of Wood Workers was successful at establishing industrial unions and remained under communist leadership to the mid-1940s. As a result of a major strike conducted during 1934–35, the union was one of the first to achieve the forty-hour week.

TEXTILE WORKERS UNION (Unión de Obreros Textil—UOT).

The Textile Workers Union was formed in 1930 under socialist leadership. In 1933 communist organizers formed the rival Federation of Workers in the

Textile Industry. In 1936 that Federation fused with the Textile Workers Union, and within two years communists dominated the leadership of the union. In 1941 internal tensions between the socialist and communist leadership resulted in the formation of two groups within the Textile Workers Union. The union lost a large part of its membership in 1945 through the rapid growth of a parallel union in the industry, whose formation was encouraged by Juan Perón when head of the National Labor Department, with the intention of forming a labor bureaucracy favorable to government policy. In less than six months, the membership of the parallel union, the Association of Textile Workers,* grew to include 80,000 members, decreasing the membership of the Textile Workers Union to 7,000 workers. By 1936 the Textile Workers Union had dissolved.

TYPOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY OF BUENOS AIRES (La Sociedad Tipográfica Bonarense).

Founded in 1857, the Society was the first working-class organization in Argentina and functioned as a mutual aid society. Its fundamental principles reflected craft-based concerns, including that to "further the state and progress of the lithographic arts." The printers are considered to have been the most militant group of workers in the late nineteenth century. They organized the Typographical Union* in 1877. The union dissolved in 1879, shortly after winning a major strike. The Society continued to support worker militance and to function as a mutual aid society after the dissolution of the union.

TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION (Unión Tipográfica).

Founded in 1877, the Typographical Union was the first workers organization in Argentina whose objectives were similar to those of the modern union. The Union had a number of locals in Buenos Aires, one in Córdoba, and one in Montevideo. It organized a major strike in Buenos Aires in 1878; over 1,000 workers attended the assembly that preceded the strike. As a result of the strike, the printers won a collective contract that established a shorter workday, a minimum salary, and the replacement of child labor by adult workers. The Union was dissolved in 1879, typical of the often short-lived character of the craft unions in late nineteenth-century Argentina.

UF. *See* Railroad Workers Union.

UGT. *See* General Union of Workers.

UNIÓN DE OBREROS TEXTIL. *See* Textile Workers Union.

UNIÓN FERROVIARIA. *See* Railroad Workers Union.

UNIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* General Union of Workers.

UNIÓN OBRERA DE LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA (Construction Labor Union of the Argentine Republic). *See* National Federation of Construction Workers.

UNIÓN OBRERA METALÚRGICA (Union of Metalworkers). *See* Union of Workers in the Metallurgic Industry.

UNION OF BUILDING, CEMENT, AND EXCAVATION WORKERS (Sindicato de Obreros Albañiles, Cemento Armado y Anexos).

Founded in 1935, the Union of Building, Cement, and Excavation Workers was organized by communist labor leaders on an industrial basis. Prior to the formation of the union, workers in the building trades had been divided into many craft-based unions of anarchist tendency. A strike called by the union in 1935 elicited the participation of over 60,000 construction workers. Other unions lent their solidarity to the strikers through assemblies, marches, and a general strike. The union membership grew during the strike, attracting other workers in the construction trades. The union became the foundation for the National Federation of Construction Workers* (FONC). The union dissolved in 1936 to become part of the larger, industrially organized FONC.

UNION OF METALWORKERS. *See* Union of Workers in the Metallurgic Industry.

UNION OF WORKERS IN THE METALLURGIC INDUSTRY (Sindicato Obrero de la Industria Metalúrgica—SOIM).

The Union of Workers in the Metallurgic Industry formed as a splinter group from the Union of Metalworkers (Unión Obrera Metalúrgica) in 1943. The latter had formed during the 1930s and was represented by leaders of both socialist and communist tendencies. In 1942 a major strike of the Union of Metallurgic Workers failed, and the tensions between the two tendencies within its leadership led to the formation of the SOIM. In 1944 the SOIM began to cultivate support from Juan Perón, then head of the National Labor Department. By 1946 the union had grown to 100,000 members, eclipsing the membership of the Union of Metallurgic Workers. Even while the SOIM had grown through the support extended to it by the Perón administration (1946–55), the union engaged in a major strike in 1954, demonstrating the disaffection of some rank-and-file union members with the labor policies of Perón in the years immediately preceding his removal from power by a military coup d'état.

UNIÓN SINDICAL ARGENTINA. *See* Argentine Syndical Union.

UNIÓN TIPOGRÁFICA. *See* Typographical Union.

WORKERS FEDERATION OF RÍO GALLEGOS (La Federación Obrera de Río Gallegos).

Founded in 1910, the Workers Federation of Río Gallegos was a member of the Regional Federation of Argentine Unions* (FORA) and retained anarchist leadership until its demise, which followed the massacre of striking workers in 1921. Formed on the southern end of the Patagonia, the union functioned in solidarity with other anarchist unions of rural workers and miners in Chile and with anarchist unions in the small urban centers of the surrounding Argentine provinces and southern coastal region. The first strike of the Federation occurred in 1914; the strike spread throughout the region and was repressed through the use of the Law of Social Defense (*Ley de Defensa Social*), an anti-anarchist law that led to the imprisonment and deportation of many foreign workers and union leaders. The first attempted general strike occurred in 1917 in the city of Río Gallegos, in solidarity with the Federation's attempt to abolish the corporal punishment of peons who were minors. The Federation declared another general strike in 1919; after a scuffle during a large demonstration of proletarian women, the Federation was declared illegal. The labor militance of these anarchist workers of the Patagonia continued and in 1920, during the course of a major strike, the military was brought to the area. The troops arrived in late December and left massive open graves of workers in their wake.

Belize

WILLIAM L. CUMIFORD

In 1981, Belize, the second smallest country in Central America, became the last British Caribbean possession to achieve full independence; it was formerly known as British Honduras. Belize's capital was moved in 1970 from Belize City to the inland site of Balmopan; the former, however, retains its status as the country's leading urban center. The population of some 145,000 is mixed; the vast majority of the people trace their ancestry to Creoles and Indians. Others include Caribs (immigrants from the West Indies) and a smattering of Lebanese, Chinese, British, and Americans. Though English remains the official language, a slight majority of Belizeans speak Spanish as a primary tongue. The Spanish-speaking population, concentrated on the northern and western borders, exhibits strong Guatemalan and Mexican influences.

Following the demise of a sizable Mayan civilization around the ninth century AD, the area now called Belize faded into a deserted, inhospitable coastland. Like many New World lands, the region attracted little attention until 1638, when English buccaneers poured into the area searching for logwood—an important ingredient for making dyes. Intermittent Spanish efforts to expel these intruders failed; a final victory by local settlers over a Spanish naval force in 1798 effectively ended Hispanic control. However, this little-known strip of land remained almost anonymous to the English government for decades. Officially proclaimed a British colony in 1862, the territory fell under the jurisdiction of the Jamaican governor until 1884, when it finally became a separate colony. The absence of boundary treaties with neighboring Central American states, however, presaged a long and acrimonious history of diplomatic controversy.

A vigorous dispute over Britain's presence in Central America began shortly after Guatemalan independence in the early nineteenth century. In 1859 Guatemala recognized British sovereignty, contingent upon the latter financing a railroad from British Honduras to Guatemala City. When the promised rail line

failed to materialize as late as World War II, the Guatemalan government resurrected its historic claim to the region. The boundary issue persists as the leading national question in Belize. In fact, the lingering boundary problem delayed the independence movement in British Honduras and compelled Britain to garrison a sizable military force on the Guatemalan border.

During the early years of settlement, the Belizean economy depended almost solely on its forest reserves. Logwood timbering gave way to mahogany operations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, followed by the extraction of chicle from wild sapodilla trees early in the twentieth century. Agricultural production appeared promising at the turn of the century, but immigration had been slow and unpredictable. Several important food-growing operations exist, including citrus production in Stann Creek, coastline banana growing, and sugar processing. Unfortunately, sugar is the only product regularly exported for substantial profit. Tourists, attracted by the world's second largest coral reef, off the Belizean coast, have provided significant revenues since the 1960s. Coastal waters also yield impressive catches of fish, lobster, and shrimp for export to the United States.

The economic life of Belize, especially the agricultural sector, experienced severe repression from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century as a result of land control exercised by the Belize Estate and Produce Company. For years prior to independence, this British concern owned half of all Belizean private lands. The company's financial interests and political power were carefully protected by London authorities and the colonial government. Under these circumstances, manufacturing and industry never developed, and the very limited population, characterized by a conspicuous absence of skilled labor, places Belize's industrial future in jeopardy.

Belize's colonial legacy provided the backdrop for the nation's trade union struggles. Coupled with the racial and geographical vagaries of this former British possession, the colonial heritage underpins the history of working-class issues. Also, the traditional Belizean economic structure encouraged the underutilization of labor and protracted unemployment. In this regard, the seasonal nature of many jobs in Belize looms as an endemic problem. Moreover, the absence of a strong free enterprise system compelled an early alliance between burgeoning political leaders and pioneer union organizers. The tumult of the 1930s gave birth to nationalist politics and trade unionism.

While Belizean trade unionism developed only recently, labor unrest dates to the brief but bitter riots carried out by the colony's forest workers in the late fall of 1894. These relatively minor incidents failed to budge colonial employers and, likewise, did not precipitate fairer wages for timber cutters. Four decades elapsed before renewed labor agitation. In the mid-1930s the Labour and Unemployment Association* (LUA), in league with a group known as the Unemployment Brigade,* attempted to arouse working-class interests by staging a series of demonstrations. Antonio Soberanis, an unemployed log cutter and

Brigade stalwart, received support from the LUA in promoting boycotts against anti-labor stores and in fund-raising activities.

These early labor protests prompted threatening responses from a colonial regime besieged by workers' unrest throughout the Caribbean. The embryonic Belizean trade union movement became equated with subversion and radicalism, and colonial authorities blunted union effectiveness by ultimately sinking these organizations into a legal and administrative quagmire. Government's aims were twofold: to rigidly control unionism and to observe carefully any and all native political developments. Nonetheless, the disturbances of the Depression years produced genuine labor organization, calling forth political sensitivities crucial to the Belizean independence movement.

Until the mid-1930s British Honduras functioned as a Crown Colony under nearly absolute gubernatorial power. The legislative council consisted primarily of British civil servants who rubber-stamped the governor's decrees. The constitution promulgated in 1936 stipulated that council members be elected, but the majority vote was held by the colonial aristocracy. Britain's delay in granting wider franchise rights in British Honduras resulted in serious disturbances by the late 1930s and early 1940s.

Beyond the work of Soberanis and the LUA, various professionals and businessmen in Belize City mounted a series of protests against the colonial administration. None of these movements, however, carried the spontaneity of similar events in Trinidad, British Guiana, or Jamaica. Two political parties appeared briefly in the 1930s—the People's Group and the Progressive Party—only to fade rapidly without benefit of strong internal structure or popular support.

In fact, the first lasting political organization in Belize followed a somewhat unlikely harbinger of change: devaluation of the British Honduran (B.H.) currency. On the last day of 1949 the governor fulfilled earlier threats of bringing the B.H. dollar in line with the recently devalued British pound. Facing popular and legislative opposition to this move, the governor enacted his "reserve powers," inadvertently creating a fulcrum for political protest. A group called the People's Committee, established immediately after the devaluation announcement, produced some key union officials for service in the vanguard of their new political activism. Leigh Richardson, George Price, and Philip Goldson held offices in the General Workers' Union* (GWU) simultaneously with their newly acquired political functions. Anger over currency devaluation soon expanded to embrace other political grievances. In September 1950 these leaders formed Belize's first genuine political organization, the People's United Party (PUP).

This body also gained adherents from the *Belize Billboard*, a weekly tabloid strongly opposed to the colonial status quo. Despite the governor's efforts to discredit the People's United Party through a pro-colonial radio campaign, the new party triumphed in the first bona fide elections held in Belizean history. In 1954 four high officials in PUP won seats in the colonial legislative council.

Even though the People's United Party suffered two serious splits in the 1950s, the organization has continued to dominate Belizean political life. The first break, in 1956, also deeply affected the General Workers' Union, whose officers were the same men leading PUP. Defecting to form the Honduras Independence Party, Goldson and Richardson sought a largely traditional commonwealth status for British Honduras. However, Price, who remained in charge of PUP, emphasized closer ties with Central America and the establishment of direct negotiations with Guatemala. While most of Belize's political parties elevated Caribbean over Central American interests, Price labored for a more constructive dialogue with his western neighbor. The second split occurred in 1959 when a veteran trade unionist, Nicholas Pollard, resigned his PUP office to organize the Christian Democratic Party. He was joined by yet another PUP expatriate, Denbigh Jeffrey.

Meanwhile, following unsuccessful attempts to squelch the People's United Party, Britain granted greater internal autonomy to the colony throughout the 1950s. Under a new constitution established in 1960, British Honduras assumed the status of a Crown Colony administered by a governor, with assistance from the legislative assembly and executive council. The 1960 charter also allowed British Hondurans to choose their own prime minister. In 1973 the citizens voted to change the name of the colony to Belize, and today all Belizeans over twenty-one years of age possess suffrage rights.

The relaxed political environment of the late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed a proliferation of parties, accompanied by periodic efforts to dislodge PUP. In 1958 the Honduras Independence Party joined with the National Party (NP), founded in 1951 to oppose PUP, to create the National Independence Party (NIP). Eleven years later NIP fused with the People's Democratic Movement (PDM) under Goldson's guidance in a fruitless attempt to thwart Price's power. NIP-PDM accused Price of pandering to Guatemalan interests on the boundary question, and they vigorously supported the 1966 civil service strike against the government.

The forty-eight-hour work stoppage enacted by the Public Officers' Union* (POU) in 1966 emphasized the intense politicizing of Belizean trade unionism. By the early 1960s the predominantly Creole civil service had fortified political alliances with government-opposition elements, especially Goldson and the PDM. The increasing estrangement between Price and the public employees had practically nothing to do with traditional trade union issues. Sparked by unsubstantiated rumors of the administration's selling out to Guatemala, the POU strike mirrored the deep ethnic, religious, and political differences in Belizean society.

Members of the powerful POU, fearful of Price's entrenched power, predicted their eventual displacement by the Indian-Catholic element comprising the backbone of PUP's support. Furthermore, the decided middle-class makeup of the union disguised its inherent militancy. This aggressiveness surfaced in the early summer of 1966 when a retinue of Belize's top leaders returned from a London conference amidst rumors of a secret treaty arrangement with Guatemala. Mod-

erate union executives hastily convened a general meeting which denounced the administration and called for all public officers to “unite now to save the country.” (Grant, 1966, p. 45.)

When government officials countered with a blistering verbal assault on the public service, including the police, union matters quickly fell into the hands of the radical POU junior officers and rank and file. At the eleventh hour the moderate senior executives convinced the general body to compromise on a two-day sit-down strike. Called for 30 June 1966, the work delay had its greatest impact on the postal service. When Jesuit students from St. John’s College were summoned as strikebreakers, civil employees raised a storm of protest over the government’s alleged pro-Catholic stance. The work stoppage was brief and government services returned to normal operation within one week. However, the whole episode jarred the otherwise serene Belizean political environment. The strike revealed deep conflicts in the social and economic structure and raised timely questions over the political activities and interests of the POU.

Fundamental reasons explain the almost unabated success of Price and PUP over the past three decades. First, adroit, able leadership characterized PUP from its inception. Despite early alienation among top leaders and subsequent splits, PUP enjoyed several strong years in developing a viable organizational infrastructure. Also, PUP drew critical support from a hardworking, dedicated cadre of Jesuit priests. The clergy’s tireless promotion of agricultural programs, co-operatives, and trade union classes had earlier constituted the training core of the General Workers’ Union. Finally, closely associated with Jesuit support is the pro-Hispanic, devoutly Catholic nature of PUP. In Belize, where about 70 percent of the population profess Catholicism, PUP stands as the integral political voice of Catholic religious ideas and Hispanic cultural values.

Bibliography

- Alexander, Robert J., ed. *Political Parties of the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies*, vol. 1. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982.
- Ashdown, Peter. “Antonio Soberanis and the 1934–1935 Disturbances in Belize.” *Belizean Studies* 5, no. 4 (July 1977): 1–11; 5, no. 5 (September 1977): 16–28; 6, no. 2 (March 1978): 12–19; 6, no. 3 (May 1978): 7–12; 6, no. 4 (July 1978): 8–15.
- . “The Labourer’s Riot of 1894.” *Belizean Studies* 7, no. 6 (November 1979): 8–20; 8, no. 2 (March 1980): 22–28.
- Coldrick, A. P. and Philip Jones, eds. *The International Directory of the Trade Union Movement*. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1979.
- Grant, Cedric H. “The Civil Service Strike in British Honduras: A Case Study of Politics and the Civil Service.” *Caribbean Quarterly* 12, no. 3 (September 1966): 37–49.
- . *The Making of Modern Belize: Politics, Society, and British Colonialism in Central America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

- Hamill, Don. "Colonialism and the Emergence of Trade Unions in Belize." *Journal of Belizean Affairs* no. 7 (September 1978): 3-20.
- Knowles, William H. *Trade Union Development and Industrial Relations in the British West Indies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959.
- Robinson, G. M., G. M. Furley, and P. A. Furley. "An Independent Belize." *Geography* 68 (January 1983): 43-46.
- Waddell, D.A.G. *British Honduras: A Historical and Contemporary Survey*. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

BELIZE NATIONAL TEACHERS' UNION—BNTU.

The Belize National Teachers' Union developed in 1970 from a fusion of the British Honduras Union of Teachers (registered in 1963) and the Catholic Education Association. Rank-and-file members in this body number approximately 600 Belizean public and private schoolteachers. The BNTU is led by Miguel Wong and holds international affiliation with the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession.

In the mid-1960s the BNTU joined the General Workers' Development Union* and the Public Officers' Union* in forming the British Honduras Trade Union Congress (BHTUC). In 1972 the BHTUC offered affiliation with the Democratic Independent Union* as an expansion of Creole-oriented labor opposition to the Price regime, but the Congress dissolved in 1975.

BELIZE PUBLIC OFFICERS' UNION. *See* Public Officers' Union.

BRITISH HONDURAS DEVELOPMENT UNION. *See* General Workers' Development Union.

BRITISH HONDURAS TRADE UNION. *See* General Workers' Development Union.

BRITISH HONDURAS TRADE UNION CONGRESS. *See* Belize National Teachers' Union.

BRITISH HONDURAS UNION OF TEACHERS. *See* Belize National Teachers' Union.

CATHOLIC EDUCATION ASSOCIATION. *See* Belize National Teachers' Union.

CAYO LABOUR UNION. *See* National Federation of Workers.

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION. *See* National Federation of Workers.

CHRISTIAN WORKERS' UNION. *See* National Federation of Workers.

CIVIL SERVICE ASSOCIATION. *See* Public Officers' Union.

DEMOCRATIC INDEPENDENT UNION—DIU.

The Democratic Independent Union, a relatively minor force in Belizean unionism, developed out of the stormy career of Nicholas Pollard. During a conflict between outdistrict unions and the Christian Workers' Union (CWU) in the late 1960s, the media portrayed Pollard as an agitating opportunist determined to undermine strong management-labor cooperation engendered through the new capital building project. When this pressure forced Pollard out of the CWU, he masterminded another movement, the Democratic Independent Union. At the time of its founding in 1968, the DIU enjoyed considerable support in Belmopan, Stann Creek, and Belize City.

Pollard's association with the DIU, however, lasted only a year, when the Caribbean Commonwealth-based regional labor organization, the Confederation of Latin American Christian Syndicalists (Confederación Latino Americana de Sindicatos Cristianos—CLASC), withdrew its support from Pollard's group. Even though the National Independence Party immediately aided the DIU, the new union's fortunes eventually fell to the protection of Philip Goldson, caretaker of the People's Democratic Movement (PDM). Goldson, a disaffected colleague of Premier George Price, had molded the PDM from other political parties opposed to Price and the People's United Party (PUP) in 1969. Nevertheless, on the political front this coalition proved unable to dislodge the PUP administration.

The DIU, currently headed by president Cyril Davis, holds headquarters in Belize City and claims 1,000 members. This union is affiliated internationally with the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF).

GENERAL WORKERS' DEVELOPMENT UNION—GWDU.

Formed in 1960 through a merger of the British Honduras Development Union and the General Workers' Union (GWU), the GWDU is currently the largest single union in Belize. Led by president Thomas Martinez and secretary Adolfo Rosales, this group claims just under 4,000 members and lists affiliations with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the International Transport Workers' Federation.

The convoluted history of the GWDU dates to the tumultuous 1930s. The GWU, a blanket union formed in 1938, was originally called the British Honduras Trade Union. Historically, the GWU played an extremely important role in Belize because its leaders eventually became the cadre for the People's United Party (PUP), the political progenitor for Belizean nationalism. In 1950 leadership of the GWU fell into the hands of a group of young Catholic radicals, whose chief personality, George Price, later emerged as the most influential figure in twentieth-century Belizean affairs.

Jesuit-trained GWU leaders galvanized worker demands around the themes of individual integrity and national independence. This fervent ideological base imbued the union hierarchy with a strong sense of mission and, in turn, stimulated the organization of PUP shortly after the union's takeover by the young Catholic leaders.

As a blanket union, the GWU reflected a hybrid membership. Waterfront workers, clerks, government employees, and forest and agricultural laborers all rallied under the political supervision of Leigh Richardson, George Price, and Philip Goldson. Initially, the group was democratically organized and led by the rank and file, but political events soon overshadowed union issues. A GWU strike in 1952, lasting for forty-nine days, catapulted the union's senior officers into the national limelight. These political victories, however, came at the expense of trade union effectiveness. Though a moral triumph, the strike merely increased the union's financial woes. Dues, always difficult to collect, were ignored as workers concentrated on two priorities, striking and voting.

In fact, problems suffered by the GWU offer a case study of the traditional weaknesses in Belizean trade unionism. Because labor identified very early with political factions, rather than genuine working-class interests, a politically conscious proletariat never developed. In the 1950s involvement in political affairs produced chaos in union ranks. Since that time separatist organizations centering on occupational factors have further spawned an intense parochial outlook in most Belizean industries. Finally, perennial preoccupation with the Guatemala border issue has eclipsed most domestic priorities, including working-class interests. Thus the Belizean union movement remains hostage to political manipulation.

The old GWU also alienated rival unions. For example, when the British Honduras Development Union (BH DU) withdrew support from a GWU strike, the latter group refused to recommend the BH DU for membership in the ICFTU. These differences were later resolved when the two organizations merged, forming the General Workers' Development Union. However, personal rivalries, political squabbling, internal disorder, and the inability of maintaining branch offices in the countryside rendered genuine trade unionism ineffective.

GENERAL WORKERS' UNION. *See* General Workers' Development Union.

LABOUR AND UNEMPLOYMENT ASSOCIATION—LUA.

Though trade unions in Belize were legally unacknowledged until 1941, the Labour and Unemployment Association performed an important role in early labor agitation. This group, joining forces briefly with an ill-defined body known as the Unemployment Brigade (UB), initiated public protests and general disorder over wage conditions in the mid-1930s. The LUA, though defunct after only two years of operation, deserves credit for launching the Belizean labor movement.

In February 1934 the Brigade marched through the streets of Belize City, later

making demands to the colonial governor for unemployment relief. At this juncture the UB rapidly dissolved, but the cudgel of labor reform was taken up by Antonio Soberanis, a former Brigade leader who eventually formed the LUA in July 1934. Earlier in the spring Soberanis had begun a series of speeches and public demonstrations focusing on workers' grievances. Meanwhile, Belizean colonial authorities opened a file on the labor leader and began monitoring his activities. By late summer the atmosphere in Belize City was extremely tense.

Store boycotting by the unemployed in July and August aroused the wrath of urban merchants but also rallied mass support for Soberanis and the LUA. In late September, after Soberanis announced a general convocation of the colony's unemployed, the general mood once again bordered on insurrection.

The fateful day arrived on 1 October 1934, when a demonstration on Queen's Street in Belize City turned into rioting and violence. Soberanis arrived in mid-afternoon to quiet the crowd, and he later posted bail for seventeen of the several dozen demonstrators jailed earlier in the day. Then Soberanis was arrested under Section 235 of the colony's criminal code pertaining to the use of violence against a crown official. As news of the arrest sparked rumors of yet another riot, the governor prepared to summon the nearest British cruiser in the Caribbean while pacifying the crowd through the distribution of relief funds.

As the colonial governor assessed blame for the disturbances on failure of adequate relief funds forthcoming from Westminster, Soberanis was detained until labor passions subsided. Within months after the labor leader's release from jail, the LUA forces disintegrated. A few of the more prominent members sought refuge in new quasi-political associations, such as the People's Committee, which ultimately became Belize's first genuine political organization, the People's United Party.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF CHRISTIAN TRADE UNIONS. *See* National Federation of Workers.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF WORKERS—NFW.

The National Federation of Workers emerged in 1969 through an amalgamation of disparate regional trade union interests. This body, currently led by Desmond Vaughan and William Gebon, encompasses over 2,000 members and holds affiliation with the World Confederation of Labour—Latin-American Workers (WCL-CLAT) and the Trade Union Council of Caribbean Workers.

Nicholas Pollard, a perennial union personality, founded the National Federation of Christian Trade Unions (NFCTU) in 1962 with the Christian Workers' Union (CWU) as its base soon after he split from the old Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The CWU, a general workers' group in Belize City, enjoyed a rather impressive membership—around 1,500—when it became the foundation for the NFCTU in September 1962. CWU fortunes were enhanced by attracting three important regional unions under the NFCTU umbrella: the Northern Cane

Workers' Union (NCWU) in Corozal and Orange Walk, the Cayo Labour Union (CLU), and in Stann Creek the Southern Christian Workers' Union (SCU).

These groups depended heavily on the major industries of their respective regions: forestry and cattle in the west, sugar in the north, and citrus in the south. However, these organizations, all fostered in 1961 by a People's United Party government in need of union support, were too remote to attract international affiliations and too weak to flourish without sophisticated union cadre. As a result, they were all quickly absorbed by Pollard and the CWU under the aegis of the National Federation of Workers.

From the outset, the executive council of the NFCTU fell to Pollard's control. In fact, the CWU created branch offices in Cayo and Orange Walk in the mid-1960s to reap organizational benefits from recent economic gains in those districts. CWU activities were often attributed to the regional unions. A split in CWU leadership in 1968 enabled the provincial bodies to form a separate affiliation more conducive to their mutual needs. Thus the National Federation of Workers was organized in September 1969.

NATIONAL TEACHERS' UNION. *See* Belize National Teachers' Union.

NORTHERN CANE WORKERS' UNION. *See* National Federation of Workers.

PUBLIC OFFICERS' UNION—POU.

Established in 1922 as the Civil Service Association, the POU lists approximately 400 members under the presidency of Edwin Belisle, with Pat Bernard serving as union secretary. This organization is affiliated internationally with Public Services International and with Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone International. The POU has wielded influence disproportionate to its members. As an elite civil service body composed mainly of Creoles, the POU found itself opposed to the ruling People's United Party (PUP), and the suspicion harbored by Premier George Price toward the civil bureaucracy. This situation was exacerbated by POU's overall lack of confidence in its allied unions, colonial office opposition, and the government's role in the Anglo-Guatemalan boundary dispute. The upshot was the civil servant strike staged in the early summer of 1966.

A forty-eight-hour sit-down strike of Belizean civil employees began on 30 June 1966, immediately producing complications for the POU. First, the government enlisted Jesuit students at St. John's College as strikebreakers. This only deepened the rift between Belize's Creole and Hispanic factions. Next, both the colonial and PUP leaders admonished the POU against the infusion of politics into matters affecting the civil service. Finally, the anomaly of career civil servants working concurrently in paid positions infuriated Price and confounded colonial authorities. Eventually, senior civil employees were prohibited from union membership. This may have proved a miscalculation, however, since the older career officials tended to exercise a restraining influence over the younger, more volatile public workers.

The Public Officers' Union strike highlighted a peculiar problem with unionism in developing countries: the blunting or eradication of union influence over a major component of the Third World's socioeconomic order, the civil bureaucracy. In small, underdeveloped nations, government employees represent a large portion of the work force. Moreover, this element constitutes a sizable percentage of the middle-class elite. In Belize, the tendency of disassociating civil workers from their trade union orientation has further eroded the power of organized labor.

SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN WORKERS' UNION. *See* National Federation of Workers.

TRADE UNION CONGRESS. *See* Belize National Teachers' Union.

UNEMPLOYMENT BRIGADE. *See* Labour and Unemployment Association.

Bolivia

STEVEN S. VOLK

It never fails to astonish that Bolivia, one of the poorest, least industrialized, most agrarian countries of South America, should have produced a labor movement noted not only for its militance but also for its ability to influence the modern political life of that country for more than thirty years. Such a prominent role for labor could hardly have been foreseen in the early nineteenth century when Bolivia won its independence from Spain. From the early 1800s until the late 1840s, the Bolivian economy experienced one of its worst periods of economic stagnation when production in the silver mines fell sharply. By mid-century the Bolivian economy was even more rural and subsistence-oriented than it had been in the late colonial period. It is estimated that more than 90 percent of the population lived in rural areas; the silver mines were rapidly decapitalized, and even the hacienda system retreated to subsistence agriculture.

During the presidency of José Ballivián (1841–47), Bolivia could boast of fewer than 300 mine owners and 9,000 miners in the country. Further, most of the mine workers only devoted part-time to mining activities, spending the rest of the time as small-scale agriculturalists. A modestly successful colonial artisan textile industry centered in the Cochabamba Valley was in decline because foreign competition was in decline, with only 100 *obrajes* (factories) producing cloth in 1846.

Nevertheless, encouraged by increased European demand for silver in the late 1850s, capital again began to flow into the Bolivian mines. By the 1870s Bolivia's mines were technologically on a par with any in the world. A dynamic mining sector helped reinvigorate the entire economy, encouraging population growth, the expansion of the hacienda system, and a slow process of urbanization. Not surprisingly, it also ushered in the era of the Conservative Oligarchy (1884–99), fifteen years of political rule by the owners of the largest silver mines.

Under the governments of Gregorio Pacheco (1884–88), Aniceto Arce (1888–

92), and Mariano Baptista (1892–96), foreign capital began to flow into the economy to help with the construction of the nation's first efficient railroad system and the development of rubber production in the sparsely populated eastern lowlands.

The silver boom carried Bolivia into the twentieth century, but tin, a customary by-product of silver mining, formed the basis of the modern Bolivian economy. A concurrent fall in the world price of silver and a rise in the price of tin, along with the fact that Bolivia now had a rail network which allowed for the relatively cheap transport of that bulky item, greatly stimulated tin production. By 1925 tin accounted for more than 70 percent of all Bolivian exports and more than one-fifth of the world's production of that metal.

The rapid shift to tin production helped mold an economy which would thereafter be highly sensitive to any fluctuation in world prices, but it did not fundamentally alter the nation's social structure. In 1900 the mining industry still absorbed only 1 percent of the nation's economically active population, some 13,000 workers. La Paz, Bolivia's largest city, had a population of only 55,000, up a scant 12,000 in more than fifty years. The turn to tin mining coincided with the rise of a new political force in Bolivia, the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal). While Liberals and Conservatives shared some fundamental beliefs—support of the mining industry, government subsidies for transportation, controlled elections for the presidency—the Liberals were firmly based in La Paz, whereas the Conservatives were entrenched in the silver-producing regions of Potosí and Sucre. With the success of a Liberal revolt in 1899, power shifted to La Paz, where it remained for most of the twentieth century.

Unlike the Conservatives, Liberal leaders were not themselves owners of the major Bolivian mines. Too concerned with the development of their holdings, the tin producers turned political affairs over to a new class of professional politicians who thereafter operated in their interests. This new sector, which came to be known locally as the *rosca* (literally, the "screw"), remained in power, or close to it, until the 1952 revolution.

The general economic growth stimulated by the success of silver and tin mining in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the shift of political power to La Paz, soon began to affect more than the elite sectors. In 1905 typographers in La Paz organized the first modern union in Bolivia, the National Printers' Union* (Unión Gráfica Nacional—UGN). Similar to many other labor movements in Latin America, printers—intellectuals—were to lead the workers' movement in Bolivia in its early years. In most ways, however, the UGN was actually more at home in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth. It was firmly controlled by the owners of small printing presses rather than by the typographical workers. It was therefore not long before the UGN gave way to the Printers Center (Centro Tipográfico) and then the more stable Federation of Graphic Arts* (Federación de Artes Gráficas—FAG) in 1916.

In 1906 the Workers' Society of El Porvenir* (Sociedad Obreros El Porvenir), an artisan group tied to the ruling Liberal Party, celebrated May Day for the

first time in Bolivian history. While their commemoration of the events of May 1886 in Chicago was more a panegyric to the Liberals than a recognition of the independent role of workers, it did reflect the growing influence of Marxist and anarchist thought among the youthful labor movement in Bolivia. That same year, the carpenters' and tailors' guilds formed the Workers' Social Center* (Centro Social de Obreros—CSO), which grouped the most progressive artisan organizations in La Paz.

By the second decade in the twentieth century, the more progressive sectors of the labor movement had become increasingly uncomfortable within the confines of the ruling Liberal Party and had begun to abandon the Liberals for the newly formed (although short-lived) Radical Party. In 1911 the older, Liberal-bound Workers' Federation of La Paz* (Federación Obrera de La Paz) traded blows with workers who would soon form the more politically independent International Workers' Federation* (Federación Obrera Internacional—FOI).

Railroad workers also began to organize in the second decade of the twentieth century. Mutual aid societies among workers on various rail lines were common after 1912, but in 1919 the first broadly based railroad workers union, the League of Railway Workers and Employees* (Liga de Obreros y Empleados de Ferrocarril) joined Bolivian workers as well as foreigners throughout the country who worked on the rail lines. The League was the first union to establish a strike fund.

The Liberal era of political control began to disintegrate in 1914. The Bolivian economy was simultaneously shaken by a drop in demand for tin on the international market and harsh weather conditions which disrupted internal agricultural production. Further, Liberal President Ismael Montes (1904–1909, 1913–17) was unwilling to accommodate the demands of his own party members for more power. In 1914 the New Republican Party (Partido Republicano) broke from the Liberal Party. Six years later a Republican revolt brought the Liberal era to a close.

The Republicans soon found themselves enmeshed in some of the most severe social conflicts yet experienced in Bolivia as the increasing militancy of the urban labor movement was matched by growing confrontations in the rural areas—home to the vast majority of Bolivia's Indian population. While the Liberal's economic activity was based in the mines and fomented the growth of the urban sector, it also encouraged the expansion of the hacienda system in the rural area. As hacienda owners, sensing the potential of growing markets, began to encroach on Indian lands, conflicts and major revolts began to shake the rural areas. In 1920 President Bautista Saavedra (1920–23) called out the troops to put down one such uprising in Jesús de Machaca, with hundreds killed as a result.

While Saavedra strongly supported the rights of landowners against the Indian communities, he could not win the political support of either the *hacendados* or the country's traditional elites. His attempt to replace that support with the backing of labor was a novel recognition of just how much Bolivian society had changed since 1900. And while Saavedra's turn to labor for support was hardly

an ideological commitment to the working class, it did allow for the passage of the first modern labor and social legislation in Bolivian history. Saavedra's government introduced laws guaranteeing compensation for industrial accidents, a compulsory savings scheme, and an improved strike law.

Saavedra broke new ground in one other way. Whereas previous governments had raised money for railway construction in London, Saavedra turned to Wall Street. In 1921, following a collapse in tin prices, Saavedra authorized a loan of \$33 million from three U.S. banks to help refund the external debt and finance railway construction. He agreed to the establishment of a Permanent Fiscal Commission dominated by U.S. bankers to insure the repayment of the debt. From that time, the United States played an important role in the political and economic development of Bolivia.

Saavedra's modest support for labor encouraged the growth of Bolivia's first broadly based labor federations. In 1918 the Workers' Federation of Labor (*Federación Obrera de Trabajo—FOT*) was formed from the older FOI. The new organization gathered together tailors, cab drivers, carpenters, cabinet makers, hotel workers, and electricians. In 1920 the FOT helped lead a successful general strike in support of the telegraph workers. And in 1921, in the city of Oruro, the Railway Workers convened the first congress of Bolivian workers.

The mines, however, were the key to the Bolivian economy, and the mine workers' unions soon raised the most serious challenge to Saavedra's government. Compared to the small shops which predominated in urban areas, the units of production in the mines were quite large. It is estimated that over 27,000 miners were employed in 1924. The largest mines, those of the Guggenheims at Caracoles and Simon Patiño's holdings at Llallagua and Uncía, each employed between 1,000 and 5,000 workers.

Yet in the mines, local unions alone served the workers' needs at least until the 1940s. Workers at the large mines in the Oruro-Potosí region founded the Central Labor Federation of Uncía* (*Federación Obrera Central de Uncía*) on 1 May 1923. The Federation was led by Guillermo Gamarra, who earlier had worked with a Marxist study circle in La Paz. Rather than allow Gamarra to organize freely, the company detained the Federation's leaders. Saavedra, who by this time was looking to shore up support from the mine owners, sent four army regiments to Uncía. On 4 June 1923 the soldiers fired upon the workers and their families, killing an untold number in the first of what would be a long list of massacres in the Bolivian mines.

Having lost support from nearly every sector, Saavedra was forced to turn the government over to Hernando Siles in 1923. The Siles period (1923–30) was marked by an upsurge of activity both in the labor movement and among students. This period also saw the full flowering of anarcho-syndicalist thought in Bolivia. The FOL–La Paz broke with the FOT in 1926, and the following year women workers in La Paz—street and market vendors, in particular—founded the Women's Labor Federation* (*Federación Obrera Feminina—FOF*).

By 1930 tin made up nearly three-quarters of all Bolivian exports. Even a

minor downward fluctuation of tin prices on world markets would have seriously affected a country which was already devoting some 37 percent of its budget to foreign debt servicing, and the Great Depression was considerably more than a minor fluctuation. Bolivian tin exports fell by 70 percent from 1929 to 1933; prices plummeted by two-thirds from 1926 to 1933. In 1932 total earnings accruing from tin exports amounted to only \$10 million.

Neither the labor movement nor the peasantry could muster an adequate defense to a crisis of this magnitude. President Daniel Salamanca (1930–34), who had entered office as a moderate on labor issues, soon adopted a belligerent attitude towards the workers. Strikes by the Telegraph Workers and the FOL—La Paz were forcibly checked. In 1933 Salamanca outlawed any union which struck for higher wages or better conditions. Workers and peasants largely responded as they always had to sharp periods of depression: miners forced out of the mines returned to subsistence farming; peasant mobilizations declined as hacienda expansion halted. Only the radical students remained as an obstacle to the Salamanca government, and they lacked the power to organize a serious opposition movement.

If Salamanca was able to overcome the labor and student resistance to his government, he soon fell prey to a folly of his own creation, the Chaco War (1932–35). Unable to find any internal solution to Bolivia's severe economic problems, Salamanca turned to a campaign of expansion in order to unify the country behind him.

Since independence, Bolivia had lost territory to two of its neighbors. It lost its Pacific coast to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879–83) and its rubber-rich eastern territory of Acre in a war with Brazil (1899–1903). Now Salamanca sought to reverse that trend by sending Bolivian troops into the parched Chaco, land that it disputed with Paraguay.

What Salamanca expected to be a nationally unifying, easily won venture quickly turned into a wrenching defeat which broke the political molds of the past and set the stage for the revolution of 1952. Far from a quick victory, Bolivia lost the war at the cost of more than 80,000 deaths and some 215,000 square kilometers of territory. The conduct of the government both in leading the nation into the war and in its handling of the fighting generated criticism among all sectors of the population from the peasantry to the urban middle sectors.

Politically, the post-Chaco period saw the emergence of new parties which ultimately determined the course of events in modern Bolivia. The Revolutionary Workers' Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario—POR) was founded in 1934 by a small group of exiled Bolivian leftists living in Córdoba, Argentina. In 1938 the POR formally affiliated with the Fourth (Trotskyist) International. Although always a small party, it played a vital role in the miners' union in the 1940s.

In 1940 the Party of the Revolutionary Left (Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—PIR) held its founding congress. The PIR, which was closely allied to the traditional Communist (Third) International, based its program on two

proposals: nationalization of the mines and agrarian reform. While the PIR was the strongest force in the labor movement in the late 1930s and early 1940s, its alliance with the reactionary governments of the mid- and late-1940s cost it any long-term support among the workers.

Finally, in 1941, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR) was formed among middle-class sectors. The MNR, which to this day remains a strong force in Bolivian political life despite its numerous post-1952 splits, argued for a nonsocialist, nationalist approach to Bolivian development. Although the MNR first came to power in the 1940s as an ally of a neo-fascist movement, it quickly shed its radical right-wing and emerged as a progressive, nationalist party.

Destroyed by his adventure in the Chaco, Salamanca was forced out of office by the military in 1934 and, two years later, his successor was overthrown by a revived labor movement. Led by the typographers, the FOT, the FOL—La Paz, and the newly formed Veterans of the Chaco (a nonlabor organization), the workers organized a successful general strike to support their demands for wage increases. Workers temporarily took over police powers in many of the cities. In July, in the face of a complete breakdown of governmental authority, two young army officers, Colonel David Toro and Lieutenant Colonel Germán Busch, seized power.

Toro, who served as president until he was replaced by Busch in 1937, created the first Ministry of Labor, which was filled by Waldo Alvarez, typographer and head of the FOT. Alvarez authorized the creation of the Permanent National Assembly of Union Organizations* (Asamblea Nacional Permanente de Organizaciones Sindicales—ANPOS), which was given the task of enforcing the obligatory unionization of all workers.

The majority of unions soon broke with the ANPOS, seeing it as an attempt by the state to co-opt the labor movement. Instead, in late 1936, these unions joined to form the Union Confederation of Bolivian Workers* (Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia—CSTB), which soon came to replace the older FOT and FOL—La Paz as the most important representative of organized labor in the country.

Busch continued Toro's legislative favor of the workers by passing a comprehensive new labor code in 1939. The *Código Busch* mandated an eight-hour day and guaranteed the right to strike. Just as important was Busch's 1939 decree requiring the mining companies to hand all their foreign exchange earnings from mineral exports over to the Central Bank, which would convert the funds to national currency at special exchange rates. In essence, this allowed the government to increase taxes on the mining companies by exchanging their earnings at a lower-than-official rate.

Toro and Busch were not the "military socialists" they have been labeled—in fact, they were quite at a loss to define the direction of their governments—but the old oligarchy, particularly the mine owners, grew bitterly opposed to

their rule. Following Busch's suicide in 1939, the conservative military leadership regained the initiative.

The traditional parties all supported moderate General Enrique Peñaranda in the 1940 elections, and he won handily. Yet his election represented the old oligarchy's last hurrah. Try as they did, there was no returning to pre-Chaco War political molds. Just how true this was became evident when José Antonio Arze, the Marxist leader of an embryonic leftist coalition running on a revolutionary platform, won nearly 20 percent of the vote. Two years later, in parliamentary elections, the post-Chaco parties outpolled the traditional parties by nearly two to one.

With the imposition of production controls on tin in the early 1930s and the gradual increase in tin prices, Bolivia's economy began to recover. The real key to its renewed growth in the 1940s, however, was World War II. With the fall of the Malayan Straits to the Japanese, Bolivia became the Allies' largest and securest source of tin. Tin was again Bolivia's lifeblood, and the government would ensure that it continued to flow.

In December 1942 a labor conflict threatened to reduce production at Patiño's Catavi mine. Catavi was one of Bolivia's largest mines, employing more than 10,000 workers. Negotiations between the miners and the company broke down; the Peñaranda government declared the strike illegal and sent the army into the mining center. The troops opened fire on a mass of demonstrators, killing hundreds of miners and their relatives. The Catavi Massacre proved a turning point in Bolivian history. A parliamentary inquiry into the government's conduct at Catavi provided the newly elected MNR deputies with an explosive issue with which to attack the government and gain national prominence. The MNR turned the massacre into a major political scandal. As public confidence in the regime slowly ebbed, it became easy prey for the MNR and its new allies, a group of young fascist-oriented military officers known as RADEPA (*Razón de Patria*). Led by Major Gualberto Villarroel, the military overthrew the Peñaranda government in December 1943. Villarroel appointed three MNR members to his cabinet but was forced to jettison them, along with his pro-Axis stance, when the United States refused to recognize his government.

Villarroel oscillated wildly between support for progressive positions and violent attacks against his detractors. His government passed important social legislation but also assassinated members of the opposition.

In 1944 Villarroel issued the *Fuero Sindical*, a basic labor bill of rights which granted unions and their members the essential legal rights of organization. Backed by this measure, the mine workers held their first national congress that same year. Twenty-six unions representing more than 60,000 miners attended the Huanuni congress that founded the Federated Union of Mine Workers of Bolivia* (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia—FSTMB), which to this day remains Bolivia's most important union federation.

In 1946 the leftist PIR and the traditional parties allied in a coalition against

Villarroel. Popular opposition to his arbitrary and often violent rule peaked in July, when a mob dragged him from the presidential palace and hung him from a lamppost in the central plaza. Despite the MNR's support for the fallen regime, over the course of the next six years the MNR emerged as the strongest proponent of a new order in Bolivia, and the PIR was destroyed by tying itself too closely with traditional parties that now desperately sought the elimination of the tumultuous post-Chaco political forces. When the government aggressively suppressed a miners' strike in Potosí in 1946, the PIR was assessed with the blame.

Meanwhile, the Trotskyist POR was intensifying its work among rank-and-file miners, concentrating on the large mines of the Llallagua-Uncía complex. In 1946, when the FSTMB held its First Extraordinary Congress in Pulacayo, the POR's ideological dominance of the union was unchallenged. At that congress the miners approved what became known as the "Thesis of Pulacayo," one of the most radical statements of labor militancy in the history of the Latin American labor movement. According to the "Thesis," the goal of the workers' movement was the conquest of state power for the proletariat and the destruction of capitalism and imperialism in Bolivia. It stressed that workers should be armed and should occupy their mines to prevent employer lockouts.

The six years between 1946 and 1952 saw the FSTMB in continual struggle with the government, but the miners were easily isolated from supporters in the cities and the promises of the "Thesis of Pulacayo" were not easily achieved. In the cities, the MNR was most active. The party, which never lost its middle-class base of support, regained the workers' support as the Republican governments of Enrique Hertzog and Mamerto Urriolagotia grew increasingly repressive. The government violently repressed a 1949 coup attempt by the MNR—which ironically strengthened the party's move toward its left wing and away from its neo-fascist friends in the army.

In 1951 the MNR trounced the Republicans and the PIR in national elections, but a military coup blocked their installation in office. The next MNR coup was not long in coming. In April 1952 party militants, backed by armed urban workers and miners, revolted in the cities. After three days of fighting, the miners marched on La Paz and the old order crumbled.

Led by Víctor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles Zuazo, the MNR took charge of the government. Two factors made their government fundamentally different from all of its predecessors. In the first place, the *rosca's* army had been virtually destroyed. MNR civilian militias and armed miners provided security for the new regime. Second, for at least the first year of MNR rule, the workers gave the regime its organizational and ideological direction. In April 1952, and for a short time after, Bolivia was a workers' state.

On 17 April 1952, less than two weeks after the MNR came to power, the FSTMB helped found the Bolivian Workers' Confederation* (Confederación Obrera Boliviana—COB), a single confederation representing all of organized labor in Bolivia. The COB quickly pressed the government for the passage of

three major programs: nationalization of the mines, abolition of the army, and a thoroughgoing agrarian reform. Within a year, the MNR had acted on all three.

Worker dominance of the early MNR government was evident in three other measures. First, the COB demanded *co-gobierno* (co-government) at the national political level. Through this the COB received the right to name four cabinet ministers (Labor, Mines and Petroleum, Peasant Affairs, and Transportation). Second, it called for the establishment of *control obrero* (workers' control) in the nationalized mines which would give officials named by the FSTMB an absolute veto over all decisions made by the new mining corporation (COMIBOL) except for purely technical matters. Finally, it demanded representation in the executive committee of the MNR.

The workers' ability to direct the government during the 1952–53 period was based on their organizational strength within the MNR's coalition of forces. There is little doubt that the party's center and right wing were increasingly uncomfortable with this situation. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, the MNR leader who served as president from 1952 to 1956, was very uneasy with the COB's dominance in his first government. But he was also astute enough to realize that he could not challenge the workers without tying his own middle-class supporters to a new social sector, the peasantry.

While Bolivia had developed considerably since 1900, at the time of the April revolution it was still predominantly a rural, illiterate, highly underdeveloped country. According to the 1950 census, more than 70 percent of the work force was engaged in agriculture and its allied industries; nearly 80 percent of the population lived in towns smaller than 5,000; 70 percent of the population was still illiterate. Miners and urban workers generated the bulk of national income, but the peasants were an undeniable majority.

The COB recognized this and tried to organize peasant communities into unions. A COB representative occupied the first Ministry of Peasant Affairs. But Paz Estenssoro and the right wing of the MNR also understood this and were soon able to organize the peasantry into a political base of support for conservatism.

In 1956 Paz's vice president, Hernán Siles Zuazo, was elected president. Siles Zuazo had led the MNR's internal opposition to the *rosca* in the years before the revolution and was closer to the COB's positions than was Paz. But by late 1956, faced with an economy in decline and a rising inflation rate, he opted to accept a radical International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization plan which seriously challenged the workers' strength in the government. Wages were to be frozen, government subsidization of miners' food purchases halted, and workers' control of the nationalized COMIBOL mines gradually undercut. Yet when Juan Lechín, head of the COB, called on the workers to oppose the IMF plan, few responded and the COB nearly split.

Siles Zuazo's decision to push ahead with the austerity measures resulted in an influx of U.S. aid and paved the way for a U.S.-designed plan to rebuild the

Bolivian military structure. In less than a decade, the new military was strong enough to remove the MNR from the government.

By 1960 the rift between the MNR and its radical labor supporters was complete. According to an early agreement among the various wings of the party, Lechín was to have been named as the MNR candidate (i.e., winner) in the 1960 elections. But, realizing that the party would have split over the nomination, the MNR selected Paz Estenssoro for a second term. In 1963 Paz nullified *control obrero* in the COMIBOL mines and attempted to destroy the COB by forming his own trade union confederation. When the newly "professionalized" military stepped in to overthrow Paz, the COB lent a hand through its Committee to Defend Democratic Liberties.

For the next eighteen years, with one brief exception, the military ruled Bolivia. While some of the military governments were progressive, the great majority were fundamentally opposed to the workers' movement. Yet the new society which the military tried to mold in Bolivia never challenged some of the basic accomplishments of the 1952 revolution: nationalization of the mines and the destruction of the *hacendado* power structure based on Indian labor service. At least until the mid-1970s, while the military governments fostered and protected the interests of the country's wealthy and foreign investors, they based their political support on a conservative peasantry.

The events of 1965 set the pattern for worker-military confrontations for the next fifteen years. In May the COB organized a national congress of union leaders which confirmed a pact to protect the interests of the workers and the integrity of union organizations. When the congress adjourned, the military moved in to arrest Juan Lechín, still the COB's leader. The COB responded by declaring a general strike, the government by arresting union leaders and taking over various union offices.

Although the strike fizzled out in the cities, a different story unfolded in the mines. Faced with militant miners marching on Oruro, the military declared the mines to be military zones. In August, when the military reduced wages in the mines, a new strike was called and the troops again sent out, this time to Catavi. The miners retreated into the mines and resisted the military advances from inside the shafts. Thus began, quite literally, the underground resistance of the miners' union committees. Over the next decade these committees alternately forced concessions from the military and suffered from their most intense repression.

In 1970, following the death of General René Barrientos, who had headed the government between 1966 and 1969, and the ouster of General Alfredo Ovando (1969-70), General Juan José Torres took over the government. While Barrientos had been cast in the mold of a right-wing *MNRista*, and Ovando in the mold of a reform-minded *MNRista*, Torres returned the country to the early days of the 1952 revolution when the workers held power. He called for a Popular Assembly to take over the legislative powers of the government. The Assembly, with 218 delegates, was firmly in the hands of the workers, who held

123 seats (38 from the FSTMB). In the end, however, Torres never received the full support of a much fragmented labor movement, while his radical policies thoroughly frightened the civilian and military right. In August 1971 Colonel Hugo Banzer Suárez overthrew Torres' government.

A series of developments set the Banzer government (1971–78) apart from both its civilian and military predecessors. Economically, the early 1970s saw tin prices soar on international markets. Yet the future of Bolivia was being created in the eastern lowlands of Santa Cruz and the Beni where rice, cotton, sugar, cattle, and other commodities boomed. Politically, too, the Banzer regime faced new realities. Unlike his military predecessors, Banzer sought his social base of support in the newly enriched entrepreneurs of the eastern lowlands, the military, and the conservative civilian middle-class parties—the Paz Estenssoro wing of the MNR and the reactionary Socialist Falangist Party of Bolivia (Falange Socialista Boliviana—FSB). He only half-heartedly tried to win the support of the peasants during the early years of his tenure and, in 1974, precipitated a massacre of peasants in Tolata and Epizana.

If Banzer did not exactly court the peasants, it was clear in turn that the peasants did not care much for his government. The military-peasant pacts of the 1960s partially rested on economic self-interest: peasants had been given small plots of land and, in some cases, advantages in terms of the pricing and marketing of their products. A serious devaluation of the peso in 1972 began to destroy any economic advantage the peasants may have enjoyed. Not only did the peasants receive less for their products following the devaluation, but they were totally cut out of the economic boom of the mid-1970s.

In response, the peasants tentatively began to unite and draw closer to the workers' movement. Given organized peasant support for past military regimes, this was a highly significant step. So deep was the chasm between workers and peasants that the COB's Fourth Congress in 1970 refused to seat peasant representatives. Even during the Popular Assembly period of General Torres, the COB still refused to seat a left-wing peasant group. Only in May 1979, at the COB's Fifth Congress, did the workers finally agree to invite three peasant organizations to participate.

Banzer's government also went further than the previous military regimes in trying to destroy the COB and its inveterate leaders who had remained virtually unchanged since the early 1950s. In November 1974 Banzer applied the country's Compulsory Civil Service Law to remove all elected union officials and replace them with his own nominees. The government also banned all strikes and lockouts and suspended the collection of trade union dues. Any government appointee who refused to serve as a Trade Union Coordinator was packed off to jail.

But the COB continued to function underground and, along with the powerful FSTMB, directed the most serious resistance to the Banzer government with numerous strikes throughout 1976 and 1977, including a debilitating two-month general strike in the mines. In December 1977 the miners' wives went on a hunger strike to protest the regime. By early January over 1,000 people had

joined the strike. On 18 January Banzer, who was rapidly losing the support of the military establishment as well, acquiesced to the hunger strikers' demands. Trade union activities were again permitted, and new elections were called in the unions. Within days, the old leaders of the COB, the FSTMB, and virtually every other union in Bolivia had been returned to their posts.

Faced with the collapse of his government, Banzer called for elections in 1978, opening a four-year period of swiftly changing military and civilian governments. Two developments highlighted this recent period. First, the moderate-left coalition of Hernán Siles Zuazo gathered strength in each of the three elections held between 1978 and 1980 (each of which was nullified by the military). And second, the military became increasingly discredited. It continually vetoed a clear mandate to turn over power to the civilians and was unable to solve the country's severe economic problems. Finally, with the regime of General Luís García Meza in 1980, the military became embarrassingly linked with the international drug trade.

In October 1982, when the military could rule no longer, it called on the exiled Siles Zuazo to form a government. The COB pledged its support for his Democratic Popular Union (Unión Democrático Popular—UDP) coalition government, but demanded its due in return. This included a return to *control obrero* in the COMIBOL mines, across-the-board wage increases, and a renunciation of the country's growing foreign debt.

By mid-1984, unable to break a deadlock in his own governing coalition and faced with skyrocketing inflation, a stalled economic program and continual strikes in the mines, Siles Zuazo sided with the workers. He postponed payments on the country's foreign private debt and gave up trying to implement a new IMF stabilization plan. Indeed, a major COB strike ended in July with the government agreeing to boost wages 130 percent.

The deteriorating economy and rising disorder towards the end of 1984 were joined by further political complications. Siles was kidnapped and then freed in an aborted coup, and later went on a hunger strike to protest deteriorating conditions and attacks on his regime. The following year saw inflation peaking at some 20,000 percent, the COB orchestrating its fifth general strike in three years, and Víctor Paz Estenssoro sworn in for the fourth time as President of Bolivia. This time around, Paz adopted stringent austerity measures, and when labor mobilized in protest, declared a state of siege. As 1986 drew to a close, Paz's government persevered in its attempt to slash state spending; it announced plans to close down the Catavi-Siglo XX tin mine complex and to drastically curtail the state mining corporation, COMIBOL. Strikes and protests continue, as the workers once more attempt to demonstrate that in Bolivia, the labor movement still represents a significant political force.

Bibliography

- Albó, Xavier. *Achacachi: Medio siglo de lucha campesina*. La Paz: CIPCA, 1979.
 Alexander, Robert J. "The Labor Movement During and Since the 1952 Revolution."

- In *Modern-Day Bolivia: Legacy of the Revolution and Prospects for the Future*, ed. Jerry R. Ladman. Tempe, Arizona: Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University, 1982: 59–79.
- Barcelli S., Agustín. *Medio siglo de luchas sindicales revolucionarias en Bolivia*. La Paz: Editorial del Estado, 1957.
- Klein, Herbert S. *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- . *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- Lora, Guillermo. *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano: 1848–1933*. 3 vols. La Paz: Los Amigos Del Libro, 1967–1970.
- . *A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848–1971*, ed. and abr. Laurence Whitehead. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Magill, John H., Jr. “Labor Unions and Political Socialization in Bolivia.” Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1972.
- Malloy, James. *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970.
- Volk, Steven S. “Class, Union, Party: The Development of A Revolutionary Union Movement in Bolivia (1905–1952).” *Science & Society* 39, nos. 1 and 2 (1975): 26–43, 180–98.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ANPOS. *See* Permanent National Assembly of Union Organizations.

ASAMBLEA NACIONAL PERMANENTE DE ORGANIZACIONES SINDICALES. *See* Permanent National Assembly of Union Organizations.

BANK WORKERS' CONFEDERATION (Confederación de Trabajadores Bancarios-Constbra).

One of the smaller members of the Bolivian Workers' Confederation* (COB), the Bank Workers have nonetheless often been able to tie up commercial activity in the country through their strikes. In early 1978, when the government of General Hugo Banzer Suárez lifted the restrictions he imposed on trade union organizing, again allowing the unions to elect their own leaders rather than accept government-appointed “coordinators,” the bank workers were perhaps the only union to voluntarily retain the coordinators. Strikes by bank workers nearly paralyzed the government of President Hernán Siles Zuazo in 1984.

BOLIVIAN WORKERS' CONFEDERATION (Confederación Obrera Boliviana—COB).

With more than 500,000 members, the COB, which includes all important Bolivian unions and a number of popular organizations (for example, associations of tenants and housewives), is the largest labor confederation in the country.

The COB was founded on 17 April 1952, less than two weeks after a revolution which overthrew Bolivia's traditional oligarchy. More than an organizational entity, the COB came to symbolize workers' power in the new government and has continued to represent the political voice of the workers to this day. It has been led by Juan Lechín, head of the Federated Union of Mine Workers of Bolivia* (FSTMB) since its founding.

Shortly after its creation, the COB presented the new government with a set of demands, including nationalization of the mines, agrarian reform, and the abolition of the army. All were soon acted upon by the government. The COB also appointed four ministers to the first government and, along with MNR militias, provided the regime with its only security apparatus.

Yet, as ensuing MNR governments grew more conservative, the COB became the major opposition force in the country with more authority than any single party on the left. In 1956, Hernán Siles Zuazo, president from 1956 to 1960, pushed through a monetary stabilization program which seriously challenged the role that the COB had played up to that time. His moves also nearly split the COB. One group, led by Juan Sanjinés and the railroad unions, supported the Siles government while Lechín and the miners opposed it. This rift in the COB, and a general decision by workers not to follow their union leaders, allowed Siles to impose the Stabilization Plan without serious obstacles.

But the 1956 plan did create a permanent gulf between the COB and the MNR. In 1964, when Víctor Paz Estenssoro tried to undercut the COB's authority by establishing a parallel organization, the workers' confederation lent its support to the military's successful attempt to oust him from office. (See Bolivian Workers' Confederation of Revolutionary Unity.)

Despite the workers' initial support for the military, during most of the years between 1964 and 1982 the COB and the military were bitter enemies. It was formally banned a number of times; its leaders, including Lechín, were exiled, its property confiscated, and its members forbidden to serve in the union movement. But the COB continued to function effectively for most of these years, directing the labor movement's opposition to the military. COB-organized general strikes continually challenged the nation's military governments from 1971 to 1982.

The COB supported the election of Hernán Siles Zuazo and his Popular Democratic Union (UDP) coalition in the three elections held between 1978 and 1980 (all of which were nullified by the military). But when the military finally handed over the government to Siles in 1982, the COB pressed him hard to accept its own program which included wage increases, renunciation of the foreign debt, and a return of workers' control in the mines.

In its early years the COB attempted to organize the peasantry, but was unable to prevent their turn toward the conservative wing of the MNR and, later, the military. Only in 1979 did the COB again invite peasant groups to join its ranks.

A number of governments have tried to challenge the strength of the COB by forming parallel union confederations, but none of these have met with any

success. Internal political disputes often embroil the confederation—it almost shattered over the question of whether to support Siles Zuazo's 1956 austerity program—but it remains remarkably strong and united more than thirty years after its formation.

BOLIVIAN WORKERS' CONFEDERATION OF REVOLUTIONARY UNITY
(Confederación Obrera Boliviana de Unidad Revolucionaria—COBUR).

In 1963 workers and their former allies in the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) came to their moment of greatest estrangement. In an attempt to undercut the power of the COB,* Víctor Paz Estenssoro, then in his second term as president, created the Bolivian Workers' Confederation of Revolutionary Unity (COBUR) as a parallel national labor confederation. COBUR claimed the membership of factory workers, petroleum workers, and railroad workers as well as the peasants. Nevertheless, it did not survive Paz Estenssoro's eviction by the military in 1964.

CENTRAL LABOR FEDERATION OF UNCÍA (Federación Obrera Central de Uncía).

The Central Labor Federation of Uncía was founded on 1 May 1923, following a march by some 5,000 mine workers from the large tin mines in the Oruro-Potosí district. It was led by Guillermo Gamarra, a carpenter by trade, who had worked with a Marxist study circle in La Paz. When company administrators demanded that Gamarra limit the Federation's organizing to the Uncía area, he stated his intention of establishing relations with all Bolivia's workers. "Otherwise," he argued, "we could not accomplish the lofty goal which these diverse federations seek: social revolution."

Shortly after its founding, the Federation went on strike to win its legal recognition and the guarantee that its members would not be fired for taking part in union activities. The strike was violently suppressed by the government of Bautista Saavedra, which had sent four army regiments to support the company administrators. The Federation was officially dissolved in 1926.

CENTRO SOCIAL DE OBREROS. *See* Workers' Social Center.

CGTF. *See* General Confederation of Factory Workers.

CICB. *See* Independent Confederation of Bolivian Peasants.

CNTCB. *See* National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia.

COB. *See* Bolivian Workers' Confederation.

COBUR. *See* Bolivian Workers' Confederation of Revolutionary Unity.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE SINDICATOS DE TRABAJADORES BANCARIOS. *See* Bank Workers' Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES FABRILES. *See* General Confederation of Factory Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN INDEPENDIENTE DE CAMPESINOS DE BOLIVIA. *See* Independent Confederation of Bolivian Peasants.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES CAMPESINOS DE BOLIVIA. *See* National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia.

CONFEDERACIÓN OBRERA BOLIVIANA. *See* Bolivian Workers' Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN OBRERA BOLIVIANA DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA. *See* Bolivian Workers' Confederation of Revolutionary Unity.

CONFEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES DE BOLIVIA. *See* Union Confederation of Bolivian Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN SINDICAL ÚNICA DE TRABAJADORES CAMPESINOS DE BOLIVIA. *See* Sole Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia.

CONSTBRA. *See* Bank Workers' Confederation.

CSO. *See* Workers' Social Center.

CSTB. *See* Union Confederation of Bolivian Workers.

CSUTCB. *See* Sole Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia.

FAG. *See* Federation of Graphic Arts.

FEDERACIÓN DE ARTES GRÁFICAS. *See* Federation of Graphic Arts.

FEDERACIÓN FERROVIARIA. *See* Railroad Workers' Federation.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE MUJERES CAMPESINAS DE BOLIVIA. *See* National Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA CENTRAL DE UNCÍA. *See* Central Labor Federation of Uncía.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA DE LA PAZ. *See* Workers' Federation of La Paz.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA DE TRABAJO. *See* Workers' Federation of Labor.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA FEMININA. *See* Women's Labor Federation.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA INTERNACIONAL. *See* International Workers' Federation.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA LOCAL DE LA PAZ. *See* Local Workers' Federation of La Paz.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES MINEROS DE BOLIVIA. *See* Federated Union of Mine Workers of Bolivia.

FEDERATED UNION OF MINE WORKERS OF BOLIVIA (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia—FSTMB).

With a current membership of more than 50,000—nearly the entire work force engaged in mining and related activities—the FSTMB is one of the largest and most important unions. The FSTMB has been the major force within the Bolivian Workers' Confederation* (COB) since the latter was founded in 1952. Like the COB, the FSTMB has been led by Juan Lechín since its earliest days and has retained its most important union officers for more than three decades.

The FSTMB was founded in 1944 during the government of Major Gualberto Villarroel which at that point was closely tied to the young Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR). This early dependence on the MNR and the government won the nascent union the enmity of the Union Confederation of Bolivian Workers* (CSTB), then Bolivia's most important labor confederation. Despite these early ties with the government, the miners' union soon took a radical turn to the left. At the FSTMB's Third Congress in 1946, the miners broke from the MNR and blasted the Villarroel government for "forgetting their promises to the workers." Discussion at the Congress centered on workers' control of capitalist firms, union autonomy, and the effective use of strike funds. In the final session, workers agreed to fight for the implementation of a sliding wage and hours scale. The former would automatically adjust workers' salaries to the cost of living in the mining zone; the latter required that with each increase in the number of unemployed workers in the mines, those who remained would work less. Both measures spoke to the increasing radicalization of the miners.

At the FSTMB's First Extraordinary Congress held in Pulacayo in November 1946, the delegates ratified the revolutionary "Thesis of Pulacayo." The "Thesis" moved beyond the radical solidarity expressed by the FSTMB's Third Congress to propose that direct action by workers should be their primary tactic in the ongoing struggle with the employers. To this end, the "Thesis" called

for the immediate arming of workers and advised miners to occupy their mines to prevent employer lockouts.

Nevertheless, many of the objectives elaborated in the "Thesis" severely overestimated the miners' concrete ability to obtain them. In early 1947, for example, when the owners shut down the mines of San José, Santa Ana, Siete Suyos, Oploca, and all the mines of the Oruro complex, the workers were unable or unwilling to occupy them for any length of time. Confusion and spontaneity reigned among the miners as the FSTMB struggled to turn the radical idealism of the "Thesis" into practice.

In the following years, the FSTMB tempered some of its more radical positions but never lost its status as the most politically militant of the Bolivian unions. In April 1952, when the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) rose up against the tottering oligarchy, the FSTMB quickly joined the fighting. The arrival in La Paz of a large contingent of armed miners turned the tide of battle after three days of fighting; the old order was destroyed.

The miners, now working through the COB, quickly pressed the new MNR government to accept its major demands: nationalization of the largest tin mines, their reorganization as a state enterprise (COMIBOL), and workers' control in those mines. *Control obrero* gave officials named by the FSTMB an absolute veto over most decisions made by COMIBOL.

The MNR acceded to the miners' demands, but *control obrero* in the COMIBOL mines has been a bone of contention between the FSTMB and Bolivian governments since 1956, when MNR President Hernán Siles Zuazo accepted a harsh International Monetary Fund-inspired Stabilization Plan. The plan sought to freeze the miners' wages and return control of the state-owned mines to government-appointed administrators. Siles was able to get enough support from the workers to push his plan through, but the miner-MNR alliance had been broken. (See Bolivian Workers' Confederation.) During the second term of MNR President Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1960–64), workers in the COMIBOL mines struck for a total of 210 days in 1961 and 200 days the following year.

The FSTMB doggedly opposed most of the military governments which ruled Bolivia between 1964 and 1982. In return, the miners received the brunt of the military repression. Many times during that eighteen-year period, soldiers occupied the mines and clashed with intransigent miners. In May 1965, for example, the government of General René Barrientos laid off a large number of miners, slashed wages by 50 percent, limited the right of miners to buy goods at subsidized prices in COMIBOL stores, and exiled Juan Lechín. When the miners struck in protest, the army smashed the strike. The troops returned to the mines in September 1965 and June 1967, on the latter occasion killing a number of workers at the Catavi-Siglo XX mines.

The miners again emerged as the strongest force of the organized labor movement during the Popular Assembly period of General Juan José Torres (1970–71). The Popular Assembly replaced the traditional Bolivian congress with a body of 218 delegates, more than half of whom were workers. The FSTMB won

the Popular Assembly's approval for a return to co-government by the workers at all levels of COMIBOL management.

With the 1971 coup of Colonel Hugo Banzer Suárez, the FSTMB again moved to a position of militant opposition to the government. Banzer removed all trade union leaders in 1974 and replaced them with "coordinators," but only in the FSTMB did the newly named coordinators refuse to occupy their new positions. When the miners struck to protest the jailing of the coordinators, the government was forced to allow the FSTMB's old leaders to continue in their posts. General strikes by the miners in 1975 and a two-month walkout in 1976, despite a military occupation of the mining zones, progressively weakened the Banzer government. It was finally forced to call for elections following a hunger strike led by miners' wives in early 1978.

Not even the return of civilian government in 1982 tempered the miners. The FSTMB lent the current government of Hernán Siles Zuazo its tepid support, but has actively pushed for the return to and broadening of workers' control in all COMIBOL operations. Faithful to their contentious history, the miners have struck, occupied the COMIBOL headquarters, and blockaded roads in pursuit of their goal: returning the control of mining in Bolivia to the miners.

FEDERATION OF GRAPHIC ARTS (Federación de Artes Gráficas—FAG).

Founded in 1916, the FAG replaced the National Printers' Union* (UGN) and the Printers' Center (Centro Tipográfico) as the most important organization of printers and typographers. Unlike the UGN, the FAG defined itself not only as a "guild and mutual aid society" but also as an organization of "resistance" to the capitalist class. The FAG is considered by many to be the "first real trade union organization" in the printing trade. It was the first labor organization to recognize the strike as a legitimate method of struggle, and proposed the establishment of a strike fund to protect the workers. In 1931 more radical printers left the FAG to establish the Graphic Workers' Union (Sindicato Gráfico).

FOF. *See* Women's Labor Federation.

FOI. *See* International Workers' Federation.

FOT. *See* Workers' Federation of Labor.

FOL—La Paz. *See* Local Workers' Federation of La Paz.

FNMCB. *See* National Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women.

FSTMB. *See* Federation Union of Mine Workers of Bolivia.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF FACTORY WORKERS (Confederación General de Trabajadores Fabriles—CGTF).

The CGTF was founded in 1951 with the reorganization of the older National Factory Workers Union (USTNF) as an inclusive union of all industrial workers. Factory workers had participated in the overthrow of a number of governments prior to the 1952 revolution, but their small numbers (only 4 percent of the economically active population in 1950) and dispersion in numerous small shops reduced their political potential. Nevertheless, they helped pave the way for the overthrow of the old order in 1952. In 1950 factory workers were actively involved in a general strike. Fighting spread to the Villa Victoria section of La Paz, where many factory workers lived. The government attacked the neighborhood with eight army regiments, killing an untold number of workers and their families and seriously damaging the organized strength of the factory workers.

Representatives of the CGTF served in the first MNR government after the 1952 revolution, but they were much less politically radical than the miners, for example. Whereas the miners had sharply opposed the 1956 Stabilization Plan of MNR President Hernán Siles Zuazo, the factory workers tended to accept it. This same division was apparent during the second government of Víctor Paz Estenssoro. When Paz formed the Bolivian Workers' Confederation of Revolutionary Unity* (COBUR) in 1963 to weaken the Bolivian Workers' Confederation* (COB), he won the support of the CGTF.

The factory workers also went along with a 1965 decree by the military junta of Generals René Barrientos and Alfredo Ovando requiring the reorganization of all unions, but they soon joined the general labor opposition to the military government and played an active role in leading the urban opposition to the government of General Hugo Banzer Suárez in the 1970s.

INDEPENDENT CONFEDERATION OF BOLIVIAN PEASANTS (Confederación Independiente de Campesinos de Bolivia—CICB).

The CICB was the only peasant organization represented in the Bolivian Workers Confederation* (COB) prior to its Fifth National Congress in 1979. Shortly before the Congress, a large sector of the CICB challenged its leadership for having agreed to participate in a meeting sponsored by the military government's Ministry of Peasant Affairs, and the organization split into two branches. Only the branch led by Dionisio Huayñapaco attended the COB Congress and remains affiliated with the central labor confederation.

INTERNATIONAL WORKERS' FEDERATION (Federación Obrera Internacional—FOI).

The FOI was formed in 1912 by workers who opposed the continued support given by the Workers' Federation of La Paz* to the conservative Liberal government. While the FOI was a far cry from the anarchist organization that some have claimed it to be, it did set itself apart from the earlier artisan movements

in two important ways. First, it rejected any association with existing political parties; and, second, its public statements were more often couched in class terms. The FOI reorganized in 1918 and adopted a program which stressed the importance of labor legislation. According to its new program, all workers in Bolivia regardless of age or sex were automatically members of the federation.

LEAGUE OF RAILWAY WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES (Liga de Obreros y Empleados de Ferrocarril).

The first broadly based railroad workers' union, the League of Railway Workers and Employees was founded in August 1919 in the midst of a dispute with the management of the Bolivian Railway Company. The League joined together all workers, Bolivian and foreign, who worked on the rail lines. The League was the first Bolivian union to actually establish a strike fund—which it promptly needed, since it went out on what proved to be a successful strike in 1919. The League collapsed the following year after workers on the Antofagasta-Bolivia line started their own union, the Railroad Workers' Federation.*

LIGA DE OBREROS Y EMPLEADOS DE FERROCARRIL. *See* League of Railway Workers and Employees.

LOCAL WORKERS' FEDERATION OF LA PAZ (Federación Obrera Local de La Paz—FOL—La Paz).

The FOL—La Paz was formed when the Workers' Federation of Labor* (FOT) broke into two sectors in 1926: a Marxist wing (FOT) and an anarcho-syndicalist wing (FOT—La Paz). Its most important members were carpenters, bricklayers, tailors, and workers in the match factory. Later, workers from the cardboard factory and the Said textile factory also affiliated. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the FOL—La Paz was probably the largest local labor organization in Bolivia. In 1936 it was replaced by the Union Confederation of Bolivian Workers* (CSTB).

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF PEASANT WORKERS OF BOLIVIA (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia—CNTCB).

Recognizing the weakness of a divided peasant movement, the Fifth Congress of the Bolivian Workers' Confederation* (COT) sponsored a unity conference between the three major peasant confederations: the Sole Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia* (CSUTCB), the Independent Confederation of Bolivia* (CICB), and the National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia. (See Sole Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia.)

This confederation was itself composed of two wings: the branch led by Miguel Trigo, which supported Víctor Paz Estenssoro and his Nationalist Revolutionary Movement Alliance (AMNR) in the 1979 presidential elections; and the branch led by Pascual Gamón, which supported the Democratic Nationalist Action (ADN) party of General Hugo Banzer Suárez.

After a short period of unity, the CNTCB broke with the CSUTCB in mid-1979.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF BOLIVIAN PEASANT WOMEN (Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas de Bolivia—FNMCB).

For most of the years between 1964 and 1982, Bolivia's peasant organizations supported the military rulers of the country. That support, concretized in formal "military-peasant pacts" signed by successive governments, began to crumble in the 1970s in the face of an economic situation which prejudiced small and medium-sized peasant sectors. By the late 1970s, the dissolution of the "military-peasant pacts" encouraged the active formation of new peasant organizations which opposed the military governments.

The National Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women was one such organization. The FNMCB was founded in 1980 by its parent organization, the Sole Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia* (CSUTCB). In their founding congress, the FNMCB established as its goal the creation of a country "with neither exploited nor exploiters." Their demands to the government included a number of points specific to the condition of peasant women, including equal access to educational and cultural resources. The FNMCB later affiliated with the Bolivian Workers' Confederation* (COB).

NATIONAL PRINTERS' UNION (Unión Gráfica Nacional—UGN).

Founded in La Paz in 1905, the UGN is often considered the first modern union in Bolivia. Nevertheless, the union had strong ties to the nineteenth-century mutualist movement. It was controlled by the owners of small printing presses rather than the typographical workers. Like the Workers' Federation of La Paz* (Federación Obrera de La Paz), which was organized slightly later, the UGN worked closely with the ruling Liberal Party. The emergence of the UGN at the turn of the century signaled the important role which printers would play in Bolivia's early labor movement.

PERMANENT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF UNION ORGANIZATIONS (Asamblea Nacional Permanente de Organizaciones Sindicales—ANPOS).

Following the traumatic Chaco War (1932–35), two young army officers, Colonel David Toro and Lieutenant Colonel Germán Busch, seized power. Inspired by a corporativist model, Toro, in particular, sought to reorganize the government along lines which gave the state more control of all social sectors. In 1936 he established the Permanent National Assembly of Union Organizations (ANPOS) and charged it with the task of organizing the nation's workers. The workers initially supported Toro's regime, particularly as he created the first Ministry of Labor. But they broke with him over the state-controlled unionization implied in ANPOS, and the confederation did not survive.

RAILROAD WORKERS' FEDERATION (Federación Ferroviaria).

In 1919, with workers striking on the Antofagasta-Bolivia rail lines, the leaders

of the Oruro and Uyuni committees of the League of Railway Workers and Employees* petitioned the union's central committee for relief funds for the Chilean workers adhering to the strike. The central committee refused, and the Oruro and Uyuni committees broke away from the League in 1920 to form the Railroad Workers' Federation. The League faded away, but the Railroad Workers' Federation continued to play a leading role in the trade union movement. Following a general strike by the Federation in 1921, the government introduced legislation providing social benefits for workers.

SOCIEDAD OBREROS EL PORVENIR. *See* Workers' Society of El Porvenir.

SOLE UNION CONFEDERATION OF PEASANT WORKERS OF BOLIVIA (Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia—CSUTCB).

The conservative alliance between the peasants and the military, which defined Bolivian politics between 1964 and the early 1970s, began to break down during the regime of General Hugo Banzer Suárez (1971–78). Not only were the peasants hurt by a large devaluation of the Bolivian currency, but they did not share in the benefits of the economic boom of the mid-1970s. By late in the decade, peasant discontent had given rise to a number of organizations which directly challenged the military. In 1979 at its Fifth National Congress, the Bolivian Workers' Confederation* (COB) sponsored a unity conference intending to gather the highly fragmented peasant confederations—the National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia* (CNTCB), which itself had two wings; the Independent Confederation of Bolivian Peasants* (CICB), and the CSUTCB—dissolved their national directorates, and merged into a single organization which kept the name CSUTCB.

Nevertheless, their newfound unity was extremely fragile, and the peasant movement soon split again into three different confederations. Two were called the National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia* (CNTCB) and were aligned, respectively, with the Democratic National Alliance (ADN) party of General Hugo Banzer Suárez and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement Alliance (AMNR) led by former president Víctor Paz Estenssoro. The third was an independent organization, the CSUTCB.

The CSUTCB remains the largest peasant confederation today and the major representative of the peasants in the COB. It has supported the COB's positions in its conflicts with the current government of Hernán Siles Zuazo and has put forth its own demand for peasants to share administrative control (*cogestión*) in the operations of state-run industries in the agricultural sector.

UGN. *See* National Printers' Union.

UNION CONFEDERATION OF BOLIVIAN WORKERS (Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia—CSTB).

Rejecting the corporatist attempt by Colonel David Toro to organize all workers into the state-controlled Permanent National Assembly of Union Organizations* (ANPOS), the labor movement organized the CSTB in November 1936. The CSTB was the direct descendant of the regional Workers' Federation of Labor* (FOT) and was the most important union confederation in Bolivia until the founding of the Bolivian Workers' Confederation* (COB) in 1952.

Rejecting the anarcho-syndicalist strain in the Bolivian labor movement which called for complete independence between political parties and the labor movement, the CSTB actively sought a political front with the left-wing parties of the late 1930s and the 1940s. The CSTB's strength was in the railroad workers and in the Union Workers' Federations (FOS's), cross-industry groupings of all workers from a particular locality.

By 1940, battles between the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers' Party (POR) and the Third International, or communist-affiliated, Party of the Revolutionary Left (PIR) took up a considerable portion of the CSTB's time. The Confederation itself split in 1940, and thereafter the PIR remained the strongest political force within the organization. Political maneuvering in the union confederation resulted in a number of unusual positions taken by the CSTB in the 1940s. For example, the CSTB at first refused to recognize the formation of the powerful Federated Union of Mine Workers of Bolivia* (FSTMB) in 1944 since the federation was supported by the government of Major Gualberto Villarroel, whom the PIR denounced as a fascist. The CSTB was also put in the uncomfortable position of supporting governments in the late 1940s which were responsible for the repression of the militant miners. The CSTB dissolved itself in order to join the COB in 1952.

UNIÓN GRÁFICA NACIONAL. *See* National Printers' Union.

WOMEN'S LABOR FEDERATION (Federación Obrera Feminina—FOF).

The FOF was part of the upsurge of anarcho-syndicalist organizations in the late 1920s. It was organized by women workers in La Paz, particularly street and market vendors. The FOF has been hailed as one of the pillars of the anarcho-syndicalist movement in Bolivia.

WORKERS' FEDERATION OF LABOR (Federación Obrera de Trabajo—FOT).

The FOT was formed in La Paz in 1918 and carried on the work of the International Workers' Federation* (FOI). Despite its small size, it was the most important union federation in the country until the formation of the Union Confederation of Bolivian Workers* (CSTB) in 1936. Two of the most important unions, the railroad workers and the printers, did not join the FOT for many years even though the new federation supported their job actions. Rather, artisans continued to dominate the organization in the 1920s: carpenters, tailors, cab

drivers, hotel workers. As late as 1925, the FOT claimed to represent only thirteen groups with 630 members.

The FOT recognized a close relationship between workers' demands and the larger political context in which they were made. In an early document the organization spoke of the need "to take state power through the electoral process, in order to serve the permanent interests of the people."

In 1926 anarcho-syndicalists broke from the FOT and formed the FOL—La Paz,* but the older federation continued under the leadership of Marxists, gradually gaining the adherence of more industrial workers. Waldo Álvarez, the head of the printers' union, directed the FOT in the mid-1930s and was named by Colonel David Toro to be Bolivia's first Minister of Labor in 1936. Álvarez and the FOT were instrumental in creating the CSTB later that same year.

WORKERS' FEDERATION OF LA PAZ (Federación Obrera de La Paz).

Founded by leaders of Bolivia's artisan trades in 1908, the Workers' Federation of La Paz carried on the tradition of mutual aid societies which began in the mid-1800s. Thus, the federation sought to "bring together all artisans and protect and provide them with brotherly help in the many ups and downs of life." The Workers' Federation of La Paz was closely tied to the ruling Liberal Party. In 1912 many of its members abandoned it for the more radical International Workers' Federation* (FOI).

WORKERS' SOCIAL CENTER (Centro Social de Obreros—CSO).

Carpenters and tailors formed the Workers' Social Center in 1906. The CSO was led by members of the Liberal Party, but it hinted at the future development of a radicalized workers' movement. José Valenzuela, a carpenter who helped found the CSO, argued for workers to play a role in the establishment of a democratic government in Bolivia, for "it is in the nature of democracy to recognize the sovereignty of the people as a driving force of the state." Given that the Bolivian electorate ranged between 30,000 and 40,000 out of a population of 1.6 million in 1900, this was quite a defiant demand.

WORKERS' SOCIETY OF EL PORVENIR (Sociedad Obreros El Porvenir).

An artisan organization tied to the ruling Liberal Party, the Workers' Society of El Porvenir was the first group to celebrate May Day in Bolivia in 1906.

Brazil

GERALD MICHAEL GREENFIELD

The dominant role of the state, pronounced regional and sectoral disparities, and hierarchical and corporatist sociopolitical structures comprise important structural factors in the development of organized labor in Brazil. These characteristics emerged along the longer course of Brazil's historical experience.

Brazil began its national existence in 1822 as a monarchy under Pedro I, son of the Portuguese monarch João VI, and remained an Empire until the latter portion of the nineteenth century. Its imperial history typically is divided into three stages: the First Empire, the period of rule by Pedro I; the Regency, the years from 1831 to 1840 after Pedro had abdicated in favor of his six-year-old son, Pedro II, a time of considerable regional unrest; and the Second Reign, the years from Pedro's assuming the throne until a republican revolution in 1889.

Due to a combination of this unifying monarchical principle, interlocking ties of family and education among a relatively coherent elite, and the bureaucratic centralizing policies of Pedro II's government, Brazil—at least at the national governmental level—escaped the sorry round of coups and civil wars that marked most of the other nations of Latin America during the nineteenth century. Relative peace and stability, especially after mid-century, promoted considerable prosperity, generated by an export agriculture tied first to sugar and then increasingly to coffee, with a laboring force composed of African slaves. This prosperity remained within a small sector of the nation's population, monopolized by the *fazendeiros*, or planters, who owned the land and held interests in commercial enterprises, either directly or through associated family members, and enjoyed great influence if not outright dominance over the imperial government.

The rapid emergence of coffee after mid-century produced some important changes in Brazil. It definitively shifted the locus of economic and political power from the sugar-producing northeast to lands in the south which were tributary to the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. This in turn helped spark

considerable urbanization in the southeast. As such, the historical development of organized labor centers overwhelmingly in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

A second major change, the abolition of slavery, helped spur the widening of a capitalist economy and wage-earning sector, and also prompted substantial foreign immigration, largely from Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The early labor movement in Brazil was organized and dominated by these immigrants, who provided not only the leadership but the preponderance of its rank and file. The increasing complexity of the Brazilian nation and rapid pace of change ultimately destabilized the old imperial structure, which proved unable to resolve the claims of competing groups. Indeed, increasingly as the century wore on, it lost its base of support among the old elite but failed to capture such new groups as the "progressive" coffee growers and new urban middle groups of the southeast.

Several crises shook Brazil, including a long foreign war with Paraguay (1865–70), which revealed the reality of weakness that belied the proud claims of imperial Brazil, and a deep agricultural depression in the 1870s and 1880s, the so-called *decadencia*, which severely depressed the nation's export earnings. These, coupled with other great domestic political issues—for example the immediate abolition of slavery without compensation to owners and a religious controversy which involved questions of imperial versus papal supremacy but was viewed by many conservatives as an attack on religion—and the weight of such new currents of thought as liberalism and positivism, made the monarchy seem both inept and anachronistic. With Pedro II in Portugal, having abdicated in favor of his daughter the Princess Isabel, the army staged a brief revolt that toppled the empire and inaugurated the Old Republic (*República Velha*), which lasted until 1930.

This new system was consciously a decentralized one, highly federalist in nature, with the states enjoying wide powers and prerogatives. This further exacerbated regional disparities in that wealthier states could pour revenue into development and infrastructure projects, an alternative not available to areas in economic decline. São Paulo, for example, expanded and modernized port facilities in the city of Santos, engaged in several important plans of urban beautification and development in the city of São Paulo, and sponsored immigration and colonization schemes to fulfill its growing labor needs. To the extent that national power and revenues proved important to development, it was in fact the wealthier states that essentially controlled the government. Indeed, the notion of the "politics of the governors" in which the presidency of the Republic was rotated between São Paulo and Minas Gerais, the so-called politics of coffee and cream, conveys a sense of the degree to which elite groups (state oligarchies consolidated into powerful machines) of a few wealthy states dominated the Old Republic. Ultimately, then, the area today known as the southeast, embracing the states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Minas Gerais, along with the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul showed the greatest rhythms of growth, measured in terms of infrastructure, population, and economic power.

It was in this Southern Triangle as well, most prominently in São Paulo and

Rio, that large-scale commercial activity, related particularly to coffee, and industrial activity (specifically textiles, processing, and construction) showed great growth.

The national government, and to a large extent the oligarchies in these states, continued to perceive Brazil in essentially agricultural terms, insisting that the nation's wealth and future rested on the exploitation of its natural products. Popular Liberal doctrines of free trade and comparative advantage also suggested the logic of Brazil's focusing its attention on agricultural development. Nonetheless, manufacturing and industrial development showed important gains during the Old Republic. The abolition of slavery freed large amounts of capital for investment; the work force expanded, fed by foreign migration, as well as by internal demographic processes which witnessed a continuing appropriation of the nation's surplus labor by the more dynamic southeast; urbanization accelerated, and in addition, as Brazil generally enjoyed good terms of trade for its agricultural products, foreign exchange and domestic revenues were available for investment. World War I, to the extent that it disrupted temporarily the traditional exchange of agricultural products for finished goods manufactured in Europe or the United States, helped spur some import substitution. The larger incidence of wage labor, growing industrial and commercial sectors, and increased urbanization quite naturally provided the backdrop for intensified union activity.

In a manner analogous to the demise of the Empire, the Old Republic increasingly became anachronistic. Despite considerable expansion of urban middle sectors and laboring classes, and the increased importance of industrial activity, the political elite seemed firmly committed to the interests of a more narrowly defined class of export agriculturalists. Furthermore, the political bankruptcy of a system in which the national government was the creature of just a few states translated into national policies that could not respond to the needs of the nation as a whole. Finally, since the stability of the system at a national level rested on alliances among different state oligarchies, the national government could not easily command the loyalties of individual citizens. Indeed, the government—if not the nation—remained more of an abstraction than a reality.

When in 1930 the unwritten rule of alternating presidential candidates was broken by São Paulo's attempting to place one of its own at the helm for another term, and the effects of the western world depression produced substantial economic disruption, the Old Republic easily fell before the forces of Getúlio Vargas, who led the so-called Revolution of 1930.

The accession of Getúlio Vargas to national power began a new era in Brazilian development. Vargas, who dominated national politics until his ousting in 1945, presided over a reorientation of national policies toward achieving rapid and substantial industrial growth, fostering notions of economic nationalism, and at least rhetorically, positing the national government as ruling in the interests of all parts and classes of the nation. Furthermore, whereas previous national administrations had seen organized labor as something that ought to be repressed (one Old Repub-

lic president is famous for observing that the social question, i.e., labor, was a matter for the police), Vargas consciously fostered labor organization, incorporating it into his power base. In so doing, he not only extended a number of important legal benefits to labor but created an organizational form and set of legal guidelines or structures that unionized labor retains to this day.

Although the Vargas era dates from the Revolution of 1930, Vargas remains most closely associated with the so-called New State (Estado Novo), his dictatorial regime proclaimed by a third Republican constitution. The first Republican constitution had created the Old Republic; the second was promulgated in 1934. Often likened to Mussolini's Italy, Vargas' new state in reality bore the hallmarks of traditional corporatist notions inherent in the Iberian-Thomistic tradition of Latin America. In this view, society emerges not as an aggregate of individuals, but of functional groups, whose relationships are articulated by the state.

Vargas saw labor as constituting one such group, as well as a potential mass base of support. He created the Ministry of Labor, Industry and Commerce (which, as other functions were separated from it, ultimately would become simply the Ministry of Labor), which instituted a number of programs designed to win the support of workers. These included paid holidays, retirement benefits, medical assistance, a set workweek, and a law regarding job security (*estabilidade*). The unions, or *sindicatos*, were legalized and placed under the Labor Ministry's control. Vargas, then, reorganized the labor movement, providing it with channels to air its grievances and secure redress, but at the cost of its autonomy. That is, the labor movement, though recognized and legalized, became a dependency of the state.

With the discrediting of fascism in World War II, pressure mounted for a liberalization of the regime and return to more formally democratic politics. Ever the astute politician, Vargas moved to reopen the political system, calling for the election of a new Constitutional Convention and for elections for the presidency. Using his strength among the unions and the communists, he fostered a movement that called for his remaining in power ("queremistas," from their slogan "we want Getúlio," *queremos Getúlio*). Fearful of this maneuvering and the possibility that Vargas would succeed in maintaining himself without its support, the military stepped in, deposed Vargas, and oversaw the new elections in which Eurico Gaspar Dutra gained 55 percent of the vote, thanks in part to the fact that he received Vargas' endorsement.

Despite Dutra's election and the formulation of another new constitution in 1946, much of the thrust of the New State remained, particularly with regard to industrial development and a nascent economic nationalism that looked askance at foreign domination of the Brazilian economy. So, too, the co-optation of organized labor, positioned institutionally as a dependency of the state, continued. Following Dutra's term, Vargas won the presidency. This second time in office, however, some of the magic seemed to disappear, as Vargas wrestled with forces of change generated by Brazil's industrial development and the

changing nature of the world economy. His term ended abruptly with his suicide, and a cryptic note which spoke of enemies of the fatherland who had conspired against him.

The political system cranked out a replacement, Juscelino Kubitschek, who had been governor of the important state of Minas Gerais and enjoyed the support of both the Brazilian Labor Party (*Partido Trabalhista Brasileira*) and the Social Democrats (*Partido Social Democratico*). Even so, he garnered but 36 percent of the votes, and opponents challenged the election since an absolute majority had not been recorded. At this point, the army, in a movement headed by General Henrique Teixeira Lott, stepped in to guarantee Kubitschek's mandate. While the army in this case had acted to promote constitutional norms (and in fact referred to the action as the Constitutionalist Military Movement—*Movimento Militar Constitucionalista*), the increasing involvement of the Brazilian military in political affairs did not augur well for the integrity of the electoral system. Indeed, in 1964 when the military stepped in to overthrow the legally elected government, it did so claiming to represent the higher interests of the nation.

At this juncture in 1955, the military action not only allowed Kubitschek to take office, but brought in as vice president João Goulart, who had briefly served as minister of labor under Vargas and had gained both a reputation for radicalism and the enmity of important officers. This too proved significant in the Revolution of 1964, for it was Goulart who was ousted from the presidency by that action.

For the nonce, though, Kubitschek's administration enjoyed considerable popularity, as the charismatic populist president promised "Fifty years of Progress in Five," and moved vigorously to implement this slogan by laying the bases for the automobile industry, providing tremendous state support for the steel industry, and greatly enlarging the nation's highway system. It was Kubitschek also who pushed strongly to realize an old Brazilian dream: the construction of a new national capital away from the coast; and during his term Brasília became a reality, though at great ultimate cost to the economy in terms of inflation and deficit financing. Brasília was designed not only to spark internal development and the exploitation of Brazil's vast territory but to symbolically suggest and confirm a reorientation of Brazil away from the Atlantic and a dependence on imported ideas and products. In this sense, it represented a triumph of the notions of economic nationalism unleashed during the Vargas years, though in fact Kubitschek reopened the Brazilian economy to foreign penetration.

His administration, traditionally populist in orientation, witnessed a relaxation of the rigorous controls and approved ideological orientations that had marked Brazil during the second Vargas and Dutra administrations. This allowed a strong resurgence of both the communists and socialists (Dutra previously had outlawed the Brazilian communist party), and both groups proved extremely active in labor organizing. In many respects, labor under Kubitschek enjoyed greater autonomy than ever before. Still, viewed in retrospect, the Kubitschek administration emerges as one of considerable contradictions. Despite its populist rhetoric, workers did not receive real gains, and the mass of Brazilians did not share in

Brazil's prosperity. That prosperity was itself somewhat illusory in that it came at the cost of deficit financing and increased debt. And, as has been noted, foreign capital controlled increasingly large segments of the Brazilian economy. At the same time, increasing urbanization and accelerated industrial development generated expanded middle sectors and an increasingly vocal working class, both of whom would be hardest hit by inflation.

The whirlwind was reaped by Kubitschek's successors, Janio Quadros and João Goulart, whose administrations proved the last civilian governments Brazil would know until the inauguration of José Sarney as president in 1985. Instability at the top emerged as a key feature of the years between Quadros' assuming the presidency in January 1961 and the so-called April Revolution of 1964 that ushered in two decades of direct military rule. Quadros began in auspicious fashion, having won the largest popular vote in Brazilian history and becoming the first president inaugurated in Brasília. Promising to root out corruption—his campaign symbol was a broom—he began investigations into various federal bureaus and adopted a strongly nationalistic and left-leaning stance. For example, he appointed a commission to structure limits on remitting profits abroad and began a process of political and economic opening to the socialist world; he also awarded Ché Guevara the Order of the Southern Cross. But in a move that remains without a satisfactory explanation, after seven months in office Quadros resigned the presidency and left for Europe.

If moderate and right-wing elements in Brazil had been disturbed by Quadros' rhetoric and actions, the fact that his successor would be the still more radical João Goulart proved truly frightening. A movement to limit his powers quickly grew up. Indeed, he assumed office only after a compromise which saw the creation of a Parliamentary regime that assured his opponents that "Jango" would not enjoy untrammelled power as president. Although a plebiscite in January of 1963 restored his full presidential powers, Goulart's time increasingly was devoted to building coalitions to sustain his presidency or to playing groups off against each other to blunt direct challenges.

This juggling act allowed some labor groups to pressure the president, demanding favors in return for support and even managing to defy his wishes and advance instead their own programs. This very absence of strong control at the top and the increasingly autonomous and radical actions of labor proved highly disturbing to Brazilian centrists and rightists, for the society as a whole placed a strong premium on the maintenance of order. The absence of strong authority was seen by such people as an invitation to anarchy or to communist subversion. Goulart himself fed these fears, first appearing as a traditional populist in the Kubitschek mold but then sounding increasingly radical. Perhaps most important, matters seemed to be getting out of hand, with various large-scale protest movements prompting dark visions of profound turmoil. In September of 1963 a Sargents Revolt at the Navy and Airforce broke out, and at the beginning of 1964, as a consequence of new government policies regarding agrarian reform, clashes between landowners and peasants occurred throughout the country, es-

pecially in Minas Gerais. In Brasília, some 7,000 workers held a protest march, and on 13 March, before a huge gathering of workers in Rio, Goulart announced the state takeover of private oil refineries and his agrarian reform policy, then two days later sent a message to Congress outlining a new and radical course for Brazil.

The specter of increased radicalism and disorder was decried by a conservative demonstration on 19 March, The Family March with God For Liberty (*A Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade*), but scarcely one week later a group of sailors rose in revolt against the Minister of the Navy. Rising inflation, which further limited the government's room for maneuver, also fueled domestic unrest, while pressure from the United States, highly displeased with Goulart's pro-Cuba stance, provided further incentive for conservative elements in the military to move. Beginning on 31 March and ending the next day, the military deposed Goulart. A scant eight days later, Brigadeiro Corrêia de Melo, Admiral Augusto Rademaker, and General Arthur da Costa e Silva signed the First Institutional Act which began the process of reorganizing the Brazilian government into a military dictatorship, and on 11 April 1964 a purged and submissive National Congress elected as president of the Republic General Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco.

Ruthless repression of dissent in the name of anti-communism and the restoration of public order characterized most of the first decade of military rule, particularly from Institutional Act Number 5 (AI-5) of December 1968, which gave broad powers to the executive to suspend political rights, annul elections, and legislate by decree without Congress. Previous acts already had eliminated the existing political party system, replacing it with one government party, ARENA (National Renewal Alliance, *Aliança Renovadora Nacional*), and one official opposition party (Brazilian Democratic Movement, *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*—MDB) (IA-7, 27 Oct. 1965), and instituted indirect elections for state governors (IA-3, 5 Feb. 1966). Political freedoms were drastically curtailed, the news media rigidly censored, spies placed in the universities, and arrest, torture, and disappearance of opponents became commonplace.

In this, of course, the unions that had supported Goulart or jockeyed for independent power were seen as threats, especially in that an inter-union parallel group, the General Strike Command* (*Comando Geral da Greve*), which evolved into the General Workers Command (*Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores*—CGT), had proved instrumental in mounting various large-scale demonstrations of labor power in the intense political maneuvering that had marked the last days of the Goulart regime. For example, it was the CGT along with the metalworkers union that in the wake of the sailors' insubordination insisted that the Minister of Marine be removed and substituted by a People's Admiral (*Almirante do Povo*). When strikes were called to protest the military takeover, therefore, the new government proved more than willing to move forcibly against union leaders, many of whom were arrested; others went into exile or had their political rights suppressed (*cassados*, becoming essentially nonpersons). While maintaining the

union structure inherited from the New State, the government used the ample powers thus granted to purge unions of radical elements and bring once more the entire structure firmly under government control.

Continued military rule, viewed historically, represented something of an aberration in Brazil. While from the late nineteenth century on the military had become an increasingly important political actor, present at the creation of major changes in government, it had acted and then withdrawn, leaving the government to civilians. Thus while it was soon quite clear that this time the military, citing the bankruptcy and corruption of the existing political system and politicians, intended to retain power for itself, it also proffered the possibility of an ultimate return to a civilian, democratic system. Moreover, despite the destruction of political liberty, the government retained various structural elements of the old system. Thus, the National Congress—while acting, to be sure, as a rubber stamp—continued to meet; a formal two-party structure existed; and new constitutions as well as institutional acts provided formal legitimization for the system as a rule of law. Moreover, by 1974, with the election of Ernesto Geisel, head of the state oil monopoly, Petrobrás, to the presidency, following the years of considerable real economic growth (the so-called Brazilian miracle which had occurred during the administration of his predecessor Garrastazu Médici), talk of an easing of repression became widespread, as did a belief that the new government had a commitment to promote improved income distribution and social welfare to apportion the benefits of Brazil's economic growth more equitably.

Geisel himself directly spoke of a gradual redemocratization that would begin with decompression (*decompressão*), or easing of the repressive state apparatus, but still warned of the paramount importance of maintaining security. Questions of liberalization also received some boost in the 1974 congressional elections that saw an extremely strong showing by the opposition MDB, thanks in part to a recent government decision to allow all candidates relatively free access to television. The MDB virtually doubled its representation in the lower house and nearly tripled its members in the Senate. Geisel promised that the results would be respected, a decision made easier by the fact that Congress long had been stripped of any real independent power.

The millennium had not arrived, however, for Geisel's government showed itself perfectly capable of employing the most ruthless tactics of previous regimes, including torture and heavy-handed censorship. In fact, rather than any immediate return to open, democratic politics, Geisel's government initiated what became an elaborate dance that still remains uncompleted. The essential problem was to reconcile security with liberalization. The government was determined to maintain control over the pace and timing of the process. At the same time, that government was split between hard-liners—virulently anti-communist and opposed to any liberalization while the threat to the fatherland remained, and certainly to any that would allow a share of power to leftists—and other elements

committed to liberalization but equally determined to maintain order and blunt radicalism.

Other forces outside the military were building and would have to be accommodated or totally repressed. For example, the Church hierarchy became increasingly vocal critics of the regime and its repressive policies in terms not only of the damage to the political system but to the rights and well-being of the masses. In addition, the organization of base-line communities (*comunidades de base*) by both priests and Catholic lay workers provided a strong institutional base for mass action. The labor movement also had begun to revive, with the metalworkers of the São Paulo area leading large-scale strike actions. The capacity for resistance by civil society grew with these varied organizational efforts. It appeared that elements of resistance would continue to press for change, but acting largely within approved channels and avoiding potentially ruinous confrontations, for opposition elements whether in politics, the church, or labor all remained conscious of the real possibility of provoking a move by the hard-liners within the military.

Withal, as of this writing, Brazil has in fact seen a return to civilian rule, and the promise of a new constitution and a New Republic. But while the opposition soundly defeated the government party, it was only after the desertion of several former government allies, linked in some cases to questions of personality, in others to practicality. Thus, Aureliano Chaves, former vice president under the last military president João Figueiredo, helped form part of the Democratic Alliance that triumphed. José Sarney, former head of the government party, inherited the presidency after the death of president-elect Tancredo Neves in 1985. That the democratization of Brazil will continue seems, for the nonce, secure, as all political actors show restraint and a respect for the fact that the military, as always, waits in the wings. But whether the New Republic will indeed produce a transformation of Brazilian society, creating economic and social democracy along with democratic political forms, remains an open question, as does the capacity of the system to absorb discontent and open debate.

That discontent and debate will appear already seems clear. A labor movement that had gained in strength, growing up outside the formal channels of government control, was an important actor in the combination of elements that ended the military regime, and it surely will demand its rewards. At the same time, massive inflation and Brazil's serious foreign debt issue, along with IMF restrictions, force austerity measures that fall largely on the masses and limit government options. The new minister of labor, Almir Pazzianotto, is a former lawyer for the militant metalworkers of the São Paulo ABC (Santo André, São Bernardo, and São Caetano) suburbs, and important government officials have gone on record as suggesting that strikes should not be seen as threats but as normal occurrences in a democratic system. If this attitude in fact does come to characterize the labor policies of the New Republic, it would constitute a reversal of some 100 years of labor history in Brazil. Any analysis of that history reveals

a story of governments either that are hostile and repressive or that embrace union movements only to achieve control and domination.

The origins of organized labor in Brazil reach back to the mid-nineteenth century, with the appearance of mutual aid societies, generally sponsored by skilled craftsmen or artisans. But the truly generative period for Brazilian labor emerged only towards the end of the nineteenth century with the onset of mass European immigration to Brazil and the concomitant rise of class-conscious labor organizations with demands for alterations in prevailing wages and hours, and in some cases in the very nature of relations among labor, production, and capital.

The years from the latter nineteenth century up to 1930 emerge as one stage in the development of Brazilian labor organization; throughout most of that period anarcho-syndicalist doctrines provided the basic organizational philosophy. At the same time, however, socialists and communists also played a significant role. To these already varied strains, reformist or nonrevolutionary trade unionism also must be added, so that ideological diversity characterized this early period. Initially, this diversity did not always prevent cooperation, but as the years wore on, it increasingly generated conflict that weakened the movement as a whole. Ethnic diversity also generated antagonisms. At one level, domestic versus immigrant labor provoked a major rift. From 1871 until 1920 nearly 3.5 million immigrants—largely Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish—entered Brazil, lured by state-sponsored immigration schemes in Rio and São Paulo, the coffee boom, and the abolition of slavery. They occupied the skilled and semiskilled occupations, while native Brazilian laborers, for complex reasons involving class, cultural attitudes, and the availability of alternative opportunities, became marginalized. The fact that immigrants evinced disdain for the freedmen and mixed bloods added a shadow of racial tension to those already generated by the simple fact of native versus foreigner. Further complicating the possibilities for a mass movement embracing the entire working class were antagonisms among the immigrants themselves, for Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian elements each attempted to establish individual power bases.

If ideological and ethnic tensions split the movement during this time, various structural factors also limited the possibilities for an effective union movement. To begin with, Brazil remained largely an agrarian nation, and large-scale commerce was concentrated in but a few urban centers, predominantly Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, although with sizable sectors as well in such old-line northeastern capitals as Recife and Bahia. Given the vast distances separating these centers, rudimentary transportation, and strong traditions of regionalism, the labor movement for this reason alone would have remained diverse. But at the same time, as has been noted, it was Rio and São Paulo that most immigrants sought, so tensions between native and foreigner not only provoked conflict within individual urban centers but helped militate against a feeling of solidarity among labor movements in various parts of the country.

Another structural limitation was the small scale of industry. Again, Rio and São Paulo enjoyed by far the preponderant share of national industry; still, prior

to World War I, when a move toward import-substitution industry gained force, employment in manufacturing proved highly limited, though to be sure a textile industry of some size did exist. Given the relative smallness of these sectors and patterns of foreign immigration and internal migration, labor surplus existed in those few areas of greater economic opportunity. Two additional factors also played an important role in limiting the movement's success. Paternalistic labor relations militated against both class consciousness and direct confrontational tactics by Brazilian workers. At the same time, the state, strongly hierarchical, paternalistic, and authoritarian, monopolized power and placed a high premium on public order. So too did the national elites who, bound by ties of kinship, education, and class, dominated formal and informal spheres of government, politics, and power through interlocking associational networks. Labor conflicts of all kinds, but especially strikes, constituted for these groups a dangerous expression of social rebellion. The state proved ready to employ repressive measures to prevent the labor movement from exceeding the boundaries of traditional paternalistic relationships. Thus, deportation of foreign-born labor leaders, ideological campaigns against foreign doctrines (exploiting the nativistic sentiments common in Brazil), outlawing individual unions, prohibiting strikes, and mounting police and military invasions of militant union headquarters all proved common weapons of national and state government.

Many of these varied constraints on labor organization, especially ideological conflict and state dominance, continued to plague the labor movement throughout its history. During this formative period they assured that labor organization remained precarious and slow. In the years before World War I, organizational efforts achieved some success in the construction and maritime trades but recorded only failure in textiles. Anarcho-syndicalists in 1906 sponsored a general strike, promoted the nation's First Labor Congress (*Primeiro Congresso Operário*) and called for, among other things, the establishing of a national federation of labor modeled on the French CGT (*Confédération Générale du Travail*). The Confederation was still-born, and the strike prompted a new deportation law in 1907. The years from 1917 through 1920 witnessed a new wave of labor militancy, marked by a successful general strike in São Paulo in July of 1917 led by textile workers. The strike spread to other cities and helped spark increased union organizing. For example, in Rio, the Union of Textile Factory Workers* (*União dos Operários em Fábricas de Tecidos*) arose as a direct result of this action.

Anarcho-syndicalists, working with socialists, organized Brazil's most important early twentieth-century labor organizations, including the Labor Federation of Rio* (*Federação Operária do Rio de Janeiro*) and São Paulo Labor Federation* (*Federação Operária de São Paulo*), as well as the Union of Textile Factory Workers.

In its purest form, anarchism viewed all organizational structures as parts of a bourgeois authoritarianism that restrained individual liberty and perpetuated capitalist exploitation. Anarcho-syndicalism modified orthodoxy, stressing the

importance of workers organized in syndicates as a means of promoting revolutionary goals. This philosophy also saw "direct action"—for example, strikes, sabotage, and boycotts—as ways that workers learned to act in solidarity. The all-embracing general strike comprised the ultimate weapon for effecting capitalism's downfall. Anarcho-syndicalists therefore scorned all attempts to work through the state whether through parliamentary action or the formation of labor parties, something that brought them into conflict with socialists and communists who did believe in advancing their cause through such mechanisms. Another point of conflict here was the anarcho-syndicalists' insistence that anarchist principles operate within the unions. Unions, in their view, ought to have neither leaders nor hierarchies. When a union formed part of an anarchist federation, it retained its autonomy, for the federation represented not a higher level of power but merely a convenient organizational structure.

In any event, resurgence of organized labor provoked a strong response by the national government in the 1920s that saw a concerted effort to purge the labor movement of all radical elements and bring the more tractable remainder directly under state control. Indeed, Artur da Silva Bernardes as president of Brazil from 1922 to 1926 so harshly repressed labor that his administration is referred to as a time when labor endured a state of siege. Radical leaders suffered arrest, imprisonment, torture, and, in the case of foreigners, deportation. State power was employed to close down such radical unions as the Union of Civil Construction Workers* (*União dos operários em construção Civil*), while reformist trade unions—those not advocating direct confrontations or alterations in the fundamental bases of power in Brazil—were spared during this time of troubles. In fact, the government even promoted a labor congress of these more tractable unions with the aim of establishing a national confederation that would follow the government line.

With the lifting of the state of siege, some reorganization of the labor movement occurred, and some of the old unions resurfaced. But much of the old anarcho-syndicalist constituency had been lost to the Brazilian communists, who founded a political party in 1922 (*Partido Comunista do Brasil*) and had been actively organizing in the absence of the anarchists, or was attracted to those government-favored unions that did not suffer in the repression. Then too, as the number of native-born Brazilian workers increased, movements led by foreigners lost appeal. And in any event, the Revolution of 1930 prevented not only the old anarcho-syndicalists but all unions from consolidating an effective independent position. In that sense, despite limited gains, the formative period had witnessed an autonomous labor movement that mounted a radical critique of the Brazilian nation. By contrast, during the Vargas years the labor movement would gain many benefits, but at the cost of its autonomy. For under Vargas, organized labor became a tool and dependency of the state, a position that once established would forevermore characterize organized labor in Brazil save for the brief interregnum between the later years of Kubitschek and the military coup of 1964.

Vargas' era witnessed a spurt of industrialization, keyed by dislocations prompted by the Great Depression and by conscious government policy embracing the tenets of economic nationalism that sought to equip the nation with the full array of basic or heavy industries as opposed to the previous pattern of import substitution and processing. This in turn helped promote a massive influx of rural migrants into Brazil's larger cities. As a result, the support and control of the urban working class, along with that of the expanded national bourgeoisie, became an increasingly important aspect of Brazilian political reality.

Consciously projecting an image of the father of the masses (*o pai do povo*), one eminently suited to traditional Brazilian paternalism, Vargas transformed Brazilian labor relations, legitimizing union organization and sponsoring important pro-labor legislation, but exacting in return a high price: total government domination of the labor movement. The Vargas labor laws, ultimately codified as the Consolidated Labor Laws in 1943 (*Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho*), divided economic activity into seven sectors, with each featuring a parallel structure of worker and employer associations. The code also established associations for members of the liberal professions. The basic unit of organization was the *sindicato*, an industrial or occupational grouping at the level of the *município* (essentially, a county level). In this structure, conspicuously absent was the plant-level union or any single nationwide all-labor confederation. Instead, it aggregated these individual industrial groupings into state or regional federations and then, nationally, into confederations. The Ministry of Labor exercised close jurisdiction over all union activity, for without official recognition from the ministry, unions had no legal right to exist; and it remained the prerogative of the labor ministry to enforce labor legislation, formulate employment policy, and to supervise the operation of trade unions. New State legislation also established in 1946 a system of labor courts, headed by a Higher or Superior Labor Court (*Tribunal Superior do Trabalho*), to act as a court of appeal, and as a court of first instance regarding interpretive issues arising out of the labor laws as well as collective disputes between employees and employers. Regional and local tribunals, with more limited mandates, also were established.

Vargas attempted to place all relations between labor and capital in the context of state administrative agencies. Thus, rather than constituting a challenge to state power or a source for conflict and disorder, labor would become a functional group in the corporatist state. Since basic issues like wages, hours, and social welfare benefits became legislative matters, they would be settled within the government structure. Conflict would be contained and managed.

In this system, the state enjoyed the right to draft and decree labor codes, and it was the state that extended, or denied, recognition to unions. Indeed, following each of three successive changes in the fundamental law (1931, 1934, and 1939), all unions had to reapply for recognition. This recognition spelled fiscal life or death for the union. Only officially recognized unions received proceeds from the union tax (*imposto sindical*), a payroll tax collected by the national government, equal to one day's pay per worker per year, and distributed to the unions.

That tax provided the major funding source for union activity. The legislation also specified the purposes for which the funds could be disbursed, generally limiting them to social service activities, and prohibiting their use for mobilizing workers or building a strike fund. The government also reserved the right to intervene in unions it judged to be operating illegally. Essentially, this translated into the right to annul elections, remove union officials, and appoint functionaries known as interventors to run the union in an approved fashion. Furthermore, it remained the prerogative of the Ministry of Labor to make this judgment, as well as to rule on the legality of strikes. The broad powers of the labor ministry also included such areas as employment and wage policy.

New State labor legislation aggregated local unions at a state or regional level into individual federations, linked at the national level into confederations. The original legislation provided for seven such national confederations: National Confederation of Land Transport Workers* (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Transportes Terrestres); National Confederation of Industrial Workers* (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Indústria); National Bank Workers Confederation* (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores nas Empresas de Crédito); National Confederation of Commercial Workers* (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores no Comércio); National Seamen and Air Transport Workers Confederation* (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Transportes Marítimos, Fluviais e Aéreos); National Confederation of Educational and Cultural Workers* (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Estabelecimentos de Educação e Cultura); National Confederation of Communications and Advertising Workers* (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores—Comunicações e Publicidade). To parallel each of these organizations, the law specified the establishing of employer associations. Tellingly, no provision existed for one single national-level union embracing the whole of organized labor.

In both theory and practice, government direction and control of the labor movement emerged as the dominant theme. The space for unions to grow up and operate outside the official bureaucracy and legal environment proved highly limited. This situation remains a feature of Brazilian labor organization. For example, present-day labor legislation allows for only one union in any professional category in a *município*. Thus, once a union has received recognition, no rival organization may legally be constituted. The Ministry of Labor has the prerogative to grant such approval, but also oversees union budgets, expenditures, and elections. These comprise legal mechanisms for controlling ideological persuasions; indeed, current law specifically prohibits as union officers persons who hold ideologies "threatening to national security." Further underscoring the degree of government control, basic issues of wages and hours are subjects for compulsory arbitration rather than for collective bargaining. The underlying conception is to prevent strikes (seen as threatening confrontations between labor and capital) and to promote notions of organic solidarity.

The 1937 National Constitution specifically prohibited strikes, styling them

as “anti-social, prejudicial to labor and capital, and incompatible with the interests of national production.” Subsequent legislation modified the total exclusion of strikes but continued to define appropriate rationales and areas in which strikes would be tolerated. The general ambiguity of such phrases as “national interest” or “national security” as constituting grounds for prohibiting strikes—standard terminology in Brazilian legislation—provided wide latitude for the Ministry of Labor or the Labor Courts to make politically expedient decisions with regard to labor actions. And once ruled in defiance of the law, unions must end their strikes or become subject to the interventor power of the state.

The Vargas era legislation thus limited unions to educational and social welfare activities. In this sense it attempted to turn back the clock, resurrecting the old nineteenth-century pattern of mutualist associations. The advocacy role of unions, pressuring for improved conditions or alterations in prevailing wage-labor systems, would occur *vis-à-vis* the national government. That is, union demands would occur not in the labor-capital marketplace at the level of individual firms or industries and their employees, but in the controlled bureaucratic environment of the state.

In return for becoming a more compliant appendage of the national bureaucracy, labor received substantial legislative benefits, including the stipulation of a minimum wage, forty-eight-hour maximum workweek, paid vacations, workmen’s compensation, guaranteed severance pay, and maternity leave. Legislation passed in 1938 also established a system of obligatory insurance. Prior to this, Vargas’ regime extended the retirement and survivors’ pension funds that had been established in 1923 for railroad workers under the Eloy Chaves law. In 1926 this CAP (Retirement and Pension Fund, or Caixa de Aposentadoria e Pensões) was extended to dock and maritime workers. Then, in 1933, the administration created a new social insurance institution, the IAP (Retirement and Pension Institute, or Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões), that essentially mirrored the general organizational structure of unions. Thus, these institutes were established to cover all employees in specific occupational groupings. For example, by 1939 separate institutes existed for workers in commerce, banking, industry, transport, and maritime activities. As with the organizational structure of labor itself, this system undermined any overall sense of labor solidarity, instead dividing workers into discrete, more easily manageable categories.

The institutes also were to provide a wider range of social services including, for example, health care and housing loans; they remained under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Labor. Paradoxically, while these institutes both reflected and reinforced the corporatist and authoritarian thrust of the Vargas state, they provided an unanticipated base of strength for the union bureaucracies. Unions gained a measure of influence over these agencies, which, as they developed further, controlled vast funds and provided wide opportunities for patronage positions. In periods when the political system opened up, for example following Vargas’ fall, some labor groups found in the institutes an important political resource that they could use as a bargaining lever with the government.

In sum, the Vargas administration attempted to integrate the urban working class into the nation, but in a fashion that rendered it harmless to the authority and control of the state. To that end, it established a wide array of labor legislation and an institutional structure for organized labor that remained characteristic throughout succeeding administrations. Yet the vastly expanded union movement, enlarged urban working class, and greater amount of money tied up in that sector tended to alter the nature of the political game, creating new leaders, strongly entrenched bureaucracies, and a mobilizable mass of urban workers who would, under the proper conditions, serve as effective pressuring agents against the government. This potential became clear when the end of the New State weakened some of the traditional authoritarian controls. In fact, the years from Vargas' fall in 1945 to the military coup of 1964, while by no means exclusively focused on the issue of labor, can legitimately be seen as ones in which various groups or actors sought to either dominate labor or blunt the potentially explosive social consequences of an autonomous labor movement, at the same time that others sought to have labor exercise that very independent political role.

During 1945, a beleaguered Getúlio Vargas freed labor from some of the New State controls. The communists quickly emerged as the most militant and successful labor organizers and as a focal point for anti-Vargas labor elements, sponsoring labor congresses, strikes, and a national organization, the Workers Unity Movement* (Movimento de Unidade dos Trabalhadores—MUT), to coordinate their labor activities. Vargas organized his backers into a Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro) and used it to pressure for his own continuation in power. When the military removed Vargas, and General Eurico Gaspar Dutra triumphed, the labor movement reflected a tripartite split: followers of Vargas, the communists, and the administration.

MUT called for a national labor congress to convene in September 1946; Dutra responded by outlawing both the congress and the MUT. He then began formulating plans for his own national labor congress which would definitively organize the various confederations envisioned by the Vargas labor legislation. For a while it seemed that the communists and the administration would cooperate; thus, both sponsored and helped organize the congress. However, competing claims to authority could not be resolved, and the Congress itself split in two. Followers of Vargas joined the communists and established a national central labor organization: the Confederation of Brazilian Workers* (Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil—CTB). The Dutra faction, following the New State blueprint, established the bases for three high-level organizations: national confederations for industrial, commercial, and land transport workers. The following year, the continuing power of the state became evident when the Supreme Court declared both the CTB and the Communist Party illegal, and the Ministry of Labor purged communist union leaders.

In the next scheduled elections, 1950, ironically it was Vargas, standing for election and winning it, who promised unions greater freedom. He kept his campaign commitment to the renewal of union elections (Dutra had cancelled

them so as to keep government control over the leadership), and the labor ministry under João Goulart adopted a more sympathetic stance toward leftist elements. Vargas' successor, Juscelino Kubitschek, in most ways was the quintessential representative of the national bourgeoisie, rather than a pro-labor politician. However, the agenda of his primary constituency demanded labor peace, and he attempted to provide an atmosphere of freedom for organized labor. On the whole, his administration intervened very few unions. Elections generally proceeded without government interference, and organizing began among agricultural workers, numerically by far the largest component of the Brazilian work force.

The degree of freedom or independence granted to labor should not be overstated, for Kubitschek's traditional populist stance stressed control over the masses. His government definitely attempted to prevent communists from gaining control over unions, moving forcefully in 1960 against a leftist-inspired rail and maritime strike. A most significant alteration for organized labor did take place in terms of a revised social security law. This gave labor leaders one-third of the seats on the governing councils of the various social security agencies (IAPS). The councils themselves enjoyed considerable autonomy, so membership expanded labor leaders' possibilities for autonomous action. Reinforcing points here were increased patronage possibilities represented by the bureaucracies. The combination of control over a national labor confederation and a power base in the governing councils afforded labor leaders an opportunity to challenge the state and demand a still greater share of independent power.

While Kubitschek managed to avoid any showdown, his successor, João Goulart, could not command the loyalties of all those elements traditionally supporting the state. With a weakened base in traditional power sectors, Goulart sought support in organized labor. Unlike the case of his mentor Getúlio Vargas, however, Goulart confronted a movement whose demand was not ameliorative legislation but a share of political power. Moreover, at least in some cases, it seemed that this increased power would be used to alter the prevailing socioeconomic balance of the nation.

The political threat posed by a militant, left-leaning, and increasingly independent labor movement loomed large, especially as Goulart began to adopt a more radical populist position, one tending toward expanded conflict, and left-wing labor organizers assumed control over a larger number of labor unions, including the single largest national confederation, the CNTI. In addition, labor had moved to establish extra-legal bodies like the General Strike Command, which evolved into the General Labor Command (CGT), which first allied itself with Goulart, pressing for the restoration of his full presidential powers, but then showed itself to be more radical than Goulart and rather than his lackey, an organization determined and apparently able to exercise some independent power. The CGT in fact was the heir of a number of other so-called parallel labor organizations (all illegal under existing labor legislation) that evinced left and independent stances and attempted to bypass the paternalistic and authori-

tarian controls of the state. The General Strike Command itself had been formed by leaders representing such "radical" and extra-legal associations as the Pact of Unity and Action* (Pacto de Unidade e Ação), the Permanent Commission of Trade-Union Organizations* (Comissão Permanente das Organizações Sindicais), and the Union Council of Workers in the State of São Paulo* (Conselho Sindical dos Trabalhadores no Estado de São Paulo), as well as from legal but now left-dominated organizations like the National Confederations of Land Transport Workers and of Bank Insurance Workers.

The increased power gained by labor to an extent proved self-reinforcing in that it allowed the organization of several major strikes and, more important, gave labor sufficient clout to resist administration pressure for their termination. For example, in 1962 two general strikes occurred, and in both cases the CGT rejected Goulart's request that they be cancelled. This demonstration of power, in turn, provided labor leaders with increased leverage over the beleaguered president.

This relationship between labor leaders seeking increased political power and populist politicians, including the president, confronted by strikes and demonstrations, has been styled as one of "mutual dependence and mutual antagonism" in which each side attempted to gain an advantage but not to destroy its opponent. (Erickson, 1977, p. 131.)

Ultimately, neither side proved more powerful than the military. Labor's strength in one significant fashion clearly was more apparent than real: the power of new labor leaders did not translate into firm lines of authority over the rank and file. As was only natural for people operating in a system and tradition where favor and advantage flowed from the top, labor leaders had devoted their efforts more to political positioning than to successful organizing. As for the populist politicians, to the extent that their maneuverings indicated a lack of respect for the traditional norms of Brazilian political and social life, they easily could be branded as dangerous and destabilizing demagogues bent on using the masses for political gain. In any event, as civil unrest increased and Goulart seemed unable to guarantee public order or to demonstrate the traditionally expected strong executive authority, the armed forces intervened.

The Revolution of 1964, then, emerges as both anti-communist and anti-populist, responding to the perception of a real threat to the fundamental bases of the Brazilian state. The armed forces quite naturally identified militant unions and their leaders as provocateurs, agents of a domestic conspiracy linked to a larger international one, elements that intended to destabilize the nation. Using powers granted by Vargas' labor legislation, the new military government moved quickly to intervene radical unions, removing leftist leaders, totally outlawing some unions, and forcibly suppressing dissent; pliant pro-government officials replaced the ousted radicals. Only conservative unions and Catholic labor organizations remained relatively unscathed.

The new regime took additional steps to return labor to a dependent, controlled

position. It required all union officers to affirm that they did not hold ideologies contrary to national security. These loyalty oaths were not simply demeaning. Given the broad interpretation of national security and the fact that the definition of offensive ideologies rested with the labor ministry, the oaths allowed the government to remove from leadership posts all those who had been anything other than pro-government in orientation. A reorganized social security system effectively removed that system from union control, eliminating the power base that had fostered increased union independence. At the same time, social security benefits became available to previously excluded groups—for example peasants—and the government fostered rural union development. Both these measures were designed to create a new and sizable union sector that had played no part in the pre-coup maneuvering and presumably would give allegiance to the government that had called it into existence. Further limits on the right to strike constituted another important legal change.

The new government did not have to engage in wholesale restructuring of the labor system. In point of fact, the system's existing organization had been designed to preclude autonomous labor activity. Thus, the government already enjoyed the right to declare strikes illegal, intervene in union elections, and determine wage increases. In addition, its control over the *imposto sindical* provided further leverage. Hence, the most critical difference for organized labor following the coup was the nature of the government in power, specifically, its ability to monopolize power, thereby removing the free space that had promoted union strength, and its willingness to engage in large-scale and continued repression.

In 1967 and 1968, with some talk of liberalizing the regime and workers directly feeling the impact of a deteriorating wage situation, labor leaders began agitating against the so-called salary squeeze, and major strikes broke out among metalworkers beginning in April 1968 with a wildcat action in Contagem, Minas Gerais, followed four months later by a walkout in Osasco, a city suburb of São Paulo. The government used all weapons at its disposal to destroy these movements and remove their leadership. So ferocious was the government response that labor remained quiescent until the mid-1970s. At that time when the regime spoke once again of relaxing its siege mentality and "redemocratizing" Brazilian society, sit-downs and slowdowns occurred. Furthermore, factory commissions, essentially worker groups at the plant level which sought to negotiate with owners and to mediate between workers and management, had grown in size and strength; *pelego* control of union posts no longer remained uncontested.

This growth of plant-level activity and the blossoming of factory commissions as virtually parallel, extra-legal labor organizations, combined with the incidence of government statements upholding the democratic opening, further encouraged union activity, especially among leaders and groups who were not firmly wedded to the government bureaucracy or kept in power solely by virtue of official state blessing. The late 1970s witnessed a major renewal of strike

activity that shook the government, galvanized previously dormant sectors of labor, and brought to the fore a new generation of labor leaders who shared no association with or stigma from past patterns and practices.

The major strike action began as a protest demanding the restoration of lost income resulting from government falsification of new minimum wage rates, a fact that became public and was acknowledged by the government in 1977. The metalworkers of São Paulo's ABC suburbs took the lead. In addition to holding assemblies that demanded the replacement of lost wages, they initiated in 1978 a major wave of strikes. The leader of the São Bernardo Metalworkers, José Inácio da Silva, known popularly as Lula, gained national prominence and even something of an international reputation as the leader of a new wave or style of Brazilian syndicalism.

At that time, the administration of João Figueiredo, pledged to continue the policy of *abertura*, was just beginning. Thus, this new spate of labor conflict became widely seen as a test of the government's commitment to the democratic opening. At first it seemed a question of business as usual: the Regional Labor Court found in favor of the companies, and when strikers refused to desist, the government declared the strike illegal, intervened in the ABC unions, and arrested Lula. Ultimately, however, the Figueiredo administration sought some accommodation. Minister of Labor Murillo Macedo removed the interventors, announced Lula's release, and agreed to reconsider some of the minor aspects of the Labor Court's decision. Macedo also went on record as personally supporting more autonomous unions and more direct bargaining between workers and employers. At that juncture there occurred another significant event. Continuing to shed its traditional role as either silent onlooker or apologist for government policy, the Catholic Church hierarchy in São Paulo expressed its support for the workers. The Bishop of Santo André, Claudio Hummes, for example, attended the striking workers' assemblies and collected food and money to help see them through. When the government closed down the union's headquarters, the Church provided substitute meeting places, and Bishop Hummes traveled to Brasília to speak with Macedo on behalf of the strikers.

On balance, while the strikers did not emerge victorious, the union movement as a whole gained important allies, increased prestige, and a certain legitimacy. At the same time, the government had proved more sympathetic than its immediate predecessors. It did not employ its full arsenal of repressive powers, a fact that encouraged further union militancy. Indeed, the first eight months of 1979 witnessed some 100 strikes involving more than one million workers. A revised anti-strike decree/law of August 1978 actually provided some additional encouragement, for it tacitly permitted strikes in nonessential activities provided that such actions remained nonviolent, nonpolitical, and limited to economic issues. Thus, in August 1979, with 150,000 construction workers striking in Belo Horizonte, the Regional Labor Court judged the action legal and granted a generous wage increase.

Towards the end of 1979 the government promulgated a new wage policy

providing that the inflation-indexed automatic wage increases occur at six-month intervals rather than yearly. And, in contrast to the previous system of across-the-board percentage increases, a system that brought the greatest gains to those at the upper end of the wage scale, the new policy called for a sliding scale designed to bring some additional relief to those at the bottom. For example, as of 14 November of that year, workers earning ten to fifteen times the official minimum wage received increases calibrated at 50 percent of the official index, while those earning one to three times the minimum received an adjustment of 110 percent.

But union success attributable to government suffrance could translate easily into failure if that policy altered. The administration's determination to control the nature, pace, and timing of the democratic opening and the limits that bore upon even the best organized segments of Brazilian labor became apparent during the metallurgical strikes of 1980 and 1981. That action showed that the Brazilian state would not brook open threats to its authority nor a renewal of the type of public disorder that had characterized the immediate pre-coup period. But the strikes also showed that organized labor enjoyed some strong allies within the Church and intellectual communities, substantial public support, and a considerable hold on the loyalties of the rank and file.

In March of 1980 the metalworkers voted to strike. When on 1 April the strike officially began, it embraced not only the ABC suburbs but nearly forty other cities throughout São Paulo state, making it the largest labor action in Brazil in some fifteen years. The government, beleaguered by the return of extremely high inflation and pressures from hard-line military officers, adopted a tough stance designed to demonstrate that it remained the nation's sole power center. It actually encouraged companies to reject worker demands and asserted that the strike was political in nature. This accusation, which if true would provide the basis for outlawing the strike, arose from the fact that Lula had taken advantage of a new law freeing up the organization of political parties to establish a Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores—PT).

The Regional Labor Court, on a very close vote, attempted to remain on the sidelines by ruling itself incompetent to judge this matter. Shortly thereafter, however, on another close vote it reversed itself and judged the strike illegal. The union, despite support from the São Paulo Archdiocese, suffered intervention. Police occupied union headquarters and arrested Lula, along with several of his chief associates. Rank-and-file support began to wane, and by 11 May the last of the strikers, the metalworkers of São Bernardo, went back to work. Although some of the union leaders were exonerated, Lula and twelve of his associates received prison sentences of three and one-half years for "incitement to collective infringement of the law." (Lula initiated a series of appeals, but on 16 April 1982 the Supreme Military Tribunal voted 9 to 3 to declare itself incompetent to hear his last appeal, so the original sentence stood.)

The union movement, though it had suffered a setback, proved highly resilient and flexible. In August of 1981 some 5,000 labor leaders met in an effort to

establish new guidelines for the labor movement and to seek new ways to pressure business and government. At that meeting they resolved to try once more to establish a national central workers organization, using the name Sole Workers Central* (Central Única dos Trabalhadores—CUT). At a subsequent meeting which took place 26–28 August 1983, a meeting that, significantly, did not include leaders of the principal confederations and federations, CUT was established. This sent a clear signal to both government and government-dominated unions that leaders of a more authentic, new syndicalism were determined to work toward true union autonomy. Furthermore, as Brazil's economic situation deteriorated with continuing high inflation and mounting foreign debt, working-class protest became commonplace. For example, in April 1983 violent protests occurred in São Paulo, with jobless workers storming the state governor's palace in a March Against Unemployment; in April of that year some 10,000 workers in São José do Campo totally paralyzed General Motors, and São Bernardo Metalworkers engaged in a slowdown. The São Bernardo action, moreover, was coordinated by a union directorate that officially had lost its political right to exist. Then, during October 1984, thousands of workers and students in Rio and São Paulo took to the streets to protest government austerity measures, particularly a presidential decree limiting pay increases to 80 percent of the cost of living.

Viewed as a whole, not only did labor activity increase, it did so outside the formal channels of government control. This posed a strong challenge to official union leaders, confronting them with the real possibility of losing their constituencies if they failed to support labor's new militancy. The continued democratic opening and creation of new political parties further increased labor's opportunity to play an important role. Indeed, organized labor was one of the important forces in the Democratic Alliance that defeated the official party candidate Paulo Maluf, bringing Tancredo Neves to the presidency, and inaugurating the so-called New Republic.

In 1985 the new Minister of Labor, Almir Pazzianotto, gave amnesty to union leaders who had been persecuted by the military government. The new regime, however, faces serious economic problems including high inflation, debt, and unemployment, and unions throughout the country are mobilizing and pressing their demands. Whether the government can absorb these pressures—especially given Tancredo's untimely death—and retain its mandate remains an open question. A new constitution is to be written, and its provisions may well provide a strong indication as to whether organized labor will remain a dominated element or become instead a truly independent actor.

Bibliography

- Alexander, Robert J. *Organized Labor in Latin America*. New York: Free Press, 1965.
Dulles, John W. F. *Anarchists and Communists in Brazil, 1900–1935*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973.

- . *Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises, 1955–1964*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970.
- Erickson, Kenneth Paul. *The Brazilian Corporative State and Working-Class Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
- Erickson, Kenneth Paul and Kevin J. Middlebrook. "The State and Organized Labor in Brazil and Mexico." In *Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development*, ed. Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Richard S. Weinert. Philadelphia: ISHI, 1982: 213–63.
- Fausto, Bóris. *Trabalho urbano e conflito social, 1890–1920*. São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1976.
- Harding, Timothy Fox. "The Political History of Organized Labor in Brazil." Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1973.
- Humphrey, John. *Capitalist Control and Workers' Struggle in the Brazilian Auto Industry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
- Malloy, James M. *The Politics of Social Security in Brazil*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979.
- Maram, Sheldon L. *Anarquistas, imigrantes e o movimento operário brasileiro, 1890 a 1920*. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1979.
- Moisés, José Alvaro. "Current Issues in the Labor Movement in Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives* 7, no. 4 (1979): 220–45.
- . "What Is the Strategy of the New Syndicalism?" *Latin American Perspectives* 9, no. 4 (1982): 55–73.
- Pinheiro, Paulo Sérgio. *Política e trabalho no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1975.
- Rodrigues, José Albertino. *Sindicato e desenvolvimento no Brasil*. São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1968.
- Rodrigues, Leôncio Martins. *Conflito industrial e sindicalismo no Brasil*. São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1966.
- . *Trabalhadores, sindicatos e industrialização*. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1974.
- Sanders, Thomas G. "Brazil's Labor Unions." American Universities Field Staff Reports. No. 48, 1981.
- Simão, Aziz. *Sindicato e estado*. São Paulo: Dominus, 1966.
- Weffort, Francisco C. *Participação e conflito industrial: Contagem e Osasco, 1968*. São Paulo: Cebrap, 1972.
- Wiarda, Howard J. *The Brazilian Catholic Labor Movement: The Dilemmas of National Development*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts, Labor Relations and Research Center, 1969.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ABC METALWORKERS. *See* Metallurgical, Mechanical, and Electrical Workers of São Bernardo and Diadema.

ALIANÇA DOS TRABALHADORES EM CALÇADO (Shoemakers Alliance). *See* Auxiliary Union of Shoemakers.

ARTISAN-LABOR CONGRESS OF PERNAMBUCO (Congresso Artístico-Operário de Pernambuco). *See* Regional Labor Federation of Pernambuco.

ASSOCIAÇÃO DE ARTES GRÁFICAS. *See* Graphic Workers Union.

AUXILIARY UNION OF SHOEMAKERS (União Aluxiliadora dos Artistas Sapateiros).

Founded in Rio de Janeiro around the turn of the twentieth century, this organization in 1902 led what may well have been the first major strike in Rio organized by a union. The artisan mentality of the organization emerges in the fact that during the shoemakers strike of 1906 it condemned firms that used cardboard in shoes. This union apparently by 1917 had given rise to the syndicalist-oriented Shoemakers League (Liga dos Operários em Calçado), which disputed leadership of the trade in Rio with the anarchist-influenced General Union of Shoemakers (União Geral dos Trabalhadores em Calçado). The League, which enjoyed the greater influence at that time, directed the principal shoemakers strikes, but always with a conciliatory as opposed to confrontational spirit. In 1919 the two shoemakers organizations merged to form the Shoemakers Alliance and sent a delegation to the Third Brazilian Labor Congress (Terceiro Congresso Operário) that met in Rio de Janeiro in 1920.

BENEFICIAL CIRCLE OF CIVIL CONSTRUCTION WORKERS (Círculo Beneficente dos Operários em Construção Civil). *See* Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers.

BRAZILIAN CONFEDERATION OF CHRISTIAN WORKERS (Confederação Brasileira de Trabalhadores Cristãos—CBTC).

Throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century there had been various attempts to organize Catholic Unions and Worker Centers (for example, the Christian Labor Federation of Pernambuco*), that did not partake in the ideological and political struggles among anarcho-syndicalists, socialists, and communists. In 1932, after the accession to power of Getúlio Vargas (in the so-called Revolution of 1930), Father Leopoldo Brentano, an Italian Jesuit in the city of Pelotas in Rio Grande do Sul, reinvigorated the movement by founding ten Worker Circles (Círculos Operários). The newly established Ministry of Labor, viewing the agenda of these circles with favor (they were anti-communist, emphasized social harmony, and stressed the moral, professional, and intellectual development of workers and cooperative mutual assistance) helped promote their further organization. Brentano was called to Rio de Janeiro in 1937 by Cardinal Sebastião Heme to organize a unified national movement. By that year, there were 34 circles with some 31,000 members throughout the country. Five years later there were 142 circles and four state federations. These circles, however, did not receive official recognition from the state as unions; therefore, the original notion of organizing circles according to worker occupation was abandoned. Instead, the circles essentially paralleled officially sanctioned state unions, with each circle member having also to belong to a union. However, the ideological affinity between the circles and Vargas' New State (*Estado Novo*) led the Minister

of Labor to propose that they function as advisory organs to the Ministry, a collaboration that was officially established by governmental decree and resulted in their receiving financial assistance from the government. In the early 1970s there were seventeen federations said to include 450,000 members and 415 circles, with a preponderance of these located in the northeast. The Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers functions as the national body for the circles and federations, but the national organization has been known by other names. In 1937, when Father Brentano moved to Rio de Janeiro and organized the First National Catholic Labor Congress, it established a national organization known as the National Confederation of Workers Circles (*Confederação Nacional de Círculos Operários*). It also has been called the National Confederation of Catholic Workers (*Confederação Nacional dos Operários Católicos*). It adopted the CBTC title in the 1960s.

During the 1950s the circles sponsored trade union leadership-training classes (which in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were affiliated with the prestigious Catholic universities of those cities), which stressed anti-communism and a democratic trade union philosophy.

During the intense political agitation of the early 1960s, the Catholic labor movement typically joined with the right-wing and old-line labor leadership, and formed part of the Democratic Union Movement (*Movimento Sindical Democrático*) founded in São Paulo in 1961, which was strongly anti-communist and spoke for a democratic-Christian Brazil. After the military coup of 1964, this Catholic labor movement suffered no purges or interventions and in fact continued to receive financial support from the government. However, as political repression increased and liberation theology and reform increasingly made inroads into the Brazilian church, the CBTC began to take a more critical stance with regard to the government and to stress the need for substantial improvement in the standard of living of the Brazilian worker.

BRAZILIAN CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (*Confederação Brasileira do Trabalho*).

Brazilian President Hermes da Fonseca (1910–14) attempted to undercut anarchist influence in the labor movement by sponsoring a so-called Fourth Labor Congress (*Quarto Congresso Operário*) in Rio de Janeiro in 1912. With militants denouncing the Congress as a political tool of the government, the only important state labor federation attending was that of Rio Grande do Sul. That delegation soon left, but the unions remaining, mostly from Rio de Janeiro, agreed to establish a Brazilian Confederation of Labor to rival the moribund anarchist organization, the Brazilian Labor Confederation* (COB), with the president's son, Mario da Fonseca, as its honorary president, and the reformist labor leader A. A. Pinto Machado as secretary-general. The new confederation apparently died shortly after its birth, though it did spark efforts by anarchists to revive the COB and hold a national labor congress in 1913.

BRAZILIAN COOPERATIVIST SYNDICALIST CONFEDERATION (Confederação Sindicalista Cooperativista Brasileira—CSCB).

Founded around 1923 by Sarandi Raposo, a labor organizer with a moderate trade union orientation, the Brazilian Cooperativist Syndicalist Confederation brought together railroad workers and miners in three southern states, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná. The CSCB, along with the Brazilian Communist Party, the Union of Textile Factory Workers* and the Federation of Workers of Rio de Janeiro,* sponsored the 1924 May Day rally at the Mauá Plaza that competed with the rally promoted by the anarchist-oriented Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro* and the Union of Civil Construction Workers.* Raposo and the CSCB remained caught up in the battles between anarchists and communists, and ultimately were criticized by both of them. The CSCB often is cited, however, as the first central labor organization in Brazil to be under communist domination.

BRAZILIAN LABOR CONFEDERATION (Confederação Operária Brasileira—COB).

The first Brazilian Labor Congress (Primeiro Congresso Operário), dominated by anarcho-syndicalist ideology, met in 1906 in Rio de Janeiro and urged the formation of a national labor organization modeled on the French Confédération Générale du Travail. The Brazilian Labor Confederation, founded in 1908 and headed by German-born Edgard Leuenroth, a journalist and major figure in Brazilian labor, was intended to fulfill that role. Though it participated in the Antimilitarist League (Liga Antimilitarista) in Rio de Janeiro and published a newspaper, *The Worker's Voice* (*A Voz do Trabalhador*), during its first year of existence, it quickly became virtually moribund.

The wave of strike activity in 1912 in São Paulo and Santos, as well as Rio de Janeiro, led to the COB's revival. The Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro,* responding to the government-backed labor congress which had been held in 1912, established a COB Reorganizing Committee as part of a movement to sponsor a second Brazilian Labor Congress in Rio de Janeiro in 1913. The revived COB claimed to represent nearly 80,000 workers, in some fifty workers associations in the states of São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and Pernambuco.

It concentrated almost entirely on promoting popular agitation, sponsoring fifteen rallies in Rio de Janeiro during the early months of 1913 in protest against increases in the cost of living. It also joined with the Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro in protests against the imprisonment of leaders of the Santos dockworkers, and held rallies to oppose the Adolfo Gordo law that served as the legal basis for deporting foreign-born labor leaders, a tactic used against the Santos labor leaders.

Strengthened by the Second Labor Congress, the COB sent delegates to various Brazilian states to foster increased organization and took an active role in demonstrations against World War I, including the organizing of a Peace Congress

that met in Rio de Janeiro in October of 1915. Though weakened by the depression of 1914, as well as by popular enthusiasm for Brazil's participation in World War I, the COB did sponsor a Third Brazilian Labor Congress (Terceiro Congresso Operário Brasileiro) that met in 1920. This resulted in a restructuring of the COB with the creation of an Executive Committee empowered to coordinate all actions needed to carry out the general resolutions at the Congress. At the same time, this Executive Committee was divided into five sections, which together embraced the entire country, to coordinate labor activity. Each section was to have a permanent and a traveling secretary. The COB, however, soon disappeared amidst postwar political turmoil, caught up in disputes between anarchists, communists, and trade unionists and in the issue of forming formal worker-oriented political parties.

BRAZILIAN REGIONAL LABOR FEDERATION (Federação Operária Regional Brasileira). *See* Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro.

CATHOLIC LABOR CENTERS (Centros Católicos Operários). *See* Christian Labor Federation of Pernambuco and Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers.

CBTC. *See* Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers.

CENTRO COSMOPOLITA. *See* Cosmopolitan Center.

CENTRO DAS CLASSES OPERÁRIAS. *See* Working Classes Center.

CENTRO INTERNACIONAL (International Center). *See* Cosmopolitan Center.

CENTRO TIPOGRÁFICO PAULISTANO (São Paulo Typographic Center). *See* Graphic Workers Union.

CGG. *See* General Strike Command.

CGT. *See* General Labor Confederation of Brazil, General Strike Command, General Council of Workers.

CHRISTIAN LABOR FEDERATION OF PERNAMBUCO (Federação Operária Cristá de Pernambuco).

The Catholic union movement in Brazil was initially associated with paternalistic organizations established by owners. The Christian Labor Federation of Pernambuco is one of the earliest examples of this type of labor organization. Carlos Alberto de Menezes, a textile industrialist in the northeastern city of Recife, in the mid-1890s began to establish some mutual aid mechanisms for his factory workers. In 1900 he participated in the First Brazilian Catholic

Congress (I Congresso Católico Brasileiro) for workers' mutual aid societies. Inspired by that meeting and the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, two years later at a Catholic Congress in Recife he founded the Christian Labor Federation and became its president. Its activities reached into other northeastern states, but perhaps its greatest impact was in prompting the passing of a labor law in 1907. Known as the *Lei Tosta* after its sponsor Ignacio Tosta, this legislation authorized the free organization of occupational unions and cooperative societies, through registration that would be independent of government authorization. True to the spirit of Carlos Alberto de Menezes' orientation, the law stressed accommodation and harmony between owners and workers.

About the same time, the São Paulo industrialist Jorge Street promoted the establishment of a similar organization for his factory workers, but his efforts ultimately contributed to his own financial ruin. Around 1917, however, Catholic Labor Centers (*Centros Católicos Operários*) arose in São Paulo state reflecting the same ideology of promoting improved conditions for workers without conflict with owners. In 1920, amidst rising labor militancy in the city of São Paulo, the Catholic Labor Center there opposed the strike, declaring instead solidarity with the government in its attempt to suppress anarchism. This orientation continued to characterize Catholic Labor organizations throughout most of the century. (See *Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers*.)

CÍRCULO BENEFICENTE DOS OPERÁRIOS EM CONSTRUÇÃO CIVIL (Beneficent Circle of Civil Construction Workers). *See* Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers.

CÍRCULO DOS OPERÁRIOS EM CONSTRUÇÃO CIVIL (Civil Construction Workers Circle). *See* Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers.

CIVIL CONSTRUCTION WORKERS' CIRCLE. *See* Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers.

CNTC. *See* National Confederation of Commercial Workers.

CNTEEC. *See* National Confederation of Educational and Cultural Workers.

CNTI. *See* National Confederation of Industrial Workers.

CNTT. *See* National Confederation of Land Transport Workers.

CNTTMFA. *See* National Seamen and Air Transport Workers Confederation.

COB. *See* Brazilian Labor Confederation.

COMANDO GERAL DA GREVE. *See* General Strike Command.

COMANDO GERAL DOS TRABALHADORES (General Workers Command). *See* General Strike Command.

COMISSÃO EXECUTIVA DO TERCEIRO CONGRESSO. *See* Executive Commission of the Third Congress.

COMISSÃO PERMANENTE DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES SINDICAIS. *See* Permanent Commission of Trade Union Organizations.

COMITÉ OPERÁRIO DE ORGANIZAÇÃO SINDICAL (Labor Committee of Syndical Organization). *See* São Paulo Labor Federation.

CONFEDERAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE TRABALHADORES CRISTÃOS. *See* Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers.

CONFEDERAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DO TRABALHO. *See* Brazilian Confederation of Labor.

CONFEDERAÇÃO DOS TRABALHADORES DO BRASIL. *See* Confederation of Brazilian Workers.

CONFEDERAÇÃO GERAL DO TRABALHO DO BRASIL. *See* General Labor Confederation of Brazil.

CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DE CIRCULOS OPERÁRIOS (National Confederation of Workers Circles). *See* Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers.

CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DE CIRCULOS OPERÁRIOS CATÓLICOS (National Confederation of Catholic Circles). *See* Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers.

CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DOS OPERÁRIOS CATÓLICOS (National Confederation of Catholic Workers). *See* Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers.

CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DOS TRABALHADORES (National Confederation of Workers). *See* Confederation of Brazilian Workers.

CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DOS TRABALHADORES EM COMUNICAÇÕES E PUBLICIDADE. *See* National Confederation of Communications and Advertising Workers.

CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DOS TRABALHADORES EM ESTABELECIMENTOS DE EDUCAÇÃO E CULTURA. *See* National Confederation of Educational and Cultural Workers.

CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DOS TRABALHADORES EM TRANSPORTES MARÍTIMOS, FLUVIAIS E AÉREOS. *See* National Seamen and Air Transport Workers Confederation.

CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DOS TRABALHADORES EM TRANSPORTES TERRESTRES. *See* National Confederation of Land Transport Workers.

CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DOS TRABALHADORES NA AGRICULTURA. *See* National Confederation of Agricultural Workers.

CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DOS TRABALHADORES NA INDÚSTRIA. *See* National Confederation of Industrial Workers.

CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DOS TRABALHADORES NAS EMPRESAS DE CRÉDITO. *See* National Bank Workers Confederation.

CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DOS TRABALHADORES NO COMÉRCIO. *See* National Confederation of Commercial Workers.

CONFEDERAÇÃO OPERÁRIA BRASILEIRA. *See* Brazilian Labor Confederation.

CONFEDERAÇÃO SINDICALISTA COOPERATIVISTA BRASILEIRA. *See* Brazilian Cooperativist Syndicalist Confederation.

CONFEDERAÇÃO SINDICAL UNITÁRIA DO BRASIL. *See* Unitary Union Confederation of Brazil.

CONFEDERATION OF BRAZILIAN WORKERS (Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil—CTB).

In the mid-1940s, during the presidency of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946–51), the socialist-oriented Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), the communists, and the administration's labor ministry all were competing to dominate organized labor, which had been an important prop for the New State (*Estado Novo*) established by Dutra's predecessor Getúlio Vargas. With Vargas still a force, conflict between socialists and communists, and labor unrest being met by government repression, the political situation became increasingly complex and tense.

The labor ministry and the communists agreed to co-sponsor a National Labor Congress in 1946 to deal with a number of issues on which the various factions

were divided. Among these was the establishing of a central union confederation, illegal under the labor law then in force.

While the labor ministry officially closed the Congress when it became apparent that the majority of delegates did not support the government's position, the Congress continued to meet, and as its final act established the Confederation of Brazilian Workers. Shortly after the Congress adjourned, the government declared the CTB illegal and warned it would depose leaders of any unions who chose to affiliate with that organization, a threat it in fact carried out.

The CTB functioned for a brief period as a communist labor front, since only communist-controlled labor unions were willing to risk government sanctions for their affiliation. It disappeared early in 1947 when the Communist Party itself was declared illegal and suppressed.

The labor ministry also attempted to organize a national confederation composed of leaders of the state union federations, labor leaders closely associated with the Dutra regime who had left the 1946 Congress in protest against "Communist domination." The new organization, the National Confederation of Workers* (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores), though officially recognized in November of 1946, remained only a name on paper. By the year's end, it no longer existed.

CONGRESSO ARTÍSTICO-OPERÁRIO DE PERNAMBUCO (Artisan-Labor Congress of Pernambuco). *See* Regional Labor Federation of Pernambuco.

CONSELHO GERAL DOS TRABALHADORES. *See* General Council of Workers.

CONSELHO SINDICAL DOS TRABALHADORES NO ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO. *See* Union Council of Workers in the State of São Paulo.

CONTAG. *See* National Confederation of Agricultural Workers.

CONTCOP. *See* National Confederation of Communications and Advertising Workers.

CONTEC. *See* National Bank Workers Confederation.

COSMOPOLITAN CENTER (Centro Cosmopolita).

The organization of hotel, bar, and restaurant workers in Rio de Janeiro, the Cosmopolitan Center drew membership mainly from Portuguese and Spanish immigrants under anarchist-syndicalist orientation. It took a leading role in labor activity, including organizing workers and sponsoring strikes during the years from 1917 to 1920. It was closed down by police during a partially successful general strike in Rio in 1919. João da Costa Pimenta, a mulatto graphic worker

and prominent anarchist labor organizer, was an important force in the Cosmopolitan Center during that time.

During the 1920s, however, the Center became one of the union strongholds of the Brazilian Communist Party, having in fact hosted the "First Communist Conference" in Brazil which met 21–23 June 1919 in Rio de Janeiro. The Center remained highly visible in labor activities throughout the 1920s, often serving as the meeting place for organizational efforts. In 1920, for example, the Bolshevik-oriented communist group of Rio de Janeiro, led by Astrogildo Pereira, was formed, and in turn attempted to secure adherence to the Third International and to form communist groups in other Brazilian cities. Although anarchists and communists managed to work together in the early 1920s, their rivalry ultimately caused tensions and schisms within the labor movement. In 1925 Bolsheviks and anarchists disputed for leadership of the Cosmopolitan Center, and for control as well of its newspaper, *Voz Cosmopolitana* (*Cosmopolitan Voice*); the communists won, and dominated the Center from that time on until it disappeared during the reorganization of labor that occurred following Getúlio Vargas' coming to power in the Revolution of 1930.

Similar labor organizations existed in the city of São Paulo and in its port city, Santos. These were, respectively, The International (A Internacional) and the International Center (Centro Internacional).

CPOS. *See* Permanent Committee of Trade Union Organizations.

CSCB. *See* Brazilian Cooperativist Syndicalist Confederation.

CST. *See* Union Council of Workers in the State of São Paulo.

CTB. *See* Confederation of Brazilian Workers.

CUT. *See* Sole Workers Central.

DEMOCRATIC UNION MOVEMENT (Movimento Sindical Democrático—MSD).

The Democratic Union Movement was an inter-union organization associated with the *pelego* position, that is, union leaders who maintained moderate trade unionism and an accommodationist stance. Founded in the late 1950s by leaders bitterly opposed to the labor policies and philosophy of João Goulart, whose presidential administration witnessed great labor unrest and ideological conflict, and eventually ended with a right-wing military coup in 1964, the Democratic Union Movement urged the use of labor courts rather than the strike to settle disputes. It also refused membership to communists and, by contrast with the two other interunion organizations of that time, the Syndical Union of Workers* (UST) and the General Workers Command* (CGT), it did not call for basic reforms in the labor system. Antonio Pereira Magaldi, president of the National

Confederation of Commercial Workers,* was a major force in the MSD at that time. Unlike the UST and CGT, the Democratic Union Movement survived the Revolution of 1964.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE THIRD CONGRESS (Comissão Executiva do Terceiro Congresso—CETC).

The Executive Committee was an anarcho-syndicalist organization established in 1920 to carry out resolutions adopted at the Third Brazilian Labor Congress and to promote labor organization until the convening of the Fourth Congress, scheduled for 1921. Seen as national in scope, it had traveling secretaries for each of five geographical sections embracing the whole of Brazil.

It published a *Bulletin* (*Boletim*) that praised Bolshevism but denied the appropriateness of the Russian model for Brazil. True to its anarchist orientation, it opposed the formation of a political party for labor.

FEDERAÇÃO DAS ASSOCIAÇÕES DE CLASSE. *See* Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro.

FEDERAÇÃO DE RESISTENCIA DAS CLASSES TRABALHADORES DE PERNAMBUCO. *See* Resistance Federation of the Pernambucan Working Classes.

FEDERAÇÃO DOS OPERÁRIOS EM FÁBRICAS DE TECIDOS. *See* Textile Factory Workers Federation.

FEDERAÇÃO DOS TRABALHADORES DO RIO DE JANEIRO (Federation of Workers of Rio de Janeiro). *See* General Union of Workers.

FEDERAÇÃO OPERÁRIA CRISTÁ DE PERNAMBUCO. *See* Christian Labor Federation of Pernambuco.

FEDERAÇÃO OPERÁRIA DE SÃO PAULO. *See* São Paulo Labor Federation.

FEDERAÇÃO OPERÁRIA DO PERNAMBUCO (Labor Federation of Pernambuco). *See* Regional Labor Federation of Pernambuco.

FEDERAÇÃO OPERÁRIA DO RIO DE JANEIRO. *See* Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro.

FEDERAÇÃO OPERÁRIA REGIONAL BRASILEIRA (Brazilian Regional Labor Federation). *See* Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro.

FEDERAÇÃO OPERÁRIA REGIONAL DE PERNAMBUCO. *See* Regional Labor Federation of Pernambuco.

FEDERAÇÃO OPERÁRIA REGIONAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO (Regional Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro). *See* Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro.

FEDERAÇÃO SINDICAL REGIONAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO. *See* Regional Union Federation of Rio de Janeiro.

FEDERATION OF CLASS ASSOCIATIONS (Federação das Associações de Classe). *See* Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro.

FEDERATION OF WORKERS OF RIO DE JANEIRO (Federação dos Trabalhadores do Rio de Janeiro). *See* General Union of Workers.

FNT. *See* National Labor Front.

FORJ. *See* Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro.

FRENTE NACIONAL DO TRABALHO. *See* National Labor Front.

FSRR. *See* Regional Union Federation of Rio de Janeiro.

FTRJ (Federação dos Trabalhadores do Rio de Janeiro). *See* General Union of Workers.

GENERAL COUNCIL OF WORKERS (Conselho Geral dos Trabalhadores—CGT).

In an attempt to coordinate labor activity and organization in Rio de Janeiro, the Third Brazilian Labor Congress (1920) established the CGT. Each autonomous labor association was to have a representative. Rio's four labor federations would have three representatives. As has proved the case with other attempts to develop organizations above the federation level, the CGT seems to have remained largely plans on paper. *See* Executive Committee of the Third Congress.

GENERAL LABOR CONFEDERATION OF BRAZIL (Confederação Geral do Trabalho do Brasil—CGT).

Organized in 1929 with leadership from the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), the General Labor Confederation was to function as a united front to bring together all working groups under a more "modern" organizational base of industrial unions grouped into federations by type of industry. The initial impetus to form this organization came in a 1925 message from the Central Executive Committee of the PCB, and by the following year, the idea of establishing a CGT received the endorsement of the important Graphic Workers Union* in São Paulo. By 1927, with the Bloco Textil (Textile Block), the communist wing of the Union of Textile Factory Workers* of Rio de Janeiro having achieved dominance, the PCB convened the Regional Union Congress of Rio de Janeiro

(Congresso Sindical Regional) and established from it a Regional Union Federation* as a step toward the CGT. Finally, from 26 April to 1 May 1929, a National Labor Congress officially established the CGT, with Minervino de Oliveira as its secretary-general, and headquartered at the same office as the Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers.* In 1929 the CGT sent representatives to the organizing congress in Montevideo, Uruguay, which established the Latin American Union Confederation (Confederación Sindical Latino Americana—CSLA) and sponsored a Hunger March early in 1931 to call attention to the incidence of malnutrition in Brazil. But having drained considerable labor support from older anarchist unions, the CGT proved incapable of maintaining itself in the face of increased public repression, and soon vanished in the general reorganization of labor that attended Getúlio Vargas' accession to power in the so-called Revolution of 1930.

GENERAL STRIKE COMMAND (Comando Geral da Greve—CGG).

During the agitated political scene of the early 1960s when João Goulart succeeded to the presidency upon the resignation of Janio Quadros, alarmed centrists and conservatives limited Goulart's powers by creating a ministerial system, and leftist labor groups tried to pressure Congress to ratify Goulart's choice for prime minister, San Tiago Dantas, as a means of building Goulart's power. Leaders from the National Confederation of Bank Insurance Workers (CONTEC), the National Confederation of Industrial Workers* (CNTI), the Permanent Committee of Trade Union Organizations* of Guanabara State (CPOS), the Syndical Union of Workers* of São Paulo State (UST) and the Pact of Unity and Action* (PUA), formed the General Strike Command to pressure Congress by lobbying, organizing marches and demonstrations, and threatening a general strike. Following Congress's rejection of Dantas, the CGG scheduled a general strike for 5 July 1962 to oppose Auro de Moura Andrade of São Paulo's Social Democratic Party, who had been named in place of Dantas. Though Moura resigned on 4 July, and Goulart in fact opposed it, the strike took place, and proved both widespread and effective. This resulted in the naming of a radical nationalist from the PSD in Rio Grande do Sul, Francisco de Paula Brochado, a man more radical than either Dantas or Moura, as prime minister. It also led to the administration's recognizing the growing independent power of labor.

At the Fourth National Union Congress, held in Guanabara in 1962, a conference boycotted by the anti-communist and anti-Goulart labor groups affiliated with the Democratic Union Movement, the CGG became the General Workers Command (Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores—CGT). It included three of the five national labor confederations, the CNTI, CONTEC, and the National Seamen and Air Transport Workers Confederation* (CNTTMFA), along with the PUA, CPOS, and other national federations and unions. The CGT worked with Goulart and Prime Minister Brochado to pressure Congress into scheduling the plebiscite to restore Goulart's full presidential powers, demanding that it be held on 7

October 1962, and threatening a general strike should it not be scheduled by 14 September. CGT leaders also demanded a higher minimum salary, various "basic reforms," and a law for unionizing rural workers.

When Congress allowed the deadline for scheduling the plebiscite to pass, Brochado resigned and a two-day general strike took place. This resulted in Congress's scheduling the plebiscite for 7 January 1963 and the meeting of other of the CGT's demands. Again, as in the 1962 action, labor exercised power not only on the opposition, but on Goulart as well, refusing to end the strike until its demands were met.

The CGT's success aroused the fear of anti-communist labor groups, as well as of employer groups, conservative factions in the Social Democratic Party and the National Democratic Union, and U.S. officials, including the U.S. labor attachés in Rio and São Paulo, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), and the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (Organização Regional Interamericana dos Trabalhadores—ORIT). Goulart, with full presidential powers after the plebiscite, also feared the CGT's strength and in fact formed a rival organization, the Syndical Union of Workers* (UST), whose main strength lay in the São Paulo state metalworkers and the Santos-Jundiaí Railroad Workers' Union. Oriented toward the Vargas style of labor paternalism, the UST proved less militant than the CGT. A 1963 survey on labor affiliation showed an 8 percent adherence to the UST, as opposed to 25 percent for the CGT and 17 percent for the MSD.

By April 1963 the CGT clearly had become more radical than Goulart, and opposed his three-year stabilization plan, an austerity program adopted under pressure from the International Monetary Fund to combat mounting inflation and debt. Several months later, Goulart reversed himself, abandoned the UST (in August he instructed his labor minister to quietly drop them), and tried to identify himself with the CGT. As the political situation deteriorated and labor militancy grew, army officers became increasingly alarmed and attacked the CGT and the PUA as being subversive. Indeed, when on 31 March 1964 the military launched the coup which toppled the Goulart regime, it moved against what it perceived as the palpable threat of the CGT to traditional bases of power in Brazil. With the military takeover, the CGT was abolished and many of its leaders arrested. Its leaders represented the left wing of President João Goulart's Brazilian Labor Party in Guanabara, and the organization was one of the important actors in the political maneuvering and turmoil that attended the last years of Goulart's regime. By that time two of its prominent leaders, Roberto Morena of the Carpenters Union and Hércules Correia dos Reis of the Textile Workers, were communists, and another, Benedito Cerqueira, from the Guanabara Metallurgical Workers, a communist sympathizer. Ari Composta, one of CPOS founders, however, was a non-communist.

GENERAL UNION OF SHOEMAKERS (União Geral dos Trabalhadores em Calçado). *See* Auxiliary Union of Shoemakers.

GENERAL UNION OF WORKERS (União Geral dos Trabalhadores—UGT).

A successor to the Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro, which had been dissolved by the government in 1917, the anarchist-oriented General Union of Workers as of 1918 brought together sixteen unions, the majority of which were industrial. According to José Oiticica, a prominent anarchist labor leader of that time, the UGT in 1918 boasted 30,000 members. In the midst of the so-called insurrectional strike in Rio in 1918, which began with textile workers, and then metalworkers and those in civil construction, and was marked by sporadic violence and sensational newspaper disclosures of anarchist plots, Acting President Delfim Moreira (1918–19) and the Justice Minister issued a decree on 22 November, dissolving the UGT. Despite this decree, the UGT retained sufficient strength to bring some 3,000 workers out for a May Day celebration. In 1920 it resurfaced officially as the Federation of Workers of Rio de Janeiro (Federação dos Trabalhadores do Rio de Janeiro—FTRJ).

The FTRJ supported the 1920 strike of workers of the Leopoldina Railroad by calling, in concert with the Teamsters Federation, a general strike in Rio. The strike, which began on 24 March, ended within five days due to a combination of police repression and the intervention of so-called Yellow or *pelego* labor leaders (those who enjoyed good relations with the government and police) from the maritime labor associations, who bypassed the FTRJ and entered into direct negotiations with the government and the Leopoldina Company. It was associated with another failed general strike the following year, this one to support maritime workers who had been fired by the Brazilian Lloyd Shipping Company. Relatively few of its affiliates even formally heeded the call for a general strike on 15 February 1921. It was in part the weakness and disorganized condition of the FTRJ resulting from these failures that led anarchists in 1923 to establish their rival organization, the Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro* (FORJ). Unions with a communist orientation joined the Federation of Workers of Rio de Janeiro. For the rest of the decade the two federations competed with one another, with the FTRJ ultimately gaining the dominant position.

The FTRJ supported the Third Brazilian Labor Congress efforts to establish a General Council of Workers, and published an important labor newspaper, *Voz do Povo* (*Voice of the People*).

GENERAL WORKERS COMMAND (Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores). *See* General Strike Command.

GRAPHIC ARTS ASSOCIATION (Associação de Artes Gráficas). *See* Graphic Workers Union.

GRAPHIC WORKERS UNION (União dos Trabalhadores Gráficas—UTG).

In 1904 in São Paulo two mutualist-oriented organizations, the Graphic Arts Association (Associação de Artes Gráficas) and the Paulistano Typographic Center (Centro Tipográfico Paulistano), merged to form the Graphic Workers Union.

Edgard Leuenroth, who was to become São Paulo's leading anarchist, then around twenty-three and having only two years earlier converted from socialism to anarchism, became librarian for the UGT and helped publish its newspaper, *The Worker (O Trabalhador)*. Revealing both socialist and trade unionist influence, it proposed the formation of reformist-oriented labor parties. A participant in the First Brazilian Labor Congress (1906), the UTG took the lead along with the masons in 1907 in promoting strikes in favor of the eight-hour day. At its height during that year, supported by an estimated 80 percent of São Paulo's graphic workers, the UTG quickly declined as a result of police pressure and factionalism that towards the end of 1907 led to the creation of a rival organization, the São Paulo Typographic Guild* (Gremio Tipográfico Paulistano).

The UTG, in a pattern common to labor organization during the first two decades of the twentieth century, disappeared and reformed several times. It seems to have revived somewhat around 1912, but then ceased to have much significance until around 1919; even then, it gave only feeble support to the general strike in São Paulo. Still, its secretary-general, João da Costa Pimenta, who had been organizing affiliates throughout the state in 1919, was arrested, subjected to several months imprisonment in distant Rio Grande do Sul marked by torture and barbaric living conditions. In 1923 the UTG spearheaded an important and successful printers strike, highlighted by a mammoth rally on 7 February, which ever since has been known as Printers' Day (O Dia do Gráfico) in Brazil. Pimenta again was jailed, but returned to direct the successful conclusion of the strike. The UTG, though not directly affiliated with the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), did in 1926 back the communists in their efforts to form a General Labor Confederation* and used their publication in the *Graphic Worker (O Trabalhador Gráfico)* to support that cause. The next year the union lent money to prevent the demise of the São Paulo communist newspaper *The International (O Internacional)*.

The demise of the UTG began the following year when the PCB-directed printers strike, which lasted from March through May, was declared illegal; the UTG was closed and its executive committee arrested. The strike's relatively unsuccessful outcome led to a certain disillusionment with the communist leadership, which facilitated the UTG's takeover by the dissident São Paulo Trotskyites, who referred to themselves as the Left Opposition and criticized the PCB for "opportunism." Its last significant action of this Trotskyite phase was to support the Shoemakers and São Paulo Railway Company Workers in their strike of May 1932, which became a general strike, an action that ended with police invasion of a public meeting at the UTG headquarters and the arrest of many of the strike's leaders. However, ultimately known as the Union of Graphic Industry Workers (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores na Indústria Gráfica), the union survived the years of Getúlio Vargas (1932-45).

GREMIO TIPOGRÁFICO PAULISTANO (São Paulo Typographic Guild). See Graphic Workers Union.

A INTERNACIONAL. *See* Cosmopolitan Center.

THE INTERNATIONAL. *See* Cosmopolitan Center.

INTERNATIONAL CENTER (Centro Internacional). *See* Cosmopolitan Center.

INTER-UNION MOVEMENT AGAINST THE SALARY SQUEEZE (Movimento Inter-Sindical Anti-Arrocho—MIA).

In 1967 when the administration of President Artur da Costa e Silva (1967–69) attempted to “humanize” the military dictatorship by lifting some of the state’s repression, opposition union groups attempted to organize a parallel labor organization reminiscent of those Inter-union Unity Pacts of the populist period which had preceded the 1964 military coup. The MIA appeared in São Paulo, sparked by the Metalworkers of São Bernardo, a group that formed part of the official union bureaucracy but tolerated left-wing activists. Other MIA groups appeared in Guanabara, Rio Grande do Sul, and Minas Gerais.

Its immediate impetus was protest against the Lei do Arrocho Salarial (Law to Roll Back Salaries) that outlawed any wage increases greater than figures established by the labor ministry. These figures were supposed to reflect a calculation of annual inflation, productivity increase, and anticipated rate of inflation for the coming year. Government manipulation of statistics helped produce a precipitous drop in the real minimum wage, thus producing profound distress among workers. At the same time, by removing the salary issue from the bargaining table, the law reduced the ability of unions to pressure for wage increases.

The MIA held assemblies to collect signatures to petition the labor minister, Jarbas Passarinho, to annul the salary law. While the official union leadership attempted to maintain this peaceful and nonthreatening activity, opposition labor leaders as well as students helped transform it into a more authentic and popular expression of labor discontent. The assemblies became forums for attacking a broader range of government policy. As the threat to official leadership grew, and more radical groups like the Osasco Metalworkers and São Paulo Bank Workers pressured for more confrontational approaches, the MIA came apart. By 1968 it had ceased to exist.

INTER-UNION UNITY PACT (Pacto de Unidade Inter-Sindical—PUI).

Founded around 1952 in São Paulo, the PUI, under leftist direction, represented an attempt to form higher-level union organizations of regional scope, technically illegal under existing labor law but tolerated throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. For the next five years, especially in the city of São Paulo, the PUI was a force for union and political action, functioning as a sort of permanent plenary for some 100 labor unions. Its attempt to unify the labor movement into a single front by creating an Executive Committee that would be composed of the presidents of the major labor federations put it in competition with two parallel organizations of an anti-communist, right-wing orientation that arose

during that time, the Democratic Union Movement (MSD) and the Union Renewal Movement (MRS).

Labor militancy escalated in 1953, culminating in an extensive strike from March to April in São Paulo that embraced textile, metal, glass, furniture, and printing workers. The unions for each of those sectors belonged to the PUI, which coordinated the strike. Its leadership included socialists, communists, and independents. To some extent, this show of labor militancy led President Getúlio Vargas to appoint João Goulart, head of the Brazilian Labor Party, as Minister of Labor in an attempt to remain ahead of the labor radicalization, thereby maintaining his support base in the labor movement.

On May Day of 1954 Vargas continued this line by calling for a 100 percent increase in the minimum wage and urging more worker participation in government. When the Supreme Court suspended this wage increase pending an investigation of its constitutionality, eight PUI federations in São Paulo called for a united front against the Supreme Court and threatened a strike. The salary level was in fact deemed constitutional and quickly put into effect.

By 1956 the PUI formally constituted itself as a regional labor group. It included both unions and statewide federations, with each having a single vote. The equality of voting negated the more conservative thrust of federation leaders and gave unions an independent power base for their dealings with both government and employers. This became apparent during the 1957 São Paulo strike which involved from 350,000 to 500,000 workers. Coordinated by the PUI, it resulted in an 18 percent wage increase. With the strike's success, the PUI grew in popularity, becoming virtually a mass organization embracing not only labor but neighborhood associations, students, and women's federations. It also gained political clout, with politicians seeking its endorsement.

The PUI went out of existence in September or October of 1959. It had declined in prestige, reflecting a deep division in the labor movement over political controversies relating to the upcoming presidential elections and rifts between anti-communist federation presidents who opposed the influence in the PUI exercised by the Brazilian Communist Party. A new organization, the Union Council of Workers in the State of São Paulo (Conselho Sindical dos Trabalhadores no Estado de São Paulo—CST), formed by the heads of São Paulo's twenty-two labor federations, was established in 1959 to supplant the PUI.

LABOR COMMITTEE OF SYNDICAL ORGANIZATION (Comité Operário de Organização Sindical). *See* São Paulo Labor Federation.

LABOR FEDERATION OF PERNAMBUCO (Federação Operária do Pernambuco). *See* Regional Labor Federation of Pernambuco.

LABOR FEDERATION OF RIO DE JANEIRO (Federação Operária do Rio de Janeiro—FORJ).

Established in 1903 as the Federation of Class Associations (Federação das

Associações de Classe), and based in Rio de Janeiro, by 1906 it had undergone several successive name changes: Brazilian Regional Labor Federation (*Federação Operária Regional Brasileira*); Regional Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro (*Federação Operária Regional do Rio de Janeiro*); and, finally, Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro. In 1906 when the national government was studying proposals for regulating unions, the FORJ spearheaded a move to convoke a general meeting of labor organizations to discuss questions of policy and the structure of the labor movement. This First Brazilian Labor Congress (*Primeiro Congresso Operário Brasileiro*) met in April 1906 at the Spanish Center (*Centro Galego*) in Rio, attended by over forty delegates primarily representing fifteen labor organizations from the city of Rio and the São Paulo Labor Federation.* Additional delegates came from the interior of both those states as well as from the northeast. Despite an appeal from socialists to establish a Socialist Party, the Congress, largely dominated by anarchists, resolved to establish a federative system modeled on that of the French syndicalist *Confédération Générale du Travail*, with a national body to be known as the Brazilian Labor Confederation* (COB), which two years later was established in Rio. The Congress also urged workers to demonstrate for the eight-hour day by striking on May Day 1907, a move that apparently sparked several strikes in Rio and São Paulo throughout that year.

In 1912, after a two-year period of inactivity, the FORJ was revived by the leaders of six Rio de Janeiro unions (graphic workers, plasterers, cabinetmakers, stonemasons, marble workers, and tailors), and it began to plan for a second Brazilian Labor Congress, to compete with a so-called Fourth Brazilian Labor Congress promoted by the administration of President Marshal Hermes da Fonseca (1910–14) that took place in November 1912. The FORJ and COB-based Second Brazilian Labor Congress met in September 1913.

The FORJ in 1913 also helped orchestrate campaigns against the Adolpho Gordo Law, which facilitated the deportation of foreign-born labor leaders. Two years later, in response to the outbreak of World War I, the FORJ formed a Popular Commission for Agitation against the War and joined with other anarchists in organizing an International Peace Conference, which met in Rio de Janeiro in October.

By 1916 the FORJ was buffeted by quarrels between anarchists and syndicalists, with several important anarchists accusing the organization of having become a “syndicalist fiction” and renouncing any further association with it. Despite such incidents of tension, however, the FORJ remained identified with anarchists and was instrumental in the 1917 general strike in Rio de Janeiro. The authorities closed its headquarters, aided by the declaration of a state of siege enacted by Congress shortly after Brazil entered the World War. Its place in Rio’s labor movement first was taken over by the General Union of Workers* (UGT), but by the following year that organization also had been dissolved.

In 1923, anarchist effort to reorganize labor saw the reestablishment of a FORJ to compete with the communist-dominated Federation of Workers of Rio de

Janeiro* (FTRJ) that had succeeded the UGT. The following year, on May Day, the FORJ and FTRJ held rival rallies; the FORJ had the allegiance of nine unions, of which the most important were the Union of Civil Construction Workers* (UOCC), the General Union of Metalworkers, and the General Union of Employees in Hotels, Restaurants and Cafes. The conflict between communists and anarchists intensified in ensuing years, characterized by rival demonstrations, denunciations, and attempts at organizing. By 1928 the FORJ had lost most of its membership with the UOCC, its only important union. See General Union of Workers.

LIGA DOS OPERÁRIOS EM CALÇADO (Shoemakers League). See Auxiliary Union of Shoemakers.

METALLURGICAL, MECHANICAL, AND ELECTRICAL WORKERS UNION OF OSASCO (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e de Material Elétrico de Osasco).

This union is most noted for its part in 1968 in directing the first independent May Day demonstration in Brazil after the military takeover of 1964 and for the strike that year against the Cobrasma Company, an event that marked the end of the so-called democratic opening of the Costa e Silva government (1967–69) and ushered in a period of severe repression of independent and leftist labor activity.

Previously a local affiliate of the São Paulo Metalworkers, Osasco separated from São Paulo in 1962 to become an independent county (*município*); the Osasco Metalworkers were then legally constituted as a union. At that time, there also was formed a workers commission at the Cobrasma Company. This arose at the initiative of the Catholic National Labor Front (Frente Nacional de Trabalho—FNT), a group led by labor lawyers and espousing Christian humanism, that stressed mobilization of the rank and file (*mobilização da base*) and improved conditions for workers. The workers commission was a vehicle for direct worker participation in labor negotiations, something atypical of the Brazilian situation at a time when considerable distance separated union hierarchies and the rank and file. The FNT also had links with a local high school student movement, the Osasco Student Center (Centro Estudantil de Osasco), as well as such other religiously based organizations as the Catholic University Youth (Juventude Universitária Católica) and Catholic Worker Youth (Juventude Operária Católica). Because of its base in such organizations and its religious association, in the wake of the 1964 coup the FNT retained greater organizational vitality than did other labor groups. Nonetheless, as the deteriorating wage situation (the so-called *arrocho salarial*, or wage squeeze) of post-coup Brazil became critical, the FNT lost its absolute control of the Cobrasma Workers Commission to activists associated with the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (Vanguardia Popular Revolucionária).

The Commission's relationship with the Metalworkers Union was complex in

that some members of the commission also were members of the union directorate. In 1963 union elections, for example, FNT adherents shared power with the so-called situationists (*situacionistas*) linked to the São Paulo Metalworkers, then under communist control. Following the coup, the political situation became more muddled, for in addition to an accommodationist union leadership, there emerged an opposition group which focused on bread-and-butter demands but sought no structural changes.

The Osasco Metalworkers came to represent another tendency, a more radical one which directly threatened the military dictatorship. This occurred after the 1967 union election which saw José Ibrahim, a member of the Workers Commission, gain the presidency with the backing of that commission, the FNT, and the Osasco Student Union. Ibrahim was committed to expanding factory workers' commissions and increasing the power of the working class.

In 1967 the Osasco Metalworkers were largely responsible for taking over the official May Day celebration, convoked by the official unions, that is, those linked to the government, and sponsored by the governor of São Paulo State. The crowd advanced on the speakers' platform and deposed the official spokesmen; opposition leaders then addressed the crowd, decrying the salary squeeze and urging a strike.

The strike at Cobrasma began on 16 July 1968, with 1,000 workers occupying the factory and holding thirty service chiefs and fifteen engineers hostage. Other factories adhered to the strike, raising the total number of strikers to around 6,000. (As part of this process, the Lunaflex factory also was occupied. Four others that adhered to the strike were not.) Pamphlets were distributed denouncing the government's antistrike law and the salary squeeze, and decrying police repression and dictatorship.

The government responded quickly, declaring the strike illegal, then invading the occupied factories and arresting several workers, including one Cobrasma Commission leader, José Campos Barreto. By the strike's second day, the labor ministry declared the union itself illegal and police invaded the Osasco Union hall. José Ibrahim went underground to avoid arrest. With the leadership in disarray and heightened repression, workers returned to the factory.

METALLURGICAL, MECHANICAL, AND ELECTRICAL WORKERS UNION OF SÃO BERNARDO AND DIADEMA (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e de Material Elétrico de São Bernardo e Diadema).

In the late 1970s this metalworkers' union of one of the so-called ABC suburbs of São Paulo City (Santo André, São Bernardo, and São Caetano) assumed a leading role in a wave of strike actions that marked a new awakening of the Brazilian labor movement and challenged the military government which had ruled since the coup of 1964. Its president, Luis Inácio da Silva (popularly known as Lula), became an internationally famous as well as an immensely popular and politically important figure in Brazil.

The immediate issue that led to the mobilization of the metalworkers was the government's manipulation of inflation figures to hold down wage increases which were by law tied to that index. When it became officially acknowledged in 1977 that the 1973 figures had been falsified, the metalworkers throughout the ABC suburbs helped promote assemblies to pressure the government to replace the lost income. The following year, strikes proved common throughout Brazil, with some of the most well-organized work actions led by the metalworkers, largely employed in the automobile and truck industry for corporations like Volkswagen and Ford. Thus, while rarely in recent Brazilian history have a majority of union members honored strike calls, in Santo André and São Bernardo, 82 percent and 72 percent respectively of union members participated.

The 1978 strikes provided the occasion for Lula's first notoriety. In addition to being a man with charisma, Lula emerged as a new type of labor leader, a man of the rank and file rather than a well-paid labor bureaucrat. Free from the taint of political ties to traditional interest groups or institutions, he stood for union autonomy, rapid redemocratization of Brazil, and an increased share of the national income for labor.

In March 1979, as the new Brazilian President João Figueiredo took office, publicly committed to continue the so-called democratic opening of his predecessor Ernesto Geisel, some 200,000 ABC metallurgical workers went on strike. The Regional Labor Court, which heard the salary dispute, rendered a decision that totally upheld management's offer. When strikers refused to accept that verdict, the government intervened. Declaring that the ABC unions were engaged in an illegal strike, the government arrested Lula. However, the Minister of Labor soon announced Lula's release and removed the intervention. This reflected in part the government's desire to cultivate Lula, and in part his immense popularity with workers and reasonably good standing with the auto industry leaders who saw him as an effective and honest voice. Then, too, the São Paulo Church hierarchy, increasingly caught up in a new societal sense sparked by liberation theology and the organization of ecclesiastical base communities (*comunidades de base*), supported Lula and an autonomous labor movement.

In 1980 the ABC Metalworkers' contract came up for negotiation. Heartened by displays of government flexibility in 1979, the unions decided to press not only for salary increases but for improved safety conditions, a reduction of the workweek from forty-eight to forty hours, double pay for overtime, and guarantees against workers being dismissed because of their participation in strikes.

The union went on strike in April 1980, an action that not only included the ABC suburbs but reached into the interior of the state. The union claimed 330,000 workers were out; the government put the figure at 205,000. In any event, it clearly was the largest strike Brazil had witnessed since the military coup of 1964.

As opposed to the previous year, the government determined to act forcefully, seeing an autonomous union movement as a real threat to its control of the pace and nature of the democratic opening. In addition, Lula, operating under recently

liberalized electoral laws, had organized a new national political party, the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores).

The Minister of Labor declined all invitations to meet with the São Bernardo Metalworkers at one of the daily gatherings they were holding at the local soccer stadium. Determined to break the threat posed by the spread of this new style of labor militancy pioneered by the São Bernardo union—which featured real rank-and-file organization, a demand for direct negotiations with companies (illegal under Brazilian labor law), and a new breed of leaders who rejected the old paternalistic, co-optive government labor policies—the government urged companies to stand firm.

The Regional Labor Court, which had first judged the strike legal, reversed itself on 14 April. This provided the opportunity for government intervention which featured forcible occupation of union headquarters and the arrest of union leaders.

The São Paulo Church hierarchy actively supported the São Bernardo strikers. Indeed, with the closing of the union halls, the workers met at the main São Bernardo church, and President Figueiredo accused Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns, cardinal and archbishop of São Paulo, of “inciting the workers to strike.”

Despite support for the strikers from many opposition groups, and a strong show of independence on May Day 1980, when in São Bernardo 100,000 demonstrators forced the government to allow their planned rally (it had previously denied them this right), the strike was contained; Lula was arrested and indicted for violating national security law, the army and police threatened and engaged in violence, and support for the walkout ebbed. On 11 April, after being out for forty-one days, and with Lula engaged in a hunger strike, the São Bernardo union voted to return to work.

Although the strike was largely a failure in terms of most of its stated objectives, the metalworkers’ action had a transforming impact on some of the authoritarian structures of Brazilian society, demonstrating the limits and inadequacies of the traditional system of labor control. And while the 1981 metallurgical contracts showed some effective company techniques for bypassing union militants, the São Bernardo union has largely retained its membership and influence, while Lula has gone on to become an important actor in the changing political climate of contemporary Brazil, as head of the Workers Party.

Jair Meneghelli, Lula’s friend and disciple, assumed the union’s presidency. Under his leadership, the union continued its militant stance, becoming closely allied with the political efforts of the PT in its attempt to forge a broad power base. The São Bernardo Metalworkers in July 1983 helped orchestrate a major strike action involving oil workers in various parts of the nation and staged a sympathy strike of their own that paralyzed Brazil’s major automobile manufacturing plants. In the wake of this strike, which was in part staged to deflate the call for a general strike by the political rival São Paulo Metalworkers Union,* the government took this same action with several of the oil unions’ leaders identified with the PT. Despite the government’s action, in November 1983 the

metalworkers at Jair Meneghelli's direction staged another major strike, demanding the upward revision of salaries above the level decreed by the government. See Sole Workers Central.

MIA. *See* Inter-Union Movement Against the Salary Squeeze.

MOVIMENTO DE UNIDADE DOS TRABALHADORES. *See* Workers Unity Movement.

MOVIMENTO INTER-SINDICAL ANTI-ARROCHO. *See* Inter-Union Movement Against the Salary Squeeze.

MOVIMENTO SINDICAL DEMOCRÁTICO. *See* Democratic Union Movement.

MSD. *See* Democratic Union Movement.

MUT. *See* Workers Unity Movement.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura—CONTAG).

Not until the 1950s did union organization penetrate the traditional dependent, patron-client labor relations of rural Brazil. In 1954 the Brazilian Communist Party organized the first national agricultural union, the Union of Farmers and Agricultural Workers of Brazil* (ULTAB). As late as 1960 there existed only eight rural unions in the entire country: three in Pernambuco, three in Bahia, one in Rio de Janeiro, and one in Santa Catarina. But following the appearance of peasant leagues in the northeast in the 1950s, and a political climate favoring agrarian reform and modernization of the countryside, rural union-organizing activity showed dramatic increase, with competition among communists, radical and moderate Catholics, and the government union bureaucracy.

In 1963 the administration of João Goulart put into effect a new Rural Labor Law which facilitated the creation of rural unions and guaranteed rural workers most of the legal rights enjoyed by their urban counterparts. Goulart hoped to contain rural radicalism while co-opting rural workers, and both national and state government efforts were put into union activity. The communist ULTAB enrolled one-third of the rural federations. The progressive or radical Catholics associated with Popular Action (Ação Popular—AP), who had been especially strong in the northeastern states of Rio Grande do Norte and Pernambuco, accounted for another nine, as did moderate Catholics, or those unassociated with AP. In December 1963 the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers was set up in Rio. Although the Catholics controlled a majority of federations, their ideological differences proved decisive, so much so that the AP group joined with the communists. As a result, CONTAG's president, second vice

president, and treasurer (respectively, Lindolfo Silva, Bezerra da Costa, and Nestor Vera) came from communist unions. Shortly after its founding CONTAG joined the General Workers Command.

After the military coup of 1964, CONTAG was purged of its communist leaders, and factions tied to the government assumed control. Some of these were moderate Catholics who tried to promote improved conditions for rural workers, but they met with little success from the highly conservative administrations that characterized Brazil in the wake of the coup. During the later 1970s, however, with a relaxing of repression and a move toward more open electoral politics (*decompressão* and *abertura*), government legislation with regard to minimum wages and the participation of workers in the Social Security system was perceived in a positive light. At the national level CONTAG joined with other labor organizations in pressuring for greater independence from government control.

CONTAG has federations in all the states of Brazil. The union itself is divided into four groups: agricultural laborers, livestock workers, workers in rural extractive production, and administration employees. See Union of Farmers and Agricultural Workers of Brazil.

NATIONAL BANK WORKERS CONFEDERATION (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores nas Empresas de Crédito—CONTEC).

One of seven national labor groupings that stood at the apex of the pyramidal union structure established by Getúlio Vargas' New State (*Estado Novo*), CONTEC did not come into existence until August 1959. At that time, the relatively free atmosphere accompanying the presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek allowed new opportunity for leftist elements in Brazil, and CONTEC from its inception was under communist influence. Indeed, Armando Ziller, a member of the Brazilian Communist Party's Central Committee during the early 1960s, was one of its leaders. After the Riani-Pelacani wing won control, in the election of December 1961, of the National Confederation of Industrial Workers,* the CONTEC leadership joined with them and other communist-influenced labor leaders in 1962 to form the General Strike Command* (CGG) that later became the General Workers Command, which played key roles in the agitated political climate that preceded the military coup of 1964. As was the case with Brazil's other unions, after the coup CONTEC was purged of its leftist leadership and brought under government domination.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF CATHOLIC WORKER CIRCLES (Confederação Nacional de Círculos Operários Católicos). See Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF CATHOLIC WORKERS (Confederação Nacional dos Operários Católicos). See Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF COMMERCIAL WORKERS (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores no Comércio—CNTC).

Organized in November 1946 during the strongly anti-communist presidency of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946–51), this union was one of the seven national labor organizations that formed the apex of the pyramidal structure of organized labor envisioned by the corporatist New State (Estado Novo) of Getúlio Vargas. The second largest labor confederation in Brazil during the early 1960s, the CNTC had formed part of the so-called democratic bloc that opposed communist-influenced labor organizations.

Its leader, Antonio Pereira Magaldi, worked closely with the anti-communist Democratic Union Movement* (Movimento Sindical Democrático), and it affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organização Regional Interamericana dos Trabalhadores —ORIT), both anti-communist in orientation. By 1964, however, communist influence within the CNTC reached such a point that half of its constituent federations favored a slate of pro-communist leaders. This resulted in an electoral stalemate which saw the labor ministry taking temporary control of the Confederation. Shortly after the military coup of 1964, the CNTC joined with the National Confederation of Industrial Workers* and the National Confederation of Land Transport Workers* to demand complete freedom for trade union activities, an end to government intervention in union affairs, and abolition of the trade union tax (*imposto sindical*) which served as a major mechanism for government control of union funding. The government did not accede to these demands. Intervention increased; the CNTC was purged of its leftist leadership and came under government domination.

The CNTC is affiliated with several of Brazil's largest labor unions including the Guanabara Commercial Employees Union (Sindicato dos Empregados no Comércio de Guanabara) and the Rio de Janeiro Union of Hotel Workers (Sindicato dos Empregados no Comércio Hoteleiro e Similares). As of 1965, the CNTC embraced twenty-two state or regional federations and six national federations. Its total membership today stands at about one million, a figure exceeded only by the National Confederation of Industrial Workers.*

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ADVERTISING WORKERS (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Comunicações e Publicidade—CONTCOP).

Founded in 1964 after the military coup of that year, this national body always has operated under tight state control, especially given the rigid censorship of news media that characterized Brazil's authoritarian regimes for the remainder of the 1960s and early 1970s. It brings together telephone and telegraph, radio and television workers, journalists, and public relations personnel. The smallest of the national confederations, it has slightly in excess of 100,000 members, with five national or state federations.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL WORKERS (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Estabelecimentos de Educação e Cultura—CNTEEC).

Founded in 1967, a time when Brazil had entered a period of rule by a military government, this national confederation never enjoyed any independent existence and served more as an example of the regime's desire to reorganize and control Brazilian society than of any autonomous effort on the part of labor. With around 600,000 members grouped into some eighty locals and four national or state federations, this union brings together teachers, musicians, actors, theater, movie, and racetrack employees, and professional athletes.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Indústria—CNTI).

Labor legislation of Getúlio Vargas' New State (*Estado Novo*) established a pyramidal structure with trade unions affiliated with state federations and then, where more than three such federations existed, a confederation. The National Confederation of Industrial Workers was one of the seven national confederations provided for in the legislation. Pro-Dutra (Vargas' successor in the presidency) labor delegates who split with communist and pro-Vargas adherents at the Syndical Congress of Workers of Brazil, held in September 1946 (see Workers Unity Movement), laid the groundwork for the CNTI, which was constituted in October of that year. In 1949 it held its first national conference. Although *pelegos* (conservatives adhering to the labor ministry) dominated the CNTI leadership, resolutions adopted at that meeting stressed the need for more union self-governance and autonomy. Early in the 1950s the CNTI affiliated with the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organização Regional Interamericana dos Trabalhadores—ORIT), an anti-communist international labor organization backed by U.S. unions. Throughout the years of the Dutra administration (1946–51), the CNTI leadership remained a loyal ally of the government's repression of communists; in so doing it also alienated itself from Vargas' Brazilian Labor Party (PTB). When Juscelino Kubitschek became president of Brazil in 1956, however, he attempted to promote labor unity and end the schism among so-called *pelegos* (like the CNTI's president Deocleciano de Holanda Cavalcanti, who had headed the union since its establishment), labor factions associated with the PTB (the party of his vice president João Goulart, who had been Vargas' labor minister), and the Brazilian Communist Party. After a brief honeymoon, however, labor again fragmented along ideological lines: the CNTI, like some of the other confederations, began to depend more heavily on Brazilian and U.S. anti-communist groups.

This orientation provoked considerable turmoil within the CNTI leadership when Goulart took over the national government and allied himself with left-wing nationalists and communists against both the more conservative *pelegos* who dominated the CNTI and a new reformist group known as the "renovators," who wished to remove government influence from labor. Goulart then directly

intervened on behalf of his allies in the CNTI Congress in December 1961, using the assurance of governmental favors to persuade delegates to oust the *pelegos*, a move that proved successful. The CNTI then became increasingly tied to Goulart's attempts to negotiate the increasingly tense political situation that preceded the military coup of 1964. After some attempts to weaken the radical left CGT, which was showing signs of growing independence, Goulart supported the CGT ticket in the January 1964 CNTI election.

Indeed Clodschmidt Riani, president of the CGT, won the presidency of the CNTI, and immediately threatened a general strike for a 100 percent raise in the minimum wage. Riani was pro-communist, and the rest of the officers showed communist ties or sympathies. By this time, the CNTI, it is estimated, boasted two million workers (half of all the organized workers in Brazil), some 700 locals, fifty federations, and fifteen regional councils. It also provided the CGT's organizational base. This combination of mass organization and independent, radical leftist control of labor produced great fear among conservative elements and apparently proved an important factor in the 1964 coup.

Following that right-wing military takeover, the CNTI was purged of its radical elements, and *pelegos* restored to control. Brazil's single largest union organization then became identified with that regime and an apologist for its policies. Annual meetings in recent years have seen attempts by more militant unions to gain more control of the CNTI, but official government favor—and the economic and political power thus conferred—has proved impregnable. However, the rise to prominence of more radical unions, like those of the metalworkers in São Paulo, has seen the CNTI lose prestige. Furthermore, in December 1983 its longtime president, Ary Campista, left that post amidst allegations of embezzlement and fraud.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF LAND TRANSPORT WORKERS (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Transportes Terrestres—CNTT).

One of seven national labor unions that formed the apex of the pyramidal union organization established by Getúlio Vargas' New State (*Estado Novo*), the CNTT was organized in February 1953 during Vargas' presidency (1951–54). Of its five federations, four remained anti-communist, and throughout the 1950s the CNTT formed part of the so-called democratic bloc that opposed communist influence in the Brazilian labor movement. It affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the Inter-American Regional Organization (Organização Regional Interamericana dos Trabalhadores—ORIT), both anti-communist organizations. It played that same role during the political agitation of the 1960s that preceded the military coup of 1964. However, its National Federation of Railroad Workers was led by a communist, Rafael Martineli, who became treasurer of the General Strike Command* (CGG), which later became the General Workers Command (CGT) and played a significant role in the pre-coup maneuvering. Mário Lopes de Oliveira, head of the CNTT, was the only labor confederation president who adopted an anti-CGT position.

Because of its anti-radical stance, the CNTT suffered fewer purges and interventions after the 1964 coup than did those labor organizations associated with leftist positions. Its present membership hovers slightly above 400,000. See Pact of Unity and Action.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores). See Confederation of Brazilian Workers.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS CIRCLES (Confederação Nacional de Círculos Operários). See Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers.

NATIONAL LABOR FRONT (Frente Nacional do Trabalho—FNT).

Mário Carvalho de Jesus—who had been a lawyer for the São Paulo metalworkers union in the mid-1950s, had organized a highly successful union at São Paulo's largest cement plant, the Perus factory at Cajana, along with cement union leaders, some other labor lawyers, and Catholic Church officials inspired by the encyclicals of Pope John XXIII—in 1958 in São Paulo helped organize the FNT as a way of promoting radical Christian social ideals in the labor movement. Dom Jorge Marcos de Oliveira, bishop of Santo André, served as honorary president. The FNT achieved considerable fame with its coordination of a forty-six-day strike at the Perus Cement Company in 1959. Not only was the length of the strike extraordinary for Brazil, it also proved successful in that fired personnel were reinstated and workers received a 40 percent wage increase. The FNT also proved successful in a June 1960 strike against the Melhoramentos paper factory in Caieiras, São Paulo, securing a very favorable collective contract (*contrato coletivo*) and an agreement by the company to consult the union on hiring and to notify it prior to the firing of workers.

Later that year, the FNT led a 159-day strike, the longest in Brazilian history, against the British-owned Aymore Cookie Company at Barra Funda, on the outskirts of São Paulo city. The mixed results of this labor action, which had centered on labor-management relations rather than on issues of wages and hours, caused the FNT to adopt a more cautious stance.

In 1962 the FNT formed a workers commission at the Cobrasma Company, located in Osasco, a city suburb on the periphery of São Paulo. This commission achieved acceptance by company directors as a mediator, and helped secure some worker benefits. In 1966, after the new military government had declared a wage freeze, the workers elected a new commission in which activists associated with the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard wrested control from FNT adherents. This Commission later played a key role in the 1968 Cobrasma Strike which resulted in the shelving of the so-called normalization policy of President Artur da Costa e Silva (1967–69) which had tolerated a degree of labor militancy, and initiated a period of escalating repression. See Metallurgical, Mechanical, and Electrical Workers Union of Osasco.

NATIONAL SEAMEN AND AIR TRANSPORT WORKERS CONFEDERATION (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Transportes Marítimos, Fluviais e Aéreos—CNTTMFA).

One of seven national labor organizations standing at the apex of the pyramidal labor structure established by Getúlio Vargas' New State (*Estado Novo*), the National Seamen and Air Transport Workers Confederation was established in June 1960 towards the end of Juscelino Kubitschek's presidency (1956–61), and reflected the so-called era of peaceful co-existence, 1956–59, which saw a diminution of governmental repression, a lessening of the conflict within organized labor between right- and left-wing elements, and greater freedom for communist organizers. The CNTTMFA was established under "renovating" leadership, a term that included both communist and non-communist reformers. This leadership participated in the General Workers Command which succeeded the General Strike Command,* leftist organizations that played a key role in the political agitation preceding the military coup of 1964. Pro-communist segments of the CNTTMFA included the National Stevedores Federation (Federação Nacional dos Estivedores), led by Brazilian Communist Party Central Committee member Osvaldo Pacheco da Silva, and some unions in the federations of dock, maritime, and aviation workers. One of the smallest of the major confederations in contemporary Brazil, the CNTTMFA has slightly more than 100,000 adherents.

PACTO DE UNIDADE E AÇÃO. *See* Pact of Unity and Action.

PACTO DE UNIDADE INTERSINDICAL. *See* Inter-Union Unity Pact.

PACT OF UNITY AND ACTION (Pacto de Unidade e Ação—PUA).

On 8 November 1960 port workers, seamen, and railroad workers employed by government-owned lines, all of whom belonged to the National Confederation of Land Transport Workers (CNTTT) and worked for government-owned enterprises, engaged in a national strike calling for pay increases equal to raises recently given the military. This so-called parity strike, which was declared illegal by President Juscelino Kubitschek (he also asserted that it was communist-inspired), was coordinated by the Pact of Unity and Action, an inter-union organization based in Guanabara that had been developed for that purpose. It included leftist labor leaders from the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and communists in the transport unions and other labor organizations, including the leadership of the bank workers' union. In February 1962 with President João Goulart and his cabinet at odds over labor, Justice Ministry officials accused leaders of the three main PUA unions of planning a strike and sabotage and threatened to jail them if they continued with this design. PUA officials denied that any such plans existed and praised Goulart for his support in ongoing salary negotiations. The PUA, along with leaders of the National Confederation of Industrial Workers* (CNTI), the Permanent Commission of Trade Union Organizations* of Guanabara State (CPOS), and the Union Council of Workers in

the State of São Paulo* (CST), was active in supporting the 19 December 1961 general strike in São Paulo and Guanabara, urging that Congress approve a Christmas bonus amounting to one month's salary to be paid to all workers. Though the strike quickly collapsed after its leaders were jailed, Congress approved the bonus, leading those same unions to demand that it be institutionalized every year as a "thirteenth salary." In 1962 PUA leaders, along with those from CPOS, CNTT, CST, and the National Confederation of Bank Insurance Workers (CONTEC), formed the General Strike Command.* The PUA ultimately was absorbed by that organization.

PERMANENT COMMISSION OF TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS (Comissão Permanente das Organizações Sindicais—CPOS).

Created in Guanabara in 1958 along the lines of São Paulo's Inter-Union Unity Pact, the Permanent Commission of Trade Union Organizations was a united labor front of industrial workers that functioned as the Rio de Janeiro branch of the General Workers Command (CGT), successor to the General Strike Command.* In 1963, along with the Pact of Unity and Action,* the CPOS proclaimed the National Basic Reform Week, a pressure campaign designed to force President Goulart into adopting a more radical left position with regard to organized labor. On the Day of Protest Against the High Cost of Living, the culminating event of the Basic Reform Work, state police invaded the textile workers union and, in the process, attacked CPOS' president, Hercules Correia dos Reis. See General Strike Command.

PUA. *See* Pact of Unity and Action.

PUI. *See* Inter-Union Unity Pact.

REGIONAL LABOR FEDERATION OF PERNAMBUCO (Federação Operária Regional de Pernambuco).

Also referred to as the Labor Federation of Pernambuco (Federação Operária do Pernambuco), this organization was founded in 1914 in Recife, capital of the State of Pernambuco, and included four associations representing stevedores, textile workers, warehouse workers, and those involved in diverse trades (respectively, União dos Estivadores; Liga dos Trabalhadores das Fábricas de Tecidos; União da Resistência; and Sindicato de Ofícios Vários). Its immediate origins lay in the Second Brazilian Labor Congress (Segundo Congresso Operário Brasileiro) of 1913, which under anarcho-syndicalist leadership had stressed the establishing of labor federations throughout Brazil. A labor leader from Rio de Janeiro, José Elias, came to Recife to help organize the federation. Its deeper roots, however, probably lay in earlier worker organizations in Pernambuco. In July of 1890, for example, the Artisan-Labor Congress of Pernambuco (Congresso Artístico-Operário de Pernambuco) was established, and two years later held an assembly in Recife to urge the adoption of an eight-hour day.

The Regional Labor Federation played an active role in the heightened labor agitation that attended the era of World War I, including strikes of tramway workers in 1919 as well as a strike action against the British-owned Great Western Railroad. By that time, the Federation apparently had expanded its base to include workers in civil construction, graphics, railroads and tramways. As in other states, notably Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, tensions between anarcho-syndicalists, socialists, and communists led to a formal rupture and establishing of a rival organization. Thus, by 1920 there also existed a Working Class Federation of Pernambuco.*

REGIONAL LABOR FEDERATION OF RIO DE JANEIRO (Federação Operária Regional do Rio de Janeiro). *See* Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro.

REGIONAL UNION FEDERATION OF RIO DE JANEIRO (Federação Sindical Regional do Rio de Janeiro—FSRR).

The Regional Union Federation was organized in 1927 at a Regional Union Congress sponsored by the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) to promote labor unity in the Federal District and move toward the creation of a unified labor front in a national labor confederation (see General Labor Confederation of Brazil—CGT). Former PCB treasurer and secretary for union affairs, Joaquim Barbosa, became first secretary of the FSRR, and João da Costa Pimenta, a prominent labor organizer in São Paulo who was active in the graphic workers strike in Rio in 1928, became the second secretary. By 1928, however, these FSRR leaders were criticized by the PCB for the union's ineffectiveness and urged to promote the party's electoral efforts in the 1928 municipal elections in Rio. This led to Barbosa's resignation. Pimenta also broke with the PCB leadership.

Claiming towards the end of 1928 to represent thirteen Rio unions including those in textiles, metallurgy, graphic arts, and construction, the FSRR issued a strong protest against some favorable comments by pro-administration labor groups on the return to Brazil of Artur Bernardes who, as president (1922–26), had subjected labor to a virtual state of siege. At that time, according to the PCB, the FSRR was one of only two regional federations in Brazil, the other being the General Union of Workers of Pernambuco. The FSRR attended the April 1929 National Labor Congress that created the General Labor Confederation. As with other communist- and anarchist-led labor organizations of the 1920s, the FSRR disappeared during the reorganization of labor that attended the accession to power of Getúlio Vargas in the Revolution of 1930.

REGIONAL UNION OF CIVIL CONSTRUCTION WORKERS (União Regional dos Operários em Construção Civil—UROCC).

Established under communist influence as a rival to the anarchist-dominated Union of Civil Construction workers* (UOCC) and commonly referred to as "The Regional" or the UROCC, this union first arose in the mid-1920s during

the so-called state of siege, a period of labor repression associated with the presidency of Artur Bernardes. At that time the UOCC had been closed, and the communists used that opportunity to gain influence with construction workers. Initially known as the Civil Construction Workers' Circle (Círculo dos Operários em Construção Civil), its name was changed first to the Beneficial Circle of Civil Construction Workers (Círculo Beneficente dos Operários em Construção Civil), then around 1927, to the Union of Painters and Those in Related Trades (União dos Pintores e Anexos); that same year, following the reemergence of the UOCC, it underwent its final name change. When the UOCC sponsored a strike for higher minimum wages in April 1927, the Regional suggested the formation of a united front. When the UOCC rejected that proposal (which conflicted with fundamental anarchist doctrine), the Regional did not adhere to the strike and instead used it as an opportunity to attract more workers to its organization.

The UROCC associated itself with the communist-oriented Regional Union Federation of Rio de Janeiro* (FSRR) and the General Labor Confederation of Brazil.*

RESISTANCE FEDERATION OF THE PERNAMBUCAN WORKING CLASSES (Federação de Resistencia das Classes Trabalhadores de Pernambuco).

In 1918 the Resistance Federation claimed to include thirteen unions in Recife, the Pernambucan capital, and fourteen others throughout the state. It published a weekly newspaper, the *Tribune of the People* (*Tribuna do povo*), founded that year by Antonio Bernardo Canelas, then an anarchist (he later embraced Bolshevism) originally from Rio de Janeiro who had fled from the State of Alagoas when authorities closed down his weekly because of its opposition to World War I. Subsequently, the *Tribune* was replaced by the *Social Hour* (*A Hora Social*), which for about three months functioned as a daily, the first such workers' publication in the Brazilian northeast.

The Federation enjoyed considerable success in supporting a 1919 strike against the British-owned Pernambuco Tramway Company which had been called by the Cosmopolitan Union (União Cosmopolita), which claimed to represent the company's workers. The Federation called for a general strike which paralyzed Recife. Successful in portraying this action as a blow against British imperialism, the Union thereby gained government support. The Federation was represented at the Third Brazilian Labor Congress held in 1920 by José Alves Diniz who had attended a National Anarchist Congress held in Brazil in 1915, and in 1921 helped found the Communist Group of Rio de Janeiro, a Bolshevik group intended to back the program of the Third International.

RESISTANCE SOCIETY OF WATERFRONT WAREHOUSES AND COFFEE WORKERS (Sociedade de Resistencia dos Trabalhadores em Trapiche e Café).

A so-called yellow union, a moderate reformist labor organization that enjoyed good relations with both government and the police during the 1920s when

anarchist and communist unions suffered repression, the Resistance Society was founded early in the 1900s. In 1908–09 it was weakened by tensions between Brazilians of African ancestry and Portuguese immigrants, which on one occasion exploded into bloody violence. This dispute, coupled with financial problems and employer pressure, caused its membership to tumble from 4,000 to 200 by 1910. It reached a low of around fifty members in 1912 when it began to reorganize and revive.

Along with similarly oriented organizations, the Resistance Society participated in the 1926 meetings to select a Brazilian delegate to the Geneva Conference of the International Labor Bureau. When former Brazilian President Artur Bernardes (1922–26), whose administration virtually laid siege to radical labor unions, made his first return to Brazil (he had taken a European trip upon leaving office), the Resistance Society joined with three other labor organizations in praising Bernardes for his efforts on behalf of Brazil's workers. After these statements appeared in the establishment Rio de Janeiro newspaper, the *Jornal do Commercio*, the Regional Syndicalist Federation of Rio* issued a strong protest. The Resistance Society also participated in the 1933 elections for a constitutional assembly decreed by Getúlio Vargas (who had come to power in a 1930 coup) as a member of a labor political party organized to back yellow union candidates.

SÃO PAULO LABOR FEDERATION (Federação Operária de São Paulo).

Established in 1905 during a period of anarchist and socialist labor cooperation to energize the workers movement in São Paulo and revive the moribund labor organizations that came together to form it, the São Paulo Labor Federation included the Hatmakers Union (União de Chapeleiros), Stonemasons League (Liga dos Pedreiros), and International Union of Shoemakers (União Internacional de Sapateiros) and was a counterpart to the Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro.*

A participant in the First Labor Congress (Primeiro Congresso Operário) of 1906, which marked the preeminence of revolutionary syndicalism in the labor movement, the São Paulo Labor Federation became active in a strike of railroad workers of the Paulista Company (Companhia Paulista) which broke out in June of that year. It organized rallies, provided aid to the strikers, and sponsored a solidarity strike in São Paulo city, but the Paulista strike nevertheless failed. Indeed, its last days witnessed a police invasion of the Federation's headquarters.

The following year, the Federation coordinated a general strike in the city of São Paulo calling for the eight-hour workday, the largest labor action in the state's history up to that time. Although the strike ultimately included workers in civil construction, metallurgy, food, graphic workers, shoemakers, and textile operatives, at best it proved only partially successful. Again the police invaded the Federation's headquarters, though union leaders reconvened in another location. A period of decline ensued, reflecting continued police repression, the disproportionate power of ownership, and organizational weaknesses within the labor movement. The Federation reconstituted itself in August 1917 amidst a

general resurgence of anarchist-led labor militancy, which witnessed agitation over Brazilian participation in World War I and rising inflation. The Federation received the resources of the São Paulo Proletarian Defense Committee, established to articulate demands and rally popular support for a general strike then developing in São Paulo, and had the support of sixteen craft and industrial unions and eight workers leagues (*Ligas Operárias*).

The Federation also spoke of reactivating the Brazilian Labor Confederation.* This period of euphoria proved short-lived. In 1919 the Federation declared a general strike throughout the state in support of strikes against the São Paulo Gas Company and the Light and Power Company, both foreign-owned enterprises. The strike proved a complete failure; the Federation was tarnished not only by its lack of control over the labor movement but by accusations from the establishment press, particularly the prestigious *Estado de São Paulo*, of excessive politicism and the use of violence. Also a factor in the Federation's decline was the growing competition between anarchists and communists. After another unsuccessful general strike called in 1920 to support workers of the Mojiana Railroad Company, continued police repression, and declining economic conditions within Brazil, the Federation in 1921 ceased to exist.

The organization had one final and brief reprise in 1930. Following the fall of Washington Luis, anarcho-syndicalists had established a Labor Committee of Syndical Organization (Comité Operário de Organização Sindical—COOS) to reorganize São Paulo labor unions that had been closed during the repressions of the 1920s. However, textile workers and those in civil construction refused to follow the anarchist line, and schisms between anarchists and communists, the latter in turn disturbed by the appearance of Trotskyite factions, limited the Federation's effectiveness. It attempted, without success, to organize a general strike to oppose the Vargas government's decree that workers carry identification booklets with employment histories (*carteiras profissionais*) and that unions had to admit all bearers of such *carteiras*. The Federation soon disappeared in the reorganization of labor that marked the Vargas regime.

SÃO PAULO METALWORKERS UNION (Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de São Paulo).

Led since 1965 by Joaquim dos Santos Andrade (known popularly as Big Joaquim, or Joaquinzão), this union is based in the city of São Paulo, Brazil's largest urban and industrial center. With a membership of 350,000 workers employed in 13,000 separate enterprises, the São Paulo Metalworkers Union is neither as large nor as concentrated as its political rival the Metalworkers of São Bernardo, and a greater number of its members earn low wages. Despite its tie to the Brazilian Communist Party, in the contemporary context of union militancy the São Paulo Union emerges as traditional and accommodationist.

While new-style syndicalists like these of São Bernardo focused on rank-and-file organization at the plant level, the São Paulo Metalworkers had a very low rate of unionization at individual firms, and showed little presence there in terms

of activities or worker solidarity. This pattern resulted in part from the very large number of plants covered by the union, but more so from a traditional union orientation focusing on leadership struggles, political rivalries, and relations with the government. For example, Joaquinção attempted to unseat Ary Campista as head of the National Confederation of Industrial Workers,* and stood apart from attempts by Luís Inácio da Silva, former head of the São Bernardo Metalworkers and leader of the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) to establish a unifying central labor organization, the Sole Workers Central.* On 21 July 1983 Joaquinção orchestrated a partially successful general strike demanding that Brazil break with the International Monetary Fund and declare a moratorium on payment of its external debt. In so doing, he essentially repeated the basic demands of a less successful strike a few days earlier (which he openly criticized) by oil workers and metalworkers that had been organized by the Workers Party. The intense political nature of union activity in the waning days of the military government emerges clearly in that the Workers Party action had been an attempt to anticipate, and therefore deflate, the importance of the general strike called by Joaquinção.

SÃO PAULO TYPOGRAPHIC GUILD (Gremio Tipográfico Paulistano). *See* Graphic Workers Union.

SÃO PAULO TYPOGRAPHIC CENTER (Centro Tipográfico Paulistano). *See* Graphic Workers Union.

SHOEMAKERS ALLIANCE (Aliança dos Trabalhadores em Calçado). *See* Auxiliary Union of Shoemakers.

SHOEMAKERS LEAGUE (Liga dos Operários em Calçado). *See* Auxiliary Union of Shoemakers.

SYNDICAL UNION OF WORKERS (União Sindical dos Trabalhadores—UST).

Founded in São Paulo in September 1962 as a central labor organization by Domingos Alvares, president of the São Paulo State Federation of Metalworkers, the UST eschewed partisan politics and ideology. However, it urged labor activism, the use of the strike, and the need for basic labor reforms. One of three such organizations important during the political turmoil attending João Goulart's administration (see the General Workers Command—CGT, and the Democratic Union Movement), the UST was attractive to Goulart in that unlike the CGT, it was not pressuring him into a more leftist position. Thus, in 1963, seeking to reduce his dependence on the CGT, Goulart sent his labor adviser, Gilberto Crockatt da São, to speak with UST leaders and indicate his favorable predisposition toward them. Eager to amplify the power of their organization, the UST began to plan a national labor conference. Its leaders rejected the suggestion of

CGT moderates that the two organizations pool their strength, and announced plans to dispute the incumbent Clodschmidt Riani for the presidency of the National Confederation of Industrial Workers,* the CGT's main power base. The UST did not realize these ambitions, however, as Goulart patched up his differences with the CGT. Denied such perquisites of governmental favor as money and appointments in the labor ministry bureaucracy and outmaneuvered by the CGT, which scheduled a National Basic Reform Week and Day of Protest Against the High Cost of Living for the same time as the UST national meeting, the Syndical Union of Workers declined rapidly and by August 1963 no longer was a factor in either labor or politics.

SINDICATO DOS METALÚRGICOS DE SÃO PAULO. *See* São Paulo Metalworkers Union.

SINDICATO DOS TRABALHADORES NA INDÚSTRIA GRÁFICA (Union of Graphic Industry Workers). *See* Graphic Workers Union.

SINDICATO DOS TRABALHADORES NAS INDÚSTRIAS METALÚRGICAS, MECÂNICAS E DE MATERIAL ELÉTRICO DE SÃO BERNARDO. *See* Metallurgical, Mechanical, and Electrical Workers Union of São Bernardo.

SOCIEDADE DE RESISTENCIA DOS TRABALHADORES EM TRAPICHE E CAFÉ. *See* Resistance Society of Waterfront Warehouses and Coffee Workers.

SOLE WORKERS CENTRAL (Central Unica dos Trabalhadores—CUT).

In August 1981 some 5,000 labor leaders met in a National Congress of the Working Class (Congresso Nacional da Classe Trabalhadora—CONCLAT) to establish new guidelines for the Brazilian labor movement and to discuss new measures for exerting pressure on business and government. Disputes arose over union participation in the newly founded Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores—PT), organized by Luís Inácio da Silva (popularly known as Lula) who had led the São Bernardo Metalworkers (Metallurgical, Mechanical, and Electrical Workers Union of São Bernardo and Diadema*). At issue here were the political ties of other union leaders, clashes between traditionally oriented old-guard unionists and advocates of a so-called new style of Brazilian syndicalism, as well as schisms within that latter group.

The 1981 CONCLAT voted to try to fulfill a long-standing goal of Brazilian labor by establishing a central national union. It constituted a national body to create the new union, a National Commission for the Sole Workers Central (Comissão Nacional Pró-Central Unica dos Trabalhadores), setting August of the following year as the target date.

Brazilian labor law prohibited any such union but precedent existed not only in terms of previous attempts to form an all-embracing labor association (for example, the anarchist Brazilian Labor Confederation* in the years before World

War I and the Confederation of Brazilian Workers* in the 1940s), but also in such extra-legal or parallel labor organizations as the General Strike Command,* or Pact of Unity and Action* in the 1950s and early 1960s.

When the Sole Workers Central was in fact declared to exist at a 1983 CONCLAT, labor leaders tied to the existing structure of national confederations proved conspicuously absent. The new organization also was shunned by Joaquim dos Santos Andrade, president of the São Paulo Metalworkers and ally of the Brazilian Communist Party. (He had been scorned by the pro-CUT faction as being a government tool, or *pelego*.) Even some proponents of the new style of "authentic" syndicalism, which advocated strong rank-and-file organizing, opposed CUT because of its tight ties to the PT. Thus Antonio Rogério Magri, head of the São Paulo Electricians Union (Sindicato dos Electricitários de São Paulo), and whose union career began with the ABC Metal Strikes of 1978 which had been led by Lula, styled the entire notion of CUT "an irresponsible adventure." Finally, Ary Campista, head of Brazil's largest labor body, the National Confederation of Industrial Workers,* began organizing a rival central at the very moment that CUT came into existence. Once more, then, it appeared that political factionalism, government maneuvering, and ideological discord and leadership rivalries within labor's ranks precluded any successful unification of the movement.

TEXTILE FACTORY WORKERS FEDERATION (Federação dos Operários em Fábricas de Tecidos).

Organized in Rio de Janeiro around 1903 as the first Rio textile union and modeled on French syndicalism, which advocated resistance as opposed to earlier mutual aid orientations, the Textile Factory Workers Federation quickly secured the adherence of almost all of the city's textile workers. It promoted a major strike in August 1903 in which some 25,000 textile workers, along with 15,000 other laborers, participated, to secure a 40 percent salary increase and an eight-hour day. The strike's failure to achieve its objectives—ascrivable in large measure to the greater organization and resources enjoyed by the factory owners, as well as to the unskilled nature of the work and concomitant ease of replacing laborers, along with police repression—led to the Federation's losing most of its membership, a process accelerated by the owners' tactic of large-scale firings of union members. Sporadic attempts to organize Rio's textile workers ensued, with real success awaiting the formation of the Union of Textile Factory Workers* in 1917.

UGT. *See* General Union of Workers.

ULTAB. *See* Union of Farmers and Agricultural Workers of Brazil.

UNIÃO AUXILIADORA DOS ARTISTAS SAPATEIROS. *See* Auxiliary Union of Shoemakers.

UNIÃO DOS LAVRADORES E TRABALHADORES AGRÍCOLAS DO BRASIL. *See* Union of Farmers and Agricultural Workers of Brazil.

UNIÃO DOS OPERÁRIOS EM CONSTRUÇÃO CIVIL. *See* Union of Civil Construction Workers.

UNIÃO DOS OPERÁRIOS EM ENGENHO DE DENTRO. *See* Union of Workers in Engenho de Dentro.

UNIÃO DOS OPERÁRIOS EM FÁBRICAS DE TECIDOS. *See* Union of Textile Factory Workers.

UNIÃO DOS PINTORES E ANEXOS (Union of Painters and Those in Related Trades). *See* Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers.

UNIÃO DOS TRABALHADORES GRÁFICOS. *See* Graphic Workers Union.

UNIÃO GERAL DOS TRABALHADORES. *See* General Union of Workers.

UNIÃO GERAL DOS TRABALHADORES EM CALÇADO (General Union of Shoemakers). *See* Auxiliary Union of Shoemakers.

UNIÃO OPERÁRIA E CAMPONESA (Worker and Peasant Union). *See* Unitary Union Confederation of Brazil.

UNIÃO REGIONAL DOS OPERÁRIOS EM CONSTRUÇÃO CIVIL. *See* Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers.

UNIÃO SINDICAL DOS TRABALHADORES. *See* Syndical Union of Workers.

UNION COUNCIL OF WORKERS IN THE STATE OF SÃO PAULO (Conselho Sindical dos Trabalhadores no Estado de São Paulo—CST).

In 1959 as ideological conflict among and within Brazilian labor organizations accelerated in anticipation of the presidential election of 1960, the heads of twenty-two São Paulo labor federations formed the CST to replace the Inter-Union Unity Pact* (PUI), which had become highly politicized and dominated by leftists. This new organization was to avoid partisan politics and focus on labor issues so as to promote unity. Inter-union Unity Pacts which had been established in the so-called ABC triangle (the industrial suburbs of São Paulo City, Santo André, São Bernardo de Campo, and São Caetano) and the city of Sorocaba, as well as a Syndical Debate Forum (Forum Sindical de Debates) in Santos also formed part of the CST.

The organizational structure of the CST largely neutralized the union presidents, whose power in the PUI had discomforted federation presidents. The

CST's officers embraced various ideological positions, and its bylaws forbade political discussions. It allowed participation only from legally recognized unions, further promoting thereby its lack of desire to threaten the established order. Despite this posture, the CST protested the Kubitschek administration's attempt to nullify the 1959 election of Domingos Alvares to the presidency of the powerful São Paulo Metalworkers' Federation, defeating the incumbent president who had communist support. The intervention was engineered by Goulart in an attempt to keep his own communist backing while blocking those favoring Janio Quadros, who was running for the nation's presidency against Goulart.

In April of 1960 the CST sponsored a statewide labor conference in preparation for the Third National Union Congress planned for August of that year. The CST prepared a position paper that provided a history of the São Paulo labor movement since 1946, emphasized the importance of worker participation in union activities, decried government domination of unions and the lack of union autonomy, and held out a preferred image of democratic trade unionism on the model of the United States that had been sparked by their contact with U.S. labor leaders and the Regional Inter-American Labor Organization (ORIT). The meeting, however, became a forum for the presentation of opposing views, particularly those of the Union Renewal Movement, the so-called *renovadores*, who urged a number of far-reaching reforms, including an end to the government funding of unions through the union tax (*imposto sindical*) and a complete reorganization of unions from the bottom up. Splits within the labor movement among *renovadores*, communists, and the moderates allied with the government (*pelegos*) ultimately destroyed the CST. Shortly after the presidential election, which had seen the CST irrevocably divided between supporters of the ultimately victorious Janio Quadros, and those of his opponent, General Henrique Teixeira Lott, the CST went out of existence.

UNION OF CIVIL CONSTRUCTION WORKERS (União dos Operários em Construção Civil—UOCC).

Anarcho-syndicalist in orientation, this union was founded in Rio de Janeiro in 1919. In 1920 it struck in protest against the arrest and disappearance of Antonio da Silva, who had been active in organizing construction workers. As a response to labor militancy over the past few years, Congress passed new legislation which, among other things, allowed the president to dissolve those unions engaging in acts deemed injurious to the public good. In February 1921, as a protest against this legislation and as an act of solidarity with striking maritime workers in Rio de Janeiro and the port of Santos, the UOCC declared a strike. After a battle at the Union's headquarters between strikers and police, the government closed the UOCC. Police moved against the UOCC again in June 1923 as part of a general government roundup of radical labor leaders. It remained closed throughout the so-called state of siege from 1922 to 1927 associated with the presidency of Artur Bernardes, a time of repression used primarily to oppose military challenges to his regime but also to repress labor

action. During this time the communists founded a rival association which ultimately came to be known as the Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers* (UROCC). The UOCC, reopened in January 1927, found itself in conflict with the new organization, especially during an April 1927 UOCC-sponsored strike which failed because of what anarchist leaders termed "treason" on the part of the communists. Specifically, the UOCC leadership accused the rival UROCC of having attempted to dissuade construction workers from carrying on with the strike as well as having created schisms within the construction workers labor movement.

UNION OF FARMERS AND AGRICULTURAL WORKERS OF BRAZIL (União dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores Agrícolas do Brasil—ULTAB).

Organized by the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) in 1954 among coffee sharecroppers and sugarworkers in São Paulo and Paraná, this national agricultural workers union complemented earlier PCB organizing activities during the 1950s which established rural unions in various states, most prominently in São Paulo and Pernambuco. The ULTAB in 1955 sponsored a Second National Conference of Peasants and Agricultural Workers that sparked a petition campaign for agrarian reform legislation. Its membership largely composed of wage workers or commercial farmers, the ULTAB pushed for the extension of national labor law to include rural workers, a more moderate position than that advanced by the peasant leagues led by Francisco Julião, which advocated large-scale land expropriation, a position more pleasing to the sharecroppers and small holders who comprised the bulk of their adherents. The administration of João Goulart enacted a Rural Labor Law in March 1963 that responded to the ULTAB position. However, in encouraging rural labor unions, the government also hoped to co-opt agricultural laborers as support of the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and to contain radicalism.

Competing with the ULTAB in organizing rural labor were three different Catholic groups: Popular Action (*Acção Popular*), a radical politicized youth group embracing segments of the Catholic Worker Youth (Juventude Operária Católica) and Catholic University Youth (Juventude Universitária Católica); Fathers Crespo and Melo in Pernambuco, who had organized Catholic peasant leagues with an orientation more moderate than those of Julião, and now with help from the U.S. Peace Corps, AID, and the CIA, began organizing cooperatives and unions under the aegis of an institution known as the Rural Orientation Service of Pernambuco (Serviço de Orientação Rural de Pernambuco—SORPE); and a group affiliated with the Catholic Workmen's Circles of São Paulo, backed by the conservative Institute of Social Research and Studies (Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais—IPES), sponsored by Brazilian businessmen and U.S. business and government groups. In December 1963 these various elements competed for control of the new rural workers' confederation, the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers* (CONTAG). With support from the AP faction, the ULTAB's Lindolto Silva emerged the winner. ULTAB member Nestor Vera

next became head of CONTAG and, as the speaker at a mammoth labor rally in March of 1964, helped pressure the Goulart administration for a series of basic legislative reforms shortly before the military coup which overthrew Goulart and established a conservative authoritarian regime.

UNION OF GRAPHIC INDUSTRY WORKERS (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores na Indústria Gráfica). *See* Graphic Workers Union.

UNION OF PAINTERS AND THOSE IN RELATED TRADES (União dos Pintores e Anexos). *See* Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers.

UNION OF TEXTILE FACTORY WORKERS (União dos Operários em Fábricas de Tecidos—UOFT).

Founded in Rio de Janeiro in August 1917 under anarchist influence as the sole textile workers union, the UOFT claimed to have by 1918 a membership of 30,000.

In November 1917 during the patriotic fervor attending Brazil's entry into World War I, strikes broke out in various large Rio de Janeiro textile factories demanding recognition of the UOFT. One of the major employer groupings, the Industrial Center of Brazil (Centro Industrial do Brasil), reached an accord with the Union which, among other things, established a fifty-six-hour workweek and a 30 percent salary increase. A combination of factors, including resistance from various large enterprises and dislocations caused by a Spanish flu epidemic led to the rapid breaking of that agreement. This, in turn, provoked a violent strike during November and December 1918 and the assumption of the union's leadership by the noted anarchist José Pereira de Oliveira. Under his leadership, the resurgent UOFT helped mediate in the general strike of May 1919 in São Paulo, achieving many of the workers' aims. Buoyed by this success, the UOFT sponsored a strike in Rio de Janeiro in June 1919 which called for various concessions with regard to salaries and working conditions, but which had as its ultimate objective achieving recognition of the union. In addition to the Industrial Center of Brazil which under the presidency of the "progressive" Jorge Street reached an agreement with the union, Rio's large textile enterprises were grouped into the Industrial Center of Spinning and Weaving of Cotton (Centro Industrial de Fiação e Tecelagem de Algodão), which took a harder line. Ultimately, the strike failed to achieve its objectives, and the UOFT entered into decline as several firms began firing workers known to be UOFT members while others, notably the giant America Fabril, organized company unions.

By 1923 unions associated with companies, and enjoying the backing of the presidential administration of Artur Bernardes (1922–26), began promoting a Textile Workers Congress. The UOFT initially declined to send representatives, but Sarandi Raposo, who headed the Brazilian Cooperativist Union Confederation* and advocated worker participation in politics, persuaded the UOFT president, then Manuel Inacio de Castro, to change his mind. In effect, this ended

the anarchist orientation of the UOFT, a process confirmed in 1926 when the Textile Bloc (*Bloco Textil*), the union's communist wing, managed an electoral triumph and took over leadership. At that point, the UOFT was said to have 2,000 members. This success encouraged the Brazilian Communist Party to organize a Regional Union Congress to establish a Regional Union Federation of Rio de Janeiro* (FSRR). When the FSRR became reality, the UOFT joined it.

UNION OF WORKERS IN ENGENHO DE DENTRO (União dos Operários em Engenho de Dentro).

Established in 1889 in Engenho de Dentro, a suburb of Rio de Janeiro which primarily housed railroad workers of the Brazil Central (*Central do Brasil*), in 1903 this union's presidency was assumed by the important reformist labor leader, Antonio Augusto Pinto Machado. By 1904 the Union's membership had risen from 82 to around 6,000. Accommodationist in approach, Machado in 1906 announced that his union would not participate in the Brazilian Labor Confederation,* which he denounced for its European-influenced anarchism.

UNITARY UNION CONFEDERATION OF BRAZIL (Confederação Sindical Unitária do Brasil).

Founded in 1934 in Rio de Janeiro during a Labor Congress under communist influence, the Unitary Union was intended as a single national labor organization to supplant the General Labor Confederation of Brazil as an attempt to respond to the regime of political liberty established by the new national constitution of that year. It apparently absorbed an organization known as the Worker and Peasant Union (União Operária e Camponesa) that existed in 1933 and 1934, mainly in Rio de Janeiro, which was under communist influence, and supported various "proletarian" candidates in state elections. However, by April 1935, operating under a newly passed National Security Law, the administration of Getúlio Vargas outlawed the Confederation. The repression of unions and leadership not dominated by the administration proved characteristic of the period which ushered in Vargas' New State (*Estado Novo*).

UOCC. *See* Union of Civil Construction Workers.

UOFT. *See* Union of Textile Factory Workers.

UROCC. *See* Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers.

UST. *See* Syndical Union of Workers.

UTG. *See* Graphic Workers Union.

WORKER AND PEASANT UNION (União Operária e Camponesa). *See* Unitary Union Confederation of Brazil.

WORKERS UNITY MOVEMENT (Movimento de Unidade dos Trabalhadores—MUT).

Toward the end of the Vargas dictatorship in 1945 as the labor movement gained some freedom from the authoritarian controls of the New State (*Estado Novo*), the Communist Party organized various city and statewide labor congresses, ultimately establishing the Workers Unity Movement as a sort of general staff for their labor-related activities. Immediately after the 1945 overthrow of the New State, three groups—the communists, followers of Vargas, and elements loyal to the new regime of General Eurico Dutra—competed for control of the labor movement.

The MUT became a vehicle for the communists' attempt to dominate the labor movement, promoting the demand for a national labor congress to establish a single national labor confederation, the Confederation of Brazilian Workers* (CTB), and attempting to convene such a meeting for September 1946. The Dutra government then outlawed the MUT, but nonetheless held discussion with its leaders regarding a national labor congress. This resulted in an agreement that the Ministry of Labor and the MUT would jointly sponsor the meeting. The Syndical Congress of Workers of Brazil (Congresso Sindical dos Trabalhadores do Brasil) took place in September 1946 but witnessed a split between the Vargas adherents and communists, versus forces loyal to the ministry. The former established the CTB, but the following year the Supreme Court declared it and the Communist Party illegal.

WORKING CLASSES CENTER (Centro das Classes Operárias).

The Center had a brief existence (1903–1904) in Rio de Janeiro under the leadership of Vicente Ferreira de Souza, a Bahian physician who helped form the Collectivist Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Coletivista). Typical of several organizations of that era stressing minimalist improvements for workers, in opposition to the approach of anarchists, it was composed largely of maritime workers. It participated in a 1903 strike against the Brazilian Lloyd Shipping line, then was closed by the authorities the following year when it became involved in the opposition to the government program of mandatory vaccination.

Chile

BRIAN LOVEMAN

From the days of the Spanish conquest of the indigenous peoples in what is now Chile, great social distances have separated the rulers of Chilean society from those who labored in the fields, mines, ports, cottage industries, and trades. In accord with Spanish tradition, artisans and skilled tradesmen formed guilds, or *gremios*, to regulate certain aspects of the labor market, the quality of production, pricing, and apprenticeship. Spanish colonial policy encouraged and supported the activities of these guilds, including their restrictive requirements for admission based on lineage, surname, and race.

If the *gremios* somewhat protected skilled craftsmen, the vast majority of the population remained unorganized and unprotected against the power and caprice of the owners of land, mines, and commercial enterprises despite the symbolic regulations that theoretically defined the limits of master-servant relations. The legacy of this colonial situation, a highly stratified class and race-conscious social hierarchy, provided the basis for intense and bitter class conflict when the Chilean economy began to modernize in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century brought Chile's gradual incorporation into the orbit of West European capitalist nations, in particular that of the expanding British Empire. By mid-century, the technological advances of modernization in Europe began to make themselves felt in Chile; steamships, railroads, telegraph, telephones, gas lighting, and urban transport systems altered the physical infrastructure of the cities, ports, and hinterland. Relying on the country's mineral wealth (silver and copper) and responding to the needs of European farmers for fertilizer, to the demands of California and Australia for wheat during the gold rush booms of the 1850s and 1860s, and more generally to the needs of expanding and industrializing economies of Europe and North America, Chilean and foreign investors forged a dynamic export economy that gave the country the blush of progress and prosperity. The veneer

of prosperity masked the plight of the nation's farm workers, miners, urban unskilled, construction workers, and laborers in the ports. Lacking the political and economic power to influence conditions of work or salaries by collective action, Chile's working classes suffered as did their counterparts in Europe, North America, and Latin America during the early stages of industrialization, that is, before the development of an institutionalized industrial relations system.

The first collective response of Chilean workers to the socioeconomic changes wrought by modernization consisted of mutual aid societies dedicated to the provision of medical services, burial benefits, libraries, night schools, vocational training, recreation, and job searches. Mutual aid societies, or *sociedades mutualistas*, first appeared about mid-nineteenth century and gradually grew in number until the 1880s. After this time their number increased dramatically, and by 1901 a national convention of *mutualistas* brought together thousands of workers in Santiago, the nation's capital. In 1924 the Chilean government officially recognized over 600 mutual aid societies with approximately 90,000 members.

Though the mutual aid societies served as training grounds for labor leaders as well as sources of solidarity in times of need, they rarely played the role of a modern union or class organization in representing workers' demands to employers, bargaining for improvements in working conditions or wages, or insulating the work force against layoffs or dismissal. Nevertheless, these precursors of later Chilean labor organizations (and recruiting grounds for others) offered an initial political and social base for workers within the legal framework of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Recognizing their potential significance, ambitious populist politicians sought to gain the support of mutual aid societies in Santiago, Valparaíso, and other towns as Chilean electoral politics became more open in the first decades of the twentieth century.

Parallel to the development of the mutual aid societies in the late nineteenth century there also emerged "resistance societies," or *sociedades de resistencia*. Unlike the mutual aid organizations, the resistance societies existed outside the framework of the legal system and dedicated themselves specifically to confrontations with employers and the government in defense of the class interests of their members. Primarily influenced by anarchist and socialist ideals, resistance societies proclaimed their intention to overthrow the corrupt, exploitative capitalist society through direct action—strikes and violence—and eventually create a worker-dominated society. Recruiting members from the mutual aid societies as well as from the unorganized artisans, craft workers, metalworkers, railroad workers, miners, and dockworkers, the resistance societies seriously challenged the basic interests of Chilean elites and not infrequently suffered employer and government repression. Meanwhile, in the northern nitrate fields, workers forged a radical labor movement which eventually produced the leadership of Chile's Socialist and Communist parties in the early twentieth century.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, a wide range of resistance societies joined in a wave of strikes that disrupted the routine of Chilean life in the capital

as well as in the country's major towns and cities. In several instances attempted general strikes led to widespread rioting and looting in Santiago and Valparaíso with concomitant use of troops to quell the threat to order. On other occasions concentrations of workers were fired upon by army units and suffered numerous casualties.

Difficult economic conditions combined with government repression contributed to a decline in the activity of the nascent labor movement in the period 1908–1910. Many of the members of the resistance societies and northern *Mancomunales* (brotherhoods) again participated in the less dangerous mutualist societies where they seldom risked loss of jobs or police persecution. In this context Paulo Marín (1909), a conservative and politically ambitious lawyer, assisted railway shop workers in the organization of a mutualist society called the Great Chilean Workers Federation (Gran Federación Obrera de Chile—GFOCH).

Unlike most mutualist societies the GFOCH soon extended its membership to include craft workers in several cities and stimulated creation of regional federations. By 1911 the GFOCH included federal (regional) councils in more than fifteen cities and joined together trades as diverse as electricians and tannery workers with the railway shop workers. In 1912 Paulo Marín, “honorary president” of GFOCH, attempted to use the organization as a political base in his effort to win election to the Chilean Congress from the city of Concepción. Labor's traditional identification with the Democrat Party (Partido Demócrata) prevailed and Marín's candidacy was unsuccessful.

That same year, Luis Emilio Recabarren and others who would become prominent politico-labor leaders split from the Democrat Party to form the Socialist Workers Party (Partido Obrero Socialista—POS) in the northern nitrate port of Iquique. Gradually elements of the POS and more radical workers ascended to leadership within GFOCH. Branches of the POS soon appeared in Santiago, Valparaíso, and other cities. In 1913 future Trotskyist Manuel Hidalgo became the first socialist (POS) to win an elective post, gaining a seat on Santiago's Municipal Council.

From 1913 to 1917 GFOCH evolved from a mutualist society into a radical labor federation. Though weakened by an unsuccessful railroad strike in 1916, GFOCH emerged from its convention of 1917 a substantially different organization. Officially dropping its mutualist identity, it became a trade union federation, the Chilean Workers Federation* (Federación Obrera de Chile—FOCH), dedicated to defending workers' class interests through collective bargaining, strikes, and *political* action. FOCH appealed to the unskilled, as well as to textile, glass, tobacco workers and metalworkers, coal and nitrate miners, and even some agricultural workers. Between 1917 and 1921 FOCH intensified its activities. In 1919, for example, FOCH demanded an end to capitalism in Chile, and several years later it affiliated with the Red International of Labor Unions (RILU). Closely allied (sharing leaders, working-class newspapers, and meeting halls) with Chile's newly formed Communist Party (Partido Comunista, 1922),

FOCH grouped some 30,000–60,000 workers into Chile's largest national labor organization.

Often at odds with the anarchists and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) for its political and electoral activities, FOCH nonetheless set the pattern for organized labor during the next fifty years. Democrats, socialists, "independents," and even anarchists joined communists in an ideologically fragmented labor central which the communists sought to dominate.

FOCH gained significant political influence in the period 1917–25, helping to elect communist and democrat members to Congress and pressuring the Chilean political system for reforms that would benefit the working classes. Paralleling the continued labor activism by the IWW, anarchists, and resistance societies, FOCH's new labor alliance with working-class political parties established a pattern followed by its two most important successors, the Confederation of Chilean Workers* (Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile—CTCH, 1936–46) and the Chilean Workers Central* (Central Única de Trabajadores—CUT, 1953–73).

FOCH's growth and temporary economic success from 1917 to 1925 were followed by harsh repression during the dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez (1927–31). This repression practically destroyed FOCH as a national organization. A resurgence of FOCH activity in the early 1930s was followed by its amalgamation into the Confederation of Chilean Workers, formed as part of the Popular Front Coalition in 1936.

For decades, employers and the Chilean Congress had resisted the enactment of systematic labor legislation, but then a military coup d'état in 1924 pushed a package of social legislation through the Chilean legislative system at the point of sabers. Laws 4053–4059, labeled the Social Laws, obligated employers to enter into written labor contracts with their workers, introduced an eight-hour day, prohibited child labor, prohibited payment of workers with company scrip instead of currency, required six-day notice for dismissal of workers, recognized collective labor agreements and collective bargaining, created a new national social security and obligatory health care program, legalized strikes under specified conditions regulated by government Labor Department personnel, and provided an *institutionalized* framework for industrial relations.

Initial confusion by workers, employers, and government personnel concerning the methods of implementation of these social laws gradually gave way to uneven, fitful acknowledgment by employers of the legitimacy of government participation and regulation of industrial relations. From 1924 to 1931 the new Labor Department leadership worked on modification and enhancement of the social laws as well as on the practical limitations to implementation and enforcement of the new legislation.

Adoption of the social legislation of 1924 had set the stage for strife within the labor movement between legal unions and "free unions," or *sindicatos libres* (those not officially sanctioned), between anarcho-syndicalists, socialists, and

communists. Moreover, employer resistance to unionization, the complexity of the labor code requirements for unionization, and the ideological objections to government intrusion into the industrial relations arena all made implementation of the new system difficult. These twin struggles, within the labor movement and between labor and capital, took a dramatic turn when General Carlos Ibáñez took power in 1927 and moved to establish government control over the labor movement by repressing the socialist, anarchist, and populist organizations, as well as FOCH and the Communist Party, and by creating a government-sponsored labor organization.

In 1929, under the auspices of the Ibáñez government, the legal union movement, the white-collar workers association, the Union of Chilean Employees* (Unión de Empleados de Chile—UECH), and some of the free unions were called together in Santiago by the Workers Social Congress* (Congreso Social Obrero) to form a new group called the Republican Confederation of Civic Action* (Confederación Republicana de Acción Cívica—CRAC). This group became an officialist central labor confederation for the next two years. Ibáñez assigned official legislative and administrative posts to CRAC leaders and invited them to participate in the elaboration of a new detailed labor code to regulate Chilean industrial relations. The dictator's attempted use of CRAC as a base of political support and as a means to subordinate the labor movement to the central government anticipated other similar efforts by Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, Juan Perón in Argentina, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, and even Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico in the next two decades.

In late 1931 Chile finally adopted an elaborate labor code which consolidated existing legislation, including the social laws and earlier worker protection laws, and incorporated such new groups of workers as domestics and agricultural laborers under the laws' protection.

This labor code, which would provide the basic framework for the Chilean industrial relations system until the military coup of 1973, created specialized administrative agencies called conciliation juntas (*juntas de conciliación*) to oversee mandatory collective bargaining and arbitration, to review labor petitions by organized workers, and to regulate strike votes and strike actions. Labor courts modeled on the system used in Italy received jurisdiction in all cases "involving questions originating from disputes related to application of the labor code and work contracts." At first labor courts also heard requests by labor inspectors for the levying of fines against employers cited with code violations. Later the inspectors obtained the authority to apply fines directly, subject to employer appeals to the labor courts.

The new legal and administrative system for industrial relations provided for substantial government participation in regulation of the labor movement as well as government involvement in settling labor disputes, setting the tone for labor negotiations, and, perhaps most important, making all labor disputes a matter of direct governmental concern. This last meant that henceforth political parties

and labor organizations of all stripes would focus their attention upon the current position of the incumbent government in collective bargaining and pending settlements.

Though each conflict involved only local labor inspectorates or *juntas de conciliación*, the potential always existed for particular labor conflicts to become centers of national political debate. This was especially true in key sectors of the economy where foreign investors or large national monopolies employed large numbers of workers who, over time, became organized in relatively strong national and regional confederations—for example, in the copper industry, the coal mines, or the docks and ports. Likewise the growing public sector work force emerged as a key political actor, notwithstanding the legal prohibition against strikes by government employees.

The Labor Code of 1931 placed precise and sometimes restrictive requirements on unions and their members, thereby limiting the autonomy of workers' organizations. These included systematic oversight by the Labor Department of union finances, strike fund prohibitions, review of the qualifications of union leaders and elections, and imposition of fines for engaging in activities, including illegal strikes, that contravened Labor Code regulations. The Labor Department could also dissolve unions that failed to conform to legal requirements.

These requirements and others conflicted radically with anarcho-sindicalist ideology and also met resistance from unions which drew membership from the militants of Socialist, Communist, and other working-class parties. However, inasmuch as "free unions" (those not established under the terms of the Code) were legally prohibited from representing workers in collective bargaining or in the labor courts, all but the anarchists gradually decided to make some efforts to achieve legal recognition. After the ousting of General Ibáñez in 1931 and the demise shortly thereafter of CRAC, the legal union movement began a period of steady growth from 1932 to 1947.

The ousting of Ibáñez was followed by an interlude of political uncertainty, including a brief experiment with a "socialist republic" in 1932. With the world depression hammering at the Chilean economy and unemployment at crisis levels, the country turned back to Arturo Alessandri, a demagogic populist president of the early 1920s, who now committed himself both to a more moderate course and to institutionalization of the new industrial relations system. Under the Alessandri administration (1932–38) the legal union movement expanded significantly, while the political system afforded opportunities for increasing participation by leftist parties, new centrist groups including the Falange and Social Catholics, and the traditional political right. Confrontation between the government and a variety of labor organizations in the mid-1930s further politicized the labor movement. The violent government response to a railway workers strike in 1936, for example, precipitated military administration of the railroad and promulgation of a Law of Internal Security that foreshadowed more severe legislation later in the century.

During the mid-1930s the intensity of political debate and its ideological content increased. In 1936 the political parties of the left and center—in particular, Socialists, Communists, and Radicals—organized a “Popular Front” coalition and sponsored the formation of a unified national labor organization. This organization, called the Confederation of Chilean Workers (CTCH), became a militant national labor confederation which attempted to defend workers in the industrial relations arena, in the Congress, in the courts, and in the workplace. It also provided electoral support for the successful popular front presidential candidate, Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938–41). Invited to cooperate in the popular front government, the CTCH took an active role in union organization in the urban centers, the countryside, and the mines. From the time of its organization in 1936 until 1948, the number of recognized unions increased from approximately 200 to over 1,800, and the number of organized workers grew from some 60,000 to over 260,000. Another 80,000–100,000 workers in “free unions” and government workers augmented the organized work force to almost 350,000.

Controversy over unionization of agricultural workers, internal divisions within the Popular Front, and the ever-present competition between socialists and communists in the labor movement weakened the CTCH considerably. Likewise, refusal of the anarcho-syndicalists and anarchists of the General Confederation of Labor* (Confederación General del Trabajo—CGT) to join in the CTCH divided the labor movement. After two years of worker mobilization from 1939 to 1941 and the death of Pedro Aguirre Cerda forced a realignment of the government coalition, the CTCH gradually declined in national influence.

The politicized character of the Chilean labor movement persisted. Party leaders and union leaders often were one and the same, particularly at the national level. Leftist and populist politicians cultivated rural and urban labor clienteles for both ideological and more narrowly political reasons, assuring that class conflict, political conflict, and party competition remained closely intertwined.

The advent of the Cold War immediately affected Chilean politics and the labor movement. An initial coalition of the Radical Party and the communists in the administration of President Gabriel González Videla collapsed dramatically after communist-directed agricultural unionization drives and strikes in the coal mines. Political conflict led socialist and communist factions to divide the CTCH into two separate organizations. Then, under growing internal political pressure and with the support of the United States, the Chilean president sponsored new internal security legislation and promulgated the infamous *Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy* (1948), which outlawed the Communist Party and communist participation in the labor movement.

Severe repression of most of the labor movement quickly ensued, with communists and suspected “communists” being persecuted, incarcerated, or sent into internal exile (*relegación*). Under these conditions the socialist wing of the CTCH survived and continued to represent workers’ organizations, while the communist wing of the CTCH withered, notwithstanding continued clandestine

activity. Complicating this picture was the fact that some socialists rejected their party's collaboration in the repression, thereby dividing the major working-class parties still more.

During the next five years, the labor movement experienced little growth and exercised little real power in the Chilean political system. The presidential elections of 1952, however, found the old dictator, Carlos Ibáñez, running on a populist platform that drew support from an array of personalist, centrist, and socialist elements. This new political context and Ibáñez's ultimate election permitted a rapprochement between the still outlawed communists and much of the Socialist Party. These developments, in turn, led in 1953 to reunification of the labor movement at the national level in a Chilean Workers Central (CUT). For the next twenty years CUT would be the single most important labor organization in Chile.

Drawing together an assortment of non-Marxist labor organizations and also the dominant communist and socialist unions and federations, CUT attempted to regain the influence lost by organized labor after 1947. Following a national organization drive from 1954 to 1956, legal union membership, according to the best available estimates, reached almost 320,000. Culminating in a series of general strikes (1954–56), CUT militancy drew renewed government repression, but not before CUT had frightened the Chilean employer sector and, perhaps more important, the growing Chilean middle class. From this time forward until the brutal military coup of 1973, the failure of the Chilean labor movement to win the sympathy of the middle sectors and professionals would mean isolation of the working classes in times of political crisis.

After an unsuccessful general strike effort in 1956, the Chilean labor movement again suffered internal divisions. Anarchists withdrew from CUT in 1957; Catholic labor organizers in Chilean Union Action* (Acción Sindical Chilena—ASICH) also attempted to establish their own national alternative to CUT. Although the majority of the Catholic and Christian Democratic unions maintained their CUT affiliation until the early 1960s, the internal cleavages sustained by the growing Christian Democratic movement further exacerbated the traditional fragmentation of the national labor movement. By 1958 official union membership had declined to pre-1952 levels.

As the 1958 presidential elections approached, the Chilean left united in a coalition headed by socialist candidate Salvador Allende, while the rightist opposition offered Jorge Alessandri. The election was close and only the votes of minor party candidates prevented an Allende victory. CUT had played an active role in the campaign of the socialist-communist coalition (Popular Action Front, Frente de Acción Popular—FRAP), but the victory of the Chilean political right promised six more years of hard times for the labor movement.

The Alessandri government sought to implement a program of fiscal restraint and economic stabilization. Restrictive wage policies announced at the outset of the administration's tenure brought an immediate negative response from CUT leadership. The new president denounced CUT's declaration of opposition as a

“call for sedition.” This exchange set the tone for the next several years of government-CUT relations.

Implementation of the stabilization program resulted in growing labor unrest. Coal and copper miners; metal, textile, and construction workers; and personnel in the telephone and electric service industries went out on strike in 1960. A subsequent march on the presidential palace degenerated into incidents of vandalism and minor altercations to which the police responded with violence.

Ultimately, the workers achieved a 15 percent increase in wages, less than one-half the rate of inflation. More importantly, however, the Alessandri administration—after renewed confrontations with workers over its anti-inflationary policies—was unable to sustain its overall stabilization program. As the end of Alessandri’s presidential term drew near, increasing levels of political and labor opposition along with pre-electoral maneuvering by the opposition parties eroded the president’s firm resolve on economic policy.

Nevertheless, as the 1964 election approached, organized labor claimed fewer members than it had at the approach of the presidential elections of 1952. Indeed, after fifteen years of struggle and sacrifice, membership had slipped to a level slightly below that of 1947. Now, however, due to electoral reforms in 1958 and efforts by leftists and Christian Democrats to mobilize agricultural workers and peasants, the political right faced an election without its traditional control of rural votes and without any political credibility. Recognizing the dilemma, the political parties of the right withdrew their own candidates and supported Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei against the by-now-customary candidacy of Socialist Salvador Allende. Frei promised a “Revolution in Liberty” and his victory ensured that Chile would never again be the same.

The Christian Democratic government of President Eduardo Frei represented a serious reformist initiative in Chilean politics that satisfied neither the political right nor the leftist parties and movements. Committed to creation of a “communitarian society”—neither capitalist nor socialist—the Christian Democrats promoted, among other goals, tax reforms, expansion of the educational system, health services and public housing projects, agrarian reform, “Chileanization” of the key copper industry through government purchase of a majority interest, and industrialization projects financed with foreign capital. Above all else, however, the Christian Democrats encouraged a dramatic increase in popular participation in an array of new organizations of shantytown dwellers, rural villagers, peasant proprietors, and poor women. The new participants in these secondary organizations both increased support for the government and, with time, placed new pressures upon it for social and economic change.

The labor movement also benefited from the Christian Democratic emphasis on “integration” and “incorporation” of the poorest sectors into national political and economic life. Mobilization of rural labor on a massive scale into cooperatives, agricultural unions, and land reform communities upset the traditional balance of forces in the countryside and, therefore, eroded the control landowners had previously exercised over national politics. For the first time in

Chilean history labor inspectors received instructions to enforce systematically labor law and social security legislation in the rural sector, and the government committed resources to finance a rural inspection program. Other government agencies, such as INDAP (the Institute for Agrarian Development) and Promoción Popular, also stimulated rural labor organizations and peasant committees to political action. Parallel and competitive efforts by the opposition leftist parties, particularly the Communists and Socialists, made agricultural unions, union federations, and confederations a growing power to be reckoned with in national politics as they had been, briefly, from 1939 to 1941 and from 1946 to 1947. Unlike the earlier mobilization efforts in the countryside, this time the government did not accede to landowner demands for retrenchment and repression.

Similarly, in the urban areas the Christian Democratic program and the parallel activities of the leftist parties helped to more than double the active members of organized labor, from 270,542 to 551,086. The Christian Democrats focused especially on previously non-unionized sectors. This emphasis altered the character of both the labor movement and the political system. Competing with the leftist parties for control of CUT, the Christian Democrats also sponsored splinter labor organizations such as Chilean Union Action and the Unitary Movement of Chilean Workers* (Movimiento Unitario de Trabajadores de Chile—MUTCH). Basically unsuccessful in its strategy to wrest control of organized labor from the communists and socialists, the government nevertheless managed to divide the labor movement even further over ideological questions and over its support of or opposition to an array of Christian Democratic policies.

As in the case of the Alessandri administration (1958–64), wage and inflation-fighting policies found the Christian Democratic government and the labor movement at odds. In this regard the government faced a number of organized protests against proposals for a forced savings program (a so-called capitalization fund) and also against proposals to limit the scope of collective bargaining as a temporary measure to combat inflation. Strikes in key economic sectors over the traditional issues of wages and working conditions ultimately pitted the government against the copper miners who labored in the industry that accounted for more than 80 percent of all foreign exchange earned by the country.

In 1966 a strike at the El Salvador mine resulted in numerous injuries and several deaths as the government used police to control the strike movement. Invoking the old Law of Internal Security, the government accused the labor leadership and leftist parties of subversion and turned responsibility for public order over to the military. This action increased tensions between the government and CUT, while underlining the unavoidable political implications of labor activism in the copper mines and other key economic enterprises. As the 1970 elections approached, political and union militancy increased and more workers joined in strike activity. That very year, for example, there were over 1,800 strikes, involving nearly 660,000 workers, thereby upsetting the government economic policies and political future.

Ultimately, the Christian Democratic government alienated the middle classes and elites with the implementation of tax reforms, land reforms, and mobilization of the rural and urban poor. The government also found itself opposed by the traditional leftist parties, unions, and movements who criticized the pace of the reformist program and the government's lack of revolutionary zeal. In the presidential elections of 1970 the anti-Marxist coalition that had elected Frei in 1964 could no longer be sustained; the political right offered ex-president Jorge Alessandri as its own candidate; the Christian Democrats supported Radomiro Tomic. A new and expanded left-center coalition, called Popular Unity (Unidad Popular), again supported the by-now perennial candidacy of Socialist Salvador Allende. Due to the three-way split in the voting, Allende's Popular Unity coalition won a narrow victory over Alessandri, with the Christian Democrats, still the country's single most important party, finishing third.

Following its electoral victory in 1970 the Popular Unity coalition extended legal recognition to CUT (previously a *de facto* organization) and welcomed the labor movement as a key participant in the new government's cabinet. This arrangement, going well beyond the more fragile participation enjoyed in the Popular Front government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938–41), included the appointment of three labor representatives to ministerial posts: labor, public works, and finance. Later the CUT secretary-general served as minister of interior, and CUT representatives were appointed to major policymaking posts, including the National Planning Office and the State Development Corporation (CORFO) which had been created during the Aguirre Cerda administration.

Labor's new role in national politics also produced immediate economic benefits. The Allende government rejected the old stabilization policies and wage restraints of the Alessandri and Frei administrations, providing initial readjustments in salaries and wages in excess of the last year's rate of inflation for the poorest workers. In addition, government programs expanded the state sector of the economy, generating new employment opportunities, though often at the cost of featherbedding and inefficiency that ultimately contributed to a soaring rate of inflation.

Intensifying the initiatives of the Christian Democratic government in labor organization and support for expanded political participation, the Popular Unity promoted improvements in Labor Department services and responsiveness to the working classes. By 1973 union membership had increased by one-third, to over 900,000 (40 percent of the work force), while labor union activism resulted in numerous strikes, factory seizures, and nationalizations by the government. Indeed, the climate of political mobilization stimulated by the government resulted in the spread of an insurrectional ideology that exceeded the bounds of the government-CUT program. The Left Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR) and those socialists less restrained than President Allende fomented the creation of centers of "popular power" and *cordones industriales* (industrial belts) on the outskirts of Santiago. Workers in the *cor-*

*done*s, who seemed to represent the possibility of a revolutionary "parallel power" to the legal authorities, both criticized the CUT's "conservative" approach and terrified the middle classes and industrialists with their militancy.

In some ways the insurrectional environment seriously undermined the credibility of the Popular Unity government's efforts to pacify the moderate elements within the coalition and to parry the opposition of the Christian Democrats. Socialists and Communists renewed their old disputes within CUT and within the coalition. To make matters worse, the Socialist Party itself splintered over the appropriate tactics to follow.

After 1972 the political and economic situation deteriorated, exacerbated by U.S. policies designed to destabilize further the Chilean government. Faltering and ambiguous government policies also divided the labor movement. Strikes by copper workers in 1972 followed by a series of politico-economic strikes by truckers, shopkeepers, dockworkers, and professionals created a feeling of chaos within the country. Christian Democratic supporters among the rural workers battled with government officials and their fellow workers who were affiliated with rural labor organizations that supported the government. The Christian Democrats also made gains in internal CUT elections among workers wanting to pressure the government for their own economic and political objectives. Once again the political and ideological cleavages of the party system and Chilean society had bitterly divided the country's labor movement.

By 1972 the initial economic gains by workers under the Popular Unity coalition began to be eroded by inflation and by supply shortages generated by government errors and by deliberate economic sabotage by the political opposition. Investor panic, political polarization, and the U.S.-sponsored "invisible blockade" of the Chilean economy further exacerbated the crisis.

Finally, on 11 September 1973, a brutal military coup abruptly ended the Popular Unity government. Supported by the United States, by the vast majority of the Chilean upper and middle classes, and by the opposition political parties, the military leaders promised to end the chaos, restore order, and defend the constitution they claimed that President Allende's government had violated. They also proposed to erase the last fifty years of Chilean history, extirpate subversive movements and ideology, "purify" and depoliticize the labor movement, and replace Chilean democracy with a new authoritarian regime.

The result was a regime of state terror that destroyed the gains made by organized labor since 1931 and replaced the old industrial relations system with arbitrary authoritarian policies even more severe than those adopted by General Ibáñez from 1927 to 1931. In its first months of power the military dictatorship suspended the processing of all labor petitions and eliminated the right of union leaders to absent themselves from work for union business; suspended the right to strike and to bargain collectively; nullified CUT's legal status and then dissolved CUT; modified existing laws regulating dismissals of workers from their employment, including provisions allowing for the layoff of any workers involved in "interruption or paralyzation" of work; declared a "recess" for all

juntas de conciliación and assigned military officers to hear labor disputes; prohibited union elections, combined with provisions that if any union officer had to be replaced, seniority would determine the identity of the new officer—unless workers with seniority belonged to proscribed organizations or movements (i.e., any leftist party); restricted any union meeting held without prior notification and approval by the police of the time and place. (This “emergency” measure remained in effect until 1979.)

According to the military regime these measures were of an “emergency” character and would be revised as the regime developed a more institutionalized system to modify the old labor code. Nevertheless, the Minister of Labor declared in a 1976 Labor Day speech that “it is not possible to introduce a new industrial relations system until the evils that brought us to this social crisis are extirpated. For this reason collective bargaining and union elections have been suspended.” The military government and its civilian supporters viewed all political party activity within the labor movement as unacceptable.

Systematic and crushing purges of the old union leadership combined with infiltration of unions by the new secret police, or DINA, demoralized the working classes and allowed imposition of wage and price policies that significantly eroded real wages. Neo-liberal economic policies that removed tariff protection for most Chilean industries added growing unemployment to the workers’ misery.

Initial counters to the military government by organized labor were halting, but nevertheless evidenced a determination to resist the clearly reactionary policies. By January 1974 the National Workers Central* (Central Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT) joined together workers from Christian Democratic and gremialist movements, including public employees, maritime workers, bank employees, health workers, and even some workers from the metallurgical federation, and attempted to achieve recognition by the government as a legitimate voice of labor. Excluding almost all Marxist and Popular Unity elements, CNT failed to achieve any immediate mass support. The inevitable conflicts between the gremialists, who essentially supported the military government, and the Christian Democrats, who preferred the role of a “responsible” opposition voice for labor, undermined any long-term alliance that could defend working-class interests—even when the gremialists sometimes found themselves at odds with government labor policy.

In the meantime CUT, dissolved by the military regime, constituted an external directorate in Paris, and clandestine activity of the parties of the Popular Unity coalition assured the presence of the political left, even if temporarily unable to respond directly to the military repression. Illegal strikes during 1974 challenged the military’s hegemony and also brought intensified state terror against union leaders. Speaking at the 1 May Labor Day celebration in 1975, the minister of labor declared that “September 11 detained Marxism, it did not destroy it; now we must destroy Marxism.” In June, however, a group of labor federations previously affiliated with CUT, including Christian Democratic labor leaders who rejected collaboration with the government, loosely organized an alternative

to CNT. The new organization, officially designated the National Union Coordinating Committee* (Coordinadora Nacional Sindical—CNS) emerged as an ideologically diverse effort to resist the onslaught of the dictatorship.

In turn the government attempted to control the labor movement through a new National Gremialist Secretariat (1976) and sponsorship of an officialist National Unity Labor Front. Utilizing the language of its Decree Law 198, the government removed opposition leaders from their positions within key federations or national unions and replaced them with government supporters. In addition, the dictatorship sponsored parallel unions within firms or economic sectors where labor opposition remained intense, for example among copper workers, port workers, and the National Electricity Industry (ENDESA). In 1977 the government attempted to form officialist federations among chemical, railroad, and metallurgical workers, while refusing most requests by the older labor organizations to hold meetings under the terms of the government's "emergency" decrees.

Still, the labor movement refused to disappear. Strikes in the copper mines, among railway and port workers, and in factories and service industries all testified to the survival of a heterogeneous labor opposition to the regime under the most difficult of circumstances. Again in 1978 the military government attempted to create a new officialist labor organization called the National Union of Chilean Workers* (Unión de Trabajadores de Chile—UNTRACH). A bit more subtle than the regime's earlier efforts, UNTRACH actually spoke out in favor of workers' rights and interests while carefully avoiding attacks on the government's legitimacy.

Under mounting pressure from domestic labor and threatened by an international labor boycott against its repressive policies, including a threat by the AFL—CIO in the United States, the government moved to institutionalize—or at least codify—its new industrial relations system. Beginning with Decree Law 2200 (1978) and followed by a series of decrees that purported to modify the 1931 Labor Code, the military government rewrote the Chilean industrial relations system. The new laws, adopted after 1978 as part of the government's *plan laboral*, or "labor plan," made it easier still to dismiss workers without cause and made union activity more restrictive with respect to collective bargaining and strike actions (only plant unions or unions in individual farms could present labor petitions and engage in collective bargaining).

While the government eliminated the often criticized distinction between craft unions and plant unions, it also forbade union federations, confederations, or national unions from carrying out their customary collective bargaining role. In effect, workers in individual plants, and multiple unions in the same plant, were forced to bargain in an isolated fashion with their employers. To avoid the possibility of simultaneous labor disputes or strikes, the new regulations specified a timetable for labor negotiations in particular firms or sectors of the economy, and published a long list of firms and sectors where strikes were prohibited. The new laws also authorized the government to dissolve labor organizations for

“monopolistic” practices (presenting similar labor petitions in several firms at the same time), for engaging in “political activities,” or for carrying out activities beyond the scope of “union functions.”

In the case of agricultural unions this meant the loss of all the gains achieved during the Christian Democratic years and the abrogation of the unionization law for agriculture (Law 16.625). The “Plan Laboral” restricted agricultural unions essentially to individual farms with at least fifteen workers (or nine in special cases) instead of the regional or commune-wide unions of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1981 the major confederations of agricultural workers unions claimed fewer than 30,000 members—or approximately 15 percent of the membership at the end of 1973 (207,900). Related agricultural policies which reversed the agrarian reforms of the 1964–73 period added to agricultural unemployment and misery in the countryside as expropriated farms were returned to their former owners, and government programs of technical assistance, credit, and education to the small holders were drastically reduced. No group of workers suffered more, or lost more, under the military dictatorship than the Chilean peasants (*campesinos*).

Workers found their legal organizing activities even more restricted than before the Social Laws of 1924, more repressed than under Ibáñez from 1927 to 1931, and less protected than in the early days after adoption of the Labor Code of 1931. Chilean workers lost the fruits of almost half a century of political and economic struggle.

A new constitution, adopted by the military government in 1980 after a staged plebiscite, further worsened the plight of labor and the political opposition. In particular, Articles 8, 15, 16, and 19 of the new constitution prohibited “propagation of any doctrines that . . . advocate violence, or a conception of society or of the state or of the juridical order of a totalitarian character, or founded in the idea of class conflict. . . .”; made unconstitutional all movements, organizations, or political parties that advocated such ideas; outlawed all political party participation in labor organizations; and outlawed participation by labor leaders in political parties. In addition, any future congressman or senator who intervened in an attempt to influence labor negotiations, administrative proceedings, or labor court proceedings could be removed from office.

In August 1981, Law 18.018 further refined Decree Law 2200 in the midst of an excruciating economic recession that pushed hundreds of thousands of Chileans into grinding poverty. The new law allowed workdays of up to twelve hours—without overtime pay scales, as long as total hours worked per week did not exceed forty-eight. The government also eliminated the traditional system of labor courts and even dissolved the old *colegios profesionales* (essentially, professional associations of doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, or journalists) and replaced them with “gremialist associations.”

Responding to the CNS leadership’s energetic opposition to its policies, the government moved in early 1981 to arrest the organization’s president and secretary-general. Released shortly thereafter, these same leaders were again taken

prisoner in June after the CNS presented a "pliego nacional," or national labor petition, that made a number of economic and political demands on the government.

In the meantime (April 1981), certain labor leaders within the Christian Democratic movement, opposed both to the military government and to renewed leftist influence within the CNS, organized the Democratic Workers Union* (Unión Democrática de Trabajadores—UDT). The UDT sought to mobilize a broad spectrum of non-Marxist anti-government labor organizations. In its declaration of principles the UDT challenged the government's labor plan explicitly with a call for renewed political party activity and a legitimate political role for the labor movement. Although the UDT represented a new source of labor opposition to the military regime, it also reflected the continuing ideological and organizational fragmentation of the Chilean labor movement—even when confronted by a military dictatorship.

Faced with growing political and labor opposition, General Pinochet angrily responded to the national labor petition formulated by the CNS and signed by over 400 labor leaders. He labeled the CNS "a front organization for international communism" and threatened the leadership with prosecution under Article 8 of the new constitution which prohibited propagation of "totalitarian ideas" or concepts of "class conflict." Once again CNS leaders went to jail. When a number of ex-politicians (including prominent Christian Democrats) signed declarations of support, they were sent into exile by the government. Even as the CNS and other labor leaders suffered renewed repression, strike activity continued among metalworkers, in the shoe and leather industry, and in some large textile firms. Employers retaliated with widespread dismissals of union leaders; the government retaliated with more violence, including the early 1982 assassination of Tucapel Jiménez, president of the National Association of Public Employees* (Agrupación de Empleados Fiscales—ANEF) and vice president of the UDT.

By mid-1982 the effects of the international recession and Chile's profound debt crisis (the most indebted nation per capita in all Latin America) produced a desperate situation for the working classes and even a growing impoverishment of middle sector and professional groups. Unemployment reached more than 20 percent of the work force. Nevertheless, labor protest and organizational activity continued to challenge the dictatorship's policies.

Seemingly always disposed to turn the screw one turn tighter, the government prohibited unions from receiving funds externally in late 1982 and arrested numerous union leaders in the first half of 1983. Still seeking the elusive unity that had been impossible to achieve since the 1930s, labor leaders in the winter of 1983 created a new umbrella organization, the National Workers Command (Comando Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT). Shortly thereafter the new CNT attempted to organize a "national strike" but failed to achieve its objectives. Undaunted, the various workers organizations and umbrella groups continued to

struggle against the military regime's array of reactionary decrees, intimidation, and violence.

From 1984 to 1986 the Pinochet regime clung to power despite a clear loss of support even among the middle classes and professionals who had provided the social base for opposition to the Allende government and the initial support for the military coup. Protests against the government grew more public and more vocal, but Pinochet remained disposed to use force to maintain himself in power and to prevent the return of "politics" to Chile. Within the labor movement the CNT had emerged as the largest umbrella organization, but it only loosely coordinated the activities of the CNS, UDT, Unitary Workers Front* (Frente Unitario de Trabajadores—FUT), and a number of the larger confederations and federations. Dissension and ideological differences continued to plague the labor movement at the national level, just as the political opposition to Pinochet was severely fragmented among the old leftist parties (themselves sometimes splintered internally), Christian Democrats, parties of the democratic center, and the parties of the traditional political right—which belatedly sought to lessen their identification with the government.

General Pinochet's hard-line response to political protest and labor demands continued, alternating "openings" with renewed repression. Unable to destroy the labor movement even with the instruments of state terror utilized over a period of thirteen years, the General was able to cripple it, to decimate its leadership, and to impose misery on millions of Chileans. The struggle against the dictatorship continued, but labor unity remained an elusive, perhaps impossible, goal.

Bibliography

- Alexander, Robert J. *Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil and Chile*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.
- . *Organized Labor in Latin America*. New York: Free Press, 1965.
- Angelio, Alan. *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Barría Serón, Jorge. *El Movimiento Obrero en Chile*. Santiago, Chile: Universidad Técnica del Estado, 1971.
- . *Trayectoria y estructura del movimiento sindical chileno, 1946–1962*. Santiago, Chile: INSORA, 1963.
- Burnett, Ben. *Political Groups in Chile*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970.
- Campero, Guillermo and José A. Valenzuela. *El movimiento sindical en el regimen chileno 1973–1981*. Santiago, Chile: El Gráfico, 1984.
- De Shazo, Peter. *Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 1902–1927*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.
- Drake, Paul. *Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932–52*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978.

- Hirsch, Fred and Richard Fletcher. *The CIA and the Labour Movement*. Nottingham, England: Russell Press, 1977.
- Jobet, Julio César. *Los orígenes del movimiento obrero y del socialismo chileno*. Santiago, Chile: Prensa Lationamericana, 1955.
- Kaempffer Villagran, Guillermo. *Así Sucedió, 1850–1925: Sangrientos episodios de la lucha obrera en Chile*. Santiago, Chile: Arranchibia Hermanos, 1961.
- Loveman, Brian. *Struggle in the Countryside*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976.
- Poblete Troncoso, Moisés. *La organización sindical en Chile*. Santiago, Chile: R. Brias, 1926.
- Ramírez Necochea, Hernán. *História del movimiento obrero en Chile, Siglo XIX*. Santiago, Chile: Lautaro, 1965.
- Rivas Guzmán, Ramón. *El nuevo regimen laboral*. Santiago, Chile: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1982.
- Stallings, Barbara. *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1959–1973*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978.
- Zapata, Francisco S. "The Chilean Labor Movement Under Salvador Allende, 1970–1973." *Latin American Perspectives* 3, no. 1 (Winter 1976); 85–97.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ACCIÓN SINDICAL CHILENA. *See* Chilean Union Action.

AGECH. *See* Chilean Educators Gremialist Association.

AGRUPACIÓN DE EMPLEADOS FISCALES. *See* National Association of Public Employees.

ANEF. *See* National Association of Public Employees.

ARTISANS SOCIETIES

Beginning in the late 1840s the tradition of guilds, or *gremios*, reasserted itself in the form of artisan societies in Santiago, Valparaíso and La Serena. The most well-known of these early mutualist societies include the Typographers Society of Santiago (1853); Typographers Society of Valparaíso (1855); Society of Artisans of Valparaíso (1858); Union of Artisans (Santiago, 1858); and Union of Artisans (Valparaíso, 1862). As mutualist societies these institutions, along with some sixty others, grew slowly in strength between the 1850s and the outbreak of the War of the Pacific against Bolivia and Peru in 1879.

The most active proponent of artisan mutual aid societies was Fermin Vivaceta, a firm believer in self-help and cooperativism among the skilled artisan classes. Soon professional and middle sector groups also began to form mutualist societies, for example, primary teachers (Society of Mutual Aid Among Institutions and Instructresses, Sociedad de Soconos Mutuos entre Instituciones e Institu-

trices, Valparaíso, 1873) and white-collar employees (Employees Society of Santiago, Sociedad de Empleados de Santiago, 1876). The artisan societies fostered by Vivaceta and other pioneers in the mutualist movement rarely focused upon employer-employee relations or other aspects of what later would be considered industrial relations. In this sense the mutualist movement of which the artisan societies were a part was pre-industrial but nevertheless served as a significant antecedent and school of leadership for the modern Chilean labor movement.

ASICH. *See* Chilean Union Action.

ASOCIACIÓN DE MAESTROS DE PRIMARIA. *See* Primary Teachers Association.

ASOCIACIÓN GENERAL DE MAESTROS. *See* General Association of Teachers.

ASOCIACIÓN GREMIALISTA DE EDUCADORES DE CHILE. *See* Chilean Educators Gremialist Association.

BROTHERHOOD OF WORKERS OF IQUIQUE (Combinación Mancomunal de Trabajadores de Iquique).

Led by Abdón Díaz, maritime workers in the northern nitrate port of Iquique formed the first labor brotherhood, or *mancomunal*, in 1900. This organization affiliated mutualist societies, craft unions, and some resistance societies into a loosely coordinated "federation" for job actions. Shortly thereafter other brotherhoods were created in many of Chile's northern ports as well as in La Serena and Valdivia. Influenced more by politicians of the Democrat Party than by anarchists and socialists, the brotherhoods nevertheless played a leading role in labor conflicts until 1907 when the *mancomunal* movement in the north suffered a bloody setback with a government massacre of workers at Santa Mariá de Iquique. Hundreds of people died as government troops gunned down protesting workers.

The Brotherhood of Workers of Iquique published its own newspaper, *Labor* (*El Trabajo*), which gained wide circulation by denouncing employer abuses and defending labor's demand for improved wages and working conditions. Combining job actions with political activity, the *mancomunales* held a convention in Santiago in 1904 to petition the Chilean president to support labor reforms in the nitrate fields and northern ports. As politicization of the brotherhoods increased along with labor militancy, the Chilean government eventually made the decision to confront the brotherhoods directly, persecute the leaders, ransack and destroy the various workers newspapers, and, ultimately, carry out the massacre referred to above. These tactics essentially destroyed the *mancomunal* movement.

CENTRAL NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES (1974). *See* National Workers Central (1974).

CENTRAL ÚNICA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Chilean Workers Central.

CEPCH. *See* Confederation of Private Sector Employees.

CHILEAN EDUCATORS GREMIALIST ASSOCIATION (Asociación Gremialista de Educadores de Chile—AGECH).

In mid-1980 the military government of Chile, in dramatic contrast to the tradition of centralized administration of the country's system for primary education, announced its intent to turn over administration of the public school system to municipal governments. The effect of this reform on the 90,000 teachers linked to the national education system was to make negotiations over salary and working conditions essentially a local matter of no large-scale concern to the central government. This meant a great loss of power to the country's teachers, previously represented in the national Education Workers Union* (affiliated with the Chilean Workers Central*). With the subsequent dissolution of *colegios profesionales* (professional associations) as licensing and obligatory professional associations, the country's teachers faced a fragmented, localized labor market without the protection of national regulation on entry into and practice of the teaching profession. While this "reform" fit the neo-liberal model of the labor market favored by the military dictatorship, it radically altered the position of teacher unions in Chile.

At the end of 1981, largely as a response to these government initiatives, a new Chilean Educators Gremialist Association (AGECH) was formed. During 1982 some 2,000 members joined the new organization, and regional branches also appeared. AGECH almost immediately expressed its concern to the Minister of Education regarding the government's new educational policies. Operating initially within the new law regulating "gremialist associations," AGECH attempted to influence the military dictatorship through official channels. In early 1983 the government cancelled AGECH's legal charter on the grounds that it was engaging in "political" activities in contravention of the law that defined the legitimate functions of "gremialist associations." In May 1983, however, a court found the minister of education's charges without foundation and ordered restoration of AGECH's legal charter (*personalidad jurídica*).

During 1984 AGECH grew more vocal in its requests for protection of its constituents' economic and professional interests, as well as more explicit in its calls for a return to democracy in Chile. In the midst of widespread public protests against continuation of the military dictatorship in September 1984, AGECH added its support to the efforts of the newly formed National Workers Command* to regain the rights of the labor movement and to reestablish democracy in Chile. However, widespread unemployment of teachers, military control over the local (municipal) governments that now administered education,

and the deliberate fragmentation of teacher union focus to individual unions in particular localities made effective representation of teachers in Chile more difficult than at any time since the 1930s.

CHILEAN UNION ACTION (Acción Sindical Chilena—ASICH).

A Catholic labor organization evolved from the pastoral and educational work of Catholic Action (Acción Católica) in the late 1940s, ASICH counted initially with the spiritual and intellectual guidance of Father Alberto Hurtado and leadership elements which emerged from the Chilean Social Christian and Falange movements of the 1920s. Founded officially in 1947, ASICH became for a short time the most visible national Catholic labor organization in Chile.

Most well known for its support of the famous strike by peasants in Molina (Talca province) in 1953, ASICH eventually allied itself with the Christian Democratic Party. One of the union's principal legal advisers, William Thayer, later served as minister of labor under the Christian Democratic government of Eduardo Frei (1964–70). Thayer and other ASICH leaders intended that ASICH develop as a Catholic labor organization to combat the growing influence of Marxist ideology and movements among the workers and peasants of Chile. In addition, ASICH leaders desired to develop ASICH as an organizational counterbalance within the Chilean Workers Central* to the communist- and socialist-dominated labor unions.

Beyond its initial activism under the special circumstances of the peasant strike in 1953, ASICH failed to achieve broad national affiliation or support. In 1956 reorganization occurred in an attempt to overcome stagnation; another reorganization effort in 1961 sought to upgrade ASICH's credibility as a national labor central, adding the name Christian Workers Confederation (Confederación Cristiana de Trabajadores) to its official designation: ASICH-CCT. This effort proved of little efficacy and ASICH then supported creation of an alternative labor central by certain sectors of the Christian Democratic Party called the Unitary Movement of Chilean Workers* (MUTCH) in 1961. ASICH was active again, briefly, in the countryside during the early 1960s, but its national influence practically disappeared after that time.

CHILEAN WORKERS CENTRAL (Central Única de Trabajadores—CUT, CUTCH).

After division of the national labor movement (organized into the Confederation of Chilean Workers,* CTCH) in 1946 in response to the Cold War and the attack by President González Videla's administration on the Communist Party, Chilean workers suffered a notable decline in political influence and economic bargaining power. With the departure of the González Videla administration and the election of Carlos Ibáñez (1952–58), the national labor movement again reunified in the new Chilean Workers Central (CUT) in 1953.

CUT, while somewhat more pluralistic in leadership and membership than its predecessors—the Confederation of Chilean Workers* and Chilean Workers

Federation*—still defined its main orientations in terms of the abolition of private property in the means of production and establishment of a classless society through strikes and all other means of class struggle. Despite this initial ideological formulation, in the years that followed, most of the major labor federations and confederations, including many with anarchist or Catholic orientations, affiliated at one time or another with CUT—even when some later withdrew. Most of CUT's membership derived from the affiliation of union federations, confederations, and large national or industrial plant unions. Since the labor movement continued to be ideologically divided, CUT's internal debates and leadership conflicts typically reflected the current national political ambience.

By the early 1960s CUT included some thirty federations, confederations, associations, and unions of workers with approximately 300,000 members, including miners (30,000); metalworkers (12,000); copper workers (16,000); peasant unions (10,000); railway workers (25,000); public employees (40,000–50,000); health care workers (25,000); and teachers (30,000), along with numerous other smaller groups of workers. Since government workers and municipal employees were legally prohibited from unionizing, they were not included in official statistics on organized workers even when they participated in CUT or cooperated with other workers' organizations. In any case, CUT remained the most important national labor central in Chile.

CUT continued its central role in Chilean politics and the labor movement into the early 1970s. By 1973 CUT, which participated actively and integrally in the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende, claimed to affiliate over 130 confederations, federations, associations, and unions (over 6,600 unions). The Popular Unity government gave CUT official legal status along with an official political role in the government.

The military dictatorship which brutally ousted the Popular Unity coalition in 1973 outlawed CUT, declared it officially "dissolved," and persecuted labor leaders throughout the nation. Though CUT established a clandestine directorate in exile early in the military regime's tenure, it was unable to reestablish its organizational base within Chile under the conditions of state terror instituted by the government of General Augusto Pinochet. A number of new national labor organizations attempted to fill the vacuum created by CUT's repression.

CHILEAN WORKERS FEDERATION (Federación Obrera de Chile—FOCH).

The Great Chilean Workers Federation (Gran Federación Obrera de Chile—GFOCH) was created as a mutual society among railway shop workers in 1909 by an ambitious lawyer, Paulo Marín. Interested in the welfare of the railway workers and also in a political career, Marín provided leadership of the mutual aid society until after his unsuccessful efforts to be elected to Congress in 1912.

Unlike most other mutualist societies, the GFOCH included workers from a number of towns and cities as well as workers in a variety of crafts and professions. Gradually, more militant workers and political leaders from the newly

formed Socialist Workers Party (POS, 1912) gained control over the GFOCH. In 1917 the organization changed its character from a mutualist society to a labor federation dedicated to the abolition of capitalism in Chile through political activism and working-class job action. The GFOCH became the Chilean Workers Federation, the first of three national labor organizations of great influence in Chile in the twentieth century.

In contrast to the anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists who had been very influential in previous urban labor reorganizations in Chile, the FOCH explicitly identified itself with political party activities of the Democrat Party, the POS and, later, the Communist Party. Gaining strength among the northern nitrate workers, in the ports and in transportation, as well as in the southern coal mines, FOCH became a militant, ideologically classist labor movement closely allied with the socialist and Marxist political parties. In the early 1920s FOCH affiliated with the Red International of Labor Unions (RILU) and shared meeting halls, leaders, and working-class newspapers with the Communist Party after its creation in 1922.

Highly active and often successful in winning improved wages and working conditions for workers in the years 1917–25, FOCH called for nationalization of Chilean mines in 1923 and for sweeping agrarian reforms. Moving also into the countryside, FOCH organized a number of peasant unions and stimulated job actions and strikes on various large estates in the region just north of Santiago and in the central valley.

After 1927, however, the dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez (1927–31) directly attacked the FOCH along with other labor organizations and opposition political parties. The Marxist parties and movements were singled out by Ibáñez for especially harsh treatment; leaders were jailed, exiled, and assassinated. A brief resurgence of FOCH activity in the early 1930s after adoption of the Labor Code in 1931 was followed by its amalgamation into the second of Chile's large national labor organizations, the Confederation of Chilean Workers,* in 1936.

CHILEAN WORKERS UNION (Unión de Trabajadores de Chile—UTRACH).

Created in 1968 as an effort by sectors within the Christian Democratic government to develop an alternative national labor central to the Chilean Workers Central* (CUT), the UTRACH drew support from Chilean Union Action* and from conservative elements within the Christian Democratic Party.

When most unionized workers who belonged to the Christian Democratic Party refused to join the new labor central, the party leadership also rejected UTRACH as an acceptable political alternative to CUT. Important more for its failure to achieve any significant affiliation even with some government support than for its successes, UTRACH lost all influence when the labor sector of the Christian Democratic Party voted to reincorporate the Christian Democratic-oriented union organizations in CUT in late 1968.

CHRISTIAN RURAL UNION FEDERATION (Federación Sindical Cristiana de la Tierra).

Organized in the vineyards of Molina in Talca province in 1952, this organization grew into a regional rural union movement which carried out a large-scale strike and political protest in 1953. Led by Emilio Lorenzini, later a maverick Christian Democratic congressman, and influenced by the work of Catholic labor organizers and the Bishop of Talca, this agricultural union movement became the rural base of Chilean Union Action* and exercised considerable economic and political influence in the central valley from 1953 to 1957. Later, the experience of this organization in leadership training and organization was transferred to a number of independent and Christian Democratic Catholic rural unions in the 1960s.

CNSC. *See* National Confederation of Chilean Unions.

COMANDO NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES (1983). *See* National Workers Command (1983).

COMISIÓN NACIONAL CAMPESINA. *See* National Peasant Commission.

COMBINACIÓN MANCOMUNAL DE OBREROS DE IQUIQUE. *See* Brotherhood of Workers of Iquique.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE EMPLEADOS DEL SECTOR PRIVADO. *See* Confederation of Private Sector Employees.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE CHILE. *See* Confederation of Chilean Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DEL COBRE. *See* Copper Workers Federation.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DEL TRABAJO. *See* General Confederation of Labor.

CONFEDERACIÓN MARÍTIMA DE CHILE. *See* Maritime Confederation of Chile.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL CAMPESINA. *See* National Peasant Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE SINDICATOS CHILENOS. *See* National Confederation of Chilean Unions.

CONFEDERATION OF CHILEAN WORKERS (Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile—CTCH).

Created in 1936 with the participation of workers organizations affiliated with the Chilean Workers Federation* (FOCH), the socialist-dominated National Confederation of Chilean Unions* (CNSC), Association of Chilean Employees, and a number of “free unions” (those not officially approved) and legal unions, the CTCH was the working classes’ political and organizational response to formation of the Chilean Popular Front. The convention in which the CTCH was organized was called by the CNSC for the specific purpose of uniting Chilean workers in the fight against fascism. Its original declarations lacked the explicitly bombastic attacks on capitalism contained in the ideological expressions of FOCH, the result of both its pluralistic membership and the political context of the moment in which a multiclass coalition sought to attain political power in the country.

The CTCH grew rapidly from 1936 to 1942, greatly assisted by the victory of the Popular Front presidential candidate, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, in 1938. Invited to participate in the Popular Front government, the CTCH, according to government estimates, counted over 250,000 members by the early 1940s in more than 1,500 unions. Sweeping organizational campaigns and job actions from 1938 to 1941 aroused the animosity of Chilean employers and political elites; in 1939 the CTCH agreed to suspend its rural unionization efforts in order to guarantee “social peace.” Conflicts among the socialist and communist leadership elements weakened the CTCH considerably, and the refusal of the anarchist General Confederation of Workers* to participate in the CTCH (anarchists cited its compromises and class collaboration) prevented consolidation of this second of the Chilean workers centrals in the twentieth century.

Continuing struggle within the CTCH, compounded by Cold War politics and U.S. support for the anti-communist socialist faction of the CTCH, led to an official split of the organization in 1946. The intensity of intra-organizational conflict reached a level sufficient for socialists to offer to help the government break a communist-led strike in the coal mines in 1947. Subsequent anti-communist legislation (1948) temporarily gave the socialists the upper hand in the labor movement as communist leaders faced persecution, internal exile (*rele-gación*), and imprisonment.

From 1947 to 1952 the two wings of the CTCH remained divided, though some elements in the Socialist Party, including future president Salvador Allende, rejected socialist support for the repressive legislation and broke ranks with the party. Finally, in 1953, under different political circumstances, the labor movement again attempted to form a new workers central, the Chilean Workers Central,* thereby ending the existence of the CTCH.

CONFEDERATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES (Confederación de Empleados del Sector Privado—CEPCH).

In 1948 the major federations of white-collar employees in the private sector

joined forces to create CEPCH. CEPCH has included white-collar workers in the copper industry, private pension funds, commerce, electrical industries, pharmaceuticals, insurance companies, travel agencies, pensioners and other middle-class professionals. CEPCH membership usually consisted of affiliation through sectoral federations, for example, white-collar workers in the Federation of Copper Employees.

Initially, CEPCH relations with the Confederation of Chilean Workers* and then the Chilean Workers Central* (CUT) were strained, but by the 1960s a certain common interest was recognized regarding economic and social interests of blue-collar and white-collar workers. CEPCH resistance to some aspects of the Christian Democratic stabilization program and the collaboration of the middle-class Radical Party in the Popular Unity movement led to CEPCH affiliation with CUT in 1969, at which time membership had reached between 50,000 and 70,000. Unlike CUT, however, CEPCH survived the early years of the military government (1973–) and joined in the struggle for restoration of labor rights after promulgation of the repressive decrees of the military dictatorship.

CONGRESO SOCIAL OBERO. *See* Workers Social Congress.

CONSTRUCTION WORKERS FEDERATION (Federación de la Construcción—FIEMEC).

This federation was among the numerous groups of unions affiliated with the Chilean Workers Central* (CUT) by trade or profession. In the late 1960s it claimed 6,000–8,000 members; in the aftermath of the military coup of 1973 it was one of several federations affiliated with CUT which survived the initial dissolution actions by the government and began in 1974–75 to reorganize to defend worker's rights. Under the auspices of FIEMEC a national "consultation" of invited labor organizations (Confederation of Private Sector Employees,* Textile and Clothing Workers Federation,* and Metallurgical and Iron Workers Union Federation*) was held in the famous Caupolican theater in June 1975. This meeting saw the participants protest the ongoing massive layoffs of unionized workers and called for repeal of the "emergency" decrees imposed by the military regime and elimination of the obstacles to collective bargaining. Along with other federations previously affiliated with CUT,* the Construction Workers Federation again denounced the military government in open letters during the course of 1976. In 1978 FIEMEC affiliated with the newly created National Union Coordinating Committee,* which became the single most important focus of labor opposition to the military regime from 1978 to 1984. In 1978, however, the military government dissolved FIEMEC, along with six other CNS-affiliated federations, arrested some of its leaders, and confiscated much of its property.

COORDINADORA NACIONAL SINDICAL. *See* National Union Coordinating Committee.

COPPER WORKERS CONFEDERATION (Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre—CTC).

Organized in the late 1940s when the copper workers withdrew from the Federation of Miners, the CTC occupies a critical role in Chilean politics and in the economy. Since copper typically accounted for 60–80 percent of the value of Chile's exports prior to 1973, workers and employees in the Copper Confederation have been able to gain relatively high wages and salaries and to hold successive governments hostage to their economic demands. Copper workers have also paid the price for this central position in the Chilean economy, suffering casualties in numerous strikes from the 1950s into the 1980s.

Officially recognized in the special legislation affecting the copper industry, the Copper Workers Statute, adopted in 1956 during the government of Carlos Ibáñez, the Copper Workers Confederation has proved a nemesis of every subsequent Chilean administration, including that of the reformist Christian Democrats and the socialist-oriented Popular Unity coalition. Heterogeneous leadership among the copper workers has permitted tough bargaining against the foreign private owners and then against the Chilean government after nationalization of the industry in 1971. Such union behavior led many Marxists to question the workers' class consciousness and to characterize their attitudes as "economistic" despite the long history of support for Chilean Workers Central,* leftist candidates, and solidarity with other strike movements.

During the first several years of military government after 1973 the dictatorship replaced some of the CTC directorate with non-Marxist supporters of the regime under the provisions of the emergency decrees applicable to labor and also arrested some of the more militant union leaders. Nevertheless other copper union leaders continued to criticize the military economic program, including denationalization of the copper sector. Protests in the El Teniente and El Salvador mines in 1977 against government policies included severe criticism of some of the collaborationist policies of the government-selected leaders of the CTC.

By 1979, however, even the moderate labor leaders in the CTC were forced to reject the government's Labor Plan (Plan Laboral) which, in the leadership's words, "represented a thirty year regression, . . . eliminating rights won through years of struggle." In particular, the CTC objected to the elimination of the special status of copper workers contained in the Copper Workers Statute and its subsequent amendments.

In 1981 a lengthy strike at El Teniente mine created a tense situation between the copper workers and the government; continued divisions within the CTC were magnified by the seriousness of the copper strike in the eyes of the military government. Gradually, the CTC moved closer to the newly formed National Union Coordinating [Committee]*, CNS, which the government accused of being a front for the outlawed Chilean Workers Central.* The CTC joined the CNS, the Confederation of Private Sector Employees,* and the Unitary Workers Front* in sending a letter to General Pinochet (Chilean Dictator/President, 1973–) in July 1982 requesting modifications in labor and economic policy and, shortly

thereafter, in its convention, threatened the government with still another strike in the copper mines. From mid-1983 until the end of 1984 the copper miners and the majority of CTC leadership joined in the growing national opposition to the military regime, with a series of illegal strikes followed by layoffs of workers and union leaders.

CTCH. *See* Confederation of Chilean Workers.

CUT. *See* Chilean Workers Central.

DEMOCRATIC WORKERS UNION (Unión Democrática de Trabajadores—UDT).

This group was created in 1981 by the so-called Group of 10 (all but one of the ten were high-ranking Christian Democratic union leaders who in May 1976 signed an extremely critical open letter directed at the military government concerning union rights) as an alternative to a leftist-led national labor central (the National Union Coordinating [Committee]*—CNS). Originally based in the National Association of Public Employees,* workers in the national sugar industry, the Copper Workers Confederation,* Railway Workers Industrial Federation,* Confederation of Private Sector Employees,* Maritime Confederation of Chile,* and certain textile and petroleum unions, the Group of 10 had added other unions by 1979–80 and vocally opposed the government's new constitution of 1980.

With the constitution approved, however, the Group of 10 seemed to take a pragmatic view of the situation and attempted to represent workers within the existing system. In the leadership's view this precluded a dominant role for the CNS, which the military regime accused of being a facade for the dissolved Chilean Workers Central,* and in this context created the UDT as an "independent" alternative national workers central. From 1981 to 1984 the UDT continued its autonomous existence within the opposition labor movement while attempting to regain workers rights and participating in actions directed at overcoming the dictatorship. In August 1984 the UDT reaffirmed its commitment to agrarian reform and to the union rights lost by its agricultural affiliates—"The Triumphant Peasant" Confederation,* the "Liberty" Confederation,* and the "Sargento Candelaria" Federation—with the repeal of Law 16.625 (passed in 1967 by the Christian Democratic government). Thus the UDT attempted to maintain the support of the remaining agricultural unions loyal to the Christian Democratic Party.

EDUCATION WORKERS UNION (Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Educación—SUTE).

Founded in 1970 as a national union affiliating teachers and administrators employed by the Ministry of Education, SUTE exercised considerable influence during the Popular Unity government in the elaboration and implementation of educational policy. In 1972 SUTE was extended formal legal recognition by the government, thereby eliminating previous administrative prohibitions on union

organization of public sector teachers. SUTE represented a significant step in the evolution of teachers unions in Chile, from the time of the first teachers strikes in 1917 through the years of struggle carried on by the Federation of Chilean Educators,* which formed the principal component of SUTE at the time of its creation in 1970.

After the military coup of 1973 General Pinochet declared that it was necessary to purge public education of subversive elements, and to accomplish this task Pinochet eliminated most of the employment security teachers had won over the last fifty years. Many educators lost their jobs; others were imprisoned or executed. The national director of SUTE, Juan Gianelli, "disappeared"—the fate of many "subversives" singled out by the military regime for repression. In December 1973 the military government ended payroll checkoff for SUTE and froze the union's funds. A year later SUTE's legal recognition was withdrawn (Decree Law, 1284) as was the legal recognition of several other related teachers organizations (e.g., the Teachers Union—Unión de Profesores, and the Association of Technical and Commercial Teachers—Asociación de Profesores de Enseñanza Técnica y Comercial).

To replace SUTE and other teachers organizations the government announced the creation of a gremialist association: the Teachers Association, or Colegio de Profesores (Decree Law 678, 1974). The new organization would register all teachers in the public and private sector, regulate professional and ethical conduct of teachers, and set standards for teacher preparation and licensing. In addition, the Colegio would concern itself with its members' economic and social improvement. Establishment of the Colegio was viewed by the government as a step toward the professionalization and depoliticization of the teaching profession in Chile. Many of the old headquarters and social centers of SUTE were confiscated and turned over to the new Colegio in order to provide it with locales.

After 1981 the military government moved to transform the various professional associations (*colegios profesionales*) into gremialist associations (*asociaciones gremialistas*), a further lessening of influence and prestige for the nation's teachers. The gremialist associations were not authorized to represent workers in collective bargaining and, more important, any group of twenty-five persons of the same profession could form such an association. This meant that the Colegio de Profesores, Asociación Gremial no longer was a mandatory affiliation for teachers, despite the fact that the military government continued to use it as a conduit for announcing and explaining new initiatives in education policy. Parallel to this Colegio a new organization evolved in 1982–84, the Chilean Educators Gremialist Association,* which firmly attacked the government's education policies in its new publication, *El Pizarrón*.

EQUALITY SOCIETY (Sociedad de Igualdad).

Founded in 1849–50 by Francisco Bilbao and Santiago Arcos as a center of radical opposition to the incumbent government, the Equality Society called for redistribution of wealth and income, including land reform. Bilbao and Arcos,

both influenced by French liberalism and socialism of the late 1840s, are credited with introducing the class struggle concept into the Chilean political lexicon in Arcos' famous Open Letter to Francisco Bilbao (*Carta abierta a Francisco Bilbao*). The Equality Society was never truly a working-class organization; the society, however, did include artisans (for example, tailors, hatmakers, shoemakers, typographers) in its initial directorate.

As a result of street demonstrations in San Felipe (Aconcagua province) in 1850, the Intendent declared a state of siege, dissolved the Equality Society branch in that city, and arrested several of its members. The government accused the Society of "exploiting the ignorance and passions of the poorest classes." Political suppression of the Equality Society both anticipated future government response to elite worker alliances and precipitated the era of mutualist societies that dominated Chilean working-class (artisan) history from the 1850s into the early twentieth century.

FEDERACIÓN DE EDUCADORES DE CHILE. *See* Federation of Chilean Educators.

FEDERACIÓN DE SINDICATOS INDUSTRIALES DE SANTIAGO. *See* Plant (Industrial) Union Confederation of Santiago.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES TEXTILES Y DEL VESTUARIO. *See* Textile and Clothing Workers Federation.

FEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE UNIONES DE PROTECCIÓN AL TRABAJO DE SUDAMERICA. *See* General Federation of Unions for the Protection of Labor of South America.

FEDERACIÓN INDUSTRIAL FERROVIARIA DE CHILE. *See* Railway Workers Industrial Federation.

FEDERACIÓN MINERA. *See* Federation of Miners.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DE SALUD. *See* National Health Workers Federation.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL SINDICAL METALÚRGICA. *See* Metallurgical and Iron Workers Union Federation.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA CHILENA. *See* Chilean Workers Federation.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA NACIONAL DEL CUERO Y EL CALZADO. *See* National Federation of Leather and Shoe Workers.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA REGIONAL CHILENA, 1913. *See* Regional Federation of Chilean Workers.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL CRISTIANA DE LA TIERRA. *See* Christian Rural Union Federation.

FEDERATION OF CHILEAN EDUCATORS (Federación de Educadores de Chile—FEDECH).

Organized in 1944, the Federation of Chilean Educators affiliated or coordinated almost all the teachers organizations in Chile until 1970 when it merged with the Education Workers Union* (SUTE). During its existence as a national organization, FEDECH contributed greatly to the expansion of public education in Chile and also served as a major pressure group in the Chilean political system. Ideologically diverse, FEDECH represented over 40,000 members before its merger into SUTE.

FEDERATION OF MALE AND FEMALE SHOEMAKERS (Federación de Obreros y Obreras en Calzado). *See* Shoemakers Federation.

FEDERATION OF MINERS (Federación Minera).

The Federation of Miners included the most important unions of coal, nitrate, and iron miners, all of which have a long history of labor militancy. In the 1960s and 1970s this federation was estimated to affiliate some 30,000 members and played a major role within the national labor movement and the Chilean Workers Central.* The Federation of Miners consistently opposed the new labor policies of the military regime after 1973 and actively participated in the National Union Coordinating [Committee]* resistance to the military dictatorship. Recurrent strikes in the coal mines near Concepción challenged the military regime at great cost to the mine workers; in 1983, at least, some significant economic gains were achieved by job actions in Lota and the northern nitrate regions.

FEDERATION OF WORKERS IN CHILE (Federación de Trabajadores en Chile—FTCH).

Formed in 1906 from an amalgamation of a number of resistance societies in Santiago, the FTCH grew to include twenty-four of the capital's thirty-three resistance societies by late 1907. Seeking to stimulate union activity in Santiago and elsewhere, the FTCH competed with the mutualist societies for membership. Concentrating on class issues and strike activity, the FTCH insisted that members automatically strike if employers violated negotiated agreements.

The FTCH played a leading role in the Labor Day demonstrations in Santiago in 1907 and also in supporting the general strike initiated by railway workers. Though not a hard-line anarchist movement, the FTCH attempted to limit political activity within worker organizations. Government repression after the 1907 strike movements in Santiago and in the northern nitrate districts greatly reduced the

influence of the FTCH as workers withdrew in order to keep from losing their jobs. By 1909 FTCH withered and practically disappeared.

FENATEX. *See* Textile and Clothing Workers Federation.

FENSIMET. *See* Metallurgical and Iron Workers Union Federation.

FORCH, 1913. *See* Workers Federation of the Chilean Region.

FORCH, 1926. *See* Regional Federation of Chilean Workers.

FRENTE UNITARIO DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Unitary Workers Front.

FTCH. *See* Federation of Workers in Chile.

FUT. *See* Unitary Workers Front.

GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS (Asociación General de Maestros).

This national teachers association was created in 1922, incorporating many of the members of the Primary Teachers Association* (1915). In part this organization was a response to the growing militancy of teachers after the strike of 1917; post-World War I inflation and the populist appeals of President Arturo Alessandri also contributed to the increased interest in union-like activism by white-collar workers, including the country's teachers. The early contributions of the General Association of Teachers would later be carried forward by the Federation of Chilean Educators,* the Education Workers Union,* and, under the military dictatorship after 1972, by the Chilean Educators Gremialist Association.*

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (Confederación General del Trabajo—CGT).

Founded in 1931, this anarcho-syndicalist labor organization merged many of the older Industrial Workers of the World* (IWW) and Regional Federation of Chilean Workers* affiliates into a new anarchist central after the fall of Carlos Ibáñez (1927–31). Drawing its strength from artisans, maritime workers, printers, shoemakers, and the construction trades, the CGT celebrated three national conventions between 1932 and 1936. In the latter year government estimates placed CGT membership at about 15,000 workers with federations in La Serena, Valparaíso, Santiago, Rancagua, Curicó, Talca, Concepción, Temuco, Valdivia, and Osorno. Other affiliates were found in Antofagasta, Iquique, and Viña del Mar. In the mid-1930s CGT affiliates experienced a certain degree of success in strikes, achieving significant salary increases and, temporarily (in the construction trades), a thirty-six-hour week. The CGT refused to abide by the terms of the Social Laws and the Labor Code, rejecting the legal union movement

which emerged after 1931. In 1936 the CGT refused to join the Confederation of Chilean Workers* in forming a single national labor central—in great part because of the legal union issue and, of course, because of the supposed “collaborationist” nature of the popular front coalition that the latter confederation supported. By the early 1940s the CGT had lost most of its influence in the labor movement.

GENERAL FEDERATION OF UNIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF LABOR OF SOUTH AMERICA (Federación General de Uniones de Protección al Trabajo de Sudamerica).

This short-lived organization was created in 1892 and is referred to by a prominent Chilean labor historian as perhaps the first effort to create a Chilean labor central. Formed in part as a response to government-proposed legislation to repress strikes, it succumbed to internal disputes between anarchists and other workers, disappearing by 1893.

GRAN UNIÓN MARÍTIMA DE VALPARAÍSO. *See* Maritime Workers Society of Valparaíso.

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD, CHILE (IWW, CHILE).

The Chilean branch of the Industrial Workers of the World was established relatively late in Chilean labor history. Originating among port workers in Valparaíso in 1918 as a result of contact with IWW elements from California, USA, the IWW drew support for industrial unionism from anarchists looking for a more successful approach to destroying capitalism in Chile. The IWW enjoyed more success on the docks and in the construction trades than among artisans, thereby supplanting to some extent the old resistance societies among the construction workers, stevedores, sailors, and lightermen.

The IWW's militancy and growing control of the ports resulted in government infiltration and concoction of a supposed anti-Chilean (pro-Peruvian) plot in 1920, followed by severe repression prior to the presidential elections of that year. Subsequent to the election of Arturo Alessandri (1920–24; 25) the IWW renewed its efforts in Valparaíso and attempted to forge an alliance with Chilean Workers Federation* (FOCH) affiliated streetcar drivers and teamsters. Using strikes, boycotts, and coercion against employers and non-union workers, the IWW eventually confronted the Employers Merchant Association in a general strike that spread to Antofagasta and Talcahuano. Employers joined in a lockout and the strike spread to other ports, crippling the nitrate and coal industries.

With government collusion the employers overcame the strike, blacklisted IWW members, and organized company unions. Deterioration of the IWW position coincided with the rise of the rival FOCH and culminated with the general attack on organized labor by the Ibáñez administration from 1927 to 1931.

JUNTA NACIONAL DE EMPLEADOS DE CHILE. *See* National Employees Association.

“LIBERTY” CONFEDERATION (Confederación “Libertad”).

Organized in 1967, this peasant union confederation amalgamated the Union of Christian Peasants (Unión de Campesinos Cristianos—UCC, 1960) and the National Association of Peasant Organizations (Asociación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas—ANOC, 1962) which had previously united the National Peasant Confederation* (CNC, 1965). The UCC was created originally as part of the old Chilean Union Action* with its base in Molina; the ANOC grew out of the Catholic and U.S.-supported Institute for Rural Education (IER). Both of these groups shared an anti-Marxist, social Catholic ideology that lent itself to support of Eduardo Frei in the presidential election of 1964 and then to unification in the National Peasant Confederation in 1965. With passage of the new rural union legislation in 1967 (Law 16.625) the CNC became a rural union confederation called “Libertad.” Though supportive of the Christian Democratic government, this peasant union confederation maintained its autonomy from the government’s Institute for National Development (INDAP) and supported “The Triumphant Peasant” Confederation* formed at about the same time. Its membership was less than the INDAP-sponsored confederation and also less than that of the Marxist-oriented “Ranquil” Confederation.*

LIGA NACIONAL DE DEFENSA DE CAMPESINOS POBRES. *See* National League for the Defense of Poor Peasants.

LIGAS DE ARRENDATARIOS. *See* Tenant Leagues.

MARITIME CONFEDERATION OF CHILE (Confederación Marítima de Chile—COMACH).

The Maritime Confederation of Chile was created in the late 1940s as a successor to the Maritime Federation of Chile. Headquartered in Valparaíso, the COMACH maintained a decided autonomy from the Chilean Workers Central* from 1957 to 1967. COMACH affiliated unions of dockers, coastal sailors, whalers, fishermen, and some government workers. In the early 1960s COMACH claimed to represent some 40,000 workers in legal and “free” unions as well as workers in public sector “associations.”

During the 1960s Christian Democratic influence within the COMACH increased greatly; anti-Marxist sentiment was common within the Confederation. During the Popular Unity government (1970–73) Christian Democratic influence continued to be felt and after the military coup of 1973 COMACH leadership joined with the National Association of Public Employees* in the creation of the politically moderate National Workers Central* in 1974. Gradually, leadership elements within COMACH united with other labor leaders in denouncing the military government’s economic and labor policies, thereby precipitating efforts by the dictatorship to replace the most outspoken COMACH spokesmen. During the next ten years COMACH continued its relatively moderate role within the labor movement, essentially attempting to protect the economic position of

its membership without taking a prominent role in labor's political opposition to the military regime. Practically inactive in the early 1980s, COMACH obtained a new lease on life in February 1984, grouping twenty-seven unions in a "new" legal confederation.

MARITIME WORKERS SOCIETY OF VALPARAÍSO (Gran Unión Marítima de Valparaíso).

Organized in 1892 under the direction of Carlos Jorquera, a member of the Democrat Party, after his return from a trip to Europe and the United States, the Maritime Workers Society became the Chilean Section of the International Maritime League. Jorquera used this base to organize workers in other sectors of the economy, including typographers, construction workers, and artisans. The Maritime Workers Society itself enjoyed only a brief organizational existence, giving rise to numbers of resistance societies and unions for the protection of labor in several towns and ports. In this sense its importance results from its role in leadership formation and support for the spread of worker organizations at the turn of the nineteenth century.

METALLURGICAL AND IRON WORKERS UNION FEDERATION (Federación Nacional Sindical Metalúrgica—FENSIMET).

This federation of unions was one of several industrial workers organizations that took an active role in the political and labor opposition to the military regime after 1973. Allied with the Textile and Clothing Workers Federation,* the Construction Workers Federation,* the Federation of Mine Workers, and two leftist peasant organizations, "Ranquil" Confederation* and Peasant Worker Unity (Unidad Obrero Campesina), the FENSIMET was one of the important base organizations of the new labor central, the National Union Coordinating [Committee]* (CNS), formed in an attempt to replace the outlawed Chilean Workers Central.* In 1978 new decrees by the military dictatorship essentially delegatized FENSIMET along with the other base organizations of the CNS. This did not prevent the organization's continued extra-legal continuation in labor and political opposition, but it did lead to arrest and persecution, again, of union leaders.

MOVIMIENTO UNITARIO DE TRABAJADORES DE CHILE. *See* Unitary Movement of Chilean Workers.

MUTCH. *See* Unitary Movement of Chilean Workers.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES (Agrupación de Empleados Fiscales—ANEF).

Though legally forbidden to join unions, the employees of Chile's national government have long belonged to a variety of employees associations which often served as surrogates for formal unions. ANEF was created in 1943 from a variety of mutualist societies, teachers unions, and other employees associa-

tions. Motivated primarily by the post-World War II inflation which adversely affected salaried employees, government workers joined blue-collar and white-collar workers in the private sector in seeking protection from the impact of government anti-inflationary policies.

ANEF remained nonpolitical, in the sense of identification with particular political parties, although many of its members tended to gravitate toward the middle-class Radical Party. ANEF did not affiliate with the Confederation of Chilean Workers* (CTCH) during the popular front years, but did participate in some of the strikes in the 1950s supported by the CTCH and then the new Chilean Workers Central* (CUT). Interestingly, the first president of ANEF was also the president of CUT—Clotario Blest, a heroic figure in the Chilean labor movement. By the 1960s a number of ANEF directors also participated in the executive committee of CUT, but ANEF retained its ideological pluralism and the predominance of Radical Party directors.

During the government of Christian Democratic President Eduardo Frei (1964–70) ANEF played an active role in defending the interests of public employees; membership reached almost 60,000. ANEF members tended to have much in common with the private sector white-collar employees organized in the Confederation of Private Sector Employees,* and this common interest continued even after the military coup which toppled the Popular Unity government in 1973.

After the military coup ANEF was among the labor organizations which created the National Workers Central* in 1974; Tucapel Jiménez, identified with the old Radical Party, represented ANEF in the new central's leadership. Purges in the public sector by the military government significantly affected ANEF affiliates, but the organization continued its efforts to protect employee interests within the context of the new "emergency decrees" of the military regime. ANEF consistently objected to the new labor regimen imposed by the dictatorship and seemed supportive of the initiatives of the Group of 10 and then of its successor, the Democratic Workers Union* (UDT). In 1979 ANEF joined with the leaders of the National Union Coordinating [Committee],* Unitary Workers Front, Group of 10, and Confederation of Private Sector Employees* in a short-lived Command for the Defense of Union Rights (CDDS)—a very loose alliance of the principal national labor groups struggling against the government's newly announced Labor Plan (Plan Laboral).

In the early 1980s ANEF leader Tucapel Jiménez assumed a prominent role in efforts to unify the labor movement in a growing and more militant opposition to the military regime. As labor-government relations deteriorated and strike-protest activity intensified in 1982–84, ANEF director Tucapel Jiménez joined a long list of labor leaders that "disappeared" and were assassinated from 1973–1984. Though not among the most radical labor organizations in ideological terms, ANEF continued its persistent defense of public employees within the constraints of the military dictatorship.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF CHILEAN UNIONS (Confederación Nacional de Sindicatos Chilenos—CNSC).

Created in 1934 as a merger of the National Federation of Unions and Labor Organizations* (“free unions” and legal unions) and the Confederation of Plant and Craft Unions of Santiago, the CNSC affiliated local unions with a total estimated membership of approximately 80,000 workers. The CNSC adopted a socialist program which called for establishment of a new economic and political system in Chile “with a higher social morality.” Dominated by socialist ideology with explicit commitment to class struggle and revolution, the CNSC called upon all workers and white-collar workers and employees to join together to overthrow the existing system. In 1935 the CNSC, by now predominantly under the influence of the Socialist Party, organized a “Congress of Union Unity” in Valparaíso with the intent of creating a single national workers central. Failing in this objective, the organization’s leaders supported the railroad workers in the strike of 1936 with a call for a national work stoppage of forty-eight hours. In response the government arrested most of the CNSC leadership and ransacked the Confederation’s headquarters. Moving again to achieve working-class unity, the CNSC managed to forge a loose National Union Front with the Chilean Workers Federation* and the National Association of Employees. Shortly thereafter a new “Congress of Union Unity,” meeting in Santiago in 1936, gave birth to the Confederation of Chilean Workers*—the most important workers central in Chile from 1936 to 1946.

NATIONAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF CHILE (Junta Nacional de Empleados de Chile—JUNECH).

This organization affiliated workers and employees in local, national, and semi-autonomous public enterprises who legally could not unionize under the terms of the 1931 Labor Code. Created in 1948 to defend workers in the public sector from the immediate postwar economic and political crisis, JUNECH was a peak organization which represented existing groups of public sector workers in a “National Junta.” Often allied with the Confederation of Private Sector Employees* (CEPCH) and the municipal employees organizations, JUNECH represented the interests of white-collar employees in semi-autonomous public enterprises, such as the Railway Workers Industrial Federation,* Federation of Chilean Educators,* municipal employees, and the National Health Service. Typically focused on government anti-inflation policies, wage and salary issues, and benefits packages, JUNECH joined in union political action when government programs negatively affected white-collar workers and government employees. For example, JUNECH joined with CEPCH, students, and other public employees in the creation of the movement protesting increases in the rates on public transportation in 1949.

Sharing the economic interests of private sector white-collar employees, JUNECH tended to be less conservative than CEPCH on most political issues. For

example, JUNECH opposed the law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy and its subsequent use to purge the public sector of communists and "subversives" (1948–58), whereas the CEPCH, while expressing formal opposition to the repressive legislation, took no active part in the political resistance to the anti-communist purge. In 1953 JUNECH played an active role in representing public employees in the newly created Chilean Workers Central,* the most important labor central in Chile from 1953 to 1973. Though ideologically diverse and politically fragmented, the public employees represented by JUNECH continued to play a prominent role in the Chilean labor movement until the military coup of 1973.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LEATHER AND SHOE WORKERS (Federación Obrera Nacional del Cuero y el Calzado—FONACC).

Federating unions with a membership of 5,000–10,000 workers in the 1960s and 1970s, FONACC carried on the militant tradition of organized labor in the shoe and leather industry from the early twentieth century. Immediately after the military coup (1973) and the dissolution of the Chilean Workers Central,* with which FONACC was affiliated, FONACC began its resistance to the loss of labor rights imposed by the "emergency decrees." In August 1974 FONACC proclaimed that the right to strike and collective bargaining were nonnegotiable since "they are the only way for workers to defend their rights." Echoing sentiments reminiscent of the anarchist strength in this sector in the early decades of the century, FONACC spokesmen called for worker direct action to better conditions for the working classes. Maintaining an active opposition posture, FONACC remained closely tied to the other ex-Chilean Workers Central* federations which eventually organized the new labor central, the National Union Coordinating [Committee].* In 1980 shoe and leather workers participated in a series of strikes; the following year leaders of FONACC were accused, under the new restrictive labor laws, of "monopolistic practices" (similarities in labor petitions from factory to factory were outlawed since only individual plant unions, not federations, could participate in collective bargaining). As the struggle of the labor movement against the military government continued, FONACC representatives joined in the latest effort to achieve worker unity, the National Worker Command,* toward the end of 1984.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF UNIONS AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (Federación Nacional y Organizaciones del Trabajo de Chile).

Founded in 1932 as a federation of "free unions" and legal unions, this organization had only a brief independent life. In 1932 and 1933 it held national conventions in which socialist elements played a significant role. By 1934, at which time official sources estimated the organization's membership at 50,000, it merged with the Confederation of Industrial and Craft Unions of Santiago to create the National Confederation of Chilean Unions.* This latter Confederation,

dominated by the Socialist Party, became one of the largest components of the Confederation of Chilean Workers* in 1936.

NATIONAL HEALTH WORKERS FEDERATION (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de Salud—FENATS).

This national federation of organized workers in the health sector was one of the larger groups (25,000–30,000 members) affiliated with the Chilean Workers Central* in the period from the mid-1950s until 1973. After the military coup of 1973 FENATS leadership passed to pro-government officers who joined with the Bank Workers Federation (FEBACH) and the Confederation of Industrial and Commercial White-Collar Employees (CEIC) in supporting the new (1974) National Confederation of Workers. While health care workers suffered along with most other workers the loss of union benefits and freedoms, FENATS played a relatively insignificant role in the years from 1973 to 1984. Nevertheless, it remained an important association of workers within the Chilean organized labor movement.

NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR THE DEFENSE OF POOR PEASANTS (Liga Nacional de Defensa de Campesinos Pobres).

This loose league of small holders and rural workers was created in 1935 under the direction of Trotskyist congressman Emilio Zapata. Created initially to extend the benefits of frost disaster relief to peasants as well as the large landowners, the League became an outlet for both radical political ideology and clientelistic politics by Zapata. The League's official publications called for sweeping agrarian reforms, rural unionization, and reduction in rents for sharecroppers. Initially based in Santiago province, the League gradually affiliated a large number of very loosely organized individual "ligas" throughout Chile. In competition with the socialists and communists for the support of rural workers and peasants, the League was largely absorbed by the Socialist Party when Zapata joined the socialists. By 1942 the League had practically disappeared as an independent entity, but many of its members had joined socialist-supported rural unions.

NATIONAL PEASANT COMMISSION (Comisión Nacional Campesina—CNC).

Formed in 1982 to bring together the surviving peasant confederations, federations, unions, and cooperatives into a loose national coordinating organization, the CNC attempted to rally rural workers and farmers to regain the benefits of agrarian reform and agricultural unionization obtained from 1964 to 1973. By late 1983 the new CNC was publishing a bulletin called *Land (Tierra)* and calling for peasant support of the more general labor mobilization against the military government. In July 1984 the CNC sponsored a commemorative celebration honoring the seventeenth anniversary of the Christian Democratic-sponsored Agrarian Reform Law (Law 16640, 1967) and also calling for reestablishment

of the agricultural unionization legislation of the same period. Representatives of "Liberty,"* "The Triumphant Peasant,"* and "Ranquil"* confederations; Nehuen Confederation; and Peasant Workers Unity (Unidad Obrero Campesina), along with the Federation Sargento Candelaria, all participated in the new effort to attain unity among peasant and agricultural worker unions, cooperatives, and small holder associations. Representing almost the entire range of ideological and political diversity within the rural labor movement, the CNC's total affiliated membership still was not one-third that of the peasant and rural labor organizations at the time of the military coup in 1973.

NATIONAL PEASANT CONFEDERATION (Confederación Nacional Campesina—CNC).

Constituted in 1965 as a merger of Catholic- and Christian Democratic-oriented agricultural unions and organizations, the National Association of Peasant Organizations (Asociación Nacional de Organizaciones—ANOC) and the Union of Christian Peasants (Unión de Campesinos Cristianos—UCC), which had been created in the early 1960s, the National Peasant Confederation became a major source of rural support for the government of Eduardo Frei (1964–70). The CNC called for liberalized laws on agricultural unionization, land reform, and expanded educational, health, and technical services in the countryside. During the 1960s the CNC received support from a number of Chilean government agencies and also from the International Development Foundation, an entity later linked to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Even if funding came from the CIA for some of the Confederation's activities, the base organizations on the farms of Chile's central valley often were militant defenders of their members' interests and refused to be subordinated entirely to the Christian Democratic government or to the Popular Unity administration which followed (1970–73). Later, many of the affiliates of the CNC formed the base of the national Liberty Confederation.*

NATIONAL UNION COORDINATING [COMMITTEE] (Coordinadora Nacional Sindical—CNS).

The CNS had its origins in the efforts of union leaders and federations affiliated with the outlawed Chilean Workers Central* (CUT) to organize labor resistance to the military government in the period 1974–75. In June 1975 a group of federations previously identified with CUT denounced the government's labor policies in several public forums (for example, at the Federation of Miners,* Textile and Clothing Workers Federation,* and Association of Retired Persons). Growing opposition to government policies from 1975 to 1978 finally resulted in mid-1977 in creation of the National Union Coordinating Committee. Leftist as well as Christian Democratic unions and federations joined in the CNS as a potential successor to the outlawed CUT. Other Christian Democratic organizations—such as the Group of 10, the Democratic Workers Union* (UDT), and the Unitary Worker Front* (FUT)—refused to identify with CNS but did join

in a number of common protests against the government. From 1978 to 1984 CNS took a prominent role in labor's opposition to the military dictatorship. In reaction the government officially dissolved seven federations affiliated with CNS (1978), arrested some CNS leaders, exiled others, and assassinated still others. CNS took the initiative in rejecting the legitimacy of the government's Labor Plan (1979–80), in presenting the "Pliego Nacional" (a national labor petition), and in organizing and carrying out the national protest movements in 1983–84. Labeled by the military government as a "communist" organization and a front for the ex-CUT, the CNS bore the brunt of considerable regime repression. In 1984 CNS participated with other groups (UDT, FUT, the Copper Workers Confederation, and the Confederation of Private Sector Employees*) in a new organizational effort to unify the Chilean labor movement in a National Workers Command.* In addition to its participation in the new National Workers Command, the CNS continued its own organizational and political activities, suffering as a consequence the arrest of a number of its leaders again in 1984 as well as a series of government raids on its offices.

NATIONAL UNION OF CHILEAN WORKERS (Unión de Trabajadores de Chile—UNTRACH).

Formed in April 1978 as an autonomous, pro-military regime labor central, the UNTRACH emphasized its nonpolitical, unionist orientation. Although this new organization did not challenge the political legitimacy of the military government, it gradually moved toward a critical stance in regard to the government's labor and social policies. Led by a Copper Workers Confederation officer, the ex-Christian Democrat, Bernardino Castillo, UNTRACH sometimes found itself allied with the Group of 10 (see Democratic Workers Union) in its anti-Marxist and anti-military positions. UNTRACH, despite its "officialist" origins, bitterly attacked the Labor Plan after 1979.

NATIONAL WORKERS CENTRAL (Central Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT, 1974).

This organization was created in early 1974 as an initial effort by some Christian Democratic trade unionists and by the gremialist associations to replace the outlawed Chilean Workers Central* (CUT). Leaders from the Maritime Confederation of Chile,* the National Association of Public Employees,* the bank workers federation, textile, metallurgical, and health sector unions took the lead in this effort to mediate between the labor movement (now purged of Marxist and leftist influence) and the military government. Tension between the Christian Democratic and gremialist labor leaders as well as the government's unwillingness to recognize the role of the new organization made it relatively ineffective.

Inasmuch as most of the old labor movement was excluded, the CNT also lacked legitimacy in the eyes of many sectors of organized labor. Although its life was short, the CNT played an important role as the first of many efforts to

reconstitute the national labor movement after the military coup of 1973, and some of its leaders eventually took a much more militant stance against the military regime in the early 1980s.

PLANT (INDUSTRIAL) UNION FEDERATION OF SANTIAGO (Federación de Sindicatos Industriales de Santiago).

Organized in 1931 as a federation of approximately thirty plant unions with some 10,000 workers, this labor group's leadership first came from unions of weavers, hatmakers, leatherworkers, and textile workers. In its only convention (1932) the federation decided to include craft unions (*sindicatos profesionales*) and changed its name to Confederation of Plant and Craft Unions of Santiago (Confederación de Sindicatos Industriales y Profesionales de Santiago). This organization supported the railway worker job actions of 1933–34 and was attacked by the government for its “political” activities. In 1934 a fusion with the National Federation of Unions and Labor Organizations of Chile* gave rise to the National Confederation of Chilean Unions,* which ultimately played a prominent role in the creation of the Confederation of Chilean Workers* in 1936.

PRIMARY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (Asociación de Maestros de Primaria).

Often cited as the first example of white-collar unionism, this organization was a loose “union” of primary teachers created in 1915. In 1917 this association carried out one of the first white-collar strikes in Chile and then, in 1922, supported the organization of the General Association of Teachers.*

From 1915 to 1922 political divisions within the teachers union movement between adherents of the Radical Party and those of the Democrat Party gave rise also to a League of Primary Teachers (Liga del Magisterio Primario de Chile, 1917–18) and to the Federation of Teachers of Primary Instruction (Federación de Profesores de Instrucción Primaria de Chile, 1915). The latter was directed by supporters of the Radical Party and the former by Democrat Party cadres. The political struggle weakened both teachers groups, but ultimately unification was achieved with formation of the General Association of Teachers in 1922.

In the meantime, lobbying by the teacher organizations contributed to passage of Chile's first legislation making primary instruction obligatory (1920). From 1922 to 1928 the General Association of Teachers participated in elaboration of new legislation and programs for public education in Chile. With the establishment of the dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez in 1927, partisan political divisions within the Association resurfaced and this, combined with government repression of the labor movement in general, led to dissolution of the Association.

PRINTERS FEDERATION (Federación de Obreros de Imprenta de Chile—FOI).

Organized in 1902 after years of leadership by printers among resistance societies, the FOI carried out a successful strike against most of Santiago's newspapers and publishers in the same year. Strongly anarchist in orientation, the FOI, though suffering declines in membership and strength after 1908, re-

mained committed to direct action and violence. Reorganized in the post-World War I crisis (1918), the FOI emerged again as a leader within the Chilean urban labor movement. In 1921 a FOI affiliate was established in Valparaíso, and in its convention of that year the FOI committed itself to "destruction of capitalism." Like several other anarchist organizations, the printers' post-1920s militancy was accompanied by a name change, in this case to Printers Federation of Chile (*Federación de Obreros de Imprenta de Chile*—FOICH). Remaining active in the mid-1920s, the FOICH shared the repression dealt out by the Ibáñez dictatorship in the years 1927–31. At its height (1925–26) the organization probably had some 2,000 members in Santiago and perhaps 700 in Valparaíso.

RAILWAY WORKERS INDUSTRIAL FEDERATION (*Federación Industrial Ferroviaria de Chile*—FIFCH).

When this federation was created in 1938, it affiliated blue-collar and white-collar railway employees who, in turn, belonged to a federation of operating engineers, watermen, and firemen; a union of nonoperating manual workers; and an association of white-collar workers. Within the FIFCH ideological and political diversity has prevailed, making the organization one of the many battlegrounds for political parties within the labor movement. Representing workers and professionals in a critical transportation sector of the Chilean economy, FIFCH played a central role in many labor disputes and national labor job actions from the late 1930s into the 1970s (e.g., strikes in 1949, and the mid-1950s) and was one of the larger federations affiliated with the Chilean Workers Central* in the 1960s and early 1970s (25,000 members).

While not one of the most militant federations in opposition to the military government after 1973, FIFCH did survive and continue to attempt to protect its members. In 1977 the military regime supported creation of a parallel organization called the Railroad Labor Front (*Frente Laboral Ferroviario*) in an effort to reduce the influence of FIFCH. Nevertheless, in 1976 a prominent FIFCH leader joined the Group of 10 in its vocal opposition to the military government's labor policies. After the government's presentation of the Labor Plan, FIFCH leadership joined with leaders from the National Association of Public Employees,* Confederation of Private Sector Employees,* National Union Coordinating [Committee],* Unitary Workers Front,* and the Group of 10 (later to be the Democratic Workers Union*) in protesting the government's new policies. Government efforts to weaken FIFCH continued from 1979 to 1984; in 1983 a decree of the Minister of Economy provided for five separate processes of collective bargaining for state railway workers, according to geographical zone, thereby legally excluding the possibility of national coordinated action by the workers.

"RANQUIL" CONFEDERATION (*Confederación "Ranquil"*).

Named after the location of an infamous massacre of peasants in southern Chile in 1934, this peasant confederation amalgamated the previously existing

National Federation of Peasants and Indians (FCI, 1961)—which had earlier united a number of peasant organizations dominated by the Communist party, including the National Peasant Movement (MNC); Federation of Agricultural Workers; Association of Small Farmers; and the National Indian Association. This peasant confederation became the second largest national peasant organization in Chile from 1964 to 1970 and under the Popular Unity government (1970–73) became the single most important peasant confederation in the country. With membership at the farm level divided among the Communist and Socialist parties, “Ranquil” was integrated from the outset into the Chilean Workers Central* (CUT) at the national level. After 1973 this peasant confederation, along with other affiliates of CUT, suffered extreme persecution and violent repression by the military dictatorship. It also again splintered between Socialist and Communist Party–dominated federations.

REGIONAL FEDERATION OF CHILEAN WORKERS (Federación Obrera Regional Chilena—FORCH, 1926).

A loose coordinating central of federations of anarchist resistance societies and industrial federations which refused to accept the Industrial Workers of the World* model of industrial organization, FORCH emerged in 1926 as the most prominent voice of anarcho-syndicalism in Chile. Including some of the most militant resistance societies in Santiago and Valparaíso (plasterers, carpenters, plumbers, masons, and printers), FORCH aggressively sought better economic conditions for its members and opposed implementation of the new social security law (Law 4054, 1924), which required worker contributions for its financing.

Extremely weak as anything but the voice of its autonomous local groups and federations, FORCH nevertheless faced the wrath of the Ibáñez dictatorship (1927–31) shortly after its founding. On 27 February 1927 Ibáñez declared “Henceforth, there will be in Chile neither Communism nor Anarchism.” Police raided FORCH headquarters and rounded up leaders of the organization for incarceration, internal exile, or, in some cases, “disappearance.” In prisons and zones of relegation members of FORCH and the Industrial Workers of the World, Chile, gradually appreciated the need to reunify the Chilean anarchist movement. With the fall of Ibáñez the anarchists’ organizations joined together in 1931 in the new General Confederation of Labor.*

REPUBLICAN CONFEDERATION OF CIVIC ACTION (Confederación Republicana de Acción Cívica—CRAC).

In 1929, with the encouragement of dictator Carlos Ibáñez (1927–31), the Workers Social Congress* invited members of mutual aid societies and unions to participate in a “general convention.” This convention agreed to the creation of CRAC as an organization of workers to collaborate with the “Great Worker of National Glory” (Ibáñez) in the task of national reconstruction. Ibáñez, in turn, provided CRAC with a headquarters in Santiago and participation in both the national congress and the public administration. Ibáñez recognized the role

of legal unions under the social laws of 1924 and moved forward with elaboration and promulgation of the Labor Code of 1931 as part of the regime's effort to control and to co-opt the labor movement. When the Union of Chilean Employees* joined CRAC, the organization counted over 100,000 members. Although CRAC did not survive the fall of Ibáñez in late 1931, many of its constituent organizations and unions formed the backbone of the labor movement which evolved in the 1930s.

REPUBLICAN SOCIAL UNION OF WAGE EARNERS OF CHILE (Unión Social Republicana de Asalariados—USRACH).

Organized as an alliance of railroad workers, teachers, and a variety of white-collar employees after the 1925 presidential elections, USRACH was a combination of labor organizations with electoral coalition for the congressional elections of 1925. Joining the Democrat Party and supporters of the Communist Party, USRACH assisted greatly in the victory of leftist congressional candidates (five communists, four USRACH, including a senator). Headed by the prestigious leader of the mutualist societies in Santiago and later socialist *político*, Carlos Alberto Martínez, USRACH managed to put together the first "popular front" coalition in the country's history. Unfortunately for the membership, internal disputes between the communists, democrats, "independents," and anarchists led to USRACH's demise—also a harbinger of the fate of later popular-front type strategies in Chile.

RESISTANCE SOCIETIES (Sociedades de Resistencia).

Resistance societies were among the earliest organizational expressions of anarchist labor unions in Chile, appearing often among workers already affiliated with mutualist associations. The resistance society formed among the metalworkers of the state railroad shops in Santiago (1898) is often cited as the first resistance society in Chilean history. Between 1898 and 1901 sailors, bakers, miners, and numerous artisans formed resistance societies in Santiago, Valparaíso, and Concepción.

The influence and activity of the resistance societies reached their peak in the years 1905–1907; often victory in a particular strike or repression by the police ended the life of nascent resistance societies. In 1906, however, a number of resistance societies banded together in the Federation of Workers in Chile* (FTCH), and by 1907 this federation counted twenty-four member resistance societies. These resistance societies ranged from that of 150 women in the Resistance Society of Garment Workers, to the Printers Federation.* Repression of working-class organizations after the general strike of 1907, along with the massacre at Santa María de Iquique, blacklisting of many resistance society leaders, and an economic turndown, eroded the activity of the resistance societies and by 1908 the FTCH had dissolved.

SHOEMAKERS FEDERATION (Federación de Zapateros—FZA).

Organized in 1917 among the workers of five shoe factories in Santiago, the FZA managed during its first four years of life to ally socialist, anarchist, and independent workers in the footwear industry. Between June 1917 and late 1918 the FZA successfully led an industry-wide strike of over forty factories that established a nine-hour day, increased wages, and gained employer recognition of the unions in the factories. The FZA claimed over 4,000 members by the end of 1918 and its successes made it one of the most prestigious worker organizations in the country. Of note was equal representation of male and female workers as well as FZA's contributions to unionization of workers in transportation, construction trades, and other artisans.

In 1921 anarchist ascendancy within the FZA leadership caused some dissension. Renamed the Federation of Male and Female Shoemakers (Federación de Obreros y Obreras en Calzado, FOOC) to reflect its libertarian commitment to federal organization, the organization nevertheless continued its syndicalist tradition, and some socialists remained in the organization into the mid-1920s. In 1925, with the entry of tannery workers, the FOOC became the Industrial Union of Leatherworkers (UIC). Like most of the anarchist and socialist labor groups, the leatherworkers union suffered the repression imposed by the Ibáñez dictatorship after 1927.

SINDICATO ÚNICO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA EDUCACIÓN. *See* Education Workers Union.

SOCIEDAD DE EMPLEADOS DE COMERCIO. *See* Society of Commercial Employees.

SOCIEDAD DE IGUALDAD. *See* Equality Society.

SOCIETY OF COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES (Sociedad de Empleados de Comercio).

Founded as a mutualist society in 1887, this first white-collar employee association gained formal government recognition in 1924 when it counted some 2,000 members. Over the years this organization provided a large range of services to its members, including life insurance, burial benefits, disability pensions, and other economic assistance. Like the early blue-collar mutual aid societies, this white-collar group did not participate in collective bargaining or other union job actions.

SUTE. *See* Education Workers Union.

TENANT LEAGUES (Ligas de Arrendatarios).

Created in 1907 by anarcho-syndicalists in Santiago to challenge rising rents in tenements (*conventillos*), tenant leagues periodically emerged as specialized

working-class organizations in the first decades of the twentieth century. In 1914 and then from 1925 to 1927 tenant league protests resulted in rent strikes in Valparaíso and Santiago. Some tenant leagues were led by Industrial Workers of the World, Chile* and anarchist organizers; others were formed by socialists and democrats. A massive protest and general strike coming out of the tenant leagues in 1925 pressured the military junta to pass a decree-law to alleviate rising rents. Eventually, ideological divisions within the tenant leagues and conflicts over tactics weakened the tenant league movement, which gradually lost momentum by 1927.

TEXTILE AND CLOTHING WORKERS FEDERATION (Federación de Trabajadores Textiles y del Vestuario—FENATEX).

This federation was one of the important affiliates of the Chilean Workers Central* (CUT) in 1973 which experienced severe repression after the military coup that overturned the Popular Unity government. Rapidly responding to the military government's emergency decrees, along with the Construction Workers Federation* and the Metallurgical and Iron Workers Union Federation,* the textile and clothing workers leadership was purged, exiled, jailed, and in some cases eliminated. FENATEX continued, despite the repression, to ally itself with the leftist-oriented federations and formed part of the original membership of the National Union Coordinating [Committee],* the national labor central which attempted to fill the vacuum left by the dissolution of CUT. Like metallurgical workers, textile workers were adversely affected by the military government's new trade policies which opened up the Chilean economy to imports from Europe, Asia, and North America. FENATEX along with CNS affiliates led the labor opposition to the regime's trade policies.

“THE TRIUMPHANT PEASANT” CONFEDERATION (Confederación “El Triunfo Campesino”).

This national peasant confederation was organized under the tutelage of the Christian Democratic government of Eduardo Frei and, in particular, under the supervision of the Institute for Agrarian Development (INDAP). Access to government resources and full-time government-paid organizers helped make this confederation of peasant unions the largest single peasant organization in Chile by 1970. While the Confederation played an opposition role during the Popular Unity government (1970–73), it continued to defend the perceived interests of its constituents who had benefited from the Christian Democratic reforms. After 1973 “Triunfo Campesino” allied itself with the eventual Christian Democratic opposition to the military dictatorship and took a leading role in the creation of the National Peasant Confederation* which resisted the labor and agricultural policies of the military regime.

UDT. *See* Democratic Workers Union.

UNIÓN DE EMPLEADOS DE CHILE. *See* Union of Chilean Employees.

UNIÓN DEMOCRÁTICA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Democratic Workers Union.

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE CHILE—UNTRACH. *See* National Union of Chilean Workers.

UNION OF CHILEAN EMPLOYEES (Unión de Empleados de Chile—UECH).

The UECH represented the first white-collar labor organization in Chile, apart from teachers, to take an active stance in defending the economic and social interests of private sector employees. The UECH refused to affiliate with the Chilean Workers Federation,* despite its harsh criticisms of capitalism, and eventually joined in the government-dominated Republican Confederation of Civic Union* under Ibáñez (1927–31). Experiencing many of the same internal political divisions as blue-collar worker unions and federations, the UECH suffered several divisions between 1932 and 1948 when many of the old UECH affiliates became the base of the new Confederation of Private Sector Employees.*

UNIÓN SOCIAL REPUBLICANA DE ASALARIADOS. *See* Republican Social Union of Wage Earners of Chile.

UNITARY MOVEMENT OF CHILEAN WORKERS (Movimiento Unitario de Trabajadores de Chile—MUTCH).

Founded by Christian Democrats in 1961 with the base of Chilean Union Action* in order to challenge the dominant role of the Chilean Workers Central* in the Chilean labor movement, MUTCH experienced little success. After holding an alternative Labor Day meeting and an initial call for affiliation by Christian and independent labor organizations, MUTCH vanished as a visible force in the Chilean labor movement. Its historical importance resides in its place among several Christian Democratic efforts to create parallel organizations to national labor centrals with significant Marxist leadership.

UNITARY WORKERS FRONT (Frente Unitario de Trabajadores—FUT).

A splinter Catholic labor central created in 1978 and led by Carlos Frez (ex-leader of the port workers federation), the Front rejected domination of the labor movement by political parties and also by the military. For this reason it offered an alternative to the Group of 10 (UDT*) and the National Union Coordinating [Committee]* as labor confronted the military dictatorship. FUT had existed previously as a labor group originating with Catholic Worker Youth (JOC) and Catholic Action Workers Movement (MOAC). Frez reactivated FUT as an effort to generate an autonomous workers opposition to the military regime. Nevertheless, FUT cooperated with the Group of 10 (UDT*) and the National Coor-

minating [Committee] in a number of protests against the military government and supported the efforts of the National Workers Command created in late 1983 as yet another attempt to unite labor opposition to the military regime.

UNTRACH. *See* National Union of Chilean Workers.

USRACH. *See* Republican Social Union of Wage Earners of Chile.

UTRACH. *See* Chilean Workers Union.

WORKERS ASSEMBLY ON NATIONAL NUTRITION (Asamblea Obrera de Alimentación Nacional—AOAN).

This organization was created in 1918 as an alliance of working-class organizations to protest exports of food products as food prices rose dramatically in Santiago. Supported by anarchists, the Chilean Workers Federation,* the Democrat Party, mutual aid societies, and nascent Catholic workers organizations, AOAN demanded new regulations to lower the cost of food, limit cereal exports, remove the tax on imported Argentine beef, and establish farmers' markets for direct sale to urban consumers. The government responded with new legislation regulating food prices, a first step toward the establishment of the National Subsistence Administration (NSA) demanded by AOAN.

After months of delay in the Congress on legislation concerning the NSA, AOAN staged a massive rally in Valparaíso; the Congress gave the president emergency powers and declared a two-month state of siege in Santiago, Valparaíso, and Aconcagua. Political dissension and failure to achieve its major objectives led to AOAN's dissolution in 1920, but only after it had organized the largest working-class demonstration in Valparaíso and Santiago in the country's history to that time.

WORKERS FEDERATION OF THE CHILEAN REGION (Federación Obrera Regional Chilena—FORCH, 1913).

In the tradition of the Federation of Workers in Chile* movement of the first decade of the century, FORCH consisted initially of five resistance societies in Valparaíso. Organized in late 1913, FORCH increased its membership to twenty unions in 1914 and attempted to coordinate collective bargaining and strike activity of its member organizations. Drawing members from construction workers, artisans, stevedores, railway workers, and some factory workers, including those in the sugar refinery in Viña del Mar, FORCH played a leading role in the prolonged Valparaíso general strike of 1913. Inspired by anarchist ideology, FORCH battled to achieve an eight-hour day, six-day workweek, indemnities for industrial accidents, and improved working conditions. Although the Valparaíso-based FORCH failed to achieve national prominence, many of its leaders later developed as national labor and political leaders.

WORKERS SOCIAL CONGRESS (Congreso Social Obrero—CSO).

A mutualist labor organization allied with the reformist Democrat Party, the Congress emerged as a key actor in the urban protests against rising food prices and rents in Santiago during the first decades of the twentieth century. Founded in 1900, the CSO affiliated almost 170 mutual aid societies and petitioned the government frequently for passage of social and labor legislation. Much less militant than the resistance societies or labor brotherhoods, the CSO endured into the late 1920s when it took the lead in the formation of the Republican Confederation of Civic Action* under the Ibáñez dictatorship.

Colombia _____

RENÉ DE LA PEDRAJA TOMAN

The Colombian labor movement has been strongly affected by the geographical divisions that separate the four main regions of the country. The most important region has always been Bogotá, the national capital, with the surrounding areas of Cundinamarca. Antioquia, with Medellín as its main urban center, and the Valle del Cauca, with Cali as the main city, have been of about equal importance, followed by the Atlantic Coast, site of Barranquilla, the fourth largest city in the country. There are other regions, such as the Llanos and the Amazon, but they have generally lacked important labor organizations mainly because those regions have been outside the economic mainstream of Colombia. However, some important exceptions do occur. For example, the petroleum fields of Barrancabermeja and Catatumbo did give rise to the most important union in Colombia, Unionist Workers' Unity* (Unión Sindical Obrera—USO); the Magdalena river valley, which was the necessary travel route between the four main regions until the 1940s, had powerful river and dock workers unions, in particular the National Federation of Maritime, River, Port, and Air Transport* (Federación Nacional del Transporte Marítimo, Fluvial, Portuario y Aéreo—FEDENAL).

The pronounced geographical divisions have left as their imprint on the organized labor movement a strong tendency towards regional federations rather than national confederations. Yet this has not meant the absence of centrals, because the very existence of a highly centralized state requires national labor organizations to negotiate with the government. The centralization imposed in Colombia in 1886 and reflected legally in the constitution of that year came too late to prevent the loss of Panama in 1903, but it did determine that the organized labor movement would at some moment have to face the national government and thus become a political question. From the beginning, the partisan aspect that almost always has affected the labor movement was inevitable, since the

introduction of the centralized system of 1886 was the work of the Conservative Party that remained in power until 1930.

No matter what the shape of the particular institutional molds, the rise of a labor movement ultimately depended on the industrialization of the country and in particular on the gradual transformation of an agrarian economy into one mainly urban based. These processes have not concluded in the 1980s, even though they had their beginnings in the 1890s. In the last decade of the nineteenth century businessmen established or at least organized on a permanent basis breweries, sugarmills, textile mills, and electric power plants (as well as cement factories from the 1910s). These factories prospered, accompanied by a whole host of ancillary industries and manufacturing processes, and thus formed a sharp contrast to the artisan production of previous periods.

These industries, created usually with Colombian capital, provided the conditions for the rise of an organized labor movement. The most powerful initial stimulus for organizing labor came, however, from foreign companies operating in Colombia, in particular the United Fruit Company in the banana region near Santa Marta and the Standard Oil Company in Barrancabermeja, but there were others such as in the gold fields. These foreign companies—with the vast size of their holdings, which stood out even more in the subsistence agriculture regions, their officials' lack of knowledge of local customs and sometimes even of the Spanish language, and proclivity for strong-arm tactics and violence as well as corruption to achieve their ends—generally provoked labor conflicts sooner than typically was the case with their Colombian counterparts.

The evolution of the Colombian labor movement has been marked by many dramatic episodes and a large number of labor organizations. The crucial first step was to create distinct and separate organizations to challenge those, like the Unity of Industrialists and Workers (*Unión de Industriales y Obreros*) founded in 1904, which claimed to represent the workers but in fact defended the interests of the propertied classes. The organized labor movement dates its beginning from 1906, when the Printers' Union of Bogotá* (*Sindicato de Tipógrafos de Bogotá*) was founded, but in spite of its title, it was really the earliest known mutual aid society for workers since it had renounced the right to strike; the next founded was the Artisans' Society of Sonsón* (*Sociedad de Artesanos de Sonsón*) in 1909. From 1910 mutual aid societies for workers began to proliferate, some under the influence of the Catholic Church such as the Workers' Circle* (*Círculo de Obreros*), but most were lay. Organizations calling themselves unions also began to proliferate from 1910, but since they openly renounced any intention of engaging in strikes or similar activities, these "unions" together with the mutual aid societies might best be considered the "proto-unions" that were taking shape in the period from 1906 to 1918.

Prior to the twentieth century, labor protests were virtually nonexistent in Colombia, and the only known strike, that of the railroad construction workers of Buenaventura in 1878, was a political protest over the election of the local governor. However, the province of Panama that then belonged to Colombia

witnessed more active labor protests. In February 1880 the workers went on strike against the Panama Railroad because the wages had not been adjusted in many years to keep up with rising prices. The company quickly acquiesced, but six months later lowered the wages, provoking another strike that the Panama Railroad crushed through government repression and the arrest of the leaders. A better organized strike in 1883 secured a pay raise, but this was the last success of the railroad workers who were henceforth kept under control by threats and not allowed to form a permanent labor union.

The Canal workers went on strike in 1881 over the new requirement of free Sunday work and in 1884 over a wage cutback. These measures of the French company were inspired by cost-cutting to try to save the Panama Canal venture, but as operations declined, the workers were left without employment and the incipient labor movement disappeared. Nevertheless, the Panama strikes foreshadowed the twentieth-century pattern of the strong labor movements that arose in reaction to the Colombian enclaves of foreign companies.

In twentieth-century Colombia, strike activity began in 1910, when the dockworkers of Barranquilla halted activities until they were finally paid in gold rather than in devalued paper money. No further protest erupted until January 1918, when a wave of strikes swept the Caribbean coast and practically paralyzed foreign trade. Dockworkers demanded higher wages in Barranquilla and Cartagena, and they were soon joined by the workers of the railroads and the banana region. Bloody clashes followed by hundreds of arrests were required to finally quell this movement that had been led by ad hoc committees.

A main reason why the 1918 strikes were more violent than those of 1910 was the example provided by the success of the Soviet Revolution. Henceforth the Soviet triumph became another powerful stimulus that soon translated itself into the earliest attempts by leftist groups to create and control a labor movement. The reaction of the national government and of the ruling groups in general to the wave of strikes and the incipient leftist influence was not at all unexpected.

The government and the private companies supported the spread of mutual aid societies as the only tolerable alternative for workers; any other type of labor organization was considered subversive and the government upheld the traditional policy of declaring strikes illegal. Events soon got out of control, and a wave of bitter strikes at the end of the 1920s, in particular the massacre in the banana region and the bloody clashes with petroleum workers, brought such discredit to the government that the Conservative Party, which had held office for nearly half a century, fell from power. This period thus offers an example of what has been only rarely the case in the Colombian labor movement: that labor unions can overcome bitter official hostility to procure important structural changes in the economy and society of Colombia. Usually, however, the centrals have too often relied on government support, but this is more an indictment of many labor leaders than a condemnation of the potential of the labor movement.

The "heroic" age characterized by bloody clashes and many charismatic leaders as well as martyrs that had given a permanent aura and legitimacy to the

labor movement came to an end in 1930 when a period of collaboration with the Liberal Party began. As an electoral tactic the Liberal government strongly supported the unionization of workers who thus meant votes, and too many labor leaders, worn out because of the bloody and bitter fights of the 1920s, generally accepted the official favors bestowed on the labor organizations. Favorable legislation and subsidies paved the way for the creation in 1934 of the first modern central in Colombia, the Confederation of Colombian Workers* (Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia—CTC). This rather unwieldy organization harbored the leftist and Liberal unions, and was mainly composed of transportation and petroleum workers. CTC made into an apparent reality the dream to have one institution speak for all unionized workers, but as it became too powerful, the Liberal Party, not wanting to lose power to either the Conservatives or to organized labor, began withdrawing support and even crushed one important strike in 1945. (See National Federation of Maritime, River, Port, and Air Transport.)

From 1945 there ensued a period of intensive industrialization that lasted until the early 1970s. Factories were established for products formerly imported, for example, steel, automobiles, and various chemicals, while such existing sectors as cement, beer, and textiles engaged in a vast expansion. Factory workers became the predominant group within the organized labor movement that previously had been comprised largely of transportation and petroleum workers, although Unionist Workers' Unity (USO) retained its preeminence as the single most important union in Colombia.

Organized labor remained initially under the aegis of the CTC; then the Conservative Party returned to power in 1946 with many old accounts left to settle with the unions. Eager to strike a blow against labor organizations, the Conservative government was slowly and with difficulty convinced to tolerate the 1946 creation by the Catholic Church of a rival central, the Unity of Colombian Workers* (Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia—UTC), as the most effective counterweight against the radical CTC. By 1950 UTC had displaced CTC as the predominant central in Colombia, but in so doing had introduced the principle of parallel unions, which has become the bane of labor organizations ever since. In spite of its many links to the Conservative Party, UTC had considerable appeal among workers because it stayed clear of partisan politics and concentrated on improving the conditions of the workers, if need be even resorting to strikes, although this only rarely occurred. When the Conservatives were overthrown in 1953 by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, a certain paralysis befell labor activities, partly because of repression, but also because the entire country was in a profound crisis over the legitimacy of military rule.

The election of the Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo to the presidency in 1958 not only marked the definitive end of military intervention but also initiated the *Frente Nacional*, or National Front, where for sixteen years the Liberal and Conservative parties alternated in the four-year presidency. This arrangement

had the purpose of ending the open warfare between the rank and file of both parties that had cost hundreds of thousands of lives. The National Front had some success, and partisan pressures did subside among labor organizations, but curiously not enough among some leaders of the UTC who acting out of personal ambitions had themselves elected to political offices. Labor unions grew under the National Front and quickly recovered the strength and numbers they had lost in the uncertain years of the Rojas Pinilla regime. Soon, however, a new problem provoked very sharp internal strife within the labor movement.

The triumph of the Cuban Revolution panicked certain ruling groups who were determined to prevent “another Cuba” at any cost, a firm conviction also held by American agencies in Colombia who vigorously joined the anti-communist campaign. To make CTC an acceptable vehicle for the Liberals, it was purged of its pro-communist labor unions and this meant losing some important federations such as the Federation of Workers of the Valley* (Federación de Trabajadores del Valle—FEDETAV). The anti-communist campaign backfired, however, because it forced the pro-communist elements to abandon working through such organizations as CTC, and instead to set up in 1964 their own central, Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers* (Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia—CSTC). This communist central soon revealed unexpected strength, and it is certain that it would have gone on to eclipse even the UTC, then still predominant, had not bitter strife broken out among leftist groups.

This strife among leftist unions contributed to the rise of an “independent” labor movement made up by unions that did not attach themselves to any central. Independent Revolutionary Workers’ Movement* (Movimiento Obrero Independiente Revolucionario—MOIR), a combination of a political party and a labor union, appeared as an alternative for Maoist groups, while a fourth central, the General Confederation of Labor* (Confederación General del Trabajo—CGT) was founded for those unions with social-Christian tendencies. The Sino-Soviet split had far-reaching repercussions on the leftist labor movement, but other tendencies also contributed to the confusing clashes. There were suggestions to create a fifth central, but this was vigorously opposed by the other national organizations that were discovering that each additional central did not bring in the unattached but merely caused a shifting of affiliated unions to the new central.

From the early 1970s the distinctions between CTC and UTC were becoming blurred and CGT was lapsing into insignificance, so the proposal was repeatedly made, and even backed by American agencies (for example, the AFL-CIO’s American Institute for Free Labor Development—AIFLD), to fuse UTC with CTC and thus form a coherent organization to face the pro-communist CSTC and attract the unattached unions. The proposal produced strong opposition from each central since its adoption would eliminate the executive positions of many officials. The confusion among labor organizations had reached such extremes that to prevent further parallelism of unions and the unchecked proliferation of

petty rival federations, the government that since 1946 had encouraged rival unions was forced in 1976 to raise the number of members needed to form unions and federations.

With the 1960s, white-collar workers in large numbers began to enter the organized labor movement, although it should be noted that employees' unions had existed since 1930 (for example, the Bogotá Employees' Federation,* *Federación de Empleados de Bogotá*). A rapidly growing government bureaucracy swelled the ranks of white-collar employees, while the end in the early 1970s of the intensive period of industrial expansion marked in the labor organizations the displacement of the factory workers as the single most important group. Since a renewal of rapid industrialization is not foreseen for the rest of the century, the predominance of white-collar workers such as government employees (grouped in the National Federation of State Workers,* *Federación Nacional de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado—FENAL TRASE*) and public school teachers (grouped in the Colombian Federation of Teachers,* *Federación Colombiana de Educadores—FECODE*) has become a long-term characteristic of the organized labor movement, and it is an important reason for the proliferation of unattached unions.

Opposition to the government of Alfonso López Michelsen (1974–78) allowed at last the four centrals to work together in the National Unionist Council* (*Consejo Nacional Sindical*), which staged a successful nationwide general strike in September 1977. The labor unity was short-lived, and the usual bickering soon resumed that soon disrupted the National Unionist Council.

The late 1970s saw the end of the National Front, and this brought renewed partisan pressures upon the labor movement. With both parties now seeking electoral support within each central, the traditional ties of the CTC to the Liberals and of the UTC to the Conservatives have weakened. American influence over the labor movement has also declined, among other things, because the operations of American agencies were restricted when, for budgetary reasons, the U.S. government closed the Consulates in Medellín and Cali.

In the 1980s, the most important problem facing organized labor is the crisis that affects the four main centrals, since the very need for the existence of these centrals has been seriously questioned by many unions. CGT was on the verge of extinction when it was saved in 1981 by the affiliation of the Unity of Workers of Cundinamarca* (*Unión de Trabajadores de Cundinamarca—UTRACUN*) that bolted from UTC. Proposals have again been made to fuse CTC* with UTC but to no avail. Already plagued by problems with graft and corruption, both CTC and UTC in 1986 were widely said to be involved in narcotics trafficking.

The appointment in 1985 of union leader Jorge Carrillo Rojas as Minister of Labor—the first time that post had been filled by a person of working-class origin—smoothed relations among all four centrals. Carrillo lifted government sanctions that had been imposed on the Communist CSTC for its role in the abortive general strike of 1984. He also enthusiastically pushed for the dream of one big central, even securing acceptance for the CSTC in the new Single

Confederation of Workers* (Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores—CUT). However, as soon as he left the ministry in 1986, the carefully constructed arrangements fell apart, and the four centrals resumed their usual feuding. The bureaucratic, partisan, and personality struggles that characterize the centrals continue to alienate the unaffiliated unions who, in pursuing their own paths, conserve whatever dynamism remains in the Colombian labor movement.

Bibliography

- Caicedo, Edgar. *Historia de las luchas sindicales en Colombia*. 4th ed., rev. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones, 1982.
- De La Pedraja Toman, René. *Historia de la energía en Colombia 1537–1930*. Bogotá: El Ancora Editores, 1985.
- Herrán, María Teresa. *El sindicalismo por dentro y por fuera*. Bogotá: CINEP y Oveja Negra, 1981.
- Pecaut, Daniel. *Política y sindicalismo en Colombia*. Bogotá: Ediciones Culturales, Bogotá 1982.
- Sowell, David-Lee. "The Early Latin American Labor Movement: Artisans and Politics in Bogotá, Colombia, 1832–1919." Ph.D., dissertation, University of Florida, 1986.
- Torres Giraldo, Ignacio. *Los inconformes*. 5 vols. Bogotá: Editorial Latina, 1978.
- Urrutia, Miguel. *Historia del sindicalismo colombiano*. Bogotá: La Carreta, 1978.
- Villegas, Jorge and José Yunis. *Sucesos colombianos 1900–1924*. Medellín, Colombia: Universidad de Antioquia, 1976.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ACC. *See* Catholic Colombian Action.

ACCIÓN CATÓLICA COLOMBIANA. *See* Catholic Colombian Action.

ACEB. *See* Colombian Association of Bank Employees.

ANTIOQUIAN UNIONIST ASSOCIATION (Asociación Sindical Antioqueña—ASA).

Established in 1961 as a result of a split within the Unity of Workers of Antioquia,* ASA affiliated with the international social-Christian labor movement. ASA saw the opportunity to attract unattached unions from other regions and to that effect created the largely paper organization of the Colombian Union Association (Asociación Sindical Colombiana—ASICOL), which provided the base to establish a fourth central, General Confederation of Labor.*

ANUC. *See* National Agrarian Federation.

ARTISANS' SOCIETY OF SONSON (Sociedad de Artesanos de Sonsón).

Mutual aid societies had functioned in Colombia since the 1880s, but those only for workers or artisans did not formally appear until the foundation of the Artisans' Society at Sonsón in 1909. (A premature attempt to establish a labor union had been made by the Printers' Union of Bogotá.*) Until the end of the 1910s, artisans' and workers' associations of a mutual aid nature, sometimes but not always under Catholic Church influence, spread more rapidly than regular unions that were prohibited from going on strike. In this sense mutual aid associations were the tolerated alternative until the workers had won by 1930 the right to have true unions.

ASA. *See* Antioquian Unionist Associations.

ASOCIACIÓN COLOMBIANA DE EMPLEADOS BANCARIOS. *See* Colombian Association of Bank Employees.

ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE USUARIOS CAMPESINOS. *See* National Agrarian Federation.

ASOCIACIÓN SINDICAL ANTIOQUEÑA. *See* Antioquian Unionist Association.

BOGOTÁ EMPLOYEES' FEDERATION (Federación de Empleados de Bogotá).

Established in 1930 as a protest against arbitrary layoff practices by private firms and by the government during the Great Depression, this was the first successful attempt to organize a federation of white-collar workers. It did not go on strike, but rather wielded pressure through such indirect tactics as threat of disclosure of damaging or sensitive information to which white-collar workers had access. In 1939 the Bogotá Employees Federation in conjunction with the Association of Bank Employees of Colombia (Asociación de Empleados Bancarios de Colombia), a Bogotá-based organization, and a Cartagena union, the Federation of Employees of Bolívar (Federación de Empleados de Bolívar), established the Confederation of National Employees (Confederación de Empleados Nacionales) that largely remained a pocket organization of the Bogotá federation. World War II prosperity and the postwar boom lessened the pressure for unionization among the employees, and although the Federation still had 1,458 members in 1947, it was in decline and would eventually be replaced by new organizations, in particular the National Federation of State Workers* from 1959.

CATHOLIC COLOMBIAN ACTION (Acción Católica Colombiana—ACC).

Founded in the early 1930s to complement Workers' Circles* and the Colombian Social Action (Acción Social Católica Colombia), earlier attempts of the

Catholic Church to enter the labor field, this Catholic lay association had among its many activities the important labor task of countering the communist influence of the Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CTC) unions. By 1939 it had seventy-three unions affiliated, of which forty-eight were agrarian. From the 1940s the Church found a more effective means to influence the labor movement in the Unity of Colombian Workers* (UTC) unions, among which was the National Agrarian Federation* that took over the agrarian unions of Catholic Colombian Action.

CENTRAL WORKERS' UNION OF COLOMBIA (Sindicato Central Obreros de Colombia).

Founded in 1915 as a mutual aid organization for workers, this Bogotá union was not even a regional federation but rather a city-based organization that served as a meeting place where workers could congregate to share the experience of the other unions in the capital. By 1920 the Central Workers' Union was under socialist influence, and joined with those leftist labor organizations that later founded the National Workers' Confederation* in 1925. The Central Workers' Union continued to exist as a separate entity until repression in the wake of the 1927–28 strikes dispersed its members.

CGT. *See* General Confederation of Labor.

CÍRCULO DE OBREROS. *See* Workers' Circle.

COLOMBIAN ASSOCIATION OF BANK EMPLOYEES (Asociación Colombiana de Empleados Bancarios—ACEB).

Following up earlier attempts to unionize the banking sector (see Bogotá Employees' Federation), twenty-five bank employees established ACEB in 1958, an organization that staged important nationwide strikes in 1959, 1960, and 1961. Favorable terms offered by the banks headed off new strikes until 1974. Briefly affiliated with Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CSTC) during 1973–74, it since has remained one of the key members of Independent Revolutionary Workers' Movement.* From 1974 to 1979 ACEB entered a new period of strikes, not all of which were successful. This association remains the single most important federation of bank employees. However, since Unity of Colombian Workers* (UTC), CSTC, and splinter leftist groups also share in the control of the 11,302 members grouped into ninety-three bank unions in 1980, this permanent rivalry has weakened white-collar labor activity in the 1980s.

COLOMBIAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (Federación Colombiana de Educadores—FECODE).

The largest teachers' federation, with 150,000 members in 1981, it is also the largest federation of government employees. Founded in 1959 as a radical federation, FECODE gathered the experience of previous decades in organizing

teachers' unions. Its main source of strength has been the government's chronic delays in paying teachers' salaries. From 1960 to 1966 FECODE organized a wave of strikes and protest demonstrations that put the teachers in the forefront of the Colombian labor movement. FECODE, along with the Colombian Association of Bank Employees,* briefly joined the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CSTC). It left in 1975, and while nominally under the Independent Revolutionary Workers' Movement,* the latter's gradual disintegration has meant that FECODE is virtually independent. In membership it rivals several of the centrals. Despite government prohibition of strikes by teachers, FECODE, since 1974, has almost continuously sponsored regional strikes throughout the country, as well as some national strikes, such as a 1976 action notable because of the almost total support it received from public school teachers.

CON. *See* National Workers' Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE COLOMBIA. *See* Confederation of Colombian Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DEL TRABAJO. *See* General Confederation of Labor.

CONFEDERACIÓN OBRERA NACIONAL. *See* National Workers' Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES DE COLOMBIA. *See* Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers.

CONFEDERATION OF COLOMBIAN WORKERS (Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia—CTC).

The first of the modern centrals, this confederation was founded in 1934 originally as the Union Confederation of Colombia (Confederación Sindical de Colombia), but from 1938 it was called the CTC at the suggestion of the Mexican labor leader Vincente Lombardo Toledano. Until 1946 the CTC held the hope of permanently representing all unionized workers in one national confederation, but at the cost of unconditional subservience to a Liberal Party mainly interested in the mass-mobilization aspects of the unions for electoral purposes. From the start the CTC was plagued with bitter quarrels between the Liberal wing and a communist faction over the necessity of an alliance with the Liberal governments. Differences and sometimes bitter quarrels were patched up, so that gradually the CTC spread to many sectors and regions of the economy. The Federation of Workers of the Valley* and the Federation of Cundinamarca* were its most important regional organizations, and all the federations and unions active in this period that appear in this chapter were affiliated with CTC. In 1947 it had

109,000 members belonging to 427 unions. However, CTC, basking in official support, lost its aggressiveness, and many of its leaders fell into comfortable bureaucratic posts. When the Conservatives returned to power, CTC unrealistically declared general strikes (1947, 1948, and 1949) that failed. Unity of Colombian Workers,* founded in 1946, emerged as the powerful competitor that by 1952 had displaced CTC.

In 1959 CTC had only twenty-seven unions, but from that year anti-communism and support from both the government and American agencies revived the central and pushed its membership figures back up into the 100,000–200,000 range where they have hovered to the present. CTC remained in the 1960s closely attached to the Liberal Party under the seventeen-year presidency of Gustavo Serpa. José Raquel Mercado, the next president, appeared to be following the same direction, but his assassination in 1976, in another of the unexplained murders that dot Colombian history, unleashed internal quarrels. The black labor leader Manuel Felipe Hurtado emerged as president, and as a Conservative he has broken the traditional links of this central with the Liberal Party.

CONSEJO NACIONAL SINDICAL. *See* National Unionist Council.

CSTC. *See* Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers.

CTC. *See* Confederation of Colombian Workers.

DIRECTORIO OBRERO DEL LITORAL ATLÁNTICO. *See* Workers' Directorate of the Atlantic Coast.

FANAL. *See* National Agrarian Federation.

FECODE. *See* Colombian Federation of Teachers.

FEDENAL. *See* National Federation of Maritime, River, Port, and Air Transport.

FEDEPETROL. *See* Federation of Petroleum Workers of Colombia.

FEDEPUERTOS. *See* National Federation of Maritime Dockworkers of Colombia.

FEDERACIÓN AGRARIA NACIONAL. *See* National Agrarian Federation.

FEDERACIÓN COLOMBIANA DE EDUCADORES. *See* Colombian Federation of Teachers.

FEDERACIÓN DE EMPLEADOS DE BOGOTÁ. *See* Bogotá Employees' Federation.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE ANTIOQUIA. *See* Federation of Workers of Antioquia.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE CUNDINAMARCA. *See* Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DEL VALLE. *See* Federation of Workers of the Valley.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES LIBRES DEL VALLE. *See* Federation of Free Workers of the Valley.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES PETROLEROS DE COLOMBIA. *See* Federation of Petroleum Workers of Colombia.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE FERROVÍAS. *See* National Federation of Railways.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES AL SERVICIO DEL ESTADO. *See* National Federation of State Workers.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DE LA CONSTRUCCIÓN Y DEL CEMENTO. *See* National Federation of Construction and Cement Workers.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES PORTUARIOS DE COLOMBIA. *See* National Federation of Maritime Dockworkers of Colombia.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DEL TRANSPORTE MARÍTIMO, FLUVIAL, PORTUARIO Y AÉREO. *See* National Federation of Maritime, River, Port, and Air Transport.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA DEL LITORAL ATLÁNTICO. *See* Workers' Federation of the Atlantic Coast.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES DE CUNDINAMARCA. *See* Unionist Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca.

FEDERACIÓN UNITARIA DE TRABAJADORES DEL TRANSPORTE. *See* Unitary Federation of Transportation Workers.

FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS OF THE VALLEY (Federación de Trabajadores Libres del Valle—FESTRALVA).

Organized after the Confederation of Colombian Workers* expelled the com-

munist-controlled Federation of Workers of the Valley* (FEDETAV), FESTRALVA serves to illustrate how excessive rivalries can render a labor movement virtually ineffective. Backed by American government agencies (for example, the AFL-CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development—AIFLD) that also supported the Unity of the Workers of the Valley* (UTRAVAL), FESTRALVA prospered during the 1960s, but as foreign funds began to be cut back, it could not face the stern competition of a resilient FEDETAV, as well as that of UTRAVAL which had stronger links to the business community. As the internal rivalry increased, FESTRALVA leaders went to Bogotá looking for a solution from the president of Confederation of Colombian Labor* José Raquel Mercado in 1970, but his unyielding anti-communism only aggravated the conflicts, and a splinter group bolted to set up another federation.

FEDERATION OF PETROLEUM WORKERS OF COLOMBIA (Federación de Trabajadores Petroleros de Colombia—FEDEPETROL).

This federation was created in early 1945 at a meeting of President Alfonso López Pumarejo with labor leaders. The purpose was to coordinate the activities of the petroleum workers in different oil fields and installations, organized in the Unionist Workers' Unity (USO)* and the Union of Workers of Catatumbo,* in one single organization that the government could use against the American oil companies. FEDEPETROL supported USO in its 1946 strike and especially the 1948 strike, as could be expected since USO's 3,870 members formed more than half of FEDEPETROL'S 7,808 members in 1947. Since 1950 FEDEPETROL has led a stormy existence as a pawn in a tug-of-war among the government, American agencies, and the communists. From 1950 to 1960 it was virtually powerless, having lost its unions to the rival Unity of Petroleum Workers.* FEDEPETROL was originally affiliated with the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CSTC). When FEDEPETROL failed to support actively the 1971 strike of Unionist Workers' Unity, the latter, the single most important union, broke with the Petroleum Federation. Relations were subsequently patched up, but since the Union of Workers of Catatumbo later fused with USO, FEDEPETROL is now mainly a front organization serving USO's interests.

FEDERATION OF WORKERS OF ANTIOQUIA (Federación de Trabajadores de Antioquia—FEDETA).

The entry of the Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CTC) into Antioquia was opposed by business and Catholic groups who did not want the whole region to face dangerous labor activities like the railroad strike of 1934. (See Industrial Union of the Antioquia Railroad.) When CTC decided to take a gamble by founding FEDETA in late 1944 out of the railroad and municipal workers who comprised about two-thirds of the membership (the other third being mainly coal and gold miners), in reaction the Catholic Church in 1946 created the rival Unity of Workers of Antioquia* (UTRAN). In 1947 FEDETA represented almost 10,000 workers grouped in thirty unions while UTRAN had 6,200 members in

twenty-seven unions. By 1950, however, FEDETA had been displaced because of a persistent campaign by the companies, as well as by the Catholic Church that used threats of excommunication (quite effective among the female employees of the textile mills). The withdrawal of many individuals from the union affiliated with FEDETA left it in the hands of a core of communists, and it was expelled in 1959 from CTC. Working openly as a communist Federation, it revived, leading important strikes in Medellín in 1961, and was one of the founders in 1964 of the communist central, the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers,* in which it has remained as one of its most important regional federations. To counter the communist influence of FEDETA, CTC with the support of American agencies founded in 1972 a rival federation, but this failed to weaken the hold which FEDETA retains over Antioquia in the 1980s.

FEDERATION OF WORKERS OF CUNDINAMARCA (Federación de Trabajadores de Cundinamarca).

Founded in 1934, the Federation was the outcome of numerous attempts to establish one organization that would represent the workers of Bogotá and neighboring regions. The Federation of Cundinamarca published a very influential newspaper, *Vanguard* (*Vanguardia*), and with 27,000 members in 135 unions in 1947 it was the largest regional federation of the Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CTC). The usual tendency in the 1940s for membership to come primarily from transportation workers, in particular railroad but also bus drivers and aviation workers, was evident; however, the federation was also well represented among government workers and employees, and had unions in most of the factories in Bogotá. Compared to the Federation of Workers of Antioquia* that had not unionized important segments, the Federation of Cundinamarca was well entrenched and thus did not immediately face a challenge. But the Unity of Colombian Workers* decided to take a chance and in 1951 founded the Unity of Workers of Cundinamarca,* which then rose steadily in importance until it eclipsed but did not displace the Federation of Cundinamarca. Since Communist Party elements could not capture it, they were forced in the early 1960s to form a rival federation, the Unionist Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca.* Except for a brief period between 1972 and 1978 when because of personality rivalries CTC expelled the Federation of Cundinamarca, it has remained in CTC not as dynamic element but rather sharing in the general decline of the central that continues in the 1980s.

FEDERATION OF WORKERS OF THE VALLEY (Federación de Trabajadores del Valle—FEDETAV).

Established in 1934 as the State Labor Center Union (Sindicato Centro Obrero Departamental), later reorganized as the Syndical Federation of the Valley (Federación Sindical del Valle), in 1942 it took its present shape as FEDETAV. The second most important regional federation in the Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CTC), it had reached a membership of 13,500 in 1947, distributed

mainly among coal miners and workers in the railroads, sugar mills, and some factories. The next year, the Unity of the Workers of the Valley* (UTRAVAL) appeared and, strongly supported by the sugar mill owners, posed a serious challenge to FEDETAV, but the onset of the Rojas Pinilla regime (1953–57) virtually paralyzed both rival federations. In 1958 when FEDETAV had to be reconstituted, it had only 5 unions, but the number rose rapidly to 130 in 1960. Communist influence had become so strong that in 1959 FEDETAV was expelled from CTC, thus beginning a bitter fight for control over the labor movement of the Cauca Valley. The Colombian government and American agencies strongly backed UTRAVAL as well as a new regional federation of CTC, the Federation of Free Workers of the Valley,* designed to woo back to the CTC fold the individual workers who did not feel comfortable with UTRAVAL. Fear of another Cuban Revolution in the cane fields near Cali gave an urgency to the battle, but the final result was a stalemate reflected in the existence of individual rival unions within each company. FEDETAV participated in the foundation of the communist central, the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CSTC), and is one of its most important regional federations. However, CSTC has had little success in integrating the Valle del Cauca to its national federations by sector of the economy (e.g., a sugar workers' union has been impossible). FEDETAV therefore will remain an important link.

FEDETA. *See* Federation of Workers of Antioquia.

FEDETAV. *See* Federation of Workers of the Valley.

FENAL TRACONCEM. *See* National Federation of Construction and Cement Workers.

FENAL TRASE. *See* National Federation of State Workers.

FERROVIAS. *See* National Federation of Railways.

FESTRAC. *See* Unionist Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca.

FESTRALVA. *See* Federation of Free Workers of the Valley.

FUTT. *See* Unitary Federation of Transportation Workers.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (Confederación General del Trabajo—CGT).

The youngest of Colombia's four labor centrals, the CGT was created in April 1971 in a Congress of the Colombian Syndical Association (Asociación Sindical Colombiana) that was just a front for the Antioquian Unionist Association* (ASA), which in effect converted itself into CGT with the support of some

unattached unions. The attempts to attract more independent unions failed, and those that had originally affiliated with CGT began dropping out. The unattached labor movement had clearly shown its objections rested not with any particular central, but rather with the whole central system, marked by intense partisan and personal rivalries to which the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CSTC) had fallen victim. By 1981 the CGT was down to one union in Medellín and a paper peasant organization, Colombian Peasant Action (Acción Campesina Colombiana) so that its demise seemed inevitable. The CGT was saved by the violent personal rivalries inside the Unity of Colombian Workers* (UTC) between its president Tulio Cuevas and Alvaro Ramírez, the president of the Unity of Workers of Cundinamarca (UTRACUN).^{*} In August 1980 UTRACUN withdrew from UTC and began negotiations to fuse its over 100,000 members to the less than 10,000 of the "central" CGT. Not surprisingly, Alvaro Ramírez was elected president of the CGT in May 1981; the personality clashes were not yet over because Tulio Cuevas tried to expel CGT from the National Unionist Council* so that he would not have to deal with Alvaro Ramírez. This central has not made substantial progress in other regions of the country.

INDEPENDENT REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS' MOVEMENT (Movimiento Obrero Independiente Revolucionario—MOIR).

The subservience of Cuba to the Soviet line led leftist groups to establish this organization of Maoist tendency, a mixture of a labor organization and a political party. Except for a brief flirtation with the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CSTC) in 1972, it usually has been the implacable rival of the communist central, convincing many unions of government employees to join MOIR or at least to stay out of CSTC. The latter has been more often the case as deep ideological conflicts have torn MOIR apart; sizable splinter groups left in 1979 and again in 1981. MOIR, which doubles as a political party, still has managed to win a few elected positions. As revisions in China cast further doubts on Maoist thought, the ideological quarrels of MOIR have intensified, further fragmenting the leftist unions that still refuse to join under the leadership of the communist central.

INDUSTRIAL UNION OF THE ANTIOQUIA RAILROAD (Sindicato Industrial del Ferrocarril de Antioquia).

Founded in early 1933 in Medellín, this union represented the workers of the railroad owned by the state of Antioquia and was the second most important union in the National Federation of Railways.* In June 1934 a railroad strike gained the support of other unions in Antioquia that likewise went on strike. The national government declared a state of emergency so that the governor could take extraordinary measures to force the union to make a settlement, but not before shock waves of "social intranquility" had swept through the country. The memory of this event was still vivid in 1947 when the union declared another strike that the Conservative government promptly put down by declaring illegal

both the strike and the union. When in 1961 the national government bought the railroad from the state of Antioquia, a process of negotiations ensued that culminated by 1971 in the fusion of this union with the National Union of Railroad Workers (*Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Ferroviarios*).

MOEC. *See* Movement of Workers, Students, and Peasants.

MOIR. *See* Independent Revolutionary Workers' Movement.

MOVEMENT OF WORKERS, STUDENTS, AND PEASANTS (*Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Campesino—MOEC*).

Established in 1959 in imitation of the Cuban revolutionary experience, this was an attempt to establish a leftist organization outside the rigid control of the Communist Party. Students of the National University as well as some employees unions made up the main body; in 1969 it joined with other groups to form the Independent Revolutionary Workers' Movement.*

MOVIMIENTO OBRERO ESTUDIANTIL CAMPESINO. *See* Movement of Workers, Students, and Peasants.

MOVIMIENTO OBRERO INDEPENDIENTE REVOLUCIONARIO. *See* Independent Revolutionary Workers' Movement.

NATIONAL AGRARIAN FEDERATION (*Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos—ANUC*).

Established in 1967 by President Carlos Lleras Restrepo for the peasants, supposedly to maintain the Agrarian Reform launched in 1961, ANUC claimed half a million members in 1971, and had organized many invasions of large private landholdings. As the momentum for Agrarian Reform slowed in the country, so did ANUC's importance, and it fell prey to bitter internal struggles that produced in 1972 a split into two rival branches, one in Armenia and another in Sincelejo. Leftist groups with Maoism as the predominant tendency, the Colombian government, and American agencies (for example, the AFL-CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development—AIFLD) battled for control over this agrarian labor organization. Those close to the two traditional parties won and in 1981 pushed through the reunification of the two branches so as to have a more efficient organization for electoral purposes. ANUC claims in the early 1980s a membership of over a million peasants and farm workers, but in reality it depends heavily on government subsidies to the point that its offices are located in a government building. It too has fallen into partisan strife.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF CONSTRUCTION AND CEMENT WORKERS (*Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Construcción y del Cemento—FENAL TRACONCEM*).

This federation is one of the mainstays of the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CSTC) and is one of the very few successful federations by sector of the economy that now exists. A National Federation of Construction Workers had been founded in 1944 and claimed 5,200 members in 1947 but was very weak because of the chronic inability in Colombia to organize construction workers, most of them rural migrants hired by different subcontractors for short periods of time at widely separate sites, and with no job security. Real strength came when in 1956 the Unity of Colombian Workers* (UTC) began to organize cement workers who largely had been ignored by the Confederation of Colombian Workers.* In 1960 the cement and construction workers joined in FENAL TRACONCEM that by then was already showing strong communist leanings. Some factory unions withdrew, but then came back in 1973 as FENAL TRACONCEM effectively challenged the cement industry, then controlled by three financial groups, Suramericana, Santodomingo, and Bogotá Bank. It led important industry-wide strikes in 1969, 1973, 1974–75, and 1977. Membership in the cement sector was 4,000 in 1977, and by 1981 90 percent of the cement workers belonged. Ironically, while FENAL TRACONCEM attracted some factory unions that though affiliated with the Confederation of Colombian Workers* and UTC consider FENAL TRACONCEM a more effective vehicle, it has had little success among construction workers. Its president for many years has been Gustavo Osorio, who is also a vice president of the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers.*

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF MARITIME, RIVER, PORT, AND AIR TRANSPORT (Federación Nacional del Transporte Marítimo, Fluvial, Portuario y Aéreo—FEDENAL).

Established in 1938, this federation represented in a continuous and visible way the dockworkers on the Atlantic Coast and the Magdalena River, the latter being its real base. Prior to its foundation, the dockworkers had been represented by either short-lived unions (the oldest known being the Girardot Labor Directorate, *El Directorio Obrero de Girardot*, in 1919) or ad hoc committees organized for a specific strike. Wildcat strikes and rumors and threats of strike were the order of the day until a very successful strike all along the river in June 1937 provided the stimulus to create FEDENAL. The federation obtained excellent terms for the dockworkers in the rivers. When some river shipping companies failed to live up to the terms, FEDENAL demonstrated its power by a very successful strike in 1942. In spite of the fact that the federation was based in Barranquilla, a certain tension always existed between the river and the maritime dockworkers, the latter represented principally by such unions as the Fluvial Subsistence Union of Barranquilla (*Sindicato Fluvial de Subsistencia de Barranquilla*). The very important Union of Dock Laborers of Buenaventura* on the Pacific Coast never belonged to FEDENAL. Counting on a supposed promise of support from Unionist Workers Unity* and despite government warnings, FEDENAL launched in December 1945 a massive strike. The government

quashed it in January 1946. FEDENAL was discredited and the unions began withdrawing, partly because of hostility from the Conservative government, but mainly because the shippers had decided to abandon by the end of the 1950s the river route for the sake of air, road, and railroad transport to the interior, thus bypassing the dockworkers and their unions.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF MARITIME DOCKWORKERS OF COLOMBIA (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Portuarios de Colombia—FEDEPUERTOS).

With the disintegration of the National Federation of Maritime, River, Port, and Air Transport* and the gradual abandonment of the Magdalena River route, only maritime dockworkers remained, represented by about a total of ten locals in the main ports of Colombia. The creation of an official government agency, COLPUERTOS, in 1959 to handle and store cargoes confronted local unions with a sole employer, the state. The locals from the main ports of Colombia (Barranquilla, Buenaventura, Cartagena, Santa Marta, and Tumaco) established FEDEPUERTOS in 1962. This federation not only represents the common interests of the dockworkers but also has considerable influence on the positions taken by the locals with regard to their specific regional problems. FEDEPUERTOS theoretically has the immense power of shutting down the country's ports, but in practice has generally avoided crippling strikes because the government is ready to send (and has sent) navy sailors to take over if quick agreement is not reached. Affiliation has been with the Confederation of Colombian Workers,* and FEDEPUERTOS had over 10,000 members in the early 1980s.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF RAILWAYS (Federación Nacional de Ferrovías—FERROVIAS).

Founded in July 1938 by the strong regional railroad unions, at peak strength in 1947 the federation represented over 20,000 workers grouped in twenty unions. It was in the 1940s the largest of the federations based on sectors of the economy rather than on geography. Both the federation and the regional railways unions declined in importance in the 1950s because of the competition of truck and air transport, and also because of the rise of other sectors of the economy to prominence. The integration of the national railway system was completed in 1961 when the National Railway State Agency finished the line joining the Atlantic Coast to the interior of the country and also bought the railroad owned by the state of Antioquia. A single voice was now needed, and a gradual process of fusion culminated in the creation of the National Union of Railroad Workers that from 1971 represented the workers in negotiations. This belated unification has failed to restore the union to the position of power it held up to 1950, for workers now face the permanent threat of a bankrupt National Railway Agency. Originally affiliated with Confederation of Colombian Workers* and from 1950 to 1980 with Unity of Colombian Workers,* the railroad workers have become an unattached union.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF STATE WORKERS (*Federación Nacional de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado—FENAL TRASE*).

Founded in 1959 with eight unions, the National Federation of State Workers is today the second largest of the federations of government employees, surpassed only by the Colombian Federation of Teachers.* In 1978 FENAL TRASE fused with another federation of government employees, the International Committee of State Workers (*Comité Internacional de Trabajadores del Estado—CITE*), raising the number of unions to thirty-six. Based mainly in Bogotá, the location of most government jobs (thirty-eight of its fifty-six unions are from the capital), FENAL TRASE had in 1981 about 100,000 members. Some of its individual unions are affiliated with other centrals; the federation, although not formally linked to any of the centrals, does reveal strong permanent leanings to the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers.* During the 1980s a woman labor leader, Aída Avella, has been president of FENAL TRASE.

NATIONAL UNIONIST COUNCIL (*Consejo Nacional Sindical*).

The National Unionist Council was created in August 1977 to stage the general strike of 14 September 1977 in protest against the economic and labor policies of President Alfonso López Michelsen. The four centrals, the Unity of Colombian Workers,* Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CTC), General Confederation of Labor* (CGT), and Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers* comprise its membership, and each of those organizations formally accepted and codified the Council's existence in 1980. Opposition to López Michelsen was the strong bond uniting the Council, but it was only partially replaced by opposition to the Julio César Turbay administration and has virtually vanished with the administration of Belisario Betancur. The National Unionist Council has refused entry to any of the unattached unions such as Unionist Workers Unity* or even the Colombian Federation of Teachers,* the former more powerful, the latter more numerous than the two smallest centrals, CGT and CTC. In effect, the National Unionist Council is less an attempt to have one voice speak for organized labor than a mechanism used to justify the continued existence of the centrals that since 1979 have suffered many desertions from their ranks.

NATIONAL UNION OF FEMALE NEEDLE WORKERS (*Sindicato Nacional de Obreros de la Aguja*).

Founded in 1917 in Bogotá, this artisan organization is the earliest known union for women. Besides the traditional artisan areas, from the early 1920s women occupying jobs in the factories and schools, as well as other areas, started to participate in larger numbers in the organized labor movement.

NATIONAL WORKERS' CONFEDERATION (*Confederación Obrera Nacional—CON*).

The National Workers' Confederation was founded in July 1925 at a congress in Bogotá by leftist workers who adhered to the Moscow line but lacked a deep

ideological orientation. The election of Ignacio Torres Giraldo as secretary-general in effect located CON in Cali, the home of Torres Giraldo, who had come as a delegate from that region. CON also doubled as the first regional federation of the Cauca Valley, representing among others the railroad workers (see Railroad Union of the Pacific). By 1926 CON had found in the anti-imperialist campaign the most effective way to mobilize workers, with the greatest success precisely in the enclaves of Barrancabermeja (see Workers' Union) and the banana plantations (see Unionist Unity of Workers of Magdalena), along with the river and dock workers. Torres Giraldo and Maria Cano toured the country in proselytizing campaigns that caused widespread fears among the ruling circles. Bitter and bloody destruction fell first upon the petroleum strikers in 1927 and then upon the banana strikers in 1928, both followed up by arrests and persecution. By 1929 the first leftist national labor organization had been destroyed, and this forced the scattered leftist groups to coalesce temporarily for the foundation of the Communist Party in 1930.

PRINTERS' UNION OF BOGOTÁ (Sindicato de Tipógrafos de Bogotá).

This craft group founded in 1906 was the earliest one to call itself a union in Colombia, but since it did not accept strikes, it more properly belonged to what might be called the "proto-unions" and was similar to the mutual aid societies founded afterwards such as the Artisans' Society of Sonsón.*

RAILROAD UNION OF THE PACIFIC (Sindicato Ferroviario del Pacífico).

The most important of the regional railroad unions, this organization represented the workers in the state-owned railroad lines stretching between Buenaventura, Cali, Popayán, Palmira, Cartago, and Armenia. Railroad workers for earlier strikes had relied in the 1920s on ad hoc organizations or on leaders of the National Workers' Confederation* based in Cali, in particular Ignacio Torres Giraldo. Persecution in the early 1930s delayed the establishment of a Railroad Labor Center (Centro Obrero Ferroviario) until 1933, when it won a successful strike. Reorganized into the Railroad Union of the Pacific in 1937, it won another strike in that year and soon took the lead with the Industrial Union of the Antioquia Railroad,* the National Federation of Railways* (FERROVIAS). With 7,144 members in 1947, the Railroad Union of the Pacific comprised almost a third of the membership of FERROVIAS. As the railroads faced greater competition from trucks, this regional union responded by joining with other unions in the Valle del Cauca region in general strikes, thus perpetuating its bargaining strength until the early 1960s, longer than other regional railroad unions. Nonetheless, to avoid being played off by the National Railway Agency, the sole employer, the Railroad Union of the Pacific had no option other than to join, in 1971, the weak National Union of Railroad Workers.

SIDELCA. *See* Union of Workers of Catatumbo.

SINDICATO CENTRAL OBRERO DE COLOMBIA. *See* Central Workers' Union of Colombia.

SINDICATO DE BAVARIA. *See* Union of Bavaria Breweries.

SINDICATO DE BRACEROS DE BUENAVENTURA. *See* Union of Dock Laborers of Buenaventura.

SINDICATO DE OBREROS AGRÍCOLAS. *See* Union of Agricultural Workers.

SINDICATO DE TIPÓGRAFOS DE BOGOTÁ. *See* Printers' Union of Bogotá.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA FRONTINO MINAS DE ORO. *See* Workers' Union of the Frontino Gold Mines.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DEL CATATUMBO. *See* Union of Workers of Catatumbo.

SINDICATO FERROVIARIO DEL PACIFICO. *See* Railroad Union of the Pacific.

SINDICATO INDUSTRIAL DEL FERROCARRIL DE ANTIOQUIA. *See* Industrial Union of the Antioquia Railroad.

SINDICATO NACIONAL DE OBRERAS DE LA AGUJA. *See* National Union of Female Needle Workers.

SINDICATO OBRERO. *See* Workers' Union.

SOCIEDAD DE ARTESANOS DE SONSÓN. *See* Artisans' Society of Sonsón.

SOCIEDAD UNIÓN OBREROS. *See* Unity Society of Workers.

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE ANTIOQUIA. *See* Unity of Workers of Antioquia.

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE COLOMBIA. *See* Unity of Colombian Workers.

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE CUNDINAMARCA. *See* Unity of Workers of Cundinamarca.

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DEL PETRÓLEO. *See* Unity of Petroleum Workers.

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DEL VALLE. *See* Unity of Workers of the Valley.

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES ESTATALES DE COLOMBIA. *See* Unity of Government Workers of Colombia.

UNIONIST CONFEDERATION OF COLOMBIAN WORKERS (Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia—CSTC).

This is the communist central of Colombia, and it is surpassed today in importance only by the Unity of Colombian Workers* (UTC), and that by ever-decreasing margins. The expulsion from the December 1960 Unity of Colombian Workers* (CTC) Congress of those unions with strong communist sympathies initiated a process that culminated in the foundation of the CSTC in May 1964, and thus permanently ended the old liberal-communist alliance that, although occasionally broken, had characterized the labor movement since the early 1930s. The communists relied on powerful support from the Federation of Workers of Antioquia,* the Federation of Workers of the Valley* (FEDETAV), the Federation of Petroleum Workers of Colombia* (FEDEPETROL), and the National Federation of Construction and Cement Workers* to establish their central, and furthermore they quickly set up new organizations such as the Unionist Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca* in time to be founding members of the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers (CSTC). From FEDETAV came J. Pastor Pérez Martínez to be president, a position he held until his death in July 1984 in Budapest. The government harassed this central that also faced combined opposition from CTC, UTC, the Catholic Church, and American agencies, so that in the 1960s when fear of another Cuba was rampant, CSTC could not prosper and hovered around 100,000 members.

In the 1970s opposition did not let up, but growing disenchantment with the bureaucratized and partisan central gave CSTC opportunities to expand. The expansion was short-lived, because ideological conflicts, the bane of CSTC, produced the loss of individual unions and federations such as FEDEPETROL and the Colombian Federation of Teachers. Constant feuding with Marxist groups ranging from Trotskyite to Maoists has prevented all leftist workers from joining the central. CSTC has concluded that no easy victory is possible, and since 1977 has instead changed to short-run collaboration with other centrals, for example, through the National Unionist Council.* CSTC has also backed a conscientious study of Colombian realities in research centers and has an extensive publications network ranging from scholarly journals *Marxist Studies* (*Estudios Marxistas*) to the widely read newspaper *Voice* (*Voz*; formerly *Proletarian Voice*, *Voz Proletaria*). It also has institutions of higher learning to train future generations of socialists. In 1984 CSTC passed the 200,000 figure for members and was growing. It even displaced UTC from the bus drivers' unions, which every few years paralyze public transport in the main cities (see Unitary Federation of Transportation Workers). CSTC suffered a bitter setback in late 1984 when a

planned general strike fizzled. In reprisal, the administration of Belisario Betancur punished the Communist central by imposing sanctions. On the verge of becoming a clandestine organization, the 1985 intervention of Minister of Labor Jorge Rojas Carrillo (a former union leader) to lift the sanctions and gain admittance of the CSTC to the newly formed Single Confederation of Workers (Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores) restored the union's legal standing.

UNIONIST FEDERATION OF WORKERS OF CUNDINAMARCA (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores de Cundinamarca—FESTRAC).

The failure of the communists to take over the Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca* forced them by 1960 to set up FESTRAC as a rival federation for Cundinamarca and Bogotá. The Unionist Federation helped found the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers* in 1964, and along with the Federation of Workers of Antioquia* has remained among the most important regional federations supporting that communist central.

UNIONIST UNITY OF WORKERS OF MAGDALENA (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Magdalena—USTM).

This union had perhaps the most dramatic and catastrophic experience in Colombia. Founded in early 1926 to face up to the United Fruit Company in the banana region of Santa Marta, the USTM had formed out of experiences gained in earlier unions, such as the Labor Unity of Ciénaga (Unión Obrera de Ciénaga) and the Unity and Force Workers Society (Sociedad de Obreros Unión y Fuerza) that had participated in previous strikes in 1918 and in 1924. These strikes had little success because the railroad, dock, and farm workers had not united with the squatters who clashed with the United Fruit Company over land and water rights. Through the work of local labor leaders such as José Montenegro the USTM unionized all these groups and set up a large number of locals. In early 1928 the National Workers' Confederation* (CON) sent María Cano and Ignacio Torres Giraldo on a speaking tour for rallies, and also stationed Raúl E. Mahecha to organize a full-scale strike. While CON later denied it had planned an insurrection, Mahecha acted accordingly. The strike began on 9 November 1928, and the United Fruit Company promptly obtained troops from the government; when over 400 strikers were arrested, one incident led to another until in Ciénaga on the night of 5 December the soldiers fired into massed crowds, killing hundreds. More deaths followed as the soldiers "mopped up" the resistance in the fields, abruptly ending the life of USTM and dealing a bitter blow to CON. Not until 1934 was another union formed in the region. See Union of Agricultural Workers.

UNIONIST WORKERS' UNITY (Unión Sindical Obrera—USO).

The single most important union in Colombia and one of the oldest, its activities occupy a prominent place in the country's history. After the destruction of the Workers' Union,* company spying and repression aborted later attempts

to found another union in Barrancabermeja. When the Alfonso López Pumarejo administration came to power in 1934 (1934–38; 1942–46), three unions were established, but only one, USO, escaped the hostile measures of Tropical Oil Company (the subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey). On 8 December 1935 USO declared the first strike. Tropical Oil resisted by all possible means, but when a sympathetic government refused to send in the army and the police to create another bloodbath, it accepted most of the workers' demands. Among other strikes, the most significant for the economic development of Colombia occurred on 7 January 1948. The USO with 3,870 members was in opposition to the Conservative government, but with material support from the Federation of Petroleum Workers of Colombia,* Confederation of Colombian Workers,* and the National Federation of Railways,* went on strike to force Tropical Oil to return to the Colombian state the oil fields and installations in 1951, a contractual obligation that the American company was trying to avoid. This latest triumph sealed the power of USO that has since remained one of the very few Colombian unions that have repeatedly challenged the national government, represented by ECOPETROL, the state petroleum agency that since 1951 has handled the Barrancabermeja fields. Of recent strikes, that of 1971 and the one of 1977 seriously affected the economy, so that even rumors of activities by USO are attentively watched. In 1983 it had 11,521 members and had been augmented by the fusion with the Union of Workers of Catatumbo.*

UNIÓN OBRERA DE COLOMBIA. *See* Workers' Unity of Colombia.

UNION OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS (Sindicato de Obreros Agrícolas).

Organized in 1934 to resume the workers' struggle against the powerful United Fruit Company, unlike its earlier unfortunate predecessor (see Unionist Unity of Workers of Magdalena), the Union of Agricultural Workers enjoyed the support of the sympathetic government of Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934–38; 1942–46). When the strike broke out on 12 December 1934, there was no danger of a repetition of the earlier massacre, so it ended successfully, in January 1935. Meanwhile, Sigatoka disease had attacked the banana plantations but the United Fruit Company, fearing that the unfriendly attitude of the government and the workers had become permanent, was reluctant to make investments to counter its spread. The Company abandoned its prior policy of land acquisition and began offering to sell land, so that the clashes with squatters and large landowners disappeared. All other banana producers competed to share in the ever dwindling export market handled by the Company's organization. The Union of Agricultural Workers disintegrated in the late 1930s as the United Fruit Company reduced gradually its labor force. A very weak regional labor organization, the Federation of Magdalena Workers (the Federación de Trabajadores del Magdalena), attempted to defend the banana workers' interests in the early 1940s, but it too remained ineffective against the Company's withdrawal, which when totally

completed in 1966, ended one of the most famous foreign enclaves in Latin America.

UNION OF BAVARIA BREWERIES (Sindicato de Bavaria).

This is one of the most important of the unions that represent the workers of a single company with plants throughout the country. A proto-union existed since 1925, but not until 1933 did real union activity begin with annual strikes or shutdowns, because of persistent company opposition to organized labor that continued until 1939. The union was legally constituted in 1936, but not until 1939 did the company accept it; in 1947 the union had 1,200 members and company growth had increased the number to over 3,000 in 1984 (about three-fourths of the labor force). A period of high profits allowed the company to buy off workers' demands so that not until 1969 did another strike occur. Higher-than-average wages and considerable fringe benefits have assured cordial labor-management relations ever since. Originally affiliated with the Confederation of Colombian Workers,* since the late 1940s it has remained with the Unity of Colombian Workers.*

UNION OF DOCK LABORERS OF BUENAVENTURA (Sindicato de Braceros de Buenaventura).

This union was founded in 1933 to represent the workers of this Pacific Coast port which had replaced the Caribbean as the main transfer point for Colombia's foreign commerce. The port facilities are on an island in the bay, so that the small causeway to the mainland is easily blocked by the workers in any of countless wildcat strikes. This great power and the rivalry with the Caribbean ports convinced the union that affiliation with the National Federation of Maritime, River, Port, and Air Transport* was not essential, and this thus contributed to the latter's demise. In 1947 the Union of Dock Laborers of Buenaventura had 350 members; in the early 1950s it reconstituted itself and became one of the founding members of and a key element in the National Federation of Maritime Dock Workers of Colombia,* with which it closely harmonizes national policies. The great importance of port traffic, only partially replaced by airports, has allowed unions like the one in Buenaventura a local power base that keeps them independent, unlike the declining and bankrupt railroads whose unions had to fuse into the National Federation of Railways* to save what little negotiating strength still remained.

UNION OF WORKERS OF CATATUMBO (Sindicato de Trabajadores del Catatumbo—SIDELCA).

Originally known as the Union of the Barco Concession Workers (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Concesión Barco), which was founded in 1937, by 1939 it represented the majority of the workers in the oil fields near the Venezuelan frontier. The second most important oil union, it however did not have the success of the Unionist Workers' Unity* (USO). In 1950 SIDELCA fell under

the control of the Unity of Colombian Workers* (UTC), but in 1959 it returned to the Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CTC). When CTC gave insufficient backing to a 1960 strike, SIELCA left that central. Communist influence soon predominated and brought the affiliation with the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CSTC). The most important strike of SIELCA occurred in 1971 when the union, in the same manner as USO in 1948, demanded the end of the concession to the American oil companies. The strike soon became a civic protest mobilizing vast sectors of the population in the region, but representatives of CSTC ended the strike before full victory had been attained. Nevertheless, the return of the concession to the Colombian state was hastened. After the strike SIELCA broke with both CSTC and the Federation of Petroleum Workers of Colombia* to begin negotiations with USO, leading to a fusion with the latter by 1978.

UNIÓN SINDICAL OBRERA. *See* Unionist Workers' Unity.

UNIÓN SINDICAL TRABAJADORES MAGDALENA. *See* Unionist Unity of Workers of Magdalena.

UNITARY FEDERATION OF TRANSPORTATION WORKERS (Federación Unitaria de Trabajadores del Transporte—FUTT).

Established by the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers* (CSTC) to group all transportation workers, this federation has had its main success among bus drivers. By 1983 FUTT was functioning and had displaced some Unity of Colombian Workers* unions. The bus drivers have traditionally engaged in strikes that have crippled the cities for a few days, and now under the control of CSTC a greater bellicosity has been the rule. The government thus was forced to take strong measures against both FUTT and CSTC to end their 1984 national strike.

UNITY OF COLOMBIAN WORKERS (Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia—UTC).

The predominant central from 1950 to 1980, when it always grouped over half of the unionized workers, it is still the largest, though its share has dropped since 1980 to about a fourth. UTC gathered the Catholic Church's experiences in previous organizational efforts such as Workers' Circle* and Catholic Colombian Action,* and ongoing efforts in four federations, the most important being the Unity of Workers of Antioquia* and the National Agrarian Federation,* and forty unions that met for UTC's founding Congress in June 1946.

UTC represented a mixture of Church groups under the guidance of Jesuit priests, discreet backing from Conservative governments while remaining apolitical, as well as support and sometimes manipulation from factory owners. UTC made labor organizations acceptable, thus opening up many areas—for example, the Antioquia textile workers—that the Confederation of Colombian

Workers* had failed to unionize. It carried out strikes and brought real benefits to the workers not only in negotiations but also in contributions to labor law and its practice. Its nonpartisan and nonpolitical nature was broken only in 1957 when it participated in the workers' and businessmen's unanimous national strike against the Rojas Pinilla regime (1953–57). On the debit side, the very creation of UTC broke the unity of the labor movement and legitimized parallel unions, the bane of the Colombian labor movement. Cracks in UTC began when it enmeshed itself too passionately in the anti-communist campaigns financed by American agencies (especially the AFL–CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development—AIFLD), thus losing valuable unions. The election of Tulio Cuevas to the presidency in 1963 marked the abandonment of UTC's traditional nonpartisanship, and henceforth it became deeply involved in the politics of the Conservative party, with union executives including Cuevas holding elected office in the National Congress. In 1971 UTC had half a million members, but disenchantment with Cuevas and the UTC's policies produced a crisis in 1980. The 100,000-member Unity of Workers of Cundinamarca* and other unions withdrew, and UTC was left with about 350,000 members. Cuevas failed to be reelected in 1983, bringing to an end his twenty-year rule.

UNITY OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS OF COLOMBIA (Unión de Trabajadores Estatales de Colombia—UTRADEC).

The Unity of Colombian Workers* has continued to establish regional federations in every corner of the country, but as this avenue is almost exhausted, it has sought to establish new federations by sector of the economy or type of employment. A most recent attempt is UTRADEC, founded in 1979 to represent the workers employed by the state; in 1980 it claimed 21,000 members. Since double counting of unions and members for both regional and sectorial unions is not unknown, it is too early to say whether UTRADEC will represent a significant advance towards the unionization of government workers or only another expression of the crisis that affects the centrals.

UNITY OF PETROLEUM WORKERS (Unión de Trabajadores del Petróleo—UTRAPETROL).

The 1948 strike in the oil fields (see Unionist Workers Unity) that overturned the government's decision to keep Standard Oil Company in Barrancabermeja prodded the Conservative government to seek an alliance with the Unity of Colombian Workers* (UTC) to control the oil workers in the future. From 1949 a combination of repression, inducements, and false promises wooed away most unions from the Federation of Petroleum Workers of Colombia,* and by 1952 UTRAPETROL had been created to represent the majority of oil workers. The triumph of UTC was short-lived, however, as the return of the socialist labor leader Diego Montaña Cuéllar to the oil fields in 1960 produced the withdrawal of almost all the petroleum workers from that organization. Since then, UTRAPETROL has remained a largely paper organization.

UNITY OF WORKERS OF ANTIOQUIA (Unión de Trabajadores de Antioquia—UTRAN).

This organizations was founded in early 1946 at the prodding of the Catholic Church to counter the bitter strikes that had rocked Antioquia since 1939, for which the communist-controlled unions such as the Federation of Workers of Antioquia* (FEDETA) were held responsible. From the pulpits the priests excommunicated those who insisted on remaining in unions belonging to the Confederation of Colombian Workers.* Church leaders with the backing of factory owners grouped the textile and some other industrial workers into unions that formed UTRAN. The Unity of Workers had 6,200 members in 1946 and was still outnumbered by FEDETA; nearly half the members of UTRAN were women, reflecting female employment in the textile factories. UTRAN, closely identified with the industrialists, was a founder of the Unity of Colombian Workers* (UTC) in June 1946. In 1961 a split occurred when some advisory priests who had become dissatisfied at the links with the factory owners, took their unions out to form the Antioquian Unionist Association* (social-Christian in orientation), thus weakening an UTRAN that already faced strong competition from FEDETA. Nevertheless, UTRAN has remained in UTC.

UNITY OF WORKERS OF CUNDINAMARCA (Unión de Trabajadores de Cundinamarca—UTRACUN).

The initial success with the Unity of Workers of the Valley* led the Unity of Colombian Workers* (UTC) to challenge the Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca,* the oldest and largest of the regional federations of the Confederation of Colombian Workers.* UTRACUN was founded in 1951 with 25 unions, the number rising to 70 in 1960, 120 in 1970, and 156 in 1980 representing 100,000 members, or about a fifth of UTC. The growth of UTRACUN contrasted with the decline of the central which did not adjust to the new situation. Fierce personal rivalries erupted between Tulio Cuevas, the president of UTC, and Alvaro Ramírez, who had been president of UTRACUN since 1962 (as well as a founder of UTC). In the violent internal conflict that in August 1980 exploded over power, influence, policies, and tactics, UTRACUN was the most important of the federations and unions that left UTC. Shortly after, UTRACUN joined the almost moribund General Confederation of Labor* and in May 1981 Alvaro Ramírez was elected the new president of that now revitalized central.

UNITY OF WORKERS OF THE VALLEY (Unión de Trabajadores del Valle—UTRAVAL).

In the search for power bases outside Antioquia and Boyacá, the Unity of Colombian Workers* had its greatest success with UTRAVAL (founded in 1948), which appeared at the right moment to pose a challenge to the Federation of Workers of the Valley* (FEDETAV), which was heavily infiltrated with communists. With the support of the sugar mills and the government, UTRAVAL was able to displace FEDETAV and to rise to prominence within the Unity of

Colombian Workers.* The Cauca Valley witnessed in the last years of the Rojas Pinilla regime (1953–57) a virtual paralysis of all union activity, which resumed with bitter intensity in 1959 over the issue of communism. UTRAVAL and the Federation of Free Workers of the Valley* were the two federations supported by the sugar mills and the American agencies (for example, the AFL–CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development—AIFLD) against FEDETAV, which because of its extreme communist leanings had been expelled from the Confederation of Colombian Workers.* UTRAVAL gained considerable influence during the anti-communist campaign, but by the end of the 1970s it suffered the loss of some unions that established still another federation. The existence of five rival federations in the Cauca Valley in the 1980s has meant that none can prosper and has thus given a free hand to the companies.

UNITY SOCIETY OF WORKERS (Sociedad Unión Obreros).

This society was founded in February 1923 in Barrancabermeja by Raúl E. Mahecha, a leftist labor leader and activist who published the labor newspaper *Labor Vanguard* (*Vanguardia Obrera*). The many abuses of the Tropical Oil Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey) facilitated organizing the petroleum workers. The union declared its first strike on 5 October 1924, which ended on 13 October 1924 when the government intervened to secure an agreement favorable to the union. Less than two weeks later Tropical Oil fired over 1,200 workers including all the labor leaders; the union was totally destroyed but it was later replaced by the Workers Union.*

USO. *See* Unionist Workers' Unity.

USTM. *See* Unionist Unity of Workers of Magdalena.

UTC. *See* Unity of Colombian Workers.

UTRACUN. *See* Unity of Workers of Cundinamarca.

UTRADEC. *See* Unity of Government Workers.

UTRAN. *See* Unity of Workers of Antioquia.

UTRAPETROL. *See* Unity of Petroleum Workers.

UTRAVAL. *See* Unity of Workers of the Valley.

WORKERS' CIRCLE (Círculo de Obreros).

Founded on 1 January 1911 in Bogotá, this was the first organization successfully established by the Catholic Church to influence the incipient labor movement of Colombia, and was composed mainly of unskilled and semiskilled

workers of shops and small businesses. More Workers' Circles were established in other regions of Colombia, but the one in Bogotá remained predominant. A mutual aid organization that stressed savings, education, and religious instruction, by the 1930s it had slowly moved towards building low-rent housing for workers and running a hiring hall. Opposition within the Church hierarchy did not allow the Circle to take up workers' interests in a more vigorous way; in spite of the urgings of the Jesuit priest José Maria Compoamor, its founder and adviser throughout its existence, it could not even consider organizing formal unions. This huge gap allowed left-wing forces to seize the leadership of the labor movement and to found the Confederation of Colombian Workers,* thus largely rendering ineffective the Workers' Circles. These, however, regrouped under the Unity of Colombian Workers* to take part in a renewed offensive by the Catholic Church together with other groups to regain influence over the organized labor movement.

WORKERS' DIRECTORATE OF THE ATLANTIC COAST (Directorio Obrero del Litoral Atlántico).

The closer contacts of Barranquilla with the outside world had previously stimulated the publication from 14 January 1912 of one of the first labor newspapers in Colombia, *The Laborer (El Obrero)*, and certainly the first one to appear regularly for many years. It formed the kernel for founding the Workers' Directorate of the Atlantic Coast on 1 May 1914, the first regional labor organization in Colombia. Never officially recognized by the government, this union that grouped dockworkers, railroad, streetcar, and some factory workers, staged a bitter strike that nearly paralyzed Barranquilla in 1918. Since it was coordinated with another citywide strike in the nearby port of Cartagena (carried out by the Society of Laborers and Artisans, *Sociedad de Artesanos y Obreros*), this revealed to the country, for the first time, the power that even a regional labor movement when well organized could wield. A campaign of repression and especially of co-optation followed during the 1920s, and although the Directorate still existed in 1931 (it subsequently disappeared), by then workers already had found other avenues of expression. See Workers' Federation of the Atlantic Coast.

WORKERS FEDERATION OF THE ATLANTIC COAST (Federación Obrera del Litoral Atlántico).

By 1926 the ineffectiveness of the Workers' Directorate of the Atlantic Coast* had become evident, and this prompted the creation of a rival regional labor organization that, however, did not become more aggressive until the election of Abel del Portillo as its president in December 1927. The federation grouped, in addition to the railroad and dock workers, the employees of the customs and shipping companies so that in theory it was able to halt Colombia's foreign commerce; it had also proselytized extensively among the artisans of Barranquilla. Abel del Portillo played a dangerous balancing game of publicly claiming allegiance to the government while covertly maintaining contacts with the leftist

leaders Ignacio Torres Giraldo and Raúl E. Mahecha, in effect secretly affiliating the federation with the National Workers' Confederation.* When the police uncovered these links, which were exaggerated into a giant plot that supposedly took the December 1928 United Fruit strike as the start of a generalized insurrection in the whole Atlantic Coast region, the government applied repressive measures; and this federation, which had become a confederation in August 1928, was already ineffective in 1930, when it was last heard from. The rise of Buenaventura on the Pacific Coast as a rival port deprived Barranquilla of its previous monopoly position over foreign commerce, and this contributed to the continued fragmentation and weakness of the regional labor movement in Barranquilla.

WORKERS' UNION (Sindicato Obrero).

Founded in early 1926 in Barrancabermeja as the replacement for the Unity Society of Workers* destroyed in the 1924 strike, the union's main leader was Raúl E. Mahecha, who acted as representative of the socialist National Workers' Confederation.* The Workers' Union distributed two labor newspapers and secured the support of farmers and retail merchants who resented being excluded by the retail business of the Tropical Oil Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey). Preparations for a massive strike were not yet finished when the announcement by Tropical Oil of only a very modest wage compensation for inflation precipitated on 8 January 1927 a bitter strike. Tropical Oil fired over 5,000 strikers, while soldiers and police broke up demonstrations, leaving behind a bloody trail of arrests, wounded, and killed. The crushing of this strike and of the union fixed in the minds of most Colombians a permanent resentment against American oil companies. See Unionist Workers' Unity.

WORKERS' UNION OF THE FRONTINO GOLD MINES (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Frontino Gold Mines).

This union founded in Segovia, Antioquia, formed part of the typical reaction to foreign control: the presence of enclaves accelerated the creation of strong labor unions as was also the case in the petroleum fields and the banana plantations. A socialist group organized a strike in 1919; the moderate success of the strike, coupled with favorable company policies towards the workers, kept a permanent union from arising until 1935. The union staged a bitter strike in September 1942 with strong anti-foreign overtones that was quashed in part because the government did not back the workers. The union, which had 600 workers in 1947, continued fighting until this foreign mini-enclave in Antioquia was neutralized.

WORKERS' UNITY OF COLOMBIA (Unión Obrera de Colombia).

Though established in 1913 in Bogotá to defend workers' interests throughout the country, in practice its activities did not extend beyond the city. It initially did not advocate strikes, and this passivity left a vacuum that the Central Workers'

Union of Colombia* was among the first to try to fill with a more aggressive policy. Workers' Unity nevertheless played an important role in the early years in creating an awareness among the workers through such mediums as one of the first labor newspapers in the interior of the country, *The Labor Unity (La Unión Obrera)*. In the 1920s Workers' Unity had become less passive and backed the streetcar workers of Bogotá in their strike of 1925; it was superseded by the more dynamic leftist unions such as the National Workers' Confederation* and later the Confederation of Colombian Workers* unions. By 1947 it barely survived with a mere twenty-six members, and shortly thereafter disappeared.

Costa Rica _____

JOHN A. BOOTH

In spite of over a century of labor organization and conflict, and although labor exercised great influence in the government from 1942 to 1948, relatively few Costa Ricans belong to labor unions today. However, the low overall level of labor organization in contemporary Costa Rica notwithstanding, unions presently exercise considerable informal political power because of their strategic positions in key government ministries, public sector services, and export industries. The principal public strategy for dealing with labor demands is conciliatory and co-optative, a tradition that dates from the nineteenth century prior to the organization of formal unions.

For much of its history, the Costa Rican economy experienced a shortage of agricultural labor that maintained an upward pressure on wages and kept wage workers relatively prosperous and nonmilitant. The rapid expansion of coffee cultivation after 1850, however, eventually transformed a majority of the central highlands' yeoman farmers (once almost the only type of cultivator) into well remunerated agricultural wage laborers. The state regulated workers in some industries, but independent labor organization, politicization, and conflict proved rare before 1880.

Although coffee brought relative prosperity to Costa Rica in the 1870s, by late in the century the great expansion of cultivation and export of the bean had begun to hurt both rural and urban workers. Costa Rica became a food importer, dependent upon imported manufactures and subject to international coffee price and demand cycles. By the 1880s, when the coffee boom peaked, urban bureaucratic, commercial, laboring, and artisan sectors which depended indirectly upon the coffee industry had emerged. When coffee prices and exports began to fall in the mid-1880s, the resultant general recession led to the first serious incidence of unemployment in Costa Rica. Although brief recoveries occurred in the late 1880s and again in the late 1890s, and although the colonization of

public lands and the growing banana industry provided new jobs for many, the last fifteen years of the century saw increasing unemployment among laborers and a general economic crisis around the turn of the century. Each of these episodes involved rapid inflation, stagnant or declining real wages, and rising unemployment. These unaccustomed economic problems for workers spawned Costa Rica's early labor movement.

The first manifestations of labor organization in the early national period (1823–50) were initiated by the Costa Rican state. The 1830 Mining Ordinance established regulations and a mandatory Miners Guild* (*Gremio de Mineros*) to help control disorder (vice and alcohol abuse affecting labor supply, wages, unsafe working conditions, and legal questions of ownership and operation of mines) in the valuable Monte del Aguacate mines. In 1846 the Costa Rican government created guilds of various types of port and dock workers at the Pacific port of Puntarenas (*Guilds of the Port of Puntarenas*,* *Gremios del Puerto de Puntarenas*). Wages were fixed, boat owners regulated, and one-fourth of stevedores' wages was set aside to insure against cargo damage and theft. In 1865 boatmen, pilots, and sailors in the Gulf of Nicoya were similarly regulated; see *Guild of the Gulf of Nicoya Fleet** (*Gremios de la Marina del Golfo de Nicoya*). Regulation of the all-important oxdrivers (*arrieros*) that hauled cargo among the populated central *meseta* towns and Puntarenas began in 1842 and expanded steadily as cargo volume escalated with the onset of coffee exportation directly to Europe in the 1850s. An 1860 law organized *arrieros* and cargo handlers (*cargadores*) into a mandatory guild (*Guild of Drivers and Handlers of Merchandise*,* *Gremio de Conductores y Cargadores de Mercaderías*).

Other early guilds also developed at the initiative or under the aegis of the state. An 1857 law organized physicians, pharmacists, and dentists into a *gremio* known as the Protomedical Society of the Republic* (*Protomedicato de la República*), which licensed practitioners, set prices, and promoted scientific and technical advances among health professionals. Legislation in 1895 transformed the Protomedicato into the national Faculty of Medicine, Surgery, and Pharmacy* (*Facultad de Medicina, Cirugía, y Farmacia*). In 1902 the legislature established the national College of Pharmacists* (*Colegio de Farmacéuticos*) to regulate education, licensing, and pharmaceutical practice in Costa Rica. State-sanctioned colleges of physicians and dentists eventually also grew out of the Faculty, which, through this process of dismemberment, ultimately disappeared. The first Lawyers Guild* (*Gremio de Abogados*) appeared in 1857, to be succeeded by the College of Lawyers* (*Colegio de Abogados*), created by an 1881 decree. An 1887 law established a guild of notaries and regulated notarial practice.

In summary, the government organized workers and professionals in order to protect wider societal interests from inadequacies or abuses among practitioners of particular trades. Little attention was paid to protection of the rights of workers per se, but the responsibilities and obligations of employers, clients, and workers in the various fields were often delineated in such laws. These labor guilds (e.g., *arrieros*, dockworkers) were antecedents of later mutual aid societies and modern

labor unions. The early professional guilds also established a Costa Rican pattern of state-sanctioned professional associations that has spread to more than a dozen other professions.

The second major type of working-class organization, mutual aid societies, proliferated in the last quarter of the nineteenth century in an economy increasingly subject to international market forces and the novelty of underemployment or unemployment. The mutual aid societies collected small periodic contributions from members in order to insure workers against sickness, to provide a source of credit and other improvements of workers' lives, and to defray burial costs. The artisans and laborers in these groups did not promote conflict with employers, but sought (largely unsuccessfully) to lift themselves by their collective bootstraps.

The first such group was the Societies for Assistance* (*Sociedades de Socorros*), a mutual aid organization formed in San José in 1854, of which little else is known. In 1859 reports appeared that members of the armed forces had a credit union (*caja de ahorros*). In 1874 Fr. Francisco Calvo helped establish the Artisans Society* (*Sociedad de Artesanos*) of San José, which survived until 1889.

Mutual aid groups proliferated rapidly beginning in 1888, coinciding with a period of great national turmoil. The economy suffered the first of several sharp cyclical slumps that moved urban laborers and tradesmen to take on a new political role. The first group formed in this wave was a second Artisans Society of San José (*Sociedad de Artesanos de San José*), which published a paper, had a credit union, and organized a night school and a library. In 1899, 145 San José workers founded a Society of Arts and Trades (*Sociedad de Artes y Oficios*), which established a teaching shop and a credit union. In 1890–91 similar multitrade self-help groups formed in the provincial capitals Alajuela, Cartago, and Heredia, and single trade-based societies were formed in the capital by painters, tailors, commercial employees, carpenters, plasterers, engineers and mechanics, newspaper employees, national telegraph employees, and typographers. Most of these lasted only a few years, but a few outlived the end of the century after becoming either guilds (typographers in 1888) or technical faculties (engineers in 1903).

The period of guild formation from 1888 to 1902 involved laborers and artisans much more directly in politics. The 1886 presidential election had been marked by active demonstrations by workers and artisans of their support for General Bernardo Soto. In 1889 incumbent Soto manipulated the first-stage presidential election against a candidate favored by workers, prompting a popular uprising in San José and other cities. The movement, thousands strong, caused Soto to resign and designate an acceptable interim regime. Impressed by their newfound influence on politics, artisans in early 1890 formed the Artisans Constitutional Club* (*Club Constitucional de Artesanos*) to promote the political unity and influence of workers. There is scant evidence that the club succeeded in its political goal. Of far greater impact, however, was the club's effort to promote

the formal organization of guilds as a first step toward creating a guild federation. This directly caused the formal organization of several important guilds (painters, tailors, carpenters, plasterers) in the early months of 1890 and constituted a major part of the boom in labor organization in this era.

Controversial Bishop Bernardo Augusto Thiel founded the Catholic Union Party (ca. 1890) among priests and the faithful in local parishes. Bishop Thiel, influenced by the 1891 papal encyclical *Rerum Novarum* and seeking to manipulate labor votes in order to boost Catholic Union's success in the 1893 elections, published in September 1893 a pastoral letter demanding "Fair Salaries for Laborers and Artisans." The government ordered Thiel to cease publishing "such erroneous doctrines" and "the socialist tendencies they encompass." (Backer, p. 50.) Amidst growing political turbulence, the incumbent regime fraudulently awarded the 1894 second-stage election to Rafael Yglesias, prompting an abortive revolt by Catholic Union supporters in the city of Cartago. The new Congress barred clerical participation in politics in 1895, undermining the Catholic Union Party, and Yglesias repressed much political activity, including worker participation, until near the end of his second term in 1902.

In 1901 another working-class political organization, the Workers' League* (Liga de Obreros), formed in several cities and towns. The League organized workers to support the presidential campaign of Ascención Esquivel Ibarra, who won the 1902 election. The League also elected Víctor J. Golcher a member of its board as the first labor representative to Congress, where he unsuccessfully proposed legislation to establish a system of social security and build hospitals in the banana zones.

Despite extensive labor organization and political activity among Costa Rican workers, the country's first strikes and open labor conflict involved foreign workers. Chinese, first imported in 1873 under contract to work on the railroad, experienced severe exploitation, poor working conditions, and frequent contract violations. In January 1874 a group of disgruntled Chinese workers who refused to work on a religious holiday were attacked by their Costa Rican foreman, whereupon they mutinied. Authorities killed five Chinese and wounded others, putting down the strike. Jamaican blacks and other Caribbeans, also recruited for railroad construction, mutinied at Matina in 1879 over an error in wages, and other small but violent labor conflicts took place in 1887. Perhaps in response to these early labor contract conflicts the Costa Rican penal code in 1880 made it a crime to use "fraudulent methods to alter the current price of labor."

Continued labor shortages in the Atlantic in the late 1880s led the railroad to contract some 2,000 Italians. In 1888, 1,200 of the Italians struck to protest bad food and dangerous working conditions. The strike lasted several weeks and received considerable press commentary and popular support. The railroad eventually ceded on some issues, some 800 Italians were returned to Italy, and the government permitted other Costa Ricans to hire away from the railroad unhappy strikers who wished to remain in the country. Similarly, in 1883 northern Spanish workers under labor contract to Costa Rican farmers struck over working con-

ditions and the unexpectedly harsh and insalubrious tropical climate. The government mediated and resolved the dispute by abrogating their original contracts on condition that the workers remain in Costa Rica.

With the example of foreign workers' strikes and protests, Costa Ricans themselves began to take job actions. Following a sharp budget reduction and layoff by the national telegraph system in 1883, telegraph workers struck. Although no further details of this action are known, it was a portent of future events that the first known Costa Rican strikers were public employees. In 1892, 300 workers struck a textile factory in Heredia over a lack of water at the facility. In 1894 bakers struck over the application of new health regulations and won a government concession to their position. In 1901 San José bakery workers walked out to protest increasing work loads and frozen wages. The provincial governor mediated the conflict and the strike was settled after three days.

New labor organizations formed in Costa Rica in the early years of the twentieth century due to altered working and economic conditions. The population of the populous central highlands had doubled since 1890, and the previously high demand for labor had deteriorated. The system of yeoman farming ceded more ground to export agriculture, services, and manufacturing. New manufacturing enterprises had created more proletarians. Working conditions in traditional trades had eroded as well, especially in construction. Six-day workweeks and even sixteen- to twenty-hour workdays had become common for some urban workers. Guilds and mutualist groups unsuccessfully lobbied Congress for legislation to regulate such working conditions. Tensions between workers and patrons grew steadily for the first two decades of the new century, and workers' organizations changed character.

In 1905 shoemakers, plasterers, carpenters, typographers, and bakers formed the first Costa Rican labor organizations to call themselves unions (*sindicatos*). Influenced by socialist and anarchist labor theories imported from Europe by immigrating workers, the new unions had a class-confrontation rather than mutualist orientation. The emergence of a more combative unionism did not spell the immediate end of the mutualist tradition, however, because the absence of a social security and retirement system—the conditions necessitating worker self-help—continued.

During this period two ideological perspectives still influential in Costa Rican labor organizations today gave rise to several newspapers and organizations that supported working-class interests. The social Christian tendency found its expression when in 1902 Catholic Youth of Cartago began to publish the newspaper *Social Justice* (*La Justicia Social*). This effort involved Jorge Volio, who later established his Reformist Party (Partido Reformista) upon the foundation of a major union confederation, the General Confederation of Workers* (Confederación General de Trabajadores). A Marxist tendency also developed: in 1909 a group of intellectuals, influenced by leftist ideologies from Europe and concerned about the growing plight of Costa Rican workers, formed the Workers' Society (Sociedad de Trabajadores), began to publish the *Workers' Page* (*Hoja Obrera*),

and established the Center for Social Studies, also known as the Centro Germinal, which had the purpose of "educating workers with a sociological vision"—that is, class consciousness.

The Centro Germinal in 1913 persuaded several guilds and unions to form the General Confederation of Workers (CGT). The CGT represented a qualitative change in the nature of Costa Rican labor organization; born as a wave of strikes swept Costa Rica, it deemphasized self-help and stressed class struggle, political action, and broad-scale working-class organization. The CGT sought to promote "working class solidarity and common action and defense of workers' interests in their struggle against capital." (de la Cruz, p. 84.) In addition to its confrontational rhetoric, the CGT lobbied the government for accident protection, social security, and retirement programs for workers. The CGT's optimism stands out in its own words as it convoked workers for a May Day parade in 1913; the CGT described its goals as "to protest against the exploitation, the injustice, to which workers can be and have been victims . . . it is the flowering of the hopes of better days, of new times, of peace, equality, and fraternity." (de la Cruz, p. 85.)

Times failed to improve, however, as World War I interfered with markets for Costa Rican exports and recession deepened. In 1917 a movement led by Minister of War Federico Tinoco Granados and his brother José Joaquín and backed by many important Costa Rican capitalists, overthrew President Alfredo González Flores. Labor remained uninvolved but severe speculation, and hoarding brought renewed waves of strikes, the most severe of which came in 1919 and coincided with an exile invasion that toppled the Tinocos.

The CGT gave birth in 1919 to the Socialist Center (Centro Socialista), headed by Aniceto Montero, "the first great Marxist leader of the Costa Rican labor movement." (de la Cruz, p. 101.) The CGT and the Centro Socialista helped organize and support new unions and a series of strikes in which the once mutualistic and decentralized labor movement became more oriented toward class conflict and more broadly united. Several new unions appeared in the turbulent years of 1920 and 1921: the Musicians Mutual Assistance Society* (Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de la Música), the Tax Office Employees Association (Asociación de Empleados de Tributación Directa), the Plasterers Union (Sindicato de Albañiles), the Graphic Workers Federation* (Federación Gráfica), and a workers mutual aid group in Heredia.

Another wave of important strikes occurred during the same period, one of which was Costa Rica's first general strike. In February 1920 unions demanded an eight-hour day and higher wages; the striking unions included plasterers, several railroad and Public Works Ministry craft unions, furniture makers and carpenters, National Liquor Factory employees, employees of the official newspaper *La Gaceta*, cigar makers, seamstresses, bakers, painters, and shoemakers, Gulf of Nicoya sailors, and coachmen of Limón and Puntarenas, commercial employees and cigar makers in Alajuela, and many others. In response to the general strike, the Costa Rican government set an important precedent by ex-

pressly recognizing (tacitly only, not in law) the right of workers to strike. But the government also attempted to divide the movement by demanding that strikers respect the right of nonstrikers to work if they wished. The government itself, however, was partly paralyzed by the strike, and it capitulated to workers' demands, decreeing a 20 percent wage increase and eight-hour day for public employees.

Later in 1920 a workers' protest of high sugar prices and insufficient supplies degenerated into a rock-throwing attack on the Congress. Also in 1920 United Fruit laid off many workers in the Atlantic port of Limón, prompting a general strike by some 2,500 members of the Limón Federation of Workers* (*Federación de Trabajadores de Limón*), which demanded restoration of the jobs and a 30 percent wage increase. Police reinforcements arrested union leaders. When workers responded with a violent protest, police burned the Federation's headquarters. Railroad workers then struck in sympathy, and the CGT began to raise strike support funds. The brief 1920 boundary war between Costa Rica and Panama forced an end to the strike.

The government's 1920 concessions to labor in the general strike notwithstanding, following the wave of labor unrest in the early 1920s the national Congress in 1924 revised the Costa Rican Penal Code to outlaw "concert or league with others in order to depress the freedom of supply or demand . . . in order to alter salaries." (Van de Laet, p. 38.)

The second quarter of the twentieth century was the most turbulent in Costa Rican labor history as the growing working classes experienced the economic devastation caused by the Great Depression and World War II. Labor sharply increased its political organization, and both its influence and opposition to that influence rose rapidly, eventually leading to civil war.

After its 1923 convention the CGT dissolved itself to form the Reformist Party (*Partido Reformista*), led by social-Christian ex-priest Jorge Volio. This new organization, formed after Volio won election to the Congress on a regional party slate in 1920, called for a labor code and major social reforms for the benefit of workers and for a civil service system, as well as other reforms. Volio's 1923 presidential bid failed, but the party did elect several members to Congress during the twenties. Before the party vanished in the 1930s, it had mobilized workers into the electoral arena and forged a temporary alliance between workers and reformist clergy. The Reformist Party and Volio receive credit today for paving the way for the alliance of the Church and the communist unions during the 1940s, and as the intellectual precursor of the social democratic movement and the National Liberation Party.

The great intellectual, economic, and political ferment of the late 1920s profoundly influenced the Costa Rican labor movement. Collaboration between working-class organizations and the emerging Costa Rican leftist intelligentsia received an enormous boost from Augusto Sandino's anti-imperialist struggle in Nicaragua (1927–33) and from the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. When the Reformist Party began to abandon its commitment to labor, the CGT was

reconstituted (1927). The nationalistic Civic League (formed in 1925) advocated the cause of public employees. In 1928 the Civic League brought to Costa Rica Peruvian Marxist Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, founder of the Revolutionary Popular Alliance of America (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria de America—APRA), whose visit helped crystallize a Costa Rican chapter of APRA. In 1929 leftists formed a political party called the Alliance of Workers, Peasants, and Intellectuals, and the Revolutionary Association of Worker Culture (Alianza Revolucionaria de Cultura Obrera—ARCO), a Marxist circle with many members from the Civic League, socialists, Law School, and union leadership.

In 1929 coffee and banana prices and Costa Rican exports plunged, bringing massive layoffs. In El Salvador labor and political unrest grew and in Nicaragua Sandino's war against the Americans went on. Costa Rican union leaders and intellectuals, now strongly influenced by Marxist theory, supported these movements. In March 1930 as the early effects of the world depression began to be felt in Costa Rica, *Revolution (Revolución)*, a newspaper published by the ARCO group, appeared. The heightened militancy of that era was manifested not only in ARCO but in the anti-imperialist movement of the students of the Law School. These, combined with the General Union of Workers (Unión General de Trabajadores—UGT) and the development of Aprismo, formed the social-political base which generated a Costa Rican Communist Party. Government efforts to repress leftist groups led to greater student agitation and to the formation of the Communist Party in June 1931 under the leadership of law student Manuel Mora Valverde, who remains head of the party to this day.

Labor unrest escalated rapidly in the banana zones in the early 1930s. The Communist Party began to organize banana workers in 1933 and led a massive strike against United Fruit in 1934. As one observer has written:

The social problem (in the banana zones) had especially poignant qualities. The United Fruit Company was a power unto itself, and its area was . . . a colony where many of the characteristics of United States imperialism, on which Communist propaganda often dwells, were exemplified. . . . The workers . . . suffered daily injustice and hardship. Racial discrimination and discrimination by national origin were the order of the day, . . . living conditions were harsh, and summary dismissal was a constant threat. . . . To many of the workers living in the unhealthy and alien conditions of the camps, the Communist interpretation of the class struggle made unusually good sense and, consequently, the movement flourished. (Bell, pp. 24–25)

The Communist Party subsequently enjoyed great success among banana workers as well as other laborers. In the absence of a strong national labor confederation in the wake of the Reformist Party's absorption of the CGT, the communists founded the Confederation of Costa Rican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Costa Rica—CTCR), which united numerous unions and grew steadily. Labor unrest intensified in the mid- and late 1930s, with several violent incidents involving demonstrations and strikes. The CTCR was so successful in winning affiliates that the banana company, the government, and the

Church would all eventually promote unions of their own in order to counteract communist influence.

The devastating misery afflicting Costa Rica's lower classes during the Depression eventually united the social Christian and labor movements behind the populist political movement led by the coffee aristocrat and Republican Party president Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia (1940–44). When Calderón, a social Christian, persuaded the Congress to establish a sweeping social security program in 1941, he was attacked by his former allies among the economic elite. Archbishop Víctor Manuel Sanabria, of similar ideological orientation, supported the government's program. Sanabria and Communist Party head Manuel Mora agreed that their goals for the working class were similar and jointly backed Calderón's reforms. Thus politically reinforced against the upper class, Calderón subsequently implemented other major reforms long demanded by the labor movement, including a labor code that recognized the right to organize, minimum wage, and collective bargaining. The 1941 Labor Code thus overrode the 1880 and 1824 prohibitions against unions and strikes; while recognizing the right to a legal strike, it also barred forcing others to take part in a strike.

Calderón forged his popular base by allying with the Communist Party, formally known as the Workers and Peasants Bloc (*Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos*). Renamed the Popular Vanguard (*Partido Vanguardia Popular*) in 1943, the communists played a key role in the government of Calderón's successor, Teodoro Picado (1944–48). The Costa Rican labor movement (particularly the Vanguard-dominated CTCR) attained the apogee of its political power from 1942 to 1948, but opposition from conservative interests escalated rapidly.

Though formally allied with Vanguard, Archbishop Sanabria instructed Father Benjamin Nuñez to begin organizing Catholic unions, which he did with much success. In 1945 the Costa Rican Workers Confederation "*Rerum Novarum*"* (*Confederación Costarricense de Trabajadores "Rerum Novarum"*—CCTR) was formed, bringing together many unions and federations into an organization with an estimated 5,000 members. The CCTR cooperated with the CTCR during the Picado government, but it eventually became a directly competing, anti-communist union confederation.

As opposition to the Picado government grew, the Popular Vanguard and its unions began to employ political intimidation and violence to protect their newfound power and policy gains. One consequence of this tactic was to inflame their opponents. A leading force in the opposition, anti-communist social democrats led by José Figueres Ferrer, allied with the right and became increasingly violent after 1946. When Congress attempted a fraud in the 1948 election, Figueres pronounced against the government as head of a "National Liberation Revolution."

The resultant 1948 civil war lasted only forty days but took some 2,000 lives. Popular Vanguard, under the leadership of Manuel Mora Valverde, mobilized CTCR laborers to support Picado's 300-man army but soon lost the military initiative. Figueres and Mora soon negotiated a settlement in which a Liberation

junta would take power but would protect workers' jobs and their new legal rights. This promise was largely kept, but during the eighteen-month rule of the Liberation junta, labor minister Benjamin Nuñez undertook to dismantle the CTCR. The courts dissolved the Popular Vanguard Party and the CTCR in order to break the power of the communists over the labor movement.

Father Nuñez's exit from the Costa Rican Workers Confederation "*Rerum Novarum*" to serve as labor minister in the Liberation junta initiated a period of internal division and decline in the Catholic labor movement. Many of the confederation's top leaders followed Nuñez to the emergent National Liberation Party (Partido Liberación Nacional—PLN), and internal disputes and personal conflicts divided the CCTRN. In 1950 several unions and a leadership faction were expelled from the CCTRN and formed a short-lived Peronist (after Argentine President Juan Perón) confederation. Nuñez persuaded the CCTRN to formally ally itself with the PLN in the early 1950s, but middle-class preeminence within the party leadership meant that little attention was paid to working-class unions. Moreover, the confederation began to collaborate with the U.S.-backed American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) and Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), engendering considerable criticism from the left. Under a new, more conservative archbishop in the early 1950s, relations between the CCTRN and the Church eroded so badly that the confederation formally severed its ties with the Church in 1955.

By the late 1950s the CCTRN had substantially shrunk in membership to about 4,000. The organization converted itself into the Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation* (Confederación Costarricense de Trabajadores Democráticos—CCTD) in 1966, keeping its much criticized affiliation with the U.S.-backed AIFLD and ORIT. The CCTD, supported by Liberation governments and having fully severed its ties to the Christian labor movement, recovered membership so that by 1971 it claimed some 8,500 members. Alleged interference in the CCTD by its ORIT-AIFLD advisers and the U.S. labor attachés caused dissidents to form the Authentic Confederation of Democratic Workers* (Confederación Auténtica de Trabajadores Democráticos—CATD) in 1971. The CATD, concentrated mainly in the San José area and including several public sector unions (teachers, nurses), renounced any external ties or influence.

The Communist Party and the CTCR, although declared illegal by the Costa Rican courts, were too large and important to repress completely. Indeed, by 1953 they won legal status from the Ministry of Labor for the General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers* (Confederación General de Trabajadores Costarricenses—CGTC), which consisted largely of agricultural unions and developed its greatest strength in the southwestern banana zones, Puntarenas, and in the Atlantic zone, which eventually came to dominate much of the work force of the United Fruit Company. Although the CCTD formed competing unions in the banana industry, the CGTC eventually absorbed many of them; the CGTC had approximately 4,000 members in 1957 and had grown to roughly

5,900 members by 1971. The CGTC has consistently sought, with some success, to cooperate with other Costa Rican unions in wider working-class organizations.

Yet another union confederation emerged from the wreckage of the Church-CCTRN relationship, and from the Catholic Worker Youth (Juventud Obrera Católica—JOC) and rural Community Progress Committees (Juntas Progresistas), both of the latter products of Archbishop Sanabria's Catholic Action social programs. The Costa Rican Workers and Peasants Front (Frente de Obreros y Campesinos Costarricenses—FOCC), constituted in 1964 at the initiative of the social Christian CLASC (Latin American Confederation of Christian Unionists, Confederación Latino Americana de Sindicalistas Cristianos), changed its self-designation to Confederation (COCC) in 1967. Despite religious involvement in its formation, COCC remained formally independent of the Church. COCC's greatest early success lay in the organization of *campesinos*, which prompted competition from other unions. The COCC had approximately 2,000 members in 1971. In 1972 the growth of the nonpeasant, nonproletarian affiliates of the COCC led to another name change, to the Costa Rican Workers Central* (Central de Trabajadores Costarricenses—CTC).

To complete the picture of great decentralization and fragmentation of the post-1950 Costa Rican labor movement, one must turn to other, independent, unions. In addition to the four major confederations (CGTC, CCTD, CATD, CTC), which included over 16,000 members and roughly some 100 individual unions, in 1971 there were nearly 190 independent unions with a total of roughly 20,000 members. In other words, some 56 percent of the organized Costa Rican work force belonged to unions not affiliated with either the social democratic, communist, or social Christian confederations. These tended to be concentrated in the public sector (ministry and autonomous agency employees, teachers, public employees, health professionals) and to represent middle-class employees. Some of the independent unions are among the oldest and most respected national labor organizations (including teachers) or most strategically located in the public sector services (telephone and electrical, water, public works, and railroad workers, for example), giving each of these organizations considerable bargaining power due to an ability to interrupt key public services. A good example of this power occurred in 1980, when a revenue shortfall forced the government to delay negotiated wage increases to many public employees. The threatened strike by the major teachers union, National Educators Association* (Asociación Nacional de Educadores—ANDE), and several other public sector unions would have paralyzed the nation. This prompted President Rodrigo Carazo (1978–82) to decree tax reforms under emergency powers in order to finance the wage package and thus head off the strike.

Falling coffee prices and substantial inflation increased worker dissatisfaction in the late 1970s, apparently predisposing Costa Rican labor leaders to seek to increase labor's political power. This developed in 1979–80 into a major effort to unify the long-divided Costa Rican labor movement. The first discussions involved the CGTC, CCTD, CATD, and CTC, as well as several independent

public sector and private sector unions. The CGTC's effort to control the process led to the withdrawal of the CCTD, but several unions did form the Unitary Workers Confederation* (Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores—CUT). Leadership of CUT was heavily influenced by CGTC and the Communist Party. CUT did not win the affiliation of the major independent unions, although its base was broader than that of CGTC alone. CUT's major action came in 1982 in a sixty-seven-day strike against Bananera de Costa Rica, an affiliate of BANCOCODECO Del Monte, which was eventually broken without a wage increase. The government did negotiate the reinstatement of many fired workers and some back pay, but the reversal for CUT led to a leadership shakeup.

Bibliography

- Backer, James. *La iglesia y el sindicalismo en Costa Rica*. San José: Editorial Costa Rica, 1978.
- Bell, John Patrick. *Crisis in Costa Rica: The Revolution of 1948*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971.
- Chacon Leon, Edwin. *El Sindicalismo en Costa Rica*. San José: Centro de Estudios Laborales, 1980.
- de la Cruz, Vladimir. *Las luchas sociales en Costa Rica*. San José: Editorial Costa Rica, Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica, 1980.
- Dammers, Kim. "An Introduction to the Labor Union Movement of Costa Rica." Associated Colleges of the Midwest, Central America Field Program, San José, 1965.
- Fallas Monge, Carlos Luís. *El movimiento obrero en Costa Rica: 1830–1902*. San José: Editorial Universidad Nacional a Distancia, 1983.
- Laat, Bernardo Van de. *La huelga y el paro en Costa Rica*. San José: Editorial Juricentro, 1979.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. *Peasants of Costa Rica and the Development of Agrarian Capitalism*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ANDE. *See* National Educators Association.

ANEP. *See* National Public Employees Association.

APSE. *See* Association of Secondary Education Professors.

ARTISANS CONSTITUTIONAL CLUB (Club Constitucional de Artesanos).

In the wake of heavy involvement by artisans in the 1889 presidential contest, artisans in 1890 formed this short-lived Club to promote increased political unity and influence among workers. The Club published a newsletter, *The Democrat* (*El Demócrata*). One action of the organization was to attempt to organize San José's artisans into formal guilds which would then affiliate into a general artisans

confederation. Although this organizational effort did not bear fruit, it did help promote the formation of the numerous guilds and artisans' mutual aid societies that developed in Costa Rica in the 1890s.

ARTISANS SOCIETY (*Sociedad de Artesanos*).

Formed by Fr. Francisco Calvo, this early mutual aid society (1874–89) collected small contributions from worker members to provide some insurance for disability and burial expenses.

ASOCIACIÓN DE EMPLEADOS DE TRIBUTACIÓN DIRECTA. *See* Association of Tax Office Employees.

ASOCIACIÓN DE PROFESORES DE SEGUNDA ENSEÑANZA. *See* Association of Secondary Education Professors.

ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE EDUCADORES. *See* National Educators Association.

ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE EMPLEADOS PÚBLICOS. *See* National Public Employees Association.

ASOCIACIÓN SINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES DE AGUA Y ACANTARRILLADOS. *See* Union of Water and Sewer Institute Workers.

ASOCIACIÓN TIPOGRÁFICO (Typographers Association). *See* Typographers Guild.

ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY EDUCATION PROFESSORS (*Asociación de Profesores de Segunda Enseñanza—APSE*).

This association developed in 1955 as an offshoot of the major teachers organization, the National Educators Association,* due to the latter's insufficient attention to the needs of secondary schoolteachers and to a possible leadership conflict. APSE admitted as members not only titled teachers but untitled teachers and other school employees. With perhaps 5,000 members in 1980, APSE was technically an association rather than a union. APSE nevertheless has collectively bargained on salaries, lobbied for benefits, participated in the Teachers Unity Front,* and threatened to take part in an August 1980 general strike involving many public sector unions over unpaid wage increases.

ASSOCIATION OF TAX OFFICE EMPLOYEES (*Asociación de Empleados de Tributación Directa*).

This union, one of the oldest public employees groups in Costa Rica, formed in 1920 during a period of great labor unrest. It has remained independent; in 1979 it had some 363 members.

ATLANTIC BANANA WORKERS UNION (Unión de Trabajadores Bananeros del Atlántico—UTBA).

Affiliated initially with the Christian union movement (see Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation), this banana workers union split with the Christian confederation and joined the independent Authentic Confederation of Democratic Workers* (CATD) in 1971. The UTBA, however, later withdrew from the CATD and became independent. The UTBA had about 355 members in 1979; it was one of numerous unions representing workers in the banana and oil palm industries.

AUTHENTIC CONFEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC WORKERS (Confederación Auténtica de Trabajadores Democráticos—CATD).

The Authentic Confederation of Democratic Workers shares the origins of the Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation* (CCTD), originating in the Catholic Church's labor-organizing effort that created the Costa Rican Workers Confederation "Rerum Novarum,"* renamed the CCTD. In 1971 a severe leadership split within the CCTD, stemming partly from personal differences among leaders, a financial crisis, and discrepancies over membership in the U.S.-backed American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) and Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) led to the departure from the parent union of several leaders and federations. Ernesto Ortiz Mora and Alvaro Jiménez Zavaleta founded the CATD, which received formal legal recognition from the Ministry of Labor in 1972. The CATD pledged itself to accept no external affiliation or funding, a factor credited with its reportedly chronic financial difficulties.

The CATD originally consisted of unions of food, drink, and hotel workers, nurses aides, independent transit workers, and the Atlantic Banana Workers Union* (UTBA). The UTBA eventually dropped out of the CATD, leaving the organization seriously weakened. In 1979, however, the CATD's membership rose precipitously with the affiliation of the 5,000-member Costa Rican Educators Union,* which had split off from the main national teachers union in 1969. The CATD joined the Unitary Workers Confederation* (CUT) in 1980 and remained affiliated even after several other participants withdrew due to the early dominance of the CUT by the communist-led General Workers Confederation.*

CABINETMAKERS AND CARPENTERS UNION (Sindicato de Ebanistas y Carpinteros).

Carpenters were among the first (1905) Costa Rican workers to abandon the mutual aid style of organization and form a class-conscious union (the Carpenters Union, Sindicato de Carpinteros). The Carpenters Union was probably one of several groups that formally organized the Cabinetmakers and Carpenters Union in early 1920, incorporating members from both trades. The motive for organization was unsatisfied wage demands. In 1920 the union affiliated with and

played a leading role in the General Confederation of Workers* and struck numerous jobs in 1920 as part of a wave of strikes among many trade unions. By the late 1970s the apparent successor to this tradition was the National Union of Construction, Wood, and Building Materials Workers, a leftist General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers* affiliate with over 600 members.

CARPENTERS GUILD (Gremio de Carpinteros).

This guild was formally established in 1890 after the Artisans Constitutional Club* (Club Constitucional de Artesanos), a political group, promoted guild formation as a first step toward building an artisans confederation. The guild apparently survived until around 1905, when the Carpenters Union was established. See Cabinetmakers and Carpenters Union.

CATD. *See* Authentic Democratic Workers Confederation.

CCTD. *See* Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation.

CCTRN. *See* Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation.

CENTRAL DE TRABAJADORES COSTARRICENSES. *See* Costa Rican Workers Central.

CGT. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

CGTC. *See* General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers.

CHRISTIAN WORKERS AND PEASANTS CONFEDERATION. *See* Confederation of Costa Rican Workers.

CLUB CONSTITUCIONAL DE ARTESANOS. *See* Artisans Constitutional Club.

CNT. *See* Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation.

COCC. *See* Confederation of Costa Rican Workers.

COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS. *See* College of Lawyers.

COLEGIO DE FARMACEÚTICOS. *See* College of Pharmacists.

COLEGIO DE MÉDICOS Y CIRUJANOS. *See* College of Physicians and Surgeons.

COLEGIO DE PERIODISTAS. *See* College of Journalists.

COLLEGE OF JOURNALISTS (Colegio de Periodistas).

This professional college was legally constituted in 1969 by the national Legislative Assembly; its organic law was revised in 1974. The College regulates access to the professions of journalism and public relations, and promotes the professional interests of its members. A national controversy arose in 1980 over a provision of the organic law that permitted licensing of journalism graduates of the University of Costa Rica or foreign journalism programs, but not graduates of a new Costa Rican private university. A graduate of the private program working as a reporter challenged that provision of the College's organic law as an unconstitutional abridgement of free expression, but eventually lost in the courts.

COLLEGE OF LAWYERS (Colegio de Abogados).

This state-sanctioned (via 1881 and 1883 presidential decrees) organization is the Costa Rican professional college of attorneys or bar association, incorporating the earlier Lawyers Guild.* In addition to serving as a professional association representing the interests of attorneys, the College has the responsibility for supervision of the national law school, licensing attorneys, and study and advice to the state on matters of jurisprudence and legislation. It carries out the same general functions today.

COLLEGE OF PHARMACISTS (Colegio de Farmaceúticos).

Established by the National Congress in 1902 as a specialized offshoot of the Faculty of Medicine, Surgery, and Pharmacy,* the College both licenses pharmacists and pharmacies and acts as the professional association of its members. Membership in 1980 was approximately 982.

COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS (Colegio de Médicos y Cirujanos).

Established by law by the National Congress in 1940 as an offshoot of the Faculty of Medicine, Surgery, and Pharmacy,* the College has the function of representing the professional interests of physicians and surgeons, as well as overseeing medical education and the licensing of medical practitioners and related professionals and technicians. In 1977 the College had as members 1,449 physicians and surgeons and 470 other professionals and technicians. In 1944 physicians employed by the national health system formed the National Medical Union* to deal as a union with special issues of working within the public sector.

COMITÉ DE UNIDAD SINDICAL. *See* Labor Unity Committee.**CONFEDERACIÓN AUTÉNTICA DE TRABAJADORES DEMOCRÁTICOS.**
See Authentic Confederation of Democratic Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN COSTARRICENSE DE TRABAJADORES DEMOCRÁTICOS. *See* Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN COSTARRICENSE DE TRABAJADORES “RERUM NOVARUM” (Costa Rican Workers Confederation “Rerum Novarum”). *See* Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE OBREROS Y CAMPESINOS CRISTIANOS COSTARRICENSES. *See* Confederation of Costa Rican Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES COSTARRICENSES. *See* Confederation of Costa Rican Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE COSTA RICA (CTCR). *See* General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES COSTARRICENSES. *See* General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES (National Workers Confederation). *See* Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN UNITARIA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Unitary Workers Confederation.

CONFEDERATION OF COSTA RICAN WORKERS (Confederación de Trabajadores Costarricenses—CTC).

This organization dates from the 1960s when the Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation finally broke definitively with the Church. Costa Rica's second Christian labor confederation's organizers came from backgrounds in the Catholic Worker Youth (Juventud Obrera Católica—JOC) and rural Community Progress Committees (Juntas Progresistas), both movements within Archbishop Sanabria's Catholic Action social programs. The Costa Rican Christian Workers and Peasants Front (Frente de Obreros y Campesinos Costarricenses—FOCC) was constituted in 1964 at the prompting of the international Christian union organization, the Latin American Confederation of Christian Unionists (Confederación Latino Americano de Sindicalistas Cristianos—CLASC). FOCC changed its name from Front to Confederation (COCC) in 1967.

Despite religious involvement in its formation, COCC remained formally independent of the Church. COCC's early success lay in the organization of peasants, including small truck, coffee, and cane farmers and agricultural workers

in various areas of the central highlands. COCC also won affiliations from unions representing public employees in several national and municipal agencies (transport, capital area municipalities). The COCC had approximately 2,000 members in 1971.

In 1972 the addition of nonpeasant, nonproletarian affiliates of the COCC led to another name change to the Costa Rican Workers Central (CTC). By 1979 the CTC had added affiliates among several more transport-related trades, and several hospital workers unions for a total of twenty-nine, and had a total membership of about 3,500.

In 1980 the CTC took part in the discussions of the Labor Unity Committee* that gave rise to Unitary Workers Confederation* (CUT), but like the CCTD withdrew in protest of quickly established dominance and, under the leadership of general secretary Alsimiro Herrera, opened an "anti-communist offensive" of criticism of the CUT.

COSTA RICAN CHRISTIAN WORKERS AND PEASANTS FRONT (Frente de Obreros y Campesinos Costarricenses). *See* Costa Rican Workers Central.

COSTA RICAN DEMOCRATIC WORKERS CONFEDERATION (Confederación Costarricense de Trabajadores Democráticos—CCTD).

The Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation's distant roots go back to the social Christian movement of the early twentieth century, but the organization first appeared under the name Costa Rican Workers Confederation "Rerum Novarum" (Confederación Costarricense de Trabajadores "Rerum Novarum"—CCTRN), begun in 1943 as a drive to organize Christian labor unions undertaken by the Catholic Action movement at the initiative of reformist Archbishop Víctor Manuel Sanabria. At that time the Catholic Church was collaborating with the Communist Party and its union confederation, the General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers* (CGTC), in support of the populist reform government of President Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia. Despite this collaboration, the CCTRN was clearly intended to win union support away from the CGCT. The CCTRN, led for several years by priest Benjamin Núñez, won formal legal status in 1945.

During the 1948 civil war, the CCTRN supported the National Liberation movement, and Núñez became Minister of Labor. He was succeeded as president of the CCTRN by Luis Alberto Monge Alvarez, who later became president of Costa Rica (1982–86). During the early 1950s the ties between the CCTRN, affiliated with the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), backed by the AFL–CIO and the Agency for International Development of the U.S. government, became stronger. Overall, the decade following the civil war was one of decline for the CCTRN. A first major split involved the separation of several confederations to create the National Workers Confederation, a short-lived Peronist (after Argentine President

Juan Perón) federation. In 1958 the CCTRN's largest affiliate, the 3,000-member National Public Works Federation (FENTROP) and the eight-union Agrarian Federation also withdrew from the federation.

In 1966 the CCTRN completely severed its Christian labor movement ties and changed its name to the Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation (CCTD). It began a slow recovery of membership, interrupted in 1971 by the splitting off of several unions and leaders unhappy about CCTD to form the Authentic Confederation of Democratic Workers* (CATD). Recovery continued during the 1970s, however; the CCTD grew to thirty-five unions with over 15,000 members by 1979. In 1980 the CCTD initially joined a Labor Unity Committee* aimed at forging a single national confederation, but soon withdrew to protest an alleged effort by the communist General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers* to dominate the new federation's board.

In 1980 the CCTD's affiliate unions included employees of several government agencies (both national and municipal development, commodities distribution, and refinery employees), technicians of several kinds (laboratory employees, telecommunications and electrical workers), railroad and port workers, and one banana workers union.

COSTA RICAN EDUCATORS UNION (Sindicato de Educadores Costarricenses—SEC).

The Costa Rican Educators Union appeared in 1969 as an independent labor union, at first consisting mainly of rural teachers. Previously, the only significant teachers organization was the National Educators Association* (ANDE), which had since its founding in 1942 considered itself a professional association. Although rural teachers, less likely to hold academic titles and subject to lower salaries and less attractive working conditions than urban teachers, made up the bulk of SEC's initial membership, it eventually attracted a cross section of teachers dissatisfied with ANDE's conservatism. By 1979 SEC's membership had grown to 5,300. SEC was independent for several years; its leadership became gradually more leftist, but the union eventually affiliated with the social democratic splinter group, the Authentic Confederation of Democratic Workers.* In the late 1970s SEC and ANDE feuded bitterly, but both eventually joined a common front known as Teachers Unity Front* to negotiate with the government.

COSTA RICAN MUSICAL UNION. *See* Musicians Mutual Assistance Society.

COSTA RICAN WORKERS CONFEDERATION “RERUM NOVARUM.”
See Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation.

CTC. *See* Confederation of Costa Rican Workers.

CTCR. *See* General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers.

CUS. *See* Labor Unity Committee.

CUT. *See* Unitary Workers Confederation.

FACULTAD DE MEDICINA, CIRUGÍA, Y FARMACIA. *See* Faculty of Medicine, Surgery, and Pharmacy.

FACULTY OF MEDICINE, SURGERY, AND PHARMACY (Facultad de Medicina, Cirugía, y Farmacia).

Established in 1895 by the Congress in a reorganization and amplification of the Protomedical Society of the Republic,* the Faculty continued its predecessor's roles as both professional college and state regulatory agency for the medical professions, and added the functions of training physicians, surgeons, and pharmacists and overseeing general matters of public health. Out of the Faculty eventually developed state-sanctioned professional colleges of physicians, pharmacists, and dentists. *See* College of Pharmacists and College of Physicians and Surgeons.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LIMÓN. *See* Limón Federation of Workers.

FEDERACIÓN GRÁFICA. *See* Graphic Workers Federation.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DE LOS SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS. *See* National Federation of Public Service Workers.

FENATRAP. *See* National Federation of Public Service Workers.

FOCC. *See* Confederation of Costa Rican Workers.

FRENTE DE OBREROS Y CAMPESINOS CRISTIANOS (Costa Rican Christian Workers and Peasants Front). *See* Confederation of Costa Rican Workers.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF COSTA RICAN WORKERS (Confederación General de Trabajadores Costarricenses—CGTC).

The origin of the General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers is that of the Communist Party of Costa Rica; both sprang from a tradition of leftist intellectual organization and labor militancy dating from the early twentieth century. The Communist Party (then called the Workers and Peasants Bloc, *Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos*) was founded in 1930 under the leadership of Manuel Mora Valverde; it actively organized Atlantic zone banana workers and led the massive 1933 banana strike. Out of the strike grew the Communist Party-led Confederation of Costa Rican Workers (CTCR). In addition to CTCR's great success in organizing banana workers, it won many affiliates among other At-

lantic zone workers (such as stevedores, railroad workers, and public employees) and successfully followed the United Fruit Company when it moved to the southern Pacific area around Golfito. Among the early other affiliates of the CTCR were older unions heavily influenced by Marxist ideology, like the National Union of Shoe and Leather Workers* and the Typographers Union.*

In collaboration with the Communist Party (which changed its name to the Popular Vanguard Party (Partido de Vanguardia Popular) in 1943 the CTCR allied with Archbishop Sanabria and the newly organized Christian union movement, the Costa Rican Workers Confederation “*Rerum Novarum*,” to support the government of Presidents Calderón Guardia and Picado from 1942 to 1948. On the losing side of the 1948 civil war, the CTCR and some of its affiliates were disbanded by the victorious National Liberation Party junta and the courts. By 1953, however, both the Popular Vanguard Party (renamed the Socialist Action Party, Partido de Acción Socialista—PASO) and its union confederation, rechristened the General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers (CGTC), regained legal status. By the late 1950s the CGTC had 4,000 members, a number which rose to around 6,000 by 1971. The CGTC regained much of the strength of the old CTCR in Atlantic and Pacific zone fruit company unions. It also organized many new groups of peasant small holders, industrial workers, public employees, and construction and transport workers. In 1979 the CGTC had thirty-four constituent unions with nearly 20,000 members; its greatest relative strength and number of affiliates were found in the provinces where the banana industry and fruit companies operate—Limón and Puntarenas. The CGTC affiliated with the World Union Federation (Federación Sindical Mundial) and continued to share many top leaders with the Costa Rican Communist Party.

In 1980 the CGTC led in the effort to form a single national labor confederation by taking part in the Labor Unity Committee* organizing effort and later the Unitary Workers Confederation* (CUT), coming to dominate the leadership of the latter. Although all of the major labor confederations took part in early conversations toward unification, only the Authentic Confederation of Democratic Workers* remained allied to the CGTC in the Unitary Workers Confederation after 1980. The CGTC and CUT were intensely criticized by the Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation* and Costa Rican Workers Central* for their heavy communist influence in the wake of this episode. In 1981 the CGTC-CUT affiliate of BANDECO (Del Monte) workers struck for sixty-seven days. CUT calls for sympathy strikes and boycotts failed, as did the strike itself. The old CUT leadership was subsequently purged in a move led by Isaias Marchena.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederación General de Trabajadores—CGT).

This confederation was founded during a wave of strikes in 1913 when the leftist Centro Germinal persuaded several guilds and early unions to affiliate. Costa Rica’s first modern confederation of labor unions, the CGT deemphasized

the previous mutualistic approach to working-class organization and concentrated on promoting working-class solidarity, political organization, and "struggle against capital." The CGT proved instrumental in organizing numerous unions in the 1913–23 period, and was deeply involved in the first two general strikes in Costa Rica, both in 1920. At its 1923 national convention the CGT dissolved and reconstituted itself as the Reformist Party (Partido Reformista), led by presidential candidate Jorge Volio. The Reformist Party and Volio proved ineffective in promoting worker interests, so that the CGT was reorganized as a labor confederation *per se* in 1927. Largely ineffective in its second period of existence, the CGT was one of several organizations whose leaders gave rise to the Communist Party (founded in 1930). As such, it is a direct precursor of the communist Confederation of Costa Rican Workers, which in 1953 resuscitated the old name, General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers.*

GRAPHIC WORKERS FEDERATION (Federación Gráfica). *See* Typographers Union.

GREMIO DE ABOGADOS. *See* Lawyers Guild.

GREMIO DE ALBAÑILES. *See* Plasterers Guild.

GREMIO DE CARPINTEROS. *See* Carpenters Guild.

GREMIO DE CONDUCTORES Y CARGADORES DE MERCADERÍAS. *See* Guild of Drivers and Handlers of Merchandise.

GREMIO DE LA MARINA DEL GOLFO DE NICOYA. *See* Guild of the Gulf of Nicoya Fleet.

GREMIO DE MINEROS. *See* Miners Guild.

GREMIO DE OBREROS. *See* Workers League.

GREMIO DE TIPÓGRAFOS. *See* Typographers Guild.

GREMIOS DEL PUERTO DE PUNTARENAS. *See* Guilds of the Port of Puntarenas.

GUILD OF DRIVERS AND HANDLERS OF MERCHANDISE (Gremio de Conductores y Cargadores de Mercaderías).

An 1860 decree created this guild and established licensing and regulations for oxcart drivers (*arrieros*) and cargo handlers. Membership was mandatory, for its main purpose was to regulate the all-important hauling trade for the protection of merchants. Additional legislation in 1885 amplified the initial reg-

ulation, but by the early twentieth century the advent of the railroads from the capital to both coasts, better roads, and automobiles rapidly reduced the guild's size and importance.

GUILD OF THE GULF OF NICOYA FLEET (Gremio de la Marina del Golfo de Nicoya).

The government in its 1865 Regulation for the Gulf of Nicoya fleet established mandatory guilds and registration for sailors (*marineros*), pilots (*pilotos*), and masters (*patrones*) as part of a general law regulating maritime commerce in the Nicoya Gulf waters surrounding the Puntarenas port.

GUILDS OF THE PORT OF PUNTARENAS (Gremios del Puerto de Puntarenas).

Government initiative (the 1846 Law for the Government of the Ports) established four mandatory guilds, one each for cargo handlers (*cargadores*), boatmen (*lancheros*), laborers (*peones*), and artisans (including carpenters, blacksmiths, and plasterers) working at the nation's principal seaport.

LABOR UNITY COMMITTEE (Comité de United Sindical—CUS).

The communist-led General Workers Confederation* (CGTC) convened the CUS in 1980 for the purpose of promoting a single national labor confederation in reaction to declining living standards caused by high inflation and to perceived anti-union pressures by the administration of President Rodrigo Carazo Odio. Early moves by the CGTC to dominate the CUS led to the withdrawal of the social democratic Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation,* the Christian Costa Rican Workers Central,* and several independent unions. Out of the CUS effort was born the Unitary Workers Confederation* (CUT) of which the CGTC and the splinter social democratic Authentic Democratic Workers Confederation* were the major members. When the CUT formed, the CUS dissolved.

LAWYERS GUILD (Gremio de Abogados).

This guild came into being in 1857 via a presidential decree establishing and regulating the national Court of Justice. The decree required membership in the guild as a condition for licensure to practice. The guild operated until 1881 when it was incorporated into the national College of Lawyers* by presidential decree.

LIMÓN FEDERATION OF WORKERS (Federación de Trabajadores de Limón).

Organized around 1915, this union of black workers in the Limón Port affiliated with the General Confederation of Workers* (CGT) in 1920. It called a general strike of all workers in Limón in January 1921 following a large layoff by the United Fruit Company. The general strike lasted twenty-two days and was spreading to Northern Railroad's unions when the brief boundary war with Panama

erupted. The CGT and Limón Federation suspended the strike in support of national security.

MAESTROS UNIDOS (Teachers Unified). *See* National Educators Association.

MINERS GUILD (Gremio de Mineros).

This was the first guild formed in Costa Rica (1830), at the initiative of the state, to regulate labor supply and conditions in the Aguacate mines. Not a voluntary labor union in the modern sense, it was established by law, and membership (registration) was mandatory for miners, engineers, and mine owners.

MUSICIANS MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SOCIETY (Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de la Música).

This union and mutual aid society formed in 1920 and quickly succeeded in organizing most professional musicians. Its contemporary successor is the 560-member Costa Rican Musical Union, affiliated with the social democratic Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation.*

NATIONAL BANK OF COSTA RICA EMPLOYEES UNION (Sindicato de Empleados del Banco de Costa Rica).

This union's 1,800 members (1979) work for the Costa Rican Central Bank. It is affiliated with the social democratic Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation* and is one of several unions of employees of Costa Rica's nationalized banks.

NATIONAL EDUCATORS ASSOCIATION (Asociación Nacional de Educadores—ANDE).

Technically a professional association rather than a union, ANDE developed a reputation for conservatism that spawned several competing teachers organizations (see Association of Secondary Education Professors and Costa Rican Educators Union). ANDE grew out of Teachers United (Maestros Unidos), a group formed in 1936 to provide professional training and cultural development to teachers, to press for improved salaries and working conditions, and to provide mutual self-help. In 1942 Teachers United disbanded and passed its records on to the emergent ANDE, which was established by statute in 1943.

ANDE, with many teachers as members nationwide from the very outset, developed a professional orientation but also sought to improve the economic and social welfare and working conditions of teachers. Although long viewed as conservative, ANDE called strikes in 1955 (over salaries) and 1973 (over a new education code and salaries). It has also constantly lobbied the Ministry of Education and the Legislative Assembly in pursuit of its goals. The membership of ANDE in 1980 was about 24,000, perhaps 70 percent of Costa Rican teachers. ANDE feuded intensely with the Costa Rican Educators Union in the 1970s,

but joined it and the Association of Secondary Education Professors in the Teachers Unity Front* in the late 1970s. ANDE led the threatened 1980 strike over unpaid back raises that forced the administration of President Rodrigo Carazo (1978–82) to decree new taxes to fund public employees' salaries.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE WORKERS (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de los Servicios Públicos—FENATRAP).

This federation originated in the mid-1970s following the 1974 and 1975 strikes against the national telephone and electrical service, the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad—ICE). Employees of ICE were led by a charismatic leftist Mário Devandas, who later played a major role in organizing FENATRAP; Devandas also appeared to play important roles in the 1979 strike by national hospital and health service workers and in the disturbances and strikes in the Atlantic zone in August 1979. Despite early competition with the National Public Employees Association,* FENATRAP has generally cooperated with the other great public service employees union in policy demands.

NATIONAL GRAPHIC AND PRESS WORKERS UNION (Unión Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria Gráfica y de la Prensa). *See* Typographers Union.

NATIONAL MEDICAL UNION (Unión Médica Nacional).

This independent union of physicians and surgeons employed by the national health system was founded in 1944 to pursue labor and other professional goals not adequately supported by the National College of Physicians and Surgeons. In 1979 the union, with some 1,400 members, employed a series of brief strikes to win salary increases from the Social Security (health) system. In 1982 the union again struck for salaries, this time for several weeks.

NATIONAL PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (Asociación Nacional de Empleados Públicos—ANEP).

The Association's membership in 1979 was around 11,000, making it the largest registered union in Costa Rica. ANEP, founded in 1961, originated in the dissatisfaction of public employees with salaries and benefits following the passage of Costa Rica's 1953 Civil Service Law. Its organizational antecedents included unions formed in the 1950s among employees of the ministries of Labor and Social Welfare and among postal workers. The union initially had close ties to the social democratic Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation,* but remained formally independent and has concentrated on organizing public employees in the traditional central government ministries, in contrast to employees of decentralized (autonomous) bureaucracies.

ANEP's major goals have been to improve public employees' salaries, to establish permanently the *aguinaldo*—a "thirteenth month" end-of-year salary bonus—and to win government recognition of automatic salary adjustments for

inflation. Although public employees strikes are illegal, ANEP struck in 1963 (over the *aguinaldo*), 1969 (over salaries), 1970 (over salaries and to protest a government aluminum mining contract with ALCOA), and 1979 (over salaries).

In the mid-1970s there appeared a competing organization led by the charismatic leftist Mário Devandas, the National Federation of Public Service Workers* (FENATRAP). FENATRAP grew out of Devandas' leadership of the 1974 and 1975 strikes by employees of the national telecommunications and electrical service and grew rapidly in public sector union affiliations. At ANEP's second congress in 1975, the organization responded to FENATRAP's challenge from the left by moving leftward itself. ANEP redefined itself as "working-class oriented"; its leadership was divided among three Marxist factions, each apparently independent of the Communist Party. In 1980 ANEP threatened to strike with the major teachers unions if raises promised by the government in 1979 were not delivered; the government capitulated. Also in 1980 ANEP joined the Unitary Workers Confederation.*

NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY EMPLOYEES UNION (Unión Nacional de Empleados del Seguro Social).

This independent union's roughly 2,100 members (1979) are employees of the government National Social Security Institute, an autonomous public bureaucracy that provides Costa Rica's free health and medical care.

NATIONAL UNION OF CONSTRUCTION, WOOD, AND BUILDING MATERIALS WORKERS (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Construcción, Madera, y Materiales de Construcción). *See* Cabinetmakers and Carpenters Union.

NATIONAL UNION OF SHOE AND LEATHER WORKERS (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores del Calzado, Cuero, y Similares).

This organization dates back to 1905, when it appeared as one of the first class-conscious, militant labor unions in Costa Rica then called the Shoemakers Union.* It joined an early labor federation, the Artisans Federation, in 1905, and later affiliated with the 1913-23 General Confederation of Workers* (CGT).

NATIONAL WORKERS CONFEDERATION (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores). *See* Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation.

PLASTERERS GUILD (Gremio de Albañiles).

This guild was created in 1890 as the result of efforts by the Artisans Constitutional Club* to promote guild formation in order to establish an artisans confederation, but apparently disbanded within the same year.

PROTOMEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE REPUBLIC (Protomedicato de la República).

Established by the government in 1857, this professional association exercised the public functions of regulating prices, licensing, and promoting the professional advancement of the health professions in Costa Rica. Having considerably advanced its promotional goals for the medical fields, in 1895 the Society was transformed by the National Congress into the Faculty of Medicine, Surgery, and Pharmacy.*

PROTOMEDICATO DE LA REPÚBLICA. *See* Protomedical Society of the Republic.

SAN JOSÉ ARTISANS SOCIETY (Sociedad de Artesanos de San José).

Established in 1888 for workers' mutual aid, this society was the first of a wave of such organizations formed between 1888 and 1900. It not only provided disability and burial assistance but published a paper and provided a credit union, night school, and library.

SEC. *See* Costa Rican Educators Union.

SHOEMAKERS UNION (Sindicato de Zapateros).

This union formed in 1905, one of several labor groups that took on a more combative, class-conscious role than the previously common mutualist organizations. *See* National Union of Shoe and Leather Workers.

SINDICATO DE CARPINTEROS (Carpenters Union). *See* Cabinetmakers and Carpenters Union.

SINDICATO DE EBANISTAS Y CARPINTEROS. *See* Cabinetmakers and Carpenters Union.

SINDICATO DE EDUCADORES COSTARRICENSES. *See* Costa Rican Educators Union.

SINDICATO DE EMPLEADOS DEL BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA. *See* National Bank of Costa Rica Employees Union.

SINDICATO DE TIPÓGRAFOS. *See* Typographers Union.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DEL FERROCARRIL AL ATLÁNTICO. *See* Union of Atlantic Railroad Workers.

SINDICATO DE ZAPATEROS. *See* Shoemakers Union.

SINDICATO NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DE CONSTRUCCIÓN, MADERA, Y MATERIALES DE CONSTRUCCIÓN (National Union of Con-

struction, Wood, and Building Materials Workers). *See* Cabinetmakers and Carpenters Union.

SINDICATO NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DEL CALZADO, CUERO, Y SIMILARES. *See* National Union of Shoe and Leather Workers.

SOCIEDAD DE ARTESANOS. *See* Artisans Society.

SOCIEDAD DE ARTESANOS DE SAN JOSÉ. *See* San José Artisans Society.

SOCIEDAD DE SOCORROS MUTUOS DE LA MÚSICA. *See* Musicians Mutual Assistance Society.

SOCIEDADES DE SOCORROS. *See* Societies for Assistance.

SOCIETIES FOR ASSISTANCE (Sociedades de Socorros).

This was probably the first workers' mutual aid society formed in Costa Rica (1854), about which little else is known.

TEACHERS UNITED. *See* National Educators Association.

TEACHERS UNITY FRONT (Unidad Magisterial).

This temporary coalition involving the major teachers organizations—the National Educators Association,* Association of Secondary Education Professors,* and Costa Rican Educators Union*—in the late 1970s reversed a long-standing trend of hostility among these unions. The Teachers Unity Front first challenged the government of President Rodrigo Carazo (1978–82) over salaries and later over unpaid raises in the late 1970s and in 1980.

TYPOGRAPHERS GUILD (Gremio de Tipógrafos).

As early as 1888 this guild existed and published a newspaper, *The Worker* (*El Obrero*). In 1891 the initiative of the Artisans Constitutional Club,* a political group, led to the formalization of the guild under the name Typographers Association (Asociación Tipográfica), which promoted mutual aid activities and published a paper. In 1897 a new typographers organization appeared, probably on the ashes of the old one, the Typographers Mutual Aid Society (Sociedad Tipográfica de Socorros Mutuos). It too published a paper and provided typical mutual aid programs. This organization was apparently the predecessor of the more militant and class conflict-oriented Typographers Union* and its successors.

TYPOGRAPHERS MUTUAL AID SOCIETY (Sociedad Tipográfica de Socorros Mutuos). *See* Typographers Guild and Typographers Union.

TYPOGRAPHERS UNION (Sindicato de Tipógrafos).

The first reported typographers guild dates from 1888 and their first strike occurred in 1901, probably involving members of the earlier typographers guilds and mutual aid societies (see Typographers Guild). The Union itself formed in 1905, one of the first labor groups to call itself a union (*sindicato*) rather than a guild or mutual aid society. It apparently played an important role in the formation of the leftist General Confederation of Workers* in 1913 and appears to have survived until the 1920 labor unrest. A new typographers organization, the Graphic Workers Federation (Federación Gráfica), appeared in 1920, probably built upon the old Union. In 1923 the Graphic Workers Federation helped form the leftist General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers* (CGTC). The apparent contemporary heir of these typographers organizations is the National Graphic and Press Workers Union (Unión Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria Gráfica y de la Prensa), which belongs to the leftist CGTC and has some 700 members.

UNIDAD MAGISTERIAL. *See* Teachers Unity Front.

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES BANANEROS DEL ATLÁNTICO. *See* Atlantic Banana Workers Union.

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE GOLFITO. *See* Union of Workers of Golfito.

UNIÓN MÉDICA NACIONAL. *See* National Medical Union.

UNIÓN MUSICAL COSTARRICENSE (Costa Rican Musical Union). *See* Musicians Mutual Assistance Society.

UNIÓN NACIONAL DE EMPLEADOS DEL SEGURO SOCIAL. *See* National Social Security Employees Union.

UNIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA GRÁFICA Y DE LA PRENSA (National Graphic and Press Workers Union). *See* Typographers Union.

UNION OF ATLANTIC RAILROAD WORKERS (Sindicato de Trabajadores del Ferrocarril al Atlántico).

With roughly 1,100 members in 1979, this union was independent, as were most other autonomous government bureaucracy employees unions. Its predecessors included the unions of the Northern Railway Company, the British firm that owned the Atlantic Railroad prior to its nationalization in the early 1970s.

UNION OF WATER AND SEWER INSTITUTE WORKERS (Asociación Sindical de Trabajadores de Agua y Acantarrillados).

This public sector union represents the employees of the autonomous state bureaucracy (Instituto Nacional de Agua y Acantarrillados) that provides water and sewer service. It is an independent union with just over 1,000 members in 1979.

UNION OF WORKERS OF GOLFITO (Unión de Trabajadores de Golfito).

This union of laborers in various jobs in the southwestern banana production and port of Golfito had 5,400 members in 1979. It belonged to the General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers* (CGTC) and played a major role in the largely unsuccessful sixty-seven-day banana workers strike called by the CGTC and the Unitary Workers Confederation in 1981.

UNITARY WORKERS CONFEDERATION (Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores—CUT).

In 1980 the communist-led General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers* (CGTC) promoted the Labor Unity Committee* (CUS), out of which grew the CUT. Several federations and independent unions took part in the CUS at first. The CGTC, however, soon dominated the CUS organizing effort and later the CUT itself, a situation that prompted the withdrawal of most other major confederations except for the 7,000-member Authentic Democratic Workers Confederation.* CUT was intensely criticized by the Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation* and Costa Rican Workers Central* for communist influence in the wake of this episode.

In 1981 the CGTC-CUT affiliate of BANDECO (Del Monte) workers struck for sixty-seven days. Many observers argued that the BANDECO strike was intended to help mobilize workers and secure a leftist vote in the 1982 legislative elections. However, CUT calls for sympathy strikes and boycotts failed to win support from other unions. The strike itself was a failure for workers, for although they did win reinstatement of some fired workers and some back pay, they won no wage increase at all. Moreover, the Communist Party fared poorly at the polls, winning only three instead of its five accustomed legislative seats. CUT leadership was subsequently purged in a move led by Isaías Marchena. CUT continues to exist with a somewhat broader base than the CGTC alone, but it is far from the powerful unified labor front envisioned when the CUS formed in 1980.

UTBA. *See* Atlantic Banana Workers Union.

WORKERS LEAGUE (Liga de Obreros).

Formed in several cities in 1901, the League promoted the presidential candidacy of Ascención Esquivel Ibarra, who won the 1902 election. The League also elected Victor J. Golcher to the national Congress as a representative of workers. The organization declined and disappeared within a few years without repeating such electoral success and without workers reaping much benefit from it.

Cuba

LINDA FULLER

Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the economic, social, political, and ultimately the labor history of Cuba has been shaped by two major crops: sugar and, to a lesser degree, tobacco. The fecundity of the land, the fortunes of climate and geography, and the relatively thorough penetration of capitalist production methods into the tobacco and sugar industries were the foundation for a certain type of prosperity on the island during most of this period. Thus, by the 1950s Cuba had one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America. The island also had more doctors, television sets, and cars per inhabitant than did most countries in the hemisphere. Literacy and gross national product (GNP) figures also proved impressive in comparison to the rest of the continent; infrastructure and communications systems were advanced; the degree of urbanization was high.

Despite the level of well-being implied by such measures, beginning just a short distance from the center of Havana, life for most people was very harsh. Indeed, the Cuban economy displayed all the classic signs of underdevelopment. One crop—sugar—accounted for at least 80 percent of the island's exports, and the sugar companies controlled almost 75 percent of the arable land. The distribution of wealth was badly skewed, the most dramatic contrast existing between the urban and rural areas. Economic growth was slow and uneven, underemployment and unemployment figures were high, and labor productivity remained very low.

These and related problems were connected to the domination of Cuban economic life by the United States. Despite its small size (about 44,000 square miles), by 1929 Cuba attracted over one quarter of all U.S. investment in Latin America, and by the 1950s U.S. foreign investment per capita was greater in Cuba than in all except the petroleum-exporting countries. The rush to capitalize the island began in earnest after Cuba became independent from Spain in 1898.

At that time most investor dollars, which often originated from loans guaranteed by the U.S. government, were destined for the sugar industry. By the time U.S. investment in sugar began to cool with the onset of the Depression, U.S. companies held a quarter of the cane land, and 50 to 60 percent of the sugar Cuba produced came from U.S.-owned mills.

U.S. investment in the Cuban economy picked up again after World War II, though it was now directed toward such new sectors of the economy as minerals, oil refining, and tourism. Nevertheless, by the 1950s U.S. firms still owned 40 percent of Cuba's sugar production as well as 23 percent of its nonsugar production, 50 percent of its railroads, and 90 percent of its telephone and electric companies. Moreover, trade statistics indicate that the depth of Cuba's economic dependence on the United States went far beyond foreign ownership of its productive assets. Cuba sold 64 percent of its exports to the United States, which in turn provided up to 80 percent of Cuba's imports. In contrast, the U.S. economy did not depend in any important ways on trade with Cuba, and as a result, the U.S. was in a position to determine—almost unilaterally—the amount and price of major Cuban exports, as well as the amount and price of most of the goods Cuba purchased abroad.

Throughout much of Cuba's history, the corollary to U.S. economic domination has been frequent U.S. intrusion into the political affairs of the smaller nation. The annexation of Cuba to the United States was seriously considered off and on from the middle of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century. The U.S. government even tried once to buy Cuba from Spain, though its offer was rejected. U.S. troops first landed on Cuban soil in 1899, and until 1902 the island was ruled by a U.S. military government. U.S. troops occupied the country again between 1906 and 1908, landed a third time in 1912, and once more in 1917 when they remained for six years. The majority of these military interventions were justified by what many consider one of the most extraordinary examples of U.S. interference in the internal affairs of another nation—the Platt Amendment. When the first Cuban constitution was drafted in 1902, the United States had enough influence over Cuban politics to pressure for the inclusion of this amendment, which granted the United States the right to intervene militarily in Cuba, and made any treaties or loan agreements entered into by the Cuban government subject to U.S. approval. The Platt Amendment remained in effect until 1934, after which time U.S. involvement in Cuban politics assumed a less visible, more subtle manner. Since the Cuban revolution in 1959, Cuban political life has been much less susceptible to intervention from the north, though this is not for lack of attempts on the part of the United States, many of which were documented in the Church Committee Senate hearings in 1975.

The peculiarities of the growth and consolidation of capitalism in Cuba had some interesting repercussions on the island's social structure. The development of a landed aristocracy, common in much of Latin America, was stifled by the very late date of Cuban independence, and significantly weakened by the rapid influx of U.S. capital thereafter. The growth and cohesiveness of a national urban

or industrial bourgeoisie was also affected negatively by the domination of the most profitable areas of economic activities by foreign interests. Both economically and culturally, this class was oriented towards the United States almost as much as towards Cuba, and as a result lacked the legitimacy and the will to perform the nation-building function that it has elsewhere. A middle class, large by Latin America standards, did develop. Many of its members earned a living in the burgeoning state sector, yet this group was as denationalized by the overriding U.S. presence as were the upper classes.

The Cuban working class, on the other hand, has been described as the only truly national class in pre-revolutionary Cuba. Relatively large by Latin American standards, the class of wage workers was spread throughout the island in both urban and rural areas; and given the size of the country, different segments of this class were in fairly constant contact with one another. Also, in contrast to much of Latin America, rural wage earners outnumbered the small landowning peasantry by over two to one. Nor did language barriers divide the working class, which almost from its birth had been further linked by nationalist sentiments which crystallized out of the frequent experience of being pitted against foreign bosses. Furthermore, the working class in Cuba developed its own history and traditions based on struggles reaching far back into the last century. Most of these struggles were carried out under the leadership of unions, many of which were explicitly class-conscious organizations. By the 1950s the union movement in Cuba had grown to the point where, in Latin America, only the much larger countries of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina could boast more union members. And while the large number of unemployed and non-union workers in the country diluted the union movement's strength, and even though unions went through periods of greater and lesser activism, the organized sector of the working class exercised a steady and important influence over the course of Cuban history.

The earliest attempts at organization among Cuban workers occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century and took the form of mutual aid societies. The first of these societies appeared among tobacco workers when they still labored as individual artisans in small workshops. However, this early organizational form was soon superseded by unions: the first in Cuba appeared in the mid-1860s, quite predictably among the tobacco workers, 400 of whom went out on strike in 1865. By the late 1880s the Havana Tobacco Workers' Association* (*Asociación de Tabaqueros de la Habana*), as this union was called, was heavily influenced by anarcho-syndicalism, an ideological current which was to play a dominant role in Cuban labor organizations into the 1920s. Early labor organizations in Cuba had their work cut out for them. Workers had no legal protection against the abuses of owners, the workday stretched up to sixteen hours, and wages were very low. To their credit, even before the last century was out, Cuban workers attempted to respond to these conditions by unifying. Their earliest attempts were made in 1887 and again in 1892 at what is now referred to as the First Workers' Congress. Delegates to this congress called for an eight-hour day, an end to racial discrimination, and independence from Spain. As a

result, Spanish authorities terminated the congress and arrested its principal organizers. Repression, however, did not stifle the growing militancy of the Cuban labor movement: one source cites over eighty strikes in the last two decades of the century. Nor did it prevent Cuban labor from adopting an increasingly political focus. Workers in Cuba held one of the first May Day celebrations in the world in 1890 and participated in numerous ways in Cuba's belated struggle for independence.

After independence, through a number of U.S. troop landings and into the Republican era, Cuban labor remained active, moved towards unification, and developed politically. Both union organizing and strike activity continued unabated. Most labor historians agree that five general strikes, as well as numerous others of a more circumscribed nature, occurred between 1899 and 1924. This period also witnessed the beginning of major worker actions in the rural-based sugar industry, even though workers in this sector were poorly organized at the time. Despite continual repression during this era, labor, and especially skilled labor, made important efforts to unify its forces: unions in the same industry began to come together in fewer and larger organizations and to federate by locale; in 1899 the General League of Cuban Workers* (*Liga General de Trabajadores Cubanos*) was formed; in the early 1920s the Havana Labor Federation* (*Federación Obrera de la Habana*) appeared. A main theme of the 1920 National Workers' Congress was the need for a national federation grouping all of Cuba's organized workers.

While labor's demands were mostly of an economic nature during this period, the movement was gradually assuming a more political character. In 1914, for instance, striking dockworkers in Havana demanded an end to the draft, and the 1920 National Workers' Congress sent a fraternal greeting to Soviet workers instead of a delegation to a Pan-American labor meeting organized by Samuel Gompers. The politicization of the Cuban labor movement at this time was nurtured by the formation of the first working-class political organizations on the island, most notably the Socialist Labor Party (*Partido Obrero Socialista*) and the Cuban Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista de Cuba*).

Nineteen twenty-five was an important year in the history of Cuban labor, for it marked the founding of the first genuinely national workers' confederation, the National Labor Confederation of Cuba* (*Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba—CNOC*), as well as the Communist Party whose ongoing association with the working class would influence Cuban history for decades. That same year witnessed the inception of the notorious dictatorship of Gerardo Machado (1925–33), which unleashed a reign of terror against both fledgling organizations. CNOC brought together trade unionists of a variety of persuasions—anarcho-sindicalist, communist, and reformist—but as repression increased throughout the 1920s, the communists assumed a dominant role in the organization. The most significant task taken on by CNOC and the communists was the organization of workers in the sugar sector. The two organizations began this work in earnest in 1931. Despite the difficulties of having to organize clandestinely, their efforts met with

success almost immediately, leading in 1932 to the foundation of Cuba's first national sugar workers' union, the National Sugar Industry Workers' Union* (Sindicato Nacional de Obreros de la Industria Azucarera—SNOIA). SNOIA grew very rapidly: two years after its formation it represented around 100,000 workers.

Against the backdrop of the international Depression—which had especially severe repercussions in developing countries like Cuba—CNOC, the Communist Party, and the sugar workers' union led an uninterrupted battle against the Machado regime. At times, however, most notably in the midst of the 1933 and 1935 general strikes and during the social eruptions following Machado's deposition, the militancy of the Cuban workers surpassed that of their leaders, who had then to revise their tactics in light of workers' actions. Beginning with a general strike called to protest Machado's ban of CNOC in 1930, labor and its allies in other sectors of the population—using increasingly effective tactics such as mass pickets and demonstrations—kept the pressure up until, after a successful general strike in 1933, the hated dictator was forced to flee.

The period following Machado's defeat was a tumultuous one. Governments followed one another in rapid succession. Strikes and union organizing continued, and in the countryside workers occupied thirty-six mills which together produced 30 percent of Cuba's sugar. In some areas worker actions went even further: railroads and villages were taken over; nearby lands were parceled out among the population; soviets were declared; workers' guards were established and administrators seized. Apparently these worker actions were not spontaneous. Rather they were coordinated and directed by the most influential working-class organizations of the day—CNOC, the Communist Party, and SNOIA.

The militancy of the urban and rural workers in Cuba during this period proved instrumental in forcing the government of Ramón Grau (1933) to adopt the first significant body of labor legislation in the country's history. This new labor code recognized the right to organize and the right to strike, decreed a minimum wage and the eight-hour day, and established social security, health and safety, and equal pay for equal work laws. However, management's refusal to comply with some of these laws, and the government's subsequent unilateral cancellation of important parts of this legislation, led to increased labor unrest and heightened government repression.

At the beginning of 1934, the fourth National Workers' Congress—the first which the communists clearly dominated—took a further step towards strengthening the labor movement by declaring its support for industrial unionism. Yet within two months, with the government's repression of the March 1934 general strike in which more than 200,000 participated, the end of Cuba's brief "popular revolution" came into view. The death knell was sounded the next year when Fulgencio Batista, not yet president of Cuba but in control of the army, reacted even more savagely to a second general strike which had lasted almost ten days. Never again in the pre-revolutionary period was organized labor to match the level of militancy it had attained between 1930 and 1935.

In the ensuing decade, the character of the Cuban labor movement changed dramatically. More than in any previous period, the movement was dominated by the communists. Yet the communists—in accordance with their anti-fascist popular front strategy—became enmeshed in electoral politics, thus beginning a long tradition of union-government collaboration. They formed alliances with two successive Cuban governments, those of Batista (1940–44) and Ramón Grau, who began his second term as president in 1944. Batista was a very powerful figure in Cuban political life before his first presidential term, and his close relationship with both the communists and the Cuban labor movement was established in the late 1930s.

In return for promises of labor peace and electoral support, organized labor and the communists received a great deal from Batista. The Communist Party was legalized in the late 1930s and its membership reached 160,000 by the end of World War II. The number of organized workers also grew, and in early 1939 the Confederation of Cuban Workers* (*Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba—CTC*) was founded under the clear leadership of the communists. In the early 1940s, the CTC joined 300,000 to 400,000 workers from over 80 percent of Cuba's unions. The incorporation of organized labor and the communists into the Cuban political process also resulted in the inclusion and strengthening of numerous pro-worker provisions in Cuba's 1940 Constitution, and in the enactment of complementary and enabling legislation which was also favorable to workers. Furthermore, the government often proved willing to intervene on behalf of labor during strikes or when firms did not comply with labor laws or collective bargaining agreements. In addition, under the presidencies of both Batista and Grau, workers received wage increases.

The important benefits that accrued to both organized labor and the communists through their cooperation with Batista and later Grau came at the price of increased dependence on political groups whose commitment to improving the lot of the majority of Cuba's workers, peasants, and unemployed was superficial. That the price paid would be steep became clear in the middle of Grau's presidency: the full ramifications of the unions' collaborationist policy would be felt well into the post-revolutionary period. In the 1944 election many unions and the Popular Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Popular—PSP*), the name which the communists had adopted in 1943, supported Batista, but Grau and his Authentic (*Auténtico*) Party were victorious. A deal was quickly struck with Grau, but he proved to be a much less steady ally than Batista. In the midst of an atmosphere of Cold War anti-communism, Grau began in 1946–47 to turn against the PSP and the communist leadership of the labor movement. Partly as a result, the party suffered a precipitous decline. It lost roughly three-quarters of its members between the end of the war and the end of the Authentic Party's control of the presidency in 1952.

Divisions in the CTC, which had been brewing since the beginning of Grau's term, came to a head at the fifth National Workers' Congress, held in 1947. Three factions contended for power at this Congress: the communists, whose

main strength was among the sugar workers and certain urban groups; the Authentics; and the Independents. At first Lázaro Peña, the communist leader who had been secretary-general of the CTC since its founding, was reelected, but the government intervened, annulled the election, and held another Congress some months later in which the leader of the Independent faction was chosen as head of the CTC. For a time the labor movement was so deeply divided that in 1949 each of the three factions held its own Congress. By then, however, the Auténticos had installed their own head of the CTC, Eusebio Mujal, who remained secretary-general of the organization until the victory of the 26 July forces (the student-worker attack on the Moncada barracks led by Fidel Castro) in 1953.

Despite the fact that organized labor continued to grow and to receive certain benefits from its close collaboration with whatever government happened to be in power, the union movement reached an unprecedented low during Mujal's tenure. Organized labor came to be viewed as a docile and subservient appendage of government rather than as the representative of the working class. Corruption was rife; the movement was undemocratic and top-heavy with bureaucrats. However, even though the communist unionists were isolated, almost totally excluded from leadership positions and persecuted, they apparently retained the sympathies of one-quarter to one-third of Cuba's organized workers into the next decade.

When Batista staged a coup in March 1952 and reinstated himself as the political boss of Cuba, organized labor first called a general strike, then quickly abandoned its former Authentic allies and became Batista's partner. This second partnership between organized labor and Batista was reminiscent of their earlier pact. Labor leaders agreed not to cause trouble for the new government in exchange for retention of their control and certain, mainly economic, benefits. These benefits, however, were distributed very unevenly both among the working class as a whole and within the organized sector of the labor force. As it turned out, during this second term, Batista was either incapable of or unwilling to back labor interests to the degree he had previously. However, this did not stop Mujal and the entrenched labor bureaucracy from turning the CTC into Batista's most faithful political ally. The CTC suppressed strikes, mobilized workers for pro-government demonstrations, and even applauded government repression of dissidents within the ranks of the union movement. Under Mujal's control, the organized labor sector in Cuba continued to grow until on the eve of the revolution, the CTC embraced at least one million workers in thirty-nine labor federations.

Despite their numerical strength and their unified form of organization, workers played only a secondary role in the ultimately victorious struggle against Batista. Not only did the country's union leadership steadfastly refuse to join the growing opposition to Batista, but the communists, the only other group that had some influence among trade unionists (even though Batista had outlawed their political party) were disinclined to support Castro's forces until the eleventh hour. The communists had repudiated Castro's famous attack on the Moncada barracks at

Santiago de Cuba as putschists, condemned the landing of the *Granma* (the ship that brought Castro from Mexico), denounced armed struggle as adventurism, and as late as June 1958 called for elections to oust Batista. The communists, in the face of mounting repression, eventually reached an agreement with Castro in the summer of 1958; but since neither of the principal leadership currents in the labor movement supported the 26 July movement during most of its struggle, workers who acted on behalf of Castro had to do so as individuals, not as a class, and largely without institutional backing. Some workers joined the unemployed and other sectors of the urban population in planning acts of sabotage against the Batista government, especially in the capital. Some workers fought alongside the 26 July forces in the mountains of Cuba, and others participated in strike activity in various parts of the island.

On the first day of January 1959, the 26 July movement entered Havana under the banner of victory, ushering in a new era of Cuban history. The island soon became the first socialist country in the Western Hemisphere, and in so doing, undertook the massive and complex project of reorganizing society according to an entirely new set of principles. Cuban polity, social life, economy, culture, and international relationships all were modified in fundamental ways. As part of this process Cuban institutions underwent major changes. Some old ones disappeared completely. Some new ones were created, and some, like the unions, continued to exist and to function in the new society, albeit in a greatly altered form.

Because the context within which the unions operated had changed so dramatically—the government became the sole employer; wages and working conditions were set centrally rather than through the collective bargaining process; hundreds of thousands of new jobs were created; numerous redistributive measures were enacted, for example, rent could not exceed 10 percent of one's income—the unions of necessity embarked on an arduous process of redefinition, and they emerged from this process as very different entities than they had been in their pre-revolutionary days. What is especially interesting, however, in terms of the post-revolutionary Cuban union movement is that the initial changes it underwent as a result of the country's adoption of socialism were followed approximately ten years later by another series of changes equally profound in nature.

Between 1959 and 1970 Cuban unions languished in a semidormant state. Organizationally weak, they performed relatively few functions and, compared with management and the Communist Party, had very little influence over the direction and character of social change in Cuba. Part of the reason is the attitude of the incumbent union leadership and the communists to the 26 July movement before the victory—hostile in the former case, equivocal in the latter. And even though many followers of the CTC's Eusebio Mujal (known as *mujalistas*) fled the country almost immediately after Batista's fall, their years of tight control over the labor movement meant that their sympathizers permeated the ranks of many unions. Moreover, it became increasingly clear as the new government

adopted a more radical approach to development—nationalizing certain industries and instituting an agrarian reform program, for instance—that the loyalties of some of the new labor leaders who replaced the *mujalistas*, including communists and 26 July people, were divided and uncertain. This strained relationship between labor and Castro's forces, coupled with the enormity of the task facing the revolution—educating masses of people, restructuring legal and economic institutions, and learning to relate to a whole new set of world allies and trading partners—fostered a neglect of the workers' organizations. All this was exacerbated by a dearth of good models of powerful unions in other socialist countries and by the whole country's focus on one overriding task towards the end of the decade: producing ten million tons of sugar in 1970.

However, in 1970 a process of union revitalization was begun in response to some distressing signals such as swelling absenteeism and declining productivity, both brought on by an unwise combination of policies which led to an overcentralization of economic and political decision making and, simultaneously, to a heavy emphasis on egalitarianism. This revitalization process encompassed three major areas. First, unions took on a variety of new functions and refined and amplified some of their old ones. Second, they reorganized along lines which enhanced their ability to carry out these expanded functions. Finally, their relationship with both the Communist Party and management was altered, and they emerged as an influential partner in decision making regarding work and the economy.

The union function which received the most emphasis before 1970 was undoubtedly the mobilization of workers to produce more, better, and faster. In their effort to mobilize the labor force, unions conducted socialist emulation campaigns, exhorted workers to be more disciplined, and aided in the organization of voluntary labor which was often relied upon in the early years whenever some sector of the economy needed many workers and needed them rapidly. In addition to mobilizing workers, unions participated in the country-wide campaigns to increase the general educational level of the Cuban population. The defense of workers' rights received much less attention from the unions during this early period. In many instances, unions went out of their way to avoid becoming involved in conflicts between workers and management over working conditions, remuneration, or discipline. At best unions would serve as neutral umpires in cases of this sort.

After 1970, however, the functions performed by Cuban unions began to expand and change. While the unions were still expected to aid in the effort to improve economic performance, their methods for achieving this goal had changed. Their major emphasis then became organizing and preparing workers to participate in making decisions about production. The most important union activities of this type included serving on the management council of each enterprise; assuming responsibility for the monthly production assemblies held in every work center, in which any issue or problem regarding production was discussed with management; and taking an active role in the often-heated yearly

sessions at which workers review and revise the planning figures for production and service delivery at their individual work centers.

Very important also, unions began for the first time in the 1970s to participate in decision-making bodies which operate at the supra-worksites level. For example, the secretary-general of the CTC became a member of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, and officials of the various industrial unions participated in the management councils of the ministries and other state organs which oversaw production and service delivery in the different sectors of the economy.

In order to ensure that workers' participation in all these decision-making forums was meaningful, the unions' education function was expanded. Besides being involved in general education campaigns as they had been in the past, unions assumed major responsibility for workers' technical, legal, and economic education. For example, the CTC ran an ongoing series of classes and seminars at its own school on such topics as labor legislation, social security, and economic planning. Finally, in contrast to previous times, the unions began to serve as the workers' advocate or representative when disputes arose between rank-and-file union members and managers. The use of the workplace grievance committees, which arbitrated disputes over both alleged violations of workers' rights and worker discipline on the job, provides a good example of this changed union role. These grievance committees began functioning soon after Castro's victory, but as the unions became stronger after 1970 the number of cases brought before them skyrocketed. One reason: more militant unions actively performing their role as workers' advocates provided the organizational backing necessary first to encourage workers to challenge administrators by bringing their cases before the grievance committees, and second to support and advise workers during the potentially trying proceedings which followed.

However, Cuban unions would have been incapable of carrying out their new and expanded functions had they not made important organizational changes. The 1959 victory strengthened union organization in accordance with two existing structural principles: dual and industrial unionism. Dual unionism refers to parallel structures, those of the CTC and those of the various industrial unions, which existed at different geographical levels (municipal, provincial, and national) throughout the island. However, by the late 1960s this intricate union structure was crumbling: over one-third of the industrial unions had disappeared, and of those that remained, many had no provincial or municipal branches. Base level union structures, called sections, were inoperative in many places, and the CTC held no National Congresses between 1966 and 1973. However, by the early 1970s this process of structural deterioration had begun to reverse. The number of industrial unions jumped back up to twenty-three; their municipal and provincial branches were reconstituted; the CTC began to hold its National Congress approximately every five years; many new union sections were created, 4,000 alone between 1972 and 1973.

Two additional organizational changes which have occurred pertain to union

membership and financing. Although groups of workers who had previously not been allowed to unionize—civil servants, for example—received the right to organize soon after the victory, by the mid-1960s the percentage of the labor force which was organized was up only slightly from pre-revolutionary figures. Yet clearly, if the benefits of increased union activity were to reach more Cuban workers, membership would have to expand, and so unions in the early 1970s began organization drives. Affiliation figures increased steadily thereafter. By 1974 88 percent of the work force was organized; by 1978 94 percent belonged to unions. Before the 1970s unions were not financially self-sufficient; a portion of their budgets came directly from state coffers, just as it had to some extent before the revolution. However, since the mid-1970s unions have become almost completely self-financing. By far the principal source of their income is collected personally from individual members on a monthly basis by the treasurer of the union section. Among other things, members' dues are used to publish a daily union newspaper, run the union schools, and pay the salaries of union officials and employees. These new financial procedures have helped to strengthen the union movement in two ways: financial self-sufficiency encourages independence from state and government organs, and individual dues collection increases contact between union leadership and rank and file.

The final organizational change which has taken place in the Cuban unions since 1959 concerns leadership selection. The first two years following the victory saw a rapid turnover in union leadership under less than optimally democratic circumstances. Almost immediately a law was passed suspending all union leaders in office prior to 31 December 1958. Then, in the confusing period that followed, first communist leaders and then anti-communist 26 July union leaders were selected and expelled after only minimal consultation with the union membership. Elections of section officers occurred infrequently before 1970, and sometimes government and party officials intervened to blackball candidates.

Almost the first sign of impending change in the status of Cuban unions was Castro's call for the "absolutely free" election of all officers of union sections to be held in November 1970. Rank-and-file workers nominated candidates in open assemblies; everyone nominated appeared on the ballots, and voting was by secret ballot. In all, 164,367 section leaders were chosen at this time, about 80 percent being elected to union office for the first time. Since 1970 section leaders have been elected every two and one-half years by the rank and file, who also elect, though indirectly, higher level union officers of both the CTC and the industrial unions. The union electoral procedure, as well as the recall process, is now carefully codified in the unions' statutes, and all eligibility restrictions for union office have been dropped, allowing for greater rank-and-file influence over selection of union leadership.

A substantial modification of the relationship between the unions and the two other main entities with responsibility for production, the Communist Party and management, also marked the years after 1959. Until 1970 Cuban unions lacked autonomy from both the party and management. For the most part, unions were

regarded as one-way transmission belts. Their job was to present directives and decisions from higher-ups to workers, and to convince workers to carry out these directives and abide by these decisions with minimal question or discussion. However, an increased emphasis on autonomy and independence of the organized labor movement accompanied the organizational modifications and expansion of functions just mentioned. Unions began to pay a great deal more attention to communicating workers' ideas and criticisms upward to political and administrative leaders. Mechanisms were developed through which the unions could ascertain, organize, and report workers' opinions, suggestions, and demands. Principal among these were the management councils, production assemblies, and planning meetings referred to earlier. Union autonomy turned out to be one of the main topics of discussion at the thirteenth National CTC Congress in 1973, which devoted one of its nine theses to a description and analysis of the unions as "non-state," "non-party" organizations.

The unions' lack of autonomy from management and the party in the early years corresponded to a period when the interests of the three groups were assumed to be identical. On the basis of this conception, some Cubans even began to ask whether there needed to be special organizations for workers at all. However, as autonomy increased, as functions were expanded and union organization revitalized, the notion of a complete correspondence of interests between unions, the party, and management was called into question, and differences of opinion between the three groups came to be seen as normal. The recognition that there are legitimate differences of opinion and interpretation between labor and management under socialism prompted the unions to suggest at the fourteenth National CTC Congress in 1978 that a unified work code governing labor relations be compiled, a task which has now been completed.

Before 1970 there also was a decided lack of differentiation in the functions of the unions, the party, and management, with lines of authority and responsibility badly blurred. Union leaders had no clear idea of what they were supposed to be doing. Since the early 1970s, however, the tasks of the unions, party, and management have undergone considerable differentiation; the unions now have primary authority, as we have seen, over the organization and preparation of workers for participation in decision making and the defense of workers' rights. An indication that this change was occurring came with the move to halt the earlier practice of uniting party, administrative, and union leadership in one individual. As a result, high-level administrators have been prohibited by the union statutes from running for union office, and after 1970 party members were encouraged to minimize their candidacy in union elections. Consequently, 1975 figures showed that only about 5 percent of section leaders were members of the party.

A final point regarding the changed relationship between the union, the party, and management concerns the relative power of these three entities. By the late 1960s the unions were clearly subordinate to the party and management both at the point of production and in the wider decision-making arena.

Once again, the balance of power in this regard began to shift in the early 1970s and is exemplified by the current use of the term "counterpart" to describe the relationship between the unions and management. As management's counterpart, the union is expected to keep a watchful eye on administrator performance, inform management of deficiencies and errors, and help them make necessary improvements. Yet it is not considered enough for the unions just to respond to the actions of management after the fact. Instead, unions have begun to assume a more offensive counterpart posture, confronting management at whatever point in the decision-making process they are judged to be acting incorrectly, unjustly, or inappropriately.

One of the best tests of the unions' ability to perform their counterpart role occurs in situations where there is pressure from the rank and file to remove a particular manager. Nowadays, unions become involved in important ways in cases where workers feel a boss should be removed. Workers often broach the matter at a union meeting or privately with union officials. The union may also participate in an investigation of the charges against the administrator and in the presentation and argument of the case for dismissal before the administrator's superior.

In February of 1984, the CTC held its fifteenth National Congress, the third since the status of the unions began to change in 1970. The previous fall, workers in nearly every production and service delivery unit in the country had debated and delivered comments on the main topics to be discussed at the Congress. Of the over 2,000 congressional delegates, nearly 70 percent came from the grass-roots levels in the union structure. The main debates at the Congress centered on managerial excesses in applying disciplinary sanctions against workers, improprieties in the determination of production norms, problems workers face in trying to get the training necessary to improve their skill level, wage payments to workers who are idle due to lack of materials, and the difficulties faced by women workers who in addition to their paid employment have also to perform a second shift at housework and childcare. The Congress itself cannot make national policy concerning any of these issues, but since top-level union officials do participate in making decisions of this kind, these union debates are far from superfluous to the ultimate resolution of these problems.

Certainly most Cuban unions are still in the process of carrying out the functional and organizational changes begun in the early 1970s and have yet to completely alter their relationship to management and the party. Furthermore, not all unions have achieved uniform progress in these three areas. There exists, for example, a great deal of variability in terms of the activism, combativeness, and affiliation levels of different union sections and of different industrial unions. These dissimilarities are apparently related to the variable histories of the workers' movement in different work centers and in different sectors of the economy. Yet in general, as the 1980s unfold, Cuban unions appear to be continuing their deeply rooted tradition of playing an active and influential role in the economic, social, and political development of their country.

Bibliography

- Aguilar, Luis. *Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972.
- Bonachea, Rolando and Nelson Valdés. "Labor and Revolution: Introduction." In *Cuba in Revolution*, ed. Rolando Bonachea and Nelson Valdés. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972: 357–83.
- Bray, Donald and Timothy Harding. "Cuba." In *Latin America: Dependency and Beyond*, ed. Ronald Chilcote and Joel Edelstein. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974: 583–734.
- Domínguez, Jorge. *Cuba: Order and Revolution*. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1978.
- Fuller, Linda. "Changes in the Relationship among the Unions, Administration, and the Party at the Cuban Workplace, 1959–1982." *Latin American Perspectives* 13, no. 2 (Spring 1986): 6–32.
- Grobart, Fabio. "The Cuban Working Class Movement from 1925 to 1933." *Science and Society* 39, no. 1 (Spring 1975): 73–103.
- Hernández, Roberto and Carmelo Mesa-Lago. "Labor Organization and Wages." In *Revolutionary Change in Cuba*, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971: 209–49.
- Instituto de Historia del Movimiento Comunista y de la Revolución Socialista de Cuba. *El Movimiento Obrero Cubano: Documentos y Artículos*. Vol. 1: 1865–1925. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1981.
- Karl, Terry. "Work Incentives in Cuba." *Latin American Perspectives* 2, no. 4, supplement (Summer 1973): 21–41.
- Martin, Lionel. "Reestructuración sindical en Cuba." *Cuba Internacional* 4, no. 56 (April 1974): 28–30.
- Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. *The Labor Sector and Socialist Distribution in Cuba*. New York: Praeger, 1968.
- Murray, J. P. *The Second Revolution in Cuba*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962.
- O'Connor, James. *The Origins of Socialism in Cuba*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970.
- Ordoqui, Joaquín. *Elementos Para la Historia del Movimiento Obrero en Cuba*. Havana: Imprenta Nacional de Cuba, 1961.
- Pérez-Stable, Marifeli. "Class, Organization, and *Conciencia*: The Cuban Working Class after 1970." In *Cuba: Twenty-Five Years of Revolution, 1959–1984*, ed. Sandor Halebsky and John Kirk. New York: Praeger, 1985: 291–306.
- . "Institutionalization and Workers' Response." *Cuban Studies* 6, nos. 1–2 (Jan. and July 1976): 31–54.
- . "Whither the Cuban Working Class?" *Latin American Perspectives* 2, no. 4 supplement (1975): 60–77.
- Muñiz, José Rivero. *El Movimiento Obrero Durante la Primera Intervención*. Universidad Central de Las Villas, 1961.
- Ruiz, Ramon. *Cuba: The Making of a Revolution*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1970.
- Spalding, Hobart, Jr. *Organized Labor in Latin America*. New York: New York University Press, 1977.
- . "The Workers' Struggle: 1850–1961." *Cuba Review* 4, no. 1 (July 1974): 3–10.

Tellería, Evelio. *Los congresos obreros en Cuba*. Havana: 1973.

Woodward, Ralph, Jr. "Urban Labor and Communism: Cuba." *Caribbean Studies* 3, no. 3 (October 1963): 17–50.

Zeitlin, Maurice. *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Zimbalist, Andrew. "Worker Participation in Cuba." *Challenge* 18, no. 5 (Nov.–Dec. 1975): 45–54.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ANTI-IMPERIALIST LEAGUE OF THE AMERICAS (Liga Antiimperialista de las Américas).

The Cuban branch of the Anti-Imperialist League was founded in 1924 or 1925. Though not strictly a workers' organization, it was closely tied to them and helped to focus Cuban working-class actions and demands in a more political as opposed to economic direction. One of its main targets was the Platt Amendment, which after the Spanish-American War made Cuba a U.S. protectorate.

ASOCIACIÓN DE TABAQUEROS DE LA HABANA. *See* Havana Tobacco Workers' Association.

BROTHERHOOD OF CUBAN RAILWAY WORKERS (Hermandad Ferroviaria de Cuba).

This nationwide organization was begun in 1924 and had a spotted history. In its first year of existence it conducted two successful strikes over economic issues and the right to organize. However, the Brotherhood delegation withdrew from the Third Workers' Congress held in 1925, and after an unsuccessful strike in 1926, the new leadership of the Brotherhood collaborated closely with the dictator Gerardo Machado (1925–33) and participated in the formation of the Cuban Federation of Labor.* The Brotherhood had nearly 13,000 members in the late 1920s.

CENTRAL DE TRABAJADORES DE CUBA. *See* Confederation of Cuban Workers.

CNOC. *See* National Labor Confederation of Cuba.

COMISIÓN OBRERA NACIONAL. *See* National Labor Commission.

COMITÉ OBRERO NACIONAL INDEPENDIENTE. *See* National Independent Labor Committee.

COMITÉ DE DEFENSA DE LAS DEMANDAS OBRERAS. *See* Committees in Defense of Labor Demands.

COMMITTEES IN DEFENSE OF LABOR DEMANDS (Comités de Defensa de las Demandas Obreras).

In the 1950s as the followers of Eusebio Mujal consolidated their hold over the Confederation of Cuban Workers* (CTC) and the opposition to Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista began to intensify, a dissident tendency, represented by the Comités, developed within the organized labor movement. The Comités held a national conference attended by nearly 200 delegates in 1955. They opposed many of the CTC's official policies, such as obligatory union dues, and called for the democratization of the labor movement. The Comités helped organize various strikes during this period, including the 1955 general strike centered in the sugar industry.

CON. *See* National Labor Commission.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE CUBA REVOLUCIONARIA (Confederation of Workers of Revolutionary Cuba). *See* Confederation of Cuban Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL OBRERA DE CUBA. *See* National Labor Confederation of Cuba.

CONFEDERATION OF CUBAN WORKERS (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba—CTC).

Established in 1939 by 1,500 delegates representing approximately 600 unions, the Confederation of Cuban Workers has survived up to the present. Though its fortunes and its character have shifted with the political moment, it has been the only national union confederation of any import during this entire period. For a period after the revolution the CTC was called the Confederation of Workers of Revolutionary Cuba (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba Revolucionaria—CTC-R). Then in 1961 the name of the organization was changed to Cuban Workers' Central (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba), but it is still referred to as the CTC. Since 1959 there have been between fourteen and twenty-five national industrial unions in the CTC. In 1977 the national industrial unions included Agriculture; Public Administration; Food and Commercial Mining and Metallurgy; Education and Science; Health; Merchant Marine; Portworkers and Fishing; Communications; Food; Culture; Sugar; Construction; Light Industry; Forestry; Tobacco; Transportation; Chemical and Energy; and Civilian Employees of the Rebel Armed Forces. In 1978, 94 percent of all Cuban workers belonged to unions affiliated with the CTC.

CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF REVOLUTIONARY CUBA (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba Revolucionaria—CTCR). *See* Confederation of Cuban Workers.

CONI. *See* National Independent Labor Committee.

CTC. *See* Confederation of Cuban Workers.

CUBAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (Federación Cubana del Trabajo—FCT).

The Cuban Federation of Labor was founded sometime between 1906 and 1911, counted only 40,000 members in 1928, and was closely tied to the sector of the Latin American labor movement directed and organized by the U.S. government and the American Federation of Labor. The Federation worked closely with the dictator Gerardo Machado (1925–33) when he was Minister of Interior, received monetary support from the government during his presidency, and collaborated with its police. Certain public works employees were apparently pressured into affiliating with the FCT as a condition of their employment. A principal spokesperson described the Federation as a “reformist” and “possibilist” organization, opposed to tactics of violence. The FCT changed its name to the Union of Federated Labor (Unión Federativa Obrera), probably in the late 1920s or early 1930s, but maintained a similar political stance. It disappeared when Machado was overthrown in 1933.

FCT. *See* Cuban Federation Of Labor.

FEDERACIÓN CUBANA DEL TRABAJO. *See* Cuban Federation of Labor.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TORCEDEROS. *See* National Federation of Rollers.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES AZUCAREROS. *See* National Federation of Sugar Workers.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL OBRERA AZUCARERA (National Sugar Labor Federation). *See* National Federation of Sugar Workers.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA DE LA HABANA. *See* Havana Labor Federation.

FNTA. *See* National Federation of Sugar Workers.

FOH. *See* Havana Labor Federation.

FONU. *See* United National Labor Front.

FRENTE OBRERO NACIONAL UNIDO. *See* United National Labor Front.

GENERAL LEAGUE OF CUBAN WORKERS (Liga General de Trabajadores Cubanos).

The General League, which grouped together a considerable number of different unions, was founded in 1899 and lasted three or four years. It was an important force behind several strikes between its founding and the apprentices' strike (*huelga de aprendices*) in 1902, though its leadership was at times considerably less militant than its member unions. The League's organizers were mostly tobacco workers, many of whom had supported the Cuban independence movement as émigrés in the United States. Nondiscrimination against native-born workers was one of its principal themes.

HAVANA LABOR FEDERATION (Federación Obrera de la Habana—FOH).

Formed in 1920 or 1921, the Havana Labor Federation actively supported political protests, strikes, and boycotts carried out by unions in the capital and elsewhere on the island during the 1920s and into the 1930s. The FOH, like the National Labor Confederation of Cuba* (CNOC), which it was instrumental in creating, was forced to carry out its activities clandestinely under the dictator Gerardo Machado (1925–33), and its most influential secretary-general, Alfredo López, was kidnapped and assassinated in 1926. In 1922 the FOH grouped together nineteen diverse unions including those of shoemakers, metalworkers, printers, and electric workers, and embraced not only anarchists but communists and reformists as well. According to its bylaws, the FOH recognized the existence of class struggle and supported direct action rather than electoral activity as the most appropriate working-class tactic. In the 1930s, however, CNOC and the FOH were at odds with one another. There were moves by CNOC to create a new federation in Havana and moves by FOH to turn itself into an alternative national confederation. Apparently the leadership of FOH had at that time been assumed by a group of Trotskyists. FOH became inactive after the suppression of the 1935 general strike.

HAVANA TOBACCO WORKERS' ASSOCIATION (Asociación de Tabaqueros de la Habana).

Founded in 1865 or 1866, the Tobacco Workers' Association is considered the first union in Cuba. Characterized as reformist in the beginning, its leadership urged cooperation between workers and bosses and opposed the Cuban struggle for independence. The Association was disbanded soon after its initial formation, but reorganized again in 1878, when anarcho-syndicalist currents had begun to dominate the organized labor movement in Cuba.

HERMANDAD FERROVIARIA DE CUBA. *See* Brotherhood of Cuban Railway Workers.

LIGA ANTIIMPERIALISTA DE LAS AMÉRICAS. *See* Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas.

LIGA GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES CUBANOS. *See* General League of Cuban Workers.

LOS CÍRCULOS DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Workers' Circles.

MANUFACTURING UNION OF HAVANA (Sindicato Fabril de la Habana).

This union, which was founded shortly before 1920, included workers in various branches of the food and beverage industry. It formed a part of the Havana Labor Federation* and in 1923 began a boycott of a Havana brewery after its owners refused to increase wages. The Manufacturing Union ceased activities shortly after Gerardo Machado assumed leadership of the country in 1925.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF ROLLERS (Federación Nacional de Torcederos).

The Rollers convened the 1920 Workers' Congress to which 102 unions responded, and it was the most powerful workers' entity in the tobacco industry at the beginning of the 1930s. The politics of its leadership was variable. For a time it was controlled by the communists. Later a more moderate contingent took over, and the Rollers actually worked in opposition to the 1932 general strike called by the National Labor Confederation of Cuba.*

NATIONAL FEDERATIONS OF SUGAR WORKERS (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Azucareros—FNTA).

Founded in 1939 as the National Sugar Labor Federation (Federación Nacional Obrera Azucarera—FNOA) by representatives of seventy-eight sugar workers' unions, FNOA replaced the National Sugar Industry Workers' Union* (SNOIA). Some years later its name was changed to the National Federation of Sugar Workers. The Federation claimed around 100,000 members by the late 1940s when its most famous leader, Jesús Menéndez, was assassinated, and it was the largest workers' organization in Cuba on the eve of the revolution. Almost immediately after Castro's 1959 victory, the Federation threatened a strike against sugar producers which held the potential of unleashing a general strike on the island. However, Castro intervened personally to block the strike, a move which was strongly condemned by certain sectors of organized labor.

NATIONAL INDEPENDENT LABOR COMMITTEE (Comité Obrero Nacional Independiente—CONI).

This organization grouped the so-called independents in the labor movement in the 1940s and 1950s. Its core was composed of the relatively privileged electric and telephone workers, and its best known leader was Ángel Cofiño. CONI, the National Labor Commission,* and the communists were the three principal divisions in the Confederation of Cuban Workers* (CTC) in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1948 CONI attempted to form its own national confederation once the CTC was taken over by followers of the National Labor Commission's Eusebio Mujal, but the attempt failed when the government refused it recognition. By 1951 CONI was reintegrated into the CTC, though on occasion it continued to oppose

the Mujal block's leadership of the CTC out of personalistic more than philosophical or political considerations.

NATIONAL LABOR COMMISSION (Comisión Obrera Nacional—CON).

Founded in 1939, CON was the tendency of the labor movement organized, protected, and funded by the Authentic (Auténtico) Party which played an important role in Cuban politics in the 1940s and 1950s. CON represented one of the major divisions—for a long while the dominant one—which racked the Confederation of Cuban Workers* during these decades. Eusebio Mujal was one of its founders and its principal leader.

NATIONAL LABOR CONFEDERATION OF CUBA (Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba—CNOC).

CNOC was founded in 1925, according to its own records by 128 labor organizations representing around 200,000, mostly urban, workers. By 1930 CNOC'S original anarcho-syndicalist leadership had been replaced by the communists who used dictator Gerardo Machado's (1928–33) ban of the organization, along with deteriorating economic conditions, to revitalize the Cuban union movement. Thus between 1930 and 1933 CNOC, together with the Communist Party, was instrumental in organizing the wave of strikes and political protests which swept the country and ultimately brought the fall of Machado. By the time the dictator was ousted, CNOC had between 300,000 and 400,000 members. Among the strongest groups in the confederation were the sugar, port, textile and tobacco workers, and miners. CNOC organized groups within nonaffiliated unions and devoted special energy to the problems of the unemployed as well as blacks, women, and young workers. The unions in the confederation were organized both by economic sector and geographical region. CNOC remained active until 1935.

NATIONAL SUGAR INDUSTRY WORKERS' UNION (Sindicato Nacional de Obreros de la Industria Azucarera—SNOIA.)

This union arose clandestinely in 1932, largely as a result of the organizing efforts of CNOC and the communists, who remained influential among workers in this sector throughout the pre-revolutionary period. The organization of SNOIA prompted increased worker agitation in the industry around issues of wages, scrip payment, and the eight-hour day. Perhaps the most dramatic actions involving SNOIA were the worker takeovers of thirty-six sugar mills, some towns and ports, and the establishment of politico-military organizations and soviets in certain parts of the island after the Machado dictatorship (Gerardo Machado, 1925–35) fell in the late summer of 1933.

NATIONAL SUGAR LABOR FEDERATION (Federación Nacional Obrera Azucarera). *See* National Federation of Sugar Workers.

NATIVE WORKERS (*Obreros de la Patria*).

Native Workers was founded in 1909. Its objective was to end hiring practices which discriminated against native-born workers. The issue of unequal access to jobs based on place of birth had, in 1902, prompted the apprentices' strike (*huelga de aprendices*), which began with the tobacco workers but soon took on the character of a general strike in the capital.

OBREROS DE LA PATRIA. *See* Native Workers.

SINDICATO FABRIL DE LA HABANA. *See* Manufacturing Union of Havana.

SINDICATO NACIONAL DE OBREROS DE LA INDUSTRIA AZUCARERA.
See National Sugar Industry Workers' Union.

SNOIA. *See* National Sugar Industry Workers' Union.

UNIÓN FEDERATIVA OBRERA (Union of Federated Labor). *See* Cuban Federation of Labor.

UNION OF FEDERATED LABOR. *See* Cuban Federation of Labor.

UNITED NATIONAL LABOR FRONT (*Frente Obrero Nacional Unido—FONU*).

The United National Labor Front, formed in October 1958, brought together anti-Batista labor elements in an expanded version of the *Frente Obrero Nacional* which had been organized in 1957 to coordinate general strike activity. The United National Labor Front committed acts of sabotage in the capital, sent material aid to the front and helped organize the general strike at the time of Castro's victory. It was headed by David Salvador, who later became secretary-general of the CTC but resigned in 1960 and was imprisoned.

WORKERS' CIRCLES (*Los Círculos de Trabajadores*).

The first Circle was created in Havana in 1885 and thereafter additional ones were formed in other parts of the country. The Circles were established to support the workers' societies of the time and to promote worker education and cultural improvement. The Havana Circle provided meeting and office space for workers' groups, offered adult classes, and supported three schools for poor children. In addition, it organized the first May Day celebration in Cuba and participated in the workers' congresses of 1887 and 1892.

Dominican Republic _____

MARTIN F. MURPHY

The Dominican Republic of the nineteenth century, long an economic backwater in Latin America and ruled by brutal dictatorships, is not a country where one would expect to find an early and vibrant labor movement. So was the case. Even with the rebirth of the sugarcane industry in the 1870s and the influx of foreign capital and labor in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, labor organization was at best at a primitive state. Although various strikes by the sugar workers occurred during this period (especially in 1883 and 1884), these actions were isolated and short-lived responses to immediate needs and demands rather than demonstrations of worker class consciousness and political unity.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and first quarter of the twentieth century the Dominican Republic was characterized by the lowest population density in the Antilles, a predominantly agrarian population composed of small-scale producers, virtually no industrial base outside the agro-industrial sugarcane plantations, heavy reliance on seasonally imported foreign plantation labor, small urban-based guilds composed of artisans; dictatorial and puppet governments, and the U.S. military occupation from 1916 to 1924. During the last two decades of the nineteenth century the only labor organizations were instructional, recreational, and mutual aid societies, based in the four principal cities (Santo Domingo, Santiago de los Caballeros, San Pedro de Macoris, and Puerto Plata). Composed primarily of artisans, these associations served the social and cultural rather than the political needs of their members. In many senses these organizations attempted to imitate for their members the "high culture" roles of the private clubs of the dominant class. Thus, their meetings featured poetry and literature readings and performances of European classical music.

Those labor organizations founded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which had some importance include the League of Workers and Artisans* (Liga de Obreros y Artesanos, 1899); Artisans' Club (Club de Artesanos,

1902); Mutual Aid (Socorro Mutuo, 1891); and Aid Union (Union de Ayuda, 1891)—all social clubs and artisans or workers mutual aid societies, formed in the capital city of Santo Domingo. In Puerto Plata the Mutual Aid Society (Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos, 1882) was founded along with artisan organizations which were recreation and education oriented. In Santiago de los Caballeros, the Cibaëña Alliance* (Alianza Cibaëña, 1884), Society of Artisans (Sociedad de Artesanos, 1884), and Lights of the Yaque* (Luces del Yaque, 1902) were formed as mutual aid, recreational, and instructional clubs. The League of Workers and Artisans, Cibaëña Alliance, and Lights of the Yaque were the most influential of the groups in the country.

After the assassination of the dictator Ulises Heureaux (Lilis) in 1899, new organizations arose and many of the previously existing associations began to take on a different orientation. For a short period of two to three years, many labor organizations orchestrated a few strikes and envisioned a new role for themselves as political vehicles for an elite sector of the working class: urban-based artisans. However, under the eighteen different governments in power from 1899 until the U.S. invasion of 1916 and with the massive importation of foreign seasonal laborers for the sugar plantations, during this and subsequent periods, the labor movement generally was fragmented and represented only a small percentage of workers.

The U.S. military occupation (1916–24) is often cited as an impetus for the development of the modern Dominican labor movement. However, the contemporary debate about the invasion initially brought labor together under a common banner and later was a factor in dividing the movement and permitting U.S. labor involvement. An example of these phenomena at play is found in the history of the Nationalist Communal Brotherhood* (Hermandad Comunal Nacionalista).

The Brotherhood was founded during the first year of the occupation as both a labor organization and a vehicle for nationalist protest against U.S. imperialism and the importation of foreign workers. In 1919 José Eugenio Kundhart, Brotherhood founder and principal leader, enlisted the support of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) through Samuel Gompers, and the newly founded nationalist organization joined the Pan-American Federation of Labor. Kundhart's address to the International Federation of Labor delegates in 1919 brought international condemnation of U.S. occupation and of the living and working conditions in the Dominican Republic. However, the Nationalist Communal Brotherhood was dominated by professionals, not by members of the working class, and vehement debates concerning labor's positions toward the U.S. occupation, nationalism, and strategies eventually divided the Brotherhood and the nascent modern labor movement.

In 1920 the country's first Workers' Congress was celebrated in Santo Domingo, within the context of the U.S. military occupation, American Federation of Labor involvement in the labor movement, and expansion of the Dominican sugar industry and the economy. During the convention the formulation of the

constitution of the Dominican Confederation of Work* (*Confederación Dominicana de Trabajo—CDT*) was begun. At this and subsequent conventions (1922, 1926, 1928, 1929), all the urban centers of the country and most of the crafts were represented. In 1929, for reasons of regionalism and differences in political ideologies especially concerned with nationalism and social class, the nascent CDT experienced a fracturing of the organization through internal division among the delegates to its last convention of the decade. In 1930 the remnants of the CDT received formal recognition from Provisional President Rafael Estrella Ureña.

Rafael Trujillo's rise to national power (16 August 1930) profoundly influenced subsequent labor development. The CDT and the other smaller labor organizations which survived Trujillo's repressive campaigns became co-opted, dependent on the dictatorship for their very existence. Therefore, precisely in a period of great economic crisis and sacrifice by the Dominican working class (1930s), the labor movement was controlled by the dictatorship. This utilitarian and paternalistic dictatorship passed a few legislative acts favorable to labor, such as a compensation fund for work accidents (although Trujillo's own company, Seguros San Rafael, was the insuring agent), limits on child labor, and reduction of the workday to eight hours in response to International Labour Organization pressure. Nonetheless, the laws were seldom enforced.

In the 1930s and 1940s the Dominican economy developed rapidly under Trujillo's agricultural and industrial import substitution model. The Trujillo family not only ruled the country but was its major employer. By the mid-1950s it is estimated that 75 percent of the country's salaried employees worked directly or indirectly for Trujillo, a fact of major importance in understanding the nature of labor-management relations during his regime.

During the 1940s the most recalcitrant labor groups were composed of sugar workers on the U.S. corporation plantations, and in 1942 the country's first large-scale industrial strike was called at the Central Romana plantation. The Trujillo regime quickly put down the strike, brutally dealt with its leaders, and little was done to ameliorate the condition which brought on the strike—the drastic deterioration of the workers' real wage due to inflation. In 1946 a second strike broke out at the plantations around the eastern cities of San Pedro de Macorís and La Romana. Due to many factors, especially efficient coordination and the element of surprise, the immediate material gains of the workers as a result of this strike proved most impressive, with average salary increases of slightly over 100 percent. On the political level it also appeared that labor had for the first time made major inroads toward power sharing.

In mid-1946 Trujillo helped organize the Workers' Congress (*Congreso Obrero*), permitted the reentry of many socialists in exile, attendance by the Confederation of Cuban Workers, and active participation by the major organizers of the 1946 sugar strike. At the time many felt that Trujillo, in response to international pressure and the demise of the Nazi and fascist regimes in Europe, was prepared to offer labor concrete legal guarantees. Instead, through this

Congress the dictator created a new national labor organization: the Confederation of Dominican Workers* (Confederación de Trabajadores Dominicanos—CTD), with an executive board composed in the main of Trujillo appointees, and opposition labor representatives such as Mauricio Baéz a distinct minority.

Through this maneuver Trujillo was able to identify and select opposition leaders for eventual assassination, once again co-opt the labor movement, and crush the socialist and Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations in the country. As has been noted by many authors writing about this period, the material conditions of the workers improved during this time, but the labor movement lost its liberty. This loss of autonomy is readily seen in two examples. The presidents of all local or provincial labor federations were the Trujillo-appointed governors of the respective provinces, and in the mid-1950s sugar workers staged strikes on Trujillo's command at the U.S. corporation plantations during his attempts to buy out the enterprises.

During the final years of the Trujillo regime the beginnings of a free and independent labor movement can be noted. Various organizations and political parties in exile, along with the U.S.-financed International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CIOSL) and the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT), all worked to inform the international community of the plight of workers under the Trujillo regime. Nonetheless, these organizations could do little to organize Dominican labor.

Months after Trujillo's assassination in 1961, the first independent labor organization to be known in the country in thirty years was founded. During its first months of existence the United Workers' Front for Autonomous Labor Unions* (Frente Obrero Unido Pro Sindicatos Autónomos—FOUPSA) met strong opposition from the new government headed by Rafael Trujillo's son Ramfis and Joaquín Balaguer and confronted attempts by the CTD to incorporate FOUPSA. With the final demise of the Trujillo family empire in November 1961, the CTD collapsed, and FOUPSA emerged as the dominant labor organization, claiming 60,000 members.

FOUPSA's reign as the country's principal labor federation was, however, short-lived. Internal division and competition from other fledgling labor organizations caused FOUPSA to be relegated to the status of a federation of secondary importance by late 1962.

This period of political opening in the Dominican Republic caused a rapid process of fracture of the nascent labor movement, as seen in the case of FOUPSA. Moving from a model of all organized labor united in one organization, albeit under Trujillo's control, in little more than one year seven major labor federations appeared; each with its particular political ideology, most associated with the various nascent political parties of the time, and all with their own philosophy as to the appropriate role of labor in a dependent capitalist economy.

These federations founded in 1961 and 1962 include FOUPSA, by mid-1962 a nationalist, pro-Castro labor group of reduced importance; the Free United Workers' Front for Autonomous Labor Unions* (Frente Obrero Unido Pro Sin-

dicatos Autónomos Libre—FOUPSA Libre), a splinter organization of FOUPSA, financed by the AFL–CIO and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (by late 1962 FOUPSA Libre was the nation's largest labor organization and changed its name to the National Confederation of Free Workers, Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Libres—CONATRAL); the Autonomous Confederation of Christian Labor Unions* (Confederación Autònoma de Sindicatos Cristianos—CASC), a Christian, Social Democrat group allied with the Social Christian Revolutionary Party (PRSC) and numerous international Catholic organizations; the Dominican Union of Workers* (La Unión), allied with the leftist June Revolutionary Movement (IJ4) (La Unión became an anti-imperialist labor group of secondary importance); the Labor Union Confederation of Dominican Workers* (Central Sindical de Trabajadores Dominicanos—CESITRADO), a splinter group of FOUPSA (in late 1962 progressive sectors of FOUPSA and CESITRADO reunited to form the National Confederation of Workers* (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores—FOUPSA-CESITRADO); the National Federation of Teachers* (Federación Nacional de Maestros—FENEMA), a national education organization with anti-imperialist and pro-Castro orientations; and the National Federation of Employees of Public Sector and Autonomous Institutions* (Federación Nacional de Empleados Públicos e Institutos Autónomos—FENEPIA), a federation primarily of public sector employees with nationalist and pro-socialist leanings.

As further testimony to the liberalizing impact of Trujillo's elimination, from 1962 to 1963, nearly 200 new unions registered with the Secretariat of Labor.

In late 1962 the Dominican labor movement played an important role in the upcoming national elections slated for 20 December. The movement represented both a political force in its own right and one to be manipulated by the various Dominican political parties, interest groups, and U.S. foreign policy. At the time of Juan Bosch's presidential victory on the Dominican Revolutionary Party's (PRD) ticket, his administration actively sought to unite the labor movement. Nonetheless, Bosch's record during his eight-month administration (overthrown by a coup in mid-1963) reveals attempts to manipulate the movement for electoral gains and little respect for the rights of labor.

Fearing "another Cuba," the U.S. Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and Agency for International Development, along with the AFL–CIO's Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) and American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), all played active overt and covert roles in the Dominican labor movement of the 1960s. As noted above, these organizations encouraged the division of the largest labor organization, FOUPSA, shortly after its founding; helped to create FOUPSA Libre (CONATRAL), financed and trained its leaders, and thwarted attempts at a unified labor movement during Bosch's eight-month tenure as president. But these organizations and their agent, CONATRAL, also went a few steps further. CONATRAL, which always called itself "apolitical," publicly congratulated the military for the coup d'état which toppled Bosch in

1963; and during the Civil War of 1965 the CONATRAL leadership, unlike other major organizations, refused to unite forces with the Constitutionalist who were fighting to reinstate the Dominican Constitution and the electoral process. CONATRAL leadership went so far as to publicly support the United States and Organization of American States military invasion of the country in 1965, and to support the U.S.-backed presidential candidate, Joaquín Balaguer, in the 1966 elections.

There were two principal motives behind the U.S. State Department, intelligence sector, and U.S. organized labor and business's manipulation of the Dominican labor movement. These interest groups wanted to keep the labor movement "apolitical" but vehemently antiprogressive, and they wished to counter the classist, combative orientation of certain labor organizations by fostering an ideology of class cooperation—labor and business (native and foreign) working together for the "development" of Dominican society and economy.

Through the manipulation of the labor movement and the creation of a pro-U.S. stance by many workers, these organizations contributed to the division of the labor movement and the defeat of the Constitutionist forces in the Civil War; justified the invasion and occupation; rallied support for the election of former Trujillo ally, Joaquín Balaguer, in 1966; minimized nationalist, anti-imperialist positions; and set the stage for increased U.S.-based multinational corporate investment in the Dominican Republic.

From 1966 to 1978, the Balaguer years, the progressive and classist labor federations, FOUPSA-CESITRADO, CASC, La Unión, FENEMA, and FENEPIA, were either divided and made virtually ineffectual or completely disappeared. Union busting through the denial of government recognition, the creation of parallel unions, capricious arrests of labor leaders, assassinations and disappearances, and the use of National Police and Armed Forces troops to quell labor disturbances became common tactics used by the Balaguer governments and business.

During the first four-year Balaguer government (1966–70) the labor movement recorded little overall growth. Generally, the classist federations were in retreat in terms of both affiliated unions and membership, and political activities, while CONATRAL and other pro-U.S. and class cooperation organizations were on the rise. A model was created at the nation's largest sugar plantation, Central Romana, which would be extensively used in the next two tenures of Balaguer: union busting and the creation of parallel, company unions.

While the U.S.-based multinational corporation Gulf + Western was beginning its takeover of the South Porto [sic] Rico Sugar Company and its Central Romana plantation, it sought the assistance of the Balaguer government to disband the United Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana* (Sindicato Unido de Trabajadores del Central Romana—SU). SU at this time was the most organized and combative of the country's classist organizations. Between 1966 and 1967 Gulf + Western and the government managed to destroy the federation through assassinations and disappearances of labor leaders, police and military intervention, and the dismissal of many federation members. To replace SU, the

company created the Free Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana* (Sindicato Libre de Trabajadores del Central Romana—SL). SL immediately received its certification from the Department of Labor, never called work slowdowns or strikes against the company, and survived as the only labor organization on the plantation until the end of the Balaguer era, 1978.

From 1970 to 1978 the two consecutive Balaguer governments actively encouraged business concerns to create company unions modeled after the Gulf + Western experience in order to both minimize labor unrest and inhibit the growth of a unified national labor movement. During this period, therefore, the number of new labor unions registered with the Department of Labor rose sharply. In 1970, for example, nine new unions registered with the Secretariat of Labor, whereas for the remainder of the period new union registration averaged approximately thirty-six yearly. This does not imply, however, an increase in labor organization; rather it demonstrates the further fracturing of the labor movement.

An exception to the general trends during the Balaguer years was the birth of the General Confederation of Workers* (Central General de Trabajadores—CGT). During a period of union busting and denial of Department of Labor certification to many organizations (in 1973 the Labor Department revoked the certification of over 300 groups), the classist CGT was formed in 1972 and certified in 1974. Through the efforts of a dissident faction—the Renewal Movement (Movimiento Renovador) of the Autonomous Confederation of Christian Labor Unions (CASC) and various leaders of the dismantled FOUPSA-CESI-TRADO and other labor organizations—the CGT arose and assumed a posture toward business and the Balaguer government quite distinct from the majority of labor groups of the period. The CGT expanded rapidly until its division in 1983. Within three years of its certification the confederation was one of only three in the country and had organized workers in diverse technical and manual labor fields.

With the 1978 election of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) candidate, Antonio Guzmán, the Dominican labor movement took on vastly different quantitative features but showed little qualitative change. After the withdrawal of Juan Bosch from the party (he formed the Dominican Liberation Party—PLD—in 1973), the PRD exhibited a much more moderate political approach. With some similarities to the 1961–62 period of democratic opening in Dominican society, from 1978 to 1982 another “union boom” took place in the country. For example, in 1978, 117 new labor unions (of which 73 were in Santo Domingo) registered with the Secretariat of Labor. And by 1981 that total reached 350 (155 in Santo Domingo, 195 outside the capital). This tremendous increase in the number of new unions registered with the Department of Labor appears impressive and suggests that the situation of the working class had improved; instead it continued to deteriorate through division of existing organizations and the creation of groups competing for membership of workers in key industries.

Two new labor confederations were formed between 1978 and 1980: the General Union of Dominican Workers* (Unión General de Trabajadores Dom-

inicanos—UGTD) and the Unitary Confederation of Workers* (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores—CUT). Also, the National Confederation of Free Workers (CONATRAL) and the Labor Union Confederation of Organized Workers* (Confederación Sindicalista de Trabajadores Organizados—COSTO) merged into the National Confederation of Dominican Workers* (Central Nacional de Trabajadores Dominicanos—CNTD). An important point to bear in mind is that the first two new confederations, UGTD and CUT, are appendages and vehicles of political parties, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and the Dominican Communist Party (PCD), respectively.

Various attempts to unify the labor movement and even attempts to band together temporarily have been frustrated. A case in point is the failure of the other confederations in 1980 to invite the UGTD to participate in an attempt to unite the organizations under the National Council for Labor Union Unity* (Consejo Nacional de Unidad Sindical—CNUS) because of the UGTD's ties with the ruling PRD. To further aggravate the unification movement, the CGT divided in 1983 to form two competing organizations of the same name; in mid-1985 CUT expelled many of its most influential leaders, and the UGTD was in shambles, divided along the lines of competing factions within the PRD.

Although from 1978 to 1986 the two Dominican Revolutionary Party administrations proved less brutal than Balaguer in their dealings with labor, labor has not achieved much in terms of unity, political influence, or improved living and working conditions. Although labor leaders are no longer exiled or imprisoned for long periods, labor unrest is still responded to with police billy clubs and rifles; the impact of increases in the national minimum wage has been negated by inflation; and the working class has generally been excluded from power sharing during this period of democratic opening (*apertura democrática*).

Bibliography

- Calderón, Rafael. "El movimiento obrero dominicano, 1870–1978." In *Historia del movimiento obrero en América Latina*, ed. Pablo Gonzales Casanova. México, D. F.: Siglo XXI, 1983.
- . "Movimiento obrero dominicano, 1930–1962." *Realidad Contemporánea* (Santo Domingo) 1, no. 2 (1976): 93–139.
- Cassá, Roberto and Ciprián Soler. "La clase obrera dominicana y su movimiento en los orígenes." Paper presented at the conference "Historia del Movimiento Obrero Dominicano," Departamento de Historia y Antropología, Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo and POASI, 2 June 1985, Santo Domingo.
- De Arango, Fernando. "Sindicalismo dominicano." *Estudios Sociales* (Santo Domingo) 1, no. 1 (1968): 141–56.
- De Galíndez, Jesús. *La era de Trujillo: Un estudio casuístico de dictadura hispanoamericana*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Americana, 1958.
- De la Cruz, Carlos E. "Sindicatos azucareros y su percepción por los obreros: Estudio exploratorio de cuatro ingenios dominicanos." *Estudios Sociales* (Santo Domingo) 9, no. 7 (1976): 143–67.

- Del Castillo, José. "La atomización del movimiento sindical." In *Ensayos de sociología dominicana*, ed. José del Castillo. Santo Domingo: Taller, 1981: 87-91.
- De Peña Valdez, Julio. *Breve historia del movimiento sindical dominicano*. Santo Domingo: Ediciones Dominicanas Populares, 1978.
- . *El movimiento sindical dominicano, 1961-1983*. Santo Domingo: Proyeectos Editoriales, 1984.
- Espinal, Rosario. *Clase obrera y movimiento sindical en Republica Dominicana*. Santo Domingo: Fondo para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales, 1984.
- González Casanova, Pablo, ed. *Historia del movimiento obrero en América Latina*. México, D.F.: Siglo XXI, 1983.
- Jonas, Susanne. "Trade Union Imperialism in the Dominican Republic." *NACLA's Latin America & Empire Report* (New York) 9, no. 3 (1975): 13-30.
- José del Orbe, Justino. *Mauricio Báez y la clase obrera*. Santo Domingo: Taller, 1981.
- Kryzanek, Michael J. "Diversion, Subversion and Repression: The Strategies of Anti-Opposition Politics in Balaguer's Dominican Republic." *Caribbean Studies* 17, nos. 1-2 (1977): 83-103.
- Pozo, Manuel de Jesús. "Historia del movimiento obrero dominicano, 1900-1930 (I)." *Realidad Contemporánea* (Santo Domingo) 1, no. 2 (1976): 35-89.
- . "Historia del movimiento obrero dominicano, 1900-1930 (II)." *Realidad Contemporánea* (Santo Domingo) 1, nos. 3-4 (1976): 25-77.
- Wiarda, Howard J. "The Development of the Labor Movement in the Dominican Republic." *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 20, no. 1 (1966): 41-63.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

LA ALIANZA CIBAENA. See The Cibaena Alliance.

AUTONOMOUS CONFEDERATION OF CHRISTIAN LABOR UNIONS (Confederación Autónoma de Sindicatos Cristianos—CASC).

Founded on 5 February 1962, CASC, though it changed its name in the early 1970s, is the only major labor federation from the early 1960s which remained in existence in 1985. The basic ideological posture of the organization is Christian socialist, and it always has maintained ties with international Catholic labor organizations. From its inception the Autonomous Confederation of Christian Labor Unions proclaimed itself to be revolutionary, anti-imperialist, nonsectarian, and nonpartisan. Nonetheless, it has maintained close ties with the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC), and its original board was composed exclusively of PRSC militants.

Because of its association with international Catholic labor organizations and exile groups, the CASC leadership has been both influenced and relatively well financed by external sources. Initial training of leaders took place in Venezuela by the Latin American Confederation of Christian Labor Unionists (Confederación Latino Americana de Sindicalistas Cristianos—CLASC) and with the aid of the National Institute of Labor Union Studies (Instituto Nacional de Estudios Sindicales—INES) and the Institute for the Formation of Christian Democracy

(Instituto de Formación de Democracia Cristiana—IFEDEC). Emilio Maspero was one of the principal instructors of the CASC leadership, leading courses in Venezuela and later in the Dominican Republic.

After the December 1962 election of Juan Bosch, the candidate for the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), the CASC refused to formally join a united labor front with the other major labor federations of the time, but worked closely with the Bosch government. The CASC leadership and membership also joined the Constitutionalist forces in the 1965 Civil War and fought for the reinstatement of the Dominican Constitution and reinstatement of Bosch as president after his overthrow by the military in 1963.

Originally growing out of a Christian trade union, Autonomous Labor Union of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Sindicato Autonomo de Industria Farmaceutica—SADIF), the CASC within months covered peasant leagues, industrial labor unions, sugarcane plantation unions, and public employee unions. Months after its creation, in April 1962, CASC claimed to have twenty-five affiliated unions and 14,000 members. In mid-1963, at the time of the overthrow of the Bosch government, its size had increased to ninety-six unions and 25,000 members. In the early 1970s the name of the organization was changed to the Autonomous Confederation of Classist Labor Unions (Confederación Autónoma de Sindicatos Clasistas), while its acronym, CASC, was maintained along with its basic Christian and somewhat revolutionary orientation.

AUTONOMOUS CONFEDERATION OF CLASSIST LABOR UNIONS (Confederación Autónoma de Sindicatos Clasistas). *See* Autonomous Confederation of Christian Labor Unions.

CASC. *See* Autonomous Confederation of Christian Labor Unions.

CDT. *See* Dominican Confederation of Work.

CENTRAL GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

CENTRAL NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DOMINICANOS. *See* National Confederation of Dominican Workers.

CENTRAL SINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES DOMINICANOS. *See* Labor Union Confederation of Dominican Workers.

CENTRAL UNITARIA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Unitary Confederation of Workers.

CESITRADO. *See* Labor Union Confederation of Dominican Workers.

CGT. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

THE CIBAEÑA ALLIANCE (La Alianza Cibaeña).

Founded in 1884 in the country's second largest city, Santiago de los Caballeros, and best characterized as a society of artisans, the organization was dedicated primarily to instruction, recreational activities, and mutual aid. At the turn of the century it had only 56 active members; in 1915 there were a reported 100 members. By the 1920s it either was ineffectual or had disbanded completely.

CNTD. *See* National Confederation of Dominican Workers.

CNUS. *See* National Council for Labor Union Unity.

COMITÉ PRO-CONFEDERACIÓN UNICA. *See* Committee for Unitary Confederation.

COMMITTEE FOR UNITARY CONFEDERATION (Comité Pro-Confederación Unica—CUT).

Founded in the 1960s, the Committee for Unitary Confederation historically played interesting roles as first an organization which advocated a united labor movement and later was divisive in attempts to unite labor. CUT, always controlled by the Juan Bosch faction of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), was first used by the former Dominican president as a unifying force among the various labor union confederations during his eight-month tenure, 1962–63. During this period CUT, as its name implies, attempted to rally labor into a united, cohesive movement in support of the Bosch government.

In April 1972 CUT participated with other labor organizations and helped found the coordinating committee of the General Confederation of Workers* (Central General de Trabajadores—CGT), an organization with plans to unite Dominican labor. Only three months later, in July 1972, CUT withdrew from the Coordinating Committee of the CGT, along with the powerful National Union of Independent Unionized Drivers (UNACHOSIN), at a critical period of struggle against the Joaquín Balaguer–Reformist Party (Partido Reformista) government. At this point it became obvious that CUT was an appendage of the Juan Bosch faction of the PRD and advocated labor unity only when most appropriate for that political party.

Although CUT has never achieved a significant following in terms of membership and affiliated unions, its unitary and divisive roles in the Dominican labor movement are most important.

The Committee for Unitary Confederation (CUT) should not be confused with another labor organization with the same acronym, Unitary Confederation of Workers* (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores—CUT).

CONATRAL. *See* National Confederation of Free Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN AUTÓNOMA DE SINDICATOS CLASISTAS. *See* Autonomous Confederation of Classist Labor Unions.

CONFEDERACIÓN AUTÓNOMA DE SINDICATOS CRISTIANOS. *See* Autonomous Confederation of Christian Labor Unions.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DOMINICANOS. *See* Confederation of Dominican Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN DOMINICANA DE TRABAJO. *See* Dominican Confederation of Work.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* National Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DOMINICANOS. *See* National Confederation of Dominican Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES LIBRES. *See* National Confederation of Free Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN SINDICALISTA DE TRABAJADORES ORGANIZADOS. *See* Labor Union Confederation of Organized Workers.

CONFEDERATION OF DOMINICAN WORKERS (Confederación de Trabajadores Dominicanos—CTD).

The Confederation was formed in 1946 through the successful efforts of Rafael Trujillo (the dictator who ruled the country from 1930 to 1961) to co-opt both the growing labor movement and the socialist parties and organizations. Trujillo placed his appointees, such as Francisco Prats Ramirez, on the board of the organization and they quickly dominated the minority of pro-socialist and pro-labor members.

By 1951 the CTD was the only officially recognized labor organization in the country, and presidents of all provincial-level labor organizations were Trujillo's own appointed province governors. The Confederation was instrumental in organizing strikes in the sugar industry during the mid-1950s on Trujillo's command. These strikes helped to drive out U.S. sugar corporations and allow the Trujillo family to purchase the plantations at below market value. With the demise of the Trujillo family empire in late 1961, the CTD disappeared.

In the literature concerning the history of the Dominican labor movement and labor organizations the CTD is often confused with the Dominican Confederation of Work* (CDT).

CONSEJO NACIONAL DE UNIDAD SINDICAL. *See* National Council for Labor Union Unity.

COSTO. *See* Labor Union Confederation of Organized Workers.

CTD. *See* Confederation of Dominican Workers.

CUT. *See* Unitary Confederation of Workers; Committee for Unitary Confederation.

DOMINICAN CONFEDERATION OF WORK (Confederación Dominicana de Trabajo—CDT).

At the first Labor Congress (Congreso Obrero) celebrated in Santo Domingo in 1920, the process of formulating the constitution of the CDT was begun. Throughout this decade a total of five labor congresses were held with representation from labor organizations from all urban centers in the country. For reasons of regionalism and differences in political ideology, especially in relation to nationalism and social class, the nascent CDT divided along factions during the decade's last convention in 1929. In 1930 the remnants of the Confederation received formal recognition from Provisional President Rafael Estrella Ureña.

Months after its legal recognition the CDT became ineffectual as a pro-labor organization under the Trujillo regime and was dependent on the dictatorship for its survival. In the literature concerning the Dominican labor movement and labor organizations, the CDT is often confused with the Confederation of Dominican Workers* (CTD).

DOMINICAN UNION OF WORKERS (Unión Dominicana de Trabajadores—La Unión).

Founded in mid-1962, a year after the assassination of Rafael Trujillo and during a period of dramatic growth in the Dominican labor movement, the Dominican Union of Workers was committed to the unification of the rapidly developing and dividing labor organizations of the time into a single organized movement. Led by Marcos de Vargas, La Unión was strongly anti-U.S., anti-imperialist, and most sympathetic to the nationalist and socialist direction of the Castro government in Cuba at the time.

The 14 June Movement, the principal left political party of the early 1960s, helped organize and worked closely with La Unión. During the short-lived Juan Bosch (Dominican Revolutionary Party—PRD) government, 1962–63, La Unión cooperated with Bosch and enthusiastically participated in the creation of a semi-unified labor movement. Although La Unión never achieved its goal of unification and at its height never developed a following of more than thirteen labor unions, its impact was felt through support of the Constitutionalist forces in the 1965 Civil War.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE EMPLEADOS PÚBLICOS E INSTITUTOS AUTÓNOMOS. *See* National Federation of Employees of Public Sector and Autonomous Institutions.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE MAESTROS. *See* National Federation of Teachers.

FEDERACIÓN PROVINCIAL DE TRABAJO DE LA ROMANA. *See* Provincial Work Federation of La Romana.

FEDERACIÓN PROVISIONAL DE TRABAJO DE SAN PEDRO DE MACORÍS. *See* Provincial Work Federation of San Pedro de Macorís.

FENEMA. *See* National Federation of Teachers.

FENEPIA. *See* National Federation of Employees of Public Sector and Autonomous Institutions.

FOUPSA. *See* United Workers' Front for Autonomous Labor Unions.

FOUPSA-CESITRADO. *See* National Confederation of Workers.

FOUPSA LIBRE. *See* Free United Workers' Front for Autonomous Labor Unions.

FREE LABOR UNION OF WORKERS OF CENTRAL ROMANA (Sindicato Libre de Trabajadores del Central Romana).

After the 1966–67 labor disturbances orchestrated by the United Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana* (SU) at the Central Romana sugar plantation, Gulf + Western management and the Balaguer government helped form a rival organization, the Free Union of Workers of Central Romana. The principal organizer of the Free Union was Danilo Brito Báez, a former high-ranking official of the National Confederation of Free Workers* and assistant to American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) country representative, Jack Goodwyn. The Free Labor Union was immediately recognized by the Balaguer government, and Gulf + Western managers demanded that workers sign a form disaffiliating from the United Labor Union (Sindicato Unido) and join the newly formed company union.

During contract negotiations in 1978 more than 10,000 workers left the Free Labor Union to attend a United Labor Union assembly and rally. Gulf + Western management recognized that the majority of members of the Free Union were once again allying with the United Labor Union, which was now (1970s) formally associated with the General Confederation of Workers.*

The classist and combative orientation of the United Labor Union and the

General Confederation of Workers threatened management. Gulf + Western agreed to recognize the United Labor Union in the late 1970s only on the condition that it reorganize its leadership and renounce affiliation with the General Confederation of Workers. The Free Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana disbanded, and the United Labor Union is once again the principal labor organization of Central Romana workers. However, many former leaders of the Free Union are now officials of the United Labor Union, and the orientation of this organization toward labor dispute is conciliatory. See United Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana.

FREE UNITED WORKERS' FRONT FOR AUTONOMOUS LABOR UNIONS (Frente Obrero Unido Pro Sindicatos Autónomos Libre—FOUPSA Libre).

Begun as a splinter group of FOUPSA (United Workers' Front for Autonomous Labor Unions*) in February 1962, FOUPSA Libre adhered to a pro-U.S. and right-of-center ideology. Although the organization claimed to be apolitical, training of leaders and political and financial support came from the U.S. government, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, and the AFL-CIO, and the front was vehemently anti-communist.

FOUPSA Libre quickly became the largest labor organization in the Dominican Republic. By the summer of 1962, six months after its creation, it claimed to represent 150 labor unions and 70,000 members, and in November 1962 it affiliated 209 unions and close to 100,000 workers. At its convention in November 1962, FOUPSA Libre changed its name to National Confederation of Free Workers.*

FRENTE OBRERO UNIDO PRO SINDICATOS AUTÓNOMOS. *See* United Workers' Front for Autonomous Labor Unions.

FRENTE OBRERO UNIDO PRO SINDICATOS AUTÓNOMOS LIBRE. *See* Free United Workers' Front for Autonomous Labor Unions.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Central General de Trabajadores—CGT).

The CGT was formed in 1972 through the efforts of a dissident faction, the Renewal Movement (Movimiento Renovador), of the Autonomous Confederation of Christian Labor Unions* (CASC), various leaders of the dismantled National Confederation of Workers* (FOUPSA-CESITRADO), the Committee for Unitary Confederation* (which soon withdrew its support), and other labor federations and unions. Not until late 1974 and after national and international pressure on the Balaguer government did the Department of Labor certify the CGT as a legal labor organization.

The General Confederation of Workers expanded rapidly from its founding in 1972 until its division in 1983. By 1977 the CGT, under the leadership of Julio de Peña Valdez, was one of three labor confederations in the country, and

included workers unions in telecommunications, education, the national corporation of state-owned businesses (CORDE), the sugar and mining industries, and national professional organizations of physicians, lawyers, and journalists. After the number of national confederations increased to five in 1978, the CGT still remained the second largest labor organization in the country.

The CGT traditionally had been associated with all leftist parties in the country (except the Dominican Communist Party—PCD), but relations between many leaders of the confederation and Juan Bosch's Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) were always tense. (Bosch left the Dominican Revolutionary Party [PRD] in 1973 to form the PLD.) Regardless of these associations, the CGT leadership until the 1980s refused to be formally affiliated with any Dominican political parties, and affiliated only briefly with an international workers organization. The CGT's stance toward labor organization can best be categorized as classist, and from its founding until the early 1980s it has repeatedly called for the unification of the Dominican labor movement.

At the Second National Congress of the CGT in late 1981, a confederation faction associated with the PLD attempted to take control of the organization. Before the Third National Congress to be celebrated in December 1983, a barrage of charges and countercharges of fiscal improprieties and interference by political parties culminated in the withdrawal of the leadership of the PLD faction of the CGT and along with it the majority of its unions and members. As of this writing there are two organizations named CGT: these commonly are referred to as Majority CGT (CGT Mayoritaria) and Minority CGT (CGT Minoritaria). The former group, affiliated with the PLD, controls, among others, the powerful and influential education, telecommunications, and the CORDE labor unions.

GENERAL UNION OF DOMINICAN WORKERS (Unión General de Trabajadores Dominicanos—UGTD).

Founded in 1978 during a period of greater liberalization by the state, the UGTD is tied to the contemporary Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). Its rapid growth, from thirty-six affiliated labor unions in 1980 to ninety-two in late 1983, is primarily due to its intimate association with the ruling PRD. Presently, the UGTD is one of five labor confederations in the country and affiliates 16 percent of the existing labor unions.

Since 1982 serious divisions have developed within the UGTD along the lines of intra-party political factions of the PRD. These divisions and squabbles have seriously hampered the effectiveness of the UGTD and the Dominican labor movement in general.

HERMANDAD COMUNAL NACIONALISTA. *See* Nationalist Communal Brotherhood.

LABOR UNION CONFEDERATION OF DOMINICAN WORKERS (Central Sindical de Trabajadores Dominicanos—CESITRADO).

Founded in late 1961 after the assassination of Rafael Trujillo and the demise of the Trujillo empire, and during the period of dramatic development of the labor movement, CESITRADO was originally composed of a powerful drivers' union, a few other unions of minor importance, and a splinter group from the United Workers' Front for Autonomous Labor Unions* (FOUPSA). Prior to the national elections in December 1962 the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) orchestrated the unification of the progressive sectors of FOUPSA and CESITRADO, and the National Confederation of Workers* was formed.

LABOR UNION CONFEDERATION OF ORGANIZED WORKERS (Confederación Sindicalista de Trabajadores Organizados—COSTO).

Created in 1964 by the business sector and the state, this organization is best described as one used to further divide the labor movement and serve the immediate interests of the ruling junta of the time. Later, the confederation served the rightist Balaguer regime and the business community with its ideology and strategies of class cooperation between business and labor. Throughout its tenure COSTO received little active support from the working class and in 1978 was incorporated, with the National Confederation of Free Workers,* into the National Confederation of Dominican Workers.*

LABOR UNION MOVEMENT OF WORKERS' UNITY (Movimiento Sindical de la Unidad Obrera—MOUSO).

Founded in 1979 and affiliated with the Dominican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Dominicano—PCD), the Labor Union Movement of Workers' Unity was reorganized in 1980 into the Unitary Confederation of Workers*—CUT.

LEAGUE OF WORKERS AND ARTISANS (Liga de Obreros y Artesanos).

Founded immediately after the assassination of dictator Ulises Heureaux (Lilis) in 1899, the League held its first publicized meeting on 31 December 1899 and on 1 January 1900 presented a manifesto. Although the League publicly advocated socialism, its program is best described as anarchist. Leadership was dominated by Spanish and Puerto Rican immigrants, a petit-bourgeoisie of primarily professionals, intellectuals, journalists, and aspiring politicians.

The League of Workers and Artisans in the second and third decades of the twentieth century actively worked with the Nationalist Communal Brotherhood* to protest the importation of foreign workers. The League was eventually incorporated into the Dominican Confederation of Work.*

LIGA DE OBREROS Y ARTESANOS. *See* League of Workers and Artisans.

LIGHTS OF THE YAQUE (Luces del Yaque).

Founded in 1902 in the country's second largest city, Santiago de los Caballeros, this organization was also known as the Society of Workers (Sociedad

de Obreros). Its ranks were primarily composed of artisans, and its ends were instruction and recreation for its members.

LUCES DEL YAQUE. *See* Lights of the Yaque.

MOUSO. *See* Labor Union Movement of Workers' Unity.

MOVIMIENTO SINDICAL DE LA UNIDAD OBRERA. *See* Labor Union Movement of Workers' Unity.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF DOMINICAN WORKERS (Central Nacional de Trabajadores Dominicanos—CNTD).

Founded in the 1970s as a continuation of the National Confederation of Free Workers* (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Libres—CONATRAL) and the Labor Union Confederation of Organized Workers* (Confederación Sindicalista de Trabajadores Organizados—COSTO), CNTD received the active support of the rightist Balaguer government and the United States. CNTD is a noncombative labor organization with an ideology of class cooperation between labor and business and is associated with the AFL-CIO and Inter American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT). CNTD is presently one of five labor confederations in the country, although the second smallest in terms of affiliated unions and members.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Libres—CONATRAL).

Originally titled FOUPSA Libre, this pro-U.S., right-of-center labor organization was chartered as CONATRAL in November 1962. In spite of its USAID (United States Agency for International Development), AIFLD (American Institute for Free Labor Development), and AFL-CIO backing, prior to the December 1962 elections Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) established close but informal ties with CONATRAL. Bosch's PRD recognized that it had no alternative, because at this time CONATRAL was the largest labor organization in the country, claiming 209 affiliated unions and close to 100,000 members.

After Bosch's election as President of the Republic, CONATRAL refused to participate in a united labor movement and effectively dashed all hopes of ever creating a unified movement. This labor organization not only found it impossible to cooperate with nationalist, classist organizations because of its pro-U.S., right-of-center ideology and conciliatory stance toward the resolution of labor-management conflicts, but it found that it did not need the other labor organizations in order to survive because of the tremendous financial backing it received from the U.S. government and U.S. labor organizations. At the time of the overthrow of Bosch in September 1963, CONATRAL claimed more than 300 affiliated unions and more than 100,000 members. After the coup, CONATRAL praised

the “patriotic gesture” of the armed forces in the overthrow of the constitutional government.

CONATRAL backed the rightist president Joaquín Balaguer during his twelve-year tenure from 1966 to 1978 and in turn received favor during his three administrations. CONATRAL advocated a “free unionism” which justified the development of rival unions, replacement of union boards, and creation of company-controlled labor groups (“yellow unions”). When Balaguer lost power in 1978 CONATRAL was dismantled by its own leaders, as they recognized that it was impossible to maintain the organization without state support. In 1978 the remnants of CONATRAL were incorporated with the Labor Union Confederation of Organized Workers* (Confederación Sindicalista de Trabajadores Organizados—COSTO) to form the new organization, the National Confederation of Dominican Workers.* Although for sixteen years (1962–78) CONATRAL was by far the largest labor organization in the country, it received little active support from the working class.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores—FOUPSA-CESITRADO).

FOUPSA-CESITRADO arose in late 1962, prior to the national elections in December, through the efforts of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). This labor organization was composed of progressive sectors of the United Workers’ Front for Autonomous Labor Unions* (Frente Obrero Unido Pro Sindicatos Autónomos—FOUPSA) and the Labor Union Confederation of Dominican Workers* (Central Sindical de Trabajadores Dominicanos—CESITRADO).

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR LABOR UNION UNITY (Consejo Nacional de Unidad Sindical—CNUS).

In the most recent attempt to unify the Dominican labor movement, the National Council for Labor Union Unity was formed in 1980. Representatives from the General Confederation of Workers* (CGT), Autonomous Confederation of Classist Labor Unions* (CASC), and Unitary Confederation of Workers* were the original organizers of CNUS. The General Union of Dominican Workers,* because of its ties and conciliatory approach to the ruling Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), was not invited to participate. The National Confederation of Dominican Workers (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Dominicanos—CNTD) joined the movement in mid-1980.

The CNUS tenure was short-lived, as were all previous attempts to unify the Dominican labor movement. Two months after joining CNUS, CASC withdrew with the claim that the CGT was trying to manipulate the movement and divide the power base of CASC. With the withdrawal of CASC and the exclusion of UGTD, two of the five major labor confederations of the time, CNUS lacked the broad-based labor support necessary to effectively organize labor.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF EMPLOYEES OF PUBLIC SECTOR AND AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTIONS (Federación Nacional de Empleados Públicos e Institutos Autónomos—FENEPIA).

Founded in November 1961, after the assassination of Trujillo and the demise of the Trujillo family, FENEPIA grew during a period of dramatic development in the Dominican labor movement. Its basic ideological orientation was nationalist and quasi-socialist, and its leadership advocated revolutionary change along the lines of Castro's Cuba.

At its height FENEPIA claimed 20,000 members and membership was restricted by occupation. With the rise of rightist governments after the overthrow of Juan Bosch in 1963, FENEPIA was dissolved.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (Federación Nacional de Maestros—FENEMA).

One of the many labor federations founded in the early 1960s after the assassination of Rafael Trujillo and the demise of the Trujillo family, the National Federation of Teachers (FENEMA) was a national organization whose membership was restricted to educational personnel. Although the rolls of FENEMA never rivaled the size of other federations of the period, its importance lies in the influential position of its members. The basic orientations of this labor organization were nationalistic, pro-socialist, and pro-Castro. The National Federation of Teachers was disbanded in the late 1960s.

NATIONALIST COMMUNAL BROTHERHOOD (Hermandad Comunal Nacionalista).

Founded in 1916, primarily as a vehicle for nationalistic protest against the U.S. military occupation (1916–24), the Brotherhood actively worked with the League of Workers and Artisans* (Liga de Obreros y Artesanos) to protest the importation of foreign workers by the sugar plantations.

The Brotherhood was led by José Eugenio Kundhart, a professional land surveyor who represented the organization at the 1919 International Labor Conference in Washington. At the conference Kundhart established contact with Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). The AFL's influence over the Brotherhood soon became evident, in spite of the latter organization's professed nationalist stance.

The Nationalist Communal Brotherhood was most influential in the second and third decades of the present century in the north coast cities of Puerto Plata and Sánchez.

PORT OF SANTO DOMINGO LABORERS' UNION (Unión de Braceros del Puerto de Santo Domingo).

Founded on 3 September 1916 as a nationalist and workers' defense organization, unlike the Nationalist Communal Brotherhood,* the group was primarily a labor union. This labor organization was the most important of the various

groups of dockworkers in other port cities and associations of carpenters and masons which developed in the the second decade of the present century, partially as a response to the U.S. military occupation (1916–24).

PROVINCIAL WORK FEDERATION OF LA ROMANA (*Federación Provincial de Trabajo de La Romana*).

Known also as the Local Federation (*Federación Local*), this organization arose in 1945 through the efforts of the Provincial Work Federation of San Pedro de Macorís.* Led by Hernando Hernández, unlike its sister organization in San Pedro, the federation was not socialist-oriented but was vehemently anti-Trujillo. The federation affiliated eighteen unions, principally those of sugar plantation workers.

Shortly after its unsuccessful participation in the sugar strike of 1946, the organization was co-opted by the Trujillo regime and its principal organizers were assassinated. See Provincial Work Federation of San Pedro de Macorís.

PROVINCIAL WORK FEDERATION OF SAN PEDRO DE MACORÍS.

The Provincial Work Federation (sometimes called the Local Federation, *Federación Local*) arose in the early 1940s led by Mauricio Báez, often called the father of the Dominican labor movement. Originally the federation was composed of intellectuals from the eastern sugar city of San Pedro de Macorís, urban guilds, and a longshoremen's union; in 1945 it began clandestinely to organize sugar workers.

Under the leadership of Báez, the federation took on a pro-socialist and vehemently anti-Trujillo stance and published a sophisticated labor newspaper openly critical of Trujillo's regime and policies. It was also the first labor organization to successfully organize, even though only temporarily, the Haitian field workers on the sugarcane plantations. It also helped organize a sister federation, the Provincial Work Federation of La Romana.* Shortly after calling the major sugar industry strike of 1946, the Provincial Work Federation of San Pedro de Macorís was co-opted by the Trujillo regime, and while in exile in Cuba Báez was assassinated by Trujillo agents.

SINDICATO LIBRE DE TRABAJADORES DEL CENTRAL ROMANA. *See* Free Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana.

SOCIEDAD DE OBREROS (Society of Workers). *See* Lights of the Yaque.

SOCIETY OF WORKERS. *See* Lights of the Yaque.

SU. *See* United Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana.

UGTD. *See* General Union of Dominican Workers.

LA UNIÓN. *See* Dominican Union of Workers.

UNIÓN DE BRACEROS DEL PUERTO DE SANTO DOMINGO. *See* Port of Santo Domingo Laborers' Union.

UNIÓN DOMINICANA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Dominican Union of Workers.

UNIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES DOMINICANOS. *See* General Union of Dominican Workers.

UNITARY CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores—CUT).

CUT appeared in 1980 through a reorganization of the Labor Union Movement of Workers' Unity,* which was founded in the year before. On the international level, the Unitary Confederation affiliates with Labor Union Unity of Workers of Latin America (Unidad Sindical de Trabajadores de América Latina—CPUS-TAL) and the World Labor Union Federation (Federación Sindical Mundial—FSM). Nationally, CUT is affiliated with the pro-Soviet Dominican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Dominicano—PCD) and is the smallest of the five labor confederations in contemporary Dominican Republic. In 1981 CUT claimed thirty-four affiliated labor unions. It places primary emphasis on labor organization in the sugar industry.

In mid-1985 a large and influential sector of CUT leadership was expelled from the Dominican Communist Party over ideological differences with the party leadership. As of this writing CUT is in turmoil, and the expelled faction has not formed its own federation.

UNITED LABOR UNION OF WORKERS OF CENTRAL ROMANA (Sindicato Unido de Trabajadores del Central Romana—SU).

In 1964 plans were begun by labor organizers to unite the more than thirty-five unions in both the agricultural and industrial sectors of the South Porto [sic] Rico Sugar Company's (SPRSC) Central Romana plantation. By 1966 the United Labor Union of the Workers of Central Romana was firmly established as the labor federation which represented the vast majority of workers at the country's largest sugar plantation. The United Labor Union at this time was also associated with various groups from the Dominican left and Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD).

When Gulf + Western began its acquisition of South Porto [sic] Rico Sugar Company stock on the way to its eventual control of SPRSC, there were both labor unrest in the form of work slowdowns orchestrated by the United Labor Union and increased company repression of the federation. Using charges that the United Labor Union was "communist-dominated," the newly hired Cuban-exile Teobaldo Rosell, in concert with the National Police and the Joaquín

Balaguer government, quickly destroyed the United Labor Union. His tactics included the dismissal of labor leaders, confiscation of the organization's \$100,000 strike fund, the assassination of the union's lawyer and officials, and the eventual cancellation of the contract between the company and the federation.

In 1967 Gulf + Western set up its own union, Free Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana*, and forced all employees to disaffiliate from the United Labor Union. Still recognized as a legal entity, the United Labor Union in 1974 associated with the General Confederation of Workers* and attempted to organize itself once again and reclaim the \$100,000 strike fund. Given the aggressive posture of Gulf + Western and the Balaguer government, its attempts were futile.

With the return of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) to power in 1978, although now a moderate social democratic organization, over 10,000 Central Romana workers left the company union, Free Labor Union, to attend a United Labor Union assembly and rally. In September 1978 Gulf + Western agreed to recognize the United Labor Union if it would renounce its affiliation with the classist and combative General Confederation of Workers.* United Labor Union leaders insisted that the decision could not be made without a referendum by the workers.

In early 1979 a hotly disputed election was held, with an abstention rate as high as 70 percent, according to one report. In April 1979 the Free Labor Union was disbanded, and a faction of the United Labor Union not associated with the General Confederation of Workers (CGT) but affiliated with the General Union of Dominican Workers* (UGTD) and the ruling Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) was recognized by Gulf + Western. The United Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana is again the major labor organization on the plantation; however, except for its name, this federation of workers has little in common with the classist and combative United Labor Union of the 1960s. See also Free Labor Union of the Workers of Central Romana.

UNITED WORKERS' FRONT FOR AUTONOMOUS LABOR UNIONS (Frente Obrero Unido Pro Sindicatos Autónomos—FOUPSA).

FOUPSA was founded on 17 September 1961 after the assassination of Rafael Trujillo and during the period of dramatic growth of labor organizations. Initially, the Confederation of Dominican Workers* (CTD) attempted to incorporate FOUPSA, but on the complete dissolution of the Trujillo family empire in late 1961 the former organization collapsed and FOUPSA temporarily became the principal labor organization in the country.

All of FOUPSA's founders claimed to be workers and ideologically anti-communist. FOUPSA represented an organization in which various sectors of different ideological positions united under the common banner of anti-Trujilismo. The principal leaders at its inception were members of the three major opposition parties: the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), the National Civic Union (UCN), and the 14 June Movement (1J4). However, on the demise of

the Trujillo family, ideological conflicts between PRD, UCN, and IJ4 militants began to tear FOUPSA apart. By May 1962 these internal divisions and the creation of new organizations had made FOUPSA a labor organization of secondary importance.

The number of members of FOUPSA at specific dates demonstrates the rapid rise and fall of the organization. One month after its creation, October 1961, the front claimed 10,000 members organized in all twenty-six provinces of the country. Two months later, after the collapse of the CTD, its ranks swelled to 60,000 members. In 1964 FOUPSA maintained only seventy-four unions and 20,000 members.

FOUPSA's first president, Augusto A. Rodríguez, was ousted only three months after the creation of FOUPSA and days after publicly stating that FOUPSA would be an apolitical labor organization not tied to any political party. Rodríguez quickly formed the Labor Union Confederation of Dominican Workers* (CESITRADO) with the drivers' union led by Robinson Ruiz López and a few unions of minor importance. Subsequently, the National Civic Union (UCN), a bourgeoisie-dominated political party, attempted to control FOUPSA, and in February 1962 the conservative wing of FOUPSA changed its name to FOUPSA Libre. Prior to the national elections in 1962 the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) orchestrated the unification of the progressive sectors of FOUPSA and CESITRADO, and the National Confederation of Workers* (FOUPSA-CESITRADO) was formed. FOUPSA-CESITRADO worked closely with the elected PRD government of Juan Bosch until its overthrow in 1963. In the 1965 Civil War this organization joined the Constitutionalist forces fighting for the reinstitution of the Dominican Constitution and the reinstatement of Bosch as president.

Ecuador _____

RICHARD LEE MILK

An important consideration for understanding the development of Ecuadorian labor is the physical setting. Geographically, historically and culturally, the heart of the Ecuadorian nation lies in the Andean range. As late as the twentieth century, the isolation was maintained by the Amazon jungle on the east, dry rugged mountains on the north and the desert to the south, separating Ecuador from its South American neighbors and providing a general outline to the nation's geographical identity. The geographical features also formed internal barriers, particularly on the western slope of the Andes where a dense coastal jungle separated the mountains from the Pacific Ocean, the nation's door to the rest of the world. Only in the south, where a dryer climate and proximity between coast and mountains made transportation easier, was the separation between the littoral and the interior partially overcome.

This coastal area forms Ecuador's other principal region. Site of the oldest pre-Hispanic cultures in the country, the Pacific Coast developed in a climate and with roots often quite different from those in the interior. On the site of an important preconquest civilization, Guayaquil grew into a major Pacific port. It not only provided the external communications for the Audiencia of Quito but also served as an important harbor for the Spanish fleet and contained Spain's most important shipyards on the Pacific. Thus, although Quito in its central highland location served as the nation's administrative headquarters, Guayaquil acted as Ecuador's commercial center. The presence of these two important urban centers, each with its corresponding hinterland, reflected and reinforced the nation's persistent regionalism. Throughout most of Ecuador's history the rivalry between Coast and Highland, with the parallel conflict between Guayaquil and Quito, provided a continuous backdrop to the course of events.

The conflicts that racked post-independence Spanish America took place in Ecuador within the context of regional rivalries. It was not until Gabriel García

Moreno took power in 1861 that a basic stability was finally achieved. Using the Catholic Church as an arm of the state, as a vehicle through which to enforce governmental policy, García Moreno managed to take the first steps toward national consolidation. With him the highland elites reaffirmed their traditional hegemony and managed to maintain control until 1895. Yet, competing groups constantly challenged the existing political lineup, as demonstrated in García Moreno's assassination in 1875. For the next decade, the caudillo Ignacio de Veintimilla, basing his support on the army and aided by a favorable economic situation, exercised control. From the mid-1880s to 1895, "Progresismo" represented an alliance of neo-positivistic Liberals, Conservatives, and independents who focused their energies on maintaining political control and introduced the first hints of modernization. However, this somewhat Porfirian* political machine did not—or could not—reconcile the regional frustrations, and in 1895 a scandal over the use of the Ecuadorian flag on a Chilean ship sparked an uprising which led to a complete national change.

The roots of the 1895 Revolution lay in the economic changes which had been occurring over the previous three decades. As a result of the stability imposed by the García Moreno regime, agricultural plantations increased their exports. Between 1865 and 1895, with some occasional drops, sale of agricultural commodities to the international market continually increased, providing Ecuador in 1879 with a three-million peso trade surplus. This growth in trade had an important impact on the national government, permitting it to increase its expenditures for public works, governmental functions, and army salaries.

Cacao, coffee, ivory nuts, hides, cinchona bark (source of quinine), and wood for naval construction were the major exports, all commodities grown in the coastal region. Thus, the national government became increasingly dependent on income generated in the lowlands. At the same time, the growth in exports led to a strengthening of the coastal elites, mainly plantation owners and commercial groups, the latter including exporters, importers, and bankers. The economic growth stimulated commerce and began a process of internal migration from the interior to the coastal region which would reach major proportions in the twentieth century. Although prominent members of the coastal elites participated in the national government, highland groups played the decisive political role. Thus, coastal elites were in effect subsidizing a government run by their national political rivals.

The 1895 Revolution brought an end to the traditional highland hegemony, and Liberal forces, led by the caudillo Eloy Alfaro, took over control of the national government. Social reform, anti-clericalism, and modernization characterized the first phase of the Liberal Revolution. The government restricted the power of the Church, replacing it with state control over marriage, keeping of vital statistics, and education. The new Liberal regime emphasized public works, primarily the construction of a trans-Andean railroad, and reformers

* Refers to Porfirio Díaz, president and dictator of Mexico from 1876 to 1910.

attempted to break down the traditional structures of societal control, particularly in the interior.

During this time labor organizations initiated their first period of major growth. Isolated artisan groups attempted to establish mutual aid societies as early as the García Moreno period, but only a handful were active in 1895. After the Revolution, the *alfaristas* (followers of Eloy Alfaro) actively supported the establishment of workers' societies as a means to mobilize support for the Liberal regime and implement their social goals. This governmental support not only led to the formation of organizations associated with the Liberal Party but also spurred the Church to establish worker groupings, the Catholic Workers' Centers and Circles. It was also during this period that the anarchists established their first groups, such as the association of market vendors.

The first phase of the 1895 Revolution came to an abrupt end with the assassination of Eloy Alfaro in 1912. The commercial, banking, and export-agriculture sectors had been important in the Liberal Party since its beginning. Though not opposed to the initial thrust, for the social and governmental reforms served to weaken their rivals in the interior, the business groups within Liberalism had become increasingly dissatisfied with Alfaro's leadership, and in 1912 they emerged as the dominant force in the party under the leadership of Alfaro's fellow officer, General Leónidas Plaza. For thirteen years Plaza acted as the new caudillo, although real power came to be concentrated in the hands of the coastal banks, particularly the Commercial and Agricultural Bank (Banco Comercial y Agrícola) led by Francisco Urbina Jado.

The vehicle for coastal control was provided by the 1914 "Ley Moratoria," which permitted banks to issue their currency—the only paper currency in the nation—irrespective of the amount of backing in gold and silver. The minimal controls which did exist were bypassed by providing loans to the government, money sorely needed as a result of the post-World War I recession. The ever-larger loans and resultant emissions of paper currency had the dual effect of placing the government under the control of the banks and contributing to a severe inflationary spiral. By 1925, the government debt to the Commercial and Agricultural Bank amounted to the equivalent of \$18 billion, a nearly unbelievable sum when compared to the state's annual expenditures of approximately \$15 million. Urban workers, both salaried and self-employed, received the brunt of the inflation, causing a period of unrest which led to the 15 November 1922 massacre in Guayaquil. As a symbol, rather than an organization, 15 November represents for a large sector of Ecuadorian labor the point at which the movement came of age. After that date the emerging leadership focused on building support from below rather than developing ties above.

In historical terms, the events which led up to 15 November began with a national strike against the Guayaquil and Quito Railway Company. Although this specific strike was settled successfully through the mediation of government officials, it set in motion a series of other strikes and labor demands in the city of Guayaquil, leading to the first general strike in the country's history. Unable

to contain the movement and unwilling to accede to the demands, the government finally responded by sending in troops and provoking a confrontation that led to the death of several hundred workers.

The post-1912 policies were brought to a stop by a bloodless coup led in 1925 by a group of young army officers. Emphasizing the need for national reform, the July Revolution initiated major economic and political restructuring. Under the direction of Isidro Ayora, who succeeded the short-lived junta, the government developed a policy designed to strengthen the state's control over the economy and foment industrialization. A central bank was formed, the tribute system reformed, and a national economic policy established. On another front, the government instituted important social reforms, including the first steps toward a national social security system and legislation designed to legitimize and regulate workers' organizations. In the political arena, the post-1925 changes led to a greater balancing of coastal and highland forces and encouraged growth of the nascent left. Labor benefited from the post-1925 liberalization and, in spite of sporadic repression, demonstrated an increasing militancy, growing in absolute size and in number of workers' organizations.

The 1929 depression brought to an end the short period of stability, and until 1944 Ecuador was characterized by a series of weak and short-lived governments. Some, such as those of Enrique Páez in 1937 and Carlos Arroyo del Río in 1943, attempted to repress the leftist labor associations; at other times, the movement received direct and indirect support, as during the Alberto Enríquez period in 1938. The rise of the left during this period intensified national political rivalries, and labor became involved as one of the actors. Although most worker mobilization was carried out by the left, Catholic labor also increased its activity and militancy. During the 1938 Third National Labor Congress, the Ecuadorian left effectively presented and began to work towards its goals for labor and Ecuadorian society. Catholic labor responded by organizing a national labor conference and establishing the first national labor confederation, the Ecuadorian Confederation of Catholic Workers* (*Confederación Ecuatoriana de Obreros Católicos—CEDOC*).

The instability during the 1930s and early 1940s suggests a stalemate among the nation's competing political groups. Populism proved to be a solution, at least for the political system as a whole, for it broke the deadlock and at the same time permitted lower groups in society to have an illusion of political participation. José María Velasco Ibarra emerged as the populist leader par excellence and dominated Ecuadorian politics until the 1960s. Velasco Ibarra's rise to power in 1944 resulted from an agreement with labor, and on the basis of that understanding, non-Catholic workers were able to establish the Confederation of Workers of Ecuador* (*Confederación de Trabajadores del Ecuador—CTE*).

The 1944 turning point reflected several changes in the nature of the labor movement. The formation of the CTE in itself signaled a change with the formation of the national confederation. In addition, 1944 was the first year blue-

collar associations outnumbered their artisan counterparts, 281 to 205, as contrasted to the previous year when 168 had been blue-collar and 179 artisan. Although the new figure reflected the previous increases, the main growth occurred during 1944, a year in which 113 new unions began, a yearly increase which would not be repeated until 1962. From 1944 on, wage labor associations represented an increasing proportion of the total number of worker entities; craftsmen and their organizations continued to be an important element in Ecuadorian society, but salaried workers took over the leadership role in the labor movement.

CEDOC continued its clerical ties and policies up through the mid-1950s, under the leadership of Pedro Velasco Ibarra. At the same time, subtle changes developed within the association, as more industrial and rural organizations joined. The major changes occurred after the Fifth CEDOC Congress held in 1955. Humerto Valdez, leader of the metallurgical workers, encouraged the confederation to expand its action to the coast and among industrial workers. CEDOC disassociated itself from direct ties to the Church in a series of gradual steps, finally breaking completely in 1972 when it changed its name from the Catholic Labor Confederation (*Confederación Ecuatoriana de Obreros Católicos*) to the Ecuadorian Confederation of Class-Based Organizations* (*Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Clasistas*).

An ideological change accompanied CEDOC's structural transformation, affirming at its Tenth Congress that "the present Ecuadorian society is totally unacceptable to the workers, the poor, those marginal to society and to the immense majority of Ecuadorians," and that the workers' movement, inspired in Christian humanism should struggle for "the socialization of the means of production and the attainment of full democracy: economic, social, cultural and political." Thus, by the 1970s CEDOC had changed dramatically from its beginnings. By 1975 many observers considered CEDOC the most militant labor central in the country, surpassing the CTE in its willingness to challenge the government and act on behalf of the nation's workers. These categorical declarations could possibly be proved wrong; CEDOC represents an amalgam of many different elements, professionally as well as ideologically. Dr. Isabel Robalino, a key figure in the organization throughout the 1960s, continues to maintain important ties within the movement. Under her guidance, CEDOC teamed up in 1966 and 1968 with the AFL-CIO-financed Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Labor Organizations* (*Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres—CEOSL*) to defeat CTE's communist candidate for the position of labor senator in the National Legislature. In short, the depth of CEDOC's militancy is still being tested; the same holds true for each of the nation's confederations, and at the moment CEDOC is doing the best job of proving itself.

The challenge to the CTE as Ecuador's most aggressive labor central reflects not only CEDOC's increased militancy but, perhaps more important, the repression and splits which the CTE has undergone. The divisions go back to the

CTE's formation in 1944. For two years, Pedro Saad, Communist Party secretary, led the organization, but from 1946 to 1963 socialists held control. Closed down in 1963 by the military dictatorship, the CTE reopened in 1966 under nominally independent leadership, although Communist Party members have dominated. However, the split within the party between the traditionalists and the "Marxists-Leninists," compounded by the presence of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario, the strongest and most radical wing of Ecuadorian socialism), kept the CTE from developing a united and continuous program. In spite of these difficulties, the CTE continues to be the country's largest labor central. Until it was closed down in 1963, the CTE acted as the prime force in the labor movement, with its members on the militant forefront at both the factory and national levels. The present state of affairs may only be a temporary setback or could reflect a continuing trend in which CEDOC will emerge as the leading confederation. A completely different option lies in the possibility of concerted action among all of Ecuador's labor confederations.

CTE and CEDOC prior to the 1970s occasionally cooperated on different issues of concern to all workers, such as social security reform. Yet relations between the two were usually antagonistic. The competition increased with the formation of the Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Labor Organizations (CEOSL) in 1962. When established, this confederation consisted mainly of artisans, white-collar employees, and workers in the service sector. About a third of the organizations came from Guayas province, including five nominally Catholic associations. The CEOSL represented U.S. labor's contribution to the Alliance for Progress and was promoted to forestall communist growth among Latin American labor. CEOSL worked closely with the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Service, and other U.S. government agencies. CEOSL's major growth occurred between 1963 and 1966 when the country was ruled by a military dictatorship. The government repressed all non-CEOSL labor activities, particularly those carried out by the CTE, although CEDOC also suffered persecution.

After the fall of the junta in 1966, CTE and CEDOC renewed their activities with increased vigor, but they now shared the field with an enlarged CEOSL. As the 1970s began, Ecuadorian labor was split into three separate movements, further complicated by independents, which numerically equaled in size the weakest of the three confederations. Each of the three centrals was composed of provincial, regional, and national federations; of the 128 federations, 23 were affiliated with CEDOC, 26 with CTE, 34 with CEOSL, and the remaining 47 were unattached. Yet the geographically based federations varied greatly in size and in actual number of members; the CTE led with approximately 75,000, followed by CEDOC with 25,000, and CEOSL with 20,000. Later estimates calculated a smaller number for the CTE and slightly more for the other two centrals, placing each with a roughly equal size. By the middle of the decade, then, Ecuadorian labor consisted of three competing national confederations, neither clearly dominant.

The intra- and inter-central rivalries could have led to a severe weakening of the overall labor movement, but two recent developments suggest that the opposite might well happen. CEOSL's role as a relative defender of the status quo, as contrasted to the more militant stance adopted by CEDOC and the CTE, underwent a major change in 1974 when a majority of the affiliated associations pulled out, protesting the central's ties to U.S. interests. The CEOSL dissidents adopted a position more in line with the goals and policies advocated by the other two confederations. On 1 May 1974 the three associations organized a joint May Day march and began a series of top-level meetings to coordinate policy. In spite of institutional rivalries and divergent ideological bases, the three groups established the United Workers Front* (Frente Unitario de Trabajadores—FUT). Since then the FUT has represented the three centrals, even as late as spring 1983, and may be in the process of becoming an important vehicle of united action.

During the past months, falling oil prices and government policy have made the economic circumstances of Ecuador's working groups increasingly difficult. The situation is compounded by a growing tendency among many of the nation's industrial concerns to contract out production instead of hiring workers. It remains to be seen whether organized labor will be able to integrate this category of worker into their organizational objectives. In overall terms, FUT continues to be an important development, primarily as a potentially decisive approach.

Bibliography

- Albornoz Peralta, Osvaldo. *Historia del movimiento obrero ecuatoriano: breve síntesis*. Quito: Editorial Letra Nueva, 1983.
- Duran Barba, Jaime, ed. *Pensamiento Popular Ecuatoriano*. Editora Nacional, 1981.
- . "Genesis de la Celebración del 10. de Mayo (Ecuador)." in *El Primer 10 de Mayo en el Mundo*, (n.a.), AMCEHSMO, 1981.
- Hurtado, Osvaldo, and Joachim Herudek. *La Organización Popular en el Ecuador*. Quito: INEDES, 1974.
- Nuñez Vicuña, Elías and Leonardo Vicuña Izquierdo. *Movimiento obrero del Ecuador, 1970–1979: documentos*. Guayaquil: Universidad de Guayaquil, 1985.
- Páez, Alexei. *El anarquismo en el Ecuador*. Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional, 1986.
- Pérez Sáinz, Juan Pablo. *Clase obrera y democracia en el Ecuador*. Quito: Editorial El Conejo, 1985.
- Saad, Pedro. *Los Sindicatos en la Transformación Revolucionaria del Ecuador*. Guayaquil: Ediciones Claridad, 1974.
- Spalding, Hobart A. *Organized Labor in Latin America*. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- Vicuña Izquierdo, Leonardo. *La Clase Trabajadora Del Ecuador*. Guayaquil: Departamento de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Guayaquil, 1975.
- Weitzman, Raquel, ed. *Guayaquil, 15 de Noviembre, 1922*. Guayaquil and Quito: IDTIS, 1975.
- Ycaza, Patricio. *Historia del movimiento obrero ecuatoriano*. Quito: Editorial Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 1983.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ARTISTIC AND INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY OF PICHINCHA (Sociedad Artística e Industrial del Pichincha—SAIP).

Established in 1892 by representatives of the tailors mutual aid society and other artisan groups in Quito, the SAIP was the major highland federation until World War II.

Although nominally independent, the SAIP leadership had strong ties to leaders of the Conservative Party and to the Church. Upon taking power, the Liberal Party failed to bring about a change in the organization's leadership. See Guayas Labor Confederation.

The SAIP organized the country's First National Labor Congress, held in Quito on 10 August 1909.

The artisan bases of the SAIP and organizations like it represent the first stage of the modern labor movement in Ecuador.

ASOCIACIÓN GREMIAL DEL ASTILLERO. *See* Shipyards' Labor Association of Astillero.

"LA AURORA" WOMEN'S CENTER (Centro Feminista "La Aurora").

The Women's Center was established in 1918 for the purpose of "protecting women." Organized to provide working women with the same types of benefits that men obtained in the societies, "La Aurora" carried out a key role as one of the most active and enthusiastic of the Guayaquil mutual aid societies. This association was one of the organizations strongly supporting the citywide strike in November 1922. The officers were all women, with the exception of the legal representative. La Aurora published a newsletter entitled *The Ecuadorian Woman* (*La Mujer Ecuatoriana*).

"BAKERS' UNITY" SOCIETY (Sociedad "Unión de Panaderos").

Established in Guayaquil in 1898, the organization consisted primarily of bakery employees, in contrast to other societies in which the artisan was also an employer.

The leadership of this society was also active among other mutual aid societies, as, for example, Fidél Mosquera, also active in "Sons of Labor"* as well as the shoemakers association.

Members of the "Bakers' Unity" Society were considered important in the November 1922 demonstration, particularly in Joaquín Gallegos Lasa's historical novel, *Las Cruces Sobre el Agua*.

CATHOLIC LABOR CONFEDERATION. *See* Ecuadorian Confederation of Class-Based Organizations.

CATHOLIC WORKERS' CIRCLE (Círculo Católico de Obreros).

The first Catholic Workers' Circle was approved in Quito in 1895, and an ongoing organization was established in 1906. Founded by wealthy Catholic laymen, the Workers' Circles expanded throughout the country. Using Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* as a point of departure, clergy and laymen promoted the Church as the true defender of working people. In political terms, the drive for Workers' Circles, *Obreros de San José* associations, and other Church-labor organizations, can be perceived as a response to the large number of militant mutual aid societies established and supported by the Liberal Party, particularly from 1896 through 1908.

Individual Catholic labor organizations continued to expand throughout the 1920s and to a lesser degree during the 1930s. However, a changing social and economic reality weakened support for the predominantly artisan-based circles, leading to new types of labor organizations and to the establishment of the Catholic Labor Confederation. See Ecuadorian Confederation of Class-Based Organizations.

CEDOC. See Ecuadorian Confederation of Class-Based Organizations.

CENTRO FEMINISTA "LA AURORA." See "La Aurora" Women's Center.

CEOSL. See Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Labor Organizations.

CÍRCULO CATÓLICO DE OBREROS. See Catholic Workers' Circle.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DEL ECUADOR. See Confederation of Workers of Ecuador.

CONFEDERACIÓN ECUATORIANA DE OBREROS CATÓLICOS (Ecuadorian Confederation of Catholic Workers). See Ecuadorian Confederation of Class-Based Organizations.

CONFEDERACIÓN ECUATORIANA DE ORGANIZACIONES CLASISTAS. See Ecuadorian Confederation of Class-Based Organizations.

CONFEDERACIÓN ECUATORIANA DE ORGANIZACIONES SINDICALES LIBRES. See Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Labor Organizations.

CONFEDERACIÓN OBRERA DEL GUAYAS. See Guayas Labor Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN OBRERA NACIONAL. See Confederation of Workers of Ecuador.

CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF ECUADOR (Confederación de Trabajadores del Ecuador—CTE).

The Ecuadorian left had attempted to establish a national labor confederation as early as 1938 when the Third National Labor Congress agreed to establish the National Labor Confederation (Confederación Obrera Nacional). An effective organization, however, did not become reality until 1944. As a result of an agreement to support the return of José María Velasco Ibarra, the National Workers Committee (Comité Nacional de los Trabajadores) obtained a promise to permit the formation of the CTE. In July 1944, 1200 delegates met and established the Confederation of Workers of Ecuador as a vehicle through which the Ecuadorian working class could work towards the elimination of feudal structures, improvement of living standards and working conditions, attend to the needs of the masses, develop greater solidarity, and in general develop the unity of Ecuadorian workers.

During the 1950s and 1960s the CTE maintained itself as the principal labor confederation of the country. Its militant, strongly ideological position increased its support among the industrial workers that had always formed a significant percentage of CTE membership, as well as from other sectors of the labor force. This same position also attracted governmental repression, and CTE leaders were repeatedly jailed or exiled.

Traditionally the largest and most militant of the labor confederations, the CTE by 1975 consisted of approximately 800 organizations and 40,000 members. The CTE has suffered divisions among its top leadership, particularly between the socialists and the communists, often reflected in the provincial federations. The CTE has been a strong participant in the United Workers' Front.*

CTE. *See* Confederation of Workers of Ecuador.

ECUADORIAN CONFEDERATION OF CATHOLIC WORKERS. *See* Ecuadorian Confederation of Class-Based Organizations.

ECUADORIAN CONFEDERATION OF CLASS-BASED ORGANIZATIONS (Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Clasistas—CEDOC).

This organization began initially as the national Catholic labor confederation (Ecuadorian Confederation of Catholic Workers, Confederación Ecuatoriana de Obreros Católicos) in 1938. The roots of Catholic labor organizations go back to the latter part of the nineteenth century, to a large degree as a reaction to the triumph of the Liberal Party. Catholic Worker Circles and similar Catholic labor organizations, often in conjunction with the Conservative Party, established their organizations as a way to maintain support among artisans and workers. Catholic organizations existed throughout the country but were most successful in the interior highlands.

The rise of the parties of the left and associated labor groups during the 1930s caused increasing concern among the leaders of the Church-related labor orga-

nizations. The situation peaked in 1938 when nonconfessional labor leaders carried out the Third National Labor Congress in the city of Ambato.

Under the leadership of the Dominican Fr. Inocencio Jacome and of Pedro Velasco Ibarra, concerned clergy and laymen organized the First National Catholic Labor Congress in September 1930, for the specific purpose of establishing a national labor confederation. The Congress achieved its objective and established CEDOC.

CEDOC continued to be dominated by clergy and elements of the Conservative Party up through the mid-1950s, when it disassociated itself from direct Church ties. Growing internal dissension over the proper role of CEDOC increased, leading to a split in 1972. The dominant group indicated CEDOC's new posture with a new name, Ecuadorian Confederation of Class-Based Organizations.

By the mid-1970s CEDOC affiliates could be found in thirteen provinces among seven professional federations, was the second largest confederation in total membership, and was often the most militant on labor demands.

ECUADORIAN CONFEDERATION OF FREE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres—CEOSL).

The CEOSL was established in 1962 with major support from the AFL-CIO, Agency for International Development (AID), and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). When established, CEOSL consisted primarily of artisan, white-collar, and service workers. In 1963 a military junta took control of the country and for three years effectively limited the activities of Ecuadorian Confederation of Class-Based Organizations* (CEDOC) and practically closed down the Confederation of Workers of Ecuador* (CTE). As a result, CEOSL was able to increase its strength among service workers and develop several unions among industrial workers. By the early 1970s it had become the largest confederation in Guayaquil. In 1974 a majority of the affiliated unions separated and formed a parallel organization. The new CEOSL took a more nationalist stance and has since coordinated with CTE and CEDOC on specific issues.

ECUADORIAN REGIONAL LABOR FEDERATION (Federación Obrera Regional Ecuatoriana—FORE).

This Guayaquil-based federation was the anarchist labor federation during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Overshadowed by the Guayas Labor Confederation* and the Artistic and Industrial Society of Pichincha,* FORE nevertheless was important in setting an example of militancy, commitment to labor goals, and independence from national political leaders. FORE played a particularly important role in mobilizing labor and public action during the events of November 1922. The subsequent massacre by the army and police drove the labor movement as a whole into a period of inactivity. FORE attempted to recover, but as in many other countries, labor leadership from the left was assumed during the 1930s by the nascent Socialist and Communist parties.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE CHOFERES. *See* National Federation of Professional Drivers.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE EMPLEADOS DE TELECOMUNICACIONES. *See* National Federation of Telecommunications Employees.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DEL PETRÓLEO. *See* National Federation of Petroleum Workers.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA REGIONAL ECUATORIANA. *See* Ecuadorian Regional Labor Federation.

FENETEL. *See* National Federation of Telecommunications Employees.

FNCHE. *See* National Federation of Professional Drivers.

FNTP. *See* National Federation of Petroleum Workers.

FORE. *See* Ecuadorian Regional Labor Federation.

FRENTE UNITÁRIO DE TRABAJADORES. *See* United Workers Front.

FUT. *See* United Workers Front.

GUAYAS LABOR CONFEDERATION (Confederación Obrera del Guayas).

Established on 31 December 1905, the Guayas Labor Confederation became the major labor confederation in the region, encompassing the majority of artisan and worker organizations. Acting as an arm of the recently victorious Liberal Party, the Confederation encouraged existing organizations to support the liberal movement as the best means to carry ahead the cause of the nation's working population. It helped form societies in the neighboring coastal provinces, providing both organizational and financial support. Through Miguel de Albuquerque, the Confederation also aided the establishment of pro-liberal societies in the interior.

In May 1913 the Confederation underwent a change in its leadership reflecting the changes in the Liberal Party after the assassination of Eloy Alfaro. The Confederation maintained its ties to the Liberal Party and continued to receive governmental aids.

The Guayas Labor Confederation also provided the main impetus for the 1920 National Labor Congress and continued to be the most militant of the major labor organizations up through the massacre of Guayaquil workers in November 1922. After 1922 it continued to play a local role on bread-and-butter issues, but by the 1930s it had ceased to be an effective defender of workers' interests.

“THE INTERNATIONAL” LABOR UNION (Sindicato Obrero “La Internacional”).

This labor union at the International (La Internacional) textile plant was organized in December 1933. It was the first major industrial union in the country and led the first major industrial strike in March 1934.

In spite of company attempts to destroy the union, through, for example, the establishment of a rival labor organization, the original organization continued to be active at La Internacional as well as to provide support for the establishment of new unions at other textile plants.

LABOR LEAGUE (Liga Obrera).

Originally established in 1917 as the Guayas Labor Union (Sindicato Obrero del Guayas), the League represented an attempt to establish a militant, more labor-oriented association than the predominant mutual aid societies. The key force behind the League, Juan E. Naula, had experience as a calligrapher, photographer, and printer. He had been active in the “Sons of Labor” Mutual Aid, Instruction and Recreation Society* and established or helped establish at least five labor-oriented newspapers. Naula and his wife Dina Salazar advocated socialist goals and hoped that the Liga Obrera could work towards that end.

LABOR UNITY (Unión Obrero).

In 1905, after failing to take over the Artistic and Industrial Society of Pichincha,* labor organizers Miguel de Albuquerque and José Vascenez established Labor Unity as a rival organization. See Guayas Labor Confederation.

LIGA OBRERA. *See* Labor League.

“LOVERS OF PROGRESS” ARTISAN SOCIETY (Sociedad de Artesanos “Amantes del Progreso”).

The dean of Guayaquil’s mutual aid societies, “Lovers of Progress” continued to be one of the principal *sociedades* in the region. The early organizers met in the carpenter shop of Andres Miranda to discuss concepts of mutual aid and first established “Lovers of Progress” in 1874. Andres Miranda—thought to be influenced by Manuel Gonzalez Prada—continued active among Guayaquil labor, particularly the more radical elements.

The government closed down the society in 1874 but the organization reestablished itself in 1879. The statutes of the organization emphasized mutual aid not only in credit, burial, and medical care but also in personal and professional growth. For example, the statutes specify the formation of a library and the presentation of an artisan-industrial fair every two years.

MARKET PROVISIONERS MUTUAL AID SOCIETY (Sociedad de Protección Recíproca de Abastecedores del Mercado).

The market vendors established their association in 1906. This association did

not have as close ties to the overall mutual aid movement as the artisan societies. They were nevertheless active in specific labor-related activities, such as the First National Labor Congress organized in Quito in 1909. The only society present from Guayaquil, they formally protested the Congress's policy of allowing nonworkers to be delegates.

MARKET VENDORS SOCIETY (Sociedad de Vivanderos).

Established in 1895, this society represented the small shopkeepers and reflected the mutual aid goals found in the artisan and labor societies.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF PETROLEUM WORKERS (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores del Petróleo—FNTTP).

The FNTTP was established in 1936 and affiliated with the Confederation of Workers of Ecuador* in 1944. During its early years FNTTP represented the interests of workers for the Anglo-Ecuadorian Oil Company, for many years the major producer in the country. With the discovery of new oil deposits and a new petroleum potential, FNTTP had the possibility of representing all workers in a key portion of the Ecuadorian economy. However, as the result of activities of the Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Labor Organizations,* the FNTTP was faced with a challenge to its traditional role.

In May of 1965 the FNTTP affiliated itself with the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW), in turn part of the International Trade Secretariat (ITS), an organization with strong ties to the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). In 1971 the IFPCW called a constituent assembly and established a new federation of oil workers unions, FECUAPE-TROL, the National Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF PROFESSIONAL DRIVERS (Federación Nacional de Choferes—FNCHE).

In 1953 drivers' associations from across the country established the federation and joined the Confederation of Workers of Ecuador* (CTE). During the decade the organization played a key role in the confederation's national thrust as a consequence of the federation's power over national transportation.

In 1960 the federation separated from the CTE, apparently as the result of the inherent conflict between the self-interest of owner-operators and overall goals for labor, including salaried drivers. Since its separation, the FNCHE has acted primarily as a trade association for transportation companies rather than a labor union for salaried workers.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS EMPLOYEES (Federación Nacional de Empleados de Telecomunicaciones—FENETEL).

FENETEL was originally established in 1959 by the Communications, Telephone and Telegraph Workers International as a result of efforts by the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (Organización Regional Interamericana

de Trabajo—ORIT). It since has separated from that organization and now forms part of the Latin American Confederation of Communications Workers (CLTC).

NATIONAL LABOR CONFEDERATION. *See* Confederation of Workers of Ecuador.

PROTECTOR OF THE ARTISAN SOCIETY (Sociedad Protectora del Artesano).

This short-lived mutual aid society, established in Guayaquil in 1892, may have been the earliest organization of its kind. Its goals of credit, burial insurance, medical care, and mutual support reflect the concerns of the early, artisan-based *sociedades*.

SAIP. *See* Artistic and Industrial Society of Pichincha.

SHIPYARDS' LABOR ASSOCIATION OF ASTILLERO (Asociación Gremial del Astillero).

This association, named after the Guayaquil neighborhood where most of the members lived, was one of the strong anarchist associations. Established at the beginning of the century, the Astillero Association is best known for the activism and militancy of its members during the series of events leading up to the 15 November 1922 massacre. The organization apparently disappeared after 1922.

SINDICATO OBRERO DEL GUAYAS. *See* Labor League.

SINDICATO OBRERO "LA INTERNACIONAL." *See* "The International" Labor Union.

SOCIEDAD ARTÍSTICA E INDUSTRIAL DEL PICHINCHA. *See* Artistic and Industrial Society of Pichincha.

SOCIEDAD DE ARTESANOS "AMANTES DEL PROGRESO." *See* "Lovers of Progress" Artisan Society.

SOCIEDAD DE CARPINTEROS. *See* Society of Carpenters.

SOCIEDAD DE MAESTROS SASTRES "UNIÓN Y PROGRESO." *See* "Unity and Progress" Master Tailors Society.

SOCIEDAD DE PROTECCIÓN RECÍPROCA DE ABASTECEDORES DEL MERCADO. *See* Market Provisioners Mutual Aid Society.

SOCIEDAD DE SOCORROS MUTUOS, INSTRUCCIÓN Y RECREO "HIJOS DEL TRABAJO." *See* "Sons of Labor" Mutual Aid, Instruction, and Recreation Society.

SOCIEDAD DE TIPÓGRAFOS DEL GUAYAS. *See* Typographers Society of Guayas.

SOCIEDAD DE VIVANDEROS. *See* Market Vendors Society.

SOCIEDAD "LA UNIÓN." *See* "Unity" Society.

SOCIEDAD PROTECTORA DEL ARTESANO. *See* Protector of the Artisan Society.

SOCIEDAD "UNIÓN DE PANADEROS. *See* "Bakers' Unity" Society.

SOCIETY OF CARPENTERS (Sociedad de Carpinteros).

The carpenters' guild first established their society in 1897. The organization functioned for five years, died out, and was reestablished in 1904.

The Guayaquil carpenters carried out one of the first strikes in Ecuador after the 1896 fire which destroyed most of the city. This society is also associated with militant, pro-labor activity up through the 1940s.

"SONS OF LABOR" MUTUAL AID, INSTRUCTION AND RECREATION SOCIETY (Sociedad de Socorros Mútuos, Instrucción y Recreo "Hijos del Trabajo").

Miguel de Albuquerque first established "Sons of Labor" in 1895; the definitive establishment occurred in 1896.

This society became one of the largest associations in the Guayaquil area and played an important organizational and political role among the artisan-worker groups on the coast. Its success was largely due to the support it received from the Liberal Party.

TYPOGRAPHERS SOCIETY OF GUAYAS (Sociedad de Tipógrafos del Guayas).

Established in 1884, this society combined guild concepts with those of the mutual aid societies. The typographers published two newspapers, *The Laborer* (*El Obrero*) and later *The Typographer* (*El Tipógrafo*). The association coordinated activities with other associations and played an important role in the overall labor picture in the Guayaquil area.

UNION OBRERA. *See* Labor Unity.

UNITED WORKERS FRONT (Frente Unitário de Trabajadores—FUT).

The beginnings of FUT date back to an unsuccessful strike in 1971 initiated by a joint Confederation of Workers of Ecuador* and Ecuadorian Confederation of Class-Based Organizations* action. A strengthening of the individual confederations, both in terms of new leadership and grass-roots militancy, led to a

series of joint actions in 1974 and 1975. A strong governmental reaction succeeded in blocking forceful FUT action until 1981. After Jaime Roldos came to power, the major confederations succeeded in reestablishing the united front.

During its earlier strikes and demonstrations, FUT had focused on issues more directly related to labor, such as minimum wage. Over time it began to include issues of greater relevance to the population at large, such as opposition to price increases for basic commodities. By March 1983 FUT had enlarged its scope to include topics related to the political direction of the country. In what it called the Seventh National Strike, FUT presented a ten-point program which included—in addition to previously specified issues—agrarian reform, low income housing, nationalization of banking and international commerce, and opposition to the guidelines which the International Monetary Fund had imposed on the government.

On the basis of more than a decade of action, FUT not only has become a major force within labor but also has the possibility of influencing national political decisions.

“UNITY AND PROGRESS” MASTER TAILORS SOCIETY (Sociedad de Maestros Sastres “Unión y Progreso”).

Tailors in Quito, led by Manuel Chiriboga Alvear, established this society in 1886. It was probably the major mutual aid society in Quito and the highlands, important because of its example in establishing the Artistic and Industrial Society of Pichincha.*

“UNITY” SOCIETY” (Sociedad “La Unión”).

This short-lived Guayaquil mutual aid society was established in 1892 for social and cultural goals. It is recognized as one of the first societies in the country.

El Salvador _____

WILLIAM BOLLINGER

Although belonging to the hemisphere's smallest mainland republic, El Salvador's trade unions have played a significant role in modern Latin American history. From their involvement in the 1932 insurrection, drowned in the infamous *Matanza* (Massacre), to their pivotal role in the Central American drama of the 1980s, Salvadoran unions have been at the center of conflicts whose importance far transcends the boundaries of this country of five million.

According to Ministry of Labor data, trade union membership peaked at 78,194 in 1983, falling to 69,215 the following year (the loss coming mostly in the construction sector). Such figures masked the fact that El Salvador's rural population was the most proletarianized in Central America and that peasant and farm worker organizations, like those of government employees, functioned outside the Ministry's purview. Inclusion of public employees and the well-developed rural cooperative movement probably would have brought 1986 labor organization membership to over 300,000.

Prior to the 1983 constitution, agricultural and public employee unions were illegal, but the stronger agricultural and public employee organizations managed to gain legal status by incorporating as "associations" under the Interior or Agriculture ministries. Such status was usually won only after long and sometimes violent struggle, or as a concession from a regime seeking a political base in organized labor. From the mid-1920s on, Salvadoran communists established deep roots in the country's industrial unions and among farm workers. The significance of that solid and enduring revolutionary base in the labor movement—and attendant sharp political polarization in Salvadoran society—colored the major themes flowing through the historical profiles of Salvadoran unions: the intransigent and often violent opposition of Salvadoran landowners to rural organizing; the repeated efforts by U.S. agencies and the AFL-CIO to establish and maintain centrist or anti-communist unions to contain the left; the struggle

within the left-led union current for a labor movement strategy beyond immediate economic concerns; the combination of legal and illegal forms of union action to circumvent severe government restrictions on the right to strike; and the common quest of both centrist and left-led unions to secure democratic rights in a country which experienced almost a full half century of continuous military rule after 1932.

Most left-led unions and federations have operated for long periods in semi-clandestinity, with consequent restrictions on union life and leadership-base contact. However, Salvadoran labor history offers many examples where government repression has served to further radicalize a union's membership and consolidate it around its leftist leadership. The organizational and political composition of El Salvador's labor movement became extremely complex in the wake of the 1970s realignments. Fragmentation stemmed from decades of repression of organized labor, competition and parallel organizing by leftist, centrist, and U.S.-supported forces, and competing trade union strategies within each political current.

When a Workers Congress was held in the town of Armenia in 1918 (see Workers Confederation of El Salvador *Confederación de Obreros de El Salvador*), labor organizations were still limited to guilds and mutual associations. A reform movement inspired by the social welfare doctrines of journalist Alberto Masferrer became influential in the guilds at that time, motivating the conservative and nepotistic dynasty of Jorge Meléndez and his brother-in-law Alfonso Quiñónez (who dominated El Salvador on behalf of the coffee oligarchy from 1918 to 1927) to form the Red League* (*Liga Roja*). Worker disenchantment with the regime's demagoguery and policies led to demonstrations, strikes, and formation of the first trade unions by 1922. Once established, the union movement grew rapidly, and a unified Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador* (*Federación Regional de Trabajadores de El Salvador—FRTS*) was established in 1924. Various political currents competed for influence within the new organization, with Masferrer and reformist political leader Arturo Araujo working to build a Salvadoran Labor Party on the British model. A dynamic nucleus of Salvadoran communists became dominant in the federation in the late 1920s. Among the communist activists was Farabundo Martí, who joined FRTS in 1925 and later led the federation's delegation sent to assist Augusto C. Sandino's resistance to U.S. intervention in Nicaragua.

FRTS's most striking accomplishment was its organization of farm workers unions and the relations it achieved between urban labor activists and rural workers. Federation delegates used murals and drawings to illustrate the union's social and economic goals for the mostly illiterate peasants. By the end of the decade, FRTS encompassed fifteen unions in San Salvador, six in Santa Ana, and twenty-one other provincial unions or federations. In the context of rapid union growth and political ferment, the Meléndez-Quiñónez regime gave way to a brief period of democracy and concessions to organized labor under the

government of Pío Romero Bosque (1927–31). Procedures were established in mid-1927 to register and regulate unions, effectively legalizing the trade union movement. Arbitration commissions were created to resolve labor-management disputes, and in 1928 the government formally enacted the eight-hour day. By excluding rural workers from all of these concessions, however, the government tried to divide the labor movement by restricting benefits and privileges to urban workers. President Romero Bosque offered to subsidize FRTS (the gesture was spurned) but warned, “Workers do damage stirring up the campesinos, since they live quite tranquilly with their lot.” In March 1930 the Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido Comunista de El Salvador—PCS) was formed by some thirty-five activists, almost all working-class or artisan FRTS veterans.

With the collapse of commodity prices at the onset of the Depression, many landowners suspended the coffee harvest. Indebted small farmers lost their properties, real wages fell, and unemployment doubled. During 1929–31 the FRTS-directed labor movement grew rapidly, and union members entered communist cells in significant numbers. President Romero Bosque clamped down, arrested hundreds, and used crews of political prisoners on the Cojutepeque highway project. In the face of repression, FRTS activists learned the skills of clandestine organizing, which became the key to the survival of El Salvador’s trade union movement. In the relatively free 1931 elections liberal reformer Arturo Araujo was elected president at the head of the Salvadoran Labor Party. But repression continued, including the arrest of Farabundo Martí, whose twenty-seven-day hunger strike sparked mass protests. As the labor movement’s conflict with the liberal regime grew, a debate broke out within FRTS and the PCS over whether to contend in municipal and national assembly elections scheduled for December 1931. After an internal party struggle against an “economist” boycott of the political arena, the PCS decided to mount an electoral campaign while FRTS prepared a national coffee workers strike. Then the PCS detected military plans for a coup against Araujo. At the same time, farm workers in the heavily indigenous western zone threatened to attack the military garrison in Ahuachapán in angry protest against repression. FRTS representatives worked to defuse the situation, but farm workers told veteran FRTS organizer Miguel Mármol that it was the last time they would allow the PCS to “throw water on the fire.” (Dalton, p. 252.) FRTS promoted a general strike as an alternative to spontaneous insurrection.

After Araujo was overthrown in a military coup which gave power to his vice president, General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, the PCS learned of military preparations to liquidate Salvadoran communists and labor leaders. The new government went ahead with local and national assembly elections rescheduled for early January, but used fraud to overturn communist victories. A PCS delegation met with the Minister of Defense, offering to try to contain mass anger in return for a halt of repression. The regime refused to negotiate. Convinced that Salvadoran workers were about to take matters into their own hands and

that the government sought a confrontation in order to purge the nation, the PCS, after brief but intense internal debate, decided to put itself at the head of an armed insurrection.

Neither the party nor the trade union movement was sufficiently prepared for such an undertaking, although at the time it appeared they had enough support within key army and police units to give a slight chance of success. The government captured Martí and other key leaders responsible for liaison with army sympathizers, and PCS leadership was disrupted. Announcing discovery of the plot, the government imposed a state of siege and began nationwide roundups of suspected participants. The party attempted to call off the revolt, but farm workers in many western communities launched their insurrection on schedule. The army prevailed easily and then began the *Matanza* (massacre) of 1932, directed especially against ethnic Indian peasants in the Ahuachapán and Sonsonate regions. The number of union activists and farm workers executed remains uncertain, but estimates range from 10,000 to 25,000. FRTS was destroyed, and its surviving activists persecuted. Martí was executed, but Mármol miraculously survived a firing squad which left him for dead.

Union organizing was banned during most of the fourteen-year (1930–44) Hernández Martínez dictatorship. In the absence of a trade union federation in the early 1940s, workers and activists of the clandestine PCS formed the National Union of Workers* (Unión Nacional de Trabajadores—UNT) to lobby against anti-labor policies and build a progressive political front. The landed oligarchy, which had viewed General Hernández Martínez as a savior when he drowned the 1932 insurrection in blood, finally grew tired of the dictator's eccentricities and disparaged him in private as "That crack-pot little Indian." (Armstrong and Sheik, p. 34.) His attempt in March 1944 to change the constitution to perpetuate himself in power spurred a broad opposition movement. UNT helped coordinate the first strikes and public protests in over a decade, culminating in the famous "Huelga de Brazos Caídos" (literally, "fallen arms strike" or "folded arms strike") during April–May 1944. The General Association of Salvadoran University Students (AGEUS) also directed the growing protest. Support for the UNT-led general strike began to build after AGEUS closed down and occupied the university on 19 April. UNT unions walked out, as did primary and secondary students. Bank and public employees stopped work (the "brazos caídos"), and for three weeks protesters demonstrated in front of the National Palace. At U.S. urging, Hernández Martínez resigned and fled into exile. UNT threw its political support behind the democratic reform candidacy of Arturo Romero, but the military staged a coup and reimposed dictatorship. An armed march from Guatemala by hundreds of Romero supporters was defeated at Ahuachapán, and UNT and other labor organizations were banned.

Unions subsequently regrouped and campaigned for restoration of democratic rights and passage of labor laws. Pressured by a major Railway Workers Union* (Unión de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros) strike in late 1945, the regime of General Salvador Castañeda Castro acceded to some demands, recognizing the right to

strike in January 1946. However, the decree imposed severe restrictions through a new National Labor Department which would have to give prior approval to any legal strike. The government then repressed a series of bakery and textile workers strikes in August and September and, to forestall future labor unrest, established the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. For the next two years, union leaders operated underground, forming the clandestine Salvadoran Trade Union Reorganizing Committee* (Comité de Reorganización Obrero Sindical Salvadoreño—CROSS), which established provisional union leadership committees and rebuilt unions independent of government control. After the overthrow of Castañeda by a group of army officers in 1948, CROSS conditionally supported a military junta led by Oscar Osorio in return for a promise of legalization of trade union activity. Those goals were reflected in the 1950 constitution, which for the first time guaranteed the right to organize industrial unions. However, such ideals were not supported by enabling legislation, and the new constitution still prohibited farm workers unions.

In the meantime, representatives of the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) met with the Osorio regime to map a strategy for building an anti-communist trade union front in El Salvador. Unable to co-opt CROSS, Osorio banned the organization in 1952 and institutionalized anti-communist repression. The military officer charged with purging the labor movement, José Alberto “Chele” Medrano, told an imprisoned CROSS leader, “The government is determined that unions be under the control and supervision of the Ministry [of Labor] and, therefore, any union movement which deviates from this is considered subversive and communist and shall be destroyed.” (Carpio, 1981, p. 42.) While repression was underway, ORIT began to organize centrist and anti-communist Salvadoran unionists, but met with unexpected government hostility. Only through personal intervention of AFL Latin America representative Serafino Romualdi was ORIT able to win the confidence of the government which thought, according to Romualdi, that “it could fight the Communists by indiscriminate use of police power, and by labeling as Communist anyone who was fighting for the improvement of the working class.” Romualdi claimed he convinced Osorio that the “best way to fight Communism and build up a genuine democratic labor movement” was to foster at least minimal social reforms and permit non-communist union organizing. (Romualdi, p. 251.)

By late 1956, ORIT and Osorio’s successor, Colonel José María Lemus, felt they had enough trade union influence to allow a national labor congress, which was held in March 1957. However, the congress escaped the government’s political control, and the General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers* (Confederación General de Trabajadores Salvadoreños—CGTS) was founded in August 1957 under leftist leadership. Faced with this setback, pro-government unions supported by ORIT split off from CGTS to form the General Confederation of Unions* (Confederación General de Sindicatos—CGS), led by general sec-

retary Rafael "Chele" Fernández Saravia, Romualdi's Salvadoran protégé. From then on, the labor movement was organizationally divided between left-led and pro-government federations.

The leftist CGTS joined in a broad social movement that toppled the Lemus dictatorship on 26 October 1960, and the confederation worked with a new reformist political movement, the April and May Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Abril y Mayo—PRAM), in support of a progressive civilian-military junta. At CGTS urging, in December 1960 the junta enacted several laws benefiting trade unions, including establishment of a system of labor courts to adjudicate worker grievances. But the junta was overthrown in a violent coup on 25 January 1961, in which many trade unionists were killed.

The military regime of Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera (1962–67) provided backing to CGS and, with U.S. government encouragement, passed a labor code in January 1963 which systematized Ministry of Labor regulation of unions. The law extended rights to those rural workers directly operating in mills and other industrialized agricultural activities, but not the vast majority of laborers "directly occupied in agriculture." U.S. officials charged CGTS with having communist and "pro-Castro" sympathies, and Rivera repressed it severely, allowing CGS to gain initiative over its left-led rival. By 1963, CGTS had declined to eight unions and 2,482 registered members, and the confederation was soon abandoned in favor of a coalition of independent and left-led unions, the Salvadoran Trade Union Unity Committee* (Comité Unitario Sindical Salvadoreño—CUSS).

The AFL-CIO's work in support of CGS was transferred from ORIT to the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) beginning in 1962. Rivera and his successors transformed CGS into the urban labor arm of the military's National Conciliation Party (Partido de Conciliación Nacional—PCN), which ruled El Salvador for two decades. CGS reorganized its affiliates into four federations, conforming to requirements of the new labor code. Largest was the Construction Industry and Transport Trade Union Federation* (Federación de Sindicatos de la Industria de Construcción, Similares, Transporte y de Otras Actividades—FESINCONSTRANS), with almost 10,000 members in its Construction Workers Union* (Sindicato Unión de Trabajadores de la Construcción—SUTC). The Textile Union Federation* (Federación de Sindicatos Textiles, Similares y Conexos y Otras Actividades—FESINTEXSICA) had eleven affiliates and 2,698 members.

From the mid-1960s on, CGS suffered erosion of its influence and disaffiliation of most of its key affiliates, due in part to CGS identification with the anti-labor policies of the ruling PCN. In April 1965 CGS, the progressive CUSS regroupment, and the Catholic Workers National Union* (Unión Nacional de Obreros Católicos—UNOC) held a joint labor congress and agreed to lobby for reforms in the 1963 labor code. On 2 October 1965 fourteen CUSS unions formed the Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador* (Federación Unitaria Sindical de El Salvador—FUSS). By 1967 the rapidly growing FUSS came to the aid of

two CGS affiliates, the "Industrias Unidas, S.A." Textile Workers Union* (Sindicato Textil de Trabajadores "Industrias Unidas, S.A."—STTIUSA) and the "Acero, S.A." Factory Workers Union* (Sindicato de Trabajadores "Acero S.A."). While the STTIUSA strike was lost, the fact that more support had come from the communist-led federation than STTIUSA's parent organization further tarnished CGS's reputation. (STTIUSA eventually disaffiliated from CGS.) FUSS support for the "Acero, S.A." union culminated in a historic and successful general strike which marked the beginning of the contemporary period in Salvadoran labor history.

At issue in the 1967 conflicts was government curtailment of the right to strike. Construction workers began to employ short-term work stoppages to circumvent Ministry of Labor obstructions. Doctors and nurses in state-run hospitals defied the labor code and won a three-day strike. Some 1,600 bus drivers and other urban transportation workers struck in January, strengthening their union's position by seizing bus company vehicles. The transport union was affiliated with FUSS, which organized support for the drivers from other unions. While the pro-government CGS did not offer solidarity, several of its affiliates did so including STTIUSA. On 13 February, over objections of CGS leadership, STTIUSA itself went on strike. Although the strike demands were not won, the STTIUSA workers took defiance of labor code restrictions a step further, forming separate male and female picket brigades armed with clubs to prevent strike-breakers from entering the plant. Newspapers began to speak of "de facto strikes." Solidarity provided by FUSS, in which the Communist Party of El Salvador was influential, enhanced the federation's prestige.

The climax came in April when frustrated workers at "Acero, S.A." Factory Workers Union, near Zacatecoluca, 58 kilometers east of San Salvador, began another strike outside the restrictive labor code norms. After some initial maneuvering, leaders from CGS, FESINCONSTRANS, and FUSS formally drafted a joint declaration "in defense of the constitutional right to strike," effectively uniting all of the country's trade unions in an unprecedented showdown with business interests and the government. Union leaders formalized this cooperation in an elected Tripartite Strike Command with representation from FUSS, CGS, and the Acero local.

A progressively staged general strike brought some 9,000 workers out on its first day, 26 April, and President Rivera appointed a personal mediator and forced Acero management to finally offer some concrete proposals. Two days later, with perhaps 35,000 workers out, and others anxious to join in the attempt to reclaim the strike as a viable and recognized instrument of the labor movement, Acero management agreed to all union demands.

The 1967 strikes touched off long-term political ferment in CGS union ranks. FESINCONSTRANS split from CGS and, although still linked closely to the AFL-CIO, was able to distance itself somewhat from the onus which pro-government CGS leaders bore. Nevertheless, FESINCONSTRANS lost most of its nonconstruction affiliates over the next decade. The split in CGS left a legacy

of bitterness in the ranks of unions supported by the AFL-CIO, and eventually FESINCONSTRANS, under the centrist leadership of general secretary Felipe Zaldívar, was instrumental in having its former parent expelled from ORIT for collaboration with repressive military authorities.

With the initiative it gained in these struggles over the pro-government CGS, FUSS helped form, in January 1969, a second federation, the Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union Federation* (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores de la Industria del Alimento, Vestido, Textiles, Similares y Conexos de El Salvador—FESTIAVTSCES), a step aimed at eventual formation of a new left-led confederation.

Organizing among rural workers also became a theater for competition among pro- and anti-government labor activists. The Catholic Workers National Union* (Unión Nacional de Obreros Católicos—UNOC) had been formed in 1950 by officials of the Catholic Church seeking to establish a middle ground in the trade union movement. Although UNOC gained little influence in industrial unions, its effort to organize rural workers eventually intersected with Catholic base community organizing and agrarian reform concerns. While the Church's efforts met with landowner hostility, the Salvadoran government allowed establishment of two other anti-communist organizations among El Salvador's impoverished peasantry, the Salvadoran Communal Union* (Unión Comunal Salvadoreña—UCS) and the Nationalist Democratic Organization* (Organización Democrática Nacionalista—ORDEN). In 1965 AIFLD persuaded the regime of Colonel Julio Alberto Rivera to allow U.S.-sponsored educational seminars for farm workers. Within three years a network of AIFLD-trained leaders was able to organize UCS to administer U.S. government-funded self-help projects in the countryside. By the early 1970s UCS had forty-five affiliated rural cooperatives and claimed to have helped thousands of formerly landless peasants to purchase land. (The guiding figure in AIFLD's rural organizing effort was Michael Hammer, who later became AIFLD's regional director for Central America.)

A point of controversy regarding UCS in the labor movement concerned its alleged ties with the second government-backed rural organization, ORDEN. This unique Salvadoran institution, established in 1963, was supervised primarily out of the Salvadoran National Security Agency (Agencia Nacional de Seguridad Salvadoreña—ANSESAL), founded under guidance of U.S. government agencies. ANSESAL became the intelligence branch of the Salvadoran armed forces responsible for monitoring and countering leftist influence in the labor, peasant, and other social movements—a product of the controversial U.S. Public Safety Program. Much of the day-to-day work developing ANSESAL was coordinated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Salvadoran officer chosen to head the ANSESAL effort, Colonel José Alberto “Chele” Medrano, later proudly admitted to a long CIA association. A ten-man team of U.S. Army Special Forces counterinsurgency advisers (Green Berets) helped Medrano create ORDEN, whose acronym means “order” in Spanish. “The idea occurred to us to catechize the people,” said Medrano. “We talked about how we had to

indoctrinate the people, because he who has the population wins the war.” (Nairn, p. 23.) ORDEN’s mission was to build a pro-government peasant organization and monitor leftist union organizing in the countryside. U.S. officers helped Medrano plan ORDEN’s structure, formulate its ideology, and train its team of military coordinators. (The latter included Colonel Nicolas Carranza, who later directed Treasury Police attacks on labor unions while on CIA retainer.)

ORDEN built its base among former soldiers, and its members became the rural labor base of the military’s PCN. At ORDEN’s height, Medrano and his successors led perhaps 30,000 farm workers and peasants (some estimates ran as high as 100,000), proselytizing an anti-communist credo which adherents called “the doctrine.” ORDEN was the eyes and ears of ANSESAL—hence the Salvadoran term *oreja*, or “ear,” for an ORDEN informer or other stool pigeon in unions. ORDEN members had first claim on available jobs and could bear arms, obtain the protection of local authorities, be absolved of crimes, and carry an ORDEN identity card to show to military authorities. The ORDEN network and its military liaison officers in ANSESAL became the foundation for El Salvador’s infamous “death squads.”

By the mid-1970s, the capacity of UCS and ORDEN to contain and channel labor organizing in the countryside was diminishing, as the influence of Catholic and left-organized peasant associations spread (see Farm Worker and Peasant Association of El Salvador, Asociación de Trabajadores Agrícolas y Campesinos de El Salvador—ATACES). In 1963 the Church had begun support of the rural cooperative movement, and in 1964 Catholic organizers united a few small peasant leagues in the Christian Peasants Federation* (Federación Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoreños—FECCAS), which developed a significant base in northern and central El Salvador in the early and mid-1970s. FECCAS’s center was around Aguilares, north of San Salvador, where Father Rutilio Grande and other Jesuits organized lay preachers and implemented the “preferential option for the poor” of Latin America’s liberation theologians. Grande denounced El Salvador’s “feudal system” and was in turn damned as one of the “bad priests” by landowners. Other Catholic activists developed similar farm workers unions, including the Rural Workers Union* (Unión de Trabajadores del Campo—UTC) in San Vicente.

Landowners also disliked the AIFLD-backed UCS, despite its anti-communist purpose, and in 1973 the regime of Colonel Arturo Molina (1972–77) asked the AFL–CIO to close its El Salvador office. The Molina government pursued only token agrarian reform and mobilized its rural support primarily through ORDEN. The AFL–CIO continued to advise and financially support UCS and other centrist Salvadoran labor organizations from its regional AIFLD office in Guatemala, and the Inter-American Foundation also stepped in with almost \$1 million in funding for UCS during the period of AIFLD’s formal exclusion from the country.

Growth and radicalization of the urban and rural labor movements coincided with ideological and political conflict within the Salvadoran left. After the Communist Party (PCS) adopted a nationalist posture during the 1969 war with

Honduras, a split occurred which led to formation of the Popular Liberation Forces (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación—Farabundo Martí—FPL) and other revolutionary groups in the early 1970s. The PCS pursued an electoral alliance with the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano—PDC), forming the Nationalist Democratic Union (Unión Democrática Nacionalist—UDN), while university radicals and former PCS youth leaders turned their attention to the implications of the Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions for El Salvador. This “new left” experience led to formation of the People’s Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—ERP) and, later, the National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional) which, like the FPL, were “political-military” organizations. While all of these groups would later acknowledge each other’s accomplishments, uniting in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional—FMLN), it was primarily the PCS’s electoral strategy which was frustrated by events, and the party began to lose initiative in the labor movement after the PCS-PDC victory in the 1972 elections was overturned through fraud.

That same year, the pro-government General Confederation of Unions (CGS) suffered its most serious crisis. Eighteen unions walked out of its national congress, and with UDN support, twelve of the dissident unions founded the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers* (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Salvadoreños—FENASTRAS), which eventually became El Salvador’s largest industrial federation. FENASTRAS, FUSS, and FESTIAVTCES moved toward formation of a left-led confederation (see Unitary Confederation of Salvadoran Workers, Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores Salvadoreños—CUTS), but the organization was never consolidated due to competition among leftist currents. Furthermore, PCS-led unions suffered harsh attacks. In 1974 veteran FUSS and textile union leader Jorge Alberto “El Beatle” Morán Cornejo was assassinated by the Molina regime, and in October 1975 the federation’s general secretary, Rafael Aguñada Carranza, was killed by ANSESAL agents. The Railway Workers Union, FUSS’s largest affiliate, was dissolved by decree in May 1975, and the Water and Sewage National Administration Workers Union* (Sindicato de Empresa Trabajadores de Administración Nacional de Acueductos Alcantarillados—SETA) was destroyed by the government two years later.

While PCS-influenced unions suffered setbacks, new left union organizing initiatives began to challenge PCS leadership throughout the labor movement, both in and outside of existing leftist federations. In 1974 the Christian Peasants Federation joined with a number of urban unions, student and Church groups, and the Rural Workers Union (UTC) to form the United Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular Unida—FAPU), a left alternative to UDN which was instrumental in reorienting the Salvadoran labor movement during the late 1970s. The following year there was a split in FAPU, with FECCAS and UTC leaving to join a new mass revolutionary organization, the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (Bloque Revolucionario Popular—BPR). FAPU and BPR were at the forefront of labor movement realignment, with FAPU becoming the dominant influence

in many FENASTRAS affiliates, while BPR-oriented forces led the National Association of Salvadoran Educators* (Asociación Nacional de Educadores Salvadoreños "21 de Junio"—ANDES), FECCAS, and UTC (see Trade Unions Coordinating Committee, Comité Coordinador de Sindicatos "José Guillermo Rivas"). A new strike wave began in 1976 under leadership of these currents, and the military hit back with repression. On 12 March 1977 security forces killed Father Rutilio Grande, and farm workers unions began to arm themselves, confiscating weapons from ORDEN members.

In the industrial unions, FAPU and BPR developed tactical approaches combining legal and extra-legal methods. Strikes were backed up with civil disobedience, sit-downs, and other forms of direct action to force management to negotiate seriously or to obtain a more impartial intervention by the Ministry of Labor. The government of General Carlos Humberto Romero (1977–79) cracked down on the labor movement in November 1977, instituting the Law for the Defense and Guarantee of Public Order, a sedition act which effectively criminalized most union activity. But the repression only further radicalized the labor movement.

The realignment process was conflictive, with different leftist federations disputing each other's claims of control of several unions and union locals. The main organizational restructuring came in late 1979 with formation of the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation* (Federación Sindical Revolucionaria—FSR), which pulled one or more unions or locals away from almost every existing leftist and pro-government federation. With the shift of many industrial unions from FESINCONSTRANS and CGS into the mass revolutionary organizations (and the impending expulsion of CGS from ORIT), the ruling PCN's trade union base was collapsing. Alarmed by left advances, AIFLD had attempted to reenter El Salvador as early as 1977, telling its U.S. government funders that the AFL-CIO's Salvadoran allies were "losing ground in face of the united and militant action of the communists." But it was not until the Sandinistas were on the verge of overthrowing the Somoza regime in Nicaragua that, in June 1979, the government of Humberto Romero, itself in trouble, allowed AIFLD to reopen its San Salvador office and assume administration of UCS.

Directed once again by AIFLD's veteran Salvador representative, Michael Hammer, the AIFLD team confronted a whirlwind situation, with San Salvador boiling with urban labor conflict and leadership rivalries plaguing UCS. On 9 May a CBS television crew had filmed the awful slaughter of demonstrators on the steps of the Cathedral by National Guard troops, bringing the Salvadoran crisis to international attention. The country was convulsed by strikes, embassy takeovers, kidnappings, political assassinations, and daily street demonstrations against the regime. By September the Carter administration, under criticism in the United States for having held onto Somoza too long, signaled its lack of confidence in General Romero. As FENASTRAS and other left-led unions joined in establishing the broad opposition Popular Forum, an alternative popular parliament, the Romero dictatorship collapsed in October 1979.

Faced with integration of trade unions and other democratic organizations into a vast revolutionary movement, a reformist civil-military junta seized power, banned ORDEN, and announced plans for agrarian reform. The new government included committed reformers, but the U.S. embassy undercut the government's social democrats and left Christian Democrats, deriding them as "idealists," and instead began to broker a military alliance with pro-U.S. elements in the Christian Democratic Party. The first junta resigned on 3 January 1980, replaced eventually by Christian Democratic centrists more to U.S. liking.

Events unfolded at a breathtaking pace, as the more committed social democratic and Christian Democratic factions moved toward alliance with the five revolutionary political-military organizations. On 11 January the FAPU, BPR, and UDN fronts (in which unions constituted the primary membership) joined with the LP-28 People's Leagues (based more among youth and non-unionized workers) to form the Revolutionary Mass Coordinating Committee (*Coordinadora Revolucionaria de Masas—CRM*). Union members, angered by repression and political cosmetics blocking fundamental reform, poured into the streets on 22 January, joining some 200,000 in the largest protest march in Salvadoran history. Police fired on the demonstrators, killing forty-nine.

Amid this fluid situation, AIFLD brought in a U.S. land reform specialist, Roy Prosterman, to advise UCS leaders and help redraft the land reform law into what critics charged was a "rural counter insurgency program." (See Fourché and Wheaton.) On 6 March the junta decreed a three-phase agrarian reform program based largely upon Prosterman's recommendations, and UCS general secretary Rodolfo Viera was made head of ISTA, the Salvadoran Agrarian Transformation Institute (*Instituto Salvadoreño de Transformación Agraria*), advised by a six-man AIFLD team. Some 263 estates over 1,235 acres in size were to be turned into cooperatives for 60,000 families under direction of 500 ISTA agents, vastly increasing UCS's power and influence. (A second phase to reform estates under 1,235 acres, which included most of El Salvador's profitable coffee-producing properties, was never implemented.)

The ruling junta imposed a national state of siege to accompany the agrarian reform decree, and death-squad terror against leftist unions increased dramatically. As soon as the first junta had ordered abolition of ORDEN and ANSESAL, the military employed Major Roberto D'Aubuisson (a protégé of "Chele" Medrano and ANSESAL veteran who left the service in anticipation of Romero's fall) to transfer ANSESAL files to the army's general command. With financial support from ultra-right landowners, D'Aubuisson now moved to integrate ORDEN and the network of military intelligence operatives and death-squad commanders into a clandestine civilian-run organization which would be flanked by an aboveground nationalist political party, the National Republican Alliance (*Alianza Republicana Nacionalista—ARENA*).

Faced with repression and a rightward-moving regime, left-led unions formed the Union Unity Committee* (*Comité de Unidad Sindical—CUS*) in April and then joined with the social democratic and Christian Democratic factions from

the first junta to establish the Democratic Revolutionary Front (Frente Democrático Revolucionario—FDR). In addition to the main left-led federations (FENASTRAS, FUSS, FESTIAVTSCES, and FSR), the FDR included the large independent STTIUSA, STISSS, and ANDES unions. Unions in the FDR prepared a two-day general strike, and the action held on 25–26 June was a stunning success, testimony to the revolutionary movement's trade union support. The government retaliated on 27 June by attacking and closing the National University, killing sixteen students and denying the unions their most important organizing sanctuary. On 23 August the government issued Decree 44 dissolving FENASTRAS's large Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission Workers and Employees Union* (Sindicato de Trabajadores de Empresa Comisión Ejecutiva Hidroeléctrica—STECCEL) and imprisoned FENASTRAS general secretary Héctor Bernabé Recinos and other leaders.

As El Salvador headed toward full-scale civil war, AIFLD helped UCS, FES-INCONSTRANS, and a handful of other centrist union organizations to establish the Democratic Popular Unity* (Unidad Popular Democrática-UPD) in September 1980, as a counterweight to unions supporting the FDR. Although UPD had no significant base among industrial unions, it gained support of many agrarian reform beneficiaries and subsequently played a key role in U.S. efforts to establish a stable government in El Salvador. The AFL-CIO's program of support for UPD and its affiliates became the U.S. labor movement's largest project in Latin America, with financial backing of some \$2 million per year from the U.S. government.

By late 1980 most FDR-affiliated union leaders had been driven underground by a pattern of indiscriminate death-squad terror which would last almost four years. The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front was established in October, and the main rural bases of FECCAS and UTC became FMLN strongholds. On 27 November the top FDR leadership was captured by police and murdered. Only the AIFLD-backed UPD organizations were able to operate aboveground. By 1983 CUS was effectively dissolved, and labor unions no longer played an active role in the FDR. Of the more than 30,000 Salvadorans killed by death squads and security forces from 1979 to 1983, an estimated 5,000 trade unionists lost their lives. Dozens of unions were destroyed, and thousands of union activists fled into exile. Many employers were able to violate contracts at will and fire "troublemakers." Strikes became rare, and the Ministry of Labor recorded only four during all of 1983.

While most of the repression was directed at left-led unions, AIFLD and its allies also encountered problems. AIFLD and UCS adviser Prosterman, disillusioned with the reform process and the deteriorating political situation, accused incoming Reagan administration officials of undercutting the entire reform movement. On 3 January 1981 Rodolfo Viera, Michael Hammer, and another AIFLD agent, Mark Pearlman, were assassinated by a death squad acting on behalf of prominent Salvadoran business interests. That event accelerated a political controversy within the AFL-CIO over the U.S. role in the Salvadoran labor move-

ment. Months later, veteran FESINCONSTRANS and UPD head Felipe Zaldívar was assassinated, possibly because, according to AIFLD critics, he was seeking an alliance with the persecuted left-led unions.

The AFL-CIO role in El Salvador had already come under criticism from within the U.S. labor movement, particularly after the outgoing Carter administration's decision to renew military aid. As soon as Ronald Reagan was elected, the dispute became more public. In December 1980 the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) announced it would boycott U.S. military cargo to El Salvador. In January 1981 William Winpisinger, president of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), declared that Carter's decision to resume military aid to El Salvador was "another nail in the coffin" of his human rights policy. Other AFL-CIO leaders, such as American Federation of Teachers head Albert Shanker, backed U.S. aid to the José Napoleón Duarte junta. AIFLD director William Doherty wrote in 1981 that the "best hope" to end rightist terror and dampen the appeal of the left among workers "lies in strengthening the democratic-centrist junta." (Doherty, p. 3.) AIFLD critics replied that repression against trade unions continued unabated under Duarte and that the AFL-CIO was doing the Reagan administration's dirty work in El Salvador.

The AFL-CIO and AIFLD responded to criticism by emphasizing the Duarte regime's declared intentions to carry out social reforms and echoing the Reagan administration's charge that the opposition FMLN was aided by Cuba and the Soviet Union. In 1982 the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers established an office in the United States, headed initially by Alejandro Molina Lara, former general secretary of the Fishing Industry Union* (Sindicato de la Industria Pesquera—SIP), to call for opposition by the U.S. labor movement to the Reagan administration's El Salvador policies. AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland attacked Salvadoran union representatives "not speaking on behalf of any legitimate trade union organization recognized by the AFL-CIO." In a widely circulated document, another AFL-CIO representative labeled Molina Lara a clever interloper and terrorist, and described FENASTRAS, El Salvador's largest industrial federation, as "a small leftist union."

Meanwhile, in March 1982 the AFL-CIO was put in an awkward position by the outcome of El Salvador's constituent assembly elections. While the U.S. federation had urged UPD to support Duarte's candidacy and use the elections to boost the government's international credibility, UPD leaders withheld formal endorsement of the Christian Democrats. Worse still, the elections were a partial victory for D'Aubuisson's ARENA party. Instead of opposing the regime, however, the AFL-CIO paraded UPD representatives before the U.S. Congress and in the media to validate the new government's legitimacy.

While AFL-CIO promotion of UPD and red-baiting of representatives of leftist Salvadoran unions did inhibit debate in AFL-CIO bodies, the growing controversy was not contained. Some twenty-five local anti-intervention labor committees critical of AIFLD's role in El Salvador were established across the United

States, and in late 1981 the heads of several U.S. unions joined to form the National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador, which began to openly oppose aspects of the AFL–CIO’s Central America policies. The committee began its own investigation of the situation in El Salvador and, in March 1982, published a statement at variance with AFL–CIO policy. “What exists is a government at war with its own people. And that war is being supported and financed by the U.S.,” they said. In 1983 the committee, now representing the presidents of thirteen U.S. unions, sent to El Salvador an independent delegation led by Jack Sheinkman, secretary-treasurer of the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union. As a result of such pressure, the AFL–CIO leadership withdrew its support of military aid in February 1983 and agreed to a compromise resolution on El Salvador at its 1983 convention. Support for UPD was reaffirmed, but the federation called for peace negotiations and election of a new government. The controversy in the AFL–CIO heated up further when Lane Kirkland agreed to serve on the Kissinger Commission on Central America.

During the 1980–83 terror, progressive union activists worked clandestinely, meeting one-on-one with union members in a method of underground union organizing called “*ant work*.” In 1983 the progressive unions attempted to reemerge and establish center-left cooperation against labor repression and deteriorated living conditions. Despite inflation of almost 100 percent, the minimum wage in manufacturing had been frozen at eleven *colones* (less than \$3) per day. The minimum wage for agricultural workers remained fixed at half that rate from July 1979. Many firms fell chronically in arrears in wage payments, and some pocketed workers’ social security payments or laid off employees without severance pay—all violations of law that most unions were powerless to redress. Discontent with government policy mounted even in unions of the AIFLD-backed UPD, some of whose leaders began to respond positively to overtures from the newly formed center-left group of unions, the Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador* (Movimiento Unitario Sindicalista y Gremial de El Salvador—MUSYGES). The new coalition organized an indoor May Day commemoration. In September 1983 a death squad captured MUSYGES leader and FUSS general secretary Santiago Hernández. Thirteen days later his mutilated body was left on a street, a clear message to UPD leaders of the fate that might befall them. MUSYGES was eventually disbanded.

While AIFLD tried to hold its Salvadoran allies in line and limit their contact with its U.S. critics, by mid-1983 some UPD leaders began to privately complain that AIFLD was pressuring them to support U.S. military aid to El Salvador. And, indeed, AFL–CIO leadership was preparing to lift its opposition to military aid and become involved in a campaign to establish a credible government in El Salvador through elections scheduled for March 1984. The Kissinger Commission report, bearing Kirkland’s approval of military aid, would be issued in January. U.S. officials, anxious to have a regime that could be supported by the U.S. Congress, urged UPD unions to formalize an alliance with Duarte’s PDC.

But, faced with failed reforms and deteriorating real wages, UPD's political posture grew more independent, projecting demands which began to resemble those of left-led unions. In exchange for any presidential endorsement UPD demanded that the Christian Democrats end death-squad terror, prosecute human rights violators, extend social reforms, and negotiate a political settlement to the civil war with the FMLN. Only weeks before the election, UPD forced the Christian Democrats to sign a "social pact" which put these promises in writing.

Duarte's victory in March was a triumph for Kirkland and the AFL-CIO in El Salvador. Finally there was a government in power with a measure of international credibility and presumably accountable to UPD unions which helped put it there. But UPD's relations with the Duarte regime soon deteriorated when it became apparent that the government would appease business interests and defer action on social reforms while making the war against the FMLN its top priority. In August 1984 UCS leaders publicly opposed U.S. military aid and criticized Duarte for not pursuing peace talks. AIFLD then put pressure on UCS and other unions to stop "pushing Duarte to the left" (i.e., urging that he fulfill the social pact), and AIFLD country director Bernard Packer demanded that UCS switch from the UPD to join a new "nonpolitical" organization, the Democratic Workers Central* (Central de Trabajadores Democráticos—CTD). Some UCS leaders denounced the AIFLD maneuver as an effort to destroy the social pact and pursue a military solution to the civil war. AIFLD's heavy-handed tactics precipitated a split in UPD leadership; the main UPD affiliates became embroiled in conflict which eventually produced heavy bitterness toward the AFL-CIO. Its relations with the Salvadoran centrist unions severely damaged, AIFLD removed Packer from El Salvador; the U.S. labor attaché also left during the furor after receiving death threats which he suspected came from an AIFLD loyalist angered by his sympathy for UPD dissidents.

While the UPD crisis deepened, more conservative unions were also faring badly. The National Workers Central (Central Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT), founded in mid-1982 as a trade union base for D'Aubuisson's ultra-right ARENA party, managed to control only two unions, and its two top leaders were assassinated in 1983. The General Confederation of Labor* (Conferación General de Trabajo—CGT), founded in March 1983, formed a few parallel unions to develop a trade union current loyal to the Duarte government. But given the decline in popular support for Duarte, CGT did not prosper and instead became embroiled in a long and frustrating strike at Pesca S.A., a shrimp industry firm (see Fishing Industry Workers General Union, Sindicato General de Trabajadores de la Industria Pesquera y Actividades Conexas). Meanwhile, a series of public employee conflicts during 1984 marked renewal of open union organizing, and FENAS-TRAS and other progressive unions were able to organize a small May Day march. Later that year, the Duarte government, under heavy international pressure, especially from European unions, released FENASTRAS general secretary Recinos from prison. In November twenty-one of the most active industrial

unions formed the Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee* (Coordinadora de Solidaridad de los Trabajadores—CST).

But the most important dynamic breathing life back into the labor movement was the organizing in state agencies. Public employees associations had tended to be pro-government or politically "neutral." Now, however, the wage freeze and austerity policies kept in place since 1980 provided the impetus for new organizing, as did frustration with President Duarte's failure to implement promised reforms. Many of the newer public employees unions came together with older associations to coordinate solidarity with the postal workers strike during May and June of 1984 (see the Letter Carrier and Postal Employees Union Society of El Salvador, Sociedad Unión de Carteros y Empleados Postales de El Salvador). From those ties was formed a State Employees Coordinating Council (Coordinadora de Empleados del Estado), which in early 1985, with the addition of several other labor associations, became the State and Municipal Workers Coordinating Council* (Consejo Coordinador de Trabajadores Estatales y Municipales—CCTEM).

CCTEM's significance was twofold. First, it adopted a political posture critical of the government and in favor of peace negotiations with the FMLN, making it a public employees union front parallel to that which CST was forging among industrial unions. Second, CCTEM marked a labor movement strategy by which centrist and leftist unions regrouped by sector (industrial, agrarian, and public) in a manner transcending traditional federation structures and political lines. A similar regroupment among farm workers unions and cooperatives was led by the Agricultural Workers Union of El Salvador* (Sindicato de Trabajadores Agropecuarios, Similares y Conexos Salvadoreños) and the Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El Salvador* (Confederación de Asociaciones Cooperativas de El Salvador—COACES). The movement toward center/left unification allowed CST to join with several centrist unions in the 1985 May Day march (see May First Committee, Comité Primero de Mayo). A turning point in this process came on 2 June 1985 when President Duarte authorized a military attack against the striking STISSS employees in San Salvador's General Hospital. The brutal action tarnished Duarte's image and solidified ties between centrist and leftist unions. Meanwhile, AIFLD's El Salvador problems continued to have repercussions within the AFL-CIO in the United States. At the October 1985 AFL-CIO convention in Anaheim, the first major debate over foreign policy in thirty years erupted on the floor of the convention around the issue of the AFL-CIO's role in El Salvador and Nicaragua.

Three months later the UPD's Ramón Mendoza, STISSS's Guillermo Rojas, and several hundred other union leaders gathered in front of the National Assembly building on 8 February 1986 to announce formation of the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers* (Unidad Nacional de Trabajadores Salvadoreños—UNTS), the broadest coalition of trade unions established in El Salvador since the 1950s. Comprised of about 100 labor organizations claiming to represent

almost 300,000 workers, UNTS put forward a comprehensive program of economic development and social reform.

AIFLD reacted with vengeance. William Doherty, who a year earlier had vowed to defend UPD with his life, held a press conference in Washington to denounce "Marxist-Leninist" subversion of UPD and to charge that Mendoza and others were either "ideologically friendly to the guerrillas" or "interested primarily in taking money from both sides." (See "Guerrillas Infiltrate Salvadoran Unions," *AFL-CIO News*, May 3, 1986.) Mendoza and other longtime AFL-CIO associates replied that AIFLD was, in effect, issuing their death warrants, and UNTS called for AIFLD's expulsion from El Salvador. Meanwhile, AIFLD pulled its remaining union allies into a hastily formed National Union of Workers and Peasants* (Unión Nacional de Obreros y Campesinos—UNOC). By mid-1986 UNTS was the most visible center of political opposition to Duarte government policies, and on May Day it organized a march of some 80,000 workers to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the "martyrs" of Chicago, the largest mass demonstration in El Salvador since 1980.

Bibliography

- Anderson, Thomas P. *Matanza: El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971.
- Armstrong, Robert and Janet Shenk. *El Salvador: The Face of Revolution*. Boston: South End Press, 1982.
- Baloyra, Enrique A. *El Salvador in Transition*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982.
- Carpio, Salvador Cayetano. *La huelga general obrera del Abril 1967*. San José: Imprensa Elena, 1968.
- . *Secuestro y Capucha*. Mexico City: Editorial Millaqui, 1981.
- Casper, Norman. "El IADSL y la Corrupción del Movimiento sindical en El Salvador." *Estudios Centroamericanos* 41, no. 449 (March 1986): 205–29. Centro Documental de la Economía del Trabajo (CEDET) *Resumen*. Weekly bulletin San Salvador, 1985—.
- Dalton, Roque. *Miguel Mármol: los sucesos de 1932 en El Salvador*. Mexico City: Endiciones Cuilcuilco, 1982.
- Doherty, William C., Jr. "U.S. Labor's Role in El Salvador." *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News* 36, no. 2 (February 1981): 1–7.
- El Salvador, Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social. *Estadísticas del trabajo*. Annual editions. San Salvador.
- . *Informe anual de labores*. Annual editions. San Salvador.
- Forché, Carolyn, and Philip Wheaton. *History and Motivations of U.S. Involvement in the Control of the Peasant Movement in El Salvador: The Role of AIFLD in the Agrarian Reform Process, 1970–1980*. Washington, D.C.: EPICA, 1980.
- Larín, Arístides Augusto. "Historia del movimiento sindical de El Salvador." *La Universidad* (University of El Salvador) 96, no. 4 (July–August, 1971): 135–79; no. 5 (Sept.–Oct.): 100–154.

- Menjívar, Rafael. *Formación y lucha del proletariado industrial salvadoreño*. San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, 1979.
- Nairn, Allan. "Behind the Death Squads." *Progressive* 48 (May 1984): 20-29.
- National Labor Committee in Support of Human Rights in El Salvador. *El Salvador: Labor, Terror, and Peace*. New York: National Labor Committee, 1983.
- Montgomery, Tommie Sue. *Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1982.
- Norton, Chris. "Build and Destroy." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 19, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1985): 26-36.
- Pearce, Jenny. *Promised Land: Peasant Rebellion in Chalatenango, El Salvador*. London: Latin American Bureau, 1986.
- Romualdi, Serafino. *Presidents and Peons. Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1967.
- Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas. *Estudios Centroamericanos* (monthly) and *Proceso* (weekly). San Salvador.
- Volman, Dennis. "Salvador Death Squads, A CIA Connection?" *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 May 1984.
- White, Alastair. *El Salvador*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1982.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

"ACERO, S.A." FACTORY WORKERS UNION (Sindicato de Trabajadores "Acero S.A.").

The 1963 labor code made it virtually impossible for a union to gain government authorization for a strike, and frustration grew in several affiliates of the pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS) over its leaders' adherence to the official regulations. A series of "illegal" strikes began in January 1967 that set the stage for a dramatic conflict of 260 metalworkers at the Acero, S.A. factory near Zacatecoluca, 58 kilometers east of San Salvador, which culminated in a nationwide general strike. The Acero local belonged to the Basic Metals Industry Union of the Construction Industry and Transport Trade Union Federation* (FESINCONSTRANS), largest of four CGS federations. Workers there earned 2.40 *colones* (one dollar) per day, which, after deduction of bus fare, was less than agricultural workers in the region earned during the cotton harvest. Furthermore, there was discontent over unsafe working conditions. When two union members were fired, Acero workers called an assembly and, against the advice of FESINCONSTRANS leader (and CGS secretary of organization) Felipe Antonio Zaldívar, gave the firm a forty-eight-hour strike ultimatum to rehire the two workers, subsidize employee bus fares, and remove an abusive plant manager. When the company refused to negotiate, the union set up an encampment and picket line in front of the factory on 6 April 1967. The left-led Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador* (FUSS) offered solidarity assistance, as did the General Association of Salvadoran University Students (AGEUS). The company declared it would not negotiate "under pressure,"

and on 8 April the Salvadoran Industrialists Society (ASI) demanded the union "respect established labor law" and called on the government to uphold "the principles of legal authority." In an impromptu general assembly, strikers rejected a government ultimatum to return to work or have their contracts terminated, and called on the nation's labor organizations to back them up with "moral, economic and material support." FUSS leaders proposed a solidarity pact with CGS, and proceeded to mobilize nationwide support. Citing their "profound differences" with the communists, CGS leaders initially spurned that offer, but under worker pressure, FESINCONSTRANS and CGS leaders met in Zacatecoluca with FUSS on 13 April to formally draft a joint declaration "in defense of the constitutional right to strike," effectively uniting all of the country's trade unions in an unprecedented showdown with business interests and the government. (See Carpio, pp. 17-19.)

FUSS and CGS held support rallies in San Salvador on Friday, 14 April, and began organizing a weekend 58-kilometer "Solidarity March" to reach the Acero plant by Monday morning when the government's ultimatum would expire. Union representatives from Santa Ana, San Miguel, La Unión, and Acajutla gathered in Zacatecoluca, and at 2:30 AM on Monday, the FUSS-organized "Great Solidarity Caravan" of autos, trucks, and motorcycles from San Salvador reached the factory. A Tripartite Strike Command was elected, with representatives from CGS, FUSS, and the Acero local. The Command deployed strikers and supporters in units to form a perimeter around the factory, and at 6:00 AM the CGS and FUSS national leadership and leaders of unions from across the country lined up in front of the Acero union's picket line. National Guard troops stood by when the Ministry of Labor representative drove up at 7:00 AM. Amid great tension as union leaders sensed a historic moment, the official surveyed the scene, spoke briefly with National Guard officers, and then drove off without saying a word to the workers.

The unions had won the first skirmish. Avoiding a confrontation, a Ministry of Labor official declared that the agency had completed its role and that the conflict was now in the hands of security forces. The company continued to refuse to negotiate, and CGS and FUSS mounted a publicity campaign in San Salvador demanding negotiations. On 19 April President Julio Rivera called Acero union leaders to the government palace and personally tried to split them off from the Tripartite Strike Command. CGS and FUSS responded by creating a joint General Strike Command which issued a call for a general strike if the Acero conflict was not resolved within five days (by 24 April). In order to bring maximum pressure on the government, the Command decided to organize the nationwide action in progressive stages, beginning with the left-led railway and bakery workers. After a twenty-four-hour extension, the country's rail transport halted at one minute after midnight on 26 April. At 3:00 AM hundreds of bakery workers deployed in pickets to close down small factories and shops. At eight o'clock, San Salvador's public trash collection service was halted, and workers at the El Salvador International Hotel walked out, stranding foreign tourists.

The effectiveness of scaled actions involving some 9,000 workers had an electrifying effect on the entire labor movement and Salvadoran society in general. President Rivera changed his posture, appointing the president of the Supreme Court, José Vicente Vilanova, as his personal mediator in the conflict, assisted by National Guard officer Colonel José Alberto Medrano. (Regarding Medrano's role in labor affairs, see Nationalist Democratic Organization.) The government forced Acero management to make concrete proposals for the first time, but the offer of a salary increase included plans to dismiss fifty workers. President Rivera, in a public reply to the General Strike Command's telegram seeking a meeting, declared he was prepared to resign the presidency "if I am an obstacle to resolution of this situation," but that "I will not sit down at the same table with either the communists" (i.e., FUSS leaders Julio César Castro Belloso and Salvador Cayetano Carpio) "or the opportunists" (the CGS's Zaldívar and, especially, Rodríguez González, member of the national executive board of the ruling National Conciliation Party). (See Carpio, pp. 40–41.)

Strike leaders estimated that 35,000 workers were out by the morning of 28 April and that 15,000 others were preparing to join. With support still building among workers anxious to reclaim the strike as a viable and recognized instrument of the labor movement, Vilanova obtained Acero management agreement to all union demands. The government itself agreed to pay Acero strikers fifteen days lost wages. In addition to the historic experience of center-left unity, which was not repeated on a similar scale until 1986 (see National Unity of Salvadoran Workers), the 1967 Industrias Unidas and Acero strikes touched off long-term political ferment in CGS union ranks.

ACOPAI. *See* Integrated Agrarian Production Cooperatives Association.

AGRICULTURAL WORKERS UNION OF EL SALVADOR (Sindicato de Trabajadores Agropecuarios, Similares y Conexos Salvadoreños—SITAS).

SITAS was the first agricultural workers union to seek legal recognition from the Ministry of Labor following passage of the 1983 constitution. (Regarding antecedents, see Farm Worker and Peasant Association and Christian Peasants Federation.) By late 1985 the ministry still denied recognition on the pretext that no enabling legislation had been enacted. Meanwhile, SITAS formed a front of farm workers organizations, which included the National Peasants Association (Asociación Nacional Campesina—ANC) and the Agricultural Workers National Association* (Asociación Nacional de Trabajadores Agropecuarios—ANTA), to campaign for farm worker rights and increased rural sector minimum wages. Despite the modest wage increase conceded to urban workers in 1984, rural wages had been frozen since 1980. SITAS demanded that payment for coffee harvest workers, for example, be increased from 2.85 *colones* to 6 *colones* per *arroba* (25 lbs.). SITAS was the most active farm workers organization in the May First Committee and, despite repressive conditions, led several large farm workers demonstrations during late 1985. In November SITAS, ANC, and

ANTA held a two-day Worker-Peasant Forum on Dialogue and Peace in El Salvador. In January 1986 the Duarte regime raised the farm workers minimum wage, but a simultaneous devaluation of the *colon* left the daily rate with a U.S. dollar value of only \$1.50, possibly the lowest minimum wage in Latin America. In October 1986, SITAS, ANC, ANTA and several other rural labor organizations announced formation of the National Peasants Union (Unión Nacional Campesina—UNC).

ANDES 21 DE JUNIO. *See* National Association of Salvadoran Educators.

ANIS. *See* Salvadoran National Indigenous Association.

ANTMAG. *See* Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Workers National Association.

ASIES. *See* Federation of Independent Union Associations of El Salvador.

ASOCIACIÓN DE COOPERATIVAS DE PRODUCCIÓN AGROPECUARIA INTEGRADAS. *See* Integrated Agrarian Production Cooperatives Association.

ASOCIACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES AGROPECUARIOS Y CAMPESINOS DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Farm Worker and Peasant Association of El Salvador.

ASOCIACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE EMPRESA COMISIÓN EJECUTIVA HIDROELECTRICA—ATCEL. *See* Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission Workers and Employees Union.

ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE EDUCADORES SALVADOREÑAS (ANDES 21 de Junio). *See* National Association of Salvadoran Educators.

ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL INDÍGENA SALVADOREÑA. *See* Salvadoran National Indigenous Association.

ASOCIACIÓN SALVADOREÑA DE TRABAJADORES DE TELECOMUNICACIONES. *See* Salvadoran Telecommunications Workers Association.

ASTTEL. *See* Salvadoran Telecommunications Workers Association.

ATACES. *See* Farm Worker and Peasant Association of El Salvador.

ATCEL. *See* Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission Workers and Employees Union.

“AZÚCAR SALVADOREÑA, S.A.” REFINERY WORKERS UNION (Sindicato de Empresa Trabajadores Refinería Azúcar Salvadoreña, S.A.).

Founded in the 1950s and remaining independent through the early 1960s, this union at El Salvador's main sugar refinery later affiliated with the left-led Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union Federation.* Some 300 workers at the mill experienced prolonged plant shutdowns after onset of the civil war in 1980. Faced with yet another lockout in January 1985, workers seized the factory and began a campaign to force a government takeover that would lead to renewal of regular production. Meanwhile, the union maintained the plant and equipment. The union had 228 members registered with the Ministry of Labor in 1985, up from 140 in 1963. But, after a lengthy factory occupation, the government announced its permanent closure.

BAKERY INDUSTRY WORKERS UNION (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria del Pan, Similares y Conexos de El Salvador).

This affiliate of the left-led Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union Federation* was successor to one of the country's oldest industrial unions, the Bakery Workers Union of El Salvador (Sindicato de Obreros Panificadores de El Salvador), which won legal recognition in 1950. The union was a founder of the General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers* (CGTS) and had about 650 members in the 1960s. One of the bakery workers' leaders, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, became general secretary of the Communist Party of El Salvador and later founded the Popular Liberation Forces organization, which had broad influence during the late 1970s trade union radicalization. The union had 371 registered members in 1985. In February 1986 the Treasury Police abducted the union's general secretary, Gregorio Aguillón Ventura, and held him without charges.

BANKING AND SAVINGS AND LOAN GENERAL INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNION (Sindicato de la Industria General de Empleados Bancarios y Asociaciones de Ahorro y Préstamo—SIGEBAN).

One of two main bank employees unions, SIGEBAN was affiliated with the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers.* Although it suffered repression during the 1980–83 terror, including murder of national board member Jorge Alberto Villalta, SIGEBAN was able to maintain much of its leadership intact. Its main locals were at the Banco Salvadoreño, where it won an improved contract in 1984, and Banco de Crédito Popular, where it waged a strike in February 1984 which gained a general wage increase for workers throughout the financial sector. SIGEBAN was also noteworthy for carrying out work stoppages in solidarity with other unions. The union had 860 registered members in 1985 and was said to be gaining influence in locals at other financial institutions.

CATHOLIC WORKERS NATIONAL UNION (Unión Nacional de Obreros Católicos—UNOC).

UNOC was formed in 1950 by officials of the Catholic Church seeking to establish a middle ground in the trade union movement between left-led and pro-government unions. Although UNOC later received support from the Christian Democrat Party, it remained weak and primarily a mutual aid organization. UNOC formally separated from the Church in 1961 and played a minor role in the Second National Trade Union Congress in 1965. Among UNOC's leaders was Sergeant Rigoberto Menéndez, later founder of the Salvadoran Workers Trade Union Federation* and considered a traditional labor *caudillo* (boss). An effort by UNOC leaders to organize rural workers became the Christian Peasants Federation.* UNOC was supported by the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists (Confederación Latino Americana de Sindicatos Cristianos—CLASC), predecessor of the Latin American Workers Central (Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores—CLAT).

CCTEM. *See* State and Municipal Workers Coordinating Council.

CENTRAL DE TRABAJADORES DEMOCRÁTICOS. *See* Democratic Workers Central.

CENTRAL DE TRABAJADORES SALVADOREÑOS. *See* Salvadoran Workers Central.

CGS. *See* General Confederation of Unions.

CGT. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

CGTS. *See* General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers.

CHRISTIAN PEASANTS FEDERATION (Federación Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoreños—FECCAS).

After suppression of the 1932 insurrection, rural unions were prohibited in El Salvador (see Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador). In the early 1960s a few Catholic Church officials took tentative steps to help peasants and farm workers organize for self-betterment and improved working conditions. In 1963 the Church and the Catholic Workers National Union* began support of a rural cooperative movement, and in 1964 Catholic organizers united a few small peasant leagues in FECCAS, with initial bases in the departments of San Salvador, La Libertad, and Cabañas. A first Peasant Congress met in Cabañas in 1965, and a National Council of Christian Peasants was held in late 1967 with representatives from sixteen agrarian organizations. Both were guided by social Christian doctrine, but by the time of its second Peasant Congress in August 1968, FECCAS explicitly advocated agrarian reform. For the next decade, the landed oligarchy thwarted every attempt at land reform and used repression against rural organizing.

FECCAS did not gain momentum until the mid-1970s when a new generation of Catholic radicals moved beyond Christian Democratic Party politics to develop Christian base communities in northern and central El Salvador. The first had been established by Father José Alas in Suchitoto in 1969, which within two years had an invigorating impact on FECCAS. Another important center of Christian base community development was in the region of Aguilaes, north of San Salvador, where Father Rutilio Grande and other Jesuits organized lay preachers ("Delegates of the Word") and implemented the "preferential option for the poor" of Latin America's liberation theologians. Grande denounced El Salvador's "feudal system" and was in turn damned as one of the "bad priests" by landowners. Grande once replied, "I think that if Jesus himself came across the border at Chalatenango, they wouldn't let him in. They would accuse the Man-God, the prototype of man, of being a rabble-rouser." (Armstrong and Shenk, p. 82.) Other priests developed similar farm workers unions, including the Rural Workers Union* (UTC) founded in 1974 in San Vicente and Chalatenango. Between 1970 and 1976 some 15,000 rural catechists and delegates were trained at seven Catholic centers, and FECCAS became a dynamic, growing organization independent of both the PDC and PCS.

In 1974 FECCAS joined with a number of urban unions and student and Church groups to form the United Popular Action Front (FAPU), a left-led mass organization instrumental in reorienting the Salvadoran labor movement during the late 1970s. In 1975 FECCAS left FAPU to join a new mass revolutionary organization, the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR), and in 1977 joined with UTC in the Rural Workers Federation* (FTC). FECCAS grew rapidly under the leadership of its dynamic general secretary, Apolinario "Polín" Serrano, a peasant and sugar plantation worker born in Suchitoto who had never attended school. Its most consolidated bases were in the regions of Aguilaes-Guazapa, San Martín-San Pedro Perulapán and Cojutepeque, with additional bases in Santa Ana and La Libertad.

In 1976 the landed oligarchy's campaign against FECCAS "hordes" and "communist priests" became more strident after a prominent landowner died in a confrontation with peasants. In March 1977 FECCAS led a land seizure movement, and the army militarized the Aguilaes region. On 12 March 1977 death squads assassinated FECCAS organizer Father Grande. (Archbishop Oscar Romero later said that the killing of Grande precipitated his personal crisis of conscience that led him to become a supporter of FECCAS and other revolutionary labor organizations. See Montgomery, pp. 110-11.) In July the White Warriors Union, a death squad allegedly backed by the Eastern Region Farmers' Front (FARO), issued a public threat to kill all thirty-three of El Salvador's Jesuits within thirty days if they did not abandon the country. In November, FECCAS members joined in an occupation of the Ministry of Labor to demand that the government be more responsive in resolving labor disputes. The regime of General Carlos Humberto Romero (1977-79) responded by passing the Law for the Defense and Guarantee of Public Order (Ley de Orden), and the ensuing repression served

to further polarize the situation. FECCAS also became a primary target of the government's rival peasant organization, the Nationalist Democratic Organization* (ORDEN). A particularly shocking incident occurred during Easter week in 1978, when ORDEN captured FECCAS leader Tránsito Vázquez in the village of San Pedro Perulapán north of Lake Ilopango, murdered him, and hung his head from a tree. A growing number of FECCAS activists joined the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) and other revolutionary organizations, arming themselves against ORDEN. The main FECCAS bases became strongholds of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) after onset of the civil war in 1980. In March 1980 a new government junta decreed a state of siege and land reform program (see Salvadoran Communal Union), and FECCAS charged that army troops in Chalatenango and other areas began evicting its members and turning land seized over to members of ORDEN and UCS.

"CIRCA" WORKERS UNION. *See* Cotton and Synthetics Textile Industry Workers Union.

COACES. *See* Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El Salvador.

COES. *See* Workers Confederation of El Salvador.

COMITÉ COORDINADOR DE SINDICATOS "JOSÉ GUILLERMO RIVAS." *See* Trade Unions Coordinating Committee.

COMITÉ DE REORGANIZACIÓN OBRERO SINDICAL SALVADOREÑO. *See* Salvadoran Trade Union Reorganizing Committee.

COMITÉ DE UNIDAD SINDICAL. *See* Union Unity Committee.

COMITÉ UNITARIO SINDICAL SALVADOREÑO. *See* Unified Trade Union Federation of El Salvador.

CONELCA WORKERS UNION (Sindicato de Trabajadores—CONELCA). *See* Mechanics and Metal Industry Workers.

CONFECTIONS AND PASTAS INDUSTRY UNION (Sindicato Industrial de Dulces y Pastas Alimenticias—SIDPA).

One of the most important Salvadoran unions led primarily by women, SIDPA was affiliated with National Federation of Salvadoran Workers* (FENASTRAS). Its largest local was at the "Diana" firm, a union formerly affiliated with the pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS). "Diana" workers waged a bitter but successful struggle with the firm in 1978, and the local joined SIDPA in 1980. However, repression and political conflict took a heavy toll. In 1980 three different union executive boards claimed leadership of the local,

representing workers under influence of the United Popular Action Front (FAPU), the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR), and the pro-government CGS. Among union activists killed was "Diana" leader and SIDPA general secretary Elsy Márquez. FENASTRAS was able to rebuild the "Diana" local in the mid-1980s, but the future of the union will likely be contested by elements loyal to the firm's management, led by Hugo Barrera, a founder of the ARENA party. From over 1,000 members claimed at "Diana" alone in 1980, SIDPA's registered membership had fallen to 319 in 1985. The local at "Delicia" was unable to function due to repression and the company's anti-union policies. However, the local at "Confiteria Americana" kept its leadership intact and in 1984 forced the company to dismiss an anti-union supervisor. In 1985 SIDPA established a union school and reported progress in training a new pool of union activists.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE ASOCIACIONES COOPERATIVAS DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El Salvador.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE OBREROS DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Workers Confederation of El Salvador.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE SINDICATOS. *See* General Confederation of Unions.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES SALVADOREÑOS. *See* General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN UNITARIA DE TRABAJADORES SALVADOREÑOS. *See* Unitary Confederation of Salvadoran Workers.

CONFEDERATION OF COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS OF EL SALVADOR (Confederación de Asociaciones Cooperativas de El Salvador—COACES).

Claiming to represent about 800 rural cooperatives, COACES was an original member (1980) of the Democratic Popular Unity* (UPD), backed by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), COACES left however, as discontent spread over lack of viable rural development programs under the Duarte regime (1984–). COACES was comprised of several cooperative federations including the Integrated Agrarian Production Cooperatives Association* (ACOPAI), which thereupon left COACES to remain in the UPD. COACES lobbied for passage of the General Law of Cooperative Associations, which President Napoleón Duarte vetoed in 1985, further distancing farm workers from the Christian Democratic government. The internal conflicts wracking the UPD during 1984 and 1985 served to strengthen COACES, which joined in

several protest demonstrations during 1985. Duarte justified his veto of the co-op law on the grounds that it gave cooperatives authority reserved for the government. COACES criticized the Duarte government for not living up to its promises. Among COACES' demands were passage of the new labor code, implementation of the stalemated Phase Two of the agrarian reform, extension of a special line of credit to farm workers organizations, and a negotiated settlement of the civil war. In 1986 COACES was a leading centrist founder of the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers,* and led in a major realignment of labor organizations, forming the National Peasants Union—UNC.

CONSEJO COORDINADOR DE TRABAJADORES ESTATALES Y MUNICIPALES. *See* State and Municipal Workers Coordinating Council.

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT TRADE UNION FEDERATION (Federación de Sindicatos de la Industria de Construcción, Similares, Transporte y de Otras Actividades—FESINCONSTRANS).

Formed in 1963 by twelve affiliates of the pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS), FESINCONSTRANS was one of four federations established in a reorganization to allow CGS to become a legal "confederation" under the country's 1963 Labor Code. At that time the federation had 11,909 registered members, most (9,867) in the Construction Workers Union* (SUTC). Despite enjoying support from the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD, the AFL-CIO's labor arm in Latin America), pro-government leaders of FESINCONSTRANS and its CGS parent lost influence during the late 1960s due, in part, to their identification with the anti-labor policies of the ruling National Conciliation Party (PCN). The presidential elections of 1967, while never in doubt, afforded unions and progressive political groups an unusual degree of freedom of expression and action. A strike wave began in February, and some of the CGS rank and file escaped the leadership's control. The climax came in April when frustrated workers at "Acero, S.A." Factory Union,* a FESINCONSTRANS affiliate, began a strike outside the restrictive legal norms. The left-led Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador* (FUSS) coordinated an unprecedented series of solidarity strikes involving as many as 35,000 workers. The strike was won, but disenchanted with CGS vacillation, the following year FESINCONSTRANS, under the centrist leadership of Felipe Zaldívar, split from its parent confederation. Although remaining closely linked to the AFL-CIO, FESINCONSTRANS was able to distance itself somewhat from the onus which pro-government CGS leaders bore. That did not prevent the federation from losing most of its nonconstruction sector affiliates over the next decade; the number of FESINCONSTRANS unions declined from nineteen in the late 1970s to eleven in 1985, eight with less than 180 members and considered little more than empty shells. Furthermore, the federation's one significant base, SUTC, maintained highly inflated membership rosters through cooperation of construction companies and the Ministry of Labor.

The split in CGS left a legacy of bitterness in the ranks of unions supported by the AFL–CIO. Under Zaldívar’s leadership, FESINCONSTRANS was instrumental in having CGS expelled from ORIT (the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers), in 1980 for collaboration with repressive military authorities. Zaldívar was a key leader in the 1980 formation of the Democratic Popular Unity* (UPD) coalition backing the moderate reform program of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Despite his close relations with AIFLD, U.S. government officials, and Napoleón Duarte’s Christian Democratic Party, Zaldívar was assassinated in 1981. He was replaced as general secretary by less dynamic leaders regarded as more loyal to AFL–CIO policies. FESINCONSTRANS consistently maintained that U.S. aid should be conditioned on human rights improvements and full respect for trade union rights, and the federation never supported U.S. military aid. In addition, although critical of unionists supporting the Farabundo Martí National Liberation (FMLN) insurgency, FESINCONSTRANS referred to them as trade union “brothers” and advocated peace negotiations with the FMLN, regardless of the outcome of the 1982 and 1984 elections. (These positions were frequently misrepresented in the United States by AIFLD, AFL–CIO officials, and other proponents of the Reagan administration aid program.) In addition, the federation adopted an independent political posture within the UPD, opposing formal support for the Christian Democratic Party in electoral campaigns.

In late 1984, AIFLD precipitated a split in FESINCONSTRANS when it demanded the federation “stop pushing Duarte to the left” by insisting that the president live up to the Social Pact the Christian Democrats signed with the UPD the previous February. For the ensuing conflict which weakened FESINCONSTRANS, see Construction Workers Union and Democratic Popular Unity.

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY WORKERS GENERAL UNION (Sindicato General de Trabajadores de la Industria de la Construcción, Similares y Conexos de El Salvador—SGTICES).

One of the oldest surviving unions in El Salvador, the Construction Industry Workers General Union was formed in 1951. Despite being eclipsed by the much larger Construction Workers Union* supported by the AFL–CIO, SGTICES maintained a loyal base, even in the face of periods of severe repression. Many of its members were persecuted for belonging to the Communist Party of El Salvador. In 1955 it had 1,021 members, declining to about 800 during the 1960s. It was a founder of the left-led Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador.* Following the brutal repression of the early 1980s, SGTICES began to grow again, with a registered membership of 1,065 in 1985. However, union members were the object of several attacks by security forces in 1985. Veteran SGTICES leader Mariano Carranza, a founder of the union’s Santa Ana local in 1953, was savagely tortured by the Treasury Police for five days in August 1985. At the time, he was serving as general secretary of the Santa Ana region’s

Western Union Unitary Committee, a coalition of SGTICES and five other unions.

CONSTRUCTION WORKERS UNION (Sindicato Unión de Trabajadores de la Construcción—SUTC).

Founded in 1956 to compete with the communist-led Construction Industry Workers General Union,* SUTC rapidly became El Salvador's largest construction workers union due to the government repression directed against its rival. It claimed 6,000 members in 1959 under leadership of general secretary Julio César Tejada, growing to almost 10,000 by 1963. SUTC members benefited from the construction work associated with expanded U.S. investment and aid programs during the 1960s, but the industry was plagued by unstable employment in the 1970s. Although the union's registered membership was over 20,000 by the early 1980s, U.S. officials estimated that only one-fourth were dues-paying. In 1984 5,000 SUTC members were said to be chronically unemployed and another 7,000 able to work only sporadically, often at an artisanal level. SUTC's impressive membership figures (still at 21,311 in 1985) were maintained by cooperation of construction firms and Ministry of Labor officials with whom union leaders were said to maintain cozy relations. In addition, SUTC union officers received support from the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), which had backed the union since the 1960s.

SUTC remained a remarkably stable union for two and a half decades, and general secretary Felipe Zaldívar was regarded as one of the country's most able centrist union leaders. Zaldívar was reported to be negotiating an alliance between centrist and leftist unions when he was assassinated in 1981. As the civil war dragged on, the economy stagnated; real wages declined; and SUTC was caught up in political contradictions which split centrist unions (see Democratic Popular Unity). SUTC dissidents led by Jesús Pérez Marroquín challenged AIFLD-supported leadership, accusing U.S. and Christian Democratic Party officials of trying to reimpose Salvador Carazo as general secretary. At SUTC's annual meeting in January 1985, Carazo packed the hall with farm workers from the Salvadoran Communal Union* (UCS), an organization also heavily subsidized by the AFL-CIO and U.S. government agencies. Although the Ministry of Labor ratified Carazo's reelection in record time, SUTC dissidents appealed and won nullification of the election. Despite U.S. lobbying of President Duarte on Carazo's behalf (pressure the president was said to have described as "blackmail"), he was badly discredited, and SUTC was seriously weakened by AIFLD's heavy-handed intervention.

COORDINADORA DE EMPLEADOS DEL ESTADO. *See* State and Municipal Workers Coordinating Council.

COORDINADORA DE SOLIDARIDAD DE LOS TRABAJADORES. *See* Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee.

COTTON AND SYNTHETICS TEXTILE INDUSTRY WORKERS UNION
(Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Textil de Algodón, Sintéticos, Acabados Textiles, Similares y Conexos—STITAS).

One of the strongest and best organized garment workers unions in El Salvador, STITAS had twenty affiliates prior to the repression and plant closures which hit garment workers from 1979 to 1983. Its affiliates included the “Sacos Cuscatlán” Workers Union,* one of the country’s oldest surviving unions (founded in 1950); “INSINCA,” with some 1,500 members; and “Eagle International,” with about 500 members. Most STITAS unions were formerly affiliated with the pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS). Eagle and several smaller affiliates shifted to the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation* (FSR) after 1979, and then STITAS was almost destroyed during the 1980–83 terror. Among the locals which were rebuilt in the mid-1980s, the strongest was at the “CIRCA” factory, producer of Levi jeans. Several union activists had been killed, and the general secretary, Disnarda Gladys Acevedo, and other union leaders were forced to flee their jobs. The union was regrouped under the leadership of Febe Elizabeth Velásquez, elected general secretary in 1982. The company’s anti-union policies were halted after the union led a successful five-day strike during which the union activists took twelve management officials hostage and disarmed the company’s security force. The union won the right to construct a new union office on the factory premises, secure from police or death-squad attack, and began to hold union meetings and assemblies at the worksite. Strikes became a less frequent necessity during contract negotiations, although the union carried out four-hour work stoppages, some in solidarity with other unions. The “CIRCA” union was an important example of how some Salvadoran unions managed to survive the 1980–83 period of terror. STITAS had 882 registered members in 1985. The union rebuilt its “NEMTEX” local in 1984, fended off an attempt to split its “Sacos Cuscatlán” Workers Union, and helped its “Etiquetas y Elásticos” local prevent the company from closing the factory. The “Santa Mercedes” local was also reactivated. STITAS’s Febe Velásquez was seized by agents of the Treasury Police on 7 July 1986 and tortured during a four-day interrogation. Her 300 co-workers at the CIRCA plant declared an indefinite work stoppage, and FENASTRAS organized street demonstrations to free her, including a march of some 600 workers on the president’s residence. A U.S., Mexican, and European protest campaign was also begun. On the fifth day of her detention she was driven to the office of President Duarte, who then escorted her to FENASTRAS headquarters and released her before TV cameras. In November 1986 Velásquez was elected general secretary of FENASTRAS, and she also serves on the executive board of the UNTS.

CROSS. *See* Salvadoran Trade Union Organizing Committee.

CST. *See* Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee.

CTD. *See* Democratic Workers Central.

CTS. *See* Salvadoran Workers Central.

CUS. *See* Union Unity Committee.

CUTS. *See* Unitary Confederation of Salvadoran Workers.

DEMOCRATIC POPULAR UNITY (Unidad Popular Democrática—UPD).

Established in September 1980, UPD was designed by centrist Salvadoran unions and their AFL–CIO backers as a nonrevolutionary alternative to left-led unions which participated in formation of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). UPD was also supported initially by the Christian Democratic Latin American Workers Central (Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores—CLAT), one of the few times that the AFL–CIO cooperated in El Salvador with the country's more independent CLAT-linked unionists. UPD was born at the end of a period of labor radicalization which began in the mid-1970s and climaxed with two general strikes in mid-1980 led by the leftist Union Unity Committee* and FDR. Although UPD was without significant base among industrial unions, it included the large Construction Industry and Transport Trade Union Federation* (FESINCONSTRANS) and the Salvadoran Communal Union,* the extensive farm workers co-op network which the AFL–CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) had developed since the mid-1960s. At the height of its influence, UPD functioned as a de facto confederation of most of the labor organizations backing the reformist program of the José Napoleón Duarte wing of the Christian Democratic Party. In addition to FESINCONSTRANS and UCS, it included a coalition of agrarian reform beneficiaries, the Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El Salvador* (COACES), and two other farm workers groups which had split from UCS, the Integrated Agrarian Production Cooperatives Association, and the Salvadoran National Indigenous Association* (ANIS).

When leftist union organizations were driven underground during 1980–82, UPD was the only labor front able to intervene in Salvadoran politics. Its primary role was to champion agrarian reform, support the Christian Democratic Party against the ultra-right ARENA party of Roberto D'Aubuisson, and lobby the U.S. Congress on behalf of the AFL–CIO's objectives in El Salvador. Indeed, UPD became a key actor in the prolonged conflict within the United States over Central American policy—a conflict which eventually produced a significant foreign policy schism within the AFL–CIO. Almost from UPD's founding, tensions emerged within UPD unions and between UPD and its AFL–CIO sponsors over failure of the Salvadoran government to halt anti-labor policies and complete implementation of agrarian reform (see Salvadoran Communal Union). The Salvadoran regime maintained a wage freeze, state of siege and military buildup. The AFL–CIO was committed to helping Washington establish a viable

centrist government in El Salvador, but its Salvadoran allies grew frustrated at the disparity between image and reality. Even the AFL–CIO’s agrarian reform expert, Roy Prosterman, who had boasted that the Salvadoran land distribution program would “breed capitalists like rabbits,” became a critic of the reform process and the deteriorating political situation. (See *New York Times*, March 11, 1980.) In El Salvador, the terror targeted primarily against leftist unions began also to strike UPD unions, and some UPD supporters were ready to publicly denounce the Duarte regime. One of the AFL–CIO’s most valued associates, the head of the Agrarian Transformation Institute and former president of UCS, Rodolfo Viera, was disillusioned and threatening to resign. On 3 January 1981 AIFLD county chief Michael Hammer, Viera, and another AIFLD agent, Mark Pearlman, were meeting in San Salvador’s Sheraton Hotel when they were assassinated by a death squad set in motion by prominent businessmen. That event brought the AFL–CIO’s role in UPD to international media attention.

In March 1982 the AFL–CIO was put in an awkward position by the outcome of El Salvador’s constituent assembly elections. While the U.S. federation had urged UPD to support Duarte’s candidacy and use the elections to boost the government’s international credibility, UPD leaders withheld formal endorsement of the Christian Democrats. Worse still, a right-wing majority led by D’Aubuisson’s ARENA party gained control of the assembly. While the Reagan administration blocked D’Aubuisson’s selection as president by the assembly, the election gave ARENA control of the drafting of a new constitution and control over key government agencies, including the Ministry of Agriculture and ISTA, effectively ending the agrarian reform process. Instead of giving voice to these criticisms, the AFL–CIO presented UPD representatives as validation of the legitimacy of the new Magaía regime.

Contradictions inherent in the AFL–CIO role in El Salvador deepened during AFL–CIO chief Lane Kirkland’s participation on the Kissinger National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, which coincided with sharpened struggle by AIFLD and UPD for land reform. The Salvadoran constituent assembly was embroiled in a fight over expiration of the Phase Three “land-to-the-tiller” program. In early October 1983, as the future of land reform was up for assembly debate and UPD leaders were briefing the Kissinger Commission in the United States in preparation for the Commission’s official visit to El Salvador, D’Aubuisson made threats against UPD leaders and charged that AIFLD and U.S. government money given to UPD was being channeled into “to the FMLN.”

During the course of the AFL–CIO’s participation in the U.S. debate over El Salvador, AFL–CIO leadership and AIFLD officials in Washington tended to misrepresent UPD’s positions on key issues. For example, the AFL–CIO claimed that the Salvadoran government was making good progress on agrarian reform and, for that reason, deserved U.S. support. The AFL–CIO favored a suspension of military aid to the regime, but primarily because it was unhappy with the lack of progress in prosecuting the murderers of Michael Hammer. This was not the view of UPD, which, in demanding that the government stop repression and

respect democratic rights, never singled out Hammer's death for special focus from those of thousands of Salvadoran victims. However much they criticized the FMLN, UPD leaders were careful to oppose U.S. military aid on political grounds (not because Hammer's killers were not prosecuted) and propose a negotiated settlement of the civil war. U.S. officials urged UPD unions to formalize an alliance with Duarte's PDC. But UPD's political posture grew more independent, projecting demands which began to resemble those of left-led unions. When UPD leaders met at AIFLD's Honduran center in San Pedro Sula in July 1983, for example, they drew up a platform upon which any presidential endorsement would be based. In addition to a claim on certain government posts, UPD demanded that the Christian Democrats end death-squad terror, prosecute human rights violators, extend social reforms, and negotiate a political settlement to the civil war with the FMLN. When political negotiations were concluded in February 1984, only weeks before the election, UPD forced the Christian Democrats to sign a "social pact" which put these promises in writing. The AFL-CIO then helped Washington channel over a half-million dollars of secret U.S. funds through UPD unions to Duarte's electoral campaign against Roberto D'Aubuisson.

With Duarte's victory in March, finally Kirkland and the AFL-CIO could back a government with a measure of international credibility and presumably accountable to UPD unions. But UPD relations with the government soured when Duarte deferred action on social reforms and made the war against the FMLN its top priority. When UPD demanded Duarte live up to the social pact, AIFLD admonished its allies to stop "pushing Duarte to the left," and AIFLD country director Bernard Packer then demanded that unions switch from the UPD to join a new "nonpolitical" organization, the Confederation of Democratic Workers* (CTD). On 21 January 1985 the UPD political commission complained to AIFLD director William Doherty in Washington that Packer's behavior was "absolutely shameful" and that he was out to destroy UPD. (Norton, p. 32.)

AIFLD's heavy-handed tactics precipitated a split in UPD leadership. At a May meeting with centrist union leaders, President Duarte implied AIFLD had given him a copy of a secret military intelligence report which said UPD dissident leader Ramón Mendoza and UPD attorney José María Méndez were working to align UPD unions with the left. The main UPD affiliates went into crisis. In 1985 two UCS factions held rival assemblies. AIFLD loyalist Samuel Maldonado won Interior Ministry approval of his election as UCS general secretary, but Mendoza, elected at a separate UCS congress, challenged the ruling before the Supreme Court. Its relations with the Salvadoran centrist unions severely damaged, AIFLD removed Packer from El Salvador. A new AIFLD country representative and U.S. embassy officials tried to mediate the dispute throughout late 1985. In February 1986, UPD formed an alliance with the majority of El Salvador's leftist and centrist unions in founding the National Union of Salvadoran Workers* (UNTS). AIFLD then began echoing the accusations Roberto D'Aubuisson typically made against centrist labor leaders, suggesting ties and

sympathies on the part of UPD leaders with the guerrillas, which, as the AFL–CIO previously had acknowledged, is like issuing their death warrants in El Salvador. UPD adviser and former AIFLD attorney in El Salvador, José María Méndez, expressed outrage in a letter to the AFL–CIO and warned of legal action against AIFLD and Doherty. UPD and UNTS passed resolutions calling for AIFLD’s expulsion from El Salvador “for its shameful practice of dividing the unions and associations of Salvadoran workers.”

DEMOCRATIC WORKERS CENTRAL (Central de Trabajadores Democráticos—CTD).

Formed amid controversy in late 1984, CTD was designed by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) to undercut pressure from its own Salvadoran union affiliates on President José Napoleón Duarte (1984–). The unions, grouped in the Democratic Popular Unity* (UPD), a coalition which AIFLD had helped establish in 1980, were lobbying Duarte to live up to the “social pact” which his Christian Democratic Party (PDC) had signed with UPD in February 1984.

“The problem for AIFLD,” wrote a U.S. journalist, “was that its carefully tutored pupil was no longer content to take orders.” (Norton, p. 32.) When UPD leaders stalled, Packer tricked them into attending a CTD founding congress on 12 December 1984. In the public announcement of its formation, CTD was backed by the Samuel Maldonado wing of the Salvadoran Communal Union* (UCS), the Integrated Agrarian Production Cooperatives Association* (ACOPAI) faction led by José Orlando Arévalo, Construction Industry and Transport Trade Union Federation* general secretary Salvador Carazo (who was being challenged from within his own union), the Letter Carrier and Postal Employees Union Society of El Salvador* (SUCEPES), the Salvadoran National Indigenous Association* (ANIS), the Salvadoran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives (FECORASAL), and the Textile Union Federation (FESINTEXSICA), the most right-wing federation of the General Confederation of Unions (CGS). Although AFL–CIO loyalist Salvador Carazo was elected CTD president, the new organization immediately became embroiled in disputes over allocation and control of U.S. government funds channeled through AIFLD. Meanwhile, Packer employed the AFL–CIO’s financial and political muscle against those unions which would not move with CTD. For example, the AIFLD director reclaimed a vehicle and other equipment from the Salvadoran Workers Central* (CTS). According to UPD leaders, AIFLD was also responsible for spreading the rumor that CTS general secretary Miguel Angel Vásquez was linked to “subversives.” CTS then disaffiliated from UPD and drew closer to left-led federations.

At its July 1985 congress, UPD sent an ultimatum to the AFL–CIO to investigate and clean up its Salvadoran operation within thirty days. Centrist unions had become polarized, with CTD symbolizing submission to AFL–CIO and Reagan administration dictates. Packer was in the middle of a debacle which had severely damaged AFL–CIO relations with centrist unions, and AIFLD

abruptly removed him from El Salvador. (When Guatemalan unions discovered that Packer had been reassigned to their country, they protested the move; he was later sent to head up AIFLD in Colombia.) In late 1985, U.S. embassy officials and AIFLD's new country representative, Clemente Hernández, attempted to mediate the UPD-CTD conflict, a process complicated by the fact that key AFL-CIO loyalists had lost their union posts. CTD's failure was sealed when UPD and other centrist unions joined with leftist counterparts in formation of the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers* in February 1986. At that point, AIFLD abandoned CTD in favor of regrouping its remaining allies in a new National Union of Workers and Peasants.*

"EL DORADO" EDIBLE OIL AND FATS FACTORY WORKERS UNION
(Sindicato de Trabajadores Fábrica de Aceites y Grasas El Dorado).

Founded in 1951, the El Dorado union was independent in the 1950s and early 1960s. It moved leftward during the late 1960s labor struggles and, in 1969, was a founding member of the Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union Federation,* with which it has since been affiliated. It grew from 189 members in 1960 to some 300 registered members in 1985, and led a one-week strike in January 1987.

ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY WORKERS UNION (Sindicato de la Industria Eléctrica de El Salvador—SIES).

Formed in 1951, SIES was for many years independent of both the pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS) and left-led federations. It represented workers at private utilities which distributed electricity in different regions. SIES claimed 431 members in 1955 and 735 members in 1963, making it the largest independent union at that time after the Railway Workers Union.* In 1972, when a large number of industrial unions split from CGS, SIES joined in founding the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers* (FENASTRAS). When the electrical companies were nationalized in 1977, the government unsuccessfully attempted to disband the union. Meanwhile, the government developed a new hydroelectric system which spawned the much larger Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission Workers and Employees Union,* which also joined FENASTRAS. In 1985 SIES had 589 registered members.

FARM WORKER AND PEASANT ASSOCIATION OF EL SALVADOR (Asociación de Trabajadores Agrícolas y Campesinos de El Salvador—ATACES).

Founded in 1971, ATACES was led by political forces in the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN) and was one of the country's first rural workers unions. Salvadoran law banned farm workers unions, and ATACES activists were persecuted, as were those of most other rural organizations not sanctioned by the Nationalist Democratic Organization.* (See also Salvadoran Communal Union and Christian Peasants Federation.) In September 1979 ATACES joined the Popular Forum (Foro Popular, a coalition of labor and civic organizations), which

helped topple the Romero dictatorship (1977–79). During the early 1980s ATACES was driven underground, and it was later superceded by other organizations. See Agricultural Workers Union of El Salvador and Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El Salvador.

FEASIES. *See* Federation of Independent Union Associations of El Salvador.

FECCAS. *See* Christian Peasants Federation.

FEDERACIÓN CRISTIANA DE CAMPESINOS SALVADOREÑOS. *See* Christian Peasants Federation.

FEDERACIÓN DE ASOCIACIONES SINDICALES INDEPENDIENTES DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Federation of Independent Union Associations of El Salvador.

FEDERACIÓN DE SINDICATOS DE LA INDUSTRIA DE LA CONSTRUCCIÓN, SIMILARES, TRANSPORTE Y DE OTRAS ACTIVIDADES. *See* Construction Industry and Transport Trade Union Federation.

FEDERACIÓN DE SINDICATOS DE TRABAJADORES DE ALIMENTOS, BEBIDAS Y SIMILARES. *See* Food and Beverage Workers Federation of Trade Unions.

FEDERACIÓN DE SINDICATOS DE TRABAJADORES SALVADOREÑOS. *See* Salvadoran Workers Trade Union Federation.

FEDERACIÓN DE SINDICATOS TEXTILES, SIMILARES Y CONEXOS Y OTRAS ACTIVIDADES. *See* Textile Union Federation.

FEDERACIÓN REGIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador.

FEDERACIÓN SALVADOREÑA DE COOPERATIVAS DE LA REFORMA AGRARIA. *See* Salvadoran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA DEL ALIMENTO, VESTIDO, TEXTILES, SIMILARES Y CONEXOS DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union Federation.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES SALVADOREÑOS. *See* National Federation of Salvadoran Workers.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL REVOLUCIONARIA—FSR. *See* Revolutionary Trade Union Federation.

FEDERACIÓN UNITARIA SINDICAL DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador.

FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT UNION ASSOCIATIONS OF EL SALVADOR (Federación de Asociaciones Sindicales Independientes de El Salvador—FEASIES).

The Independent Union Association of El Salvador (Asociación Sindical Independiente de El Salvador—ASIES) was formed in February 1985, grouping the large Social Security Institute Workers Union* (STISSS) and several other important unions not affiliated with federations, including some which left the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation* (FSR) in 1984. The latter included the Mechanics and Metal Industry Workers Union* (STIMMES) and the "Lido, S.A." Workers Union (SELSA). Also joining was the "Industrias Unidas, S.A." Textile Workers Union* (STTIUSA) at the country's largest garment and textile factory. ASIES objectives were to provide coordination and solidarity to union struggles broadly, and the group chose "Unity, Progress and Struggle" as its motto. ASIES was active in building the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers* (UNTS) in 1986. The ASIES office was destroyed in the earthquake which struck El Salvador in October 1986, killing several of its activists. In late 1986 and early 1987 ASIES was consolidating into a federation, FEASIES. Among other unions joining FEASIES were the Salvadoran Telecommunications Workers Association* (ASTTEL), the Agricultural Workers Union of El Salvador* (SI-TAS), and the Santa Ana Municipal Workers Association (ATRAMSA), one of the most active unions in the Santa Ana region, which suffered considerable repression during 1985.

FENACOA (National Federation of Cooperative Associations). *See* Integrated Agrarian Production Cooperatives Association.

FENASTRAS. *See* National Federation of Salvadoran Workers.

FESACORA. *See* Salvadoran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives.

FESINCONSTRANS. *See* Construction Industry and Transport Trade Union Federation.

FESINTEXSICA. *See* Textile Union Federation.

FESINTRABS. *See* Food and Beverage Workers Federation of Trade Unions.

FESITRISEVA. *See* Industry and Services Workers Federation of Trade Unions.

FESTIAVTSCES. *See* Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union Federation.

FESTRAS. *See* Salvadoran Workers Trade Union Federation.

FISHING INDUSTRY UNION (Sindicato de la Industria Pesquera—SIP).

Representing workers in the shrimp industry, SIP was founded in 1961 and belonged to the Food and Beverage Workers Federation of Trade Unions,* one of four federations in the pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS). SIP had only 221 registered members in 1963, but the union eventually organized eight shrimp firms in two departmental *seccionales* (regions) in the ports of El Triunfo (Usulután) and La Unión, representing both fishermen on boats (*sector agua*) and workers in the processing plants, maintenance, and other land-based facilities (*sector tierra*). About 70 percent of the plant workers were women.

SIP was one of eighteen unions which disaffiliated from CGS in 1972, and it was a founding member of the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers* (FENASTRAS) that year. Its general secretary during the next decade was Alejandro Molina Lara, who was arrested and imprisoned four times from 1977 to 1981. Claiming over 2,000 members in eight locals in 1980, SIP became one of FENASTRAS's most solid bases, winning relatively advantageous contracts for its members at the Multipesca, Atarraya (a joint venture with U.S.-based Ward Foods), Pesca, La Ballena, and Mariscos de El Salvador companies. The union was severely repressed during the 1980–83 terror. Molina Lara, who also held important FENASTRAS posts during the late 1970s, was compelled to work clandestinely and was one of the union leaders most sought after by security forces. On 15 January 1981 he was captured by the National Police during a raid on FENASTRAS headquarters in San Salvador. Although tortured and told by police officials that he would be killed, Molina Lara was discovered by the Red Cross in National Police custody, and FENASTRAS initiated an international campaign for his release. After sixty days he was turned over to Mariona Prison, and he later fled into exile in the United States, where he served for a time as FENASTRAS representative. Ricardo Antonio Jovel assumed leadership as SIP's general secretary, and during the period of harshest repression the union's active affiliates were reduced to four, with a registered membership of 1,715 in 1985.

FOOD, GARMENT AND TEXTILE WORKERS TRADE UNION FEDERATION (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores de la Industria del Alimento, Vestido, Textiles, Similares y Conexos de El Salvador—FESTIAVTSCES).

FESTIAVTSCES was founded as a companion federation to the Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador* (FUSS), established in 1965 as the successor of the General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers* (CGTS). FESTIAVTSCES was formed by fourteen unions in January 1969, following two years of increased union organizing and labor strife throughout the country. The federation was

recognized by the government of General Fidel Sánchez Hernández (1967–72) in April of that year. The FUSS-FESTIAVTSCES strategy was to build the three legal federations required to form a confederation, and thereby breathe life back into CGTS. Founding FESTIAVTSCES affiliates included a number of established left-led FUSS unions, such as the “El Dorado” Oil and Fats Factory Workers Union,* the brewery workers union, the “Azúcar Salvadoreña, S.A.” Refinery Workers Union* and the Bakery Industry Workers Union.*

During the next two decades FESTIAVTSCES suffered much the same repression directed against FUSS. In 1974 FESTIAVTSCES officer and textile union leader Jorge Alberto “El Beate” Morán Cornejo was assassinated by the Molina regime (1972–77). FESTIAVTSCES general secretary Ernesto Sorto Argueta “disappeared” in 1975, the same year that FUSS general secretary Rafael Aguñada Carranza was killed. In 1977 FESTIAVTSCES joined with FUSS and the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers* to establish the Unitary Confederation of Salvadoran Workers, but the new confederation was never consolidated due to rapid radicalization and realignment of the trade union movement under competing leftist currents during the rest of the 1970s. In 1979 several FESTIAVTSCES affiliates moved to join the new Revolutionary Trade Union Federation* (FSR), including the important “Tropical” and “La Constancia” beverage factory unions, the “Minerva” Textile Union, and the Textile Industry Union. The FESTIAVTSCES headquarters was attacked and bombed, and during the 1980–83 terror the union’s leaders were underground. The federation was a founder of the Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador,* the Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee* (CST), and the May First Committee.* FESTIAVTSCES held its seventeenth congress in February 1985. Several months later, security forces intensified persecution of federation activists, and FESTIAVTSCES general secretary Modesto Rodríguez was detained, tortured, and sent to Mariona Prison in July. He was succeeded as general secretary by German Dario García in February 1986.

FOOD AND BEVERAGE WORKERS FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de Alimentos, Bebidas y Similares—FESINTRABS).

The federation was formed in 1963 as a base of the General Confederation of Unions* (CGS) with eleven unions and a membership of 2,264. Two of its most important affiliates, the Coffee Industry Union (Sindicato de la Industria del Café—SICAFE) and the Fishing Industry Union* (SIP) later became members of the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers,* the nation’s largest industrial union federation. FESINTRABS was much discredited from years of association with successive military governments and their Party of National Conciliation. The federation’s union at the Kimberly Clark paper factory disaffiliated in 1979 to join the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation.* FESINTRABS was expelled from ORIT (the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers, Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores) in 1980 due to charges that CGS unions

were linked to the government's repressive apparatus. With loss of U.S. backing, the federation became linked to the small conservative PAISA party. In 1983 it surprised observers by joining the Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador,* a predominantly left-led labor front. In 1985 FESINTRABS had 1,964 registered members in seven affiliates.

FRTS. *See* Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador.

FSR. *See* Revolutionary Trade Union Federation.

FUSS. *See* Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador.

GARMENT WORKERS GENERAL UNION (Sindicato General de Costureras).

El Salvador's oldest surviving union in the garment industry, the Garment Workers General Union (sometimes given in U.S. sources as the General Union of Seamstresses) was formed in 1950. Although independent for a time in the early 1960s, it was affiliated mostly with communist-led federations (General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers,* Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador*) and became a founding affiliate of the Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union Federation* in 1969. Its membership declined from 653 in 1963 to 236 in 1985, as other federations established parallel unions. (See Cotton and Synthetics Textile Industry Workers Union).

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (Confederación General de Trabajo—CGT).

The name of the CGT is often given in the Salvadoran literature as “de Trabajadores,” but the name registered with the Ministry of Labor documents is “de Trabajo.”

Founded by general secretary José Luis Grande Preza in March 1983, CGT was regarded as enjoying the support of the U.S. embassy and the AFL–CIO in developing a trade union current loyal to the Duarte government. It was also reported to receive support from the Christian CLAT (Latin American Workers Central, Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores). Despite such encouragement, the union did not achieve the success Grande Preza had anticipated. CGT began formation of parallel unions, one of which became embroiled in a long and bitter strike at the Pesca shrimp industry firm.

The largest of CGT's five affiliates represented workers at the Salvadoran Agrarian Transformation Institute (ISTA), with 1,119 members in 1985. CGT lacked the required number of unions to be registered as a federation, let alone a “confederation.” Nevertheless, in the United States during briefings with the press and Congress sponsored by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) to lobby for U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government, Grande Preza portrayed himself as head of “the Salvadoran equivalent of the AFL–CIO.” (See *Wall Street Journal*, 5 March, 1982)

In its public posture in El Salvador, CGT condemned political violence on both sides of the civil war and defended the post-1979 process as a democratic transformation. But CGT also criticized Christian Democratic leaders for being indecisive in matters of most concern to working people and expressed particular bitterness over lack of support in the Pesca strike. This, said CGT, left political initiative in the hands of leftist union leaders. While critical of the left's armed insurgency, CGT joined the call for the "dialogue" begun in October 1984 at La Palma. CGT's loyalty to the Duarte regime left it isolated when most centrist unions joined the National Union of Salvadoran Workers* (UNTS) in 1986, and CGT regrouped with a few other AIFLD-backed unions to form the National Union of Workers and Peasants* (UNOC). CGT had 2,644 registered members in 1985, including the 346-member Textile Industry Workers Union of El Salvador.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF SALVADORAN WORKERS (Confederación General de Trabajadores Salvadoreños—CGTS).

During the 1940s El Salvador's principal labor federation, the communist-led National Union of Workers* (UNT), was repressed and finally destroyed. After the failed 1946 general strike, progressive union leaders worked underground through the Salvadoran Trade Union Reorganizing Committee* (CROSS). After 1950, the government of Colonel Oscar Osorio (1950–56) worked with ORIT to establish pro-government unions, and by late 1956 Osorio's successor, Colonel José María Lemus (1956–60), felt strong enough to allow a national labor congress which would establish a unified pro-government union movement. The congress, held in March 1957, escaped the government's political control. Delegates drew up a program calling for trade union freedom, passage of a labor code, the right to organize for farm workers, and creation of a single Salvadoran trade union confederation.

Following the congress, the General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (CGTS) was founded in August 1957. With the military regime's setback, pro-government unions supported by ORIT (Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers), split off to form the General Confederation of Unions* (CGS). But the leftist CGTS led a broad social movement, which included the General Association of Salvadoran University Students (AGEUS), that toppled the Lemus dictatorship on 26 October 1960. At the time, CGTS had ten affiliates and 3,517 registered members under the leadership of general secretary José Alberto López. The confederation worked with the new reformist political movement, the April and May Revolutionary Party (PRAM), in support of a progressive civilian-military junta which included Fabio Castillo, a leader of the famous 1944 "fallen arms strike" (see National Union of Workers). At CGTS urging, in December 1960 the junta enacted several laws benefiting trade unions, including establishment of a system of labor courts to adjudicate worker grievances. The junta was overthrown in a violent coup on 25 January 1961 in which many trade unionists were killed.

The new military junta repressed CGTS and passed a series of labor laws designed to encourage worker support for the ORIT-backed, pro-government CGS. With U.S. government encouragement, the military regime of Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera (1962–67) passed a labor code in January 1963 which established Ministry of Labor regulation of unions but, again, kept farm workers unions illegal. Rivera and his successors transformed CGS into the urban labor arm of the military's National Conciliation Party (PCN), which would be the ruling party of El Salvador for two decades. The left-led CGTS, which published *Voz Obrera (Labor Voice)*, lacked the requisite number of unions and federations to be legally recognized as a "confederation" under the new labor code. By 1963 CGTS had declined to eight unions and 2,482 registered members. Affiliates included the Construction Industry Workers General Union* with 835 members and the Bakery Workers Union* with 642 members.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF UNIONS (Confederación General de Sindicatos—CGS).

The early history of CGS was bound up in efforts of the American Federation of Labor and the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) to establish a viable trade union base in a country with a long history of communist leadership of the labor movement. CGS did indeed become an important pro-government union confederation and, ironically, was later expelled from ORIT for being too closely associated with the misdeeds of successive military regimes.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, ORIT began to organize some centrist and anti-communist unionists but met with unexpected government hostility. AFL–CIO Latin America representative Serafino Romualdi personally intervened over a period of years to build a relationship with the regime of Colonel Oscar Osorio (1950–56) and pressed the government to foster at least minimal social reforms and permit non-communist union organizing.

Despite Osorio's unsavory reputation in the labor movement, the AFL–CIO came to view him and the military dictators who followed as progressive reformers who "set their mind and enthusiasm to remake El Salvador into a modern, developing country, with constitutional guarantees for all the citizens . . . and a favorable climate for the investment of domestic and foreign capital." (Romualdi, p. 252.) In March, 1957, ORIT and Osorio's successor, Colonel José María Lemus (1956–62), endorsed a national labor congress to establish a unified pro-government union movement, but the congress escaped the government's political control.

The General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers* (CGTS) was founded in August 1957 under leftist leadership. Faced with this setback, pro-government unions supported by ORIT split off to form the General Confederation of Unions (CGS), led by general secretary Rafael "Chele" Fernández Saravia. CGTS and other opposition forces toppled the Lemus dictatorship in October 1960, but a progressive civilian-military junta gave way to a new military regime which

repressed CGTS and passed a series of labor laws designed to encourage worker support for the ORIT-backed, pro-government CGS, which soon gained initiative over its rival. The AFL-CIO's work in support of CGS was transferred from ORIT to the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) beginning in 1962. The military regimes of Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera and his successors transformed CGS into the urban labor arm of the military's National Conciliation Party (PCN), which was the ruling party of El Salvador for two decades.

In 1963 CGS reorganized its affiliates into four federations, conforming to requirements of the new labor code. Largest was the Construction Industry and Transport Trade Union Federation* (FESINCONSTRANS), with almost 10,000 members in its Construction Workers Union* (SUTC), followed by the Textile Union Federation* (FESINTEXSICA), with 2,698 members, and the Food and Beverage Workers Federation of Trade Unions* (FESINTRABS), with 2,264 members. Only the Industry and Services Workers Federation of Trade Unions* (FESITRISEVA) was a weak federation, with no affiliates of significant size.

From 1962 to 1972 AIFLD trained 7,219 unionists, many from CGS affiliates, in seminars in El Salvador, and 29 Salvadoran union leaders were brought to Washington to study at the AFL-CIO's Front Royal center. Dependence on AIFLD, the PCN, and repressive military regimes damaged the CGS's reputation and that of the AFL-CIO in El Salvador; and quite a few AIFLD-trained union activists eventually became revolutionary labor leaders, including José Sánchez Gallegos, the first general secretary of the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation* (FSR). The passive, nonconfrontational approach of CGS in a country where employers only respected unions that demonstrated militant determination left many of its affiliates unable to defend their members' most basic interests. From the mid-1960s on, CGS suffered continual erosion of its influence and disaffiliation of most of its key affiliates. The first major crisis for CGS came in 1968 during an upsurge in strike activity. FESINCONSTRANS members at the "Acero, S.A."* plant were on strike and frustrated at the lack of support from their CGS parent. The recently founded Unitary Trade Union of El Salvador* (FUSS) backed them, mobilizing as many as 35,000 workers in solidarity strikes. In the wake of the strike victory, FESINCONSTRANS split off from CGS to become an independent centrist federation.

AIFLD also drew criticism from influential landowners for its work organizing rural cooperatives (see Salvadoran Communal Union), and the AFL-CIO was asked to withdraw its program from El Salvador in 1972. That same year CGS became embroiled in a serious crisis, once again precipitated by its pro-government leadership's failure to provide strike support to an affiliate, this time the Fishing Industry Union* (SIP). At the CGS congress, dissidents from a majority of its most active unions challenged general secretary Salvador "Bobby" Jiménez Molina, uncovering evidence of government bribing of CGS leaders. Eighteen unions walked out of the congress, including some which remained pro-government. Twelve of the unions, including SIP, then joined with several independents

to found the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers,* which was to become the country's largest industrial federation. The antagonism within centrist union ranks reached the point where, in 1980, FESINCONSTANS succeeded in having CGS expelled from ORIT for its ties with repressive military regimes. CGS federations declined during the labor movement radicalization and realignment of the late 1970s, and they were kept out of the AIFLD-backed Democratic Popular Unity* (UPD). By 1985 the combined registered membership of CGS affiliates had fallen to 4,935. No longer receiving government patronage, CGS joined the union opposition to José Napoleón Duarte.

ILOPANGO WORKERS, PEASANTS AND FISHERMEN'S SOCIETY (Sociedad de Obreros, Campesinos y Pescadores de Ilopango).

Organized by Miguel Mármol in the mid-1920s, the Ilopango union, located east of San Salvador at Lake Ilopango, was typical of the more active provincial locals of the Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador.* The Federation later consolidated the local as the Ilopango Diverse Trades Union (Sindicato de Oficios Varios de Ilopango), the preferred name taken by most of its single-union affiliates in the provinces. In his autobiography Mármol described union organizing methods that activists developed to win over a wary rural populace closely watched over by the commander of the local military garrison, General Antonio Claramount Lucero, later a presidential candidate. Previous organizers had failed in Ilopango, especially among farm workers, said Mármol, because they had seen themselves as the "enlightened" trying to motivate the "brutes." By contrast, "we began our work investigating people's attitudes . . . and organizational needs. . . . Once we put our finger on [their practical concerns], people embraced the union with enthusiasm." (Dalton, p. 120.) Mármol and other Federation leaders developed approaches to organizing which they later learned were common communist organizing methods, such as the formation of a clandestine nucleus. "I had, without knowing anything of revolutionary theory, a Leninist orientation." (Dalton, p. 119.) Several of his earliest Ilopango union recruits later became Communist Party activists. Weekly meetings held at the union's cultural center were organized as "Festive Sundays" (*Domingos Alegres*) in which entire families participated in political discussions and cultural activities. By the time authorities discovered the revolutionary character of the union and forced Federation organizers to flee the region, they had trained a second line of local leadership. "The leadership of the Federation was always in the fight, during the best and worst moments, and that's why we always had the support and respect of the masses. Our line was to never abandon the masses to their fate, and, if a leader had to leave to escape persecution, he always had to be sure that there would be continuity in the work led by capable substitutes." Members of the Ilopango union were active in the famous 1932 insurrection in which some 20,000 workers and peasants died. Mármol himself was captured and ordered shot. By coincidence, the army drove him in a truck toward Ilopango

on the night of his scheduled execution; he miraculously survived a firing squad, and local residents recognized his bloodied figure and gave him haven.

“INDUSTRIAS UNIDAS, S.A.” TEXTILE WORKERS UNION (Sindicato Textil de Trabajadores “Industrias Unidas, S.A.”—STTIUSA).

Originally known as STIUSA (without “Trabajadores”), this union at one of El Salvador’s largest factories was founded in 1958. “Industrias Unidas, S.A.” began as a 1954 Japanese joint venture by Toyo Spinning Company and C. Itoh. By 1973 its work force totaled 1,850. STTIUSA was originally affiliated with the pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS), and by 1963 had grown to 624 members. That year CGS was reorganized, and STTIUSA joined CGS’s new Textile Union Federation* (FESINTEXSICA). The union played an important role in the 1967 strike wave which produced a split in CGS. STTIUSA lost its own strike, and union members blamed CGS officials for lack of support. STTIUSA then broke with CGS to become an independent union with a social democratic orientation, and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) sought to keep STTIUSA out of leftist fronts. In 1980 STTIUSA was a founding member of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), but union leaders later told the AFL–CIO and U.S. embassy officials that it had drawn back from ties to the revolutionary movement. The plant was militarized when the firm’s officials allowed the National Guard to set up a police post inside company grounds. STTIUSA joined a progressive labor front, the Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador in 1983, and in 1985 the union became active in the Independent Union Association of El Salvador. Its registered membership in 1985 was 1,039. The AFL–CIO considered its leadership “moderate” and was using promise of an \$8,000 loan to the union as leverage to prevent election of leftist leaders at STTIUSA’s annual assembly in March 1986. AIFLD Deputy Director Donald Kessler confided to a reporter: “I’m going to tell them [the pro-AIFLD leaders] that you can safely say, ‘If we’re elected, you’ll get the loan.’ ” (See Clifford Krauss, *Wall Street Journal*, 31 December, 1985.)

Despite such pressure, AIFLD’s allies lost the March election to a new, more militant union executive board. AIFLD then backed the minority in splitting the union. A rump assembly in May held by some seventy workers elected a parallel board which was quickly certified by the Ministry of Labor. The main STTIUSA union, claiming to represent over 600 workers, denounced AIFLD and went on strike on May 26, occupying the factory. The National Guard stormed the gate on June 3 and again on June 5, but the strikers held control and received considerable solidarity support from other unions as well as national media coverage. But on June 8 the Guard gave the strikers a final ultimatum and took over the factory. The company then fired several hundred strikers. AIFLD had prevailed, at least for the time being.

INTEGRATED AGRARIAN PRODUCTION COOPERATIVES ASSOCIATION (Asociación de Cooperativas de Producción Agropecuaria Integradas—ACOPAI).

Following loss of a leadership struggle within the Salvadoran Communal Union* (UCS), Jorge Alberto Ruiz Camacho founded ACOPAI in 1976. It grew in influence during the 1980 agrarian reform when its traditional sector cooperatives were joined by some Phase One beneficiaries. The controversial Ruiz Camacho, who was alleged to have links to security forces and the Nationalist Democratic Organization* (ORDEN), was considered “able and resourceful” by U.S. officials. When he left UCS, Ruiz Camacho was alleged to have turned over UCS files to Major Roberto D’Aubuisson of ANSESAL, the military intelligence unit out of which ORDEN was directed. AIFLD later said AFL–CIO officials were unaware of Ruiz Camacho’s possible ties to ORDEN and death squads. He continued to enjoy support from AIFLD and U.S. government agencies. ACOPAI provided technical and political support to member cooperatives and built its own overlapping Farm Workers Association (Asociación de Trabajadores Agrícolas). In 1983 it claimed some twenty-five cooperatives with over 15,000 members.

ACOPAI was active in the AIFLD-backed Democratic Popular Unity* (UPD). Fruit of UPD’s social pact with the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), President Duarte (1984) named Ruiz Camacho under secretary of agriculture in 1984. But failure of the Duarte regime to carry out the social pact alienated much of the ACOPAI rank and file. As the base shifted in a more progressive direction, a split developed in ACOPAI leadership. Ruiz Camacho was accused of being a flunky of the U.S. embassy and PDC. At the July 1984 ACOPAI congress, Ruiz Camacho was deposed as the union’s president. He blamed his removal on his longtime UCS antagonist Tito Castro, who held a government position at the Agrarian Transformation Institute. As a result of the conflict, Ruiz Camacho lost his government post and left ACOPAI to form a rival organization. During 1984–85 ACOPAI was estranged from AIFLD (See Democratic Popular Unity) but reportedly returned to the AFL–CIO fold in 1986.

KIMBERLY-CLARK WORKERS UNION. *See* Revolutionary Trade Union Federation.

LEMPA RIVER HYDROELECTRIC COMMISSION WORKERS UNION (Sindicato de Trabajadores de Empresa Comisión Ejecutiva Hidroeléctrica—STECEL).

The first organizing of workers in the new state-run hydroelectric system, the Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission (CEL), began in 1967, but STECEL was not legally recognized until 1972. The union affiliated with the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers* (FENASTRAS), a federation established the same year by breakaway unions from the pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS). During the onset of generalized repression against the trade union movement in 1979–80, eighteen STECEL members were killed by death

squads and security forces. The union was in the forefront of the 1980 general strikes. Thirty STECEL members were among some 600 workers fired during the August general strike, and on 21 August STECEL went on strike to demand an end to repression, rehiring of all dismissed workers, and release of arrested union activists. The following day the government militarized all CEL plants, arrested the top STECEL leadership, including FENASTRAS general secretary Héctor Bernabé Recinos, and issued Decree 44 dissolving the union. Sixteen union members were held by the National Guard for seventy days, during which they were beaten repeatedly, starved, and told that their families would be killed. Eleven were later transferred to Mariona Prison, where they remained for over four years. One of the five who were released, Miguel Angel Centeno, was subsequently murdered by security forces. In 1981 the seventeen-year-old daughter of imprisoned STECEL leader José Valencia was abducted from her home and tortured to death. In 1982 the wife and thirteen-year-old daughter of jailed FENASTRAS general secretary Recinos were arrested and "disappeared." Recinos' remaining three young sons lived in San Salvador clandestinely for the next two and a half years until fleeing to the United States in 1984.

The STECEL case attracted international attention, particularly in Europe. FENASTRAS opened an office in Washington, and the National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador, headed by several prominent U.S. labor leaders, began a campaign for release of Recinos and the other imprisoned STECEL members. Under such pressure, they were sent into exile in October 1984. Despite heavy repression, the union remained active *de facto*. In 1985 the union took steps to reincorporate as the Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission Workers Association (*Asociación de Trabajadores de CEL—ATCEL*) and began to press management for contract negotiations.

LETTER CARRIER AND POSTAL EMPLOYEES UNION SOCIETY OF EL SALVADOR (*Sociedad Unión de Carteros y Empleados Postales de El Salvador—SUCEPES*).

Traditionally a pro-government union, SUCEPES' leadership was trained by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) and operated within the apparatus of the ruling National Conciliation Party (PCN). The military-controlled PCN lost power in 1979 when the Duarte wing of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) entered the junta. During the 1979–83 terror, SUCEPES and other old PCN-linked unions were largely spared from repression. However, like most public employee organizations, SUCEPES members suffered wage erosion under the Duarte government's austerity program. In 1984 SUCEPES complied when AIFLD demanded that its centrist union affiliates join the new Democratic Workers Central* (CTD). In 1985, however, the membership deposed the union president, who was accused of stealing funds received from AIFLD. In November 1985 the Treasury Police detained and mistreated the new SUCEPES president, Víctor Manuel Martínez, accusing him of belonging to a communist cell. The union immediately went on strike, occupying the downtown

post office and paralyzing the nation's postal service. The union denied any association with "subversives" and blamed the conflict on postal management. Union members expressed shock when AIFLD officials in San Salvador failed to come to their defense, and some leaders began to reconsider their relationship with the AFL-CIO. New strife broke out again in April 1986.

LIGA ROJA. *See* Red League.

MECHANICS AND METAL INDUSTRY WORKERS UNION (Sindicato de Trabajadores de Industrias Mecánicas y Metálicas de El Salvador—STIMMES).

Founded in 1974, this union was originally affiliated with the Construction Industry and Transport Trade Union Federation* (FESINCONSTRANS) and was one of the few industrial unions backed by the AFL-CIO. Among its founding locals was the union at the Phelps-Dodge copper wire factory (CONELCA). Another important local is at the INDECA firm. In the late 1970s, several locals came under the influence of the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (see Trade Unions Coordinating Committee), and in 1979 STIMMES disaffiliated from FESINCONSTRANS to join the new Revolutionary Trade Union Federation (FSR). In 1985 STIMMES had 477 registered members. The union left FSR over political differences and joined the Independent Union Association of El Salvador (ASIES), becoming a founder of the Federation of Independent Union Associations of El Salvador* (FEASIES) in 1987.

MOVIMIENTO UNITARIO SINDICALISTA Y GREMIAL DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador.

MUSYGES. *See* Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SALVADORAN EDUCATORS "21ST OF JUNE" (Asociación Nacional de Educadores Salvadoreños "21 de Junio"—ANDES).

Formed in December 1964, ANDES became the second largest union in El Salvador, claiming to represent over 18,000 of the country's 23,000 public school teachers by the late 1970s. Prior to the 1960s, most teachers organizations were pro-government. ANDES' immediate predecessors were the Salvadoran Teachers Federation (Federación Magisterial Salvadoreña), formed in 1960, and the Salvadoran Teachers Union (Unión de Maestros Salvadoreños), formed in 1962, both of which were repressed. In 1964 formation of ANDES was prompted by the Rivera regime's (1962-67) attempt to reorganize the teaching profession; "21st of June" was added to the name in 1965 to commemorate the demonstration of thousands of teachers that year through the streets of San Salvador in protest of the government's restrictive pension scheme, a conflict which festered for many years. The union won government recognition following another

large demonstration in 1967, and ANDES action became part of a general labor upsurge (see "Acero, S.A." Workers Union).

Because public employees were prohibited from organizing unions, ANDES was incorporated as an association. During fifty-eight days on strike in 1967 and 1968, ANDES carried out building occupations, popular tribunals, hunger strikes, and other types of campaigns which became basic Salvadoran trade union tactics during the 1970s. The regime of General Fidel Sánchez Hernández (1967–72) responded with widespread repression of the labor movement, and many ANDES activists were persecuted. Although the strike was lost, the conflict strengthened the union and reinforced the growing social activism of Salvadoran teachers. One year later, the government made several concessions to the union, including improved medical benefits.

In 1971 ANDES led a fifty-day strike for improved wages and working conditions. The teachers received considerable popular support, but meetings and demonstrations were again repressed. Two teachers were killed by police, hundreds arrested. Following the fraudulent elections of 1972, ANDES was at the center of trade union activism and radicalization, participating first in formation of the United Popular Action Front (FAPU) in 1974 and then joining the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR) a year later. Some ANDES leaders were also active in formation of revolutionary organizations that later became part of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). Former ANDES general secretary Mélida Anaya Montes, for example, became a top leader of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL).

By the late 1970s ANDES' formal dues-paying membership was said to be about 10,000, but the union claimed to represent twice that many teachers, some of whom feared repression if they registered as union members. ANDES had the unfortunate distinction of suffering the greatest repression of any labor organization during the late 1970s and early 1980s terror, reporting that 264 members had been killed by 1983. The government closed hundreds of schools in regions where the FMLN had influence, including 85 percent of schools in the eastern departments. Hundreds of teachers fled into exile. Union members in exile established an active ANDES representation in Mexico, the United States, and Europe.

In 1984 the union regained its capacity to press for a new collective bargaining agreement; it held a one-day teachers' walkout to pressure the government on wage demands and publicly criticized the Duarte regime (1984–) of intimidation of union activists. In June 1985 ANDES was able to hold its Nineteenth National Assembly in public, and international observer delegations to the meeting included twenty-seven U.S. teachers and union representatives. The convention voted to denounce the Duarte government's campaign of repression against the union and demand the resignation of the Minister of Education. Julio César Portillo served as ANDES general secretary until 1986, when Jorge Alberto Morales Duarte was elected at the Twentieth National Assembly.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SALVADORAN WORKERS (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Salvadoreños—FENASTRAS).

El Salvador's largest industrial federation, FENASTRAS was founded in 1972 by unions which broke away from three federations of the pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS). Of some thirty-six unions active in the CGS national congress that year, about half expressed opposition to either union corruption or the confederation's conservative orientation. Eighteen unions walked out of the congress, including some which remained pro-government. Twelve dissident unions went on to found FENASTRAS with support of political forces in the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN), a broad front under the influence of the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS). In 1977 FENASTRAS joined with the left-led Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador* (FUSS) and the Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union Federation* (FESTIAVTSCES) to form the Unitary Confederation of Salvadoran Workers* (CUTS), but the confederation never was consolidated due to the 1970s trade union realignment. During the mid-1970s radicalization of the labor movement, a second broad coalition, the United Popular Action Front (FAPU), began to eclipse UDN influence within FENASTRAS. By 1979 FAPU was hegemonic in most FENASTRAS unions, although there continued to be some influence of UDN and the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR), another mass revolutionary organization. In 1979–80 a number of FENASTRAS affiliates sympathetic to the BPR broke off to form the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation* (FSR).

The largest FENASTRAS affiliates were the Coffee Industry Union (Sindicato de la Industria del Café—SICAFE), the Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission Workers and Employees Union* (STECCEL, which was dissolved by government decree in 1980), the Fishing Industry Union* (SIP), and the Water and Sewage National Administration Workers Union* (SETA). The federation also represented important unions of bank employees, garment workers, bus drivers, and construction workers. Its 1985 registered membership was 17,145, second only to the Construction Industry and Transport Trade Union Federation* (FESINCONSTRANS). However, active union membership of FENASTRAS was much greater than that of FESINCONSTRANS, which had only one important union and perhaps only about 5,500 dues-paying members.

The success of FENASTRAS during the 1970s was due to its radical departure from more cautious organizing methods of both the pro-government CGS unions and the left-led FUSS and FESTIAVTSCES federations. Before the government would authorize a strike, workers had to go through three stages of contract negotiations. When initial "direct" negotiations (*trato directo*) broke down, unions were obligated to enter a "conciliation" stage overseen by the Labor Director of the Ministry of Labor. The conciliation stage lasted until the Labor Director chose to end it, and managements bent on frustrating or destroying a union were given a year or more. A third stage, arbitration, was also stacked against the unions. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labor would automatically extend

a union's old contract, without adjustment for inflation. In the modern history of Salvadoran labor-management relations, only four strikes were declared legal by the government.

FENASTRAS broke through this anti-union structure by combining legal and extra-legal methods of struggle. FENASTRAS provided locals with expert administrative and legal guidance to fully comply with labor code provisions and exhaust the legal process; but the union also experimented with civil disobedience, sit-down strikes, and other forms of direct action to force management to negotiate seriously or obtain an more impartial intervention by the Ministry of Labor. By 1977 factory seizures were becoming the norm in any successful Salvadoran labor action to win a decent contract. The most effective direct action consisted of factory takeovers in which top management officials were held hostage to protect workers from police assault.

Although the government of General Carlos Humberto Romero (1977-79) cracked down on the unions and other opposition institutions in November 1977, FENASTRAS had reintroduced the strike as a practical union instrument in El Salvador. Both FAPU and BPR provided political support to unions in these conflicts, organizing solidarity strikes, demonstrations and material aid. In some cases, where union activists were killed or a factory owner was especially intransigent or believed to be connected with death squads, the political-military organizations influential in FAPU and BPR (the National Resistance and Popular Liberation Forces, respectively), carried out armed reprisals against anti-union elements. Some employers began to show greater respect for the power of unions, and FENASTRAS affiliates won some impressive contract gains. Other employers virtually declared war on unions and made increasing use of death squads to assassinate union activists. Among the top FENASTRAS leaders killed in 1979 were Oscar Armando Interiano of the "Sacos Cuccatlán" Factory Workers Union,* Ricardo Guardado of the Port Industry Union, and Mercedes Recinos, the federation's Secretary of Women's Affairs.

FENASTRAS was in the forefront of unions which argued that effective promotion of their members' interests required a "political response," in contrast to the "nonpolitical" approach advocated by unions supported by the AFL-CIO. In 1979 FENASTRAS and other left-led unions joined the broad opposition Popular Forum, a political platform and coalition which helped bring about collapse of the Romero dictatorship in October 1979. A reformist junta lasted only three months, and El Salvador headed toward full-scale civil war. FENASTRAS' offices were destroyed by a bomb in April 1980, and many federation activists were assassinated; a gruesome massacre took place at the "Sacos Cuscatlán" factory, when striking FENASTRAS members were rounded up and shot in the company basement in what the firm later termed a "casual confrontation."

FENASTRAS coordinated its actions with federations and left-led unions linked through the Mass Revolutionary Coordinating Committee (CRM), and in May 1980 joined in founding the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). During

the ensuing three years of trade union repression and indiscriminate death-squad terror, FENASTRAS was driven underground. Not counting farm workers and day laborers, FENASTRAS estimated that 345 members of its affiliate unions were killed just during 1979–81. The FENASTRAS headquarters in San Salvador was attacked or searched by police eleven times, and its regional office in Santa Ana was dynamited twice. Offices of affiliates suffered similar attacks, and most were closed.

During most of 1981–83 FENASTRAS activists worked clandestinely, meeting only one-on-one with union members. In 1982 FENASTRAS and several other clandestine left and aboveground centrist unions formed the Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador* (MUSYGES), but the coalition was harshly repressed. Following the reduction of indiscriminate terror and the election of José Napoleón Duarte in early 1984, imprisoned FENASTRAS general secretary Héctor Bernabé Recinos was released into exile, and the federation began to reestablish ties with centrist unions. In Recinos' absence, the federation was headed by Secretary of organization Carlos Zometa.

During this initial recovery period, FENASTRAS also began to regroup activists from several inactive or de facto unions, and in 1985, as public employee union activity accelerated, FENASTRAS was instrumental in founding the May First Committee* and the Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee* (CST), which organized a highly successful May Day demonstration of some 20,000 workers. On 7–9 November FENASTRAS held its Seventeenth National Congress, the first organized in public in five years, with 400 delegates representing twenty-three unions. Following the congress, FENASTRAS continued efforts to strengthen ties with centrist unions; in February 1986 FENASTRAS joined in the formation of the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers.*

In addition to publishing its bulletin, *Despertar Proletario* (*Proletarian Awakening*), in 1985 FENASTRAS began broadcasting a daily radio labor program on a Church-controlled station. In the United States, FENASTRAS representatives were attacked as “terrorists” and “communists” by some conservative AFL–CIO leaders, but the red-baiting was not successful in preventing discussion of El Salvador's labor situation with a wide range of U.S. union activists. FENASTRAS opened an office in Washington to press its cause in the United States. While AIFLD representatives belittled FENASTRAS's significance, Ministry of Labor records demonstrated that it was by far El Salvador's largest industrial federation, with over 17,000 members. At the federation's Eighteenth National Congress in November 1986, Febe Elizabeth Vela'squez was elected general secretary. (For her role in the labor movement see Cotton and Synthetics Textile Workers Union.)

NATIONALIST DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION (Organización Democrática Nacionalista—ORDEN).

This unique Salvadoran institution was established in 1963 to organize workers and peasants “against communist subversion.” ORDEN was supervised pri-

marily out of the Salvadoran National Security Agency (ANSESAL), the intelligence branch of the Salvadoran armed forces also founded in 1963 under guidance of U.S. government agencies to monitor and counter leftist influence in the labor, peasant, and other social movements. Colonel José Alberto "Chele" Medrano, a man already well-known to trade union activists for coordinating surveillance of their organizations and torture of detainees, headed this new security organization. (Regarding Medrano's earlier role, see the Salvadoran Trade Union Reorganizing Committee.) While the CIA began to exchange intelligence information on El Salvador's labor activists with ANSESAL, a ten-man team of U.S. Army Special Forces counterinsurgency advisers (Green Berets) helped Medrano create the ORDEN anti-communist labor and political organization in rural El Salvador. ORDEN's acronym means "order" in Spanish, and Medrano said the concept "to catechize the people" evolved out of discussions with his Green Beret advisers. U.S. officers helped Medrano plan ORDEN's structure, formulate its ideology, and train its team of military supervisors. Medrano built ORDEN ranks among former soldiers, and its members became the rural labor base of the National Conciliation Party (PCN), the political party of successive military regimes. Some landowners and business interests initially opposed ORDEN, apparently fearing that a labor and political apparatus directly run by the military might one day escape landowner control. Medrano reassured landowners that ORDEN would remain "in the hands of the Salvadoran state and the responsible sectors of this country." There were later moments, however, when the military used ORDEN to pressure landed interests. On the fourth anniversary of the Molina regime in 1976, for example, the military mobilized ORDEN to bring some 70,000 peasants for a demonstration in San Salvador, a show of political force to the oligarchy in support of the government's plan for a token land reform program. (The AIFLD-backed Salvadoran Communal Union* also claimed responsibility for mobilizing the demonstrators.)

At ORDEN's height, Medrano and his successors led perhaps 30,000 farm workers and peasants (some estimates ran as high as 100,000), proselytizing an anti-communist credo which adherents called "the doctrine." Medrano later recalled, "It was almost like a religion." (See Nairn, p. 23.) ORDEN was the eyes and ears of ANSESAL—hence the Salvadoran term *oreja*, or "ear," for an ORDEN informer or other stool pigeon in unions. "You discover the communist by the way he talks," said Medrano. "Generally he speaks against Yankee imperialism, he speaks against the oligarchy, he speaks against military men. We can spot them easily." Once reported, ORDEN's staff passed the information on to ANSESAL. In El Salvador, said Medrano, "The enemy comes from our people. They are traitors to the country. What can the troops do? When they find them, they kill them." (See Nairn, p. 23.) So began the death squads which operated sporadically during the 1960s and 1970s and then devastated the trade union movement from 1979 to 1983.

Actual interrogation and killing of labor activists and other dissidents were decentralized among ORDEN itself and various military branches, most of which

developed their own intelligence operations linked to ANSESAL. The specific clandestine organizations called "death squads" were based in military networks. ORDEN veterans and former Salvadoran military officers said that CIA and U.S. embassy involvement with ORDEN and ANSESAL continued without interruption after the U.S. Congress abolished AID's Public Safety Program, and even after the United States began in 1980 to publicly denounce death-squad violence in El Salvador. (The United States did not act energetically to stop the killings until December 1983.) The CIA regularly provided ANSESAL with dossiers on labor leaders and other activists, particularly those who traveled abroad, such as Father Rutilio Grande, the Jesuit priest and farm workers organizer assassinated in 1977 by ANSESAL agents.

By the mid-1970s ORDEN's capacity to contain and channel labor organizing in the countryside was fast diminishing. Under pressure from a revitalized labor movement, the Salvadoran government faced a serious political crisis in 1979, producing a split in the military. A reformist junta which briefly held power at the end of the year decreed abolition of ORDEN and ANSESAL, promising social reform and curtailment of the labor movement repression. From 1977 until two weeks after the coup, Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, a Medrano protégé, worked at ANSESAL. When ORDEN and ANSESAL were ordered "abolished," the military employed D'Aubuisson to transfer ANSESAL files to the army's general command. At the same time, D'Aubuisson began creating a political-military apparatus to relieve the military high command of direct responsibility for guiding the death squads and right-wing political movement. ORDEN and a network of military intelligence operatives and death-squad commanders were integrated into a clandestine civilian-run political-military organization flanked by an aboveground nationalist political party, ARENA. "ORDEN has ceased to function with that name," D'Aubuisson declared, "but its principles live and are newly serving the fatherland." Meanwhile, the reformist junta was replaced by a more pro-U.S. civil-military junta incorporating the José Napoleón Duarte wing of the Christian Democratic Party. It was during this period that death-squad torture and murder of trade union and farm worker activists reached unprecedented heights. No other rural labor union or association could be organized above ground without sanction of the government and ORDEN's military supervisors, which led to accusations in the Salvadoran labor movement that the Salvadoran Communal Union,* initiated by AIFLD in the mid-1960s, was an ally of ORDEN. AIFLD denied the charge. (See Salvadoran Communal Union.) The civil war brought an end to ORDEN in some regions of El Salvador, particularly in the "zones of control" of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). Meanwhile, retired General "Chele" Medrano was assassinated on 23 March 1985. (See the investigative series by Craig Pyes in *Albuquerque Journal*, 18–22 December 1983, and by Laurie Becklund in the *Los Angeles Times*, 18–19 December 1983. Pyes and Becklund received the Latin American Studies Association 1984 award for outstanding journalism for these articles.)

NATIONAL PEASANTS UNION. *See* Agricultural Workers Union of El Salvador.

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS (Unión Nacional de Trabajadores—UNT).

The National Union of Workers was best known for its central role in organizing the “Huelga de Brazos Caidos” (literally, “fallen arms strike” or “folded arms strike,” a series of direct actions which included sit-down strikes) in April–May 1944, which toppled the dictatorship of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez (1932–44). In the absence of a trade union federation in the early 1940s, workers and activists of the clandestine Communist Party of El Salvador formed the National Union of Workers (UNT), primarily to lobby against anti-labor government policies and build a progressive political front. Its general secretary was Alejandro Dagoberto Marroquín. UNT also functioned as a coordinating body of *de facto* unions.

As a broad range of political forces gathered against the dictator, UNT helped coordinate strikes and the first public protests in over a decade. The General Association of Salvadoran University Students (AGEUS) also played a key role in the growing protest. UNT’s committee organizing for a general strike included Fabio Castillo Figueroa, later rector of the University of El Salvador and member of the reformist civil-military junta of 1960. Support for the general strike began to build after AGEUS closed down and occupied the university on 19 April. UNT unions walked out, as did primary and secondary students. Bank and public employees stopped work (the “brazos caidos”), and for three weeks protesters stood in front of the National Palace.

After police on 7 May shot and killed a student from the landed elite (and son of a cotton estate owner and U.S. citizen), the U.S. ambassador told General Hernández Martínez to resign. (See White, p. 103.) He quickly fled into exile. UNT threw its political support behind the presidential candidacy of Arturo Romero, a physician and leader of the general strike. Romero, running on a platform of democratic reforms similar to those of Guatemala’s “October Revolution” a few months later, would surely have been elected, but the military staged a coup and reimposed dictatorship. An effort by liberal leaders to split the army culminated in an armed march by hundreds of Romero supporters, including many UNT union activists, from the Guatemalan border to Ahuachapán. It failed, a number of trade unionists were killed, and UNT and other labor organizations were banned. Some communist activists were later critical of their own conduct of the UNT leadership, arguing that there had been confusion over its character and purpose. According to Marroquín, its objective was to reconstruct a unified Salvadoran trade union federation. But for others it had been led as a political front, even a mass political party. Like the earlier Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador* experience, that of UNT was analyzed and debated within Salvadoran unions for years to come.

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS AND PEASANTS (Unión Nacional Obrero-Campesina—UNOC).

Following its debacle with centrist Salvadoran unions during 1984–85 (see Democratic Popular Unity—UPD), the AFL–CIO’s American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) turned against UPD leaders and in 1986 regrouped its remaining allies in UNOC, portrayed as a “democratic” counterforce to the new center-left labor coalition, National Unity of Salvadoran Workers.* UNOC members included several unions plagued by internal divisions or remnants of organizations which had split during the previous six years, such as the Construction Industry and Transport Trade Union Federation* (FESINCONSTRANS) and the Salvadoran Communal Union* (UCS). UNOC adopted a curious motto for a Salvadoran labor organization, “No Givebacks” (*lo conquistado no se entrega*), and endorsed the economic policies of the Duarte government. On 15 March 1986 UNOC organized a pro-Duarte demonstration which, AIFLD critics alleged, was comprised largely of farm workers cooperative members bused into San Salvador by the government who did not know for what they were demonstrating. UNOC was ridiculed in the right-wing press as a *cascarón* (empty shell) to disguise the Christian Democratic Party’s loss of trade union support.

NATIONAL UNITY OF SALVADORAN WORKERS (Unidad Nacional de Trabajadores Salvadoreños—UNTS).

Publicly announced by several hundred union leaders standing in front of the National Assembly building on 8 February 1986, UNTS was the broadest coalition of trade unions established in El Salvador since the 1950s. It stemmed from a two-year effort, led primarily by unions of the State and Municipal Workers Coordinating Council* (CCTEM) and Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee* (CST) to unite leftist and centrist unions in a single front. The process was opposed by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), but the major unions backed by the AFL–CIO split during 1985. As a result, unions belonging to the AIFLD-supported Democratic Popular Unity* (UPD) were estranged from the AFL–CIO and joined with leftist and centrist federations to form UNTS. A second factor which made the coalition possible was a change in organizing strategy by union leaders following the demise of the Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador (MUSYGES) in 1984. Instead of attempting to organize a front directly through traditional federation structures, individual unions formed sectoral coalitions. This led to the emergence of two major fronts of public employees (grouped through CCTEM) and farm workers associations (the Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El Salvador*—COACES), allowing these groups to play a more central role in the labor movement. The event which precipitated the joining of CST unions with UPD, CCTEM, and COACES in UNTS was the Duarte regime’s (1984–) announcement in January 1986 to a recessive economic program. Typical of disillusioned union leaders formerly supporting President Duarte was Miguel Angel Vásquez, general secretary of the Christian Democratic Salvadoran Workers Central* (CTS). “The social pact has brought us more problems than

benefits," he said. "Workers and peasants don't have democratic union rights. Duarte hasn't kept his promises to reactivate the economy. There are two million Salvadorans unemployed. And the government is carrying out illegal arrests, harassment and torture." (See Al Weinrub, "Austerity Measures Spark Labor Revolt." *Labor Report on Central America* (March–April 1986): 1–2.)

At its founding, UNTS was comprised of about 100 labor organizations claiming to represent some 300,000 workers. Its executive board included representatives of the National Association of Salvadoran Educators,* the Social Security Institute Workers Union,* and the Treasury Ministry Employees General Association (Asociación General de Empleados del Ministerio de Hacienda) in addition to COACES, CPD, and CTS. In April UNTS cosponsored with the National Federation of Small Businesses (FENAPES) a three-day Forum for Peace and Survival of the Salvadoran People, which was attended by almost 600 delegates and foreign observers. The forum passed resolutions calling for repeal of Duarte's austerity program, an end to anti-labor repression, and a negotiated settlement of the civil war. On 24 April UNTS organized a national four-hour work stoppage in which some eighty unions participated, presaging a further trade union confrontation with the Duarte government. On May Day, UNTS organized a march of about 80,000 workers, the largest mass demonstration in El Salvador since 1980. CTS and UPD later withdrew from UNTS, but one of the UPD's main organizations, the Salvadoran National Indigenous Association* (ANIS) remained in UNTS. By late 1986, the UNTS's agrarian sector, headed by COACES, ANIS, and the Agricultural Workers Union of El Salvador* (SITAS), was leading a realignment of peasant and farmworker unions, forming the National Peasants Union (UNC). UNTS held a November 1986 conference, *In Search of Peace*, which was attended by 175 U.S. trade union, religious, and human rights representatives.

ORDEN. *See* Nationalist Democratic Organization.

ORGANIZACIÓN DEMOCRÁTICA NACIONALISTA. *See* Nationalist Democratic Organization.

PHELPS DODGE WORKERS UNION. *See* Mechanics and Metal Industry Workers Union.

POSTAL EMPLOYEES UNION. *See* Letter Carrier and Postal Employees Union Society of El Salvador.

RAILWAY WORKERS UNION (Unión de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros—UTF).

Formed in either 1949 or 1951, the UTF was the country's largest railway workers union. Two rail systems were built in El Salvador. The International Railways of Central America (IRCA) line was begun in the 1880s at La Unión,

running to San Miguel and reaching San Salvador by 1917. IRCA was a private firm incorporated in New Jersey and organized in a 1912 merger. The line was later extended to Guatemala, and a feeder line was added from Ahuachapán through Santa Ana to the main line. The second system operated only in the western region, connecting San Salvador with the port of Acajutla. It was British built and operated from 1894 until it was nationalized in 1964. A 25-mile spur connected the two systems at Santa Ana. UTF was for many years El Salvador's largest independent (nonfederated) union, with 2,385 registered members in the 1960s. The union later joined the Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador* and played an important role in the 1967–68 strikes. The union's combativeness apparently motivated the railways' sale to the government. After the railways were nationalized as the Ferrocarriles Nacionales, the government sought to destroy the union, many of its members were persecuted, and UTF was dissolved by decree in May 1975. The government gave severance pay to union members and then rehired by contract only certain workers. UTF continued to exist *de facto*, but Ferrocarriles Nacionales refused to negotiate a union contract. A fifteen day strike which paralyzed the railways in 1980 was met by repression. In 1984 the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers* claimed UTF as a *de facto* affiliate but reported little activity.

RED LEAGUE (Liga Roja).

Unlike many other Latin American countries, El Salvador did not have a well-organized anarcho-syndicalist movement. Despite its leftist-sounding name, the Red League, established in 1918, was founded with government support to co-opt political ferment in the guilds on the eve of the birth of Salvadoran trade unions. An urban-based progressive political movement had emerged with the liberal reform government of Manuel Enrique Araújo, who was assassinated in 1913. Some workers were drawn toward the progressive current, now led by Alberto Masferrer and Arturo Araújo, who later founded the Salvadoran Labor Party. But a more rightist liberal faction was able to organize artisan sectors in the "Red League." With the League as their initial mass base, Jorge Meléndez and his brother-in-law Alfonso Quiñónez were able to establish the nepotistic political dynasty through which the coffee oligarchy ruled from 1918 to 1927. Quiñónez used demagoguery and patronage to fashion the League, appropriating the red flag and—not coincidentally, in the months following the Russian Revolution—proclaiming the League "the vanguard of the working class." Although the Red League was unable to forestall leftist union organizing in the 1920s, its formation marked the beginning of the "modern" Salvadoran political system in which a nascent progressive trade union movement was countered with corruption, violence, and electoral fraud. By 1922, when Quiñónez was designated to succeed Meléndez as president, the Red League no longer provided the oligarchy with the illusion of labor support. An opposition demonstration on Christmas day, which included hundreds of women protesters, was attacked by police, and the elections had to be conducted as something of a charade. Influence of

the Red League in the labor movement was virtually eliminated by the organizing of the Workers Regional of El Salvador* after 1924.

REVOLUTIONARY TRADE UNION FEDERATION (Federación Sindical Revolucionaria—FSR).

Formed in late 1979 and legally registered in 1980, FSR represented a significant sector of the country's most active industrial unions. Included were unions of textile and food-processing workers, metalworkers, beverage workers, and several important one-company unions, such as at the U.S.-owned Kimberly-Clark paper goods factory. The FSR suffered severe repression during the early 1980s terror, and in 1984 the federation underwent a political crisis which resulted in eventual disaffiliation of most of its unions. FSR's emergence reflected the upsurge and sharp polarization of the Salvadoran trade union movement in the late 1970s, originating in a group of labor activists formed in 1975, the Workers Committee of Revolutionary Orientation (COOR), committed to combative methods of trade union defense and an explicitly political strategy of building a revolutionary current within the trade union movement. (See Trade Unions Coordinating Committee.)

FSR was one of the few federations active in plants in the San Bartolo industrial zone, despite prohibition of union activity there; most of those unions, such as that which the FSR led at the Texas Instruments plant, were destroyed by repression and plant closures. The Texas Instruments union, composed mostly of young women, was on strike in March 1980 when it was attacked by security forces. Several union activists were killed, the factory was militarized, and the union office was bombed. The union was destroyed, its leaders persecuted as "subversives."

FSR was a founding member of the Union Unity Committee* (CUS) in May 1980, an attempt to coordinate defense of progressive unions during the period of most intense repression. But FSR had to operate clandestinely during most of 1980-82. Returning to El Salvador in February 1981 from a speaking tour in the United States, FSR general secretary José Sánchez Gallegos was seized by Guatemalan authorities and murdered. In January 1982 the federation held its Second National Congress in San Salvador, and in November FSR published a demand for a general wage increase to meet the almost 100 percent rise in the cost of living since a 1980 government wage freeze. However, the federation was thrown into political crisis by events surrounding the suicide of Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) leader Salvador Cayetano Carpio in 1983.

Following the July 1983 Fourth FSR National Congress, the federation split. When FPL leaders issued a critique of Carpio's leadership and sectarian political line, union elements under influence of a pro-Carpio faction maintained control of several FSR unions and the federation leadership itself. As FSR thus came under influence of the so-called Revolutionary Workers Movement (MOR), also known in the labor movement as the "Fraction," one by one most of its key affiliates left the organization. On 19 January 1984 some 100 FSR representatives

were attending the federation's Fifth National Congress in San Salvador when the National Police broke in and arrested fifteen leaders, including FSR general secretary José Jeremias Pereira. After the fifteen had undergone eight days of interrogation and torture, a delegation of U.S. women visiting El Salvador at the time, which included author Jessica Mitford and a Service Employees International Union official, was able to intercede with the U.S. ambassador on their behalf. Six were released, and the nine principal leaders were transferred to Mariona Prison. The Magaña government released them several months later under international pressure.

In 1985 half of FSR's remaining affiliates were unable to register with the Ministry of Labor. FSR's membership of 2,700 further declined as affiliates left during the year, and by 1986, FSR was said to have been reduced to three unions. Many former FSR unions regrouped together with important independent unions in the Independent Union Association of El Salvador.*

RURAL WORKERS UNION (Unión de Trabajadores del Campo—UTC).

Like the Christian Peasants Federation* (FECCAS), UTC grew out of rural Christian base communities radicalized in part by the experience of the 1972 electoral fraud. The Union was founded in 1974 in the San Vicente and Chalatenango regions among farm workers organized by Catholic activists under the "Tecoluca Parochial Program." Its first general secretary was Justo Mejía, a Chalatenango farm worker, father of nine, and former Christian Democratic Party activist. From its inception UTC suffered heavy repression, including six members killed by the National Guard during a November 1977 land takeover. Most UTC founding leaders were killed during the late 1970s and early 1980s; Mejía was tortured to death by the National Guard in 1979. UTC organizer Facundo Guardado, a fieldworker from Chalatenango, later became general secretary of the Popular Revolutionary Bloc, which UTC joined in 1975. UTC formed an alliance with FECCAS, and the two formed the Rural Workers Federation in 1977. UTC activists were in sharp conflict with members of the Nationalist Democratic Organization* (ORDEN), especially in Chalatenango, and in 1978 UTC began to organize armed self-defense and to expropriate weapons of ORDEN members. By 1980 UTC's organizing extended into the San Miguel, Usulután, and La Paz regions, and during the ensuing civil war its farm workers unions formed the base for consolidation of a number of the "zones of control" of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN).

"SACOS CUSCATLÁN" FACTORY WORKERS UNION (Sindicato de Obreros de la Fábrica de Sacos Cuscatlán). *See* Cotton and Synthetics Textile Industry Workers Union and National Federation of Salvadoran Workers.

SALVADORAN COMMUNAL UNION (Unión Comunal Salvadoreña—UCS).

Created under guidance of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD, the AFL-CIO's labor arm in Latin America) in the late 1960s, UCS

was an association of farm workers cooperative members, sharecroppers, and tenant farmers receiving technical assistance, labor education, and political orientation from U.S.-based agencies. Rural unions were precluded by both law and intransigent landowner opposition in El Salvador. But, concerned that harsh treatment of farm workers and peasants by landowners created conditions similar to those which led to the Cuban revolution, AIFLD devoted more attention to rural organizing in El Salvador than in most other Latin American countries. In 1965 AIFLD persuaded the government of Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera (1962–67) to allow U.S.-sponsored educational seminars for farm workers. Within three years a network of AIFLD-trained leaders was able to organize UCS as a co-operative institution to administer U.S.-funded self-help projects in the countryside. AIFLD helped UCS organizers negotiate a special arrangement in 1970 with the government of General Fidel Sánchez Hernández (1967–72) whereby UCS was registered as an association with the Ministry of Interior, rather than as a union with the Ministry of Labor. During its first four years as a legal organization, UCS was AIFLD's vehicle for ninety-six training courses and thirty-nine regional meetings. The U.S. government channeled funds to forty-five UCS-affiliated rural cooperatives and provided \$671,000 for a UCS chain of savings and loan co-ops. By 1977 UCS claimed to have helped 5,000 formerly landless peasants purchase land farmed through twenty production co-ops.

Despite its anti-communist purpose, UCS aroused landowner opposition, and in 1973 the regime of Colonel Arturo Molina (1972–77) asked AIFLD to leave El Salvador. The Molina government operated its own peasant organization, the Nationalist Democratic Organization* (ORDEN), and, unlike UCS and AIFLD, pursued only token agrarian reform. The AFL–CIO continued to advise and financially support UCS and other centrist labor organizations from its bases in other Central American countries, and the Inter-American Foundation stepped in with almost \$1 million in funding. AIFLD used UCS to host a Latin American Congress of Campesino Leaders in San Salvador in 1974. By 1976 UCS claimed a membership of over 150,000 members, but AIFLD put the number at 40,000 (probably still an exaggerated figure). Meanwhile, the organization was plagued by leadership rivalries, financial irregularities, and charges that it collaborated with ORDEN in terror against more progressive farm workers groups.

Alleged corruption in UCS, substantiated in part by a U.S.-contracted agricultural economist, John Strasma, became linked to charges by critics that the organization cooperated with ORDEN. Both UCS and ORDEN claimed responsibility for mobilizing thousands of farm workers who demonstrated in 1976 in favor of the Molina regime's token land reform program. Given ORDEN's size and paramilitary nature, no rural labor union or association could be organized above ground without sanction of the government and ORDEN's military supervisors. This suggested the possibility that UCS was allied to ORDEN. AIFLD denied the charge, stating that any overlap between ORDEN and UCS officials was unknown to AFL–CIO representatives in El Salvador. Whatever the ties between ORDEN and UCS, they shared an ideological affinity in their anti-

communist doctrines, and the sponsors of both aimed to prevent "subversives" from organizing farm workers and peasants. In 1980 Amnesty International issued a report charging instances of collusion between the military, UCS, and ORDEN to suppress leftist peasants unions.

Unable to obtain agrarian reform or other legislative relief for rural workers, UCS began to lose political initiative in the countryside in the late 1970s. In growing numbers, farm workers and peasants turned to more radical strategies (for example, see Christian Peasants Federation and Rural Workers Union). Leadership rivalries and political disputes weakened UCS. A grouping of indigenous peasants in the western region broke off to form the Salvadoran National Indigenous Association.* In 1978–79 El Salvador was rocked by widespread urban and rural labor unrest which led to the collapse of the dictatorship of General Carlos Humberto Romero. AIFLD had reestablished its office in El Salvador during Romero's last months, and now brought in Roy Prosterman (who had established a "land to the tiller" program in Vietnam implemented in conjunction with the CIA's Operation Phoenix) to advise UCS leaders and help redraft the land reform law into what critics charged was a "rural counterinsurgency program." On 6 March the new junta decreed a three-phase agrarian reform program based largely upon Prosterman's recommendations, and UCS general secretary Rodolfo Viera was made head of ISTA, the Salvadoran Agrarian Transformation Institute. Creation of new cooperatives under direction of 500 ISTA agents vastly increased UCS's power and influence. A second phase to reform estates under 1,235 acres, which included most of El Salvador's profitable coffee-producing properties, was never implemented. Accompanying the agrarian reform decree was a national state of siege, and ten days later Amnesty International accused the government of using the land reform as a cover for repression. In the summer of 1980, UCS joined with other AIFLD-backed unions to form the Popular Democratic Unity* (UPD), establishing a centrist political counterweight to leftist influence in the labor movement and the prominent role of left-led unions in the opposition Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR).

In November, Ronald Reagan was elected to the U.S. presidency, and Salvadoran landowners and rightists within the military anticipated that the new U.S. administration would not continue to push for land reform in El Salvador. Death-squad killing reached unprecedented levels, and the country was plunged into civil war. A controversial third phase of the agrarian reform, benefiting sharecroppers, was initiated, but UCS adviser Prosterman became disillusioned with the reform process and the deteriorating political situation. He accused incoming Reagan administration officials of sending, in effect, a signal to Salvadoran landlords and their security force allies to begin illegally evicting farm workers and otherwise sabotaging the agrarian reform, driving rural workers politically away from UCS and toward the revolutionary movement. Amid the death-squad carnage, which took the lives of the nation's archbishop, Oscar Arnulfo Romero, and four U.S. churchwomen, the military in November brought in José Napoleón Duarte as figurehead president. In El Salvador, UCS and ISTA

head Rodolfo Viera also grew disillusioned, as rural terror began to strike UCS activists. Associates said Viera was about to publicly challenge the regime or resign. Two weeks later, on 3 January 1981, Michael Hammer, AIFLD country chief, Viera, and another AIFLD agent, Mark Pearlman, were discussing the situation in the coffee shop of San Salvador's Sheraton Hotel when they were assassinated by two soldiers. That event touched off a political controversy within the AFL-CIO over the U.S. role in the Salvadoran labor movement. Hammer was accorded a state funeral in Washington, and the U.S. Solicitor General said in an appearance before the U.S. Supreme Court that Hammer had worked in El Salvador "under cover," an apparent reference to service in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. (See Judith Miller, *New York Times*, 15 January 1981.)

During 1982-84, the Ministry of Agriculture and ISTA were dominated by the ultra-right ARENA party of Roberto D'Aubuisson, effectively ending the agrarian reform process. UCS was able to consolidate some influence among agrarian reform beneficiaries by providing independent technical and legal assistance supervised by AIFLD and funded by U.S. AID. But U.S. officials said the organization had only 15,000 to 20,000 paid-up members in 1984. UCS claimed a broader influence through associated cooperatives of up to 150,000. This inflated figure was used in Washington and AFL-CIO circles to give the impression that UCS was El Salvador's most representative labor organization. UCS general secretary Samuel Maldonado and other union representatives, including controversial advisor Tito Castro, now back on AIFLD's El Salvador payroll, were sent frequently to Washington by the AFL-CIO to lobby Congress for the Reagan administration's aid programs and to try to counter criticism of the Duarte regime from within the U.S. labor movement. But as the civil war dragged on, tensions heightened between AIFLD and other UCS leaders, who wanted to expose government corruption and call for a negotiated settlement of the war with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). While Maldonado followed the AIFLD-U.S. embassy script, other UCS leaders privately complained that AIFLD was coercing them to support U.S. military aid to El Salvador. They said they presumed that AFL-CIO representatives in El Salvador were tied to U.S. intelligence agencies, but, said one, "We need the money they give us to survive."

In 1984 UCS joined with other UPD organizations in signing a political pact with Duarte's Christian Democratic Party. Although UCS head Samuel Maldonado was made president of ISTA, relations with the Duarte regime quickly began to deteriorate. In August 1984 UCS leaders publicly opposed U.S. military aid and criticized Duarte for not pursuing peace talks. In an apparent contradiction, that same month in the United States, the AFL-CIO leadership came out publicly in favor of military aid, noting that Duarte had been "elected with the full support of the workers and campesinos." AIFLD then put pressure on UCS to switch from the UPD to join a new "nonpolitical" organization, the Democratic Workers Central* (CTD). Much of the conflict in UCS centered on AIFLD country representative Bernard Packer's manipulations of UPD and his new CTD,

as well as Maldonado's attempt to involve a UCS cooperative and the Agricultural Development Bank in a shrimp-exporting venture with private investors. In February 1985, Maldonado and his allies tried to remove Ramón Arístides Mendoza from his post as second-in-command of UCS. In March, UCS dissidents organized an assembly of over 400 UCS delegates which proceeded to expell Maldonado and Castro, and then elect Mendoza as new UCS general secretary. Maldonado appealed to the government, which became embroiled in adjudicating conflicting UCS leadership claims.

At U.S. embassy urging, AIFLD removed the controversial Packer from El Salvador, but AIFLD continued to fund the Maldonado-Castro UCS faction. Mendoza and the UPD executive board demanded that Duarte fire Maldonado and Castro from their ISTA posts which, under the social pact, were to be held by labor representatives designated by UPD. AIFLD and U.S. embassy officials tried to mediate the dispute throughout late 1985. Mendoza, now elected general secretary of the UPD executive board, started a competing farm workers union. In February 1986, Mendoza and other UPD union leaders participated in the formation of a large center-left front, the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers* (UNTS). Weakened by the UPD-CTD conflict and emergence of the broader COACES-led farm workers front in UNTS, Maldonado's UCS rump joined a small AIFLD-sponsored group, the National Union of Workers and Peasants.*

SALVADORAN NATIONAL INDIGENOUS ASSOCIATION (Asociación Nacional Indígena Salvadoreña—ANIS).

Representing Indian peasants on remnants of traditional *ejidos* (communal lands) in the western region, ANIS had some 9,000 members in nine cooperatives the early 1980s under the leadership of general secretary Adrián Esquino Lizco. Although they were among the most organized and radical of Salvadoran peasants in the 1920s, Indian farm workers in the region bore the brunt of repression after the failure of the 1932 insurrection and became politically passive (see Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador). In part because the memory of the dangers of political activity were so deeply etched in the consciousness of the region's farm workers, labor organizations sympathetic to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front had little influence there in the early 1980s. ANIS was regarded as pro-government and supported the U.S.-backed agrarian reform begun in 1980. But the reform program was quickly stalemated, and ANIS reported that rightist landowners in the western region were forcing some of its cooperatives to abandon title to their lands. In addition, ANIS members became frustrated over lack of credit and other support.

ANIS's pro-government posture did not always protect its members from repression, as was evidenced by the 1983 executions of eighteen Las Hojas workers (shot in the head, their thumbs tied behind their backs) by paramilitary units.

ANIS joined the Democratic Popular Unity* (UPD), backed by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD, the AFL-CIO's labor arm in

Latin America) in mid-1983. However, like many centrist unions, ANIS became estranged from AIFLD in 1984. As a result, AIFLD's Salvadoran operative, Tito Castro, reportedly used AIFLD funds to finance a "Salvadoran Association of Democratic Indians" and split ANIS. Esquino Lizco complained that the government of José Napoleón Duarte was not fulfilling its reform promises and had made no effort to prosecute army officers responsible for the Las Hojas massacre. When ANIS resisted heavy-handed AIFLD pressure to mute criticism of the Duarte regime, AIFLD retaliated by cutting off its U.S.-government funding. AIFLD also repossessed the union's radio and jeep. As a result, ANIS publicly denounced AFL-CIO meddling in Salvadoran union affairs. "AIFLD is a disaster for workers," said Esquino Lizco. "AIFLD says if you do what we want, we'll give you money. The institute buys union leaders." (See Krauss.) In 1986 Esquino Lizco joined in founding the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers.*

SALVADORAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS WORKERS ASSOCIATION (Asociación Salvadoreña de Trabajadores de Telecomunicaciones—ASTTEL).

The first union at the National Telecommunications Agency (ANTEL) was formed in 1979 and destroyed two years later, but workers there were among the first public employee groups to fight for improved wages prior to the end of the 1980–1983 terror period. In November 1983, they successfully forced a settlement on the government after a series work stoppages. The agreement included permission to unionize, and ASTTEL was founded in 1984. The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) tried to influence ASTTEL and, failing, tried to promote a parallel union (ASTA). In November 1985, ASTTEL went on strike after the Treasury Police seized the union's general secretary, Humberto Centeno, and his two sons. The strike disrupted repairs and operator-assisted telephone service. During the strike, the National Police detained and mistreated several ASTTEL union members. In April–June 1986, ASTTEL waged a 51-day strike, demanding a wage increase, reinstatement of the union's fired former general secretary, Rafael Sánchez, and an end to repression against members. ASTTEL leader Humberto Centeno expressed disillusionment with president José Napoleón Duarte: "We put a lot of hope in this government. But now we realize that nothing has changed and in some ways it's even worse than before. Duarte's actions have awakened us. We were sleeping before."

SALVADORAN TRADE UNION REORGANIZING COMMITTEE (Comité de Reorganización Obrero Sindical Salvadoreño—CROSS).

CROSS reorganized and rebuilt the union movement underground in the late 1940s. After suppression of the National Union of Workers* (UNT) in 1944, unions began to regroup in three tendencies. The largest, led by a Coordinating Committee representing some fifteen unions, including textile and construction workers, campaigned for restoration of democratic rights and passage of labor

laws. The committee also organized solidarity for striking unions. Pressured by a major railway workers strike in late 1945, the regime of General Salvador Castañeda Castro acceded to some demands, decreeing recognition of the right to strike in a January 1946 labor law. The Coordinating Committee, emboldened, formed a broader Pro-Workers Confederation Committee and led a series of bakery and textile workers strikes in August and September. The government responded with arrests, and the military provided employers with trucks to ferry in strikebreakers. On 15 September police fired upon a union rally, killing and wounding a number of workers. A general strike was launched on 21 September, but the regime managed to defeat it, again dissolving unions and exiling the main labor leaders. To forestall such labor unrest in the future, the Castañeda regime in October established the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. For the next two years union leaders operated underground, forming the clandestine CROSS in 1947. Its second congress was held secretly in mid-1948. CROSS established provisional union leadership committees and rebuilt unions independent of government control. When General Castañeda was overthrown by a group of army officers in 1948, CROSS leaders came out of hiding and demanded that union organizing be legalized and democratic rights restored. CROSS conditionally supported the junta led by Major Oscar Osorio in return for promise of legalization of trade union activity. These goals were reflected in the 1950 constitution, which for the first time guaranteed the right to organize unions. The constitution also contained liberal provisions regarding hours of work, overtime, social security, the right to strike, and restrictions on child labor. However, these ideals were not put into practice through enabling legislation. Furthermore, the 1950 constitution did not allow farmworker unions.

In the meantime, representatives of ORIT (Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers, Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores) and the AFL-CIO were meeting with the Osorio regime (1950-56) to map a strategy for building an anti-communist trade union alternative to CROSS. Unable to co-opt CROSS, Colonel Osorio turned against its leaders in 1952, banned the organization, and institutionalized anti-communist repression. Among those arrested and tortured was bakery workers leader Salvador Cayetano Carpio, later general secretary of the Communist Party of El Salvador and a founder of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), who recounted the experience in a book widely read throughout the labor movement (*Secuestro y capucha*). A military officer with responsibility for purging the union movement was José Alberto "Chele" Medrano, later founder of the Nationalist Democratic Organization* (ORDEN). Thereafter, the military government worked exclusively with the AFL-CIO, ORIT, and their Salvadoran allies to create a pro-government labor movement. See General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers and General Confederation of Unions.

SALVADORAN TRADE UNION UNITY COMMITTEE (Comité Unitario Sindical Salvadoreño—CUSS). See Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador (FUSS).

SALVADORAN WORKERS CENTRAL (Central de Trabajadores Salvadoreños—CTS).

Affiliated with the Latin American Workers Central (Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores—CLAT), CTS was El Salvador's most important Christian Democratic labor organization, representing a large bloc of public employees unions. Although belonging to the AIFLD-dominated Democratic Popular Unity (UPD) in the early 1980s, CTS became an early and harsh critic of the government of José Napoleón Duarte, accusing the president of violating his 1984 social pact with the centrist wing of the labor movement. CTS unions were among the first to strike against the Duarte regime's austerity policies in the fall of 1985. When AIFLD attempted to moderate the stance of the UPD, CTS left the coalition and began working more closely with left-led unions. CTS joined the May First Committee* and in 1986 co-founded the new center-left labor organization, the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers* (UNTS). Among El Salvador's centrist union leaders, CTS head Miguel Angel Vásquez was a vocal critic of President José Napoleón Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party. "The social pact has brought us more problems than benefits," said Vásquez. "Workers and peasants don't have democratic union rights. And the government is carrying out illegal arrests, harassment and torture." CTS subsequently withdrew from UNTS but reaffirmed its opposition to Duarte's policies.

SALVADORAN WORKERS TRADE UNION FEDERATION (Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores Salvadoreños—FESTRAS).

Formerly belonging to the government-controlled General Confederation of Unions* (CGS), FESTRAS unions split off to become a small independent federation led by general secretary Rigoberto Menéndez Hernández, a former head of the Catholic Workers National Union* (UNOC). Most FESTRAS members were in the Cement Products Industry Workers National Union, with 942 registered members in 1985, which reportedly had a large proportion of leftist rank and file. Although Menéndez Hernández was regarded as a prototypical union caudillo (labor boss), in the mid-1980s FESTRAS served as a link between centrist and leftist unions. The federation joined the Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador* (MUSYGES) labor front in 1983 and was reportedly instrumental in bringing in CGS. In the 1984 elections, FESTRAS allied with the Democratic Action (AD) party, a move which served to diminish its influence. FESTRAS then moved back into alliance with leftist unions and became an active member of the May First Committee* in 1985. FESTRAS was a principal organizer of the May Day demonstration that year, the first major labor rally held since 1980.

SETA. *See* Water and Sewage National Administration Workers Union.

SIDPA. *See* Confections and Pastas Industry Union.

SIES. *See* Electrical Industry Workers Union.

SIGEBAN. *See* Banking and Savings and Loan General Industry Employees Union.

SIMAS. *See* Furniture Industry Workers Union.

SINDICATO DE EMPRESA TRABAJADORES DE ADMINISTRACIÓN NACIONAL DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS. *See* Water and Sewage National Administration Workers Union.

SINDICATO DE EMPRESA TRABAJADORES DEL INSTITUTO DE VIENDA URBANA. *See* Urban Housing Institute Workers Union.

SINDICATO DE EMPRESA TRABAJADORES REFINERIA AZÚCAR SALVADOREÑA, S.A. *See* "Azúcar Salvadoreña, S.A." Refinery Workers Union.

SINDICATO DE LA INDUSTRIA ELÉCTRICA DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Electrical Industry Workers Union.

SINDICATO DE LA INDUSTRIA GENERAL DE EMPLEADOS BANCARIOS Y ASOCIACIONES DE AHORRO Y PRÉSTAMO-SIGEBAN. *See* Banking and Savings and Loan General Industry Employees Union.

SINDICATO DE LA INDUSTRIA PESQUERA. *See* Fishing Industry Union.

SINDICATO DE OBREROS DE LA INDUSTRIA DE LA CONSTRUCCIÓN, SIMILARES Y CONEXOS DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Construction Industry Workers Union of El Salvador.

SINDICATO DE OBREROS PANIFICADORES DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Bakery Industry Workers Union.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES AGROPECUARIOS, SIMILARES Y CONEXOS SALVADOREÑO. *See* Agricultural Workers Union of El Salvador.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE EMPRESA COMISIÓN EJECUTIVA HIDROELÉCTRICA RIO LEMPA—STECCEL. *See* Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission Workers Union.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA DEL PAN, SIMILARES Y CONEXOS DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Bakery Industry Workers Union.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA TEXTIL DE ALGODÓN, SINTÉTICOS, ACABADOS TEXTILES, SIMILARES Y CONEXOS. *See* Cotton and Synthetics Textile Industry Workers Union.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DEL INSTITUTO SALVADOREÑO DEL SEGURO SOCIAL. *See* Social Security Institute Workers Union.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES FÁBRICA DE ACEITES Y GRASAS EL DORADO. *See* "El Dorado" Edible Oil and Fats Factory Workers Union.

SINDICATO GENERAL DE COSTURERAS. *See* Garment Workers General Union.

SINDICATO INDUSTRIAL DE DULCES Y PASTAS ALIMENTICIAS. *See* Confections and Pastas Industry Union.

SINDICATO NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA DEL TRANSPORTE, SIMILARES Y CONEXOS. *See* Transport Industry Workers National Union.

SINDICATO TEXTIL DE TRABAJADORES "INDUSTRIAS UNIDAS, S.A." *See* "Industrias Unidas, S.A." Textile Workers Union.

SINDICATO UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA CONSTRUCCIÓN. *See* Construction Workers Union.

SIP. *See* Fishing Industry Union.

SITAS. *See* Agricultural Workers Union of El Salvador.

SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTE WORKERS UNION (Sindicato de Trabajadores del Instituto Salvadoreño del Seguro Social—STISSS).

El Salvador's largest and most active independent union, STISSS had 2,921 registered members in 1985. The union represented hospital and other health care workers throughout the national social security system (Instituto Salvadoreño del Seguro Social—ISSS) which provided medical benefits for workers covered under collective bargaining agreements. Although never affiliated with a left-led federation, the union was active in progressive labor coalitions in the late 1970s and was a founding member of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) in 1980. During the 1980–83 period of anti-union terror, STISSS made efforts to keep union activity alive and suffered severe repression. The union later distinguished itself for its energetic support of other unions during labor disputes and for putting forth a broad analysis of the Salvadoran labor situation in periodic newspaper advertisements rather than simply focusing on the specific difficulties

of its own members. In early 1985 STISSS was instrumental in organizing a broad front of public employees unions, the State and Municipal Workers Coordinating Council,* and in February STISSS joined with other unaffiliated unions in the Independent Union Association of El Salvador*. On March 27 the union held a four-hour nationwide work stoppage to protest government intransigence in contract negotiations. After another negotiating impasse, STISSS organized a strike on 6 May and called for removal of corrupt ISSS administrators. A major confrontation seemed imminent. However, two days later the union lowered its salary goals and agreed to put aside most demands which the government considered "political" in nature. Nevertheless, negotiations again broke down. President José Napoleón Duarte (1984–) authorized a military attack against the union, and, in the pre-dawn hours of 2 June, a U.S.-trained "SWAT" squad was flown by helicopter gunships to the roof of San Salvador's General Hospital. Units of the National Police in civilian dress also stormed the building. Doctors, nurses, and other personnel were beaten and detained, patients were thrown from their beds (one died during the attack), and STISSS general secretary Guillermo Rojas and another top union officer were arrested. The incident drew international attention, and the Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee* was able immediately to mobilize other unions in support of STISSS. As a result, the attack backfired against the Duarte regime, solidifying ties between centrist and leftist unions. The conflict had the effect of further consolidating STISSS membership behind the union and its progressive political posture, although union leaders reported that many qualified members were still reluctant to stand for election to union office due to fear of repression. STISSS was instrumental in the formation of the broad center-left front, National Unity of Salvadoran Workers,* in 1986 and was represented on its executive board. Rojas was reelected general secretary in 1987.

SOCIEDAD DE OBREROS, CAMPESINOS Y PESCADORES DE ILO-PANGO. *See* Ilopango Workers, Peasants and Fishermen's Society.

SOCIEDAD UNION DE CARTEROS Y EMPLEADOS POSTALES DE EL SALVADOR. *See* Letter Carrier and Postal Employees Union Society of El Salvador.

STATE AND MUNICIPAL WORKERS COORDINATING COUNCIL (Consejo Coordinador de Trabajadores Estatales y Municipales—CCTEM).

One of the most notable features of the Salvadoran labor movement following the 1980–83 terror was the upsurge in public employee organizing. With a few exceptions, such as the schoolteachers union, public employees associations had tended to be pro-government or politically "neutral." Now, however, a wage freeze and austerity policies kept in place since 1980 provided the impetus for new organizing, as did frustration with the failure of President José Napoleón Duarte to implement promised reforms after his election in March 1984. Many

of the newer public employees unions came together with older associations to coordinate solidarity with the postal workers strike during May and June of 1984 (see the Letter Carrier and Postal Employees Union Society of El Salvador). Out of that contact came a State Employees Coordinating Council (*Coordinadora de Empleados del Estado*) in July. In early 1985 those groups were joined by the Social Security Institute Workers Union,* the Water and Sewage National Administration Workers Union,* and the Banking and Savings and Loan General Industry Employees Union* to form the State and Municipal Workers Coordinating Council.

CCTEM's significance was twofold. First, it adopted a political posture critical of the government and in favor of peace negotiations with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), making it a public employees union front parallel in political character to the Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee,* which represented a majority of the country's industrial unions. Second, CCTEM marked a shift in organizing strategy by which centrist and leftist unions regrouped by sector (industrial, agrarian, and public) in a manner transcending traditional federation structures. Similar regroupment took place at the same time among farm workers unions and cooperatives. See the Agricultural Workers Union of El Salvador and the Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El Salvador. CCTEM represented the public employee union sector within the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers.*

STECCEL. *See* Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission Workers and Employees Union.

STISSS. *See* Social Security Institute Workers Union.

STITAS. *See* Cotton and Synthetics Textile Industry Workers Union.

STTIUSA. *See* "Industrias Unidas, S. A." Textile Workers Union.

SUCEPES. *See* Letter Carrier and Postal Employees Union Society of El Salvador.

SUGAR REFINERY WORKERS UNION. *See* "Azúcar Salvadoreña, S.A." Refinery Workers Union.

SUTC. *See* Construction Workers Union.

TEXAS INSTRUMENTS WORKERS UNION. *See* Revolutionary Trade Union Federation.

TEXTILE UNION FEDERATION (*Federación de Sindicatos Textiles, Similares y Conexos y Otras Actividades—FESINTEXSICA*).

Formed in 1963 with 2,698 members, as a base of the pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS), FESINTEXSICA was reduced to only a ghost of its former self, with a registered membership of 954 in 1985. Like its parent, FESINTEXSICA became discredited for its close collaboration with successive military regimes and the ruling National Conciliation Party (PCN). Of FESINTEXSICA's six largest unions in the mid-1960s, it retained only one by 1980. Its most important base, "Industrias Unidas, S. A." Textile Workers Union,* became an independent union (and was a founding member of the Democratic Revolutionary Front—FDR in 1980). Its local at "Mejoramiento Social" joined the left-led National Federation of Salvadoran Workers,* while its Textile Industry Union affiliated with the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation,* both also founders of the FDR. FESINTEXSICA and CGS were expelled from ORIT (Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers, Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores) in 1980 because of association with government repression of trade unions. Of the three remaining CGS federations, FESINTEXSICA was regarded as most directly influenced by the AFL-CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). When CGS joined the left-led Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador* labor front in 1983, FESINTEXSICA general secretary Ricardo Antonio Avila kept his federation out. And in 1985, when AIFLD demanded that its Salvadoran allies join a new coalition, the Democratic Workers Central* (CTD), FESINTEXSICA was one of the few unions to willingly comply. But, by that time, the federation had been reduced to only four locals, the largest of which had 354 members.

TRADE UNIONS COORDINATING COMMITTEE (Comité Coordinador de Sindicatos "José Guillermo Rivas"—CCS).

The Revolutionary Trade Union Federation* (FSR), founded in late 1979, had its origins in the Trade Unions Coordinating Committee, which was active during the upsurge and sharp polarization of the Salvadoran labor movement in the late 1970s. In 1975 a group of labor activists had formed the Workers Committee of Revolutionary Orientation (COOR), committed to combative methods of trade union defense and an explicitly political strategy of building a revolutionary current within the union movement. The committee was under the influence of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), headed by veteran trade union leader and former Communist Party leader Salvador Cayetano Carpio. Particularly significant was the role of COOR in developing direct action tactics which allowed unions to break out of the regulatory straitjacket in which management and Ministry of Labor officials were holding most labor organizations (see also National Federation of Salvadoran Workers). COOR participated in the seizure of the Ministry of Labor in November 1977. By 1978 COOR activists led four important union locals, including that at CONELCA (the copper wire factory owned by Phelps Dodge), and formed the "José Guillermo Rivas" Trade Unions Coordinating Committee (CCS). CCS took its name from the general secretary of the INCA plant union who was murdered by a death squad that year. Its

activists played an important role in building the People's Revolutionary Bloc, which became El Salvador's largest revolutionary mass organization in the late 1970s. CCS organized a contingent of some 5,000 workers in the 1979 May Day march and began formation of its own federation. The process was conflictive, with other federations disputing CCS claims of control of several unions and union locals. The Ministry of Labor initially rejected the new federation's registration. But in December 1979, eleven legally constituted unions under CCS leadership held an assembly which founded the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation (FSR).

UCS. *See* Salvadoran Communal Union.

UNIDAD POPULAR DEMOCRÁTICA. *See* Democratic Popular Unity.

UNIÓN COMUNAL SALVADOREÑA. *See* Salvadoran Communal Union.

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DEL CAMPO. *See* Rural Workers Union.

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES FERROCARRILEROS. *See* Railway Workers Union.

UNIÓN NACIONAL DE OBREROS CATÓLICOS. *See* Catholic Workers National Union.

UNIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* National Union of Workers.

UNIÓN NACIONAL OBRERO-CAMPESINA. *See* National Union of Workers and Peasants.

UNION UNITY COMMITTEE (Comité de Unidad Sindical—CUS).

At the climax of the late 1970s labor upsurge, and on the eve of the general strikes in mid-1980, the main left-led federations and progressive independent unions joined to form the Union Unity Committee in April 1980. They included the Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador,* the Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union Federation,* the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers,* the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation,* the Public and Municipal Employees United Union Federation, the Social Security Institute Workers Union,* the "Industrias Unidas, S.A." Textile Workers Union,* and the Farm Worker and Peasant Association of El Salvador.* CUS organized the successful June 1980 general strike, but a subsequent general strike in August was repressed, and most CUS members were driven underground during the 1980–83 terror. CUS thereafter functioned primarily from Mexico City and Europe as the representative abroad of its wing of the Salvadoran labor movement. By 1983, CUS

was effectively dissolved, as left-led and centrist unions regrouped in Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador.*

UNITARY CONFEDERATION OF SALVADORAN WORKERS (Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores Salvadoreños—CUTS).

Formed in 1977, CUTS was an effort to group three existing left-led federations into a legal confederation parallel to the pro-government General Confederation of Unions.* Its affiliates were the Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador,* the Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union Federation,* and the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers.* Although CUTS was recognized as a confederation by the Ministry of Labor, it was never really consolidated as such due to the political turmoil and realignment which took place in the Salvadoran labor movement during the late 1970s.

UNITARY TRADE UNION AND GUILD MOVEMENT OF EL SALVADOR (Movimiento Unitario Sindicalista y Gremial de El Salvador—MUSYGES).

During the 1980–83 period of indiscriminate terror, left-led unions grouped in the Union Unity Committee* were driven underground, their ties with centrist unions largely broken. In late 1982 and early 1983, the Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador* (FUSS) and the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers* joined with a group of other progressive unions to establish a coalition with certain centrist unions, such as the Salvadoran Workers Trade Union Federation,* which would protest government repression and seek some public visibility for trade union complaints about the deteriorating economic situation of workers suffering under a wage freeze imposed in 1980. FESTRAS, which had once been part of the pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS), served as centrist liaison to bring CGS and two of its member federations into the new organization, the Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador (MUSYGES). MUSYGES was constantly attacked by government and military authorities for “subversive” and “terrorist” ties. The coalition attempted to gain a public hearing by publishing paid advertisements in newspapers. On May Day 1983, MUSYGES members held a “Unitary Union Congress” but were unable to organize a public march. FUSS general secretary Santiago Hernández, who played a key role in MUSYGES, was seized by security forces on 25 September and murdered thirteen days later, one of several blows from which MUSYGES was unable to fully recover. However, the coalition created sufficient “space” for open union action to allow public employees to begin a period of dynamic union organizing. During the state employee conflicts of March–June 1984, the Duarte government accused MUSYGES of trying to “destabilize” the regime. MUSYGES dissolved in November 1984. A contributing factor was conflict within the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation,* which had come under the influence of a sectarian political faction antagonistic toward the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front and which was incapable of working with centrist or other left-led unions in broad coalitions.

UNITARY TRADE UNION FEDERATION OF EL SALVADOR (Federación Unitaria Sindical de El Salvador—FUSS).

Grouped in El Salvador's oldest surviving left-led federation, FUSS affiliates represented a continuity of union organizing dating back to the late 1940s and early 1950s, when unions were reemerging from the post-1932 prohibition of all labor activity. FUSS's predecessor was the communist-led General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers* (CGTS), founded in 1957. Both organizations published the labor bulletin *Voz Obrera* (*Labor Voice*). Following the overthrow of a progressive civilian-military junta in 1961, CGTS was weakened by repression, and the pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS) became dominant in the trade union movement with support of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). To regroup, independent and left-led unions subsequently formed the Salvadoran Trade Union Unity Committee (CUSS), which had influence in some twenty unions. An objective of CUSS was to collaborate with CGS in forming a unified confederation. In April 1965, CUSS, CGS, and the Catholic Workers National Union* held the Second National Trade Union Congress. While neither organizational nor political unity was achieved, both the left-led and pro-government unions agreed to lobby for reforms in the 1963 Labor Code. On 2 October 1965 fourteen CUSS unions formed the Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador (FUSS), and the federation won legal recognition the following January. Its founding affiliates included the "Azúcar Salvadoreña, S.A." Refinery Workers Union,* the Bakery Workers Union,* the Construction Industry Workers General Union,* and the Railway Workers Union.*

In 1967 FUSS started its Workers' Institute (Instituto Obrero "José Celestino Castro") with support from the National University. By April 1967 FUSS was growing rapidly, with thirty-two unions affiliated. FUSS support for the 1967 strike at "Acero, S.A.," a union affiliated with CGS, marked the beginning of the contemporary period in Salvadoran labor history. FUSS also supported El Salvador's first teachers strike in February 1968 (see National Association of Salvadoran Educators). Persecution of federation activists was widespread. In January 1969 FUSS helped form a companion federation, the Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union Federation* (FESTIAVTSCES), transferring some of its own affiliates as part of a strategy to reestablish a left-led confederation. After nineteenth unions split off from CGS in 1972 to form the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers* (FENASTRAS), FUSS and FESTIAVTSCES moved toward alliance with the new federation, eventually establishing the short-lived Unitary Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (CUTS) in 1977. In 1974 veteran FUSS and textile union leader Jorge Alberto "El Beate" Morán Cornejo was assassinated by the Molina regime, and in October 1975 the federation's general secretary, Rafael Aguñada Carranza, was killed by agents of the ANSESAL military intelligence unit (see Nationalist Democratic Organization). During the next decade, five different FUSS general secretaries were murdered.

Continued repression took a toll on FUSS. The Water and Sewage National Administration Workers Union* (SETA), which had joined FUSS in 1975, was destroyed by the government two years later. The Railway Workers Union* was abolished by government decree in 1975. FUSS and FESTIAVTSCES lost ground to leftist forces in FENASTRAS, which identified primarily with the United Popular Action Front (FAPU), and to a trade union current led by the Popular Revolutionary Bloc, which formed the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation* in 1979. FUSS was driven underground during the 1980–83 terror, its headquarters bombed and closed. But its key unions survived, and in early 1983 FUSS played a central role in forming the Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador* (MUSYGES). This coalition attempted to reestablish a progressive union presence in Salvadoran public life. FUSS held its Nineteenth Congress in San Salvador in September 1983, discussing, among other issues, how to develop MUSYGES as embryo of a unified labor confederation. On the morning of 25 September, as he was en route to preside over the congress, FUSS general secretary Santiago Hernández was seized by security forces. Thirteen days later he died under torture; his body was left on a street. Chosen as Hernández's successor as FUSS general secretary was Juan Editó Genovez, a veteran of twenty-five years in the labor movement, who was reelected to the post in 1986.

In 1985, FUSS reinitiated clandestine publication of *Voz Obrera*. Because police considered such union literature subversive, union activists took care not to be caught with it on their persons, and its distribution was limited. FUSS was instrumental in forming the Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee* (CST) in 1984, the May First Committee in 1985, and the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers* in 1986.

UNOC. *See* Catholic Workers National Union, and National Union of Workers and Peasants.

UNTS. *See* National Unity of Salvadoran Workers.

UPD. *See* Democratic Popular Unity.

UTC. *See* Rural Workers Union.

UTF. *See* Railway Workers Union.

WATER AND SEWAGE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION WORKERS UNION (Sindicato de Empresa Trabajadores de Administración Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados—SETA).

In 1962 the government-run water system was reorganized as an “autonomous” state agency, the Water and Sewage National Administration, ANDA. In theory, this made its employees eligible to form a union, but the government

resisted. During the 1967 presidential campaign, General Fidel Sánchez Hernández ordered the ruling National Conciliation Party (PCN) to support the unionizing effort of ANDA workers as part of his quest for votes. The pro-government General Confederation of Unions* (CGS) sent its organizers through ANDA installations, and the Water and Sewage National Administration Workers Union was founded in February 1967. However, the union's rank and file was generally progressive and dissatisfied with CGS, which received support and political guidance from the AFL-CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). At the SETA general assembly in November 1968, the membership voted to disaffiliate from the confederation.

SETA remained independent until 1975, when the new president of ANDA, Ernesto Kury Asprides, announced that he would attempt to have SETA dissolved. He began by pressuring ANDA's office employees and professionals, who represented about 40 percent of the union's membership, to resign from the union or risk dismissal. The union responded with a three-day strike in early June, which ended when the army militarized ANDA installations and forced employees back to work. Two weeks later union members held a general assembly and decided to affiliate with the Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador,* electing electrician Manuel Cheyne as SETA general secretary. For the next two years the union was under constant attack by ANDA management. In March 1977 the National Guard seized Cheyne and the union's top steward from their ANDA worksite, detaining them for thirty-four days. Both SETA officers were tortured; while they were held captive, ANDA management fired 119 SETA activists, including the key remaining union leaders. Cheyne was exiled to Mexico, and the union destroyed.

In 1978 there were efforts to reorganize the union, and it eventually affiliated with the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers* (FENASTRAS), the country's largest industrial federation. In 1982, despite the terror to which FENASTRAS and other unions were subjected, the union was strong enough to begin pressuring ANDA management for contract negotiations. The union went on strike twice in 1984, again winning legal recognition.

In 1985 SETA became embroiled in another bitter struggle with new ANDA president, Ricardo Perdomo. The union charged the Christian Democratic Party administrator with reneging on contract agreements reached the previous year. Perdomo and the Duarte government attempted to form a parallel employee association in opposition to SETA leadership. In mid-March the union struck, forcing management to come to terms. However, the Duarte government began to militarize ANDA worksites throughout the nation, and union members suffered repression by security forces. Charging violations of the new contract agreements, on 20 May the union again went on strike. ANDA management fired some 240 SETA members, including general secretary Carlos Zometa and the entire union leadership. (While Salvadoran law prohibited the firing of a union officer, the Ministry of Labor approved the action.) ANDA facilities continued militarized, and the government seemed determined to break the union. In August

1986 the dismissed SETA unionists and over 1,000 other recently fired employees formed the Dismissed and Unemployed Workers Committee of El Salvador (Comité de Despedidos y Desocupados de El Salvador—COYDES).

WORKERS CONFEDERATION OF EL SALVADOR (Confederación de Obreros de El Salvador—COES).

Also referred to in the literature as Workers Federation of El Salvador, COES was a grouping of some forty-five artisan guilds and mutual associations formed at a Workers Congress in the town of Armenia in 1918. Some 200 delegates participated, expressing political support for El Salvador's nascent social democratic movement led by Arturo Araujo and Alberto Masferrer. Araujo was a European-educated Salvadoran landowner sympathetic toward the British Labor Party, and Masferrer was a journalist and El Salvador's most important early reformist ideologue and propagandist. They founded the Salvadoran Labor Party (PLS). Espousing his so-called doctrine of the *mínimo vital* (minimum living standard), Masferrer had considerable influence in middle-class liberal circles throughout Central America. Although writing on behalf of workers and peasants, Masferrer addressed his proposals to the wealthy, arguing that it was in their own self-interest to place limits on their consumption and guarantee a decent standard of living to their employees. The homes of working people, he said, should be spacious, dry, with good air circulation and plenty of sunshine; the workplace should be hygienic and safe; all laborers and their children deserved schooling, adequate health care, and recreation. According to Masferrer, class distinctions were the natural order of society. To the poor, he urged that reforms should be sought through nonviolence, and that workers should "be content" once the *mínimo vital* was achieved. To the oligarchy he promised, "The hatred of your victims" could be mollified, "so that they let you enjoy in peace, laughing and singing, what you and your children have amassed." The Salvadoran oligarchy showed little enthusiasm for PLS proposals, but they gained a certain appeal among workers, peasants, and the middle class. A series of strikes during 1920–21 signaled emergence of a trade union consciousness. The first unions were established in 1922, together with the Salvadoran Workers Union (Unión Obrera Salvadoreña), an association opposed to COES's mutualist orientation. The Workers Union was transformed into the Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador* in 1924, and the guilds and mutual associations declined. While it was eclipsed by communists in the 1920s as an organizational force in the union movement, this earliest social democratic formation in El Salvador did much to popularize the goal of social justice for workers and won the 1931 elections with communist support. The PLS's Arturo Araujo was elected president in 1931, but he was overthrown in a coup which began five decades of oligarchic rule through a succession of military dictatorships. See Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador.

WORKERS REGIONAL FEDERATION OF EL SALVADOR (Federación Regional de Trabajadores de El Salvador—FRTS).

The Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador was the nation's first trade union federation. Prior to its founding in 1924, most labor organizations in El Salvador were guilds or mutual associations (see Workers Confederation of El Salvador). Worker dissatisfaction with the regime of Jorge Meléndez and declining real wages led to strikes in 1920–21 and formation of the first trade unions by 1922. On 21 September 1924 the new unions came together to found a single federation, the Workers Regional Federation, known simply as the Regional ("La Regional"). The organization was established as the Salvadoran affiliate of the Central American Workers Confederation (Confederación Obrera Centroamericana—COCA). The FRTS office became the focal point for all manner of political influences in the Salvadoran labor movement, including a communist current which became dominant by the mid-1920s. Among the communist activists were the shoemaker Miguel Mármol and the former student leader Farabundo Martí, who joined FRTS in 1925. Martí's impact on the labor movement was far-reaching, and his mystique remained a powerful influence in many Salvadoran unions into the 1980s, evidenced by sympathy for the political movement which took his name (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front—FMLN). He worked with FRTS in organizing dozens of unions throughout the country and campaigning for the eight-hour day. Federation delegates used murals and drawings to illustrate the union's social and economic goals for the mostly illiterate workers. Union assemblies were combined with fiestas and other social events for workers' families (see Ilopango Workers, Peasants and Fishermen's Society). By the end of the decade FRTS encompassed fifteen unions in San Salvador, six in Santa Ana, and twenty-one other provincial unions or federations. FRTS unions in the capital included shoemakers, mechanics, construction and railway workers, tailors, bakery workers, and a domestic servants union.

In its rural organizing, FRTS agitated in favor of agrarian reform, abolition of large estates, an end to servile relations, lowering of rents paid by tenants, and government guarantee of farm workers' rights. In the context of rapid union growth and political polarization, the conservative regime of Alfonso Quiñónez gave way to a brief period of relative democracy and concessions toward organized labor under the government of Pío Romero Bosque. Procedures were established in mid-1927 to register and regulate unions, effectively legalizing the trade union movement. The president offered to subsidize FRTS (the gesture was spurned) but warned, "Workers do damage stirring up the campesinos, since they live quite tranquilly with their lot." Alarm grew within the coffee oligarchy at the spread of communist influence in the labor movement. At the FRTS's Fourth Congress held in May 1928, the federation drafted proposed legislation governing working conditions and approved organization of peasant leagues on the Mexican model. At the Fifth Congress in 1929, the communist nucleus consolidated its leadership of the federation. In March 1930 the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) was formed by some thirty-five activists, almost all work-

ing-class or artisan FRTS veterans. PCS militant Carlos Castillo became FRTS general secretary.

With the collapse of commodity prices at the onset of the Depression, indebted small farmers lost their properties, real wages fell, and unemployment doubled. From 1929 to 1931, the FRTS-directed labor movement grew rapidly, and union members entered communist cells in significant numbers. President Romero Bosque clamped down, arresting hundreds and forcing FRTS activists to hone the skills of clandestine organizing, which became the key to survival of El Salvador's trade union movement during the next six decades. As the labor movement's conflict with the liberal regime grew, a debate broke out within FRTS and the PCS over whether to contend in municipal and national assembly elections scheduled for December 1931. Top FRTS leaders opposed an electoral campaign for fear that electoral fraud might spark a violent mass reaction neither the PCS nor the Regional was prepared to lead.

After a struggle against an "economist" boycott of the political arena, it was finally decided that the Communist Party would mount an electoral campaign while, at the same time, FRTS would prepare a national coffee workers strike. But angry peasants in the west were tending toward insurrectionary action beyond FRTS control. Araujo was overthrown in a military coup which installed his vice president, General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, in power, and when the new regime used fraud to overturn communist electoral victories, the PCS had to urge calm on its supporters. Convinced that Salvadoran workers were about to take matters into their own hands and that the government sought a confrontation in order to destroy the labor movement and its communist leadership, the PCS, after brief but intense internal debate, decided to put itself at the head of the brewing insurrection. In this fashion, FRTS joined in one of the most famous and controversial political events in Latin American history. Neither the party nor FRTS was sufficiently prepared for such an undertaking. The government was able to capture Martí and other key leaders and impose a state of siege. The PCS attempted to call off the revolt, but farmworkers in western communities rose up on schedule. The army prevailed easily and then began the infamous *matanza* (massacre) of 1932, directed especially against ethnic Indian peasants in the Ahuachapán and Sonsonate regions. FRTS was destroyed, and all its surviving activists were persecuted. Union organizing was banned during most of the twelve-year Hernández Martínez dictatorship.

WORKERS SOLIDARITY COORDINATING COMMITTEE (Coordinadora de Solidaridad de los Trabajadores—CST).

Following the demise of the Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador* in 1984, the country's left-led unions began a year-long process of regroupment along sectoral lines which transcended their traditional federation structures. A parallel crisis and regroupment occurred among centrist unions, enabling development of new left-center alliances in each sector (industrial,

public employees, and farm workers). The Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee (CST), which announced its formation in November 1984, was the industrial union vehicle. Rather than a coalition of leftist federations, CST was formed by twenty-one of their most active individual unions together with several independents. They included the "CIRCA" local of the Cotton and Synthetics Textile Industry Workers Union,* the Mechanics and Metal Industry Workers Union,* the "Sacos Cuscatlán" Factory Workers Union, the Banking and Savings and Loan General Industry Employees Union,* and the Social Security Institute Workers Union.* CST's first major accomplishment was building the center-left May First Committee, which organized the 1985 May Day demonstration, the largest street action by unions in five years. In June 1985, May First's assembly of union representatives publicly demanded a general 100 percent wage increase for all workers, cancellation of El Salvador's foreign debt, and a negotiated settlement of the civil war. By October 1985 the May First Committee had some seventy-three labor organizations affiliated and was gaining breadth of representation. CST put the call for "dialogue" to resolve the nation's civil war at the center of all its organizing, and its efforts to consolidate a center-left coalition embracing industrial, public employees, and farm workers unions paid off with formation of the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers* in February 1986.

French Guiana _____

WILLIAM L. CUMIFORD

French Guiana, located on the northeast coast of South America, is composed of a coastal region, savannas, and, in the interior, valleys and hills. Bordered on the south and east by Brazil, and by Suriname on the west along the Maroni-Itani River, this overseas department of France covers an area of roughly 90,000 square kilometers. French Guiana lists a population of just over 64,000, with the vast number of inhabitants residing on the coastal plain. Cayenne, the capital city, contains well over half the department's population (36,215), while the much smaller coastal towns of Maroni and Kourou each number about 4,000 inhabitants.

The area now known as French Guiana became involved in European international politics in the mid-seventeenth century. France received title to the colony in 1667 through the Peace of Breden, but subsequent European hostilities delivered the territory to a combined Anglo-Portuguese force in 1809. The Treaty of Paris (1815) returned possession to France, though the Portuguese remained in the colony until 1817.

African slavery, established in the 1600s, then prohibited by the French Revolutionary government, and revived briefly by Napoleon, finally was abolished under the Second Republic in 1848. Most of the French Guianese ex-slaves either moved to Cayenne or became subsistence farmers near the coast. In 1852 the infamous penal colony of Devil's Island was established in French Guiana. For the following eighty-seven years more than 70,000 French prisoners were exiled, most permanently, to the island. The prison was finally discontinued shortly after World War II.

The French Guianese population includes Creoles, Asians, and whites. Currently, many French colonists are settling in and around Cayenne to bolster the department's economic potential. Corn, rice, manioc, sugar, and bananas are produced for local needs, while minor fish and lumber resources are exported

by a few companies in the United States. The discovery of some bauxite deposits, still undeveloped, offers hope for the creation of a future industrial base. The vast majority of income emanates from France, with civil servants constituting by far the largest single work force.

As a political extension of metropolitan France, French Guiana has participated only marginally in party and union organizations. Guianese trade unions exist as branches of the large central labor confederations in France. Industrial relations are governed by French laws, and the absence of genuine political independence has discouraged the development of native workingmen's movements. Moreover, the French Guianese economy has little industrial base, and the department is plagued with a constantly shifting agricultural profile. The overwhelming majority of the work force is employed by the state; thus all the major civil service unions are based in Paris.

In fact, virtually all the indigenous political voices in the territory reflect the larger views of French parties and interest groups. The only issue carrying specific domestic import is the question of political autonomy for the colony. But merely a handful of the French Guianese espouse the idea of total independence.

In recent times, two prominent French political forces have dominated party interests in the territory: the Gaullists and the Socialists. Héctor Riviérez, a member of the Popular Republican wing of the Gaullists, has marshaled perennial support, being elected to the Assembly for the past eighteen years. However, the Union for French Democracy, the party of ex-president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, has made impressive strides since the late 1970s.

French Guianese Socialist forces were united until the mid-1950s under the Socialist Federation of SFIO (*Fédération Socialiste SFIO de la Guyane Française*), a faction of the French Socialist Party. A schism occurred over personal animosities and questions of autonomous authority. A splinter group, the Guianese Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste Guyanais—PSG*), led initially by Justin Catayée, has exercised considerable power in the general council of the department and sporadic influence in the French Chamber of Deputies. Léopold Heder of the PSG served as senator from French Guiana during the years 1971–78, followed by another PSG member, Henri Agarante. French Guianese political autonomy is stridently advocated by all Socialist elements in the territory.

Trade unionism in France dates to the 1830s, but genuine efforts in organized labor appeared following the economic reforms introduced by Napoleon III in 1864. Moving into eclipse in the aftermath of the Paris Commune (1870s), trade unionism revived in a mild form under the leadership of Jules Ferry in the mid-1880s.

Distinguished by an array of political and social interest—from anarchists and syndicalists to social reformers and communists—the French trade union movement has steered clear of intense politicization. By the close of the nineteenth century, active involvement in labor by Social Democrats and Christian groups typified the polarization of the trade union movement.

At the turn of the century, the General Confederation of Labor* (Confédération Générale du Travail—CGT) developed from a widely diffused political base, one representing Marxists, syndicalists, and professional interests. However, prospects for a single, large French trade union faded on the eve of World War I when the CGT claimed only one million members.

Fluctuation and periodic reorganization characterized French labor activities from 1914 to 1935. First, anarcho-syndicalists in the CGT opposed the war while nationalistic interests in France formed the French Confederation of Christian Workers (Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens—CFTC). In 1921 a schism in the CGT produced the Communist Party-dominated General Confederation of United Workers (Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire—CGTU). This rift finally was healed in 1935, when the CGT and the CGTU reunited in the old CGT.

Collective labor legislation went into effect under the government of Léon Blum in the mid-1930s. By the close of the decade, communists were expunged from the CGT for failing to denounce the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The Vichy regime banned the most significant trade union bodies during World War II. Elements of organized labor were prominent in the Resistance, as CGT leaders inspired workers' opposition to German occupation forces in 1943–44.

Trade unions in France were reinstituted after the Liberation. The communists steadily asserted their influence in the CGT, spawning another splinter group, the General Confederation of Labor, Workmen's Force (Confédération Générale du Travail, Force Ouvrière—CGT-FO), a faction opposed to what was termed "communist domination" in the CGT. General Charles de Gaulle's consolidation of power in the late 1950s alienated the CGT. However, a number of Christian trade union groups and some CGT-FO adherents over the years supported the various Gaullist parties.

French trade union influence grew somewhat during the 1960s. In 1964 the CFTC deleted "Christian" from its official title, assuming the name Confederation of Democratic French Workers (Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail—CFDT). A minority of the Christian trade unionists continued as a labor body under the former name. In the late 1970s, five trade union confederations received government sanction, led by the nearly three million members of the CGT.

Trade union activities in France and the overseas departments are guided by the concept of "representativity," i.e., a framework of collective agreements ascertained by length of existence, experience, independence, subscriptions, and size of membership. It is estimated that about one-quarter of the French work force is unionized; power industries, the educational sector, and public employees reflect the highest percentages of membership.

Large French confederations include approximately thirty national labor federations and around ninety regional groups. Departments, along with domestic regional bodies, contribute officials to the confederal executive commissions and

bureaus. The national Social and Economic Council includes union representatives; thus labor officials often act as consultants in major areas of state planning.

Bibliography

- Alexander, Robert J., ed. *Political Parties of the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies*, vol. 1, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982.
- Coldrick, A. P. and Philip Jones. *The International Directory of the Trade Union Movement*. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1979.
- Kesselman, Mark, ed. *The French Workers' Movement: Economic Crisis and Political Change*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984.
- Lorwin, Val R. *The French Labor Movement*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.
- McHale, Vincent, ed. *Political Parties of Europe*, vol. 1. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983.
- Wilgus, A. Curtis, ed. *The Caribbean: British, Dutch, French, United States*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1958.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

CENTRAL CHRISTIAN WORKERS OF GUIANA (Centrale des Travailleurs Chrétiens de La Guyane—CTCG).

Located in Cayenne, the Central Christian Workers of Guiana exists as an affiliate of the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC). Through this connection, the CTCG holds wider affiliations with other regional and international groups, such as the World Confederation of Labour, the Latin American Workers Central (CLAT), and the Trade Union Council of Caribbean Workers. On an international basis, the CFTC encompasses bank employees, clerical workers, civil servants, and miners. Thus, its branch organization in French Guiana, the CTCG, exercises a considerable influence over the twenty thousand people employed throughout the department. Albert Cyrille currently serves as general secretary of the Central Christian Workers of Guiana.

CENTRALE DES TRAVAILLERUS CHRÉTIENS DE LA GUYANE. *See* Central Christian Workers of Guiana.

CONFÉDÉRATION FRANÇAISE DES TRAVAILLEURS CHRÉTIENS. *See* Central Christian Workers of Guiana.

CONFÉDÉRATION GÉNÉRALE DU TRAVAIL. *See* Union of Guianese Workers.

FRENCH CONFEDERATION OF CHRISTIAN WORKERS. *See* Central Christian Workers of Guiana.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR. *See* Union of Guianese Workers.

UNION DES TRAVAILLEURS GUYANAIS. *See* Union of Guianese Workers.

UNION OF GUIANESE WORKERS (Union des Travailleurs Guyanais—UTG).

Socialist strength in French Guiana has effectively negated communist attempts to establish a viable party organization. Over the past forty years, however, the Union of Guianese Workers has operated as both a union and a political party. Enjoying affiliation with the General Confederation of Labor (Confédération Generale du Travail—CGT) in France, the UTG has expended serious efforts in endorsing political leaders while organizing workers in a variety of occupations. In recent years the UTG has advocated complete independence for the territory.

Traditionally, the UTG supports the programs and candidates of the Socialists and other leftist political factions. Under the general secretarial leadership of Turenne Radamonthe, the UTG publishes a bulletin called *The Voice of the Workers* (*La Voie des Travailleurs*). Headquarters for this group are located in Cayenne, and the latest reported membership (1977) was approximately two thousand. Through its intimate association with the CGT, the UTG is joined internationally with the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the Trade Unions International of Agricultural, Forestry and Plantation Workers.

As the most influential trade union confederation in the French Republic, the CGT lists just under three million workers worldwide. Beyond the UTG, the CGT draws support from more than ninety other departmental unions, both in France and abroad. The CGT comprises semiskilled workers, manual laborers, and railway employees. However, the scarcity of these occupations in French Guiana has inspired a much more active political, rather than trade union, role for the UTG.



Guatemala _____

HANK FRUNDT *and* NORMA CHINCHILLA

Among the trade union movements of Central America, workers in Guatemala faced a somewhat unique set of issues in that they came from a primarily indigenous population; faced a united upper class, which remained closely tied to Spanish patterns of domination; were the earliest to be industrialized; and yet experienced the most consistent manipulation and repression.

These themes appear throughout the periods of Guatemalan labor development in the twentieth century: early formations to 1943; popular revolution to 1954; American Federation of Labor influence to 1969; labor's upsurge to 1978, and repression to 1986. But they are rooted in historical struggle of the conquest and colonial rule.

Guatemala has always been the dominant political and economic power in the Central American region. Many centuries before the Spanish Conquest, it was the site of the Lowland Mayan Empire. At their peak (AD 300–900) the Mayans had a centralized state, extensive trade routes, monumental architecture, a developed symbolic system (hieroglyphics), a remarkably precise calendar, and an advanced system of irrigation. However, by 1524, the indigenous population had dispersed through the western highlands and tribal rivalries made united resistance to the Spanish invaders difficult: more than half were killed. However, this did not prevent periodic uprisings which continued right through the colonial period to the eve of independence in 1821.

There was good reason for the uprisings. The Spanish came to Guatemala expecting to find silver and gold, but they discovered rich agricultural land instead. So the conquerors concentrated the Indians into "Indian towns" (*pueblos de indios*), each with a distinctive costume, and demanded labor and other tributes from the village as a whole. This separation of Indian nationalities and exclusion of ladinos (non-Indians) from residence in the *pueblos* preserved a distinctive Indian culture and social structure that still distinguishes Guatemala; yet the

latifundia-minifundia agricultural system also transformed the highland Indians into an agricultural work force.

The elite of Guatemala have traditionally been the strongest and most transparent in Central America. As loyal members of the Spanish aristocracy, the elite remained unenthusiastic about independence and sought to avoid alliances with other indigenous or national groupings. Guatemala served as the administrative center of the Captaincy General which included what is now the rest of Central America and Southern Mexico. The ruling colonial elite Creoles (American-born, but of Spanish parents) collected tariffs on all products entering and leaving the region. They maintained iron-clad control to assure a constant supply of indigenous labor, and saw little need for progressive social and political reforms. After independence from Spain, which came more by default than by struggle, the elite allied with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and resisted formation of the Confederation of Central American States, which dissolved after thirty years with most internal reforms abolished.

For a number of years after independence, indigo was the primary export crop from Guatemala, but in 1870 came the introduction of a new agricultural product which required even greater labor, capital, and transportation: coffee. So, too, a new elite made up of Ladino and foreign coffee producers began to pressure for a modern economic and political infrastructure that would facilitate transportation, shipping, and banking and would guarantee labor recruitment and security. Justo Rufino Barrios won the presidential election of 1873 and initiated new reforms: a modern army, civil bureaucracy, separation of church and state, and abolition of church and Indian lands to stimulate a capitalist market.

Various forms of Indian "forced labor" were reintroduced to assure workers for the coffee producers during planting and harvest. "Progress" and "development" became passwords. Foreign investment and foreign immigration to "elevate the level of the race" were actively encouraged. Barrios matched this with public funds for ports, roads, railroads, mail, and telegraph. Soon U.S.-based monopolies such as the United Fruit Company and Electric Bond and Share began to play a significant role in Guatemalan society. Before long, the mestizo (mixed Indian-White) radical leadership merged with the traditional Creole elite, symbolized by Barrios' marriage to a woman from the aristocracy.

The Estrada Cabrera and Jorge Ubico dictatorships that followed (1898-1920 and 1931-44, respectively) put an end to any liberal ideas of political democracy but rather reasserted the unity of the upper class in a way that anticipated the future. With U.S. help the army and police were transformed into a relatively efficient apparatus of repression. Elections were rigged, presidential authority became absolute, martial law was frequently declared, the opposition was repressed and spied on, and the press was censored. Intellectuals were persecuted for the slightest criticism of the government, and Indians were harshly treated for failing to fulfill mandatory labor obligations. As a result of the breakup of communal lands and indebtedness, many Indians became destitute. By 1926 only

7 percent of the population owned land and only 13 percent could read Spanish. Both percentages held firm for the next sixty years.

The Guatemalan labor movement officially began during the years from 1871 to 1898—a period which witnessed the rule of Justo Rufino Barrios (1871–85) and that of his nephew, José Reina Barrios (1892–98), both of whom were killed while in office—with the formation of several protective associations after 1870. Most were set up with government approval in order to prevent more militant forms of organizing, and in some cases, such as that of “Worker Unification,” to inculcate patriotic sentiments to bolster the president’s power.

Strikes continued to be prohibited under Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898–1919), but in 1907 the tailors union headed by Silverio Ortiz dared issue a widely circulated letter demanding proper pay. By 1919 this impetus had grown into the Workers League of Guatemala* (Liga Obrera de Guatemala), which published the first rank-and-file newspaper, organized huge demonstrations, and was partly responsible for Cabrera’s downfall. It did this in spite of the government’s rival organizations, one of which was similarly named in order to generate confusion.

The first structured federation for artisans and crafts people was no more helpful to Cabrera than the Workers League. Known as the Worker Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor* (Federación Obrera de Guatemala Para la Protección Legal del Trabajo—FOG), it affiliated with the Pan-American Confederation of Workers (COPA), founded by the American Federation of Labor. Even though the government controlled the FOG through its delegates, the organization became less and less predictable.

Compared to the previous fifty years, unions in Guatemala in the early 1920s had much more latitude. Working people created a “Unified Socialist Worker” political organization which trained leaders all over the capital. The eight-hour day and right to strike was their common demand. New developments in the Guatemalan economy soon precipitated even more militant organizational efforts.

When United Fruit (UFCo) took control of the International Railways of Central America and operated Guatemala’s largest port at Puerto Barrios, it brought together large groups of workers who had never before interacted: seasonal and permanent workers from peasant backgrounds, small holders and the landless, Indian and ladino, women and men. The company’s unenlightened treatment of employees fomented resentment among the various groups, and their common experience created a new form of worker consciousness. Workers in UFCo plantations in both Guatemala and Honduras began to unionize, and in 1924 the UFCo wharf workers struck for nearly a month.

News of successful revolutions in Mexico and the Soviet Union spurred the fledgling Guatemalan trade union movement. The International Railway’s 15,000 workers helped to establish the Guatemalan Section of the Communist Party of Central America in 1922. It joined with the General Union of Bakers founded in 1920 to create the Workers Regional Federation of Guatemala* (Federación Regional Obrera de Guatemala—FROG) as a more radical alternative to the

AFL's FOG. In 1925 shoemakers and bakers struck for shorter hours and healthier conditions. Unions of women coffee processors and sewers workers also walked, "demonstrating that women workers had achieved active participation and development in the labor struggle on a level equal to men." (Recinos García, p. 52.)

These developments caused FOG leadership to push for worker cooperatives, discourage political involvement, and hold conferences. Other unionists attended the conferences wearing red arm bands to separate themselves from the yellow-banded "compromisers." The "communist" FROG and the more anarchistic Committee for Union Action (Comité Para Acción Sindical) maintained relations with unions from Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, and the Soviet Union and at times also engaged in disputes among themselves.

In 1931 the ruling classes again consolidated behind dictator Jorge Ubico, the new representative of the coffee growers and an admirer of Adolf Hitler. He promised a strong fist against the unions, and many labor leaders were among the 100 opponents that he executed in 1933. He also lowered wages, banned strikes, and used an anti-vagrancy law to stop itinerant organizers. In a letter to President Roosevelt Ubico wrote that unions would make his nation insecure. Only the FOG and several mutual protective associations were reluctantly allowed to exist.

Aggravated by the precarious economic conditions of the 1930s, Ubica's fourteen years of anti-labor policies generated an explosive buildup of resentment among Guatemalan workers which culminated in a series of strikes in 1944 at UFCo and elsewhere. University students and intellectuals were the first to publicly protest. Responding to the students' initiative, the telegraph and railway workers organized a general strike. On 20 October a three-person junta that included Jacobo Arbenz took temporary power with a commitment to free elections.

Because of its recognition of democratic principles and social reforms, the decade of the Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz presidencies which followed is often titled the Guatemalan Revolution. For the first time legally sanctioned forced labor was definitively abolished, and foreign investors were required to obey the labor laws of the country. Led by the Union for Action and Betterment of Railway Workers* (Sindicato de Acción y Mejoramiento de los Ferrocarrileros—SAMF) and the Union of Workers in Education in Guatemala* (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación en Guatemala—STEG), labor unions coalesced as the Confederation of Workers of Guatemala* (Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala—CTG) "for unity of the proletariat and protection of rights for all." In 1945 the CGT affiliated with the leftist Confederation of Workers of Latin America (Confederación de Trabajadores America Latina—CTAL), a move that the government itself approved.

However, SAMF and the Union of Workers at United Fruit Company* (Sindicato de Empresa de Trabajadores de la United Fruit Company—STEUFco) feared an overemphasis on political issues and withdrew with nine other unions

of major international companies to form the Federation of Unions of Guatemala* (Federación Sindical de Guatemala—FSG) which would “limit activities to the welfare of workers.” Some artisans and agricultural workers also created the Central Regional Federation of Workers* (Federación Regional Central de Trabajadores—FRCT). To reduce the continuing disputes between communists and anarcho-syndicalists, a Second Congress of Guatemalan Workers formed the National Committee of Trade Union Unity* (Comité Nacional de Unidad Sindical—CNUS) to support industrial development, trade protections, and wage increases. CNUS brought the CTG and FSG back together to work with the government to abolish the vagrancy laws and to pass the important 1947 Labor Code, one of the most advanced bodies of labor legislation in the hemisphere.

The Labor Code established, for the first time, the right to organize unions and to strike, the right to compulsory labor-management contracts, minimum wage levels, equal pay for equal work, decent working conditions, and social security. It created a “social law,” a whole body of legislation that related to trade union issues. Although the government retained the power to arbitrate disputes, to legalize unions through formal recognition, and to dissolve unions if they were found to serve foreign interests or to engage in politics, the basis for a free and autonomous trade union movement had been established.

The Guatemalan Revolution did not solve the divisions between Indian workers in the country and ladino workers in the city, but it did encourage their interaction. In 1948, as a result of pressure from the peasant organizations that would soon coalesce into the National Campesino Confederation of Guatemala* (Confederación Nacional de Campesinas de Guatemala—CNCG), the rights enjoyed in the factory were also extended to rural workers. Because of these protections, union participation increased rapidly. In a country where trade union membership had been illegal only a decade before and where 77 percent of the factories employed fewer than twenty workers, one worker out of four became a union member.

From the outset, United Fruit and the other major employers in Guatemala balked at implementing the Labor Code. The company convinced some UFCo workers to join the National Union of Free Workers* (Unión Nacional de Trabajadores Libres) set up by organizer Serafino Romualdi as the local affiliate of the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), the AFL’s new arm in Latin America. In retaliation for UFCo’s disregard of the laws, Arbenz confiscated 26,000 acres of company-owned land, a harbinger of his fight with the company over a much more substantial program of agrarian reform that brought the furious “anti-communist” intervention of the U.S. a few years later.

Arbenz was no communist, but a committed member of the Revolutionary Party. Yet unlike his predecessor, who had suppressed the party’s press and labor school, he officially recognized the communist Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo—PGT) in 1951. The party remained small, but dedicated PGT workers like Victor Manuel Gutiérrez became influential in

the large peasant organizations and labor unions, by then the most dynamic sectors in the country. The PGT played a key role in unifying 400 worker organizations under the banner of the General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers* (Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala—CGTG), which combined CGT, the FSG, the Guatemalan Autonomous Labor Federation (Federación Laboral Autónoma de Guatemala—FLAG), and the CNCG, growing to 200,000 members in two years and bringing together Indian and Ladino workers in one broad labor movement. In an unusual display of unity, the CGTG maintained ties with both the Christian CLAT (Latin American Workers Central, Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores) and the quasi-communist CTAL. It supported political democracy, agrarian reform, the defense of urban and rural worker interests, and worker unity at national and international levels. Its approach had great implications for the rest of Central America.

Partly for this reason, the United Fruit Company, the U.S. State Department and other forces banded together to support the CIA-sponsored coup that, in 1954, put an end to the Guatemalan Revolution and the freedoms it represented. They were successful. They were able to build on earlier union dissension sown by AFL organizer Serafino Romualdi who was also instrumental in the creation of the Guatemalan Autonomous Labor Federation* (Federación Laboral Autónoma de Guatemala) in opposition to the CGTG. In addition, the PGT had begun to act in ways that alienated other grass-roots organizations. The CGTG also lost the affiliation of the National Confederation of Campesinos. With tragic results, Arbenz did not utilize his broad support from labor and peasant groups to prepare for the onslaught he knew to be imminent, depending instead on constitutionalist sentiments in the military. Nevertheless, local groups of railroad workers, teachers, and UFCo employees did resist, and UFCo workers in Honduras went on strike in sympathy, profoundly uneasy about the significance of what was to come.

The bloody consequences of U.S. intervention and installation of hand-picked leader Colonel Castillo Armas have been well documented. What made the 1954 power shift so significant was its lasting influence. While the memory of the revolution remained alive in the hearts of many Guatemalan workers, the military was given new powers through U.S.-sponsored programs of "local development." With the arrival of additional investments from transnational corporations, new mechanisms of control were placed over all areas of Guatemalan life and virtually demolished the trade union movement.

As in antecedent times, the third period of Guatemalan labor development was characterized by unification of owners for purposes of labor control and repression. With government assistance, especially of cotton, cattle, sugar, and the ever-dominant coffee, agricultural exports increased. This squeezed more land from Indian workers who came to a near-exclusive dependence on seasonal wage labor. Foreign investments in manufacturing and banking services expanded through incentives of a newly created Central American Common Market. The size of corporate establishments expanded from a work force of 50 to more than

200. Many of the labor struggles that emerged in this period took place in these larger, foreign-owned plants.

The new president of Guatemala after the 1954 coup, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas (1954–57), built his power on the very groups that had opposed Arévalo and Arbenz: the coffee growers, the big corporations, and the Catholic hierarchy. He consolidated their support into a new political party: the Movement of National Liberation (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional—MLN), which engaged in the virtual elimination of all labor unions, even the “yellow” union at UFCo. Castillo Armas cancelled the registration of 533 locals, arrested all known communists, and eliminated most other political parties. He established the death penalty for most labor activities. Although some labor and student protests occurred, the former activists went underground. After one year, only a quarter of the previous union members remained on the books.

After the coup, the AFL’s Serafino Romualdi and leaders of the Cuban Federation of Labor were engaged to reorganize the Guatemalan unions. Even Romualdi was compelled to complain about the massive and indiscriminate elimination of union leaders and activists in the name of cleaning out communists. Finally, after agreeing not to utilize any former union leaders, Romualdi was permitted to set up the Union Council of Guatemala* (Consejo Sindical de Guatemala—CSG), the Federation of Guatemalan Workers* (Federación de Trabajadores de Guatemala—FTG), and the Autonomous Union Federation of Guatemala* (Federación Autónoma Sindical de Guatemala—FASGUA) under ORIT auspices. By February 1958 the three federations had officially registered fifty-eight unions. All but two were urban. Although Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes (1958–63), the successor to Castillo Armas, implemented certain legal reforms necessary for industrialization, which also opened the way to new union activity, ORIT federation membership levels remained stable for the next three years.

In October 1961 the ORIT-linked CSG held its first Congress. Delegates from ten unions attended, ratified the principles of the International Labor Organization (ILO), and called for agrarian reform. Nevertheless, ORIT’s cooperation with the government had primarily reinforced state paternalism and low salaries. The railway workers (SAMF) struck spontaneously in 1962 and then joined with aviation, sugar, and other workers to form the independent Guatemalan Workers Confederation (CONTRAGUA) in 1963.

Labor’s difficult conditions also attracted the interest of certain church activists. Students at the University of San Carlos organized the Institute for Economic and Social Development of Central America, and a Guatemalan chapter of the Christian CLAT (Latin American Workers Central, Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores). Out of these efforts, the National Confederation of Workers* (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT) emerged in 1968. Its predecessor organization, the Christian Workers Front (Frente Cristiana de Trabajadores) had become involved in grass-roots social action and creation of cooperatives, thereby attracting the attention of workers from UFCo and several peasant groups.

Although these independent and Christian Democratic efforts toward trade union reform showed little inclination toward labor militance, the U.S. government and the AFL were as worried about the potential influence of CLAT as they were about communism. In 1962 the AFL-U.S.-sponsored American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) became the North American response to both types of challenge as it set up regional offices in Guatemala. AIFLD provided leadership training and social development funds to cultivate what it characterized as “democratically oriented” unions sympathetic to U.S. foreign policy. For its part, ORIT began active penetration of campesino movements. It aided both the landowners and the government in “guaranteeing the separation between unions and the left.” To stem growing militance, ORIT brought together workers from the Union of Workers at United Fruit Company* Social Security Institute (IGSS) and others in a new organization, the Trade Union of Confederation of Guatemala (Confederación Sindical de Guatemala—CONSIGUA) and reorganized the FTG through the Light/Power and Telecommunications Workers Unions. Throughout the 1960s ORIT-AIFLD provided labor-organizing seminars for 2,811 workers in Guatemala, and 11 were sent abroad for specialized training.

In 1965 President Peralta Azurdia (1963–66) formed the Institutional Democratic Party (Partido Institucional Democrática—PID) as the voice of the armed forces. It passed an army-dictated constitution that restricted political activity and prohibited strikes. Although the Labor Code was weakened, other provisions of the new constitution did give civil servants the right to unionize and bargain collectively. The National Federation of Transport Workers* (Federación Nacional de Obreros del Transporte—FENOT) organized and affiliated with CLAT. In turn, CLAT established the Central Federation of Workers of Guatemala* (Federación Central de Trabajadores de Guatemala—FECETRAG) in 1966 and the Campesino Federation of Guatemala* (Federación Campesina de Guatemala—FCG) in 1967. When Peralta was replaced by Mendez Montenegro in 1966, however, twenty-eight underground PGT leaders were killed and dumped into the sea.

By 1968 the CNT and other trade union federations such as the breakaway FASGUA provided an alternative to the ORIT unions. The CNT had become the major CLAT confederation. It included FECETRAG, FENOT, and the FCG. However, the industrial and transport workers in the CNT pressured it to take an even more independent stance. By this time most unions were either affiliated with ORIT or with CLAT; however, only 2 percent of the nation’s urban work force and .2 percent of rural workers belonged to a union.

Even so, the U.S. government was dissatisfied with the upsurge in labor activity which it connected to an expanding guerrilla movement. The U.S. began a regional military training program which would make the Guatemalan army the most experienced and efficient counterinsurgency force in the hemisphere. Soon after Mendez Montenegro came to power he sent General Arana Osario to exterminate all guerrillas in the eastern provinces.

A friend of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, General Arana returned

from visiting Nicaragua in 1970 to run for president on a platform of free market reforms and political liberalization. For a short time, worker organizations utilized this “freedom” to organize. New unions emerged among the bank workers (Union Federation of Bank Employees,* *Federación Sindical de Empleados Bancarios—FESEB*) and peasants, and ORIT-related groups such as *CONTRAGUA* and *CONSIGUA* formed the Central of Federated Workers* (*Central de Trabajadores Federados—CTF*). In response, the Arana government declared a state of siege from January until March 1971. Seven hundred political and union leaders were murdered. When Arana believed the labor organizing movement was under control, he lifted the ban.

This time the first group to take advantage of the reduced repression was the country’s public school teachers. In the summer of 1973, 20,000 teachers struck to protest poor classroom conditions and ten years of frozen wages. Their action sparked the creation of a National Front of Popular Unity (*Frente Nacional de Unidad Popular*), and groups from many unions as well as parents and students marched through the city, reflecting a broad coalition of discontent. The CNT and FASGUA responded by attempting once again to form a national labor federation with the two ORIT federations (CTF and FTG), but the effort failed due to top-heavy structures, bureaucratic maneuverings, and AIFLD’s continued efforts to woo union leaders away from other federations. In fact, the pro-government reputation of the ORIT-influenced CTF resulted in numerous defections from AIFLD’s own ranks. Campesino members often joined the National Campesino Federation* (*Confederación Nacional Campesina—CNC*), formed in 1974. The United Fruit workers separated into their own faction. Others formed the Federated Union Front* (*Frente Federativa Sindical—FFS*) in 1975.

Thus it was the teachers’ strike of 1973 and the formation of the National Front of Popular Unity which marked the real turning point of the labor movement. It precipitated similar strikes among railroad, electrical, tobacco, and bank employees. Municipal workers and the staff at the National University also unionized. While the rail strike of 1974 was declared illegal and its leadership repressed, electrical and cigar workers won recognition for work contracts that included full-time employment. A court battle over the INDEGUA tennis shoe strike in early 1975 provided important training to an emerging group of militant union lawyers such as Frank LaRue and Enrique and Marta Torres.

Another very important event of the period was the lockout of 152 workers at the Coca-Cola plant in March 1976 and the workers’ refusal to vacate the premises despite considerable police violence. The Coca-Cola “strike” became the rallying point as three major union federations created a common labor organization in defense of all union activity: “We formed visitation teams of 2–3 people to make the various unions aware of the implications of the Coke situation: If the company and government could get away with undermining our union petition process by firing all those workers, it would also undermine all that the Labor Code and their own struggles had achieved. No other union could be formed without prior agreement with government and company.” (Marta

Torres, interview with author, 1983.) It was because of this realization that the situation at the Coca-Cola plant affected all unionized workers that the various union representatives convened the National Committee of Trade Union Unity* (Comité Nacional de Unidad Sindical—CNUS).

The CNUS brought together the CNT, FASGUA, and traditional AIFLD affiliate, the Federation of Guatemalan Workers, combining bank clerks with textile employees, sugar workers with municipal workers, artists with social security workers and journalists. When CNUS threatened a general strike if the Coke matter was not settled, President Kjell Laugerud García (1974–78) intervened. Through 1976 and 1977 CNUS-sponsored demonstrations grew from 5,000 to 20,000 and strikes increased. The business community angrily regarded the CNUS as synonymous with the labor movement. In May workers carried out two-week factory occupations at HelenoPlast(ic) Factory and ACRICASA textiles. The second occupation involved more than fifty women such as Florencia Xocop, who struck and then ran the plant themselves to avoid police attack. Labor lawyer Mário López Larrave successfully defended them in court but he was brutally assassinated shortly afterwards.

CNUS-CNT affiliate actions reached their high point in the fall of 1977, beginning with a strike by the transport workers. Then the Indian miners in Ixtahuacan demanded changes in the handling of explosives. When the company refused, they began a famous 150-mile march to the capital. To meet them, CNUS organized the largest outpouring of labor in the twenty-three years since U.S. involvement. As a result, CNUS gained the allegiance of a very important rural organization, the Committee of Campesino Unity* (Comité de Unidad Campesina—CUC), and thereby became the first bona-fide confederation of urban and rural indigenous workers since 1954. CNUS leader Miguel Angel Albizurez lists the march among the most important events in the nation's labor history. It also revived the owners' unified determination to repress the unions.

On 29 May 1978 the Guatemalan army murdered more than 100 Kechi Indians who had been invited to Panzos to discuss complaints about government takeover of their lands. The "honeymoon" between the government and the popular movement had clearly come to an end. In combative response, CNUS and CUC brought Indian workers into leadership roles for another march. They also developed Guatemalan church groups into a more important force for trade union rights. Because of the Indians' own direct experience with repression, they became more careful about security risks and the planning of counterstrategies.

In the summer of 1978, a few months after the inauguration of President Lucas García (1978–82) the transport workers' demand for their first wage increase in ten years became an important test for the entire labor movement. CNUS and others organized a new series of demonstrations which tied the demands to a general concern about the increased cost of living and other anti-union actions of the government. Lucas García's solution was to raise the price of bus tickets from five cents to ten cents. Shortly after, news of the successful urban insurrection in Nicaragua (the challenge to dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle)

reached Guatemala. Hospital and postal workers went on strike, and disaffected urban youth wearing face masks blocked the roads with paving stones and burning tires, and peppered traffic lanes with thumbtacks. Street fighting erupted in the capital and the western highlands. More than thirty people died from police firing on unarmed crowds, but the government withdrew the fare increase in another victory for CNUS and the workers.

At this point, the government decided that the trade union movement itself had to be eliminated. Lucas García outlawed the militant state employees and telecommunication unions and fired hundreds of workers. Interior Minister Donaldo Álvarez Ruíz, Police Colonel German Chupinga, and the army officers planned a new strategy of exterminating all popular leaders.

Because they were important in the trade union movement, the directors of the Coca-Cola workers union (Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca,* Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Embotelladora Guatemalteca—STEGAC) were among the first to be placed on the government's clandestine death-squad lists. Many other leaders were also killed. To counter the repression the CNUS moved beyond trade union interests and economic concerns to build a much more broadly conceived network of center-left, popular, student, and political organizations: the Democratic Front Against Repression* (Frente Democrático Contra Represión—FDCR) begun in February 1979. Lucas García's generals immediately retaliated, and the FDCR's first major act was a bitter and massive protest at the funeral of Manuel Colom Argueta. Even CLAT criticized the growing repression of trade unionists, and the immunity of the "Secret Anti-communist Army." (ESA) As a result, two of its members were also included on ESA death lists.

Fear and repression continued throughout 1979. The bulletins of the FDCR, CNT, and other unions diffused information about various company manipulations and attacks on unions, students, slum dwellers and unaffiliated employee associations. They also publicized how the police stormed and set fire to the Spanish embassy on 31 January 1980, when some thirty Indians and Committee of Campesino Unity representatives came to peacefully protest land takeovers. Most were killed, along with some embassy officials. In response, many factories and commercial establishments were shut down; public transport came to a standstill.

The most dramatic resistance of all came in March when 25,000 workers organized by CUC and the CNT on fifty cotton plantations and seventy sugar plantations in southern Guatemala went on a fifteen-day strike for higher wages and prepared for armed intervention. This precipitated additional strikes in urban areas, forcing the government to double the daily minimum wage from \$1.12 to \$3.20 for all agricultural workers, and to raise the salaries for urban workers.

The sugarcane workers' strike was seen as a major victory in spite of very difficult conditions and served to redouble the government's resolve to eliminate the trade unions. Individual workers were machine-gunned as they left the 1 May 1980 labor demonstration, their bodies found later in various places outside

of Guatemala City. The clandestine government-sponsored death squads published a new list of 600 persons to be killed before June 1.

Then came the event that most cite as the demise of the trade union movement in Guatemala: the 21 June abduction of twenty-seven CNT leaders as they were meeting at their headquarters to deal with their own internal difficulties, and a second abduction of eighteen more leaders in August. It shocked all trade union activity underground. Concerned about security and Indian rights, the CUC and its related organization "FP-31" named after the embassy massacre moved in a separate direction. While CNUS and CNT (which also divided) continued to issue bulletins, virtually all meetings and negotiations came to a halt. For the next three years only a few signs of trade union presence remained such as FASGUA's circulation of its paper, *The Voices of the Worker and the Campesino* (*Voz Obrera y Campesina*). CNT attorney Yolanda Urizar continued to work underground with various unions until her final abduction in 1982, and other women remained silently active. Unprecedented government attacks on the Indian population resulted in more than 100,000 deaths and many more refugees. The PGT emerged reinvigorated and joined with other guerrilla groups in a militant counterattack.

Because of growing problems with both the army and the economy, Guatemala experienced government coups in both 1982 and 1983. To help meet the regional economic crisis, the Reagan administration proposed the Caribbean Basin Initiative, a package of incentives to reduce trade barriers and encourage private investment. In passing the plan, the U.S. Congress also required certification of trade union activity. To qualify, the Guatemalan government proclaimed the formation of a new Confederation of Guatemalan Trade Union Unity* (Confederación Unidad de Sindicatos de Guatemala—CUSG) in May 1983, which included CLAT- and ORIT-affiliated unions as well as the respected Federation of Guatemalan Workers and its Guatemalan Electric union member. By mid-1984 CUSG totaled twelve affiliates.

And then in the midst of a yet increasing national debt, new developments at the Coca-Cola plant catalyzed the union movement. Coke's phony bankruptcy, STEGAC's occupation of the plant, and the murder of union leaders at CAVISA and elsewhere precipitated formation of a second confederation with twenty-seven affiliates known as the National Coordinator of Trade Union Unity* (Coordinador Nacional de Unidad Sindical—CONUS). To help the Coca-Cola workers, newspaper workers sent paper and ink; sugar workers sent sugar; textile unions sent clothes; and laundry workers, bank workers, and municipal workers collected funds in memory of the CNUS effort eight years before, saying "If we don't help the Coca-Cola union, then we won't survive. . . . If Coca-Cola falls, we all fall!" CONUS successfully aided other job actions and shutdowns, meeting in various places with lookouts stationed at doorways. Nevertheless, as threats against overt actions increased, it merged its strategies with the Mutual Support Group (Grupo Apoyo Mutuo—GAM), wives and mothers who sought national and international attention to locate the disappeared. In early 1985

CONUS was replaced by the Union of Guatemalan Workers Unions* (Unión de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de Guatemala—UNSITRAGUA), which grew to include twenty-five unions and 35,000 workers.

As the economic panic increased, interventions by the CUSG and its Central Federation of Guatemalan Workers and the FTG against plant closings and criticisms of price hikes also incurred government reaction. As the cost of living skyrocketed, other unions protested, such as the newly formed National Council of Democratic Workers* (Consejo Nacional de Trabajadores Democráticas—CNTD), which represented textile, beer, and some peasant workers. UNISTRAGUA joined students to protest an abrupt bus fare hike. Two dozen public sector unions, bakery workers, and 5,000 teachers protested for higher salaries and lower prices. The teachers' strike spread to nearly every department, causing the government to end the term a month early. Workers occupied the Finance Ministry and Institute for Social Security. Such actions and the increasing debt and peso devaluation so preoccupied the ruling classes that they agreed to elections for civilian rule. By December the nation had elected as president Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo, who promised more rights for trade unions, but within a very constricting structure of military power.

Labor did not improve its economic situation under the civilian government. It was less openly repressed, but union officials continued to be murdered. AIFLD poured substantial funds into CUSG. CLAT and the Christian Democrats revived the CGTG. These two, along with the strongly independent UNSITRAGUA, became the major federations, but some groups among the municipal workers and teachers avoided affiliation. GAM continued its demonstrations, and union organizing and strike activity increased. In May 1986, UNSITRAGUA/CGTG led 9,000 workers and peasants for the first important labor parade in six years.

Thus, the history of trade union development in Guatemala illustrates the continued tension between various themes: rational industrial development on the one hand and an upper class that remained conservatively unified in its fear of worker participation and racial equality on the other. This fear resulted in cycles of repression and the elimination of unions. To change it, a very different approach from inside and outside the country would be required in the future.

Bibliography

Note: This article draws on work by Hank Frundt and Norma Chinchilla as well as personal interviews with Ernestine Ceto, Miguel Cifuentes, Frank LaRue, Deborah Levinson, Israel Marquez, Francisco Parades, Enrique and Marta Torres and other Guatemalan Trade Unionists. Other helpful sources are listed below.

Alba, Victor. *Historia del movimiento obreros en América Latina*. Mexico City: Libreria Mexicana, 1964.

Albizurez, Miguel Angel. "Struggles and Experiences of the Guatemalan Trade-Union Movement." *Latin American Perspectives* 7, nos. 2-3 (Spring/Summer 1980).

American Institute of Free Labor Development. "Guatemala," May 1976.

Balcárcel, José Luis. "El Movimiento Obrero en Guatemala," in P. Gonzales Casanova,

- ed. *Historia del Movimiento Obrero en América Latina*, Vol. 2. Mexico City: XXI Ed., 1985.
- Bishop, Edwin. "The Guatemalan Labor Movement: 1944-1959." Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1959.
- Black, George, Norma Chinchilla and Milton Jamail. *Garrison Guatemala*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984.
- Centro de Información, Documentación y Análisis sobre el Movimiento Obrero Latinoamericano (CIDAMO). "El Movimiento Obrero en Guatemala." *Carta Informativa*, Nov. 1979; also published in *NACLA Report on the Americas*. XIV, n. 1, 1980, pp. 28-35.
- Chinchilla, Norma. "Guatemala: What Difference does a Revolution Make?" *CENSA'S Strategic Report*, no. 8, December 1986.
- . "The Road from Ixcán," in *NACLA Report on the Americas*, v. XVII, n. 2, 1983, pp. 2-10.
- Committee of Concerned Guatemalan Scholars. "Dare to Struggle, Dare to Win." 1981.
- Dombrowski, John, et al. *Area Handbook for Guatemala*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.
- Fried, Jonathan, Marvin Gettleman, Deborah Levinson, and Nancy Peckenharn. *Guatemala in Rebellion: An Unfinished History*. New York: Grove Press, 1983.
- Frundt, Hank. *Refreshing Pauses: Coca-Cola and Human Union Rights in Guatemala*. New York: Praeger, 1987.
- . "To Buy the World a Coke," *Latin American Perspectives*, v. 14, n. 3, Summer, 1987.
- Gutierrez, Victor Manuel. *Historia del Movimiento Obrero en Guatemala*. San Salvador (np), 1970.
- International Union of Food and Allied Workers Trade Union Delegation on the Occupation of the Coca-Cola Bottling Plant in Guatemala. "We will neither go nor be driven out." March 1984.
- Jonas, Susanne and David Tobis. *Guatemala*. New York: North American Congress on Latin America, 1974.
- López Larrave, Mário. *Breve Historia Del Movimiento Sindical Guatemalteco*. Guatemala City: Editorial Universitaria, 1979.
- Matzul Ramírez, Fernando. "Situación Actual y Perspectivas del Movimiento Obrero en Guatemala." *Polemica*, no. 9 (1983).
- Navas Alvarez, Mariá Guadalupe. *El Movimiento Sindical: Como manifestacion de la lucha de clases*. Guatemala City: Editorial Universitaria, 1979.
- Obrando Sánchez, Antonio. *Memorias: La historia del movimiento obrero*. Guatemala City: Editorial Universitaria, 1978.
- Poblete Troncoso, Moisés. *El Movimiento Obrero Latinoamericano*. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1946.
- Recinos García, María Elena. "El Movimiento Obrero en Guatemala, 1900-1954." Thesis, Universidad de San Carlos, 1977.
- Slaughter, Janc. "Guatemala: AFL-CIO Creates a Union in its Own Image." *Labor Notes*, August, 1986. Expanded in "Which Side are they On," *Progressive*, V. 51, n. 1, Jan., 1987.
- Torio, Graciela. "El Movimiento Obrero en America Central." *Historia del Movimiento Obrero*, vol. 5. Buenos Aires: Centro Editorial de America Latina, 1974.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

AUTONOMOUS UNION FEDERATION OF GUATEMALA (Federación Autónoma Sindical de Guatemala—FASGUA).

This union was originally established by young Christian workers who organized a program of leadership training for labor and peasant leaders after the U.S.-backed counter coup in 1954 which overthrew the Arbenz administration as the (Catholic) Autonomous Union Federation (Federación Autónoma Sindical—FAS). It obtained a more militant leadership in 1956 and staged the first public protest by quickly replacing the official signs with anti-government posters as the workers filed past the May Day review stand of Central Park. FASGUA soon developed into one of the most radical labor federations in the country staging a thirteen-day brewery strike in 1957 and hosting a major conference to promote agrarian reform and worker-campesino alliance in 1961. In 1963 the government made the union illegal, and its members were conscripted to work with the Union Confederation of Guatemala (Confederación Sindical de Guatemala—CONSIGUA) and later the Central of Federated Workers* (CTF). FASGUA resisted by working with the National Confederation of Workers* (CNT) to form more independent confederations such as the National Council of Labor Consultation (Consejo Nacional de Consulta Sindical—CNCS) in 1973. When the federation gained some freedom to operate, it organized many campesino groups and the employees at the University of San Carlos, Cavisá, GINSA, Industria Harinera, and Duralux. Under the leadership of Damian Gomez, it united twenty-five unions holding 5,000 members. It was an organizing member of the National Committee of Trade Union Unity.* It affiliated with CPUSTAL (Permanent Congress of Sindical Unity of the Workers of Latin America, Congreso Permanente de Unidad Sindical de Los Trabajadores de América Latina) and World Confederation of Trade Unions, but after 1979 it had difficulty maintaining contact. Because of repression in the 1980s, many of its campesino affiliates were then forced to abandon FASGUA membership. During the 1980s it continued as one of the few active federations, holding secret sessions to train leaders in negotiation and contract procedures and to publish its newspaper.

CAMPESINO FEDERATION OF GUATEMALA (Federación Campesina de Guatemala—FCG).

Formed by active church workers in the early 1960s, this union became one of the first non-Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) rural organizations that rose after the U.S.-backed coup of 1954. It affiliated with CLAT (Latin American Workers Central, Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores), became a founding member of the National Confederation of Workers* (CNT), and was especially active after President Carlos Arana Osorio (1970–74) lifted the state of siege in

1971 that had been directed against the left. It declined in the late 1970s as its members joined the CNT, which had become more independently militant.

CENTRAL DE TRABAJADORES FEDERADOS. *See* Central of Federated Workers.

CENTRAL FEDERATION OF WORKERS OF GUATEMALA (Federación Central de Trabajadores de Guatemala—FECETRAG).

Growing out of the Christian Democratic Workers' Christian Front in 1966, together with the Campesino Federation of Guatemala,* the Central Federation was a founder of the National Confederation of Workers* (CNT) and later the National Committee of Trade Union Unity.* It was taken over by the formation of the Central American Confederation of Workers in 1978, but was revived after 1983 as the CLAT (Latin American Workers Central, Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores) member of the Confederation of Guatemalan Trade Union Unity. By 1986 it was largely replaced by the new General Coordinator of Guatemalan Workers.*

CENTRAL OF FEDERATED WORKERS (Central de Trabajadores Federados—CTF).

An Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) affiliate with strong ties to the government, this central was reorganized in 1970 as a merger of two earlier confederations that had stressed "worker welfare" positions: the Union Confederation of Guatemala (Confederación Sindical de Guatemala—CONSIGUA), which retained some autonomy, and the Confederation of Guatemalan Workers* (CONTRAGUA), which had originally been independent. For a time it was the largest national confederation with more than 30,000 members, but by 1975 it had experienced many defections to the National Campesino Confederation,* the Federated Union Front,* the Autonomous Union Federation of Guatemala,* and the National Confederation of Workers.* Although its leadership split, the CTF continued its claim as "the largest democratic organization" in the country with eighty affiliates and a total membership of 20,000. Lockouts or phony plant shutdowns affecting its Bluebird and Durolite affiliates in 1979 earned the protest of George Meany from the AFL-CIO. In 1980 it listed 50,000 members. Nevertheless because of its reputation for corruption it never became very strong, and by 1982 had nearly disappeared.

CENTRAL UNION OF MUNICIPAL WORKERS (Sindicato Central de Trabajadores Municipales—SCTM).

A union with a long history of independence and activity during the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944–54 when it served as a loyal General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala* affiliate, it made a brief appearance in the 1960s and was reorganized in 1974 with affiliates in all major cities. Its stop-work actions

in 1975 achieved reinstatement of fired workers, but further negotiation required a four-hour strike. A collective pact was finally achieved. The government then set up the Capital's Municipal Employees Association (Asociación del Capital de Empleados Municipales—ACEM) as an alternate union, but it gained few members. While independent, SCTM was involved in protest demonstrations in 1985 and 1986 in conjunction with UNSITRAGUA. Its leaders remained continually under threat, and in July, 1986 leader Justo Rufinio Reyes was knifed to death.

CETE. *See* Council of Organizations of State Workers.

CGTG. *See* General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala or General Coordinator of Guatemalan Workers.

CNC. *See* National Campesino Confederation.

CNCG. *See* National Confederation of Campesinos of Guatemala.

CNM. *See* National Council of Teachers.

CNT. *See* National Confederation of Workers.

CNTD. *See* National Council of Democratic Workers.

CNUS. *See* National Committee of Trade Union Unity.

COCA-COLA WORKERS UNION. *See* Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca.

COMITÉ DE UNIDAD CAMPESINA. *See* Committee of Campesino Unity.

COMITÉ EMERGENCIA DE TRABAJADORES DE ESTADO (Emergency Committee of State Workers). *See* Council of Organizations of State Workers.

COMITÉ NACIONAL DE UNIDAD SINDICAL. *See* National Committee of Trade Union Unity.

COMMITTEE OF CAMPESINO UNITY (Comité de Unidad Campesina—CUC).

Founded by Indian Catholic parish workers primarily for peasants in the highlands, it affiliated with the National Committee of Trade Union* (CNUS) and became one of the most combative and important worker organizations. It forged links with the urban working class and was key in organizing the huge sugar strike of 1980. Becoming independent from CNUS, it founded the Popular Front

of 31 January (FP-31) in 1981 which included the Revolutionary Workers Nucleus, Christian Revolutionaries and other groups. The army's genocidal attacks on Indian communities severely reduced its numbers by 1982, but it became linked to the Democratic Front Against Repression* and helped create the Guatemalan Committee of Patriotic Unity to form a government in exile.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL CAMPESINA. *See* National Campesino Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE CAMPESINOS DE GUATEMALA. *See* National Confederation of Campesinos of Guatemala.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* National Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE GUATEMALA. *See* Confederation of Workers of Guatemala—CTG; and Guatemalan Workers Confederation—CONTRAGUA).

CONFEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE GUATEMALA (Union Confederation of Guatemala). *See* Central of Federated Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES DE GUATEMALA. *See* Union Confederation of Workers of Guatemala.

CONFEDERACIÓN UNIDAD DE SINDICATOS DE GUATEMALA. *See* Confederation of Guatemalan Trade Union Unity.

CONFEDERATION OF GUATEMALAN TRADE UNION UNITY (Confederación Unidad de Sindicatos de Guatemala—CUSG).

Begun by Antonio Alfaro with official approval of the Rios Montt government, which hoped to qualify for U.S. economic assistance, this ORIT-related federation quickly grew to include 20 federations, 200 unions and 150,000 members, many from peasant cooperatives. It also includes the Light and Telephone workers, some municipal employees and the banana workers formerly from United Fruit Co. By 1986 CUSG had 23 full-time organizers and a handsome office facility supported by AIFLD, which provided an average of \$267,000 per year, including promotional outreach, aid to educational programs and credit union activities. Often critical of the government's economic policies, CUSG nevertheless maintained a pro-company orientation. During the crisis it became more critical of government failure to control prices and prevent plant closings. By 1986 it maintained a right-centrist position of 'social democracy' somewhat critical of the government.

CONFEDERATION OF GUATEMALAN WORKERS (Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala).

Formed in 1963 by railway, airline, and sugar workers as an alternative to unions dominated by the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), this confederation carefully remained nonpolitical and stressed wage improvements. Nevertheless, ORIT did become more influential with its leaders, and the confederation joined with the Union Confederation of Guatemala (Confederación Sindical de Guatemala—CONSIGUA) in 1970 to form the Central of Federated Workers.*

CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF GUATEMALA (Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala—CTG).

A former local of the Worker Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor,* this union became the first major union confederation under the Revolutionary Government of 1945. It helped revive the Union for Action and Betterment of Railway Workers,* but then became increasingly militant and political. It joined the General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala* in 1951.

CONSEJO DE ENTIDADES DE TRABAJADORES DEL ESTADO. *See* Council of Organizations of State Workers.

CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CONSULTA SINDICAL (National Council of Labor Consultation). *See* Autonomous Union Federation of Guatemala.

CONSEJO NACIONAL DE MAGISTROS. *See* National Council of Teachers.

CONSEJO NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DEMOCRÁTICAS. *See* National Council of Democratic Workers.

CONSEJO NACIONAL DE UNIDAD SINDICAL (National Council of Trade Union Unity). *See* National Committee of Trade Union Unity.

CONSEJO SINDICAL DE GUATEMALA. *See* Union Council of Guatemala.

CONSIGUA (Confederación Sindical de Guatemala). *See* Central of Federated Workers.

CONTRAGUA. *See* Confederation of Guatemalan Workers.

CONUS. *See* National Coordinator of Trade Union Unity.

COORDINADOR NACIONAL DE UNIDAD SINDICAL. *See* National Coordinator of Trade Union Unity.

COUNCIL OF ORGANIZATIONS OF STATE WORKERS (Consejo de Entidades de Trabajadores del Estado—CETE).

Also known as the Emergency Committee of State Workers (Comité Emergencia de Trabajadores de Estado), this group demanded the right of state workers to organize. It sought the formation of a popular front and was particularly active during the 1978 transport crisis in mobilizing broad popular and student support. It became important for linking federal government workers to Autonomous Union Federation of Guatemala* and National Confederation of Workers* federations.

CSG. *See* Confederation of Workers of Guatemala.

CSTG. *See* Union Confederation of Workers of Guatemala.

CTF. *See* Central of Federated Workers.

CTG. *See* Confederation of Workers of Guatemala.

CUC. *See* Committee of Campesino Unity.

CUSG. *See* Confederation of Guatemalan Trade Union Unity.

DEMOCRATIC FRONT AGAINST REPRESSION (Frente Democrático Contra Represión—FDCR).

A broad front of trade unions, political and popular organizations, this network was created by the National Committee of Trade Union Unity* in order to unite the various groups that experienced the official violence in late 1978. This included the Socialist Democratic Party and the United Revolutionary Front. It extended outside the country, and in 1980 and 1981 it became an important link for Guatemalan leaders in exile; it joined with the Committee of Campesino Unity* in 1981 to declare the Guatemalan Committee of Patriotic Unity as a political support to the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union.

FASGUA. *See* Autonomous Union Federation of Guatemala.

FCG. *See* Campesino Federation of Guatemala.

FDCR. *See* Democratic Front Against Repression.

FECETRAG. *See* Central Federation of Workers of Guatemala.

FEDERACIÓN AUTÓNOMA SINDICAL DE GUATEMALA. *See* Autonomous Union Federation of Guatemala.

FEDERACIÓN CAMPESINA DE GUATEMALA. *See* Campesino Federation of Guatemala.

FEDERACIÓN CENTRAL DE TRABAJADORES DE GUATEMALA. *See* Central Federation of Workers of Guatemala.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE ALIMENTO, BEBIDA, TABACO, Y ASOCIADOS SINDICATOS. *See* Federation of Foodworkers.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE GUATEMALA. *See* Federation of Guatemalan Workers.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES TEXTILES Y DEL CUERO. *See* Federation of Textile and Leather Workers.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES UNIDOS DE LA INDUSTRIA AZUCARERA. *See* Federation of United Workers of the Sugar Industry.

FEDERACIÓN LABORAL AUTÓNOMA DE GUATEMALA. *See* Guatemalan Autonomous Labor Federation.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE COMUNIDADES AGRICOLAS E INDÍGENAS (National Federation of Agricultural and Indigenous Communities). *See* National Campesino Confederation.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE LA INDUSTRIA TEXTILE, DEL VESTIDO Y SIMILARES. *See* National Federation of Textile, Apparel and Related Industry Workers.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE OBREROS DEL TRANSPORTE. *See* National Federation of Transport Workers.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE ORGANIZACIONES CAMPESINAS (National Federation of Campesino Organizations). *See* National Campesino Confederation.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA DE GUATEMALA PARA LA PROTECCIÓN LEGAL DEL TRABAJO—FOG. *See* Worker Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA REGIONAL DE GUATEMALA (Regional Labor Federation of Guatemala). *See* Worker Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor.

FEDERACIÓN REGIONAL OBRERA DE GUATEMALA. *See* Workers Regional Federation of Guatemala.

FEDERACION SINDICAL DE EMPLEADOS BANCARIOS. *See* Union Federation of Bank Employees.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE GUATEMALA. *See* Federation of Unions of Guatemala.

FEDERATED UNION FRONT (Frente Federativa Sindical—FFS).

Created by former Central of Federated Workers* leaders in 1975 who split because of concern over government and by Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) influence, it grew to eight trade federations with 7,000 union members. The FFS never achieved legal status, and it disappeared by 1979.

FEDERATION OF FOODWORKERS (Federación de Trabajadores de Alimento, Bebida, Tabaco, y Asociados Sindicatos—FETRABTAS).

Originally affiliated with the National Confederation of Workers,* it reorganized in 1979 as many beverage and food companies began to experience labor difficulties similar to those of Coca-Cola in the late 1970s. Member unions came from Del Monte, Beatrice, CPC, Kellogg's, Pepsi Cola, Philip Morris, Colgate Palmolive (Kern Foods), Richardson Merrell, and Chiclet Adams/Warner Lambert (also a FASGUA member). To counter them, the food industry set up its own association in affiliation with the Chamber of Agriculture, Commerce, Industry and Finance. *See* Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca.

FEDERATION OF GUATEMALAN WORKERS (Federación de Trabajadores de Guatemala—FTG).

An Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) member union with some independence, this organization originally was begun by Serafino Romualdi of the American Federation of Labor under ORIT auspices after the U.S.-backed coup in 1954, building on some unions from the Federation of Unions of Guatemala.* It was reorganized in 1964 and became more self-determined. Its strength came from the more militant Union of Telephone Workers and the Union of Light and Power Workers.* By 1976 it listed twelve affiliated unions and 4,000 members. It joined the National Committee of Trade Union Unity* in 1978, but in 1983 under the influence of its leader and attorney Juan Francisco Alfaro Mijangos, the personal attorney to Guatemalan president, General Rios Montt, it affiliated with the Confederation of Guatemalan Trade Union Unity* as its leading member and was instrumental in preventing certain plant closings (e.g., San Bernadino Bottling) and in criticizing the government massacre of the indigenous population.

FEDERATION OF TEXTILE AND LEATHER WORKERS (Federación de Trabajadores Textiles y del Cuero—TEXTILYCUERO).

Becoming a National Confederation of Workers* (CNT) affiliate body in 1975, this union operated as an industry-coordinating body until the decimation of the CNT in 1980.

FEDERATION OF UNIONS OF GUATEMALA (Federación Sindical de Guatemala—FSG).

A breakaway federation from the Confederation of Workers of Guatemala* in 1946, led by the Union for Action and Betterment of Railway Workers,* it sought a nonpolitical “union welfare” organization. By 1952 it had patched up its differences and merged with the General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala,* some of its elements later became part of the Federation of Guatemalan Workers.*

FEDERATION OF UNITED WORKERS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY (Federación de Trabajadores Unidos de la Industria Azucarera—FETULIA).

This union has a militant history which includes its participation in the formation of the National Committee of Trade Union Unity*; its 1976 strike at Pantaleon, largest sugar refinery in Guatemala; its 1977 march in conjunction with the Union of Indian workers at the Ixtahuacan mines; and its victorious 1980 strike that doubled the minimum agricultural wage and resisted army attempts to bring in unemployed urban workers.

FENCAIG. *See* National Campesino Confederation.

FENOCAM. *See* National Campesino Confederation.

FENOT. *See* National Federation of Transport Workers.

FESEB. *See* Union Federation of Bank Employees.

FETULIA. *See* Federation of United Workers in the Sugar Industry.

FFS. *See* Federated Union Front.

FITITVC. *See* National Federation of Textile, Apparel and Leather Workers.

FLAG. *See* Guatemalan Autonomous Labor Federation.

FNM. *See* National Teachers Front.

FOG. *See* Worker Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor.

FORG (Federación Obrera Regional De Guatemala). *See* Worker Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor.

FP-31. *See* Committee of Campesino Unity.

FRENTE CRISTIANA DE TRABAJADORES DE GUATEMALA (Christian Workers Front of Guatemala). *See* Central Federation of Workers of Guatemala.

FRENTE DEMOCRÁTICA CONTRA REPRESSION. *See* Democratic Front Against Repression.

FRENTE FEDERATIVA SINDICAL. *See* Federated Union Front.

FRENTE NACIONAL DE OBREROS DEL TRANSPORTE (National Front of Transport Workers). *See* National Federation of Transport Workers.

FRENTE NACIONAL MAGISTERIAL. *See* National Teachers Front.

FROG. *See* Workers Regional Federation of Guatemala.

FSG. *See* Federation of Unions of Guatemala.

FTG. *See* Federation of Guatemalan Workers.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF GUATEMALA (Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala—CGTG).

The first major body to unite all the various unions and federations during the reformist Arbenz period (1950–54), whether urban or rural, Indian or Ladino—including the Confederation of Workers of Guatemala,* the Federation of Guatemalan Workers,* Party of Guatemalan Workers (a communist political party), the National Confederation of Campesinos of Guatemala* (CNCG), and the Regional Labor Federation of Guatemala (Federación Obrera Regional de Guatemala—FORG)—it quickly grew to 200,000. It resolved to struggle for both agricultural and industrial reform in defense of worker interests in urban and rural areas. It sought worker unity at national and international levels and spoke out in favor of both democracy and the national economy. The General Confederation became a major national force with potential influence for the rest of Latin America, causing alarm to U.S. policymakers who attempted to set up alternate unions. (See Guatemalan Autonomous Labor Federation and National Union of Free Workers.) However, it also came to face internal problems from those emphasizing economic concerns. The CNCG left the union, but it remained viable until the U.S.-engineered coup in 1954, which dissolved it.

GENERAL COORDINATOR OF GUATEMALAN WORKERS—CGTG.

The CLAT-supported labor confederation was revived under the new 1986 civilian government of President Vinicio Cerezo. It co-sponsored the labor day parade with UNSITRAGUA. Member unions included unions from Kerns, Aviateca, *Prensa Libre* and many campesino organizations.

GUATEMALAN AUTONOMOUS LABOR FEDERATION (Federación Laboral Autónoma de Guatemala—FLAG).

Organized by the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) as a means of undermining the General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala;* never large, it only lasted until the U.S. coup of 1954.

GUATEMALAN CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS. *See* Confederation of Workers of Guatemala.GUATEMALAN CONFEDERATION OF WORKER UNITY. *See* Confederation of Guatemalan Trade Union Unity.

GUATEMALAN WORKERS CONFEDERATION (Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala—CONTRAGUA).

An Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) confederation that included the Union of Workers at United Fruit Company* and the Union of Social Security Workers,* it merged into the Central Federation of Workers of Guatemala* in 1970.

GUATEMALAN WORKERS FEDERATION. *See* Confederation of Workers of Guatemala or Federation of Guatemalan Workers.INCASA WORKERS. *See* Union of Workers at INCASA.INDEGUA WORKERS. *See* Union of Workers at INDEGUA.INDEPENDENT CAMPESINO MOVEMENT. *See* National Campesino Confederation.LIGA OBRERA DE GUATEMALA. *See* Worker's League of Guatemala.MCI (Movimiento Campesino Independiente). *See* National Campesino Confederation.MOVIMIENTO CAMPESINO INDEPENDIENTE (Independent Campesino Movement). *See* National Campesino Confederation.

NATIONAL CAMPESINO CONFEDERATION (Confederación Nacional Campesina—CNC).

In 1979 two rural unions arose: the National Federation of Campesino Organizations (Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas—FENOCAM), and the National Federation of Agricultural and Indigenous Communities (Federación Nacional de Comunidades Agrícolas e Indígenas—FENCAIG or FENOCAI), both breakaway unions from the Central of Federated Workers.* Together, four years later they formed the National Campesino Confederation. Subsequently joined by the Independent Campesino Movement (Movimiento Campesino Independiente—MCI), by 1976 the CNC had twelve affiliates with some 7,000 members, with the MCI adding another 8,000 (of whom 2,000 were dues-paying). The CNC has retained ties to the government. Its FENCAIG division of 72,000 members is listed as a confederation of Guatemalan Trade Union Unity* affiliate, although it does not operate as a union.

NATIONAL CAMPESINO CONFEDERATION OF GUATEMALA (Confederación Nacional de Campesina de Guatemala—CNCG).

Formed after the 1947 labor code incorporated rights for agricultural workers, this confederation of 1,785 local agricultural unions joined with the General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala* (CGTG) and became a major support for the reformist Arbenz (1950–54) regime. When it left the CGTG it remained in strong support of the government and its rural reform programs, but was dissolved with the U.S.-backed coup of 1954.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF TRADE UNION UNITY (Comité Nacional de Unidad Sindical—CNUS).

Originally founded in 1946 to unite the various national federations under President Juan José Arévalo (1945–50), especially the Confederation of Workers of Guatemala* and Federation of Unions of Guatemala,* the National Committee was re-created in 1976 by the National Confederation of Workers,* Autonomous Union Federation of Guatemala,* Federation of Guatemalan Workers,* and several independent unions after the Coca-Cola lockout in 1976 to unify all major confederations (except the Central of Federated Workers*) in a way that would represent the interests of working groups in the country.

CNUS was really a coordinating body. There was no executive committee as such, but rather a series of commissions which administered its actions. A unity commission handled publications. Another ran a Union School (Escuela Sindical), which met in various places to train leaders in collective bargaining, etc. What made CNUS strong was its unification of Indian and Ladino movements exemplified by the actions of its Committee of Campesino Unity* affiliate and its three other major federations at a local level throughout the country. Such actions were coordinated through an organizational structure that included worker fronts in the Southeast and Amatitlan.

CNUS continues to operate. Within the country, many of its former affiliates

joined the National Coordinator of Trade Union Unity* and then UNSITRAGUA. It backed the actions of the Democratic Front Against Repression.* Its Mexican office remains as a most important voice of independent trade unionism in Guatemala.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT).

Growing out of the earlier Central Federation of Workers of Guatemala,* this Confederation appeared in 1968. Affiliated for a time with CLAT (Latin American Workers Central, Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores), it became independent in 1978. It was one of the largest and most active confederations in the late 1970s, growing from six to sixty affiliates in four years. It included five major federations: Foodworkers, Metalworkers, Textile Workers, Transport Workers, Farm Workers, and many important unions.

Legal activities on behalf of its affiliates aided the CNT's reputation in 1975. It began to grow rapidly so that by May 1976 it had fifty affiliated unions with an approximate membership of 25,000 workers. The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) reported that the CNT was "an active ad-hoc group, but without legal recognition." Its growth was also related to the dramatic role it played at the 1976 Coca-Cola strike and to its support for the National Committee of Trade Union Unity* under the leadership of Miguel Cifuentes and Miguel Angel Albizurez. In 1977 it helped workers at several major Guatemalan industrial establishments, including INCASA, Kerns, Autotext, Helenoplast, the Japanese textile plant ACRICASA, and the miners at Ixcán.

By April 1978 the CNT had carefully structured itself into two fronts, one for industrial workers and the other for peasant workers. Each contained various regional divisions. Israel Marquez, secretary-general of the Coca-Cola union, was chosen CNT general secretary. The two fronts maintained joint commissions on education, organization, and self-defense, but specialized according to other specific needs. The industrial worker front created union committees to monitor certain industry, political, and military developments. The campesino front contained unions of agricultural workers, cooperatives, and certain Indian families that held their lands in common. There were regional groupings in the Petén, Quiché, and Los Verapaz, and the structure was flexible according to particular circumstances. Even more than the National Committee of Trade Union Unity,* the CNT became a unique and unprecedented model for joining together urban and rural interests to prevent exploitation.

In late 1978 repression was especially directed against CNT leaders, and many went into exile. Nevertheless, the union continued as a strong force in the country until 21 June 1980, when twenty-seven of its key members were kidnapped by government security agents. After abduction of another seventeen leaders in August, the CNT-21 (National Confederation of Workers-21, Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores-21) emerged to commemorate those taken. The rest of the organization went underground. By 1984, CNT affiliates that remained

had joined other independent federations, and they helped to create the Union of Guatemalan Workers Unions* in 1986.

NATIONAL COORDINATOR OF TRADE UNION UNITY (Coordinador Nacional de Unidad Sindical—CONUS).

Begun in February 1984 to support the Coca-Cola workers (the company had declared bankruptcy as a means of dismissing the workers) and confront a new wave of kidnappings, this group soon included twenty-seven affiliates that operated in semi-clandestine fashion. Because of repression, it joined efforts with the Mutual Support Group (Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo), and by 1985 most of its members had affiliated with the Union of Guatemalan Workers Unions.*

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF DEMOCRATIC WORKERS (Consejo Nacional de Trabajadores Democráticas—CNTD).

Begun in late 1985 after a meeting between fifty private-sector workers organizations and government officials to demand government enforcement of wage increases in the private sector, the council includes the National Federation of Textile, Clothing and Related Industries Workers, the Central American Beer Factory Workers Union, and two peasant organizations.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TEACHERS—CNM.

Filling the vacuum left by the National Teachers Front, this ad hoc organization coordinated large demonstrations and a national strike of primary and secondary teachers in September 1985 which lasted several months. Although independent, it maintains relations with UNSITRAGUA.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES. *See* National Campesino Confederation.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF CAMPESINO ORGANIZATIONS. *See* National Campesino Confederation.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF TEXTILE APPAREL AND RELATED INDUSTRIES WORKERS (Federación Nacional de Obreros de la Industria Textil, del Vestido y Similares—FENOIT, FITIVE).

First legally recognized in 1957, this union initially enjoyed government support. In 1961, President Ydigoras gave it funds to disturb the May Day celebration. It struck in 1975, was suppressed, and then reactivated in 1985.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF TRANSPORT WORKERS (Federación Nacional de Obreros del Transporte—FENOT).

Originally organized by Christian trade union activists in 1965 as the National Front of Transport Workers (Frente Nacional de Obreros del Transporte), it became a founding member of the National Confederation of Workers.* Its

transport strike of 1978 was broadened to include various sectors and became the first major urban confrontation between police and the unions since the presidency of Kjell Laugerud (1974–78). During the mid-1980s the transport workers continued to exhibit union leadership.

NATIONAL TEACHERS FRONT (Frente Nacional Magisterial—FNM).

The front grew out of an illegal strike of primary teachers in May 1973. It was not recognized as a union, but it did obtain some promises. When the government went back on the agreement, 19,000 workers went out on strike again on 16 July with much public support; it achieved its settlement on 3 August and as a result became a symbol of possible struggle for many unions. The Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) and the government then set up the Unity of Guatemalan Teachers (Unidad de Maestros Guatemaltecos—UMAGUA) as an alternate union. In 1985 many members of the FNM joined the CNM (National Council of Teachers).*

NATIONAL UNION OF FREE WORKERS (Unión Nacional de Trabajadores Libres—UNITRAL).

Formed by the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) and the United Fruit Company to counter the growing influence of the left and independent unions under President Jacobo Arbenz (1950–54) it played a role in the U.S.-backed coup of 1954. It was then combined into the Union of Workers at United Fruit Company.*

PEASANT UNITY COMMITTEE. *See* Committee of Campesino Unity.

REGIONAL LABOR FEDERATION OF GUATEMALA. *See* Worker Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor.

SAMF. *See* Union for Action and Betterment of Railway Workers.

SCTM. *See* Central Union of Municipal Workers.

SIMCOS. *See* Union of Media and Newspaper Workers.

SINDICATO CENTRAL DE TRABAJADORES MUNICIPALES. *See* Central Union of Municipal Workers.

SINDICATO DE ACCIÓN Y MAJORAMIENTO DE LOS FERROCARRILEROS. *See* Union for Action and Betterment of Railway Workers.

SINDICATO DE EMPRESA DE TRABAJADORES DE LA UNITED FRUIT COMPANY. *See* Union of Workers at United Fruit Company.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES BANANEROS DE IZABAL. *See* Union of Banana Workers of Izabal.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE ACRICASA. *See* Union of ACRI-CASA Workers.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE INCASA. *See* Union of Workers at INCASA.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE INDEGUA. *See* Union of Workers at INDEGUA.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA EDUCACIÓN EN GUATEMALA. *See* Union of Workers in Education in Guatemala.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA EMBOTELLADORA CENTRAL (Union of Workers at the Embotelladora Central). *See* Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA EMBOTELLADORA GUATEMALTECA. *See* Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA LICORERA Y ESFUERZO. *See* Union of Light and Power Workers.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DEL INSTITUTO GUATEMALTECO DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL. *See* Union of Social Security Workers.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA MINAS IXTAHUACAN. *See* Union of Workers at the Ixtahuacan Mines.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN CARLOS. *See* Union of Workers at the University of San Carlos.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN SOCIAL. *See* Union of Media and Newspaper Workers.

SITRABI. *See* Union of Banana Workers of Izabal.

SLF. *See* Union of Light and Power Workers.

SOCIEDAD DE AUXILIO MUTUO FERROCARRILERO. *See* Union for Action and Betterment of Railway Workers.

STECAC (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Embotelladora Central). *See* Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca.

STEGAC. *See* Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca.

STEUFECO. *See* Union of Workers at United Fruit Company.

STIGSS. *See* Union of Social Security Workers.

STUSC. *See* Union of Workers at the University of San Carlos.

TEXTILYCUERO. *See* Federation of Textile and Leather Workers.

UNIDAD DE SINDICATOS DE TRABAJADORES DE GUATEMALA. *See* Union of Guatemalan Workers Unions.

UNIFICACIÓN OBRERA. *See* Worker Unification.

UNION CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF GUATEMALA (Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala—CSTG).

Formed by the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) in 1964 for agricultural workers at the time of President Peralta (1963–66), it continued to be listed by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in 1976 as a democratic union with twenty affiliates and 8,000, mainly agricultural, members.

UNION COUNCIL OF GUATEMALA (Consejo Sindical de Guatemala—CSG).

One of three federations founded by the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) soon after the U.S.-backed counter coup removed President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, it was replaced by the Union Confederation of Guatemala after Confederation of Guatemala* defections in 1963. The Central of Federated Workers* and Confederation of Guatemalan Trade Unity* retain its orientation.

UNION FEDERATION OF BANK EMPLOYEES (Federación Sindical de Empleados Bancarios—FESEB).

A founder of the National Committee of Trade Union Unity,* this federation represented many independent activist bank unions in the 1960s and achieved legal status in 1970; it includes virtually all bank unions. Its one-day work slowdown in 1974 indicated such potential economic disruption that it achieved an agreement. By 1976 it had twelve unions with 4,000 members. It continued as an active union of about the same size in 1984, a professional union with alliances to blue-collar and campesino groups.

UNION FOR ACTION AND BETTERMENT OF RAILWAY WORKERS (Sindicato de Acción y Mejoramiento de los Ferrocarrileros—SAMF).

One of the first active unions in Guatemala, the railway workers organization retained an anarcho-syndicalist approach through most of its history. In the revolutionary period (1944–54), a time when reform was associated with the presidencies of Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz, its 4,000 workers and leaders first helped to form the Confederation of Workers of Guatemala,* but when its leadership was removed over a dispute with the more leftist teachers union about international affiliation with CTAL (Confederation of Workers of Latin America, Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina), it created the less political Federation of Unions of Guatemala* with nine other unions. It carried out one of the first strikes and achieved collective bargaining agreements (1948). By 1951 it had patched up its differences and become part of the General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala.* The union revived after the revolutionary period, even picketing the elections of 1958. It struck in protest of repression and low wages in 1962 and helped form the independent Confederation of Guatemalan Workers.* It struck illegally in 1967. Declared a legal union in 1968, it won an agreement with the Railway, known as IRCA, but the Railway immediately violated the agreement, provoking another nine-day strike. It struck IRCA again in 1974; United Fruit then sold IRCA to the government.

UNION OF ACRICASA WORKERS (Sindicato de Trabajadores de ACRI-CASA).

This National Confederation of Workers* (CNT) affiliated union of women workers at the Japanese-owned Acrylic Thread Company was formed in 1977 by a two-week work stoppage that demanded a collective pact. The owners called the riot police, but the women started the machines and began to work. The police left, finding no evidence of strike or justification for removing the workers as the owners wished. A plant occupation occurred again in 1978; forty-three women were beaten and later arrested on trumped up charges; union leader Gonzalo AcBin was subsequently murdered. In 1980 many other of the union's leaders were eliminated, including its secretary-general, Sara Cabrera Flores, who disappeared after the attack on CNT headquarters, 21 June 1980.

UNION OF BANANA WORKERS OF IZABAL (Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros de Izabal).

A large unaffiliated union which replaced the Union of Workers at United Fruit Company* when Del Monte bought United Fruit in 1970. By 1976 it had 2,000 members and retained ties to the government. Nevertheless, two Del Monte union leaders were assassinated in 1980.

UNION OF GUATEMALAN WORKERS UNIONS (Unión de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de Guatemala—UNSITRAGUA).

Formed by twenty-five progressive unions, many of whom formerly belonged

to CNUS and CONUS, it asserted an independent political orientation. As a self-financed confederation it represented a progressive alternative to CUSG. It aided various strikes and protests, coinciding with the 1985 bus-fare increase, and in 1986 it organized the first major May-Day march in six years. Its 35,000 members included STECSA (Coca-Cola), Ray-O-Vac, Duralux, TACASA (Philip Morris), Capri, Pamaxan, Taylor Presa, Vicks and CIDASA, workers from the University of San Carlos, and some members of municipal, and banking (i.e. FESEBS) federations and large farms like the Mariana finca on the Caribbean coast.

UNION OF LIGHT AND POWER WORKERS (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Licorera y Esfuerzo—SLF).

First organized in 1950 at the Guatemalan Electric Company, affiliated with the Autonomous Union Federation of Guatemala* (FASGUA), it held a legal strike in 1957 which lasted fifteen days. In 1964 (without leaving FASGUA) it joined the Federation of Guatemalan Workers* (FTG). In 1974 after a series of job actions it achieved an agreement which guaranteed a standard workday and salary increase. It remained active within the FTG after repression hit most unions in 1980.

UNION OF MEDIA AND NEWSPAPER WORKERS (Sindicato de Trabajadores de los Medios de Comunicación—SIMCOS).

An active union, this National Confederation of Workers* affiliate included workers at *La Prensa* (newspaper) and other important national news outlets. Its members provided to Guatemalan news agencies abroad information and analysis which were restricted from publication in Guatemala. SIMCOS remained active throughout the mid-1980s as a member of the National Coordinator of Trade Union Unity* and a supporter of the Coca-Cola workers Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca* and other unions.

UNION NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES LIBRES. *See* National Union of Free Workers.

UNION OF SOCIAL SECURITY WORKERS (Sindicato de Trabajadores del Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social—STIGSS).

Formed following U.S. intervention in the 1950s, this union struck for a uniform work day in 1960 and over more general issues in 1962, joining with bank, municipal, electrical, and other workers.

By 1976 this union had 1,800 workers. It affiliated with the National Committee of Trade Union Unity* in 1978 and was hit with considerable repression. These incidents include the following: ambulance operator kidnapped in 1978; union press secretary abducted in 1979; secretary-general Leonel Osvaldo Contreras forced into exile; Ricardo Martínez Solorzano assassinated; Fredy Alberto

Aragón Zuniga, union leader, assassinated in 1980, along with José Emilio Escobar Barrios and María Adela González.

UNION OF WORKERS AT EMBOTELLADORA GUATEMALTECA (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Embotelladora Guatemalteca—STEGAC).

The Coca-Cola bottling plant in the mid-1970s became the catalyst for other union activity including the reformation of the National Committee of Trade Union Unity.* The fourteen-day lockout in 1976 finally achieved union recognition for this Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca, but subsequent conflicts—including the murder of three union heads (Pedro Quevedo, Manuel López Balam, and Marlon Mendizabal) and the exile of Israel Marquez (general secretary of STEGAC and, in 1978, Secretary of the National Confederation of Workers*)—made the union a symbol for the entire labor movement.

An international boycott, organized by the International Union of Food and Allied Workers of Geneva (IUF) in 1980 and supported by church and human rights groups, brought an important settlement which lasted for three years. A subsequent artificial bankruptcy shut the plant down in February 1984, but a worker occupation kept the plant open and with the help of the newly established National Coordinator of Trade Union Unity* brought the union into the international spotlight once again. After a second IUF intervention, Coca-Cola agreed to reopen the plant. After a prolonged wait and negotiations, the Guatemala-based Porras group bought the company and renamed it "Embotelladora Central" and negotiated a new contract with the renamed Union of Workers at Embotelladora Central (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Embotelladora Central—STECAC). The plant reopened in March 1985, and STECAC affiliated with the Union of Guatemalan Workers Unions.*

UNION OF WORKERS AT INCASA (Sindicato de Trabajadores de INCASA).

The union is important because of its relationship to Coca-Cola. In early March 1980 police entered Industria de Cafe SA, (INCASA) 51 percent owned by Coke, to deal with National Confederation of Workers* (CNT) union representatives who were protesting a lockout and employer refusal to negotiate renewal of the collective agreement. They also entered the headquarters of the CNT trade union center and arrested five of the INCASA union leaders and two members of the Municipal Workers Union. See National Confederation of Workers.

UNION OF WORKERS AT INDEGUA (Sindicato de Trabajadores de INDEGUA).

One of the first legal strikes to occur during the 1970–77 revival of labor, took place in 1975 at INDEGUA, a tennis shoe company. Two-thirds of the 400 workers participated in the vote to strike, including maids, drivers, and gardeners. Those in favor won by only two votes. The strike then occurred so fast and unexpectedly that the workers occupied the plant and confiscated the books before the owners realized what was happening and did not have time to get their books

out. The books showed that three managers were each earning \$3,000/month whereas the workers were getting less than \$50/month. The workers were only demanding a 50 percent increase in salary.

The judge happened to be a woman who came from a wealthy family and did not have to worry about losing her financial position. When the workers presented the evidence, she went against tradition and declared it to be a just cause. This was thus one of the first strikes since the Arbenz period (1950–54) to be declared a legal strike. It helped set the stage for later legal decisions.

UNION OF WORKERS AT THE IXTAHUACAN MINES (Sindicato de Trabajadores de las Minas Ixtahuacan).

Founded in 1977, this union's strike and 300-kilometer march to Guatemala City marked the rise of labor organizations throughout the country. Many groups came to join the march which grew to 100,000.

The miners, mainly from indigenous communities, refused to use certain breathing equipment and wicks whose design required the miners to rush out of any area of explosion. There were also other issues. Workers were being hired for two weeks to cut antimonium and tungsten ore. The company would then let them go and replace them with another group of workers to avoid paying the indemnification legally due workers terminated after two months of employment. In this "crew rotation" the company would only rehire workers that "behaved properly."

The National Confederation of Workers* (CNT) set up a local office in Huehuetenango, the largest city near the mines, and its attorneys began to work together in teams with local organizers. One such organizer was Mario (Wiwi) Mujia, a teacher at the Christian Brothers School who also worked at the Maryknoll Center for Integral Development and was active with Committees for Justice and Peace. With CNT support, various groups of workers traveled to the mines to talk with the miners about their difficulties and to discuss the experiences which they had also faced. With this help of the CNT, the workers took the U.S. owner of the tungsten mine to court. The judge finally ruled against the miners, and Minas de Guatemala closed its gates, ending jobs for 300. The miners then began a long protest march to Guatemala City to demand reinstatement and a new negotiated contract. As they walked along, miners at the Oxec mine and construction crews at the huge Chixoy and Aguacapa hydroelectric plants came to join them along the Pan-American highway. As one observer noted: "Quiché Indians ran from their homes offering food, clothing, money and moral support. Further along Cakchiquel Indians and Ladino peasants did the same. By Tecpán, 55 miles short of the capital, the miners learned their demands had been met. Yet they walked on to their destination in support of striking workers from the Pantalcón sugar mill, who in turn brought out sympathizers from the industrial estates around Lake Amatitlan." (Chinchilla, p. 5.)

UNION OF WORKERS AT THE UNIVERSITY SAN CARLOS (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad de San Carlos—STUSC).

Founded in 1974 with the help of activist student attorneys, this union of technical and clerical workers joined the Autonomous Union Federation of Guatemala* and became important in the 1976 bus strike and subsequent actions. In 1984 it occupied the university and obtained an important settlement.

UNION OF WORKERS AT UNITED FRUIT COMPANY (Sindicato de Empresa de Trabajadores de la United Fruit Company—STEUFECO).

An independent union that worked in coalition with various banana unions in the early 1940s, along with the Union for Action and Betterment of Railway Workers,* STEUFECO joined the Confederation of Workers of Guatemala* and the Federation of Unions of Guatemala.* It took action against the company in 1948 but faced problems from the breakaway National Union of Free Workers* formed by the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT). STEUFECO affiliated with the Union Confederation of Guatemala* in 1964 and later was part of the Central of Federated Workers.* It was replaced by the Union of Banana Workers of Izabal* in 1970.

UNION OF WORKERS IN EDUCATION IN GUATEMALA (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación en Guatemala—STEG).

Formed in 1945 as a major union of 2,000 after Ubico's (Jorge Ubico, dictator from 1931–44) fall, it helped create the Confederation of Workers of Guatemala* and maintain its avowedly leftist political orientation within the ruling Revolutionary Party. It opposed the more strictly economic position of the Union for Action and Betterment of Railway Workers* and the Federation of Unions of Guatemala* but helped build reconciliation through National Committee of Trade Union Unity* and the General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala* in 1951. It was eliminated by the U.S.-engineered coup in 1954, but revived after the teachers' strike in 1985. See National Council of Teachers.

UNITED FRUIT COMPANY WORKERS. *See* Union of Workers at United Fruit Company.

UNITRAL. *See* National Union of Free Workers.

UNSTRAGUA. *See* Union of Guatemalan Workers Unions.

WORKER FEDERATION FOR THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF LABOR (Federación Obrera de Guatemala Para la Protección Legal del Trabajo—FOG).

Created by the American Federation of Labor in 1918, the Worker Federation advocated worker welfare as opposed to political action; during the 1920s this union opposed all militant movements at United Fruit and International Railways. Most workers distrusted it, but some government delegates sought to make it more responsive to worker interests. It was affiliated with the Pan-American

Confederation of Workers, the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) predecessor organization in the region. It was the only federation permitted to exist during the Ubico regime (1930–44), and by U.S. admission, it was “more of a mutual aid society than a real union.” Elements of it persisted with some agricultural and artisan groups that reorganized in 1948 as the Regional Labor Federation of Guatemala (Federación Obrera Regional de Guatemala—FORG), which finally merged with the CGTG in 1951.

WORKERS LEAGUE OF GUATEMALA (Liga Obrera de Guatemala).

A movement of protective associations that sought more than ineffective government patronage, the League arose in 1919. Spearheaded by Silverio Ortiz of the tailors union, in spite of some links to the aristocracy, it published the first rank-and-file newspaper and organized 70,000 workers to call for Cabrera's (Manuel Estrada Cabrera, Guatemalan ruler from 1898 to 1920) downfall.

WORKERS REGIONAL FEDERATION OF GUATEMALA (Federación Regional Obrera de Guatemala—FROG).

Created in 1922 primarily by railway and United Fruit plantation workers with the help of the Guatemalan Section of the Communist Party to serve as a more radical alternative to the American Federation of Labor's Worker Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor, this regional organization was forced underground by President Ubico in 1931. The Party of Guatemalan Workers, a communist political party established in 1950, carried on its tradition.

WORKER UNIFICATION (Unificación Obrera).

Begun by the Manuel Estrada Cabrera (Guatemalan ruler, 1898–1920) government in 1915 to develop patriotic sentiments among workers and to prevent more militant forms of organizing, Worker Unification brought together various earlier protective associations. It officially ended with Cabrera's fall in 1920, but the following year reemerged as Socialist Worker Unification (Unificación Obrera Socialista—UOS). When the government disbanded the UOS in 1922, its members went on to help found the Guatemalan Communist Party.

Guyana _____

WILLIAM L. CUMIFORD

Guyana, covering a land area of some 83,000 square miles, is the largest former British possession in the Caribbean. The interior of the country consists of a vast, mostly uninhabitable rain forest with little fertile soil or mineral resources. The coastal strip, an alluvial plain 270 miles long and 8 to 10 miles wide, stands as a striking contrast to the interior. This narrow, elongated area boasts the productive sugar industry and the great bulk of the Guyanese population.

The sugar and bauxite industries, both major sources of revenue for Guyana, serve as the nation's most important employers. Rice, fundamentally an export surplus crop, is another leading source of employment. Georgetown, situated on the mid-coastal region, is by far the most significant urban center in Guyana.

Sighted by Christopher Columbus during his New World voyage of 1498, present-day Guyana remained for the most part cut off from European contact for more than a century. Ignored by Spain for its absence of mineral wealth, the coast of Guyana eventually fell prey to the French, Dutch, and British. The Netherlands became the chief colonizer of the region now called Guyana, striking root in the 1620s through the activities of the Dutch East India Company and the promotion of slave labor. By mid-century, these early efforts had been followed by scattered French and British settlements.

Dutch control held sway in Guyana and neighboring Suriname throughout the eighteenth century, even though British settlers were more numerous in the central village of Demerara. Sugar, first grown in a Pomeroon colony in 1658, emerged as the most important Guyanese crop before 1800. At this time Berbice also produced cotton and coffee. With their unique talent for cultivating low-lying land, the Dutch easily worked the narrow strip of Guyanese coastal terrain.

The European wars at the turn of the nineteenth century saw Guyana become first a French and then a British possession. England assumed control over most

of the area in 1796, completing occupation at the close of the Napoleonic Wars and in 1831 reorganizing the area as the colony of British Guyana.

The Guyanese economy of the nineteenth century was dominated by sugar and slavery, encompassed by a plantation-based, extensive socioeconomic operation. Developing its sugar production somewhat later than other West Indian societies, Guyana imported the latest and costliest milling equipment. Thus, Guyanese sugar operations were converted into strong, permanent capitalistic enterprises. In turn, the economy became increasingly dependent on a steady source of plantation labor.

By the mid-1800s Guyanese sugar concerns were being assailed by a variety of factors, including emancipation (1834) and the British practice of policing the Atlantic slave traffic. Also, the 1850s witnessed the dropping of preferential duties for Empire sugar and the lowering of general sugar tariffs in England. Suddenly the sugar plantation owners faced hard times, and the consolidation of large-estate sugar production quickly followed. Merchant operations, particularly the Liverpool-based Bookers Company, found themselves the owners of defaulted or cheaply sold Guyanese plantations. Enterprises were either closed or consolidated due to low prices and high wages. The number of Guyanese coastal sugar estates fell from 380 in 1800 to 64 in 1896, and eventually to only 12 on the eve of independence.

Early post-emancipation efforts to attract free laborers to the sugar estates met with dismal failure. Freedmen in Guyana sought land ownership rather than agricultural employment. Continued colonial emphasis on large-scale plantation production resulted in a policy aimed at the introduction of indentured labor.

Actually, the foundations of immigrant labor policy were laid in Guyana shortly after emancipation. In 1837 indentureship contracts were issued to attract Portuguese, Chinese, American Indians, Americans, and West Indians, but this program foundered. Nevertheless, one lucrative source of emigration—India—provided the basis for a portentous Guyanese social and economic legacy. Great Britain promoted Indian immigration by offering government loans to various sugar interests. By the 1870s an estimated 239,000 East Indians had arrived in Guyana.

This new reservoir of labor promised revived hopes for the lagging Guyanese sugar industry. By 1880 the crop value increased to 2 million pounds from only 1.2 million twenty years earlier. However, production fell again to 2 million pounds in 1913 after reaching an 1887 high of more than 2.6 million pounds. An absence of economic diversification (a trend also evident in Suriname during this period) further retarded general Guyanese development.

Central to an understanding of the social and economic character of Guyana is the race issue. As a result of slavery and the subsequent introduction of indentured labor, Guyana by the early twentieth century had become deeply divided along racial lines. Two distinct ethnic groups, African and Indian, formed this division, and the split has produced an irrevocable effect on political and labor questions before and since independence.

The black population represents the great bulk of the urban dwellers, while the Guyanese countryside is peopled primarily with the descendants of East Indian immigrants. Since labor organization followed geographical and occupational lines, trade unionism developed an unfortunate color cast, greatly affecting the nation politically and economically.

The wretched conditions experienced by plantation laborers and the only slightly improved status of urban workers touched off labor unrest before the turn of the twentieth century. Sporadic and poorly organized work stoppages in the sugarcane fields date to the 1840s, while labor grievances in Georgetown occurred in the early 1890s.

These initial strikes, usually interpreted as riots, were handled as such by the authorities. The sugar-estate owners regarded all work delays as tantamount to slave and servant rebellion. Consequently, the first modest gains made by the early disparate forces of labor were realized in the towns, where workers elicited some sympathy from a sizable bourgeois element.

The first notable Georgetown strike took place in 1905 among truckers and sugar packers. Paying daily wages of forty-eight to sixty-five cents for a ten-and-a-half hour work shift, waterfront managers ignited a unified labor protest which immediately found support in the larger community. As in all previous protests, police were summoned, numerous arrests were made, and several people died. This bloodshed aroused the city population to even greater disturbances. The riots, spreading to the nearby estates, became endemic throughout the countryside in the following decade.

By the close of World War I, Hubert Critchlow, a dockworker employed by Booker Brothers, had given the Guyanese labor movement a unique political stamp. Dock strikes begun in early 1917 by Critchlow and his followers soon affected other industries. At the end of 1917 Critchlow had secured higher wages and a nine-hour workday for the wharf employees, and by early 1918 other Guyanese laborers had made some gains through sporadic strike activity.

Critchlow's insistence on an eight-hour workday for waterfront laborers cost him his job in 1918, whereupon he initiated the formal organization of the first genuine labor union in Guyana, the British Guyana Labor Union* (BGLU). Over the next two years Critchlow's union attracted nearly 13,000 members and boasted a cash balance of just under \$10,000. The historic Guyanese practice of combining labor and political issues began in the early 1920s when Critchlow pressed for universal adult suffrage.

Despite the creation of a special trade union ordinance for Guyana in 1921, labor unrest continued throughout the early 1920s. High prices, wage reductions, and unemployment touched off a serious police strike in February 1923, followed fourteen months later by a series of confrontations between industrial workers and the authorities, that resulted in thirteen deaths. These disturbances took place in Georgetown and later spread to the nearby sugar estates.

In the aftermath of these encounters, the British Colonial Office entertained the notion of political reform for Guyana. Finally, in 1928, the old Dutch

constitution was replaced by a revised charter that offered the franchise to women and provided for elected officials to the Colonial Legislative Council, but nonetheless sanctioned the traditional mercantilist nature of colonial-mother country economic relations.

Along with other Caribbean areas, Guyana suffered tremendously during the Great Depression. Low profits from sugar exports and the need to acquire outside capital for public expenditures created conditions for low wages, unemployment, and poverty. Labor unrest late in the decade sparked the formation of the British Guyanese Workers' League (BGWL) under the direction of A. A. Thorne. This body, attempting to organize factory workers, public hospital employees, and other government workers, emerged as the first blanket union in the colony but remained small and rather ineffectual until the early 1940s.

A more significant labor response to the conditions of the 1930s took form in the Man Power Citizens' Association* (MPCA) organized by Ayube Edun in 1936. This represented the first concerted effort to organize the entire sugar estate work force in Guyana. Strong organization, low dues, and an emphasis on mass membership soon thrust the MPCA to the forefront of the trade union movement. Following disturbances which involved four deaths at the Lenora Plantation in 1939, the Sugar Producers' Association officially recognized the MPCA. During the same year the BGWL was acknowledged as the bona fide bargaining agent for Guyanese dockworkers. Moreover, a total of twelve other unions formed in Guyana between 1937 and 1939.

Labor discontent beset the West Indies and Caribbean throughout the 1930s, prompting the authorities in London to dispatch the Moyne Commission to ascertain the causes for worker unrest. The Commissioners' report, highly critical of colonial economic policies, paved the way for the creation of the Trades Union Council* (TUC) in 1941. Two years later this affiliate body represented approximately 6,770 workers in fourteen separate unions. In the mid-1940s Guyana listed twenty-four registered unions claiming just under 10,000 members. In 1942 colonial legislation set up the Guyanese Labour Department, and in the following year the TUC elected delegates to the World Federation of Trade Unions Conference.

In the 1940s, Dr. Cheddi Jagan, an East Indian, laid plans for a labor-oriented political party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP). Two of Jagan's associates, Dr. J. Lachmansingh and Amos Rangela, mobilized the East Indian estate workers under the banner of the Guyana Industrial Workers' Union* (GIWU). By the early 1950s the new union claimed twice the membership of the Man Power Citizens' Association, foreshadowing a future of racial divisions in trade unionism and politics.

Meanwhile, long-established firms such as the Demerara Bauxite Company steadfastly resisted labor demands. Yet two strikes called by the Man Power Citizens' Association in 1946 and 1947 successfully established the apparatus for the reconciliation of disputes with the bauxite firm. Moreover, in 1948 the Transport Workers' Union,* forestalling an attempt by the Transport and Har-

bours Department to transfer union leaders to outlying districts, managed a small triumph over governmental coercion.

The most noteworthy union activity of 1948, however, occurred on the Enmore sugar estate and involved five deaths and numerous injuries. The Enmore episode introduced the Guyana Industrial Workers' Union's strike efforts, especially in an attempt to attract East Indian estate employees. Though the union failed to obtain recognition from the Trades Union Council, the strike prompted the Venn Commission Report, which led to improvements in medical service, social welfare, and housing on the estates.

On the political front, Jagan's party launched a strong leftist program dedicated to anti-colonialism, political reform, universal suffrage, and internal self-government. The organizing efforts of the People's Progressive Party, particularly among the the colony's East Indian population, thrust Jagan into the Guyanese political spotlight. Following the promulgation of a new colonial constitution in 1952, Jagan assumed power, despite internal party struggles between himself and the leader of the black faction of the party, Forbes Burnham. Several years later the black element of the People's Progressive Party regrouped around Burnham's leadership to form the People's National Congress (PNC).

Jagan's first turn at political power lasted only a few months. The avowed communist proclivities of the PPP brought about the suspension of the constitution in early 1953. The Cold War mentality of the period, coupled with the party's internal factionalism, additional sugar-estate strikes, and Jagan's insistence on repealing the colony's Undesirable Publications Ordinance, prompted British intervention. An interim government ruled in Guyana from December 1953 to August 1957.

In the midst of this political impasse, Burnham broke from the PPP, forming the People's National Congress. New elections held in the summer of 1961 confirmed PPP control, but almost immediately the Jagan regime experienced difficulties. In response to a series of new tax laws in early 1962, Guyanese workers initiated four days of looting and rioting throughout Georgetown, causing damages amounting to nearly \$30 million. Jagan's budget proposals were withdrawn.

At a constitutional conference held in London from late 1962 to early 1963, the three principal Guyanese political leaders, Burnham, Jagan, and Peter D'Aguilar (head of the United Force), convened with the colonial secretary, Duncan Sandys, on the critical question of political representation. At this meeting the voting age was set at twenty-one, the date for Guyanese independence was deferred, and proportional representation selected as the means for electing the national legislature.

Shortly after returning from England, Jagan faced widespread opposition among workers over the passage of a controversial Labour Relations measure. Led by the Trades Union Council, workers went on strike in mid-April 1963. The strike, accompanied by race riots and extensive property damage, lasted until early July. The failure of the bill, which was designed to curb the enormous

influence of the Man Power Citizens' Association, compelled Jagan to offer political concessions to the Trades Union Council.

A five-month strike staged by Jagan-backed union forces in 1964 brought no change in the fortunes of the ailing People's Progressive Party. At the close of the year Jagan lost control of the legislature. Burnham assembled a coalition government, and Guyana attained independence under Burnham's leadership on 26 May 1966.

Racial and political conflict in Guyana abated with the consolidation of PNC power. As the 1970s opened, Burnham forged a "cooperative republic" as a Third World Guyanese alternative to capitalism and communism. At first, Burnham envisioned joint public and private control over the traditional foreign firms operating in the country. However, the reluctance of the Liverpool-based Demerara Bauxite Company to conclude terms with the government encouraged a program of nationalization. By 1973 Guyana claimed more than a thousand cooperatives under the aegis of a Ministry of Cooperatives and National Mobilization.

The most significant political development since independence has been the consolidation of one-party control by Burnham. In 1973 the prime minister secured a two-thirds majority in the national assembly, whereupon Jagan's forces boycotted the parliamentary body. Following this mandate the PNC expanded its cooperative program and nationalized additional industries. Another governmental milestone was the Declaration of Sophia (1974), asserting the socialist aims of one-party statism, land reform, national education, trade, and the drafting of a new constitution.

Important political alterations followed. The nation was divided into six administrative districts, and the state took control of two-thirds of the country's print media. The PNC also adopted a national service program, a measure that met serious opposition among the East Indian population.

In the mid-1970s nationalization programs increased. In 1974 the government took over the U.S.-controlled Reynolds Bauxite Company, followed the next year by the seizure of Booker, McConnell and Company, a large concern that controlled 40 percent of all Guyanese exports and 35 percent of the gross domestic product. By the end of 1976 the Burnham government held direct authority over 80 percent of the national economy, including Guyana's largest export products, sugar and bauxite.

This policy of cooperativism materialized only through momentous political adjustments. Nationalization of the sugar industry demanded a settlement with the PPP. Jagan offered lukewarm support to the Burnham government in return for the latter's recognition of the Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union* as the principal labor voice for the nation's sugar employees. This "critical support" proffered by Jagan to the PNC began a two-year truce between the dominant Guyanese racial and political factions.

The constitution of Guyana called for an election in 1978. Despite promises to the contrary, Burnham proposed in July of that year to convert the assembly

into a constituent body with powers of two-thirds ratification to alter the constitution. Burnham's move appeared to the PPP as a bold-faced attempt to create a one-party state, as the prime minister postponed the elections for a year amidst severe criticism from the East Indians. Racial and political disharmony again reigned in Guyana.

In the early 1980s a genuine political settlement in Georgetown appeared elusive. The nation faced economic difficulties and renewed racial tension. East Indian bitterness grew over disproportionate black representation in the military, police force, and bureaucracy. Further complications arose from splinter bodies formed among the majority ethnic groups. Burnham, though exhibiting considerable political agility in winning some adherents from the East Indian community, confronted growing opposition in black ranks with the organization of the African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA), a group seeking closer identification with nascent African nationalism.

The most serious dispute between the Burnham regime and labor interests occurred in 1969 when the state mining company violated an agreement over increments during training of workers. This carried over into a confrontation over wages, fomenting a six-week strike and fueling protests against alleged political repression and economic mismanagement. During this episode, the General Mine Workers' Union (GMWU) received vigorous support from a number of anti-government trade unions, led by the pro-Jagan Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union.

During the course of the strike, union leaders were imprisoned, police and strikers clashed on the picket lines, and the country was temporarily polarized by anti-union articles in the government-controlled press. Despite severe criticism from the Caribbean Congress of Labour (a subregional organization of the InterAmerican Regional Organization of Workers), the government forced the GMWU to an arbitration unpopular with the rank and file of that body.

The leaders of Guyana's trade union reflect the ethnic character of the membership with top-echelon positions traditionally occupied by Afro-Guyanese professionals who possess strong educational and social backgrounds, connections with the old colonial system, and active involvement in public life. The same may be said of the East Indians in the Man Power Citizens' Association and the Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union. Both groups have been deeply involved in civic affairs since the early days of trade unionism, when organized labor acted as a launching pad for budding political careers.

The Trade Unions Ordinance stipulates the fundamental nature of the nation's union practices, asserting that while any seven persons may form a union, recognized labor organizations must be listed with the Registrar of Trade Unions. This procedure must also be accompanied by appropriate bylaws and an index of trustees and officers. Slightly over half of the labor force in Guyana is unionized.

Guyana unions are characterized by a highly centralized power structure created by a system of shop steward elections based on appointment by union

officers. Nonetheless, rank-and-file support of labor issues runs strong owing to high unemployment, periodic racial strife, and the unions' unique position as bargaining agents.

Bibliography

- Alexander, Robert J., ed. *Political Parties of the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies*, vol. 2. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982.
- Area Handbook for Guyana*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.
- Chase, Ashton. *A History of Trade Unionism in Guyana, 1900–1961, with an Epilogue to 1964*. Demerara: New Guyana Company, 1964.
- Coldrick, A. P. and Philip Jones, eds. *The International Directory of the Trade Union Movement*. New York: Facts on File, 1979.
- Daly, Vere. *A Short History of the Guyanese People*. Hong Kong: Macmillan Education, 1975.
- Despres, Lo A. *Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana*. Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1967.
- Dunkerley, James and Chris Whitehouse. *Unity Is Strength—Trade Unions in Latin America, A Case for Solidarity*. Nottingham, Eng.: Latin American Bureau, 1980.
- Hendrickson, Embert J. "In Pursuit of the Cooperative Republic: Guyana in the 1970s." *World Today* 35 (May 1979): 214–22.
- Manley, Robert H. *Guyana Emergent: The Post-Independence Struggle for Nondependent Development*. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1982.
- Newman, Peter. *British Guiana: Problems of Cohesion in an Immigrant Society*. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Premdas, Ralph R. "Guyana: Socialist Reconstruction or Political Opportunism." *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 20, no. 2 (May 1978): 133–63.
- Sackey, James A. "Dependence, Underdevelopment, and Socialist-Oriented Transformation in Guyana." *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 33 (Summer 1979): 29–50.
- Smith, Raymond T. *British Guiana*. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.
- Spinner, Thomas J., Jr. *A Political and Social History of Guyana, 1945–1983*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1984.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

BERBICE MINEWORKERS' UNION. *See* Guyana Mineworkers' Union.

BRITISH GUYANA LABOR UNION. *See* Guyana Labor Union.

BRITISH GUYANA TRADES UNION COUNCIL. *See* Trades Union Council.

CIVIL SERVICE ASSOCIATION—CSA.

Claiming only around 2,000 members in the early 1970s, the Civil Service Association enjoys a position of power and prestige not reflected in its numbers.

The group comprises career civil service personnel and is a black-led union. Founded in 1948, the CSA is affiliated with Public Services International (PSI).

A salient feature of recent Guyanese trade unionism is the critical role played by the civil service. Throughout the colonial period the civil service existed as the primary conduit of social improvement among the urban masses. This domain, long dominated by the black population of the colony, has been invaded over the last generation by the burgeoning East Indian element. By the late 1950s the higher echelon of civil service employment had been inundated by nonwhite groups. This development was encouraged by the conversion of the Civil Service Association into a trade union. In the early 1960s the CSA, with its essentially middle-class orientation, expressed deep-seated anti-Jagan sentiments. (Dr. Cheddi Jagan was head of the People's Progressive Party and one of the major figures in Guyana politics.)

In its momentous struggle with the People's Progressive Party, the Trades Union Council* drew upon the organizational talents of the CSA to prolong the nationwide strike of 1963–64. This action thoroughly alienated Jagan. The prime minister filed formal charges against the CSA for irregularities relative to ethnic imbalances in governmental hiring practices.

After the collapse of the Jagan administration, Burnham responded to mounting charges of CSA misconduct by calling for an investigation through an international commission. In the fall of 1964 a three-member jury (Austrian, Greek, and Irish), concluded that only minor problems existed in the civil service. They recommended the creation of a security force designed to monitor signs of misconduct and ethnic favoritism in the CSA. This assessment, quickly adopted by Burnham, led to the momentary easing of racial tension and contributed to a more rapid move toward Guyanese independence.

CLERICAL AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS' UNION—CCWU.

Registered in February 1950 as the Clerical Workers' Union, this organization changed its name to the Clerical and Commercial Workers' Union in 1957. It is affiliated with the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, and Technical Employees (IFCCTE), the International Union of Food and Allied Workers' Associations (IUF), the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International (PTTI), and the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF).

With approximately 4,000 employees, this union body is directed by black leadership. The CCWU is located in Georgetown, and its current leaders are general secretary Birchmore Philadelphia and president G. Todd.

CLERICAL WORKERS' UNION. *See* Clerical and Commercial Workers' Union.

GAWU. *See* Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union.

GIWU (Guyana Industrial Workers' Union). *See* Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union.

GUYANA AGRICULTURAL WORKERS' UNION—GAWU.

Currently recognized as the official representative of the sugar laborers of Guyana, the GAWU was known originally as the Guyana Industrial Workers' Union (GIWU), the labor arm of Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party. This group, with East Indian leadership and rank-and-file membership, was registered on 5 April 1948.

Jagan's colorful career as a union and political leader began with his affiliation with the Man Power Citizens' Association* (MPCA) in the early 1940s. Though he reached the high office of treasurer for the MPCA, he eventually became thoroughly alienated by what he viewed as the union's political expediency. The compromising attitude of the MPCA in dealing with the Sugar Producers' Association prompted Jagan to bolt the organization and form a separate group devoted to the East Indian labor cause. The result was the formation in the mid-1940s of the Guyana Industrial Workers Union (GIWU). In league with a drug-store proprietor, Dr. J. Lachmansingh, Jagan initiated a program calculated to draw East Indian sugar workers away from the Man Power Citizens' Association. This activity unconsciously spawned an era of labor agitation culminating in ominous political developments for Guyana.

In its ensuing jurisdictional debate with the MPCA, the GIWU found itself opposed by a potent combination of Guyanese political forces—the Sugar Producers' Association and the Trades Union Council (TUC).^{*} The latter body, in refusing membership to Jagan's group, set the stage for bitter union rivalry among East Indian sugar employees. By 1948 both the MPCA and GIWU claimed approximately 5,000 members. Jagan soon forced the labor representation issue by calling general strikes. These walkouts, beginning in Demerara and later extending to other parts of the colony, precipitated widespread violence, property damage, and several deaths. Still, the Sugar Producers' Association and the TUC refused to acknowledge the GIWU.

Regardless of shortcomings on the organized labor front, Jagan managed to parlay his influence among the workers into political capital. Forming a new government for the colony in 1953, Jagan once again challenged the Man Power Citizens' Association. These circumstances set the stage for intense union and political rivalries in the 1960s.

Meanwhile, in an attempt to marshal his forces against the MPCA, Jagan enlisted the support of leading Guyanese blacks in forming the People's Progressive Party (PPP). Endless strikes and other labor-related disturbances led to the suspension of the constitution. Over the following decade the strength of the PPP eroded as Forbes Burnham molded the People's National Congress (PNC) from the black faction of the party. By the late 1950s the GIWU no longer existed as a powerful trade union force.

Yet Jagan proved determined to resurrect a firm labor-political base. Drawing once again from strong East Indian support, remnants of the former GIWU reorganized in the early 1960s as the Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union. Jagan gained a wide following in the countryside by exhorting vigorous oppo-

sition to Burnham and the PNC. Eventually, the prime minister's nationalization program provided Jagan a unique opportunity to reap benefits in the trade union movement.

Burnham's ambitious program of cooperativism required conciliation with the East Indian working element. Nationalization of the sugar industry, in particular, demanded accommodation with the predominant labor force in Guyana. The loyalty enjoyed by Jagan among the vast majority of these employees forced a withdrawal of the ban against the GAWU.

The arrangement between Burnham and Jagan consisted of the latter's offer of "critical support" to the government in return for PNC recognition of the GAWU as the official voice of sugar workers' concerns. This bargain smoothed the way for large-scale nationalization, and, more significantly, temporarily reconciled the two major racial and political elements of Guyana. A high point in this rapprochement occurred in May 1976 when Jagan ended a three-year PPP absence in the assembly. Burnham's political fortunes were likewise enhanced when the economy, through increased sugar production, showed marked improvement in the years 1974–75.

In the summer of 1977 this political compromise rapidly disintegrated. First, Burnham rebuffed Jagan's overtures for the organization of a coalition government. Then, a five-month sugar workers' strike threatened to plunge the nation into its former state of racial strife amidst prolonged union agitation. Though the strike ended in January 1978, hostilities continued as diminished sugar revenues thwarted the encouraging economic forecasts of the mid-1970s.

GUYANA BAUXITE MINERS' UNION. *See* Guyana Mineworkers' Union.

GUYANA INDUSTRIAL WORKERS' UNION. *See* Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union.

GUYANA LABOR UNION—GLU.

Trade unionism in Guyana dates to the organization of the British Guyana Labor Union (BGLU) by a dockworker named Hubert Critchlow. Receiving monetary aid and moral support from the British Labour Party, Critchlow set about organizing Guyanese dock laborers in 1917. This original union body boasted a membership of roughly 13,000 by the early 1920s, but experienced very limited success over the following decade. At that time only the Georgetown dockworkers claimed membership in the BGLU. The Colonial Trades Union Ordinance of 1921 extended official status to Critchlow's union, but the recognition of organized labor by employers did not materialize until the 1930s, when the Man Power Citizens' Association* was formed. Upon independence, the name of the BGLU was changed to the Guyana Labor Union.

Consisting of waterfront, sawmill, and construction laborers, the GLU presently claims a membership of approximately 9,000. This union body is organized under black leadership and holds affiliation with the International Transport

Workers' Federation (ITF). Central offices of the GLU are located in Cummingsburg, under the guidance of general secretary Stanton Critchlow and the honorary presidency of Guyana's prime minister Forbes Burnham. The union obtained a registered listing on 11 January 1922.

GUYANA MINEWORKERS' UNION—GMU

This organization, formerly known as the Mineworkers' Union and the Guyana Bauxite Miners' Union, lists 3,000 to 4,000 members and is affiliated with the International Metalworkers' Federation, and the Caribbean Bauxite and Mineworkers' Federation. The GMU, led by blacks and composed of bauxite miners and processors, is headquartered in Georgetown.

Following abortive strikes in the early 1940s, the GMU achieved official recognition after conducting prolonged strikes in 1946–47. Until very recently this group was nonaligned politically and democratic in nature; it espoused a sturdy rank-and-file philosophy. Shortly after the union organized in 1950 it split from the Man Power Citizens' Association,* and six years later amalgamated with the Berbice Mineworkers' Union. For the most part this union remained untouched by the chaos of the 1953–64 period, but entered the political spotlight in 1979 when a six-week strike precipitated direct confrontation with the Burnham government. The GMU, under the secretarial direction of P. Benjamin, is currently affiliated with the rejuvenated Trades Union Council.*

GUYANA TRADES UNION COUNCIL. *See* Trades Union Council.

GUYANESE TIMBER, SAWMILL, AND QUARRY WORKERS' UNION—GTSQWU.

The Guyanese Timber, Sawmill, and Quarry Workers' Union, also known as the Sawmill and Forest Workers' Union, is an industrial group limited by small membership. This body has proven difficult to mold into a viable labor force because of the constant mobility of the workers (the employment calls for seasonal and migratory labor). The union is further weakened by employer antipathy to unionization and a history of close ties with the People's Progressive Party. In fact, the union was suspended in 1957 by the Trades Union Council* for supporting Dr. Cheddi Jagan in the elections of that year.

Numerous operations in jungle areas also hamper communication between union officers and the larger membership. Though union numbers are presently unknown, headquarters are situated in Georgetown, and the group holds affiliation with the International Federation of Builders' and Woodworkers' Union and the Trade Unions International of Agricultural, Forestry and Plantation Workers.

MAN POWER CITIZENS' ASSOCIATION—MPCA.

Founded and registered in 1936, the Man Power Citizens' Association is one of the largest and most powerful unions in Guyana. Led primarily by East Indians,

this group represents the interests of approximately 20,000 sugar workers and lists affiliation with the Postal Telegraph and Telephone International and the International Federation of Plantation, Agricultural, and Allied workers.

The efforts of Hubert Critchlow and the British Guyana Labor Union* (BGLU) to enlist widespread support for labor activity prior to the 1930s failed for two major reasons. First, BGLU backing centered in Georgetown and thus enjoyed only meager support among rural laborers. Second, Critchlow's organization was overwhelmingly black in racial composition; the agrarian East Indian element had little in common with the Georgetown dockworkers of African descent.

In the mid-1930s an East Indian idealist advocating a philosophy of "rational-practical-idealism" appeared as a spokesman for Guyanese sugar workers. This was Ayube Edun, a visionary newspaper editor who had published a number of articles criticizing the wretched state of rural working conditions throughout the colony. Edun eventually formulated a plan for the organization of this element. Though the Man Power Citizens' Association fell short of Edun's dream of workingmen's equality, the new group did manage to forge a bargaining agreement with the powerful Sugar Producers' Association. Aside from essential labor matters, the MPCA launched Edun on a successful political career, a familiar trend in twentieth-century Guyanese public life.

Despite setbacks to the labor movement brought about by World War II, under Edun's adept leadership the MPCA inaugurated a militant drive to improve the working conditions of the colony. By the mid-1940s this effort had produced higher wages and better housing among sugar workers, the largest labor force in Guyana. Edun's death, however, foreshadowed an eclipse of this strident trade union activity, and by the early 1950s the MPCA was viewed increasingly as an appendage of sugar management interests.

Meanwhile, trade unionism flourished. In 1956 a revitalized Trades Union Council* began a process of colony-wide affiliations which included the rather conservative MPCA. Under the guidance of president Richard Ishmael and general secretary Cleveland Charran, the union embarked on a rejuvenated militancy. This organization has received large-scale support from the British Trades Union Council and publishes an influential newspaper called the *Labour Advocate*.

MINeworkers' UNION. *See* Guyana Mineworkers' Union.

MPCA. *See* Man Power Citizens' Association.

SAWMILL AND FOREST WORKERS' UNION. *See* Guyanese, Timber, Sawmill and Quarry Workers' Union.

TRADES UNION COUNCIL—TUC.

This body, founded in 1940 as the British Guyana Trades Union Council, presently claims 50,000 members and stands as the leading federation of trade unions in the country. The TUC represents more than thirty craft and industrial

workingmen's organizations and lists affiliation with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Comprising over four-fifths of Guyanese union membership, a large percentage of TUC members list their primary group affiliation as the Man Power Citizens' Association.*

Aside from private sector associations, TUC affiliates include mail carriers, medical support personnel, blue collar laborers in government industrial plants, and other workers. The largest public sector affiliate encompassed by the TUC is the Transport Workers' Union.*

Other significant groups under the TUC umbrella are the Guyana Labor Union,* the Clerical and Commercial Workers' Union,* and the Guyana Mineworkers' Union.*

The recent political history of Guyana has been greatly affected by the conflict over sugar-labor representation. The Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union* (GAWU), formed by Cheddi Jagan in 1948, evoked a negative reaction from the TUC. Ostensibly because of the political and racial overtones of the People's Progressive Party and the GAWU, the TUC denied Jagan's application for affiliate status. However, this was reversed by the accommodation reached between Jagan and Forbes Burnham (leader of the People's National Congress) in 1975. Most East Indian sugar workers support Jagan; consequently, inter-union rivalry has sparked bitter political feuds and affected labor-management relations in adverse ways since the 1950s.

The TUC offers organizational coordination to its various members by operating an educational program called the Critchlow Labor Institute, conferences and seminars on union leadership, the administration of an industrial training center, and other programs. The TUC also offers a low-cost housing program to union members.

The TUC advocates a tripartite approach to labor consultation, involving government, labor, and management concurrence on critical union matters. The council also coordinates union participation in social and economic planning, and the implementation of international trade union goals throughout Guyana. The three stated objectives of the TUC are the establishment of minimum wage laws, settlement of a forty-hour workweek, and a mandatory checkoff of union dues.

Significantly, the TUC presidency is in the hands of Richard Ishmael, also at the helm of the Man Power Citizens' Association.* Joseph Pollydore serves as the general secretary of the council, and central offices are located in Georgetown. Besides the International Confederation of Free Trade Union, TUC international affiliates include the Caribbean Congress of Labor (CCL) and the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT). Nine international trade secretariats maintain affiliates in Guyana. See Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union.

TRANSPORTATION WORKERS' UNION. *See* Transport Workers' Union.

TRANSPORT WORKERS' UNION—TWU.

Registered in 1938, the Transport Workers' Union claims nearly 3,000 employees whose occupations include ferrymen and railroad service workers in the Transport and Harbors Department of the government. This body is the largest public union under the auspices of the Trades Union Council* and holds affiliation with the International Transport Workers' Federation.

The TWU enjoys the distinction of being the first public sector union to score a small victory over the government when in 1948 it prevented the transfer of union officials during bargaining disputes. On the whole, however, this group has remained relatively disengaged from the stormy partisan politics of Guyana. A democratic, rank-and-file body appealing to skilled workers with a strong salary base, the TWU won closed-shop status by striking against the government, and is most likely financially the strongest union in the country. The union is headquartered in Georgetown and functions under the secretarial direction of F. W. Facey.

TUC. *See* Trades Union Council.

Haiti

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

The Republic of Haiti has several characteristics which make it distinctive in Latin America. It was the first Latin American nation to achieve independence, in a slave revolt in 1804. It is the most thoroughly African country in the area. It is also probably the poorest of the Latin American and West Indian territories.

Haiti has also had an almost unbroken record of dictatorships. This aspect of the country's history has been a particularly important factor in discouraging the development of an organized labor movement. Indeed, the only period in which the trade unions were able to grow and become at least of some significance in Haitian society was in the ten-year period 1946–56, covering the only more or less democratic administration which Haiti has enjoyed during the twentieth century, that of President Dumarsais Estimé, between 1946 and 1950, and of the relatively benign military dictatorship which followed Estimé's overthrow. The backwardness and weakness of the Haitian economy also served to hinder the development of a strong labor movement; the country typically had relatively few wage workers. Most such workers were organized during the years of Estimé and his successor General Paul Magloire, but even then they numbered no more than a few thousand.

During the first century of independence, Haiti suffered from a series of dictatorial presidents, "presidents for life," and three emperors. Then in 1915 came the United States Marines' invasion and occupation of the country. That lasted for a little less than twenty years, during which the first beginnings of an organized labor movement reportedly appeared.

When the Americans withdrew their troops and administration, they left in charge President Sténio Vincent, who stayed in office until 1941, when he was followed by his hand-picked successor, President Elie Lescot. Both of these regimes were more or less rigid dictatorships, which had little tolerance for an organized labor movement.

It was not until the overthrow of the Lescot government by a group of young officers of the Haitian National Guard (which the Americans had left as the country's armed forces) and civilian intellectuals in January 1946, that there was much room in the Haitian polity for a labor movement. After a short period of military rule, there were elections, which brought to the presidency President Dumarsais Estimé.

The Estimé administration was undoubtedly the most democratic government which Haiti has ever experienced. During most of the period, there existed a critical press and several opposition political parties. A real organized labor movement appeared for the first time. However, President Estimé suffered from the same weakness as most of his predecessors: a desire to stay in office beyond his constitutional term. When he tried to arrange that, he was overthrown in May 1950 by the same military leaders whose ouster of President Lescot had paved the way for Estimé's ascension to office.

After another short period of rule by a military junta, General Paul Magloire became president. Although the Magloire administration enacted some labor and social legislation favorable to the urban workers, on the whole the labor movement which had developed in the previous period was greatly weakened. Magloire also attempted to stay in power beyond his constitutional period. He, too, was overthrown as a consequence. There then followed, in 1956-57, several months of short-lived governments, including a period of less than one month in which Daniel Fignole, a major figure in the country's labor movement, was chief executive.

This period of instability ended with elections in which Dr. François Duvalier was chosen as president, with the support of the leaders of the armed forces, and under conditions in which his competitors either were in exile or were campaigning from the underground. Through various devices, Dr. Duvalier succeeded in remaining in power until his death in 1971. Then, Life President François Duvalier (popularly known as "Papa Doc") was succeeded by his son Life President Jean-Claude Duvalier ("Baby Doc").

The Duvalier regime completed the destruction of the labor movement. In the 1980s there were virtually no remnants of organized labor.

During the decade in which a more or less effective labor movement existed, various kinds of workers were unionized. Of particular importance were the dock and maritime workers, the chauffeurs, shoe workers, sugar refinery employees, and some groups of artisans.

During this period a number of unions managed to establish more or less satisfactory collective bargaining relations with employers. These included the maritime workers who won, among other things, a union hiring hall; the chauffeurs, who in some cases also won at least partial control of employment in their sector; and a few of the unions of factory workers.

Some of the unions also established cooperatives and developed mutual benefit activities for their members. The most successful, if short-lived, cooperatives were undoubtedly those among the chauffeurs.

There existed during this period a number of central labor organizations. The first of these was the Federation of Haitian Workers* (Fédération des Travailleurs Haitiens—FTH), established late in 1946. A year and a half later, a split in the FTH led to the establishment of the Haitian Federation of Labor* (Fédération Haitienne du Travail—FHT). A split in the FHT brought formation of the General Confederation of Workers* (Confédération Général des Travailleurs—CGT). Meanwhile, under the influence of one of the principal political figures of the time, Daniel Fignole, another central labor group, first known as the Union of Laborers and Workers (Syndicat des Ouvriers et Travailleurs—SOT) and then as the National Union of Haitian Workers* (Union Nationale des Travailleurs Haitiens—UNTH) had been established.

With the overthrow of the Estimé regime the existing central labor groups were suppressed. However, in 1952 a new organization was established, the National Union of Workers of Haiti* (Union Nationale des Ouvriers d’Haiti—UNOH). It survived through the remainder of the administration of General Paulo Magloire, but was completely suppressed by the Duvalier dictatorship.

The different union groups had different political orientations. At least some of the leaders of the FTH were members of the Popular Socialist Party, the Haitian Communist Party of that period. The leaders of the Haitian Federation of Labor, on the other hand, closely aligned themselves with President Dumarsais Estimé, for which they suffered after his overthrow. The CGT supported the efforts of President Juan Perón of Argentina to organize a hemispheric labor confederation. Finally, the national Union of Haitian Workers was largely controlled by Daniel Fignole, the most important leader of the opposition to the Estimé and Magloire governments.

During the 1946–56 period there also existed for longer or short periods regional federations of labor, associated with the FHT, as well as a handful of industrial federations of more or less national scope. The most important of the latter were organizations of dock and maritime workers and of chauffeurs.

During the decade of trade union organization and activity, the Haitian organized workers received considerable aid and advice from the labor movements of several other countries. Soon after the overthrow of the Lescot regime in 1946, Cuban trade union leader Juan Arevalo went to Haiti to help in the establishment of the first unions in Port-au-Prince. Subsequently, the Haitian Federation of Labor joined the Inter-American Confederation of Workers (Confederación Interamericana de Trabajadores—CIT), and on several occasions officials of the CIT or of national union groups affiliated with it visited the country. In 1952, Serafino Romualdi, of the American Federation of Labor and assistant secretary of the CIT’s successor, the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), helped to bring about the establishment of the National Union of Workers of Haiti (Union Nationale des Ouvriers d’Haiti) to replace the banned FTH.

Although after 1957 “Papa Doc” destroyed virtually all of the organized labor movement, there were attempts to regroup in the face of the tyranny of the

Duvalier regime and its attack on existing union groups. This resulted in the establishing of two new groups to serve as central labor organizations: the Inter-Trade Union of Haiti* (Inter-Sindical d'Haiti—ISH) and the Federation of Christian Trade Unions of Haiti* (Fédération des Syndicats Chrétiens d'Haiti—FSCH). By 1962 both of those groups had been totally destroyed by the Duvalier regime.

During a short period in 1979–80, under pressure of President Carter's human rights policy, the Duvalier government allowed the formation of unions. It is reported that twenty-four different ones appeared, and they joined in organizing the Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers* (Centrale Autonome des Travailleurs Haitiens—CATH). There were even a few short-lived strikes. However, in 1980, the secretary-general of the CATH, Yves-Antoine Richard, was deported and the union movement generally collapsed.

In July 1983 a two-man delegation from the American Institute for Free Labor Development reported encountering only two organizations which could in any sense be called labor unions. These were the Union of Workers of the Haitian American Sugar Company* and the Association of Chauffeurs Guides of Haiti.* The delegation was unable to establish contact with any of the eighteen other labor groups they were told still existed.

Events in Haiti took a dramatic turn in 1985 as pressure mounted on the regime of Jean Claude Duvalier. A referendum on his presidency-for-life was to form part of the elections scheduled for 1987; the government decided to allow political parties to operate, but not any challenge to Duvalier. With the issue broached, however, protests grew. Amidst growing unrest in February 1986, Duvalier imposed a state of siege, then suddenly fled to France in a United States C-141. A military junta assumed control, with Lt. General Henri Namphy in command. However, control of the country in the post-Duvalier era remained no easy task, especially with the dissolution of the hated Ton-Tons Macoutes and general rise in demands for tangible fruits of Haiti's new democratic status, including elections for an assembly and president. Financial difficulties also beset the country, as did threats of both anarchy and reimposition of harsh dictatorial rule.

Bibliography

- Alexander, Robert J. Notes on interviews with Haitian labor leaders, and miscellaneous trade union documents in writer's possession.
- American Institute for Free Labor Development. "Report on Haiti," 8 July 1983, from John Sarr and James R. Holway to William C. Doherty, Jr., Executive Director of AIFLD.
- Weinstein, Brian and Aaron Segal. *Haiti: Political Failures, Cultural Successes*. New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1984.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ACDH. *See* Association of Chauffeurs Guides of Haiti.

ASSOCIATION DES CHAUFFEURS GUIDES D'HAÏTI. *See* Association of Chauffeurs Guides of Haiti.

ASSOCIATION OF CHAUFFEURS GUIDES OF HAITI (Association des Chauffeurs Guides d'Haiti—ACGH).

This was one of the two surviving unions with which a visiting United States labor delegation was able to make contact in 1983. It had originally been established with the patronage of President François Duvalier (1957–71), who had given its owner-driver members a monopoly of transport of all tourists. However, the Association had lost this monopoly under policies inaugurated by the Ministry of Tourism in 1978. The organization owned its own garage and ran a school for 400 children near its headquarters.

AUTONOMOUS CENTRAL OF HAITIAN WORKERS (Centrale Autonome des Travailleurs Haitiens—CATH).

A very short-lived confederation of unions established in 1980, when the Duvalier administration, under pressure from U.S. President Carter's human rights policy, allowed a revival of the labor movement for a few months. It disintegrated after the deportation of its secretary-general, Yves-Antoine Richard.

CATH. *See* Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers.

CENTRALE AUTONOME DES TRAVAILLEURS HAITIENS. *See* Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers.

CGT. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

COMITÉ DE COORDINATION SYNDICALE (Committee of Trade Union Coordination). *See* National Union of Workers of Haiti.

COMMITTEE OF TRADE UNION COORDINATION (Comité de Coordination Syndicale). *See* National Union of Workers of Haiti.

CONFÉDÉRATION GÉNÉRAL DES TRAVAILLEURS. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

FÉDÉRATION DES OUVRIERS DE CAYES (Federation of Workers of Cayes). *See* Haitian Federation of Labor.

FÉDÉRATION DES OUVRIERS DU NORD. *See* Federation of Workers of the North.

FÉDÉRATION DES OUVRIERS DU VOLANT D'HAÏTI. *See* Federation of Drivers of Haiti.

FÉDÉRATION DES SYNDICATS CHRÉTIENS D'HAÏTI. *See* Federation of Christian Trade Unions of Haiti.

FÉDÉRATION DES TRAVAILLEURS HAITIENS. *See* Federation of Haitian Workers.

FÉDÉRATION DU TRAVAIL D'HAÏTI. *See* Labor Federation of Haiti.

FÉDÉRATION HAITIENNE DU TRAVAIL. *See* Haitian Federation of Labor.

FEDERATION OF CHRISTIAN TRADE UNIONS OF HAITI (Fédération des Syndicats Chrétiens d'Haïti—FSCH).

This organization was established in 1959, after the Duvalier government (1957–71) had destroyed most preexisting trade union groups. It was able to function, albeit with difficulty, until 1962, at which time it was suppressed by the Duvalier regime and its leaders driven into exile. They maintained an exile group for some years, with headquarters first in the Dominican Republic, and subsequent to the 1965 civil war there, in Caracas, Venezuela. No information is available concerning the number of affiliates and rank-and-file members the Federation had when it was able to function in Haiti. For a time at least it published a periodical, *Workers Struggle* (*Lutte Ouvrier*).

FEDERATION OF DRIVERS OF HAITI (Fédération des Ouvriers du Volant d'Haïti).

This federation, established early in the Estimé period (1946–50), had affiliated with it chauffeurs unions in eight different cities and towns. It was said in mid-1948 to have affiliates in Port-au-Prince with 365 members, Cap Haïtien with 80, Port-de-Paix-Pont with 75, St-Marc with 100, Jacmel with 42, Cayes with 75, and Seremic with 87. At that time it published a newspaper, *The Voice of the Chauffeurs* (*La Voix du Chauffeurs*). The Federation of Drivers at first belonged to the Federation of Haitian Workers,* but withdrew in 1947. It did not join any other central labor organization, although some of its local affiliates did join the Haitian Federation of Labor.* It belonged to the Inter-American Confederation of Chauffeurs, with its headquarters in Santiago, Chile, and was represented at the Second Congress of the Inter-American Confederation of Workers (Confederación Interamericana de Trabajadores—CIT) in Havana in September 1949.

FEDERATION OF HAITIAN WORKERS (Fédération des Travailleurs Haïtiens—FTH).

This was the first central labor organization established after the Revolution of 1946. It was founded in October 1946, with the mechanics, electricians, chauffeurs, and maritime workers organizations as its charter affiliates. At its peak, the organization claimed fifty-one unions in various parts of the country. These included organizations of white-collar workers and artisans and other groups. In March 1948 the FTH suffered a major split, resulting in the formation of the Haitian Federation of Labor.* The dissidents, sparked by Milien Josue,

a seaman who had come to dislike communism during an earlier period of residence in Cuba, accused the leadership of the FTH of being controlled by the Popular Socialist Party, the Communist Party of that day. Within a few months of the split, the only effective member unions of the FTH were the mechanics and electricians unions, and a year later the federation virtually had ceased to exist.

FEDERATION OF WORKERS OF CAYES (Fédération des Ouvriers de Cayes). *See* Haitian Federation of Labor.

FEDERATION OF WORKERS OF THE NORTH (Fédération des Ouvriers du Nord). *See* Haitian Federation of Labor.

FÉDÉRATION SYNDICAL DES TRAVAILLEURS DU DÉPARTEMENT DE LA ARTIBONITE. *See* Trade Union Federation of Workers of the Department of Artibonite.

FÉDÉRATION SYNDICALE DES TRAVAILLEURS DU NORDOUEST. *See* Trade Union Federation of Workers of the Northwest.

FHT. *See* Haitian Federation of Labor.

FTH. *See* Federation of Haitian Workers.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confédération Général des Travailleurs—CGT).

This organization was established by Molière Compas, late in 1949, when he split away from the Haitian Federation of Labor,* of which he had been secretary-general. Compas had been Haitian workers' delegate to a conference of the International Labor Organization in Montevideo in the summer of 1949. From there, he had gone to Buenos Aires, where he met Argentine President Juan Perón and was courted by the Peronista trade union leaders. Shortly after he returned to Haiti, his newly found Peronista sympathies led to his expulsion from the Haitian Federation of Labor; he then established the CGT. It never had more than six unions affiliated with it. It claimed 1,100 members in 1950, but this is dubious. As late as 1952 Compas was still publishing a labor newspaper, ostensibly as the organ of the CGT, the funds for which, it was alleged by other labor leaders, came from the Argentine Embassy in Port-au-Prince.

HAITIAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (Fédération Haitienne du Travail—FHT).

This was undoubtedly the largest and most important central labor organization to exist in Haiti during the democratic period of the Estimé administration (1946–50) and for a short while thereafter. It was established as a consequence of a split in the Federation of Haitian Workers* in March 1948. Three months later

it had thirteen unions affiliated with it, including five sailors' and longshoremen's organizations. Early in 1950 it was credited by the Inter-American Confederation of Workers (Confederación Interamericana de los Trabajadores—CIT) with having thirty-six affiliated unions and over 10,000 members.

The FHT established several regional federations. These included the Federation of Workers of Cayes, the Trade Union Federation of Workers of the Northwest, the Federation of Workers of the North, and the Trade Union Federation of Workers of the Department of Artibonite.

Almost from its inception, the Haitian Federation of Labor was affiliated with the Inter-American Confederation of Workers.

The predominant figure in the FHT was Milien Josue, a seaman, who had lived in Cuba for some time, and had belonged to the Maritime Federation there. Josue and the FHT had strong support from President Dumarsais Estimé. As a consequence, after Estimé's overthrow in May 1950, Josue was arrested and held for some time, and subsequently was forced to retire from union activity. By 1951 the FHT had virtually ceased to exist.

INTER-SINDICAL D'HAITI. *See* Inter-Trade Union of Haiti.

INTER-TRADE UNION OF HAITI (Inter-Sindical d'Haiti).

This was an organization established at the beginning of the administration of President François Duvalier, after most of the preexisting labor movement had been destroyed by the regime. There is no information available concerning what organizations were affiliated with it or how many members it had. It was suppressed in 1962.

LABOR FEDERATION OF HAITI (Fédération du Travail d'Haiti).

An organization of this name existed in the 1920s, headed by a M. Jalibois, who in 1930 was elected president of the country's House of Representatives. On that occasion, Jalibois cabled President William Green of the American Federation of Labor asking for support for the campaign to get the U.S. Marines withdrawn from the country.

NATIONAL UNION OF HAITIAN WORKERS (Union Nationale des Travailleurs Haitiens—UNTH).

This central labor organization was established principally by the efforts of Daniel Fignole, a teacher who from August to October 1946 had served as Minister of Education in the Estimé government (1946–50). After resigning, Fignole organized a political party, the Worker-Peasant Movement (Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan), and a trade union group which was first called the Union of Laborers and Workers. That organization was established in April 1947 and was dissolved in November 1947, most probably because of its opposition to the government of President Dumarsais Estimé. Then in March 1948 the National Union of Haitian Workers was founded.

By mid-1949 UNTH claimed twenty-one union affiliates. These included the Union of Workers of the Haitian American Sugar Company,* the workers of the Bata Shoe Company, workers of a shirt factory, an organization of commercial employees, and a union of salt workers. The UNTH and its affiliates were notable for their efforts to establish schools both for union members and their children.

The UNTH suffered considerably from the fact that both during most of the Estimé government and that of Magloire, Fignole was a leading figure in the political opposition. During the regime of General Paul Magloire, president 1950–56, Fignole was the only opposition member of the Chamber of Deputies. Although Fignole had continued actively to participate in the affairs of the UNTH under Estimé, he no longer was active in union affairs under Magloire. In any case, the UNTH was suppressed by the Magloire government.

The UNTH was invited to send a delegate to the September 1949 Congress of the Inter-American Confederation of Workers, and agreed to do so. However, no UNTH representative was in fact able to participate in that meeting.

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS OF HAITI (Union Nationale des Ouvriers d'Haiti—UNOH).

This organization was established early in the administration of General Paul Magloire (1950–56) after the government had suppressed the central labor groups which had existed before the overthrow of former President Dumarsais Estimé. It had its origins in a visit of Serafino Romualdi, assistant secretary of the Inter-American Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) in April 1951. He met with leaders of most of the still existing Haitian labor organizations. At that meeting a Committee of Trade Union Coordination of Haiti (Comité de Coordination Syndicale) was established, including most of the surviving affiliates of the Haitian Federation of Labor* and some independent unions.

A few months later, the Committee of Trade Union Coordination was converted into the National Union of Workers of Haiti. By mid-1952 it had as affiliated organizations the Printers Union, the Union of Workers of Longshore and Maritime Agencies of Port-au-Prince, the Tobacco Workers, the Mahogany Workers, and the Bakers. Subsequently, a number of other organizations in Port-au-Prince and some provincial towns, including chauffeurs and port workers groups, became part of the UNOH.

The National Union of Workers of Haiti was an early victim of the Duvalier administration (1957–71). Its principal leaders were removed from office and arrested soon after Duvalier came to power. As a consequence, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions lodged several complaints with the International Labor Organization in Geneva. Ultimately, most of the UNOH leaders went into exile.

PRINTING TRADES UNION OF PORT-AU-PRINCE (Syndicat d'Imprimerie de Port-au-Prince).

During the 1946–56 period, this was one of the most important local industrial unions in the country. Although it counted only about 110 workers, it had collective agreements with all of the daily newspapers of Port-au-Prince, as well as with some of the city's print shops. It was able to establish an apprenticeship system in the printing trades of the capital city. The union was affiliated with the Federation of Haitian Workers* after its establishment in 1946; subsequently it belonged to the National Union of Workers of Haiti.* It apparently disappeared soon after the coming to power of President François Duvalier (1957).

SYNDICAT DES CHAUFFEURS DE CAP HAITIEN. *See* Union of Chauffeurs of Cap Haitien.

SYNDICAT DES CHAUFFEURS DE PORT-AU-PRINCE. *See* Union of Chauffeurs of Port-au-Prince.

SYNDICAT DES MARINS DES BATIMENTS DE COMMERCE HAITIEN. *See* Union of Sailors of Haitian Commercial Vessels.

SYNDICAT DES MARINS ET DÉBARDEURS DE CAP HAITIEN. *See* Union of Sailors and Longshoremen of Cap Haitien.

SYNDICAT DES OUVRIERS CORDONNIERS. *See* Union of Haitian Shoemakers.

SYNDICAT DES OUVRIERS ET TRAVAILLEURS. *See* Union of Laborers and Workers.

SYNDICAT DES TRAVAILLEURS DE LA HASCO. *See* Union of Workers of Haitian American Sugar Company.

SYNDICAT DES TRAVAILLEURS DES DÉBARDEURS ET AGENCES MARITIMES. *See* Union of Workers of Longshore and Shipping Agencies.

SYNDICAT D'IMPRIMERIE DE PORT-AU-PRINCE. *See* Printing Trades Union of Port-au-Prince.

TRADE UNION FEDERATION OF WORKERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ARTIBONITE. *See* Haitian Federation of Labor.

TRADE UNION FEDERATION OF WORKERS OF THE NORTHWEST. *See* Haitian Federation of Labor.

UNION DES OUVRIERS ET TRAVAILLEURS (Union of Laborers and Workers). *See* National Union of Haitian Workers.

UNION NATIONALE DES OUVRIERS D'HAITI. *See* National Union of Workers of Haiti.

UNION NATIONALE DES TRAVAILLEURS HAITIENS. *See* National Union of Haitian Workers.

UNION OF CHAUFFEURS OF CAP HAITIEN (Syndicat des Chauffeurs de Cap Haitien).

This was the first of Haiti's chauffeurs union, established in March 1946. It was organized by a Dominican exile, Fausto de Pina, and a Haitian, Timocles Coqumard, who had unsuccessfully tried to establish a union in 1932. By mid-1949 it had over 200 members, including both drivers and mechanics. It obtained a contract covering 75 percent of the drivers employed by the Standard Fruit Company. The union maintained a cooperative which provided oil, gasoline, spare parts, and other things needed by its members. The union was affiliated with the Federation of Workers of the North and the Haitian Federation of Labor.* It was suppressed by the Duvalier regime (1957–71).

UNION OF CHAUFFEURS OF PORT-AU-PRINCE (Syndicat des Chauffeurs de Port-au-Prince).

This union was organized by Lyderic Bonaventure soon after the 1946 Revolution. By mid-1948 it had 365 members, about 70 percent of all chauffeurs in the city. It organized a producers and consumers cooperative. The former had contracts within several ministries as well as one with Pan-American Airways for a taxi service to and from the airport. The consumers cooperative, the oldest and largest such organization in the capital, sold a wide variety of things to its members.

The union took the leadership in organizing the Federation of Drivers of Haiti.* It also participated in the foundation of the Federation of Haitian Workers.* However, after the split in that group in March 1948, the Union stayed out of a central labor group, until the formation in 1952 of the National Union of Workers of Haiti.*

Because of Bonaventure's close relationship with the Estimé administration (1946–50), the union was faced with an unfriendly attitude by the successor regime. It was completely suppressed by the Duvalier government (1957–71).

UNION OF HAITIAN SHOEMAKERS (Syndicat des Ouvriers Cordonniers).

This was perhaps the most important artisan union to be established during the 1946–56 period. Established in Port-au-Prince soon after the 1946 Revolution, it organized affiliates in several provincial cities. The union had collective bargaining relations with the Master Shoemakers' Association, but did not sign any contract. The organization was affiliated with the Federation of Haitian Workers.*

UNION OF LABORERS AND WORKERS. *See* National Union of Haitian Workers.

UNION OF SAILORS AND LONGSHOREMEN OF CAP HAITIEN (Syndicat des Marins et Débardeurs de Cap Haitien).

This was one of the two principal unions in Cap Haitien, the country's second largest city, during the 1946–56 period. It had about 500 members in mid-1949, and had a collective contract with the Standard Fruit Company, the largest company shipping goods out of the port. The union was affiliated with the Federation of Workers of the North and the Haitian Federation of Labor.*

UNION OF SAILORS OF HAITIAN COMMERCIAL VESSELS (Syndicat des Marins des Batiments de Commerce Haitien).

This union, established soon after the Revolution of 1946, included most of the Haitian sailors employed in Haitian coastal trade. It established collective bargaining relations with the firms operating ships out of Haitian ports. This union does not seem to have survived the general suppression of the labor movement by the Duvalier regime (1957–71).

UNION OF WORKERS OF HAITIAN AMERICAN SUGAR COMPANY (Syndicat des Travailleurs de la HASCO—HASCO).

This was one of the principal affiliates of the National Union of Haitian Workers,* led by Daniel Fignole. Although the National Union was suppressed early in the administration of President Paul Magloire (1950–56), the HASCO union continued to exist. In 1983 it was one of the two organizations in Haiti identified by a visiting United States labor delegation as more or less qualifying as labor unions.

UNION OF WORKERS OF LONGSHORE AND SHIPPING AGENCIES (Syndicat des Travailleurs des Débardeurs et Agences Maritimes).

During the 1946–56 period, this was the most important union of Port-au-Prince and probably of all Haiti. It was formed in 1947 by the merger of two unions covering longshoremen and shipping agency employees. Those workers carried on strikes in 1946, 1947, and 1948, but in 1952 they were able to negotiate a new collective agreement without a walkout. The union was able to establish a union hiring hall, and it assigned workers to each shift. In 1952 the union had about 1,500 members. It played a leading part in establishing the Federation of Haitian Workers,* the Haitian Federation of Labor,* and the National Union of Workers of Haiti.*

When the Duvalier regime (1957–71) destroyed the existing labor movement, the leaders of the union were jailed and exiled. In 1962, Kesler Clermont, the ex-leader of the union and of the National Union of Workers of Haiti,* was named as the representative of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions before the United Nations.

UNOH. *See* National Union of Workers of Haiti.

UNTH. *See* National Union of Haitian Workers.

Honduras

NEALE J. PEARSON

The inauguration of José Azcona del Hoyo on 27 January 1986 marks the first time in nearly fifty-two years that one freely elected civilian president succeeded another in Honduras. Since achieving independence in the early nineteenth century, Honduras has had 386 armed domestic actions (including revolts, guerrilla uprisings, and coups), 126 changes of government, with only sixteen leaders—including outgoing President Roberto Suazo Cordova—serving four or more years in office, and sixteen constitutions including one approved by a Constituent Assembly in January 1982.

With economic opportunities limited, government jobs became one of the few roads open to personal advancement, and the competition for jobs made politics a bitter struggle. Graft and corruption comprised standard features of political life.

Change began to occur with the development of large-scale banana holdings in the early twentieth century. Such firms as the United Fruit Company and the Standard Fruit Company became the largest economic enterprises in the country and eventually made Honduras, for many years, the world's foremost banana producer; many North Americans and outsiders came to label the country as a "banana republic" because of the companies' frequent intervention in Honduran affairs.

A measure of stability and personal liberty finally came to Honduras when Tiburcio Carías Andino of the National Party (Partido Nacional—PN) won a clear majority of the votes in the 1932 election. (He had lost elections in 1923 and 1928 but resisted the call of followers to do as many predecessors had done and seize power through force.) Carías consolidated his power and remained president for sixteen years by persuading the Congress—dominated by the PN—to amend the Constitution to allow him to stay in office. In January 1949 he turned over the presidency to a hand-picked successor, Juan Manuel Galvez,

under whom several important institutional changes took place. These included the establishment of a military school, which became not only the basis for a professional officer corps studying military matters but also a school to study economic and political problems; creation of a Central Bank (Banco Central) and a National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Fomento, later reorganized into the Banco de Desarrollo) to improve the nation's finances and to stimulate agricultural and livestock production; and the development of a non-communist labor movement as a politically potent force in Honduras politics (the result of a sixty-nine day banana worker strike in May–June 1954).

Under civilian President Ramón Villeda Morales (1958–1963) of the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal—PL), a labor code was promulgated and a Civil Guard established to act as a counterweight to the army in policy matters. A 1962 Agrarian Reform Law for many years remained unimplemented because the chief of the air force, Colonel Oswaldo López Arrellano, seized power on the eve of the 1963 elections to forestall the likely winner, Liberal Party candidate Modesto Rodas Alvarado, who favored reducing the military's role in politics. López Arrellano was to remain an important factor in politics for the next fifteen years. Two years later, López was elected president on the ticket of the National Party for a six-year term.

The country experienced deficits in the Central American Common Market, a short-lived war in 1969 with El Salvador, and the demise of a Pact of National Unity worked out by López with business, labor, military, peasant, and political party leaders. National Party leader Ramón Ernesto Cruz won the 1971 election but lasted only eighteen months in the presidency before being overthrown by the military under López on 4 December 1972 because of widespread popular discontent over government fiscal ineptitude, scandal in the National Lottery involving the president's wife and Ricardo Zúñiga Augustinius, minister of government, and the threat of a peasant march through the capital city of Tegucigalpa over the failure to distribute land under the 1962 Agrarian Reform Law. López's second term in office was weakened by charges of corruption and ineptitude in the distribution of international funds and relief after Hurricane Fifi caused several thousand deaths and millions of dollars of property damage in September 1974.

On 22 April 1975 Colonel Juan Melgar Castro succeeded López as chief of state in a bloodless coup after revelations in the *Wall Street Journal* that López in 1974 had accepted a \$1.25 million bribe from United Brands (successor firm to United Fruit) to reduce export taxes on bananas. Melgar Castro, in turn, was ousted on 7 August 1978, by a three-man junta headed by Army General Policarpo Paz García after high government officials were implicated in revelations of drug-smuggling between Colombia and the United States.

On 20 April 1980 the Liberal Party won a plurality of the popular vote in an upset over the National Party in elections for a seventy-two member Constituent Assembly which was to draft a new constitution and establish procedures to transfer power to an elected president, presumably a civilian. While the majority

of peasants and older voters cast their ballots along traditional lines, young and urban voters rejected the National Party and its links with the military to give the Liberals the edge. The PN had been expected to win because of its control of the National Election Tribunal (Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones—TNE) and the direct aid of various state agencies in furnishing vehicles and drivers to take voters to the polls.

On 29 November 1981 an impressive number of Hondurans—1,214,735 or 82.5 percent of those registered to vote—went to the polls and elected Liberal Roberto Suazo Cordova as their president over the National Party's Ricardo Zuniga. As a consequence of Honduras' system of proportional representation, the PL won four seats in the Congress to thirty-four for the PN, three for the Party of Innovation and Unity (PINU)—recognized by the TNE in 1979—and one for the Christian Democrats (PDC)—recognized after the 1980 election by a reorganized TNE under the leadership of Liberal Ubadora Arriaga Iraeta. This massive turnout reflected voters' rejection both of calls to abstain by various leftist groups and of the violence that marked Honduras' neighboring countries.

Suazo's regime had to deal with serious economic problems of inflation, little or no international monetary reserves, an estimated unemployment of 17 percent, some 40,000 landless peasant families, the second lowest per capita GDP (gross domestic product) in Latin America (\$639), and guerrilla warfare in neighboring El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua which in 1981–1982 spilled over into Honduras. The recently active guerrilla groups with links to the Honduran Communist Party have engaged in kidnappings as well as in selective bombings of U.S. and Central American business firms. Their objective, in addition to raising money, is to create a climate of fear and uncertainty as well as to cause capital flight, by reducing international investment and prompting the exodus of leading entrepreneurs or their families.

Rumors of a military coup circulated during a constitutional crisis over makeup of the Supreme Court and the election process in March–April and May 1985. Both matters were resolved after non-Marxist labor and peasant groups, collaborating with Armed Forces *Jefe* General Walter López Reyes, presented alternatives to resolve the conflict and threatened to call a general strike if the problems were not resolved. Representatives of the four legally registered parties and three factions (*corrientes*) within the National and four factions within the Liberal Party agreed to internal party elections to determine the composition of executive committees at the same time presidential, congressional, and municipal elections were held. In what would be an Uruguayan approach to selecting a president, the winning candidate would be the leading vote-getter among the candidates of the political party receiving the greatest number of total votes. Previously, the winner had been the presidential candidate who received a simple majority—at a time when party leadership and candidate selection were more authoritarian and thus simpler.

After a long presidential campaign in which television played a greater role than in previous elections, National Election Tribunal officials announced the

second week of December that José Azcona del Hoyo of the Popular Liberal Alliance (ALIPO) was president-elect since of the valid 1,545,703 votes cast the Liberal Party collectively received 787,953 (50.97 percent) to the 703,334 votes (45.50 percent) for the National Party group. Of the 1,901,756 registered voters, 1,596,415, or 83.9 percent, went to the polls. This was an increase of 381,680 over the 1,214,735 participating in the November 1981 elections, a percentage of participation as high as that in any other Latin American nation except for Costa Rica and certainly much higher than that in the United States.

The Communist Party of Honduras (Partido Comunista de Honduras—PCH) was organized in 1927, destroyed by Carias in 1932, and reorganized in 1954. A dispute over strategy and tactics in 1967, especially after the failure in 1965 of collective bargaining and strike efforts at the Rio Lindo Textile factory as well as a supportive strike by leaders of twenty-nine unions (out of thirty-three) of the Central Federation of Free Unions of Honduras* (Federación Central de Sindicatos Libres de Honduras—FECESITLIH), led to the expulsion of one group and the division of the PCH into rival factions. One group, pro-Soviet, advocated the use of peaceful means of struggle. A second group, Castroite in ideology, advocated armed struggle in the countryside as the road to power; it is thought that members of this group organized the Morazanista Front in 1960 and subsequently reorganized themselves on 16 September 1949 into the Morazanista Front for the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH). This group, generally inactive during the 1970s as a consequence of Castro's desire for peaceful diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, announced in February 1980 its intention to start "armed action" to assume power after the 20 April 1980 Constituent Assembly elections. A third group was oriented toward Maoist solutions and proclaimed its solidarity in 1971 with the People's Republic of China as the Communist Party of Honduras—Marxist-Leninist (PCH-ML).

A second group linked to FMLH and the Moscow-oriented Communist Party of Honduras is the Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary Command which claimed responsibility for the 23 September 1981 shooting of two U.S. military advisers near Tegucigalpa's Toncontín International Airport. (Lorenzo Zelaya was a peasant leader involved in the National Federation of Honduran Peasants, Federación Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras—FENACH; he along with eleven companions was killed by army troops in the Jute Mountains 30 April 1965.) The 7:30 AM shooting preceded the march by an estimated 60,000 Hondurans through Tegucigalpa in peaceful protest of the "repression" by Honduran security forces of different groups and individuals and of Honduran involvement in the Salvadoran or Nicaraguan conflicts. Sporadic terrorism and the appearance of various revolutionary fronts or groups have continued to mark Honduras throughout the 1980s.

The poorest country in Central America (second poorest in Latin America), Honduras had a per capita GDP of \$480 in 1978 and under \$800 in 1985. During the 1975–80 period, the country enjoyed a healthy annual real growth rate that averaged 6.7 percent, but that declined to 1.9 percent in 1980 and 0.3 percent

in 1981. After a long period of relative price stability, inflation jumped to 18 percent in 1979 and to an estimated 20 percent in 1980 and then slowed to 9.2 percent for 1981–83 and 4.8 percent for 1984–85. Due to the country's extremely high population growth rate of 3.3 percent from 1970 to 1984, the size of the work force grew about 60,000 each year, from over 1,000,000 in 1980 to 1,304,780 in 1985. In 1985 approximately 62 percent of the work force had jobs in agriculture; the remaining 38 percent included 9 percent in industry (down from 12 percent in 1980), 6 percent in government, and 20 percent in the service sector.

Despite pressures from organized labor groups in 1985–86, neither the Suazo Cordova nor the Azcona government raised the minimum wages in agriculture, cattle or dairy farming above 5 Lempiras (U.S. \$2.50) per day for firms employing six or more workers or above 6.60 Lempiras (U.S. \$5.30) for manufacturing firms employing six or more workers.

Illiteracy constitutes a serious problem; at least half the adult population is functionally illiterate (57 percent in 1975). For most adults, education ends at the third grade. The goal of the current administration is to provide six years of formal education for all children, but especially in rural areas this object is far from being met. According to the U.S. labor attaché in 1980, the president of one of the nation's largest unions, with over 2,000 members, was a man in his thirties who had five children to support but was still working on his sixth-grade diploma.

Unemployment also is serious. The Labor Ministry estimates that 25 percent of the work force is unemployed and a similar number is underemployed. Although military governments claimed to have created 20,000 new jobs each year since 1972, given the rapid population growth, this has not put a serious dent in the unemployment rate. This unemployment along with the deleterious impact of the loss of major employers led the Suazo Cordova government to work closely in 1982 with two major corporations—Rosario Resource Mining Corporation and the Standard Fruit Company—and one of the country's largest labor organizations, the Federation of National Workers of Honduras* (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Nacionales de Honduras-FESITRANH), so as to keep those firms' operations in Honduras. The government ultimately granted a 30 percent reduction in tax loads.

Despite the problems of illiteracy, rapid population growth, high unemployment, and capital flight, Honduras probably has Central America's best organized labor movement. About 40 percent of the small urban work force and 20 percent of the total work force belong to labor organizations. The roots of the trade union movement, like other significant aspects of Honduran history, appear in the labor practices of enterprises developed by foreign capital, principally U.S. capital, that established enclave economies in mining in Central Honduras and banana plantations along the Caribbean coastal plain known as the North Coast. Struggles between Marxist-oriented and non-communist or anti-communist unions and federations had their origins in the 1920s, and while they lost im-

portance in the 1933–48 period when Tiburcio Carías Andino dominated Honduran politics, they were to become significant once again during the Great Banana Strike of 1954 and were then to remain an important issue of Honduran politics.

The first labor-management disputes involving foreign capital and nationalistic attitudes developed in January 1860 with the construction of what was planned to be an interoceanic railroad running from Puerto Cortes on the North Coast to the Gulf of Fonseca on the Pacific Coast. Because it was difficult to hire skilled and disciplined Hondurans accustomed to working in groups, contractors almost immediately began hiring laborers in Jamaica and other Caribbean islands, a precedent later followed in the construction of the Panama Canal and Minor Keith's railroad linking Puerto Limón with San José, Costa Rica.

Promoters of the interoceanic railroad even told London bankers they "would contract 6,000 Chinese laborers and several thousand Italians to speed up construction" when it became apparent that many of the Caribbean as well as Honduran workers deserted construction sites in order to avoid mistreatment by foremen, miserable working conditions in the humid, tropical lowlands, low salaries, and sickness. The labor relations established by the English engineers responsible for the project probably could not have been worse. One of the engineers, Herman Segebath, even assumed police powers in trying to reduce worker desertion.

While the railroad never went more than fifty miles inland, many of the workers brought in the ideas of European anarchist and socialist movements that were seeds which sprouted later in the mines and enclave plantations of the banana companies.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Honduras presented an economic and social situation different from that of other Central American countries, which helps explain why its economic development lagged behind that of the neighboring countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. Unlike those countries, where coffee got an early start and coffee plantation owners came to dominate the political scene, Honduras began planting coffee commercially for export only in the twentieth century. Coffee *finqueros* (owners of coffee plantations, or *fincas*) never came to dominate politics. Instead, small groups of cattlemen in Choluteca and Olancho, tobacco planters in Copán, and small mine owners in the central part of the country controlled political affairs. In 1876, Marco Aurelio Soto, a Liberal, assumed power in Honduras and ushered in a period known as the Liberal Reform, modeled upon that of Justo Rufino Barrios in neighboring Guatemala under whom Soto and his lieutenant Ramón Rosa had studied and worked. The collaboration of like-minded executives in neighboring states who discouraged exiles from continuing the practice of launching attacks from sanctuaries within their borders enabled Soto to pacify the country both in terms of the struggles among elite factions and the depredations of bandits who took advantage of these unstable conditions. Convinced that emulation of advanced societies in Europe and North America was necessary

for the economic development of the country—especially attracting foreign investment—Soto initiated an ambitious program of improvements in communications and juridical-legal reforms that welcomed foreign capital. A postal system was regularized. Most important towns and villages were tied into a telegraph network with international cable connections to the United States and Europe. Construction began on a cart road, the Southern Highway, from Amapala on the Gulf of Fonseca to Tegucigalpa, to which the seat of government was transferred in 1880.

The importance of these improved means of communication was matched by the legislation which Soto and his successors, Luís Bográn (1888–91) and Policarpo Bonilla (1894–99), sponsored to integrate and modernize Honduras. Under Liberal Reform investment legislation, more than one hundred American and British companies arose to rework old silver and gold mines with newer technology and imported machinery. Save for the New York and Honduras Rosario Mining Company, founded on 2 December 1879 in New York City, most of these concerns failed before they produced much bullion, overcome by declining silver prices, monetary panics, and from 1891 to 1894 a resurgence of domestic turmoil.

With tax benefits and concessions granted by the state to import machinery duty-free, the Rosario Mining Company grew to become an important influence in the economy and politics of Honduras. In the period 1887–88, 45.3 percent of Honduran export earnings came from Rosario exports of silver and other minerals. But by 1902 bananas had become the principal source of the nation's foreign exchange earnings. Concessions of land obtained by various companies—the United Fruit Company, the Standard Fruit Company, and the Cuyamel Fruit Company—ultimately allowed these companies to dominate the economics and politics of the North Coast until at least the Great Banana Strike of 1954.

The first labor-management disputes involving U.S. capital erupted on 10 March 1909, when a group of Rosario miners protested the wage system of the company. During the initial negotiations between representatives of the miners and management, both sides got into a fight; a special government commission sent to the scene began what would prove to be a common practice in ensuing years: it called on the police to restore order and the company's authority over the mines. The strike failed as various spontaneous worker-leaders were wounded or jailed, while others fell victim to other company reprisals.

In the early part of the twentieth century, various mutual aid (savings and loan associations and burial groups) and educational societies were organized in both the foreign enclaves and in firms owned by Hondurans. These societies were not perceived as threatening by the foreign or Honduran companies. Attempts to form associations or groups for bargaining purposes, however, were seen as threatening, and were forcibly opposed, generally with police or army assistance.

One of the first clandestine efforts to improve the economic status of workers came in July 1916 over the refusal of the Cuyamel Fruit Company—founded by

the famous Samuel Zemurray—to exchange U.S. dollars and coins in which most workers were paid at the official exchange rate of 2.5 units of national currency per dollar, but instead giving the workers 2.31 units per dollar. In addition, Cuyamel workers—like most other banana workers—could buy food, clothing, utensils, and other goods only in company stores (*tiendas de raya*, or *comisariatos*), which Honduran labor historian Victor Meza feels was an important mechanism of the companies to recover the cash paid out in salaries. When the workers struck—on a Sunday—with a ship due for loading the next day, the company began a practice of hiring strikebreakers of “African descent” (probably Jamaicans, which explains some of the resentment of Spanish-mestizo workers and peasants toward blacks). When this maneuver did not work out well, the Cuyamel management asked the Honduran military to intervene. More than forty workers were arrested and jailed in the gloomy cells of an old Spanish colonial sea fort known as the Castillo de Omoa.

In October 1917 workers on plantations of the Vaccaro Brothers Company banana plantations near San Francisco, Atlantida, went on strike because the company began paying them in gold coins rather than silver coins, reportedly because it was speculating in silver. From August to September 1920 another strike occurred at the Vaccaro plantations at La Masica with workers demanding an eight-hour day and a \$2 daily wage. Dockworkers at nearby La Ceiba joined the movement. The government suppressed the strike by sending in troops under a state of siege order covering the four North Coast Departments.

Strikes broke out in May 1924 among the workers of the Trujillo Railway Company, a United Fruit subsidiary, and in February 1925 on the sugar plantations of the Montecristo Company (a Cuyamel subsidiary near La Lima) over demands that they be paid in cash and not in paper coupons redeemable only at company stores. Montecristo workers also presented demands relating to working hours, food prices, and charges for health care at company hospitals and medical centers.

While workers on other banana plantations did not go out on strike, unofficial leaders began making similar demands of their supervisors and employers. The Montecristo management refused to pay higher wages or to reduce the workday, but agreed to pay the workers in cash, to allow traveling salesmen onto the plantations, and to treat the families of workers at company medical facilities at no extra charge.

By the early 1920s various mutual assistance societies and unions, including those of dockworkers, railroad workers, typographers, and such artisans as shoemakers and carpenters existed in cities throughout Honduras. There is some evidence also that peasant organizations existed. However, the most significant aspect of labor organization at this time was the convening, on 18 May 1921, of the First Congress of Workers which met in the capital, Tegucigalpa, in the Hall of the Masons' Union (Sindicato de Albañiles “El Porvenir”). The Congress gave birth to the nation's first major labor organization, the Honduran Workers Federation* (Federación Obrera Hondureña—FOH). Mutualist and conciliatory

in nature, the FOH stressed political action, cooperative societies, and the need for labor laws, hygienic housing, and schools for workers.

An officer of the FOH's Central Executive Committee, Felipe Calix Matute (one of Honduras' earliest communists), along with Manuel Calix Herrera and Juan Pablo Wainwright, attempted to take over the Federation and establish a more militant class-conflict orientation. When this effort failed, communists associated with the "La Vanguardia" Society of El Progreso invited labor representatives from several cities to form a rival organization. This led to the creation on 1 May 1926 of the Federation of Workers Societies of the North* (Federación de Sociedades Obreras del Norte—FSON).

In the face of this schism in the workers movement, the Supreme Council of the Central American Workers Confederation (COSA), then located in Tegucigalpa, convened a Regional Workers Congress on 15 November 1926 with the goal of "crystalizing in a single bloc the workers movement of the region." (Posas, pp. 22–23.) Information about the delegates and groups represented at this meeting is scarce, but it apparently approved a document known as the *Workers Constitution* (*Constitución Obrera*), which became the basis for still further dissension within the FOH and other groups because of accusations by Communists that FOH leaders were not complying with the requirements of the Constitution. Perhaps the most important organizational consequence of the November 1926 meeting was a split of the labor movement into three geographically based groups: the Council of the Center, to be located in Tegucigalpa; the Council of the West, in Santa Rosa de Copán; and the Council of the North, which would alternate between San Pedro Sula and La Ceiba.

The Workers Constitution and the threefold organizational structure proved incapable of holding the FOH together. On the one hand, an important nucleus of essential artisan organizations, led by "worker intellectuals" who were concerned over the participation of workers in the electoral process, stressed peaceful protest and policies, struggled against *caudillismo*, and saw the workers movement as a collection of groups interested in mutual support, workers' self-education and class harmony. On the other hand, especially on the North Coast, the communist leaders of the FSON and others were developing a philosophy based on class struggle, with an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist orientation. The Executive Council of the FOH decided to support the candidates of the Liberal Party's Vicente Mejía Colindres. Many labor leaders, including the communists, believed that this action violated not only the spirit but the letter of the Workers Constitution of 1926. This produced another split in the workers movement. In May 1928 the Executive Council of the FOH expelled Manuel Calix Herrera, whereupon Calix Herrera, Graciela García, Zoroastro Montes de Oca, and others also decided to leave and establish a new organization. Thus, on 1 May 1929 another federation appeared: the Honduran Syndical Organization (Federación Sindical Hondureña—FSH).

Another consequence of the split was the creation in early 1931 of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario—PSR), which was seen

by FOH leaders as an instrument to permit greater belligerence by the FOH in the daily political battles of the country. The new party's doctrine was reformist, oriented toward class conciliation and efforts at social harmony between capital and labor. The party enjoyed but a brief existence (1932–48), due to the rise to power of the National Party. The ascension to the presidency in 1932 of the National Party's Tiburcio Carías Andino, combined with severe impacts from the world depression of 1929, had major repercussions on the Honduran trade union movement. In 1929 the United Fruit Company purchased Samuel Zemmurray's Cuyamel Fruit Company for \$32 million. When United Fruit in January 1932 sought to reduce wages by 15 percent (twenty-five cents) a day on the docks at Tela, a strike occurred. While the strike was ultimately resolved on 17 January, with only a twenty-cent an hour reduction in wages, yet another strike broke out that day on Standard Fruit plantations over efforts to reduce wages by 25 percent. Army troops broke up these strikes, and the government sent various labor leaders to prison in Tegucigalpa.

The impact of the depression and the increasing power of the United Fruit Company on the North Coast led to an effort on the part of the FSH to organize the estimated "50,000 proletariado" into a single Union of Workers of the Banana Industry as a means of struggling to win their immediate demands (*reivindicaciones*) and to work for the "downfall [*abatimiento*] of the system of capitalist exploitation." (See Posas.) This new level of political conscience and combativeness on the part of a worker organization produced a strong government response. After formally taking office on 1 February 1933, Carías crushed the Honduran Communist Party, as well as all dissident political and trade union groups. Only some fifteen years later, with the inauguration of Juan Manuel Gálvez as president, did the political situation begin to change.

Moving slowly, Gálvez took steps to allow the reorganization of the political parties, and ultimately a trade union movement arose once again out of strikes involving the banana companies. Indeed, the banana worker strike of May to July 1954 sparked the development of a major new labor organization, the Federation of National Workers of Honduras (FESITRANH). Two subsequent developments testified to this resurgence of the Honduran labor movement. In 1955, United Fruit Company workers established the Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers* (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Tela Railroad Company—SITRATERCO), which became the nation's most important trade union. Shortly thereafter, Standard Fruit Company workers organized what was to be the nation's second most important union, the Standard Fruit Company Workers Union* (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Standard Fruit Company—SUTRASFCO).

Although strikes and government repression remained important features of the Honduran scene, the 1960s then witnessed the development of several other major organizations. Strong organizational efforts among peasant cooperatives sparked by the implementation of agrarian reform laws marked the 1970s. Ideological strife, particularly the conflict of Marxist and Maoist elements with more

centrist and Christian Democratic organizations, produced considerable internal strains for Honduran labor, while providing further opportunities for government intervention.

Today, the moderate Social Democrat Confederation of Honduran Workers* (Confederación de Trabajadores de Honduras—CTH), affiliated with both the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Union, claims 142,000 members and stands as Honduras' largest labor confederation. A Christian Democratic orientation marks the nation's other major labor grouping, the General Confederation of Workers* (Confederación General de Trabajadores—CGT), affiliated with the Latin American Workers Central (Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores—CLAT) and the World Confederation of Labor. The Honduran Communist Party dominates the Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers* (Federación Unitario de Trabajadores de Honduras—FUTH), whose membership of 10,000 members is dwarfed by both the CTH and CGT; but FUTH is strong in certain strategic areas of the economy, for example, unions at the Central Bank, the National University, and among construction and electrical energy workers.

Bibliography

- "Agrarian Reform Law In Honduras." *International Labour Review* 87 (June 1963): 573–80.
- Barry, Tom, Beth Wood, and Deb Preusch. *Dollars and Dictators: A Guide to Central America*. Albuquerque: The Resource Center, 1982, 163–80.
- Checchi, Vincent et al. *Honduras; A Problem in Economic Development*. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1959.
- Foreign Economic Trends and their Implications for the United States: Honduras, June 1982*. U.S. Department of Commerce. Prepared by the U.S. Embassy, Tegucigalpa.
- Morris, James A. "Honduras: A Unique Case." In *Latin American Politics and Development*, ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979, 346–57.
- Ordóñez, Santos Valeriano. *Resumen de la Historia de la ANACH*. Tegucigalpa: Instituto Nacional Agrario, 1981.
- Pearson, Neale J. "Honduras." In William P. Avery, Richard E. Lonsdale, and Ivan Volgyes (eds.), *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1976*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976: 491–94; 1979: 360–63; 1980: 368–71; 1981: 84–87; 1982: 116–20.
- . "Peasant Pressure Groups and Agrarian Reform in Honduras, 1962–1977." *Rural Change and Public Policy: Eastern Europe, Latin America and Australia*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1980.
- Posas, Mario. *El Movimiento Campesino Hondureño, Una Perspectiva General*. Tegucigalpa: Editorial Guaymuras, 1981.
- . *Lucha Ideológica y Organización Sindical en Honduras (1954–65)*. Tegucigalpa: Editorial Guaymuras, 1980.

Stokes, William S. *Honduras: An Area Study in Government*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1950.

White, Robert A. *Mass Communications and the Popular Promotion Strategy of Rural Development in Honduras*. Stanford: Institute for Communications Research, 1976.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ACCIÓN SINDICAL DE OBREROS Y CAMPESINOS DE HONDURAS (Action Workers and Peasants of Honduras). *See* National Peasant Union.

ACTION WORKERS AND PEASANTS OF HONDURAS. *See* National Peasant Union.

ALCONH (Alianza Campesina de Organizaciones Nacionales de Honduras). *See* National Association of Honduran Peasants.

ALIANZA CAMPESINA DE ORGANIZACIONES NACIONALES DE HONDURAS. *See* National Association of Honduran Peasants.

ANACH. *See* National Association of Honduran Peasants.

ASOCIACIÓN CAMPESINA SOCIAL CRISTIANA DE HONDURAS (Social Christian Peasant Association of Honduras). *See* National Peasant Union.

ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY EDUCATION TEACHERS (Colegio de Profesores de Educación Média de Honduras—COPEMH). *See* Professional Association for the Improvement of Teachers.

AUTHENTIC SYNDICAL FEDERATION OF HONDURAS (Federación Auténtica Sindical de Honduras—FASH). *See* National Peasant Union.

AUTONOMOUS SYNDICATE OF LA LIMA MECHANICS (Sindicato Autónomo de Mecánicos de la Lima—SAML).

A Honduran Communist Party-controlled North Coast group of workers on United Fruit Company plantations operating in competition with the Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers* (SITRATERCO). It was formed in the mid-1950s after democratic workers affiliated with the Federation of National Workers of Honduras* and Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) took control of SITRATERCO. *See* Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers.

CENTRAL FEDERATION OF FREE UNIONS OF HONDURAS (Federación Central de Sindicatos Libres de Honduras—FECESITLIH).

Struggles between groups linked to the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) and groups linked to the Honduran Communist Party (PCH) and the left-wing factions of the Liberal Party have been found also in the central part of the country around the capital city of Tegucigalpa. On 23 February 1958 delegates from unions in the capital, the most important of which were construction workers, retail workers (*casas comerciales*), electrical workers in the government electrical company (Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica—ENEE), and the Tegucigalpa Brewery, a Castle and Cooke subsidiary, met with members of the Autonomous Syndicate of La Lima Mechanics,* a PCH-controlled North Coast group on United Fruit plantations, and student leaders at the National Autonomous University (UNAH), including Jorge Arturo Reina, later Rector of the University and an important leader of the Liberal Alliance faction (ALIPO) of the Liberal Party. They formed the Syndical Federation of the Central Part of the Country (Federación Sindical del Centro—FESICENTRO). But because several newspapers and business groups called the new federation a Communist-dominated group, José Fernando Ferrera of the Casas Comerciales and Simeon Corrales of the Ice Cream Workers union resigned and boycotted the new organization. After Labor Minister Oscar Flores dissolved the new federation, José Melecio Fregoso of the ORIT Headquarters in Mexico came to organize delegates from thirty-four unions into the Central Federation of Free Workers of Honduras on 21 December 1958, which was granted legal existence (*personería jurídica*) 16 April 1959.

FECESITLIH has had a turbulent history. In 1965 it was dissolved by the government after leaders of thirty-three *sindicatos* called a general strike to begin 27 July 1965 in support of workers at the Rio Lindo Textile Factory who had been struggling to obtain a collective bargaining contract and had been out on strike since May. The Federation of National Workers of Honduras* and the Confederation of Honduran Workers* stayed aloof from the Rio Lindo strike in part because of communist influence among the Rio Lindo workers and some FECESITLIH leaders. Gustavo Zelaya, leader of the National Development Bank Workers Union (SITRABANAFOM), one of the unions which did not support the FECESITLIH strike, was named interventor in August 1965 and later elected secretary-general, a post he continued to occupy until 1979, when he left Honduras to pursue an agricultural degree at Cornell University on a scholarship. Mario Flores, secretary-general of the Telecommunications Workers Syndicate (SITRATEL), then succeeded Zelaya in accordance with FECESITLIH rules. The fifty-three-member FECESITLIH then had a divisive Fifteenth Congress in July 1979 in which Emílio González—also ORIT- and AIFLD-oriented—successfully challenged Flores for leadership of the Federation, but not before Flores led a walkout of seventeen affiliated *sindicatos*. Eleven leftist unions then staged their own walkout and have been flirting with the Christian Democratic-oriented General Confederation of Workers* (CGT) since. For the next two years, charges flew back and forth between González and Flores, who remained president of

SITRATEL, including a charge that Flores was *confabulado* with the general manager (*gerente*) of HONDUTEL (the Government Telephone Corporation), Colonel Roberto Nuñez Montes, by virtue of Flores' not protesting the dismissal of more than 200 workers.

FECESITLIH was also the target of PCH efforts in the 1970s to assume control. In April 1977, when nineteen unions left the Federation of National Workers of Honduras* over the question of Celeo Conzález' stewardship and the influence of AIFLD in Honduras, some seventeen FECESITLIH *sindicatos*, one-third of its membership, also questioned Zelaya's links to ORIT and his perpetuation in office. These seventeen *sindicatos*, in turn, were charged by Zelaya and Flores with not having paid dues on time and the dissident group refused to attend the July 1978 Fourteenth Congress and constituted itself into a Commission of Syndical Unity (CUS) without formally separating itself from FECESITLIH. Another group of working-class activists formed an Independent Syndical Front,* which has been subject to the pro-Soviet orientation of the PCH and the pro-Maoist orientation of the Communist Party of Honduras—Marxist-Leninist.

FECESITLIH underwent a major leadership change in 1984 with the ouster of Adan Ignacio Benitez and the election of Francisco Urmaneta as president for a two-year term. Under the new leadership, FECESITLIH became more active in trade union and political affairs but still remains plagued by internal dissension among its leaders and between some of the rank-and-file members and the leadership.

CGT. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

COLEGIO DE PROFESORES DE EDUCACIÓN MEDÍA DE HONDURAS. *See* Association of Secondary Education Teachers.

COLEGIO PROFESIONAL DE SUPERACIÓN MAGISTERIAL HONDUREÑO. *See* Professional Association for the Improvement of Teachers.

COLPROSUMAH. *See* Professional Association for the Improvement of Teachers.

COMITÉ DE UNIDAD INTERSINDICAL (Committee of Intersyndical Unity). *See* Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers.

COMMITTEE OF INTERSYNDICAL UNITY. *See* Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE HONDURAS. *See* Confederation of Honduran Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERATION OF HONDURAN WORKERS (Confederación de Trabajadores de Honduras—CTH).

After the Federation of National Workers of Honduras* (FESITRANH) and Central Federation of Free Workers of Honduras* (FECESITLIH) were organized and granted legal existence (*personería jurídica*) in 1958 and 1959 respectively, their leaders discussed with Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) and AFL–CIO leaders the need to organize peasants both to protect the long-range self-interest of urban workers and to promote the economic and social welfare of the peasantry as consumers of industrial urban-produced goods. These talks led to the creation of the National Association of Honduran Peasants* (ANACH) on 22 October 1962 in San Pedro Sula some three weeks after President Ramón Villeda Morales promulgated an Agrarian Reform Law. From 25 to 29 September 1964, FESITRANH, FECESITLIH, and ANACH leaders met in Tegucigalpa to create the Confederation of Workers of Honduras, which was granted *personería jurídica* on 29 October 1965. Since 1965, CTH leadership has been in the hands of secretary-general Andres Victor Artilles, originally a FESITRANH teacher and organizer, who was most recently reelected secretary-general in September 1980. Moving up into a leadership position of the CTH in the past two years has been Mariano de Jesus González, one of a new generation of Standard Fruit Company Workers Union* officers who became CTH president in 1980 and was reelected in 1984. Although now retired, longtime leader Celeo González still works as a consultant to the CTH, FESITRANH, and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) training programs.

The CTH has not supported any one political party in particular, although during its formative period it had close relationships with the Liberal Party's Villeda Morales and Labor Minister Oscar Flores and with General López Arrellano from 1972 to 1975 because of his promulgation of Decree Law 170 on 31 December 1974 (the Agrarian Reform Law of January 1975). Various CTH, FESITRANH, and ANACH leaders have supported National party candidates as individuals, while others, influenced by Costa Rica's National Liberation Party, joined North Coast lawyers and intellectuals to form the Revolutionary Party of Honduras (PRH). Although unable to obtain the necessary signatures to register as an official party as of December 1982, the PRH has been dedicated to expanding its base among workers and other sectors committed to change, effective suffrage, and greater citizen participation. Several members of CTH affiliates were candidates for the Congress on the slate of the Party of Innovation and Unity (PINU) but the party's poor performance in the 24 November 1985 elections showed the difficulty of translating *sindicato* leadership into votes.

Proclaiming itself Social Democrat in orientation, the CTH has been more conservative than the General Confederation of Workers* (CGT) or the Unitary

Federation of Honduran Workers* (FUTH) in policy matters, seeking more immediate worker benefits rather than pushing for radical changes in the social and economic structure of Honduras.

The CTH represents workers on the "Comision del Decreto 91," a policy group chaired by the Minister of Economy which controls the prices of critical items, for example, such key foods as rice and beans, and transportation costs. Labor also participates in the Honduran Social Security Institute (Instituto Hondureño de Seguridad Social—IHSS), which provides medical care to workers in the Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula areas. CTH, FESITRANH, and FECESITLIH officers have also been named to positions on the Board of Directors of the Workers Bank (Banco de Los Trabajadores). The serious issue of corruption in government was addressed in 1980–81 by both the CTH and FESITRANH, which advocated the creation of a "Ministry to Recover State Property." The CTH was joined by the CGT and other groups in addressing a series of demands to both President Suazo Cordova in January 1982 and his successor José Simón Azcona in January 1986 which included raising the minimum wage. Representatives of the CTH, CGT, and FUTH have had monthly meetings with Labor Minister Dario Montes Matamoros since January 1982 to discuss such problems affecting the economy as inflation and unemployment and the need to revive the agrarian reform program, stagnant since 1977.

The CTH, CGT, and the Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives* (Federación de Cooperativas de Reforma Agraria de Honduras—FECORAH) also tried without much success in late 1979 and early 1980 to force the three registered political parties (the National Party—PN; Liberal Party—PL; Party of Innovation and Unity—PINU) to define their policies toward labor. The only receptive ear was that of PINU, which actively sought and ultimately fielded five labor and ten peasant candidates for the 1980–82 Constituent Assembly. ANACH leader Antonio Julín Mendes was one of the three PINU deputies selected to the seventy-one-member Assembly and proved to be a popular member and a good spokesman for Honduran workers and peasants in the Assembly. Julín was reelected in November 1981 as a PINU deputy for the Department of Cortés.

While some members of the Constituent Assembly and political leaders talked about the Constituent Assembly, rather than the voters, electing a president (a reference to the 1957 Constituent Assembly selection of Villeda Morales as president), pressure from CTH-related groups played an important part in the ultimate scheduling of direct elections for the presidency as well as for Congress and municipal posts in November 1981. While the Constituent Assembly proceeded, Labor Minister Mejía tried unsuccessfully to persuade the CTH, CGT, and independent labor groups to present joint demands on the right to form unions, the right to strike, and other matters for inclusion in the Constitution. Despite their unwillingness to join forces, both the CTH and CGT mounted strong lobbying campaigns to influence the assembly in areas of concern to workers and peasants.

COPEMH. *See* Association of Secondary Education Teachers.

CTH. *See* Confederation of Honduran Workers.

CUI (Comité de Unidad Intersindical). *See* Union of Tela Railroad Workers.

FECESITLIH. *See* Central Federation of Free Unions of Honduras.

FECORAH. *See* Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives.

FEDACAMH. *See* Federation of Associated Peasant Enterprises.

FEDERACIÓN CENTRAL DE SINDICATOS LIBRES DE HONDURAS. *See* Central Federation of Free Unions of Honduras.

FEDERACIÓN DE COOPERATIVAS DE REFORMA AGRARIA DE HONDURAS. *See* Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives.

FEDERACIÓN DE EMPRESAS ASOCIATIVAS DE CAMPESINOS DE HONDURAS. *See* Federation of Associated Peasant Enterprises.

FEDERACIÓN DE SOCIEDADES OBRERAS DEL NORTE. *See* Federation of Workers Societies of the North.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE CAMPESINOS DE HONDURAS. *See* National Association of Honduran Peasants.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA HONDUREÑA. *See* Honduran Workers Federation.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DEL CENTRO (Syndical Federation of the Central Part of the Country). *See* Central Federation of Free Unions of Honduras.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES NACIONALES DE HONDURAS. *See* Federation of National Workers of Honduras.

FEDERACIÓN UNITARIO DE TRABAJADORES DE HONDURAS. *See* Unitary Federation of Honduras Workers.

FEDERATION OF ASSOCIATED PEASANT ENTERPRISES (Federación de Empresas Asociativas de Campesinos de Honduras—FEDACAMH).

In 1974 the National Association of Honduran Peasants* (ANACH), the Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives* (FECORAH), and the National Peasant Union* (UNC) proposed to the Agrarian Reform Institute that there was a need for a new legal status for landownership to be distributed under

the Agrarian Reform Law that was in development as well as providing mechanisms for the delivery of technical assistance for the cooperatives and collective groups that might be organized under the forthcoming law. As a consequence, the Federation of Associated Peasant Enterprises grew out of the implementation of Decree Law 170 of 30 December 1974 and the experience of the Associated Peasant Enterprises at Las Isletas (*Empresas Asociativas de Campesinos de Isletas*—EACI).

The Isletas Peasant Enterprise began as a workers collective on land abandoned by Standard Fruit Company after Hurricane Fifi destroyed banana plantations in the Aguan River Valley in September 1974. The new enterprise was run by a board of directors, elected by a general assembly of the work force, that determined work schedules—generally on a collective basis—and the distribution of wages and surpluses. The enterprise proved profitable in its production of bananas—producing 43,000 boxes in 1975, nearly one million in 1976 and four million in 1977—almost all of which were exported through Standard Fruit Company and Castle and Cook, its parent company, under the Dole label. Between 1975 and 1977, however, the Isletas Enterprise became the subject of many charges of communist infiltration, corruption involving members of the board and officials of the National Agrarian Institute (INA), and fights between “communists” and “democratic” groups wanting to take over leadership of the enterprise. Finally, in February 1977, troops of the Fourth Army Battalion in La Ceiba intervened at a special convention called to elect a new leadership, arrested some 200 militant members of the cooperative, and stayed on to protect the 35 workers who declared themselves the newly elected leaders. Nevertheless, over the next five years, charges continued to fly that the new management was siphoning off funds for its personal use, making “loans” to the families of military officers and Colonel Alvarez (the Second Battalion Commander at the time and armed forces chief, 1982–1984) or employing them and their relatives as consultants at generous salaries, and not extracting from Standard as high a price as it might have received from COMUNBANA, the marketing branch of the Union of Banana Exporting Countries. In mid-1982, the Isleta Enterprise—under a new local director and with new leadership at INA national offices in Tegucigalpa—apparently had resolved many of its former managerial and ideological problems and was returning to a more profitable state. Nonetheless, whether the Suazo Cordova government would recover any of the money from the bad loans made by the enterprise in the 1975–81 period or whether INA would actually receive the services contracted by INA officials in this period remained in doubt.

While the corruption and controversy surrounding Isletas was going on, some sixty Associative Enterprises (*Empresas Asociativas*) were being formed by AN-ACH members and landless peasants on other lands formerly used by United or Standard Fruit, generally consisting of twenty to thirty adults who were linked together, usually in a cooperative structure. These groups formed the Federation

of Associated Peasant Enterprises of Honduras, whose leaders' ideological tendencies were Marxist and anti-government.

FEDERATION OF NATIONAL WORKERS OF HONDURAS (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Nacionales de Honduras—FESITRANH).

The largest of two federations making up the Confederation of Honduran Workers* (CTH), FESITRANH has its base in the North Coast labor movement that developed out of the May–July 1954 banana worker strike. On 16 February 1955 the Villeda Morales government issued Decree Law 50 (*Carta Constitutiva de Garantías del Trabajo*) and, in June 1955, Decree Law 101, which established procedures for organized workers to obtain legal recognition (*personería jurídica*) as a *sindicato*. On 28 August 1955 United Fruit company workers formed the Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers* (SITRATERCO), which has been the largest and most important trade union in Honduras (12,000 members in 1980). Shortly thereafter, the Standard Fruit Company workers began organizing the Standard Fruit Company Workers Union* (SUTRASFCO), which has been the second most important union in Honduras. Between 1955 and 1958 SITRATERCO leaders Coleo Gonzalez y Gonzales, Luis Felipe Guerra, Victor Manuel Hernandez, Oscar Gale Varela, and other North Coast union leaders met and organized the Federation of Northern Workers of Honduras (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Norteros de Honduras—FESITRANH), which held its constituent Congress at the port city of Tela, Atlántida, on 28 April 1957. It received legal recognition from the Ministry of Labor the following year, when it also changed its name to the Federation of National Workers of Honduras (also FESITRANH). Twenty-four unions belonged to FESITRANH in 1963; forty-six in 1972, and fifty-two in April 1982, apart from the Standard Fruit Company SUTRASFCO union and the National Association of Honduran Peasants* (ANACH). Dominating FESITRANH's activities in the 1960s and 1970s were Oscar Gale, SITRATERCO secretary-general, and Celeo Gonzales, who functioned as president or secretary-general at different times. By 1985 leadership had passed into the hands of a new generation of leaders headed by Francisco Guerrero as president and Alfredo Castillo as secretary-general.

Since the late 1960s, FESITRANH has operated one of the largest training programs in Central America for urban and rural workers and peasants in a variety of subjects at the FESITRANH Institute for Labor Studies (IFES), located on the western outskirts of San Pedro Sula. FESITRANH was also one of the first trade union groups in the hemisphere to obtain a loan for worker housing under the Alliance for Progress. Its housing project (Colonia FESITRANH) near the IFES is an excellent example of neighborhood stability and pride.

FEDERATION OF WORKERS SOCIETIES OF THE NORTH (Federación de Sociedades Obreras del Norte—FSON).

After Honduras' first major labor organization, the Honduran Workers Fed-

eration* (FOH) was formed in May 1921, Felipe Calix Matute, one of Honduras' first communist leaders, Manuel Calix Herrera, and Juan Pablo Wainwright, tried to give the FOH a more militant and class-conflict orientation. When this effort failed, the three men and communists in the "La Vanguardia" (Vanguard) Society of El Progreso, a railroad and banana-processing city east of San Pedro Sula, Department of Cortés, invited delegates from different North Coast laboring groups to form a rival organization. This led to the creation on 1 May 1926 of the Federation of Worker Societies of the North.

The Marxist orientation of communist leaders such as Calix Herrera, Graciela García, Zoroaster Montes de Oca, who were developing a philosophy of class struggle, anti-capitalism, and anti-imperialism, led to another split and the formation of the Honduran Syndical Organization (Federación Sindical Hondureña—FSH) on 1 May 1929.

FENACH (Federación Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras). *See* National Association of Honduran Peasants.

FESICENTRO (Federación Sindical del Centro). *See* Central Federation of Free Unions of Honduras.

FESITRANH. *See* Federation of National Workers of Honduras.

FIRST HONDURAN PROFESSIONAL COLLEGE OF TEACHERS. *See* Professional Association for the Improvement of Teachers.

FRENTE SINDICAL INDEPENDIENTE. *See* Independent Syndical Front.

FSI. *See* Independent Syndical Front.

FUTH. *See* Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederación General de Trabajadores—CGT).

The General Confederation of Workers is a Christian Democratic-oriented group formed in April 1970 by urban workers groups that had their beginning in the Authentic Syndical Federation of Honduras* and peasants groups organized into the National Peasant Union* (UNC) in Choluteca and Valle departments in the South. While the CGT claimed 70,000 members in mid-1980 and 120,000 in mid-1985, most of its members—especially its 80,000 UNC affiliates—did not pay dues to their individual local organizations. While legal status came relatively quickly to groups linked to the Confederation of Honduran Workers* (CTH), the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), and Federation of National Workers of Honduras,* the CGT did not receive legal recognition (*personería*

jurídica) until 17 March 1984 probably because it had criticized CTH and ORIT-affiliated groups as being too pro-United States and too supportive of imperialist measures.

Personal and ideological conflicts over strategy and patronage have divided the CTG and its member groups from the beginning. Probably the most important early issue dividing the leadership and its allies in the Church hierarchy and the Christian Democratic Party followed the 12 June 1975 massacre of two priests and twelve peasants at the Santa Clara Peasant Training Institute in Juticalpa, Olancho.

The principal strength of the CGT—apart from its UNC peasant affiliate—is found among sugar mill workers, bank employees, and the employees of the municipality of San Pedro Sula. The decision of leaders of the dominant incumbent faction of the COLPROSUMAH teachers organization to affiliate with the CGT led to attacks on CGT and CTH leaders in the principal downtown park while Felecito Avila Ordoñez, reelected secretary-general in 1984, was delivering the first of several speeches by non-Marxist and Marxist labor-peasant leaders at May Day 1986 celebrations. Marcial Caballero was also reelected to another three-year term as secretary-general of the UNC in 1984.

The CGT is affiliated with the Latin American Workers Central (Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores—CLAT) and the Christian Democratic-oriented World Confederation of Labor (WCL). CGT and UNC affiliates have received some help in recent years from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, representing the West German Social Democratic Party, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, representing the West German Christian Democratic Party, and to a lesser extent the Friedrich Nauman (West German Liberal Party).

HONDURAN FEDERATION OF AGRARIAN REFORM COOPERATIVES (Federación de Cooperativas de Reforma Agraria de Honduras—FECORAH).

In 1961 United Fruit Company's Tela Railroad Company subsidiary decided to suspend its banana operations in Guanchías, a fertile valley in the counties (*municipios*) of El Progreso and Santa Rita Department of Yoro, east of San Pedro Sula, after the expiration of contracts for the rental of land. Once the company abandoned the plantations, some local ranchers and merchants began fencing off parts of the land for their livestock. In the meanwhile, many of the former banana workers found themselves without work and living precariously from subsistence agriculture, in contrast to their former salaries of \$5 per day when they worked for United Fruit. In late 1964 a group of peasants met to see what they could do to improve their livelihood. Among these were Efraín Díaz Galeas, a rural teacher with six years of education who had worked as a foreman on a fruit company plantation (*finca*), and Salvador García, a self-educated worker who had been Secretary of Labor Claims in the Union of Tela Railroad Corporation Workers.* Subsequently, the group—now expanded to sixteen families and eighty-five persons—began farming some of the former United Fruit land. On 17 April 1966, after several clashes with hired gunmen working for

the ranchers, the group was legally constituted as the Agricultural and Livestock Cooperative of Guanchías (Cooperativa Agrícola y Ganadera de Guanchías—COAGANGUANCHIAS). While National Agrarian Institute (INA) Director Rigoberto Sandoval was not happy with the Cooperative for farming United Fruit Company land without INA permission, he was pleased with the cooperative work of the group, and changed the orientation of INA from granting land titles to individuals to granting land to groups. In 1970 INA sponsored the First Assembly of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives. Out of this meeting of delegates from thirty-three cooperatives producing bananas, corn, sugarcane, and other crops came the Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives (FECORAH), which elected Diaz Galeas as its first president and which received its legal recognition in 1974.

In 1980 FECORAH had an estimated 5,000 members affiliated with 139–150 cooperatives. Working with landless peasants or peasants with small amounts of land, FECORAH has had a practical rather than an ideological approach: rather than mobilizing peasants for direct political action, it tends to organize groups when there is a good possibility of acquiring land, technical assistance, and legal recognition. Although small in terms of membership, FECORAH is successful and can boast that most of its member cooperatives are solvent. One serious problem that has risen out of the profitability of Guanchías and a few other cooperatives is their practice of hiring wage laborers to help cooperative members, but not allowing the laborers to join the cooperative as associates or to form separate unions. This opens them up to charges of reproducing the same exploitative relationships which had characterized their former relationships with the U.S. companies.

HONDURAN WORKERS FEDERATION (Federación Obrera Hondureña—FOH).

By the early 1920s various mutual assistance societies and unions, including those of dockworkers, railroad workers, typographers, and artisans such as shoemakers and carpenters existed in several cities. On 18 May 1921 the First Congress of Workers met in the capital, Tegucigalpa, in the Hall of the Masons' Union (Sindicato de Albañiles "El Porvenir") to organize the nation's first major labor organization, the Honduran Workers Federation. Mutualist and conciliatory in nature, the FOH stressed political action, cooperative societies, and the need for labor laws, hygienic housing, and schools for workers.

Two Honduras' earliest communists, Felipe Calix Matute, an FOH officer, and Juan Pablo Wainwright, joined by Manuel Calix Herrera, tried to take over the Federation and to give it a more militant and class-oriented orientation. When this effort failed, the above three individuals plus communists associated with the "La Vanguardia" (Vanguard) Society of El Progreso, a railroad and banana-processing center east of San Pedro Sula, invited labor representatives to form a rival organization. This move led to the creation on 1 May 1926 of the Federation of Workers Societies of the North.* However, splits over the ideo-

logical orientation and militancy led to the ouster of Manuel Calix Herrera by the FOH Executive Council and the formation by Calix Herrera and others of the Honduran Syndical Organization (Federación Sindical Hondureña—FSH).

INDEPENDENT SYNDICAL FRONT (Frente Sindical Independiente—FSI).

The Independent Syndical Front was formed in mid-1977 by Marxists linked to both the pro-Soviet Honduran Communist Party and the pro-Maoist Communist Party of Honduras—Marxist-Leninist who failed to take over the Central Federation of Free Workers of Honduras* at its Fourteenth Congress in July 1978. It faded away shortly thereafter.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HONDURAN PEASANTS (Asociación Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras—ANACH).

After FESITRANH AND FECESITLIH were organized by Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) and AFL—CIO representatives in 1955, they discussed the need to organize peasants both to protect the long-range self-interest of urban workers and to promote the economic and social welfare of the peasantry as consumers of industrial goods. Between 1958 and 1961 various peasant leaders were selected to attend ORIT and AFL—CIO training courses in Costa Rica, Mexico, and Washington, D.C., and a National Federation of Honduran Peasants (Federación Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras—FENACH) was created. However, as a consequence of communist influence in FENACH, anti-communists in the organizing groups then organized more than 500 FENACH and other peasant leaders into the National Association of Honduran Peasants at a San Pedro Sula meeting on 22 October 1962, some three weeks after President Ramon Villeda Morales (1958–63) promulgated an Agrarian Reform Law. ANACH was granted legal recognition (*personería jurídica*) on 18 December 1962.

When Efraín Díaz Galeas, an early ANACH leader, left to dedicate himself full-time to a cooperative at Guanchías in Yoro Department and to the leadership of the Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives* (FECORAH) in 1970, Reyes Rodríguez Arévalo emerged to lead ANACH and dominated the group for much of the 1970s.

ANACH grew fastest after National Agrarian Institute (INA) Director Rigo-berto Sandoval persuaded General López Arrellano to support a more aggressive reform program in 1973–75. Although ANACH membership and dues-paying habits are inexact, the group claimed 25,000 members in 300 subsections (the subsectional was the basic local unit) in June 1973 and 80,000 affiliates in 750 subsections in 1980. While the latter figures are probably inflated, the Executive Committee reported at the Seventh Intermediate Congress in September 1977 that 512 subsections had obtained 77,500 hectares of land distributed by INA. ANACH has been strongest in the Northern and Northwestern departments of Atlántida, Cortés, Santa Barbara, and Yoro. There are also strong ANACH groups in Choluteca and Valle departments in the South and Olancho in the East.

The increasingly personalistic leadership of Reyes Rodríguez became a bone of contention in the 1970s. Critics charged that Rodríguez was overly influenced by the Melgar Castro government (1975–78) and especially by the National Party's Ricardo Zuñiga Augustínus (the longtime *éminence gris* of Honduras politics) and therefore compromised the movement's demands. Another bone of contention that divided ANACH was whether the group should organize more subsections or focus on economically based cooperatives. Some ANACH activists opposed the cooperative structure since it placed groups within the restriction of laws governing cooperatives and hence possibly increased government control by the Director General of Cooperative Development (Dirección General de Fomento de Cooperativas—DIFOCOOP). Likewise, another source of discord among peasant groups was the Associated Peasant Enterprises (EACI's) formed under the auspices of INA. The three major peasant organizations of ANACH, the National Peasant Union,* and FECORAH view the EACI's as a means by which INA can influence peasant organizations to the point that EACI members become paid employees of the state rather than independent landowners.

Perhaps the most disruptive event in ANACH history was the walkout in September 1979 of Reyes Rodríguez and 106 followers from the Annual Congress. Victor Artilles, secretary-general of the Confederation of Honduran Workers,* and a Ministry of Labor official were forced to lead the sessions after Reyes' walkout. Internal turmoil was reduced in September–October 1980 when another long-term ANACH leader Antonio Julín Méndez was elected president and Eugénio Casalengo was elected secretary-general by a vote of 399 to 106. At that 1980 convention in Choluteca, Reyes and Benjamin Castro tried to make a comeback but were rebuffed; they and their followers then formed a new group which called itself the Peasant Alliance of National Organizations of Honduras (Alianza Campesina de Organizaciones Nacionales de Honduras—ALCONH). Reportedly financed and advised by Edgardo Zuñiga Rodezno and Carlos Alberto Urrutia, long-term National Party stalwarts who headed INA in 1980–81, the new group received its legal recognition (*personería jurídica*) on 4 June 1981. Subsequently, some of the 120 groups and 1,500 members that followed Reyes and Castro out of the Choluteca meeting returned to ANACH; Reyes himself flirted briefly with the press about returning to ANACH in 1981, but by August 1982 Castro was running the ALCONH organization in San Pedro Sula while Reyes was reportedly enjoying himself farming a small plot of land outside that city; his son remains active in ANACH headquarters in San Pedro Sula.

Since 1982, ANACH leaders have been concerned with improving the accounting and bookkeeping of cooperatives under their supervision, a point of concern in that many cooperatives have incurred heavy debts which they have been unwilling or unable to pay off. In addition, ANACH has joined with the National Union of Peasants* and many other major labor unions in making demands upon the government of José Simón Azcona, which assumed power in January, 1986, to raise the minimum wage, increase the distribution of land to the landless peasants, and provide public services to rural areas.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF HONDURAN PEASANTS. *See* National Association of Honduran Peasants.

NATIONAL PEASANT UNION (Unión Nacional de Campesinos—UNC).

The tensions in Guatemala from 1950 to 1954 between Liberals and Conservatives as well as the struggle between non-communists and the Honduran Communist Party (PCH) for control of the balance of the workers movement in Honduras in 1954 worried the Honduran clergy. In addition, illiteracy, poor health, and weak family and religious ties led to the creation of radio literacy and revival programs in the southern department of Choluteca and Valle on the Pacific Coast in 1960 that became part of a community development program. As part of this activity, Andres Mercau, a member of the Executive Committee of the Latin American Confederation of Christian Syndicalists (Confederación Latinoamericana de Sindicatos Cristianos—CLASC), began organizing urban workers and peasants into the Workers and Peasants Action of Honduras (Acción Sindical de Obreros y Campesinos de Honduras). In 1962 the National Association of Honduran Peasants* (ANACH) helped several peasants from Namague Muncípio (county) in Choluteca Department to organize subsections (*subseccionales*) to recover *ejido* (municipally owned) land from private landowners. As a result of this work and that of Mercau, the Authentic Syndical Federation of Honduras* (Federación Auténtica Sindical de Honduras—FASH) was organized in February 1963 in the South by these southern groups and some Tegucigalpa-area unions that broke away from the Central Federation of Free Unions of Honduras,* that included truckers, radio workers, mosaic tile workers, and the Shirtmakers Union (Sindicato de Camiseras).

While personal and ideological conflicts over strategy and patronage have divided the General Confederation of Workers* (CGT) and its member groups as much as other labor and peasant groups, the most important early issue dividing the leadership and its allies in the Church and the Christian Democratic Party followed the 12 June 1975 massacre at the Horcones Ranch in Juticalpa, Olancho, where the Santa Clara Leadership Training Center was located. An attack led by Army Major José Enrique Chinchilla and a local rancher, Manuel "Mel" Zelaya, resulted in the death of one Colombian priest, an American priest, and eleven other persons. While Major Chinchilla, Zelaya, and other ranchers alleged that the Training Center was the headquarters of a guerrilla group operating in the hills of Olancho under the guise of its radio school and other community development programs, army officials later said there was no proof that this was happening. After a January 1978 trial, Major Chinchilla and Army Sergeant Benjamin Plata were sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Other military and civilian codefendants were acquitted because Judge Augusto Bustillo was unable to find sufficient legal evidence to convict them.

The Santa Clara massacre plus a general repression directed at different peasant groups occupying land between May and November 1975 contributed to the Church's coming under pressure from conservative business groups such as the

National Association of Industry (Asociación Nacional de Industria—ANDI) and FENAGH (National Cattlemen's Association) for its alleged connections with rural unrest through its rural literacy and community development programs. As the Church began to back away from its sponsorship of rural development programs, the UNC-CGT organization was forced to reevaluate its commitment and strategy of rural activism. Discord surfaced at one point to such an extent that fighting broke out between different sides at CGT headquarters in Tegucigalpa. Dissidents who said they favored practical results and continued militancy broke away and founded the National Union of Authentic Peasants of Honduras (Unión Nacional de Campesinos Auténticos de Honduras—UNCAH) in cooperation with several ANACH dissidents and Marxists affiliated with the PCH.

Important differences continue to exist between the ANACH and UNC over long-range strategy and goals. The UNC, led for the past ten years by Marcial Caballero, secretary-general, traditionally has felt that ANACH has been too "accommodating" with the Honduran government. The UNC is committed to profound changes in society, eventually working for a radical redistribution of landownership and employer-employee relations. ANACH, although working toward a redistribution of land, has been more cautious in its approach to agrarian reform as has the Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives* (FECORAH). Nevertheless, since 1975 most peasant groups have been linked in an informal structure, the National Unity Front of Honduran Peasants (Frente de Unidad Nacional Campesina de Honduras—FUNACAMH) in order to increase their political leverage over agrarian issues. The most important early effort came in late 1975 when the UNC, ANACH, and FECORAH put aside differences to confront the central government over the jailing of peasant leaders in the wake of occupations or "invasions" of land by at least 125 groups in twelve of the eighteen Honduran departments on 1 November. Later, ANACH stayed away from most FUNACAMH meetings while Reyes Rodríguez was the principal ANACH leader. Once Antonio Julín Mendes gained control in 1980, ANACH began participating once more in the Front, which also included the UNC, FECORAH, UNCAH, the Associated Peasant Enterprises of Isletas, the Associated Peasant Enterprise of Guaymas, the National Union of People's Cooperatives, the National Alliance of Honduran Peasant Organizations, and the Front of Independent Peasant Associations.

In Spring, 1986, UNC, ANACH, and FECORAH cooperatively sponsored and supported the occupation of unused private and public land in some 38 *municipios* (counties) in three departments in northern and western Honduras.

PEASANT ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF HONDURAS.
See National Association of Honduran Peasants.

PEASANT LEAGUES (Ligas Campesinas). *See* National Peasant Union.

PRIMER COLEGIO PROFESIONAL HONDUREÑO DE MAESTROS (First Honduran Professional College of Teachers). *See* Professional Association for the Improvement of Teachers.

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF TEACHERS (Colegio Profesional de Superación Magisterial Hondureño—COLPROSUMAH).

Four *colegios*, or associations, of public school teachers have spoken out on education issues and working conditions since their initial organization in 1965. While the General Confederation of Workers* (CGT), Confederation of Honduran Workers* (CTH), and Communist Party of Honduras (PCH) have tried to organize affiliate groups and influence their actions, it was not until early 1986 that the most vocal of these groups, COLPROSUMAH, hinted that it planned to affiliate with the Christian Democratic-oriented CGT. CGT's secretary-general and other non-Marxist labor leaders were attacked by men wielding poles previously used to hold posters or banners at the May Day 1986 rally in Francisco Morazan Park in downtown Tegucigalpa in front of the cathedral, apparently in reprisal for the CGT's willingness to accept affiliation by the COLPROSUMAH. COLPROSUMAH had been intervened by the Ministry of Labor since a turbulent strike broke out in July 1982 when three of these teacher groups formed the Teacher Unity Front (Frente de Unidad Magisterial—FUMH) in an effort to raise wages which averaged \$200 for primary teachers. These three groups were the COLPROSUMAH, which claimed more than 10,000 members; the Colegio de Profesores de Educación Média de Honduras (Association of Secondary Education Teachers—COPEMH); and the First Honduran Professional College of Teachers (Primer Colegio Profesional Hondureño de Maestros—PRICOPROMAH). President Magdalena Velasquez de Burgos of the Public Employees in Rural Education (Sindicato de Empleados Públicos de la Educación Rural de Honduras—SINEPUDERH) refused to join the FUMH although rural primary teachers are paid less than other teachers. FUMH initiated work stoppages and marched through the streets of Tegucigalpa and adjoining Comayagua, where offices of the Ministry of Education are located, to press fulfillment of alleged promises by President Suazo Cordova in December 1981 after the election to increase teacher salaries 100 percent as well as to provide other teacher benefits. Both President Suazo and Minister of Education Alma de Rodas Fiallos told the teachers and the public over nationwide radio and television that "we all ought to sacrifice in 1982 so that in the near future the economic system can generate new resources so that salary increases, other social programs and productive re-investment might be financed." (La Prensa, 16 August, 1982.) The government opposed the pay raises principally because of a lack of revenue to pay the teachers—although FUMH scored a debating point by pointing out that cabinet ministers were to receive a pay raise of 8 percent—but also because of fear that granting teacher demands would spur demands by other public employees and trade unions for increases in their wages as well as in the minimum

wage. The government responded to a 16 August two-day strike and demand for a 90 percent wage increase by giving the teachers several days to return to classes or to face the loss of their positions. As radio stations began reading the names of teachers dismissed for not returning to work by 26 August—an action never taken before by any civilian or military head of state—troops prevented the passage of teacher leaders into or away from FUMH headquarters at the Escuela Superior del Profesorado in suburban Tegucigalpa. On 30 August classes returned to normal. On 7 September Minister of Education Rodas de Fiallos announced that 350 substitutes hired to replace the dismissed teachers would be employed in newly created positions as a reward for their willingness to teach during the strike. Most of the dismissed teachers were eventually able to return to their old jobs, but many were transferred to less desirable locations, without a cut in pay, though they were not paid for the time missed while on strike. While several CGT and PCH-FUTH affiliates expressed support for the teachers' "just demands," there were no sympathy strikes or work stoppages by other groups in support of the FUMH demands. In October and November 1985 one of several factions struggling for control of COLPROSUMAH publically urged teachers and the public through newspaper advertisements to vote against Oscar Mejia Arrellano, former minister of government and justice, and Suazo's choice to succeed himself as candidate of the Rodista-faction of the Liberal Party.

SAML. *See* Autonomous Syndicate of la Lima Mechanics.

SYNDICAL ACTION OF WORKERS AND PEASANTS OF HONDURAS (Acción Sindical de Obreros y Campesinos de Honduras). *See* Authentic Syndical Front of Honduras.

SYNDICAL FEDERATION OF THE CENTRAL PART OF THE COUNTRY (Federación Sindical del Centro). *See* Central Federation of Free Unions of Honduras.

SINDICATO AUTÓNOMO DE MECANICOS DE LA LIMA. *See* Autonomous Syndicate of la Lima Mechanics.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA STANDARD FRUIT COMPANY. *See* Standard Fruit Company Workers Union.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA TELA RAILROAD COMPANY. *See* Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers.

SITRATERCO. *See* Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers.

SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PEASANT ASSOCIATION OF HONDURAS (Asociación Campesina Social Cristiana de Honduras). *See* National Peasant Union.

STANDARD FRUIT COMPANY WORKERS UNION (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Standard Fruit Company—SUTRASFCO).

This has been the second most important individual union in Honduras. It arose in 1955 after United Fruit Company Workers formed the Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers* (SITRATERCO), which has been the largest and most important trade union in Honduras. SUTRASFCO and SITRATERCO are the principal components of the Federation of National Workers of Honduras,* which is a much more important organization than either of the two banana workers unions or the other fifty unions belonging to the Federation in April 1985, except for the National Association of Honduran Peasants* (ANACH).

The Communist Party was influential in the leadership of SUTRASFCO in the early and mid-1970s until March–April 1977 because of the influence of Napoleón Acevedo Granados, who worked with a coalition of Honduran Communist Party and Social Christian–oriented leaders. At that time an Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) oriented group ousted Acevedo in Sindicato elections.

On 21 December 1979 a troublesome twenty-eight-day strike led by communist members of the Costa Rican General Confederation of Workers* broke out on Standard Fruit plantations and spread to Honduran banana workers. On 14 February 1980, 6,000 workers began an indefinite strike on Honduran North Coast plantations of Standard Fruit, claiming that the company had not fulfilled several clauses of a labor agreement with respect to overtime pay; the workers also wanted an 80 percent wage hike to meet the pressures of inflation. As a consequence of mediation by Labor Minister Adalberto Discua and Colonel Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, commander of the Second Military Zone in Northwestern Honduras, Standard Fruit workers received a 60 percent wage increase but did not receive back pay for the missed strike time. On 11 March General Policarpo Paz García, president of the military junta governing Honduras, said that this strike and others on sugar plantations were part of a “preconceived plan” aimed at disrupting the forthcoming 20 April 1980 Constituent Assembly elections.

In the 1980s, a major problem confronting SUTRASFCO leaders has been the rising cost of producing bananas in the La Ceiba area and shipping them to Puerto Cortes. The Standard Fruit Company has responded to this situation by trying to divest itself of activities relating to dock-shipping, hospitals, and pine-apples by turning them over to independent cooperatives or private ventures. This represents a serious challenge to SUTRASFCO power and a reduction in the size of the company’s work force.

SUTRASFCO. *See* Standard Fruit Company Workers Union.

UNC. *See* National Peasant Union.

UNIÓN NACIONAL DE CAMPESINOS. *See* National Peasant Union.

UNION OF TELA RAILROAD COMPANY WORKERS (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Tela Railroad Company—SITRATERCO).

Formed on 28 August 1955, this has been the largest and most important trade union in Honduras with 12,000 members in 1980. It grew out of a sixty-nine-day banana worker strike in May–June 1954 that established a non-communist labor movement as a politically potent force in Honduran politics. Between 1955 and 1958 SITRATERCO leaders Celeo González y González, Luís Feliipe Guerra, Víctor Manuel Hernández, Oscar Gale Varela, and other North Coast union leaders met and organized the Federation of Northern Workers of Honduras, which had its Constituent Congress at the port city of Tela on 28 April 1957. Shortly after receiving legal recognition from the Labor Ministry, the Federation changed its name to Federation of National Workers of Honduras* (FESITRANH).

Since 1975 communists, other Marxists, and some Christian Democrats have tried to take over the Central Federation of Free Workers of Honduras* (FECESITLIH), Federation of National Workers of Honduras* (FESITRANH), and the two most important unions of banana workers, SITRATERCO and the Standard Fruit Company Workers Union.* Between 1975 and 1977 many SITRATERCO workers were saying that their union should withdraw from FESITRANH because they were paying too much in dues to FESITRANH and the Confederation of Honduran Workers* (CTH) without receiving enough benefits; that FESITRANH and the CTH were too close to the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and the Central American Confederation of Workers in which the United States and the AFL–CIO had “too much influence”; and that FESITRANH leaders González and Gale were ORIT bureaucrats who did not represent the true class interests of the workers.

In April 1977 nineteen North Coast unions, principally industrial unions including SITRATERCO which had been the target of Honduran Communist Party (PCH) activity since 1970, withdrew on the pretext that González had given the National Association of Honduran Peasants* more delegate votes than it deserved in a Federation Congress. The nineteen dissident groups formed a Committee of Intersyndical Unity (Comité de Unidad Intersindical—CUI) and joined the Social Christian or Christian Democratic-oriented General Confederation of Workers* as a strategic move to achieve some measure of protection from an already established group before evolving into something else. Under Luis Thiebaud, SITRATERCO began to negotiate a conditional return to FESITRANH but was unsuccessful and formally departed FESITRANH in late 1978. However, PCH influence was reduced in SITRATERCO on 28 August 1981, when “dem-

ocratic forces'' headed by Desiderio Carbajal Elvir as presidential candidate and Dario Bonilla as candidate for secretary-general swept the Sixteenth Ordinary Congress, ousting a ticket headed by Evaristo Euceda, a Maoist-oriented secretary of organization, and two other known leftists. PCH influence in SUTRASFCO was also reduced in March–April 1977 when Andres Victor Artiles led a Democratic Front ousting Napoleon Acevedo Granados and a coalition of PCH and Social Christian–oriented leaders. Acevedo was later dismissed by Standard Fruit for failure to return to his former job within the two-day period called for by the collective bargaining contract of SUTRASFCO.

On 14 February 1980, 6,000 workers of Standard Fruit Company began an indefinite strike on North Coast plantations, claiming that the economy had not fulfilled several clauses of a labor agreement with respect to overtime pay; the workers also wanted an 80 percent wage hike to meet the demands of inflation. While the Honduran strike followed a troublesome twenty-eight-day strike on Standard and United Fruit Company plantations that broke out 21 December 1979 in Costa Rica, the strike did not spread to United Fruit plantations or Tela Railroad employees in Honduras.

By April 1985 SITRATERCO was once again an important member of FESITRANH.

UNITARY FEDERATION OF HONDURAN WORKERS (Federación Unitaria de Trabajadores de Honduras—FUTH).

Until October 1978 there was no communist labor confederation although Communists had been active in organizing the Honduran Workers Federation* and other North Coast groups in the 1920s and early 1930s and in selected agricultural and urban firms since the Great Banana Strike of 1954. In March 1963 members of several North Coast *sindicatos* influenced by the Communist Party of Honduras (PCH) met in San Pedro Sula to organize the Democratic Federation of Unions of Workers of Honduras (Federación Democrática de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de Honduras—FEDESINTRABH). Among the groups participating were representatives of dissident Standard Fruit Company Workers Union* (SUTRASFCO) sections, dockworkers, railroad workers, brewery workers, workers from the Honduran Cement Corporation (Sindicato de Cementos de Honduras), dissident National Association of Honduran Peasants* (FENACH) groups, and—most importantly—members of the Autonomous Syndicate of La Lima Mechanics*, a small 150-member group of mechanics at United Fruit installations at La Lima in which the PCH had always been strong.

FEDESINTRABH soon fell apart because PCH members lost influence in June 1963 SUTRASFCO elections while United Fruit (Tela Railroad) officials pressured non-PCH members in the La Lima Mechanics group; National Association of Peasants* and Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) representatives also worked to oust PCH leaders from FENACH groups. In 1975–77, the PCH regained its influence in SUTRASFCO and the Union of Tela Railroad Company

Workers (SITRATERCO) in 1975–77 under the leadership of Napoleón Azevedo Granados and Rigoberto Luna. However, democratic-oriented groups under Victor Artilles and Celeo Gonzalez ousted Azevedo from the SUTRASFCO leadership in 1977 and Evaristo Euceda, a Maoist-oriented leader, from SITRATERCO in 1981.

In October 1978 twelve Marxist-oriented groups plus Federation of National Workers of Honduras* and Central Federation of Free Workers of Honduras* dissidents founded the Committee of Syndical Unity (Comité de Unidad Sindical—CUS), whose president was Carlos Reyes and whose secretary-general was Luis Morel in 1980. In 1981 Azevedo was the reported mastermind behind the effort to combine CUS, the Independent Syndical Front* and the Inter-Syndical Committee of Labor Unity (Comité de Unidad Inter-Sindical—CUL) into the Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers.* Although the organization claimed 30,000 members in April 1985, the membership is more likely around 10,000 but includes workers in key unions such as the Union of Workers of the National Electrical Energy Company (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica—SITRAENEE), the beverage and brewery workers union (Sindicato de Trabajadores en Industrias de Bebidas y Similares), workers in the National Autonomous Water and Sewer Service (Sindicato de Trabajadores del Servicio Autónoma Nacional de Agua y Alcantarrilado—SITRASANAA), a staff employee of the National University (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras—SITRAUNAH), workers in the Central Bank (SITRABANTRAL), and construction workers. While frequently claiming that it is not a PCH or Marxist-Communist affiliate, President Napoleón Acevedo Granados, Secretary-General Efraín Aguilar, and others have received training in the Soviet Union and Cuba as well as supported solidarity marches and demonstrations in favor of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and Salvadoran guerrillas, and against the presence of U.S. military troops in Honduras in recent years.

Jamaica _____

WILLIAM L. CUMIFORD

Jamaica, the third largest island in the Caribbean, has a total land mass of 4,244 square miles and boasts a population of slightly more than two million, with governmental headquarters situated in Kingston.

The island was discovered by Columbus in 1494, but the Spanish, uninterested in Jamaica because of the absence of mineral wealth, allowed it to languish as a supply base and ranching center. Jamaica was seized by the British in 1655.

Slave labor, introduced by Spain, continued under English plantation operations. The system flourished as the volume of sugar production increased. By the close of the seventeenth century Jamaica had become an extremely valuable island possession.

The old plantation system, however, had collapsed by the 1860s. The abolition of the slave trade in 1807, and the culmination of the emancipation process thirty years later, dealt serious blows to the plantation economy. Unemployment resulted, along with oppressive taxation and devastating droughts. By the mid-1860s the traditional foundation of the Jamaican social and economic order had eroded. This tumultuous decade witnessed grave changes. Following a rebellion, severe reprisals by the governor, and dissolution of the island assembly in 1865, Jamaica became a crown colony. As such, the island enjoyed little autonomy.

In 1884 a new constitution went into effect for Jamaica, introducing numerous reforms. However, Afro-Jamaicans held no power, and the government favored the white property owner over the predominant black population. Nevertheless, a healthy banana-exporting operation promised a modicum of economic security for the black peasantry.

In the following years, though, employment difficulties plagued the island, prompting many Jamaicans to emigrate. This trend reversed in the late 1920s and early 1930s, precipitating a dangerous spiraling of unemployment. This

situation, coinciding with the depression and lowered sugar prices, soon found Jamaica an impoverished, struggling society.

Trade unionism in Jamaica dates to the consolidation of dockworkers in two branches—the Longshoremen's 1 and 2—in 1918, and later the formation of the Jamaica Workers and Tradesmens Union* (JWTU). However, the real beginning of organized labor on the island is traced to the efforts of William Alexander Bustamante following the riots in 1938, sparked by depression-spawned dislocations, that swept the entire Caribbean. During the formative years of Jamaican trade union development, Bustamante emerged as the leading symbol and voice of the oppressed in challenging the traditional masters of Jamaican society.

In January 1939 Bustamante organized the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union* (BITU). This group developed from rather chaotic circumstances amidst the 1938 riots in and around Kingston. Beginning at the waterfront, labor discontent rapidly spread to the hinterland, where Bustamante aroused the pent-up grievances of the rural working masses. In fact, the BITU still commands great respect for its historic role in rallying the working interests of Jamaica.

Bustamante's early plans to form separate unions around specific trades evaporated as the energetic labor leader contemplated larger designs for a highly centralized organization. Rather than lessen his personal control over workers by following traditional trade union principles, Bustamante sought leadership over all working elements on the island. While other political leaders refrained from direct involvement with the unions, he erected a labor base for future political strength.

Trade unionism in Jamaica, then, must be understood in the context of direct political involvement. Bustamante's "blanket union" concept, that is, a mammoth organization comprising virtually all workers in the island, created a ready-made labor constituency. Thus the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) emerged from the core of working-class support engendered by Bustamante when he formed the BITU. This development was highly significant for two reasons: on the political front it set the mold for the intimate relationships between opposition labor-political interests, and it innately discouraged grass-roots local trade union power and activity.

By 1940 Bustamante's enormous success met stringent opposition by the British authorities, who jailed the labor leader under wartime regulations after he made an inflammatory speech. Despite its leader's incarceration, BITU membership greatly expanded. Guided by the political and legal acumen of Bustamante's cousin, Norman Manley, the BITU tripled its membership, from 6,500 in 1939 to more than 19,000 in 1942.

After the 1938 riots Manley formed the People's National Party (PNP) through the fusion of the National Reform Association, the Federation of Citizens' Association, and the Jamaican Progressive League. The PNP, originating as a group of elitist professionals, seized on the labor uprisings as an opportunity for expansion. Bustamante's charisma among the rural labor element was well com-

plemented by Manley's organizational skills and intellectual urban influence. This combination of forces proved an unbeatable alliance.

During Bustamante's internment, however, Manley committed an indiscretion that touched off a strong reaction from the labor leader. In an effort to regulate and coordinate strike activities, the PNP began the formation of the Trade Union Council* (TUC). After his release from prison, Bustamante, who viewed this development as a threat to the authority of the BITU, severed all ties with Manley. Unwittingly, this maneuver set the course for Jamaican two-party government and union dissension.

By 1942 the Manley-Bustamante split led to the establishment of several other unions. For the most part these groups consisted of railway and government workers who rallied around the leadership of Ken Hill, his brother Frank, Richard Hart, and Arthur Henry, former associates of Bustamante known as the "4H's." Manley secured vital support from these union leaders over the next decade in the course of his ongoing struggle with Bustamante.

During World War II organized labor in Jamaica developed into a growing constituency for political dissemination and communication. Union membership in the colony had grown from a sparse 1,080 in 1937 to nearly 50,000 on the eve of the first elections. By the mid-1940s the BITU accounted for better than 80 percent of trade union membership. In mid-1943 Bustamante formed the JLP, and in the elections of the following year captured twenty-three of the thirty-two lower house seats, as opposed to only four seats won by the PNP.

The astounding electoral success of the JLP continued over the years. The party lost only two general elections—held every five years—between 1944 and 1972. During his first administration Bustamante authorized the initiation of bauxite mining, offering attractive terms to foreign companies. Even though this policy drew fire from Manley and the PNP, Bustamante effectively stole the opposition's thunder by encouraging the development of import-substituting industries for Jamaica. Shortly after Jamaican independence in 1962, Donald Sangster and Hugh Shearer succeeded Bustamante as premiers, but most observers agree that the old trade union warhorse controlled decision making in the party until his death in 1977.

Meanwhile, the PNP experienced many difficulties. Despite his intellectual rigor and general acclaim, Manley never elicited the widespread support garnered by Bustamante. While BITU members constituted the JLP power base, the PNP found itself sharing urban concerns with a number of union groups and small parties. From the outset the PNP espoused democratic-socialist policies, receiving warm support from the British Labour Party. The PNP even joined the Socialist International after World War II. Manley campaigned vigorously for social and economic reform and self-government, and the sticky issue of nationalization also became a touchstone of the PNP.

Notwithstanding overwhelming JLP success at the polls in the 1940s, Manley's party enjoyed considerable popularity, especially in city politics. But the highly

charged international political atmosphere of the early 1950s threatened to destroy the PNP. The "4H's" (the Hills, Hart, and Henry) were expelled from the PNP in 1952 for advocating communist ideas and affiliations. Repercussions for the union movement were significant. At the time of the ousting Ken Hill had been the leader of the TUC, which had functioned as the labor arm of the PNP. Disassociation from the TUC forced Manley's realignment of party-labor connections, resulting in the eventual organization of the National Workers' Union* (NWU) as the symbiotic labor body of the PNP.

Shockwaves in the PNP subsided quickly, due largely to the organizational skills of Manley's son, Michael, who ascended rapidly to the helm of NWU leadership. The younger Manley proved instrumental in marshaling key support from the island's bauxite workers. In the 1955 election the PNP finally won a majority of lower-house seats through this labor-front coup and strong internal reorganization.

As the new premier, Norman Manley might have enjoyed prolonged success but for one controversial issue: the West Indian Federation. Leaders of the PNP discovered that most Jamaicans were unfavorably disposed to Federation membership, as a 1961 referendum revealed strong anti-Federation sentiment among the voters. Special elections called the following year went against the PNP, delivering power once again into the hands of Manley's old nemesis, Alexander Bustamante.

Control of the PNP passed to Michael Manley upon his father's death in 1969. Three years later the party returned to power with a sizable majority. However, 1972 proved an inauspicious year for Jamaica. World oil shortages set off a foreign exchange crisis which in turn ballooned the island's currency. A brief interlude of International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance was followed by a breakdown in Manley's negotiations with the international agency. Shortly, IMF funds were suspended altogether.

Meanwhile, a cutback in bauxite production, rising unemployment, and mounting political and criminal violence created a crisis atmosphere. These troubled circumstances convinced Manley that new elections were in order. In October 1980 the PNP went down to defeat at the hands of Edward Seaga and the JLP, winning merely eight out of sixty lower-house seats. The National Workers Union, however, received continued support from the PNP and major segments of labor.

Victorious in the 1980 campaign, Seaga attacked Manley's socialist policies and advocated a reinvigoration of Jamaican capitalism. Seaga stressed the forging of close economic ties with the United States and maintained the image of a technocrat relying on traditional formulas for solving the severe economic problems of the country. Unemployment is easily the most distressing problem in Jamaica; in 1982 more than 30 percent of the work force was unemployed. Moreover, Seaga's economic programs benefited primarily the upper and middle classes while doing little to improve the lot of the poorer elements in Jamaican society.

The dismal condition of the lower classes in Jamaica calls attention to historic leftist activities on the island. In the late 1930s interest in left-wing politics and ideologies grew among intellectuals and aspiring political activists in Jamaica. The inspiration for these two ideas originated in the "Left Book Club," an organization founded in Great Britain in 1936 as a peace movement opposed to fascist aggression in Europe. In Kingston this group became the focal point for leftist intellectual interest and socialist politics.

Though Marxist-Leninist leaders were extremely active in the Jamaican labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s, their influence waned considerably in the following decades. The "4H's" began as supporters of Bustamante and the BITU. A few key leftist labor groups, namely the Motor Omnibus Drivers' Association and Chauffeurs' Union (See Jamaica Omnibus Service Workers Association), exhibited a high level of organization under the leadership of Ken Hill. Likewise, Arthur Henry controlled an important segment of seamen interests in the formative days of labor organization. Both leaders were important members of Bustamante's inner circle in the late 1930s.

When Bustamante reorganized his union along wholly personalistic lines, it became inevitable that the leftist leaders would not dictate the ideological course of the labor movement. Important developments occurred, however, before these men departed the BITU; the most significant being the creation of a Marxist publication, the *Jamaica Labour Weekly* (JLW). The paper, advocating strong Marxist-Leninist ideas and programs, failed to arouse most workers, largely because of the backwardness and illiteracy of the Jamaican labor force. Bustamante's large following among the population further blunted leftist appeals to the working masses.

Before assisting others in organizing the TUC, various communist and socialist leaders initiated separate unions to enlist support from a large cross section of the work force. Between 1942 and 1944 about a dozen distinct organizations were created along leftist lines. Most of these bodies were comprised of government employees. Notable gains were made among transport workers, power-supply employees, and printers. The small, ineffectual nature of these groups prompted the reorganization of the TUC from an advisory capacity into a blanket union in 1949. Though the leftist faction proved instrumental in fomenting important TUC strikes throughout the 1940s, it never penetrated deeply into the leadership ranks of the union.

From 1946 through 1948 leftist leaders of the various small unions spearheaded strike actions and other tactics traditionally employed under Marxist-Leninist principles. Mental hospital employees, railway workers, and busmen all went on strike during these years. Public meetings, marches, financial subscriptions, picketing, publication of leaflets, and mass demonstrations characterized the nature of leftist agitation at this time. It is significant, moreover, that even though these activities produced few immediate, tangible changes, they foreshadowed future tactics for Jamaican labor grievances.

In the 1950s leftist trade union activity diminished. First, Marxist publications

that appeared following the demise of the *Jamaica Labour Weekly* did not measure up to the *Weekly's* standards. For example, *The Masses*, edited in the 1940s by Frank Hill, printed diluted leftist doctrine while trying to represent a broad spectrum of political ideas reflected in the TUC. Next, while Florizel Glasspole steadily consolidated his strength as the conservative leader of the TUC, the "4H's" refused to recognize the widening breach in the organization. In fact, by 1950 a majority of TUC members had assumed a middle-of-the-road political stance. Finally, the PNP split effectively isolated the TUC from a viable political base. Eventually, the most articulate spokesmen for leftist union ideals were among the writers and intellectuals.

From the earliest days of union organization, the primary political voice of Jamaican Communism had been the Workers' Liberation League, in 1978 renamed the Workers' Party of Jamaica (WPJ). In recent years the WPJ has been led by Trevor Munroe, a political science professor at the University of the West Indies. The party suffers from a narrow political base, consisting of workers, some students and faculty, and elements of the middle and lower classes. Party leaders maintain that the conditions for economic assistance demanded by the IMF dealt a crippling blow to the Jamaican economy, driving the working class into deeper chaos.

Though Michael Manley disavowed any connections with Munroe and the WPJ, the Communists did provide significant support to the PNP in the 1980 elections. The Young Communist Youth League emerged from the WPJ in 1981. Munroe's party offers political guidance and coordination to the University and Allied Workers' Union, the National Union of Democratic Teachers, and the Committee of Women for Progress.

The legal apparatus for trade unionism in Jamaica dates to the immediate post-World War I period. The Jamaican Trade Union Act of 1919 provided for union registration, vesting of property in trustees, rules, submission of account statements, withdrawal of registration, and trade union amalgamation and dissolution. This fundamental ordinance was amended following the disturbances in 1938, granting greater leverage to union action. Though additional amendments passed into law in 1939, 1952, and 1959, the basic definition of a trade union as stated in 1938 remains unchanged: "any combination whether temporary or permanent, the principal purposes of which are, under its constitution, the regulation of the relations between workmen and masters or between workmen and workmen, or between between masters and masters" (Trade Union Amendment Law, 35, 1938).

Trade union membership is explicitly sanctioned in the Jamaican Constitution, and labor-management relations on the island fall under the aegis of the Labor Relations and Industrial Disputes Act of 1974. This measure embodies clauses on mandatory recognition of trade unions, reinstatement for wrongful dismissal, and penalties for illegal lockouts. It also enables the government to outlaw industrial practices in areas which may be construed as harmful to the interests of the country. A number of Jamaican industries confer with the government

through special councils, and the promotion of free collective bargaining is encouraged under a labor relations code enacted in 1976.

Bibliography

- Alexander, Robert J. *Organized Labor in the Caribbean*. New York: Free Press, 1965.
- , ed. *Political Parties of the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies*, vol. 2. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982.
- Coldrick, A. P. and Philip Jones, eds. *The International Directory of the Trade Union Movement*. New York: Facts on File, 1979.
- Delson, Roberta M., ed. *Readings in Caribbean History and Economics: An Introduction to the Region*. New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1981.
- Eaton, George E. "Osmond Dyce—Labour Leader: A Life and its Times, 1918–1970." *Caribbean Quarterly* 20, nos. 3–4 (September–December 1974): 59–73.
- Kirkaldy, S. G. *An Introduction to Industrial Relations and Labour Law in Jamaica*. Mona, Jamaica: Trade Union Education Institute, 1979.
- Knowles, William H. *Trade Union Development and Industrial Relations in the British West Indies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959.
- Manley, Michael. *A Voice at the Workplace: Reflections on Colonialism and the Jamaican Worker*. London: Andre Deutsch, 1975.
- Munroe, Trevor. *The Marxist "Left" in Jamaica, 1940–1950*. Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1977.
- Nettleford, Rex. *Norman Washington Manley and the New Jamaica: Selected Speeches and Writings, 1938–1968*. New York: African Publishing, 1971.
- Payne, Anthony. "Seaga's Jamaica after One Year." *The World Today* 37 (November 1981): 434–40.
- Phelps, O. W. "Rise of the Labour Movement in Jamaica." *Social and Economic Studies* 9 (December 1960): 417–68.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

BUSTAMANTE INDUSTRIAL TRADE UNION—BITU.

The thrust of modern trade union activity in Jamaica dates to the immediate aftermath of the 1938 depression-spawned riots and the instantaneous leadership of William Alexander Bustamante. Bustamante, fifty-four years of age at the time, was a charismatic, volatile, and controversial figure. In his early years he had traveled throughout the Caribbean; he had even worked as a policeman in Cuba for a short time. By the mid-1940s he had become absorbed in a variety of economic and political issues in Kingston, eventually focusing on the dismal condition of Jamaican laborers.

During the insurrection, Bustamante launched a comprehensive union effort built on strong, personalistic, one-man control. As the name of the organization indicates, it was conceived as a general union anchored to Bustamante's expansive ego and unbounded ambition. The movement, beginning on the docks and

among the city's poor, quickly spread to the inland sugar districts, where Bustamante was idolized as the champion of the oppressed workers.

The leader's imprisonment in the early 1940s, rather than aborting the movement, transformed Bustamante into a national hero. Though he did not hold office at this time, Bustamante functioned as more of a political than a labor figure. His vast constituency represented a variety of occupational and class interests. In the first independent elections held in 1944, he claimed the backing of over 80 percent of all Jamaican union members.

Initially, Bustamante announced a blueprint for the creation of five separate unions designed for the representation of key occupational areas: municipal workers, maritime workers, factory laborers, transport workers, and general laborers. But the heady course of events in 1938 convinced the flamboyant Bustamante that nothing short of one all-encompassing, massive union movement could possibly marshal the impressive labor forces at work in Jamaica. Thus, in imposing contrast to North American style unionism, Bustamante harnessed workers' grievances that cut across the labor sector and forged them into one enormous organization.

The BITU constitution explicitly asserted Bustamante's life presidency. In critical ways this adversely affected the organizational capacity of the union. Branch units of the BITU were few, and local; subordinate leadership was discouraged. The personalistic nature of Bustamante's control over all potential union activities soon brought him to a collision course with his cousin, the most prominent political figure at the time, Norman Manley, who enjoyed a distinguished reputation with the intellectuals and middle class in Jamaica.

The unorthodox character of the BITU produced few tangible agreements or labor legislation. Nevertheless, Bustamante's fervent dynamism aroused the consciousness of the black working masses. (Manley and other BITU adversaries for the most part remained aloof from the working element and the poor.) Bustamante also received considerable support from the white upper class in Jamaica, who saw him as a leader untainted with dangerous socialist ideas.

In 1941 the BITU concluded the first collective-bargaining agreement on the island. This pact, arranged with the Sugar Manufacturers Association, included 35,000 fieldhands and 6,000 factory workers. For several reasons, however, this pioneering endeavor failed to produce convincing and comprehensive results for the overall trade union movement.

First, many workers demonstrated an entrenched fickleness toward the various unions, including the BITU, preferring to play the organizations against each other for short-term economic benefits. In this context the power to strike often resided with isolated groups of workers rather than being directed by a union cadre. Again, the inherent weakness of local-unit organization contributed to this trend.

Also, the BITU, overwhelmingly preoccupied with the singular issue of wage increases, fell short in other key grievance areas, such as negotiations over hours and working conditions. Finally, the Jamaican Labour Department's authorized

policy of proportional union representation for dockworkers and sugar plantation employees resulted in a strong infusion of political passion into almost every labor issue. Bargaining strategy, therefore, was seldom coordinated due to the intense political animosity generated between the various labor-party factions, especially the Jamaica Labour Party–Bustamante Industrial Trade Union and the People's National Party–Trade Union Council*–National Workers' Union.*

Bustamante's strong personal control over union strikes and walkouts created havoc from the very outset of Jamaican trade union activity. During the formative months and years of the BITU, the labor leader rushed from country, to city, back to country in feverish efforts to personally direct and dictate the many strikes and threats of violence accompanying the movement. From 1938 to 1946 Bustamante interceded on behalf of a wide contingency of labor interests, from sugar and banana workers in the rural areas to dockworkers, clerks, and hospital supervisors. In fact, in the mental hospital incident of 1946, Bustamante found himself aligned against members of the government hospitals and prisons employees' union, headed by Florizel Glasspole, long one of Manley's staunchest supporters.

Over the decades since the organization of the BITU, opposition labor groups, particularly those led by socialist organizers, have proved much more adept at sustained strike activity. The National Workers' Union (NWU), for example, has achieved a notable degree of success in planning and executing strike activity. In the period 1972 to 1976 the NWU averaged a 15 percent higher rate of work stoppages over those managed by the BITU.

Despite its uncharacteristic, nontraditional trade union role, the BITU boasts the second largest membership in Jamaica, slightly more than 100,000 workers. The union, registered on 23 January 1939, maintains central offices in Kingston and lists affiliation with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

INDEPENDENT TRADE UNION ACTION COUNCIL—ITUAC.

The Independent Trade Union Action Council, formed in 1968 and based in Kingston, is a trade union encompassing a variety of social-democratic labor interests. Citing international affiliation with the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Confederation of Labour, the ITUAC amalgamated a number of leftist factions for the purposes of acquiring a higher level of Communist centralization in the economic sphere, and greater political clout.

This small union body, numbering merely a few thousand, came into existence through the merger of the Jamaica Congress of Labour, the Jamaica Maritime Union, the Printers and Allied Workers' Association, the Jamaica Omnibus Service Workers' Association,* the Public Cleansing Workers' Union, and the Service Station Attendants' Union.

In 1975 Chris Lawrence, president of the ITUAC, spearheaded the formation of the Jamaica Communist Party. The latter organization has emerged as the political wing of the various leftist unions comprising the ITUAC. The Jamaica Communist Party, under the direction and general secretaryship of Lawrence,

contributed critical support to Michael Manley and other People's National Party candidates in the 1980 election.

JAMAICA ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICERS—JALGO.

The public-sector employees in Jamaica are largely represented by the Jamaica Association of Local Government Officers, with headquarters in Kingston under the general secretaryship of E. L. Taylor. The other significant government workers' group is the Jamaica Civil Service Association. Claiming international affiliation with Public Services International, this union body listed slightly more than 10,000 members in 1980.

JAMAICA CIVIL SERVICE ASSOCIATION. *See* Jamaica Association of Local Government Offices.

JAMAICA FEDERATION OF LABOR. *See* Jamaica Government Railway Employees' Union.

JAMAICA GOVERNMENT RAILWAY EMPLOYEES' UNION—JGREU.

Founded by Richard Hart in early 1942, the Jamaica Government Railway Employees' Union marked one of the earliest efforts to enlist labor support in the public sector of Jamaica's economy. Hart, along with his leftist colleagues, began his career in labor politics as a Bustamante insider (William Alexander Bustamante, founder of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union*—BITU). In the course of the Norman Manley–Bustamante schism, he broke with the BITU, allying with the Trade Union Council*–People's National Party faction.

As part of the early Marxist effort in organizing public-sector employees, Hart amassed a 1,000–member following in the JGREU. Using unstable wartime conditions as a pretext for political action, Jamaican governor A. F. Richards invoked an often-ignored labor law in refusing Hart's application for trade union status to represent the railway workers. This measure asserted that all union officers were required to be listed as employees of their respective organizations, a regulation made ludicrous by the entire "blanket union" concept widely adopted in the late 1930s.

As a radical Marxist in charge of workers' interests in a critical government service, Hart and his cohorts threatened the colonial administration. Thus, in November 1943 Hart, Ken and Frank Hill, and Arthur Henry (all left-leaning organizers, known popularly as the "4H's") were interned by Richards for 4.5 months as a wartime contingency measure. Shortly, a new constitution was adopted for the island, and Richards was replaced as the colonial chief executive.

Following these events, the unionization of government employees made significant strides. In 1945 the ranks of the JGREU had nearly doubled, to 1,895 members, the third largest union on the island. Along with other labor-organizing efforts in the public sector, Hart managed the railway workers as a trade union

arm of Manley's People's National Party (PNP). In 1946, in conjunction with the Mental Hospitals' Union and the Prisons and Fire Brigade Workers' Union, the JGREU staged a number of strikes and demonstrations. Though few tangible economic benefits resulted, these efforts reflected an impressive level of trade union organization and planning.

For greater coordination and strength, the public-sector groups joined forces with ten other unions in forming the rejuvenated Trade Union Council (TUC) in 1949. However, the politically charged atmosphere of the early Cold War era precipitated the 1952 PNP-TUC split.

Just one year later the Hills expelled Hart from the TUC, as the latter's intransigent Marxism obstructed the brothers' objective of creating a more moderate leftist union and political program. Meanwhile, Hart combined his activities with those of Ferdinand Smith, a Communist-union expatriate of the United States, in organizing the Jamaica Federation of Labour. However, this organization remained a small, ineffectual union body.

On the political-party front, Hart initiated the People's Freedom Movement, a group espousing strong Marxist-Leninist ideas. After failing to win any seats in the 1955 general election, the People's Freedom Movement disbanded. In recent years Hart has led a union body called Caribbean Labour Solidarity.

JAMAICA GOVERNMENT RAILWAY UNION. *See* Jamaica Government Railway Employee's Union.

JAMAICA OMNIBUS SERVICE WORKERS' ASSOCIATION—JOSWA.

Organization of the Jamaica Omnibus Service Workers' Association, as well as of the Jamaica Government Railway Employees' Union,* represents a pioneering effort at leftist public-sector union development. In 1937 Ken Hill fused his omnibus employees (then called the Motor Omnibus Drivers' Association and Chauffeurs Union—MODACU) with the Bustamante (William Alexander Bustamante, founder of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union—BITU*) labor interests. In fact, during Bustamante's incarceration in the early 1940s, Hill was instrumental in cultivating BITU organization and spearheading a successful strike in the sugar industry.

Later, in the busmen's strike of 1948, Hill's group received financial backing from the British Transport and General Workers' Union and moral support from the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Moreover, Hill served on the Executive Committee of the WFTU in the 1940s.

When the People's National Party (PNP) ousted its extreme left faction in 1952, Hill was the incumbent head of the Trade Union Council,* whereupon he formed the National Labour Party (NLP). Hill and his associates unsuccessfully sought office in the 1955 general elections. Following sporadic alliances with both the Jamaica Labour Party and the PNP in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the NLP disappeared from the political scene. In 1968 JOSWA merged with five other unions in forming the Independent Trade Union Action Council.*

JAMAICA RADICAL WORKERS' UNION. *See* Jamaica Workers and Tradesmen's Union.

JAMAICA WORKERS AND TRADESMENS' UNION—JWTU.

In 1936, Allen George St. Claver Coombs, one of the genuine founders of Jamaican trade unionism, anticipated the "blanket union" concept in establishing the JWTU. Coombs' initial popularity centered in the Montego Bay region (St. Catherine, St. Mary, and St. James parishes), as he drew support from dockworkers and artisans. By the time of the riots in the spring of 1938, this precursor of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union* had elicited a wide-ranging membership that included lightermen and a variety of agricultural laborers. In the Spanish Town Division alone, the JWTU numbered more than 2,000 workers at the close of 1937.

Coombs' role of Jamaican labor is enhanced by the fact that he tutored William Alexander Bustamante when the latter knew little if anything about organized labor practices. Bustamante first held union office under Coombs' guidance from early 1937 until the summer of the following year. As Bustamante departed to organize a national movement, Coombs consolidated his labor efforts in Montego Bay. In the early 1950s Coombs reorganized his group as the Jamaica Radical Workers' Union, and served as the Minister of Communications and Works under Norman Manley's first administration in 1955.

MOTOR OMNIBUS DRIVERS' ASSOCIATION AND CHAUFFEURS UNION. *See* Jamaica Omnibus Service Workers' Association.

NATIONAL WORKERS' UNION—NWU.

The National Workers' Union formed in the immediate aftermath of the leftist-centrist debacle in the Trade Union Council*—People's National Party of the early 1950s. Norman Manley designated two experienced labor leaders, Noel N. Nethersole and Florizel Glasspole, the founding officers of the group. However, Michael Manley, son of the distinguished barrister and leader of the People's National Party (PNP), quickly rose to the helm of NWU leadership. Largely a product of post-World War II industrial growth, the NWU successfully penetrated both the bauxite and sugar industries in the 1950s.

Strong financial support and lessons in collective bargaining forthcoming from the United Steelworkers (AFL-CIO) conferred North American style trade union legitimacy on the NWU. Bauxite workers, constituting the driving force of the new union, were organized under traditional trade union guidelines by Kenneth Sterling, a former official of the PNP. Registered on 17 October 1952, the NWU attracted nearly 70,000 members within the next five years.

Following the organization of bauxite workers, Sterling and Manley next targeted the sugar estates, a ploy that naturally intensified NWU-Bustamante Industrial Trade Union* (BITU) rivalry. Drawing from the organizational skills and funds donated by the Cuban Sugar Workers' Union, the NWU focused on

a multitude of sugar-worker grievances. These efforts were handsomely rewarded; by the late 1950s the NWU had made a massive impact on the agricultural labor sector.

A key aspect of the NWU's astonishing success story derives from the group's function as a *genuine* trade union body rather than as a quasi-political organization. In contrast to virtually all former labor groups in Jamaica, especially the BITU, the NWU concentrated on the day-to-day issues affecting labor interests. Branch offices, now numbering more than 100, were set up throughout the island as NWU leaders forged a series of collective-bargaining agreements on the agricultural estates and on the waterfront. Departing from the traditional "blanket union" idea so endemic to Jamaican labor, the NWU fostered local leadership geared to specific industrial needs rather than geographical considerations.

Despite the electoral setbacks suffered by the PNP since 1962, the NWU has retained its position as a potent and viable force in Jamaica. The organization and local leadership of this body have helped move other Jamaican trade unions toward a better understanding of traditional labor-grievance activities and achievements. Through the early and mid-1970s, the NWU maintained a very high level of work stoppages in a wide area of trade union grievances. From 1972 to 1976 the NWU was involved in a total of 1,118 work stoppages, 45 percent of the trade union industrial disputes of the period.

Approximately 145,000 Jamaican workers now belong to the NWU, making it the country's largest labor organization. Headquarters for the NWU is situated in Kingston, and the principal union officers are C. Dunkley, president, and L. Goodleigh, general secretary. The international affiliations of the union, which are vast, include International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT); Caribbean Congress of Labour; International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, and Technical Employees; International Transport Workers' Federation; Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone International; International Federation of Plantation, Agricultural, and Allied Workers; and the Caribbean Bauxite and Mineworkers' Federation.

TRADE UNION ADVISORY COUNCIL. *See* Trade Union Council.

TRADE UNION CONGRESS. *See* Trade Union Council.

TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF JAMAICA. *See* Trade Union Council.

TRADE UNION COUNCIL—TUC.

Still a marginally important union in Jamaica, the Trade Union Council (TUC) originated with Norman Manley, the first independent native politician on the island. Manley, a noted barrister recognized throughout Jamaica as an eminent political theorist and organizer, never held union office but enthusiastically espoused trade union ideas. The TUC began as the "Trade Union Advisory Council," designed as a voluntary board of labor leaders interested in coordinating

strike activity, unifying policy, and diminishing conflict among the disparate union elements. This effort was launched during the incarceration of William Alexander Bustamante, who, after his release, denounced Manley and the TUC while consolidating the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union* (BITU). Technically, Bustamante had been listed as a member of the Trade Union Advisory Council but never undertook active participation in its efforts.

Following British trade union precepts, Manley's advisory board consisted of a miscellaneous group of aspiring politicians who knew little about organized labor. Lacking experienced leaders and overall coordination, the TUC confronted the animosity of Bustamante and thus played a minor role in trade union affairs. Nevertheless, many key political and labor figures offered allegiance to the council, and the group maintained a close working alliance with the People's National Party (PNP).

As various Marxist and social-democratic unions struggled over the following decade, it became increasingly clear that both labor and political activity demanded a strong cooperative effort. In 1948–49 anti-Bustamante labor forces were subsumed under the TUC umbrella while these groups supported the political objectives of Norman Manley and the PNP. Virtually every significant leftist labor faction, including the celebrated "4H's" (longtime labor leaders Ken and Frank Hill, Richard Hart, and Arthur Henry) proffered electoral support to the PNP.

Traditionally, Kingston factory workers and public-sector employees have formed the nucleus of TUC membership. Promises of strong worker support for the TUC were dashed in the aftermath of the 1952 crisis. Leftist elements reorganized the TUC as the moderate forces, particularly Manley, Florizel Glasspole, and Noel N. Nethersole, sponsored a completely new labor force, the National Workers' Union* (NWU). Cut adrift from major party affiliation, Marxists and socialists have unsuccessfully attempted the formation of third-party movements. On the union front, former TUC members have gravitated toward the NWU since the 1952 purge.

TUC membership has dwindled in recent years, dropping from just under 20,000 in 1975 to 11,286 in 1983. This body is based in Kingston under the presidency of Edward Smith, with Hopeton Caven serving as the union's general secretary. The TUC lists international affiliation with the Caribbean Congress of Labour and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

TRADE UNION COUNCIL OF JAMAICA. *See* Trade Union Council.

UNIVERSITY AND ALLIED WORKERS' UNION—UAWU.

Leftist activities in the Jamaican labor movement played a small, yet significant role in the shaping and articulating of union grievances. Beginning in the late 1930s, with the creation of the Left Book Club, and continuing into the union activities of the 1940s and 1950s, especially those inspired by the "4H's" (leftist labor leaders Ken and Frank Hill, Richard Hart, and Arthur Henry), socialist

and Marxist-Leninist circles have left an indelible imprint on the Jamaican labor scene. Lately, the focal point of Communist involvement in labor and politics is the University of the West Indies in Kingston.

Trevor Munroe, a professor at the university and a prominent personality in the Workers Party of Jamaica, leads a coordinated trade union effort among the Jamaican intellectual class. Membership numbers in the UAWU are not disclosed, and most of the political activity of the group is controlled by the Workers Party of Jamaica. Faculty members at the University, however, contribute regularly to the intellectual and scholarly debates on myriad social and economic issues affecting the island.

Mexico

RODNEY D. ANDERSON

The power of the Mexican labor movement rests precariously on the role it plays in Mexican politics. Its actions, and the benefits obtained for its membership, are regulated by an extensive labor law, and the enforcement of that law very much remains at the discretion of the administration in power. The vast majority of Mexico's organized workers belong to unions under the control of the Confederation of Mexican Workers* (Confederación de Trabajadores de México—CTM), which in turn owes its allegiance to the PRI (Institutionalized Revolutionary Party), the dominant political force in that nation for over half a century.

Nonetheless, the Mexican labor movement in the 1980s appears to be approaching a historic juncture. A revitalized if small independent labor movement, in conjunction with restiveness among the rank and file of the "official" unions, has produced the strongest challenge yet to the traditional union leadership and its close relationship to the Mexican state.

The basic law governing Mexican labor relations is the National Federal Labor Law, implemented in 1931 and amended many times since then. The law specifies who may organize and under what conditions unions may strike. It regulates working conditions, establishes minimum wages, and spells out the process by which disputes may be resolved. The Ministry of Labor oversees the administration of the law, and local and federal Arbitration and Conciliation Boards hear worker grievances and mediate contract disputes.

Five types of unions are permitted by law: (1) Craft unions (*gremiales*) of self-employed workers; (2) plant unions (*de empresa*) for workers in a single factory (if the company controls the union, the latter is called a "white" [*blanco*] union); (3) industrial unions (*industriales*) composed of all manual and some white-collar workers in industries in which more than one firm is located within one state or region; (4) national industrial unions (*nacionales de industria*) operating in inter-state commerce in the same or similar industry, as for example

the Union of Railroad Workers of the Mexican Republic* (*Sindicato de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros de la Republica Mexicana*—STFRM); (5) unions of workers from several different trades (*oficios varios*), where the numbers of workers are too small to form their own union.

Labor organization is complicated by the fact that self-employed craftsmen who do not work under a labor contract may form labor associations or cooperatives and affiliate with the various labor federations (*federaciones*). Politically, however, they are incorporated into the “popular” sector of PRI even though Antonio Ugalde’s work on Ensenada, Baja California, indicates that they identify ideologically with the labor movement and often work under the same conditions as their union counterparts.

In both industrial and national unions, workers belong to locals organized by plant (e. g., *Volkswagen de México*) or locality. Railroad mechanics, for example, do not belong to their own brotherhood, as they might in the United States, but rather to their local, home-base branch of STFRM. Carpenters (if they are in the building trades) belong to construction unions, not carpenters’ locals. In other words, unions are usually organized by industry and region, not by craft or function.

In addition, most but not all unions are affiliated with regional federations (*federaciones*) and national confederations (*confederaciones*). Their degree of independence varies. Single-plant unions generally negotiate local contracts but have no real power to elect national confederation officials. On the other hand, only a minority of national unions negotiate industry-wide contracts; these include the railroad, telephone, petroleum, electrical, sugar, and textiles unions. All but the latter two industries are state-owned. In the important steel industry, for example, each plant negotiates its own contract.

If they are “autonomous” national unions that belong to no confederation, their freedom of action also varies. The nuclear energy workers are both free of CTM and independent of PRI control, whereas the railroad workers’ union STFRM is independent of CTM but affiliated with PRI’s labor sector. The National Union of Mining, Metallurgical and Similar Workers* (*Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalúrgicos y Similares de la Republica Mexicana*—SNTMMSRM) is autonomous in name only, being both affiliated with the PRI and closely tied to CTM. But because each plant negotiates its own contract, there is some local autonomy. Perhaps 20 percent of the union’s membership belong to the left-wing, apolitical, Proletarian Line movement, affiliated with no political party and controlling their own elections of officers. The petroleum workers and the telephone workers are both known for their vigorous independent leadership, but because of their sensitive position they come under heavy government pressure.

Collective bargaining contracts usually provide for a “closed shop” in which all workers must join the union. In addition, “dues checkoffs” are common: union dues are automatically deducted from the workers’ paycheck. Nonetheless, dues are low and union treasuries customarily supplemented through contribu-

tions from the government and PRI. Thus, the precarious and dependent financial position of most unions make them even more vulnerable to political coercion. Occasionally, contracts will even call for contributions from the company to the union treasury.

The CTM is Mexico's equivalent to the AFL-CIO. It claims nearly three-quarters of the nation's estimated four to five million union members, but this is likely an exaggeration. Smaller confederations which are anti-CTM but affiliated with PRI comprise no more than 10 percent of the nation's unionized labor. Independent confederations and national or plant unions perhaps account for 5 percent, while the autonomous national unions make up the rest. Government workers and teachers both are members of the PRI's Popular Sector, rather than the Labor Sector, and are closely controlled by the government.

In Mexico, union leaders who enjoy a close relationship with the government (and at times management) and whose administration is often corrupt and authoritarian are called *charros*. Rank-and-file revolts against such leadership are common but not often successful. The federal labor law stipulates that union officers must be recognized by the government before they can take office. In practice this makes it difficult for dissidents to overthrow unpopular leaders without the approval of the government. In 1976 insurgent telephone workers walked out in wildcat strikes in forty cities in order to force the government to allow new and fair elections. They were successful, but that tactic is rarely used because the labor law very closely defines the legality or illegality of the strikes.

Officially recognized unions may engage in "legal" strikes only after a specific waiting period, and then only if they have the support of a majority of all workers covered under the contract. The strike must also be interpreted by the labor courts as necessary to achieve a "balance" between labor and management.

Should the labor court decide that one of the criteria for a legal strike has not been met, the workers have twenty-four hours to return to work before they lose their jobs. Should a strike be declared "illegal," however, workers may be fired immediately. On the other hand, if the court finds the strike to be legal, the workers are guaranteed full back pay for as long as the strike lasts and their job back after the settlement is reached. In practice, the strike usually ends when the court hands down its decision.

The labor courts are permanently constituted boards of arbitration and conciliation operated by the labor ministry and made up of representatives of labor, management, and the government. The labor delegate is most often from the CTM. The makeup of the courts creates obvious difficulties for anti-CTM unions and, given CTM's generally recognized subservience to the government, provides PRI with essential control over the process. While business interests often charge that the boards are "pro-labor," the arbitration process severely limits the power of the unions to survive outside official patronage.

Over the years the federal law has provided gains for Mexican workers, including minimum wages, mandatory vacations, Christmas bonuses of at least fifteen days wages, no refusal to hire based on age or sex, disability compen-

sation, maternity leave, no dismissal without "just cause," and protection of seniority rights. In 1975 an amendment to the law provided that 8 percent of taxable profits be divided among every firm's employees.

The Mexican labor movement came of age during the past forty years, an era of unprecedented economic growth which made Mexico one of the most industrialized of all Third World nations. For many years Mexican gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 5 percent to 10 percent net of population growth, while capital formation grew impressively from 8 percent of gross national product (GNP) in the 1941-46 period to an average of over 20 percent in the 1970s. The figure stood at 25.6 percent of GDP in 1980.

The Mexican labor force totals nearly twenty million workers, or approximately 50 percent of the working-age population, compared to 62 percent for the United States. However, 80 percent of Mexican men are in the labor force, close to the U.S. rate of 78 percent. The difference lies among Mexican women, only 20 percent of whom are *officially* in the labor force, compared to 46 percent in the United States. Traditionally, indifference and prejudice have led to the underestimation of the role of women in the labor force. Recently this figure has increased (up from 13.6 percent in 1950), although generally in the unskilled sectors. An exception is the component-assembly plants on the border with the United States, where over three-quarters of the work force are women.

The structure of the labor force has changed dramatically over the years. In 1940 agriculture contributed over one-fifth of the nation's production and employed two-thirds of its labor force. By 1980 barely one-third of Mexico's workers were engaged in agriculture, which in turn produced just one-tenth of the nation's GDP, a figure comparable to most industrialized nations.

As one might expect, organized labor grew in similar proportions, rising from perhaps half a million members in 1940 to just over four million in 1983, according to U.S. Department of Labor statistics, or approximately one-quarter of all employed persons in Mexico.

A breakdown of union membership by industry reveals the following: (1) extractive, mainly mining, 93.8 percent unionized; (2) electricity and gas, 98.1 percent; (3) transportation and communications, 84.5 percent; (4) manufacturing, 68.3 percent; (5) construction, 26.4 percent; (6) unspecified labor, 11.6 percent; (7) services and government, 8.2 percent; (8) commerce and finance, 3.8 percent; (9) primary activities, mainly farming, 2.9 percent.

Yet the question remains, to what extent has the economic development of Mexico and the expansion of the labor movement brought economic well-being to Mexican working people? Certainly net per capita income has increased dramatically since 1940. Studies of income distribution, however, indicate that three-quarters of the Mexican people receive only about one-third of the national income, down from about 40 percent in 1950. The upper middle class has done the best, from 20 percent in 1950 to 28 percent in 1969.

Moreover, several important recent studies maintain that the percentage of

unionized workers is declining, perhaps since the 1950s, and that the real figure is closer to 14 percent of the economically active population, not 25 percent.

A closer look at the structure of the labor force lends support to these conclusions. The industrial sector of the labor force has increased from 18 percent of the labor force in 1960 to 24 percent in 1976, while employment in services increased from 27 percent in 1960 to 35 percent in 1975. Services are among the least unionized, the lowest paid, with the highest rate of disguised unemployment/underemployment of all occupations.

What has really been taking place in Mexico, as elsewhere in Latin America, is that the expansion of industrial jobs had taken place at a far slower rate than the combined elimination of rural employment and the entrance of young people into the job market. In 1980 over half of Mexico's population was under twenty years of age. Over 700,000 new jobs each year were needed to absorb new job seekers. The consensus of opinion is that the rate of unemployment may run *only* 7 to 8 percent (for Mexico, without unemployment compensation, workers out of jobs have to do *something*) but the *underemployment* rate may run as high as 45 percent—workers selling lottery tickets, newspapers, shining shoes, peddling whatever is available.

At the same time, Mexican working people are being proletarianized in the classic pattern. One study calculates that in 1930, 51 percent of the economically active population in industrial pursuits were artisans or self-employed persons; by 1970 this figure had been reduced to 13 percent and the number of semiskilled industrial workers (*obreros*) increased proportionately.

In short the questions to be asked are, Has the heavily unionized labor force achieved benefits for all of Mexico's working people? What impact has the high level of underemployment had on the importance of organized labor? And does the increasing "proletarianized" labor force mean a more militant labor movement (as has generally been the case in the industrial nations)? The answer to these questions in part lies in the history of the labor movement.

The roots of the modern labor movement go back to colonial Mexico and the medieval guild system transferred from Spain to her new colony. The guilds regulated entrance into the trades, supervised quality, and controlled prices. As the centuries passed, the guild artisans came under increasing competition from local textile sweatshops (called *obrajes*) and from contraband goods smuggled in from more efficient European producers. By the beginning of the nineteenth century many trades were controlled by merchants whose access to credit enabled them to undercut the independent artisan producers.

Meanwhile, the inevitable entrance of Spain into the developing industrial economy of Europe added to the fluctuations of the business cycle and further weakened the ability of the guilds to protect the interests of the small producers. The economic reforms of the eighteenth century Bourbon monarchs, both by design and impact, accelerated the decline of the guilds. When independence came to Mexico in 1821, the newly enfranchised government simply confirmed

anti-guild laws already in existence. Along with vast increases in imported goods these policies performed the coup de grace to the guild system.

Moreover, the economic woes of Mexican artisans were exacerbated by political chaos. Regional interests, personal ambitions, and a bitter church-state struggle combined to reduce Mexico to a nation of warring factions easily overcome by U.S. imperial interests during the American-Mexican War of 1846–48 and by the armies of Napoleon III of France and his puppet emperor, Maximilian, from 1862 to 1867.

Yet even under these conditions, Mexican workers organized. By the 1870s, mutual and cooperative societies arose among the hatters, shoemakers, tailors, carpenters, and other trades of Mexico City, and among the mill hands of various outlying cotton textile factories of the Federal District. Initially, such societies were not intended to confront the emerging capitalist system; indeed, artisan masters who owned their own shops directed most such organizations. Their purposes were to protect the artisan against loss of income from accident and sickness and to provide a small subsidy for a decent burial.

From mid-century on, however, the various currents of European socialism introduced into Mexico a more militant perspective. Working through the Artistic Industrial Society* (*Sociedad Artística Industrial*) and the Great Circle of Mexican Workers (*Gran Círculo de Obreros de México*), socialists, anarchists, and allied radicals called for worker-cooperatives to replace individually owned shops and agitated for better working conditions and higher wages and, occasionally, supported strikes.

Between 1865 and 1880, a period of generally improving economic conditions, over thirty strikes took place. The majority occurred in textiles and mining, including strikes at the San Ildefonso and La Colmena cotton mills near Mexico City in 1865, the first modern, industrial strikes to take place in Mexico. The workers had been encouraged and advised by young socialists under the influence of Greek immigrant, Plotino C. Rhodakanaty, himself a follower of European socialists Fourier and Proudhon.

After some initial successes the socialist movement floundered in the early 1880s due to internal ideological differences, the economic dislocations of a worldwide recession in the mid-1870s, and an increasingly hostile government. The political vacuum following the death of Benito Juárez in 1872 had encouraged various groups of artisans to support one faction or another, against the advice of radicals who believed that the working class should remain outside traditional politics. One group of artisans supported General Porfirio Díaz, hero of the struggles against the conservatives and the French. They were bitterly disappointed when Díaz (1876–1911) proved hostile to organized labor.

Unable to survive the difficulties, the Great Circle of Mexican Workers closed its doors in 1883. Its major accomplishment, a national Labor Congress which claimed 50,000 members, never reconvened after its second congress in 1879.

The years between 1880 and 1895 were ones of almost unrelenting recession, as Mexico suffered from the worldwide economic crisis afflicting the industrial

nations. At least seventy-six strikes took place in those years, many over the reduction of wages (or increasing work load). Most frequently struck were the cotton mills, as before, but also the mines of the newly developing north and two industrializing fields—tobacco among the predominantly women workers, and the railroads, where trade unionism was first introduced by North American workers.

Occasionally a strike would succeed, as in 1884 when mill hands at the Puebla plant El Mayorazgo struck against a pay decrease and work load increase, and won. But such victories were rare. Generally strikes failed, broken by scabs (called “squirrels,” *esquiroles*), or simply because of the workers’ inability to survive economically without work.

Beginning in the mid-1890s the economy improved dramatically, bringing with it fundamental changes in the labor force. Artisans increasingly found their products under competition from factory-made goods. In the textile industry, the number of factory workers grew from 19,000 in 1895 to 32,000 in 1910. At the same time, artisan weavers declined from 41,000 in 1895 to barely 12,000 in 1910. The factory workers who replaced them found the new labor discipline and the low wages little to their liking. Keeping wages low was a growing pool of surplus workers, fed by unemployed artisans and the large number of small farmers who had lost their lands to more entrepreneurially minded large growers.

Even the Mexican capitalist, if he did not have access to sufficient funds, found it difficult to compete with the efficient, well-financed foreign-owned plants, and often took his margin of survival from his workers’ paychecks. Those Mexican-owned businesses which did not go under during the recession of 1900–1901 began introducing new machinery, cutting wages, and tightening up their labor discipline in imitation of practices in the industrial countries.

Workers responded to those changes by organizing. Between 1905 to 1910 at least 125 strikes broke the long-imposed industrial peace of the Díaz regime. Particularly important was the copper miners’ strike in June 1906 at Cananea, Sonora, in which armed Americans crossed the border to aid in putting down the unrest. The cotton textile industry was inundated in the fall of 1906 by a wave of strikes sponsored by the newly organized Great Circle of Free Workers (Gran Circulo de Obreros Libres), culminating in a month-long walkout of Puebla’s important cotton mills. The large foreign-owned firms retaliated, forcing a nationwide lockout which closed down the entire industry. A presidential arbitration award failed to defuse the situation, and on 7 January 1907 worker bitterness turned to violence in the company town of Rio Blanco, Veracruz. Troops shot down dozens of workers in the streets and then executed their leaders.

In 1911 a popular uprising forced Díaz into exile. The moderate government of Francisco I. Madero attempted to resolve some of the issues agitating labor, but textile workers soon struck, aimed at settling old grievances, and they were joined by longshoremen, miners, and railroadmen.

Of the labor organizations during the revolutionary era, the most important was a federation called the House of the World’s Workers* (Casa de Obrero

Mundial—Casa). Originating among the artisans of the Federal District, the Casa soon controlled many of the District's workers and established branches throughout the Republic.

Initially the Casa adhered to its anarcho-syndicalist ideology and steered clear of the political struggles which had attended the overthrow of the Díaz regime. However, driven by the desperate economic conditions of the winter of 1914–15, the Casa allied itself with the Constitutionalist movement of Venustiano Carranza against the predominantly rural forces of Emiliano Zapata and Francisco "Pancho" Villa. Workers drawn mainly from the unemployed of the Federal District formed six "Red Battalions" and participated in several major battles.

The fruits of that alliance soon turned bitter for the Casa; Carranza suppressed strikes by their affiliates and then in June 1916 crushed a general strike sponsored by the Casa and closed the federation down.

Searching for a more pliable labor "ally" than the Casa had proved to be, Carranza in 1918 encouraged friendly labor leaders to organize a national labor central called the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers* (Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana—CROM). By 1920 CROM was the most powerful labor organization in the nation. Led by Luis Morones, CROM operated as the labor wing for the political factions of Mexican presidents Álvaro Obregón (1920–24) and Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–28). Opposition unions were harassed by the government, their strikes often broken by CROM's own scabs.

Despite CROM's advantage, other unions managed to survive. The General Confederation of Workers* (Confederación General de Trabajadores—CGT) was founded in 1920 among the textile workers, transportation workers, and various crafts of the Federal District. Its leaders were revolutionary syndicalists who disavowed political alliances and attacked CROM, the government, and capitalist enterprises equally.

A small but vocal movement grew out of Catholic social action, the most important organization being the National Catholic Labor Confederation* (Confederación Nacional Católica del Trabajo—CNCT). Anti-socialist and generally mutualist in labor activities, it found some adherents among urban craftsmen, but the majority were rural workers, particularly in western Mexico.

The Mexican Communist Party (PCM) was organized in 1919 out of former Casa labor unions in the Federal District. The PCM founded its first national labor confederation, the Union Centralist Confederation of Mexico* (Confederación Sindical Unitaria de México—CSUM), in 1929. Its strongest sections were among miners in the state of Jalisco; oil workers of Tampico, Veracruz; and militant leftists among railroad and textile workers, and peasants in the states of Puebla, Veracruz and Michoacán, and agricultural workers in the Laguna region.

Other socialist groups organized around the country. The turbulent twenties saw the Libertarian Worker Groups of Jalisco with fifty labor organizations, including tanners, electricians, mechanics, tailors, pharmacy workers and other,

mainly urban craftsmen. They had close relations with the Revolutionary Socialist Party (later changed to the Great Socialist Party of the West).

Among rural workers, the strongest organization was the active Veracruz Peasants League, which in conjunction with the PCM formed the National Campesino League* (Liga Nacional Campesina) in 1926. The PCM broke with the League in 1929 and the latter was eventually undermined by the National Peasant Confederation* (Confederación Nacional Campesina), established as the peasant wing of Lázaro Cárdenas' presidency. During the first half of the 1930s, the PCM eschewed cooperation with other groups organizing among Mexico's workers and concentrated essentially on building its own unions. It was notably successful among the rural proletariat of Laguna's cotton fields, contributing significantly to the area's labor militancy which led ultimately to the expropriation of the Laguna textile estates and their division into collective *ejidos* in 1935.

Eventually CROM found itself on the block where it had placed so many of its rivals. A now hostile Calles, entrenched in power with the assassination of Obregón at the hands of a Catholic fanatic in 1928, thwarted Morones' presidential ambitions. Faced with the threat of an unfriendly government from without and disaffected elements from within, CROM eventually lost the bulk of its affiliated unions to rival organizations. It still exists today as a small confederation of minor influence.

Between 1929 and 1934, the "era of crisis" as historian Arnaldo Cordova calls it, the situation turned against labor. From 1920 to 1928 the number of legal strikes numbered over one thousand, and the strikers won a good majority. Between 1928 and 1934 the number of strikes fell to an average of nineteen a year and the workers lost more than they won.

But in the following year, 1934, Lázaro Cárdenas, a young politician with a reputation as a friend of labor, was elected president and turned to labor for support for his nationalist, reformist programs. To spearhead his labor forces Cárdenas picked Vicente Lombardo Toledano. A former Morones' associate, Toledano left CROM in 1932 taking with him a number of its most important unions. In 1933 he organized the General Confederation of Mexican Workers and Peasants* (Confederación General de Obreros y Campesinos de México—CGOCM). Initially Toledano disavowed the "political struggle" in favor of "apoliticalism," specifically criticizing the PCM's efforts to politicize workers. However, caught in a struggle with CROM, which now supported Calles against Cárdenas, and attracted by the latter's revolutionary nationalist program, Toledano accepted Cárdenas' offer.

In 1936 Toledano dissolved CGOCM and founded the Confederation of Mexican Workers—CTM. In 1938 CTM was officially incorporated into the newly established Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) as the mainstay of its labor sector. Against the wishes of CTM, however, Cárdenas refused to allow it to organize rural workers, nor would he permit CTM to enlist the numerous government workers, who were placed in the so-called popular sector.

Under Cárdenas, Toledano's choice seemed a good one. With government protection the CTM sent organizers into virtually every factory in the country. By 1940 organized labor had increased from 5.5 percent to 14.5 percent of the labor force. The number of legal strikes rose from 202 in 1934 to 642 in 1935 and were settled in favor of the unions by a 4 to 1 ratio. When the foreign oil companies refused to honor the Supreme Court's ruling in favor of striking petroleum workers, the president expropriated them and handed the administration of the oil fields over to the workers.

Yet the issue remains controversial. Hobart Spalding's comparison of wages and cost of living between 1934 and 1940 shows that while workers in certain elite sectors improved their position, urban workers in general did not, nor did rural workers. More severe critics charge that Cárdenas' "sympathetic" policies disguise what was really an intent to invigorate Mexican capitalism rather than bring justice to Mexico's working class.

Under a more conservative president, Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940–46), Lombardo Toledano himself began to doubt the wisdom of his choice. He lost the leadership of CTM to Fidel Velázquez (another ex-CROM adherent) and in 1948 founded the Popular Socialist Party (PPS). Although the PPS attempted to develop its own labor wing, this proved difficult, and by Toledano's death the PPS had lost nearly all its formal connections with labor.

Meanwhile, the new administration had accepted an ambitious development plan proposed by the aggressive National Chamber of Manufacturing Industries and supported by the party's right wing. Mexican workers would benefit in the long run, so their proposal went, if labor would moderate its demands during the initial critical years of development.

In compliance with the new political direction, CTM renounced the class struggle as the basis for the labor movement and talked instead of national unity with "guarantees" for the working class. The number of strikes declined significantly under Ávila Camacho while industrial production expanded at record rates.

National income nearly tripled between 1940 and 1946, but working-class income grew far more slowly and in certain sectors, not at all. By the end of World War II, CTM increasingly came under attack from dissidents. Many left the confederation in 1947 for a newly organized Sole Central of Workers* (Central Única de Trabajadores—CUT). Among the unions which joined CUT were the railroad workers, telephone operators, miners and steelworkers, petroleum workers, and electrical workers. Government pressure and repression took its toll and CUT folded.

The series of labor crises beginning at the end of World War II illustrates how labor politics operates in Mexico. The labor agitation failed to establish a viable federation but the major dissident unions—railroad workers, miners and steelworkers, and petroleum workers—were allowed to remain outside CTM as "autonomous" national unions, and their membership received wage increases well above the average for the manufacturing sector in general.

Meanwhile, CTM was hard pressed by their remaining unions to show results for their loyalty to the PRI, or the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution as it was now called. After a series of unresolved collective bargaining conflicts in 1953–54 CTM threatened a general strike and hinted about removing itself from PRI. As a consequence, between 1954 and 1958 CTM unions saw their wages increase relative to the major independents, whose leadership had been assumed by more conservative, PRI-approved officers.

Beginning in 1958, a rank-and-file revolt took place in the railroad union and among petroleum workers, teachers, rubber workers, and electrical workers. The number of strikes rose dramatically from 193 in 1957 to 740 in 1958. Many won favorable wage settlements, and feeling their power, a number of unions pulled out of PRI. Along with an existing anti-CTM confederation, the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Farm Laborers* (*Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos*), these unions set up their own central in 1960, the National Labor Central (*Central Nacional de Trabajo—CNT*).

CTM was forced by these successes to demand similar concessions for its own members, again threatening a general strike. At the same time an increasingly vocal PRI left wing contended that national economic development could not take place without substantial broadening of the potential markets through wage increases.

The labor boards generally acceded to CTM's wage demands, and the government, after a decent interlude, introduced profit sharing into the national labor law, raised minimum wages, and established a progressive personal income tax system.

While CTM unions were obtaining wage increases, the government moved against the leadership of the more aggressive CNT unions. Railroad leader Demetrio Vallejo and his subordinates were jailed and more pliable officers installed. To this day, the railroad union STFRM remains outside the CTM but within the PRI labor sector. Dissident leaders in other unions suffered similar fates.

Having shown the mailed fist, the government then recognized the dissident central CNT and attracted their leaders back to the PRI, if not the CTM. (Some observers believe that President López Mateos, 1958–64, actually encouraged CNT in order to counter the growing power of the pro-CTM group of unions called the United Worker Block* (*Bloque de Unidad Obrera—BUO*.) The CNT joined with the BUO in 1966 to form the Congress of Labor* (*Congreso del Trabajo—CT*), a loosely organized labor central for the most part controlled by the CTM and loyal to the PRI.

On 2 October 1968 government troops opened fire on a peaceful demonstration of mainly students and young people in Mexico City. By most counts over four hundred persons died. The massacre played two roles in the history of the Mexican labor movement. First, it marked the end of an era in which the Mexican state had moved steadily to the right. The administration of Luís Echeverría Álvarez (1970–76) promised to open up the PRI to more input from below, to allow greater plurality in politics, and encourage greater union democracy. The

massacre also marked the beginning of an era of greater dialogue and avenues of action between the intellectual left—students, teachers, writers, and politicians—and the working-class activists of the labor movement.

Echeverría's initial efforts to revitalize PRI unions met with failure when CTM's aging secretary-general, Fidel Velázquez, successfully fought off the president's efforts to relieve him of his post. The regime's formal labor policy proved more successful. Echeverría resurrected the post-Cárdenas doctrine of class collaboration. In May 1971 he announced the establishment of National Tripartite Commission (Comisión Nacional Tripartita) made up of representatives from labor, business, and the government whose job was to make recommendations to improve the position of Mexico's working class.

Based on the Commission's recommendations and Echeverría's own program goals, the government established worker credit facilities, stores where the working poor could purchase necessities at subsidized prices; financed worker housing; enacted consumer protection laws; and expanded the social security program.

Despite the increased official concern for Mexico's workers, the number of legal strikes increased from 242 in 1970–71 to a peak of 789 for 1973–74. These were accompanied by marches, protests, and officially unrecognized wildcat strikes. The Echeverría years saw more labor conflicts than any other time since the 1930s.

A study of the 1950–63 era found that strikes tended to take place more frequently, with greater worker participation and duration, in the lesser skilled industries (e.g., construction) or in older mass production industries such as textiles, in comparison to moderate strike activity in industries with powerful national unions (e.g., railroads, petroleum) or the heavily unionized general manufacturing category.

The 1970s labor militancy, however, occurred precisely in the expanding capital-intensive sectors such as automaking, steel, metallurgy, machine tools, durable consumer goods, and energy. Strikes took place, for example, against Volkswagen and General Electric in the early 1970s, against General Motors (1973, 1975, 1977) and Nissan (1974, 1976), and at the Altos Hornos and Las Truchas steelworks (1975 and 1977). Wildcat "political" strikes by telephone operators and teachers brought a new dimension to high-skilled service industries.

This new wave of labor militancy, moreover, grew out of the strongest movement for union independence since the pre-Cárdenas era. Although a rough estimate of the proportion of unionized workers free of CTM or PRI control would be 5 percent, the issue of union democracy or a confrontation with the "official" union leadership was a significant factor in nearly every major strike during the Echeverría administration. In many cases the strikes were initiated or encouraged by independent labor confederations such as the Christian socialist-oriented Authentic Labor Front* (Frente Auténtico del Trabajo), the left-wing libertarian Independent Worker Unit* (Unidad Obrero Independiente), or the communist Independent Union Front (Frente Sindical Independiente). In other

cases, they grew out of democratic union movements from within CTM unions or unions affiliated with PRI's labor sector, such as the electrical workers whose leader Rafael Galván has long been the spokesman for the revolutionary nationalism espoused by PRI's "Cardenista" left wing.

It was Galván in particular who initiated the Democratic Tendency* (TD) movement during the struggle of his union for democratic representation in the newly organized Sole Union of Electrical Workers* (Sindicato Único de Trabajadores Electricistas de la República Mexicana—SUTERM). Galván's call for independent unionism attracted considerable support. In 1973 his Democratic Tendency brought together representatives from university workers, teachers, telephone workers, textile, steel, oil, railroad, and brewery workers to form the Revolutionary Union Movement (Movimiento Sindical Revolucionario—MSR). In 1975 MSR met with other unions in Guadalajara and issued the Guadalajara Declaration outlining TD goals.

The success of TD and the independent union movement in general is difficult to evaluate. Independent unions won more strikes than they lost by a two to one ratio, yet they represented only a small minority of Mexico's unions. Some insurgent groups won their struggle to oust *charrista* leaders while others did not. The telephone workers and the Altos Hornos and Las Truchas steelworkers won their fight for new union leadership and democratic elections procedures, but Galván failed in his struggle with SUTERM, and he and his officers were ousted and his rank-and-file supporters fired from their jobs.

Yet on balance Democratic Tendency and the independent union movement created a sense of purpose in the Mexican labor unlike anything since the 1930s. Official repression and the economic hardships of the 1980s have derailed for now the organizational efforts necessary to sustain the successes of the 1970s. Whether this is temporary or permanent will not be clear until the economic crisis of the 1980s is resolved.

In many ways the 1980s have been an unmitigated disaster for organized labor and all of Mexico's working people. An economic growth rate that approached 9 percent between 1978 and 1981 plummeted to a minus figure thereafter. The peso weakened dramatically in the face of high inflation, declining oil prices, and high interest rates. Mexico's foreign debt soared to a high unequaled in the Third World. By 1982 the servicing of the foreign debt alone took over half of Mexico's yearly export earnings. In the face of pressure from the United States and the International Monetary Fund, wages were frozen, workers were laid off, and an economic crisis hit Mexico which has in many ways rivaled the Great Depression.

Strikes have declined during these lean years; workers who have jobs are now less willing to risk losing them. Yet at some point labor will demand redress for the years of sacrifices made in the name of national interest. How they play that card, and with whom, will tell us much about the future of the labor movement in this complex and exciting nation.

Bibliography

- Anderson, Rodney D. *Outcasts in Their Own Land: Mexican Industrial Workers, 1906–1911*. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976.
- Araiza, Luis. *Historia del movimiento obrero mexicano*. 4 vols. México City: 1964–1965.
- Ashby, Joe C. *Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution under Lázaro Cárdenas*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963.
- Basurto, Jorge. *En el régimen de Echeverría: Rebelión e independencia*. Vol. 14 of *La clase obrera en la historia de México*, ed. Pablo González Casanova. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1983.
- . *El proletariado industrial en México (1850–1930)*. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1975.
- Carr, Barry. "Marxism and Anarchism in the Formation of the Mexican Communist Party, 1910–1919." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 63, no. 2 (May 1983): 177–305.
- . *El movimiento obrero y la política en México, 1910–1929*. vols. 1–2. SEP SETENTAS, Mexico City: 1976.
- Centro de Estudios Históricos del Movimiento Obrero Mexicano, *El movimiento obrero Mexicano. Bibliografía*. Mexico City: CEHSMO, 1978.
- . *La mujer y el movimiento obrero mexicano en el siglo XIX. Antología de la prensa obrera*. Mexico City, CEHSMO 1975.
- Clark, Marjorie Ruth. *Organized Labor in Mexico*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934.
- Córdova, Arnaldo. *En una época de crisis (1928–1934)*. Vol. 9 of *La clase obrera en la historia de México*, ed. Pablo González Casanova. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1980.
- Davis, Horace B. "Numerical Strength of Mexican Unions." *Southeastern Social Science quarterly* 35, no. 1 (June 1954): 48–55.
- Everett, Michael D. "The Role of the Mexican Trade Unions, 1950–1963." Ph.D. diss., Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., 1967.
- Frost, Elsa Cecilian et al. *Labor and Laborers through Mexican History*. Mexico City: El Colegio de México and the University of Arizona Press, 1979.
- González, Casanova Pablo. ed. *La clase obrera en la historia de México*, 17 vols. Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1980.
- De la Peña, Sergio. *Trabajadores y sociedad en el siglo xx*. Vol. 4 of *La clase obrera en la historia de México*, ed. Pablo González Casanova. Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1984.
- González Navarro, Moisés. "La Huelga de Río Blanco." *Historia Mexicana* 6 (April–June 1957): 510–33.
- Handelman, Howard. "Organized Labor in Mexico: Oligarchy and Dissent." American Universities Field Staff Reports no. 18 (1979). North America New York: American Universities Field Staff Service, 1979.
- . "The Politics of Labor Protest in Mexico: Two Case Studies." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 18, no. 3 (August 1976): 267–94.
- Hart, John M. *Anarchism and the Mexican Working Class, 1860–1931*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978.
- . "Nineteenth Century Urban Labor Precursors of the Mexican Revolution: Development of An Ideology." *The Americas* 31 (1974): 298–318.

- . "The Struggle for Independent Unions in Mexico, 1854–1931." In *American Labor in the Southwest: The First One Hundred Years*, ed. James C. Foster, 169–71, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982.
- Hellman, Judith Adler, *Mexico in Crisis*. 2d ed. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983.
- Leal, Juan Felipe and José Woldenberg. "Orígenes y desarrollo del artesanado y del proletariado industrial en México: 1867–1914." *Revista Mexicana de Ciencia Política* 21 (April–June 1975): 131–59.
- Levenstein, Harvey A. *Labor Organizations in the United States and Mexico: A History of Their Relations*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971.
- López Aparicio, Alfonso. *El movimiento obrero: Antecedentes, desarrollo y tendencias*. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1945.
- Middlebrook, Kevin J. "International Implications of Labor Change: The Automobile Industry." In *Mexico's Political Economy: Challenges at Home and Abroad*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982.
- Reyna, José Luis et al. *Tres estudios sobre el movimiento obrero en México*. Mexico: El Colegio de México, 1976.
- Rivera Castro, José. *En la presidencia de Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–1928)*. Vol. 8 of *La clase obrera en la historia de México*, ed. Pablo González Casanova. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1983.
- Ruiz, Ramón Eduardo. *Labor and the Ambivalent Revolutionaries, Mexico, 1911–1923*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
- Salazar, Rosendo and Jose G. Escobedo. *Pugnas de la gleba, 1907–1922*. Mexico: Editorial Avante, 1923.
- Schlagheck, James L. *The Political, Economic and Labor Climate in Mexico*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977.
- Silva Ruiz, Gilberto, Iris Edith Santacruz F., and Virginia López de Manjarrez. "Bibliografía comentada sobre movimiento obrero y sindicalismo en México." (Guía para el estudio de los problemas laborales en la sociedad mexicana.) *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 36 (1974): 645–72.
- Spalding, Hobart A. *Organized Labor in Latin America: Historical Case Studies of Workers in Dependent Societies*. New York: New York University Press, 1977.
- Thompson, Mark. "The Development of Unionism among Mexican Electrical Workers." Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1966.
- Trejo Delarbe, Raul. "The Mexican Labor Movement." *Latin American Perspectives* 3, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 133–53.
- U.S. Department of Labor. "Directory of Foreign Labor Organizations: Mexico." Washington, D.C., 1983.
- . "Profile of Labor Conditions: Mexico." Washington, D.C., 1982.
- Ugalde, Antonio. *Power and Conflict in a Mexican Community. A Study of Political Integration*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970.
- Walker, David. "Porfirian Labor Politics: Working Class Organizations in Mexico City and Porfirio Díaz, 1876–1902." *The Americas* 37, no. 3 (January 1981): 257–89.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ARTISTIC INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (Sociedad Artística Industrial).

Originally founded as a mutualist society in 1857, the Artistic Industrial So-

ciety was reorganized in 1865 by Santiago Villanueva and Hermengildo Villavicencio, young anarchists associated with the Greek anarchist Plotino C. Rhodakanaty, who had immigrated to Mexico in 1861. Initially a Proudhonist-type of socialism was taught to a membership composed of engravers, painters, and sculptors.

Throughout the 1860s and 1870s the society expanded its activities, becoming the main spokesman for Mexican anarchism and active in the early labor movement, both through the semisecret *The Social** and through Society members' participation in the labor central, the Great Circle of Mexican Workers.* The main leader of the Society until his death in 1872 was Santiago Villanueva. As with other socialist organizations, the Artistic Industrial Society attracted government repression and disappeared during the early 1880s.

AUTHENTIC LABOR FRONT (Frente Auténtico del Trabajo—FAT).

FAT was founded in 1964, originating in a resurgence of social-Christian unionism. It is affiliated with the Latin American Confederation of Christian Unions (Confederación Latinoamericana Sindical Cristiana—CLAS), and the World Confederation of Labor, in Brussels. It is small, with fifty-three affiliated unions cited in one estimate, and 10,000 total workers. FAT is not recognized as a labor organization under Mexican law but aids its affiliates in such activities as collective bargaining and strikes. It was particularly active in the 1970s and known for its militant stand with regards to multinational corporations. FAT directed or advised in the important strikes against *la Compañía Industrial del Norte* (CINSA) and *la Compañía Fundidora del Norte*, both in the state of Coahuila, and organized a particularly bitter strike against the multinational firm of Spicer in which the officially favored union, National Union of Mining, Metallurgical, and Similar Workers of the Mexican Republic*, ousted by a rank-and-file revolt, provided strikebreakers against the FAT-led strikers.

BLOQUE DE UNIDAD OBRERA. *See* United Worker Block.

BUO. *See* United Worker Block.

CASA. *See* House of the World's Workers.

CASA DE OBRERO MUNDIAL. *See* House of the World's Workers.

CATHOLIC WORKERS UNION (Unión Católica Obrera).

Founded in 1908 in Mexico City by Father José Maria Troncoso of the Josephine Fathers, the Union absorbed an earlier worker organization, the Workers Guadalupanos of the Federal District. Mutualist in ideology, the Union concerned itself with working conditions and working-class morality. No reference to it has been seen since 1910, and it appears to have been absorbed by the Confederation of Catholic Worker Circles.*

CENTRAL NACIONAL DE TRABAJO. *See* National Labor Central.

CENTRAL ÚNICA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Sole Central of Workers.

CGOCM. *See* General Confederation of Mexican Workers and Peasants.

CGT. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

CNC. *See* National Peasant Confederation.

CNCT. *See* National Catholic Labor Confederation.

CNT. *See* National Labor Central.

COJ. *See* Labor Confederation of Jalisco.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE CÍRCULOS OBREROS CATÓLICOS. *See* Confederation of Catholic Worker Circles.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE MÉXICO. *See* Confederation of Mexican Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE OBREROS Y CAMPESINOS DE MÉXICO. *See* General Confederation of Mexican Workers and Peasants.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL CAMPESINA. *See* National Peasant Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL CATÓLICA DEL TRABAJO. *See* National Catholic Labor Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN OBRERA DE JALISCO. *See* Labor Confederation of Jalisco.

CONFEDERACIÓN OBRERA EN PUEBLA. *See* Worker Confederation in Puebla.

CONFEDERACIÓN OBRERA REVOLUCIONARIA. *See* Revolutionary Workers Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN REGIONAL OBRERA MEXICANA. *See* Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN REVOLUCIONARIA DE OBREROS Y CAMPESINOS. *See* Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants.

CONFEDERACIÓN REVOLUCIONARIA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Revolutionary Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN SINDICAL UNITARIA DE MÉXICO. *See* Union Centralist Confederation of Mexico.

CONFEDERATION OF CATHOLIC WORKER CIRCLES (Confederación de Círculos Obreros Católicos).

Founded in the latter years of Porfirio Díaz's regime, the Confederation grew out of the series of Catholic congresses held in 1903, 1906, and 1909 on the "Social Problem." (The Congress of 1906 proposed the most progressive solutions to the labor problem while the 1909 congress reflected the ascendancy of Church conservatives on this issue.) Composed of circles established among workers (usually artisans) in such cities as Guadalajara, Mexico, and Puebla, the Confederation espoused mutualist and cooperative approaches to workers' problems. By 1913 the Confederation had established fifty circles and claimed 30,000 members. Its fate is not clear, but it likely provided the roots for the National Catholic Labor Confederation* in the 1920s.

CONFEDERATION OF MEXICAN WORKERS (Confederación de Trabajadores de México—CTM).

Founded in 1936 by Vicente Lombardo Toledano to take the place of the General Confederation of Mexican Workers and Peasants,* the CTM was incorporated into President Lázaro Cárdenas' (1934–40) Party of Mexican Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Mexicana) in 1938 as the labor sector of the party.

CTM grew from half a million in 1936 to over four million members today, the largest confederation in Mexico. CTM is made up of twenty-six national unions, twenty-nine state federations and over one hundred regional and municipal unions. It is affiliated internationally with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and, in Latin America, with the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), both heavily influenced by the AFL–CIO and its organization for hemispheric labor matters, the AIFLD (American Institute for Free Labor Development).

In the 1940s as the CTM leadership became increasingly subject to the needs of governmental policy, it lost a number of important unions to the newly founded Sole Central of Workers* (CUT). Since that time, dissidents within CTM have

periodically bolted the confederation in favor of more politically independent organizations, particularly in the mid-1950s and again in the 1970s. The CTM, headed by its aging secretary-general, Fidel Velázquez, is currently widely regarded as subservient to the interests of the state and dominant political party, Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional—PRI). As of 1982 CTM leaders made up 16 percent of the Mexican Senate and held twenty-four seats in the House of Deputies.

By the 1980s, however, CTM remained the most powerful of all Mexican workers' federations. It is strongest among the sugar, chemical, textiles, hotel, restaurant and entertainment industries, electricians, meat packing and construction workers. CTM is directly and indirectly subsidized by the Mexican government, receives most of the labor seats on the arbitration boards, and generally can count on government support in jurisdictional disputes with other unions and against dissidents within CTM ranks. See Democratic Tendency and Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic.

In return CTM sees that its members attend PRI public functions in order to give the appearance of mass public support. Occasionally CTM publicly attacks the government's policy (as in the wage disputes of 1953–54) but its independence is limited.

CONGRESO DEL TRABAJO. *See* Congress of Labor.

CONGRESS OF LABOR (Congreso del Trabajo—CT).

A loosely organized "umbrella" group established in 1966, Congress of Labor unions represent 85–90 percent of Mexico's organized workers. CT is technically an independent labor central, but in fact it is composed of those labor groups with an allegiance to the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) and is dominated by the Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM). The presidency of the the CT rotates every six months but the dominant figure, as of 1984, was Fidel Velázquez, head of the CTM. Although it is officially recognized as a labor organization, CT has no function other than as a spokesman.

COR. *See* Revolutionary Workers Confederation.

CROC. *See* Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants.

CROM. *See* Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers.

CRT. *See* Revolutionary Confederation of Workers.

CSUM. *See* Union Centralist Confederation of Mexico.

CT. *See* Congress of Labor.

CTM. *See* Confederation of Mexican Workers.

CUT. *See* Sole Central of Workers.

DEMOCRATIC TENDENCY (Tendencia Democrática—TD).

In the half century since the Confederation of Mexican Workers* began an official relationship with the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI), many charges have been made that its leadership and all those unions officially favored by the PRI have been “*charrist*,” a derisive name for leaders who take their orders from the government and party leaders, not their rank and file. One prominent critic of *charrismo* has been Rafael Galván, longtime head of the Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic* (STERM). In the process of uniting STERM with the more conservative National Union of Electrical Workers* (SNESC), headed by Francisco Pérez Ríos, Galván found that SNESC was proceeding to undermine STERM’s more democratic approach. In 1973, in order to protect the union’s interests and foster democratic, anti-*charrist* principles, Galván organized the Electrical Workers Democratic Action (Acción Democrática Electricista, ADE) to push for truly democratic union solidarity within the Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic* (SUTERM), the newly formed united electrical workers’ union.

Galván found allies for his ideas among Demitrio Vallejo’s railroaders, university workers and teachers, telephone workers, and various groups from the textile, steel, oil, and brewery unions. Drawing on this support, Galván in 1973 organized the Revolutionary Union Movement,* to fight for democratic unionism from within the labor movement. In April 1975 his supporters met in Guadalajara and drew up an extensive program of philosophy and action.

Ultimately Galván and most former STERM officers were forced out of SUTERM. Nonetheless, TD has had a lasting impact on the labor movement of Mexico, causing democratic procedures to be adopted in some unions and giving impetus to that struggle in others.

FAT. *See* Authentic Labor Front.

FEDERACIÓN DE SINDICATOS DE TRABAJADORES AL SERVICIO DEL ESTADO. *See* Federation of Civil Service Unions.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE SINDICATOS INDEPENDIENTES. *See* National Federation of Independent Unions.

FEDERATION OF CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS (Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado—FSTSE).

Second in size of all national federations, FSTSE has jurisdiction over all public sector employees except those in electric power, petroleum, and railroads. However, its largest affiliate, the National Union of Teachers,* is essentially

independent. Total FSTSE membership is claimed to be 1,600,000. Although this figure is no doubt inflated, FSTSE is relatively well-organized and its membership often provides the huge crowds seen at important public functions conducted by the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI), particularly in the Federal District. FSTSE is prohibited from organizing private sector workers or from joining federations which include such workers. In this way FSTSE cannot join with the Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM) but is a member of the Popular sector of the party. As of 1983 the leadership of FSTSE included Germán Parra Prado, secretary-general, and Dário Gómez González, alternate secretary-general.

FNAP. *See* National Front for Common Action.

FNSI. *See* National Federation of Independent Unions.

FRENTE AUTÉNTICO DEL TRABAJO. *See* Authentic Labor Front.

FRENTE NACIONAL ACCIÓN POPULAR. *See* National Front for Common Action.

FRENTE SINDICAL INDEPENDIENTE. *See* Independent Union Front.

FSI. *See* Independent Union Front.

FSTSE. *See* Federation of Civil Service Unions.

GCOL. *See* Great Circle of Free Workers.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF MEXICAN WORKERS AND PEASANTS (Confederación General de Obreros y Campesinos de México—CGOCM).

The CGOCM was founded by Vicente Lombardo Toledano in 1933 to take the place of the rapidly disintegrating Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CROM). Toledano had left CROM in 1932, taking with him a significant number of locals. Labor historian Arnaldo Córdova describes the brief existence of CGOCM as “one of the most brilliant chapters in the history of the Mexican labor movement.” (Córdova, p. 164.) After several years of intense labor activity, including two national general strikes and the calling of a national labor congress, Toledano dissolved the CGOCM and reconstituted his unions into the Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM). Despite earlier pledges by CGOCM leadership that it would stay apolitical, the new confederation became the official labor sector for Lázaro Cárdenas’ Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana), predecessor of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI). When Toledano left the CTM and the PRI in the 1940s, he attempted to reestablish his CGOCM. *See* General Union of Mexican Workers and Peasants.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederación General de Trabajadores—CGT).

The CGT was organized in 1921 by remnants of the House of the World's Workers* (Casa), workers influenced by the Industrial Workers of the World and the Mexican Communist Party (PCM). Soon the PCM left the CGT over the latter's decision to affiliate with the anarcho-syndicalist International Workmen's Association rather than the Communist Third International.

A critic of Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers'* (CROM) relationship with the government, CGT was militantly apolitical, a stance that incurred numerous repressions in the 1920s. In the early 1930s, under the leadership of Luis Araiza, CGT moved closer to Plutarco Calles' regime (1924–34). Partly as a result of CROM's decline, the CGT had acquired ninety-six affiliated unions by 1931 with a membership claimed to be 80,000. Its real strength, however, lay among the textile workers of the Federal District and the state of Puebla.

After the formation of the Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM) in 1936, CGT declined in importance. It still survives with a membership of 30,000 to 40,000 concentrated mainly in Mexico City among textile workers, bakers, bus drivers, and construction workers. CGT's current secretary-general is Lorenzo Valdepeñas Machuca. It is a member of the Congress of Labor* and affiliated with the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI).

GENERAL UNION OF MEXICAN WORKERS AND PEASANTS (Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico—UGOCM).

The UGOCM was organized in 1949 by Vicente Lombardo Toledano to serve as the labor wing of his Popular Socialist Party (Partido Popular Socialista—PPS). Although the UGOCM is not recognized as a trade union by the government, and therefore has no collective bargaining rights, it actively organized construction and agricultural workers in the 1960s and was involved in several *paracaidista* ("parachutist") invasions of land by landless peasants. In the late 1960s, under the leadership of Jacinto López, the UGOCM broke with the PPS. The GCOCM–Jacinto López, as it is now called, was expelled from the communist World Federation of Trade Unions in 1978.

GRAN CÍRCULO DE OBREROS DE MÉXICO. *See* Great Circle of Mexican Workers.

GRAN CÍRCULO DE OBREROS LIBRES. *See* Great Circle of Free Workers.

GRAN LIGA DE TORCEDORES DE TOBACOS. *See* Great League of Tobacco Workers.

GRAN LIGA MEXICANA DE EMPLEADOS DE FERROCARRIL. *See* Great Mexican League of Railroad Employees.

GREAT CIRCLE OF FREE WORKERS (Gran Círculo de Obreros Libres—GCOL).

Founded in 1906 among the cotton textile workers of Orizaba, Veracruz, the GCOL expanded to include branches in a number of states. Local authorities disbanded the GCOL because of its anti-government program, but it was soon reorganized under a more moderate president, José Morales.

After a series of GCOL-sponsored strikes in the summer and fall of 1906, the GCOL Puebla branch under the leadership of Pascual Mendoza struck all the mills in that important textile city. Lasting throughout the month of December, the strike was settled by the intervention of President Porfirio Díaz, but violence erupted at the huge French-owned Río Blanco mill near Orizaba, Veracruz. Troops were called in, and many workers were shot in the streets or executed by firing squads. This infamous incident helped turn popular opinion against the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, who was overthrown four years later.

GREAT CIRCLE OF MEXICAN WORKERS (Gran Círculo de Obreros de México).

The Great Circle was founded in 1870 by Santiago Villanueva and others associated with the more radical faction of the Artistic Industrial Society.* It functioned as a worker central and by 1875 had twenty-eight branches and claimed over 8,000 members nationally. Its membership was mainly urban craftsmen but also included textile workers. While its branches were generally mutual societies organized to provide aid to members in case of accident, sickness, or death, the Circle also supported the cooperative movement and established the first cooperative tailor shop in Mexico City.

It organized the first labor congress in Mexico, the General Workers Congress of the Mexican Republic (Congreso General Obrero de la República Mexicana), held in 1876. After the death of Villanueva in 1872 the moderate faction tended to control the Circle, although from time to time the anarchist minority made gains against the moderates. The newspaper *The Son of Labor* (*El Hijo de Trabajo*) supported the more militant position, while *The Socialist* (*El Socialista*) was the spokesman for the moderates. Weakened by internal ideological divisions and attacked by a hostile government, the Circle dissolved in 1883.

GREAT LEAGUE OF TOBACCO WORKERS (Gran Liga de Torcedores de Tabacos).

After a number of strikes in early 1900s, tobacco workers at the important Veracruz factory, El Valle Nacional, formed the League in October 1905. A successful strike led to the calling of a National Congress of Tobacco Workers in Mexico City in 1906. After an unsuccessful strike in 1909, the League declined in importance.

GREAT MEXICAN LEAGUE OF RAILROAD EMPLOYEES (Gran Liga Mexicana de Empleados de Ferrocarril).

The League was founded in 1904 by Ernesto Hernández Expejel but was soon reconstituted under the leadership of Felix C. Vera. It represented white-collar workers as well as various groups of brakemen, carpenters, firemen, and mechanics on the major lines. A major strike was called against the Mexican Central Railway in 1908 over the issue of favoritism shown to foreign workers who dominated the better-paying positions. The strike failed and the League declined. Several locals led by Branch Number 5 of the Monterrey joined with several smaller brotherhoods in 1910 to form the Confederation of Mexican Railway Workers (*Confederación de Ferrocarrileros Mexicanos*). Neither group survived the Revolution of 1910.

HOUSE OF THE WORLD'S WORKERS (*Casa de Obrero Mundial—Casa*).

The Casa was founded in 1912 by followers of the Colombian anarchist Juan Francisco Moncaleano. At that time it was called the House of the Worker (*la Casa del Obrero*). Drawing on initial support from Mexico City printers and stonemasons, the Casa was soon functioning as a labor central. It had regional branches, but its strength lay in Mexico City where its affiliates included tailors, restaurant workers, weavers, stonemasons, carriage drivers, teachers, plumbers, bakers, seamstresses, bookbinders, and others. The single strongest Casa union was the Typographers Confederation (*Confederación de Tipógrafos*).

Although its leadership supported the principles of anarcho-syndicalism, disavowing any relationship with bourgeois political parties, the Casa in 1915 decided to support Venustiano Carranza's Constitutionalist faction in the struggle against the revolutionary forces of Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata. The Casa contributed six "Red Battalions" to the Constitutionalist cause, mainly drawn from its Mexico City working-class supporters.

The controversial decision to ally with the Constitutionlists reaped only short-term rewards. When deteriorating economic conditions led to a series of strikes in Mexico City culminating in the general strike of July–August 1916, the Carranza government closed down the Casa. Regional branches of the Casa in Guadalajara, Tampico, and Saltillo continued to function, but as a national force the Casa was dead.

INDEPENDENT UNION FRONT (*Frente Sindical Independiente—FSI*).

FSI was created by the Mexican Communist Party in the early 1970s as an alternative labor central to the officially favored unions. It was directed by three representatives each from the following groups: Union of Workers and Employees of UNAM (*Sindicato de Trabajadores y Empleados de la UNAM*), Revolutionary Movement of Teachers (*Movimiento Revolucionario del Magisterio*), National Railroad Workers Council (*Consejo Nacional Ferrocarrilero*), Section I of "Plástico Romay" (*Sección I de Plástico Romay*), Revolutionary Postal Movement (*Movimiento Revolucionario Postal*), and the Independent Campesino Central (*Central Campesina Independiente*).

INDEPENDENT WORKER UNIT (Unidad Obrero Independiente—UOI).

Formed in the early 1970s, UOI was recognized by the government in 1975 as a national industrial union. It is particularly strong in the auto and rubber industries. Among its important strikes were those against the Volkswagen plant in Puebla and the Nissan-Mexicana plant in Cuernavaca in 1974 and, again, in 1976.

UOI is socialist and is run by a collective board of directors coordinated by Juan Ortega Arenas. It functions as a central, with each plant union maintaining its own registry, negotiating its own contract, etc. Current membership is estimated at 150,000.

LABOR CONFEDERATION OF JALISCO (Confederación Obrera de Jalisco—COJ).

COJ was founded in 1927 by Mexican Communist Party (PCM) representatives David Siqueiros and Roberto Reyes Pérez, with the encouragement of the anti-Calles governor of Jalisco, José Guadalupe Zuno, who saw the COJ as a foil against the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CROM), as well as a counter to the militant Catholic labor movement under the influence of the Archbishop of Guadalajara. COJ was strongest among the miners of the western part of the state and the textile workers in the Guadalajara area. COJ collapsed in 1929 when Siqueiros and other PCM leaders were expelled from the state.

LEAGUE OF SOCIALIST AGRICULTURAL WORKERS (Liga de Agrónomos Socialistas).

In the mid-1930s representatives from Torreon metalworkers, mechanics, textile workers, and bricklayers began to organize the workers on the large cotton estates in the Laguna region of northern Mexico, founding the League of Socialist Agricultural Workers. The League and allied groups including the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) called a general strike in August 1935, closing down the entire cotton production of the area, involving 20,000 workers and 104 unions. The strike ended with the expropriation of the cotton estates and their transfer to 38,000 peasant families to work as farm collectives. The League disappeared as Cárdenas' National Peasant Confederation* took over the cotton workers' union; however, the Communists' Central Union has been active in the Laguna area since the 1930s and has a loyal following of peasant families despite the fierce repression of the 1940s and 1950s.

LIGA DE AGRÓNOMOS SOCIALISTAS. *See* League of Socialist Agricultural Workers.

LIGA NACIONAL CAMPEESINA. *See* National Campesino League.

LÍNEA PROLETARIA (Proletarian Line). *See* National Union of Mining, Metallurgical, and Similar Workers of the Mexican Republic—SNTMMSRM.

LNC. *See* National Campesino League.

MEXICAN ELECTRICAL WORKERS UNION (Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas—SME).

SME was founded in 1914 among the employees of the Mexican Light and Gas Company. It is an industrial union known for its discipline and staunch apolitical, trade union approach and for its honest elections. Among its first important strike actions were the abortive general strike in 1916.

Although SME was, and still is, based mainly in Mexico City, in the 1930s the union extended its influence to other states through its dominance of the National Confederation of Electricians and Allied Workers (Confederación Nacional de Electricistas y Conexos). SME joined the Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM) in 1936 but left it a year later and has been among the leading unions in the fight for an independent Mexican labor movement. A strong supporter of Demetrio Vallejo's railroaders in the 1959 crisis, it joined the National Workers Central* in 1960 and the Revolutionary Union Movement* in 1973. Its current membership is 35,000 and the secretary-general is C. Manuel Fernández Flores. It is a member of the Congress of Labor.*

MOVIMIENTO SINDICAL REVOLUCIONARIO. *See* Revolutionary Union Movement.

MSR. *See* Revolutionary Union Movement.

MUTUALIST SOCIETY OF SPINNERS AND WEAVERS OF THE VALLEY OF MEXICO (Sociedad Mutua del Ramo de Hilados y Tejidos del Valle de México).

This society was organized in March 1865 by workers of the textile mills San Ildefonso and La Colmena, near Mexico City. Also influential in the affairs of the society were delegates from the anarchist-leaning Society for Individual Self-Help. In June 1865 the workers declared a strike over wages, the length of the workday, and the abuses of the company store. Perhaps the first modern strike by industrial workers in Mexican history, it was repressed by the federal authorities and the organization apparently disbanded.

NATIONAL CAMPESINO LEAGUE (Liga Nacional Campesina—LNC).

The LNC was founded in 1926 by leaders of the Veracruz Peasant League (Liga de Comunidades Agrarias y Sindicatos Campesinos del Estado de Veracruz) and the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), which had a strong presence in that state. Delegates to the first congress of the LNC came from the states of Puebla, the Federal District, Chihuahua, Morelos, Querétaro, Michoacán, Veracruz, Jalisco, Durango, Sinaloa, and Tlaxcala. At the height of LNC's influence in 1928 its membership was claimed to be 300,000.

The LNC split with the PCM in 1929 over the latter's support of the rebellion

against the Plutarco Calles regime. With the death in 1930 of the LNC's most important leader, Ursulo Galván, the League degenerated into political factions and soon lost most of its followers to the National Peasant Confederation* organized by supporters of President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40). The LNC continued to survive in diminished form until the 1950s.

NATIONAL CATHOLIC LABOR CONFEDERATION (Confederación Nacional Católica del Trabajo—CNCT).

Organized in 1922 during the first National Catholic Congress of Work, the CNCT was oriented toward rural workers and was the most important Catholic workers' organization in the 1920s. The CNCT and its allies such as the militant Catholic Association of Mexican Youth engaged in propaganda and occasional violence against the "atheists" of the socialist unions. The extreme nature of the struggle between Church and state in the late 1920s led to the demise of the CNCT by 1930.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS (Federación Nacional de Sindicatos Independientes—FNSI).

The FNSI is composed of company-controlled unions (called "white" unions, *blancos*), mainly in the Monterrey area, and traditionally does not strike. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, FNSI enjoys good relations with management, and its members have better pay and working conditions than workers in national confederations. Current membership is between 50,000 and 70,000.

NATIONAL FRONT FOR COMMON ACTION (Frente Nacional de Acción Popular—FNAP).

The National Front was formed in 1976 at the National Conference of Labor, Peasant and Mass Insurgency (Conferencia Nacional de Insurgencia Obrera, Campesina y Popular) attended by some 300 independent labor organizations. Among those present were representatives of the electrical workers Democratic Tendency*, Sole National Union of University Workers,* Independent Worker Unit,* as well as all those unions who had formed the Revolutionary Union Movement.* Only the Authentic Labor Front* (FAT) was missing. The purpose of FNAP was to provide an organization to unite the different groups fighting for independent unionism and to attract support from leftist and progressive elements outside the labor movement.

NATIONAL LABOR CENTRAL (Central Nacional de Trabajo—CNT).

Established in 1960 as a rival to the Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM) by dissident railroad, rubber, electrical and petroleum unions that had left the labor sector of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI), this central received official recognition during the presidency of López Mateos, thus bringing its leaders back into the official fold. Indeed, some observers suggest that

López Mateos actually encouraged the CNT's formation to counter the growing power of the United Worker Block (BUO) which was allied to the CTM, which he saw as a potential threat to continued government domination of the labor movement. The CNT ultimately joined with the BUO in 1966 to form the Congress of Labor,* a loosely organized labor central for the most part controlled by the CTM and loyal to the PRI. Having thus lost its independence, the CNT lingered on until the late 1970s but now appears moribund.

NATIONAL PEASANT CONFEDERATION (Confederación Nacional Campesina—CNC).

Formed in 1935 by President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40), the CNC incorporated agricultural wage workers, sharecroppers, and similar occupations, but the bulk of the CNC is made up of *ejidatarios*, farmers whose land has been provided as part of the national land reform program. *Ejidatarios* do not own their own land (which is held in common by the community) but generally may farm it for life and pass its use on to their children.

Although the CNC is the largest labor organization in Mexico, it is in fact poorly organized and dominated by the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) functionaries. The numerous recent incidents involving rural labor are almost always dissident CNC members or rival organizations. Moreover, small farmers are included in the Popular sector of PRI, further diluting the influence of rural people. See National Confederation of Popular Organizations.

NATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS (Sindicato Nacional de Electricistas, Similares y Conexos—SNESC).

SNESC was the largest union of electrical workers in Mexico before it merged with the Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic* (STERM) to form the united electrical workers' union, the Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic* (SUTERM). SNESC was founded in the 1930s as a pro-Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM) competitor to STERM when the latter left the CTM in 1937. From its founding until his death SNESC's leader was Francisco Pérez Ríos, a CTM loyalist who commanded SNESC during the jurisdictional battles with STERM in the 1970s. Its membership was claimed to be 50,000, mainly in plants outside Mexico City.

NATIONAL UNION OF MINING, METALLURGICAL, AND SIMILAR WORKERS OF THE MEXICAN REPUBLIC (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalúrgicos, y Similares de la República Mexicana—SNTMMSRM).

The SNTMMSRM was formed in 1934 in Pachuca, Hidalgo. It joined the Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM) at its founding in 1936 but left the following year with other left-wing unions. It returned to the CTM, grudgingly, a few months later under pressure to create a popular front. During the labor schism of 1946–47, SNTMMSRM joined the newly formed alternative confed-

eration, Sole Central of Workers* (CUT). CUT failed, but SNTMMSRM stayed outside CTM as an “autonomous” national industrial union.

Nonetheless, SNTMMSRM, although nominally independent, is today a key member of the labor sector of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) and is headed by PRI loyalist (and federal senator) Napoleón Gómez Sada. Despite strong control exercised by Gómez Sada, the independence movement of the 1970s had an impact on SNTMMSRM locals. In 1978 steelworkers at the Las Truchas mill in Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán, and the Altos Hornos mill in Monclavo, Coahuila, voted out their SNTMMSRM-imposed officers. Efforts by Gómez Sada to overturn the election failed when a dramatic march of 5,000 steelworkers in support of the new officers forced the federal government to certify the election. The workers at these two mills currently belong to what is called the *Línea Proletaria* (“Proletarian Line or Order”), a left-wing, apolitical faction within the SNTMMSRM which adheres to no political party and is critical of those unions which join either the PRI or the United Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM). *Línea Proletaria* supporters are estimated at 20,000 workers, mainly at Las Truchas and Altos Hornos. SNTMMSRM claims 120,000 members and is a member of the Congress of Labor.*

NATIONAL UNION OF TEACHERS (Sindicato Nacional de la Educación—SNTE).

The SNTE includes most of the nation’s teachers and its claimed 600,000 membership makes it the largest national union in Mexico. It is affiliated with the Federation of Civil Service Unions* (FSTSE). Its international affiliation is the leftist International Teachers Federation, but it is a member of the Popular sector of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) and generally supports government policy. During SNTE’s early years in the 1930s it often represented strong left-wing opinion within the Party of the Mexican Revolution. After 1940, however, SNTE’s leaders were less often consulted on national education matters, and their potential power within PRI was forfeited by *charro* (pliant pro-government) leadership. In 1957 dissidents within SNTE organized the Revolutionary Movement of Teachers (Movimiento Revolucionario del Magisterio—MRM) to oppose SNTE leadership. The MRM and other dissidents led wildcat strikes against President José López Portillo’s (1976–82) cutbacks in educational funding. In the early 1980s SNTE dissidents have carried on the struggle for grass-roots, democratic control of their union through a group called the National Coordinator of Workers in Education, organized particularly in an attempt to create a national union of teachers and university personnel. See National Union of University Workers.

As of the mid-1980s, SNTE’s officers were Professor Ramón Martínez Martín, secretary-general; Elba Esther Gordillo Morales, secretary of finances; and Ernesto Ordaz Labra, secretary of international relations.

REGIONAL CONFEDERATION OF MEXICAN WORKERS (Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana—CROM).

Founded in 1918 at the Third Labor Congress, held in Saltillo, Coahuila. Its leader until his death in 1964 was Luis Morones. CROM was closely associated with the administrations of Álvaro Obregón (1920–24) and Plutarco Calles (1924–28), under whom Morones served as secretary of labor. CROM's political relationship with Obregón and Calles was carried out through the Mexican Labor Party (PLM) founded in 1919 by Morones.

The dominant labor organization in Mexico through the late 1920s, CROM claimed two million members, but historian Barry Carr believes that even a more conservative estimate of 600,000 is an exaggeration. (Carr, 1976, p. 7.) Of the major labor organizations, only the railroad workers and, to a lesser extent, the petroleum workers, were able to remain outside CROM's jurisdiction. Newspapers associated with CROM were *Acción*, *El Sol*, and *Pro Paria*.

Mutual hostility after 1928 between Calles and CROM caused a break between the two. Without official support, beset by internal dissension because of its opportunism, CROM rapidly disintegrated. It remains today a small national federation in textiles, food processing, and transport workers, but is limited in any significant power to the state of Puebla. Its membership is estimated at 150,000 and its secretary-general is Salvador Serrano Ramírez.

REVOLUTIONARY CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederación Revolucionaria de Trabajadores—CRT).

The CRT was founded in 1954 and includes both industrial and farm workers. Membership in the mid-1980s is perhaps no more than 21,000 workers. The secretary-general is Mario Suárez. Since its founding, it has lost two splinter groups—the Federation of Workers Groups and the Revolutionary Workers Federation—which combined to form the rival Confederation of Revolutionary Workers* (COR). Both COR and CRT joined Confederation of Mexican Workers* rival, National Labor Central,* in 1960; both are also members of the Congress of Labor* and adherents to the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party's (PRI) labor sector.

REVOLUTIONARY CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS AND PEASANTS (Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos—CROC).

CROC was formed in 1952 by dissident Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM) and Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers* locals along with four small confederations: Confederation of Workers and Peasants of Mexico (Confederación de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico), National Proletarian Confederation (Confederación Proletaria Nacional), National Confederation of Workers (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores), and the Sole Confederation of Workers (Confederación Única de Trabajadores).

Its membership is claimed to be nearly half a million but is probably closer to 150,000 and is concentrated in the Federal District, and the states of Puebla, Veracruz, and Baja California among workers in textiles, food, beverage, hospital, and transportation. CROC joined CTM-rival National Labor Central in

1960, is a member of the Congress of Labor,* and is affiliated with the labor sector of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party—PRI. Its current leader is Alberto Juárez Blancas, president.

REVOLUTIONARY UNION MOVEMENT (Movimiento Sindical Revolucionario—MSR).

MSR was founded in 1973 by the Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic* (STERM), under Rafael Galván, during their jurisdictional struggle within the Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic.* STERM hoped to promote its concept of democratic unionism, Democratic Tendency* (TD), and brought together representatives from university workers, teachers, telephone workers, textile, steel, oil, railroad and brewery workers in Guadalajara in 1975 to outline MSR goals and demands. MSR leaders were persecuted, particularly STERM members, and the movement faltered. (See National Front for Common Action.) Their official publication was *Solidarity (Solidaridad)*. Various MSR unions joined the labor sector of the United Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM) when it was formed in 1981.

REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS CONFEDERATION (Confederación Obrera Revolucionaria—COR).

A small rival group to the Confederation of Mexican Workers,* COR is a member of the Congress of Labor,* joined anti-CTM National Labor Central in 1960 and is affiliated with the labor sector of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI). Its current membership is estimated at 40,000 and its chief officer is Ángel Olivo Solís, secretary-general.

SINDICATO DE TELEFONISTAS DE LA REPÚBLICA MEXICANA. *See* Union of Telephone Workers of the Mexican Republic.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES ELECTRICISTAS DE LA REPÚBLICA MEXICANA. *See* Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES FERROCARRILEROS DE LA REPÚBLICA MEXICANA. *See* Union of Railroad Workers of the Mexican Republic.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES PETROLEROS DE LA REPÚBLICA MEXICANA. *See* Union of Petroleum Workers of the Mexican Republic.

SINDICATO MEXICANO DE ELECTRICISTAS. *See* Mexican Electrical Workers Union.

SINDICATO NACIONAL DE ELECTRICISTAS, SIMILARES Y CONEXOS. *See* National Union of Electrical Workers.

SINDICATO NACIONAL DE LA EDUCACIÓN. *See* National Union of Teachers.

SINDICATO NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES MINEROS, METALÚRGICOS, Y SIMILARES DE LA REPÚBLICA MEXICANA. *See* National Union of Mining, Metallurgical, and Similar Workers of the Mexican Republic.

SINDICATO ÚNICO DE TRABAJADORES ELECTRICISTAS DE LA REPÚBLICA MEXICANA. *See* Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic.

SINDICATO ÚNICO NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES UNIVERSITARIOS. *See* Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic.

SME. *See* Mexican Electrical Workers Union.

SNESC. *See* National Union of Electrical Workers.

SNTE. *See* National Union of Teachers.

SNTMMSRM. *See* National Union of Mining, Metallurgical, and Similar Workers of the Mexican Republic.

LA SOCIAL. *See* The Social.

THE SOCIAL (La Social).

The Social was originally formed as the Student Socialist Club (El Club Socialista de Estudiantes) in January 1865 by followers of Plotino C. Rhodakanaty, a Greek anarchist who had migrated to Mexico in 1861. The group was active in the forming of other militant mutualist societies, such as the Society for Mutual Aid* and the Artistic Industrial Society.* Among its principal leaders were Francisco Zalacosta, Santiago Villanueva, and Hermengildo Villavicencio, students of Rhodakanaty. The Social broke up in the mid-1860s and reformed in 1871, representing the active anarchist minority in the newly formed labor central, the Great Circle of Workers of Mexico.* It was instrumental in calling the first national workers' congress in 1876, the General Workers Congress of the Mexican Republic (Congreso General Obrero de la República Mexicana). Among the Social's members was Carmen Huerta, elected president of the Congreso in 1879 and 1880 and later active in organizing women workers in Orizaba, Veracruz. In recording events and discussing issues, the newspaper *The Son of Labor* (*El Hijo de Trabajo*) generally represented the more radical of the Social's members, while *The Socialist* (*El Socialista*) supported the more conservative positions.

SOCIEDAD ARTÍSTICA INDUSTRIAL. *See* Artistic Industrial Society.

SOCIEDAD MUTUA DEL RAMO DE HILADOS Y TEJIDOS DEL VALLE DE MEXICO. *See* Mutualist Society of Spinners and Weavers of the Valley of Mexico.

SOCIEDAD PARTICULAR DE SOCORROS MUTUOS. *See* Society for Mutual Aid.

SOCIETY FOR MUTUAL AID (Sociedad Particular de Socorros Mutuos).

Originally formed in 1853 as a mutual society among the artisans of the hat-making industry in Mexico City, the Society for Mutual Aid was reformed in October 1864 by Mexican followers of Greek immigrant, Plotino C. Rhodakany. It was the first of a number of mutual societies in the 1860s and 1870s to come under the influence of European anarchism. The Society espoused more militant resistance to capitalism than earlier mutual societies, and appears to have been disbanded by the mid-1880s, probably during the period of government repression.

SOLE CENTRAL OF WORKERS (Central Única de Trabajadores—CUT).

Formed in 1947 from dissident Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM) unions, namely telephone operators, miners, petroleum workers, electrical workers, and the railroad workers' union, Union of Railroad Workers of the Mexican Republic.* Official prosecution undermined CUT by 1952.

SOLE NATIONAL UNION OF UNIVERSITY WORKERS (Sindicato Único Nacional de Trabajadores Universitarios—SUNTU).

SUNTU is an unrecognized union which organizes manual workers, staff, and university faculty at all federal and state universities in Mexico. SUNTU began in 1971 under the leadership of its secretary-general, Nicolas Olivos Cuellar, for the purpose of organizing the manual workers and staff of the National University of Mexico (UNAM). At that time it was called Union of Workers and Employees of UNAM (Sindicato de Trabajadores y Empleados de la UNAM—STEUNAM). After an eighty-three-day strike in 1973, one of the longest in the history of the Mexican labor movement, the union was officially recognized. In 1974 university faculty organized the Union of Academic Personnel (Sindicato del Personal Académico—SPAUNAM). The government granted SPAUNAM the right to organize and bargain but not the right to strike, although in fact the university was closed down on several occasions by SPAUNAM. Finally, STEUNAM and SPAUNAM joined together into one union (SUNTU) in 1977. The movement soon spread to other universities in Mexico, and after further strikes the government of López Portillo (1976–82) granted SUNTU the right to associate but not to establish an official union. SUNTU exists outside the official labor circles, is extremely vocal against the *charrismo*

(pro-government, often corrupt leadership of Mexican labor organizations), and is generally left-wing in politics, having strong connections to the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), now the United Socialist Party (PSUM). See the Independent Union Front.*

SOLE UNION OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS OF THE MEXICAN REPUBLIC (Sindicato Único de Trabajadores Electricistas de la República Mexicana—SUTERM).

SUTERM grew out of the complete nationalization of the utility companies in 1960 and the subsequent movement among the three electrical unions—Mexican Electrical Workers Union* (SME), Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic* (STERM), and National Union of Electrical Workers* (SNESC)—to merge into one union. SME dropped out of the plan, but in 1972 STERM and SNESC signed a merger agreement creating SUTERM and guaranteeing democratic procedures and minority rights. Francisco Pérez Ríos, as the leader of the larger SNESC, was designated secretary-general, and Rafael Galván, head of STERM, his second in command. Pérez Ríos was a conservative labor leader and a CTM loyalist while Rafael Galván was a vocal leader of the Cardenista wing of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI). They clashed repeatedly as Pérez Ríos was clearly moving to undercut ex-STERM unions. Out of this clash came the Democratic Tendency* and the Revolutionary Union Movement*. Galván and his ex-STERM officers were expelled from SUTERM in 1975. Pérez Ríos died soon after the break, and SUTERM is now headed by Leonidas Rodríguez Alcaine with a membership claimed at 133,000.

SPAUNAM. *See* Sole National Union of University Workers.

STERM. *See* Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Public.

STEUNAM. *See* Sole National Union of University Workers.

STFRM. *See* Union of Railroad Workers of the Mexican Republic.

STPRM. *See* Union of Petroleum Workers of the Mexican Republic.

STRM. *See* Union of Telephone Workers of the Mexican Republic.

SUNTU. *See* Sole National Union of University Workers.

SUTERM. *See* Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic.

TD. *See* Democratic Tendency.

TENDENCIA DEMOCRÁTICA. *See* Democratic Tendency.

UGOCM. *See* General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico.

UNIDAD OBRERO INDEPENDIENTE. *See* Independent Worker Unit.

UNIÓN CATÓLICA OBRERA. *See* Catholic Worker's Union.

UNION CENTRALIST CONFEDERATION OF MEXICO (Confederación Sindical Unitaria de México—CSUM).

The CSUM was founded in 1928 as the first national Communist labor confederation in Mexico. Its strength was concentrated among miners in western Jalisco, oil workers of Tampico, Veracruz, and railroadmen, textile workers, and peasants in the states of Puebla, Veracruz, and Michoacán, and agricultural workers in the Laguna region. David Alfaro Siqueiros, the famous muralist, was elected the first secretary-general of CSUM, which claimed to represent 120,000 workers.

UNIÓN DE MECÁNICOS MEXICANOS. *See* Union of Mexican Mechanics.

UNIÓN GENERAL DE OBREROS Y CAMPESINOS DE MÉXICO. *See* General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico.

UNION OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS OF THE MEXICAN REPUBLIC (Sindicato de Trabajadores Electricistas de la República Mexicana—STERM).

STERM was originally founded in 1934 with the merger of twenty-nine local electrical unions into the loosely organized National Federation of Workers of the Electrical Industry (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria y Comunicaciones Eléctricas—FNTIC). Its leader from its founding through to the struggles of the 1970s was Rafael Galván, federal senator and leading spokesman for the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party's (PRI) "Cardenista" (after Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas) left wing.

FNTIC joined the Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM) but left in 1937 along with its sister union the Mexican Electrical Workers Union.* FNTIC has consistently participated in opposition confederations such as Sole Central of Workers* (CUT) (1947), the National Labor Central* (1960) and, in 1973, organized the Revolutionary Union Movement,* as an alternative to CTM.

In 1972 STERM agreed to the merger of STERM and the larger National Union of Electrical Workers* (SNESC) into the Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic* (SUTERM), as had been agreed upon in 1960 when the complete nationalization of the industry took place. However, conflict with SNESC's pro-CTM and conservative leader Francisco Pérez Ríos led to harassment of ex-STERM unions within SUTERM and in 1975 Galván and many of his ex-STERM officers were thrown out of SUTERM. Despite sympathy and support from other unions, Galván lost his struggle with Pérez Ríos, mainly due

to the intervention of CTM's Felix Velázquez and to the persecution of ex-STERM members by the government.

Nonetheless, in the process of this conflict Galván initiated the important Democratic Tendency* movement, broadening his attack to include *charrismo* (pro-government and often corrupt union leadership) wherever it was found. See Revolutionary Union Movement.

UNION OF MEXICAN MECHANICS (Unión de Mecánicos Mexicanos).

Founded by Teodoro Larrey in Puebla in 1900, the union was relocated to Chihuahua in 1901 under the strong leadership of Silvino Rodríguez. It struck the Mexican Central Railroad in July and August 1906 in an important conflict over collective bargaining, wages, and equal pay for equal work (referring to higher wages paid foreign workers). The strike failed, but the union remained strong through the 1930s, when the various railroad brotherhoods merged into a single union, Union of Railroad Workers of the Mexican Republic.*

UNION OF PETROLEUM WORKERS OF THE MEXICAN REPUBLIC (Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la República Mexicana—STPRM).

In the mid-1930s the approximately 10,000 petroleum workers belonged to nineteen different unions. Encouraged by Lombardo Toledano's Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM), representatives of the various unions met in July 1936 to form one industrial union, the Union of Petroleum Workers of the Mexican Republic. The occasion for this unity was a month-old strike of Shell and Standard Oil. The strike dragged on, first declared illegal by the Conciliation and Arbitration Board, then declared legal by a special commission appointed by President Lázaro Cárdenas. The companies appealed to Mexico's Supreme Court but refused to accept its verdict. Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40) expropriated the companies' holdings in March 1938, but the union often lost its conflicts with PEMEX, the government agency that took over operations of the oil fields after a short-lived experiment in worker administration. Finally, STPRM opted out of the CTM in 1947, joining Sole Central of Workers.*

One of the most powerful unions in Mexico, STPRM had long had a reputation for aggressive unionism and corruption, especially under its former leader Joaquín Hernández Galicia. One particular abuse which gained widespread national attention in the 1970s was that of the "temporary" workers (*transitorios*). Such workers are not protected by the labor laws. In the case of STPRM the *transitorios* were often kept on the job for years, forced to pay union leaders for their jobs, and yet had no job security.

STPRM is technically an independent national union, but it is a member of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Congress of Labor* where it is subject to the influence of CTM. Moreover, the recent economic crisis of Mexico has brought STPRM under considerable government pressure to reform.

UNION OF RAILROAD WORKERS OF THE MEXICAN REPUBLIC (Sindicato de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros de la República Mexicana—STFRM).

With membership well over 100,000, STRFM is one of the largest industrial unions in Mexico. An industrial union representing all railroad crafts, STFRM was founded in 1933 after the earlier federation, the Railroad Workers Alliance (Alianza de Ferrocarrileros), failed to stem massive firings which accompanied the deteriorating economic conditions of the early 1930s.

Although STFRM joined the Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM) under Lombardo Toledano's leadership, they brokered with CTM in 1946 to help form the United Workers Central.* Persecuted by Miguel Alemán's regime (1946–52), STFRM's leadership was taken over by pro-government forces headed by Jesús Díaz León, "*El Charro*." He, in turn, was ousted in 1958 by dissidents led by Demetrio Vallejo. After an industry-wide strike was forcefully broken by federal troops, Vallejo and other leaders were jailed in 1963.

Vallejo was released from jail in the 1970s and founded the Railroad Union Movement (Movimiento Sindical Ferrocarrilero) which participated in Rafael Galván's Democratic Tendency* movement and was a member of the Revolutionary Union Movement.* Although members of STFRM accepted Vallejo's leadership, the union remains today in the Congress of Labor* and affiliated with the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI). Its secretary-general is Jorge Oropeza Vásquez.

UNION OF TELEPHONE WORKERS OF THE MEXICAN REPUBLIC (Sindicato de Telefonistas de la República Mexicana—STRM).

The telephone workers union was founded in 1950 and includes all workers and operators of the state-owned telephone system. It was in STRM that one of the most dramatic revolts against corrupt and unresponsive union leadership (*charrismo*) took place. The leader of STRM in 1976, Salustio Salgado, had accepted the company wage offer without even a pretext of consulting the union rank and file. A wildcat strike resulted, forcing the government to agree to a new election with direct, secret balloting by the entire STRM membership. The pro-reform slate, headed by Francisco Hernández Juárez, won 86 percent of the vote and promptly dropped out of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI), declaring their independence from all labor and political organizations. STRM did, however, remain in the Congress of Labor,* apparently under pressure from the government and from moderates within the union. Currently the secretary-general is Hernández Juárez and the membership approximately 21,000.

UNITED WORKER BLOCK (Bloque de Unidad Obrera—BUO).

Formed in 1949 by the Confederation of Mexican Workers* (CTM), in the 1950s BUO became a loosely organized central for the more conservative unions of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) labor sector. In 1966 BUO and its rival in the PRI, the National Workers Central,* were integrated into the Congress of Labor*.

UOI. *See* Independent Worker Unit.

WORKER CONFEDERATION IN PUEBLA (CONFEDERACIÓN OBRERO en PUEBLO).

Organized in 1884 among textile mill hands in the Puebla area, the Confederation was the first modern workers' organization in that important textile manufacturing city. Its impetus was a successful strike carried out by mill hands at the large mill, El Mayorazgo, which resulted in an agreement to limit the workday (to twelve hours), abolish scrip, and other reforms.

Nicaragua

RICHARD STAHLER-SHOLK

Labor organization in Nicaragua was fundamentally altered by the revolution that brought the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de la Liberación—FSLN) to power in July 1979. The Somoza dynasty, which had reigned with only brief interruptions for the previous forty-three years, had severely restricted labor organization through a combination of repression and co-optation. A series of important economic and social shifts in the 1950s and 1960s contributed to the mass mobilization of urban and rural workers in the 1970s. The Sandinistas successfully led these mobilized popular sectors, in alliance with a part of the national bourgeoisie which joined the opposition movement, to topple the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. In the post-revolutionary period, unionization expanded dramatically, with smaller unions on the left and right challenging the Sandinistas' claim to leadership of the working class and peasantry.

Working-class organization came late to Nicaragua. The spread of coffee cultivation for export in the last quarter of the nineteenth century began to create a coffee oligarchy that pushed for reforms of property and repressive labor laws, to permit the sale of lands owned communally by indigenous peoples, and to ensure a stable labor force. The growing power of Liberal coffee growers was violently opposed by Conservative cattle ranchers and owners of large haciendas. Booming coffee exports by the turn of the century shifted the political balance in favor of the Liberals, who staged a revolt in 1893 which brought José Santos Zelaya to power. Zelaya launched a program of rapid modernization under authoritarian-nationalist auspices, which included state-sponsored projects to expand infrastructure and promote agricultural exports, annexing the sparsely populated Atlantic Coast region; and negotiating with England, Germany, and Japan over loans and possible construction of an inter oceanic canal. This last item, a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, prompted the United States to land troops in

support of a Conservative overthrow of the Zelaya government in 1909. U.S. Marines occupied Nicaragua from 1912 to 1925 and from 1926 to 1933—securing U.S. control of the banks and customs houses, foreign investment, and canal options in Nicaragua, and propping up Conservative governments against Liberal assaults.

U.S. intervention on behalf of Conservative governments in the early twentieth century obstructed the kind of Liberal social reforms which took root in neighboring Costa Rica, and retarded the process of local capital accumulation. Nicaragua's small working class was clustered around the foreign enclave sector of the economy—gold mines, banana plantations, and lumber companies. The first unions in Nicaragua were formed after World War I, under anarcho-syndicalist and socialist influences. Strikes of agricultural workers at the Cuyamel Fruit Company and Cukra Development on the Atlantic Coast in the early 1920s were brutally repressed, with a massacre of striking Cuyamel banana workers in 1925. In 1927 the U.S. arranged a pact between the warring Conservatives and Liberals, which temporarily prolonged Conservative rule but ultimately left the government in the hands of the nonnationalist faction of the Liberals. However, one maverick general from the old Liberal army, Augusto César Sandino, rejected the pact and continued to fight against the occupying U.S. forces.

Sandino's guerrilla band, operating in the Northern mountains, recruited heavily among the peasantry and working class. In 1932, for example, a number of striking workers from the Braggman Bluff Lumber Company joined Sandino's army. The Nicaraguan Workers' Party (Partido Trabajador Nicaragüense—PTN), organized in 1931, was first inspired by one of Sandino's organizers. Sandino established agrarian cooperatives and literacy programs among his supporters in the mountains of Las Segovias, and imbued his movement with an ideology of national sovereignty which became a rallying cry of the latter-day Sandinistas.

Sandino's forces continually evaded capture. The U.S. Marines finally set up a Nicaraguan National Guard and withdrew from the country in 1933. The Guard, commanded by Anastasio Somoza García, arranged to have Sandino assassinated in 1934 when he came to Managua to negotiate a truce with the Liberal government. After the assassination of Sandino, the Guard proceeded to wipe out the remains of his small Army for the Defense of National Sovereignty. Repression also fell on the incipient labor organizations of the day, among which the PTN figured prominently. Somoza García seized power in 1936, inaugurating the U.S.-backed family dictatorship which would last for forty-three years. When Somoza García was assassinated in 1956, his older son Luis Somoza Debayle assumed the presidency, and younger son Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza Debayle took over the National Guard. "Tachito" Somoza became president in 1967 after Luis died.

Sporadic strikes and union demonstrations in the late 1930s were met with a combined strategy of repression and co-optation, as the regime of Anastasio Somoza García sought to consolidate a base of domestic support. By holding out the promise of legal reform and official recognition, Somoza won over an

important faction of the leadership of the labor movement. Many of the unions in this period were associated with the Moscow-oriented Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Nicaragüense—PSN). In the mid-1940s, the PSN was briefly given free rein to organize—due to the wartime alliance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as well as Somoza's populist pretensions. The PSN party line in 1944 called for a tactical alliance with Somoza, in the interest of building the labor movement and maintaining anti-fascist unity. A major organizing effort, led by Marxist labor militants, boosted union membership from about 3,000 in 1940 to a peak of perhaps 12,000 to 18,000 by 1945.

The Somoza García government had made a concerted effort to co-opt the labor movement in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Somoza's Nationalist Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Nacionalista—PLN) controlled such labor organizations as the Organized Workers' Movement of Nicaragua* (Obrerismo Organizado de Nicaragua—OO) and the Organizing Committee of the Workers' Confederation of Nicaragua (Comité Organizador de la Confederación de Trabajadores de Nicaragua—COCTN). The Somoza regime promulgated an advanced Labor Code in 1945, modeled after Mexican labor law, which provided for detailed state regulation of the work relationship (rather than collective bargaining). Worker protections were impressive on paper, though in practice they were scarcely enforced. With the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, Somoza García resorted to repression to counteract Socialist influence in the labor movement and to curry favor with the United States. The PSN, which had never actually been granted legal status, was heavily repressed in 1947–48, forcing its unions underground. The major labor federations of the mid-1940s, which were PSN-controlled, were broken up and replaced in 1949 by the pro-Somoza General Confederation of Workers* (Confederación General de Trabajadores—CGT). The corrupt, officialist CGT dominated the labor scene in the early 1950s.

The rapid spread of cotton cultivation in the 1950s, responding to booming world prices, brought important socioeconomic changes that would affect labor organizing in the subsequent decades. Cotton production was generally capital-intensive, but like coffee, it had high labor requirements during the harvest season. By 1955 cotton had replaced coffee as Nicaragua's main export. Agricultural credits remained tightly controlled by the Somoza family and two other main financial groups, known as the Bank of America (Banco de América) and Nicaraguan Bank (Banco Nicaragüense) groups. Cotton production and processing enriched these groups, while rapidly displacing thousands of peasant cultivators of basic grains. Many of these displaced *campesinos* became seasonal wage laborers on the cotton plantations of the Pacific lowlands, and/or swelled the ranks of the urban marginals in the capital city of Managua. By the 1970s fully half of all Nicaraguans employed in agriculture were seasonal workers on the cotton plantations.

The cotton export boom of the 1950s was accompanied by expanded state investment in building infrastructure (roads, ports, telecommunications, electricity) to benefit the agro-exporting bourgeoisie. In 1951 the construction work-

ers organized the Union of Carpenters, Bricklayers, Assembly Workers, and Allied Trades* (Sindicato de Carpinteros, Albañiles, Armadores, y Similares—SCAAS), which grew out of PSN organizing in the construction industry in the 1940s. SCAAS became one of Nicaragua's most militant unions. Despite the formation of new unions in this period which pressed for implementation of the 1945 Labor Code, less than 4 percent of the economically active population (and less than 1 percent of the rural work force) was unionized by 1958. The 1950s cotton boom financed new investments in sugar and beef production for export. The formation of the Central American Common Market in the 1960s stimulated light industrial production for the expanded regional market, and also attracted foreign (mainly U.S.) investment. Nicaragua's shifting economic base brought greater social differentiation.

With industrialization and the growth of the urban middle class and proletariat, labor organizing increasingly sidestepped the officialist union structure. In 1962 the middle-class Social Christians and a reformist faction of the Conservatives formed the Nicaraguan Autonomous Union Movement (Movimiento Sindical Autónomo de Nicaragua—MOSAN), which in 1972 became the Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation* (Confederación de Trabajadores de Nicaragua—CTN). After 1960, dissident unions broke away from the Somoza-controlled CGT, and in 1963 they formed the General Confederation of Workers—Independent* (Confederación General de Trabajadores—Independiente—CGT-I). The CGT-I, which had the support of the militant construction workers' union, was linked to the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN). In the mid-1960s the Confederation of Union Unification (Confederación de Unificación Sindical—CUS) was organized with support from the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), an arm of the AFL-CIO which has a history of being used as a front for CIA activities in Latin America. The CTN, the CGT-I, and the small CUS all outlived the Somoza dictatorship.

While the 1950s and 1960s saw rapid export-led economic growth, the benefits of the boom were very unequally distributed. The Somoza family used its control of the state apparatus to appropriate German-owned lands during World War II, rig sales of profitable coffee lands, monopolize credits, selectively channel state investments, exact bribes from foreign investors, and repress labor activities through use of the National Guard. While the agro-export bourgeoisie profited from cotton and beef production, rural landlessness increased. Industrialization failed to replace the jobs lost in agriculture. The economic dislocations of the 1950s and 1960s laid the groundwork for the mass mobilization of urban and rural workers in the 1970s.

The Somoza dynasty offered only feeble reforms in response to growing worker discontent. A social security system was established in 1957, but ten years later, only 14 percent of the work force was covered by the plan. National minimum wage legislation was passed for the first time in 1962, but the rates established by the law fell well below prevailing wage standards. An agrarian reform devised by the Nicaraguan Agrarian Institute (created in 1964 under Alliance for Progress

inspiration) redistributed some land, but the thrust of the program was the counterinsurgency-oriented relocation of landless *campesinos* to previously uninhabited land.

It was in this climate that the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was founded in 1961. Recruiting primarily among the North-Central peasantry at first, the FSLN organized guerrilla bands to harass National Guard forces. Following the defeat of the main Sandinista guerrilla units in 1967, the FSLN shifted tactics, turning to mass-based organizing in both rural and urban areas. The Sandinistas based their appeal on nationalism, anti-imperialism, and the widespread opposition to the injustice and brutality of the dictatorship.

Workers played a major role in the growing anti-Somoza movement in the 1970s, which the FSLN came to lead. The 1972 earthquake which devastated the capital city of Managua was a watershed event for the opposition. Anastasio Somoza Debayle stole much of the earthquake relief money and also monopolized opportunities to cash in on the booming construction, finance, and real estate industries—thus antagonizing not only the urban poor but also the bourgeoisie who were not Somoza followers. A post-earthquake reconstruction program lengthened the workweek from 48 to 60 hours and cut wages, leading to a major 1973 strike by Managua construction workers, whose clout was increased by the demand for their services after the earthquake. The following year, leaders of the bourgeois opposition formed the Democratic Union for Liberation (Unión Democrática de Liberación—UDEL), which was joined by the CGT-I and the CTN. The demands of those two unions became more explicitly political as a national anti-Somoza movement took shape and repression intensified. CUS, by contrast, took little part in opposition activities.

The FSLN moved into the forefront of this opposition movement in the 1970s. In the countryside, the Sandinistas organized Rural Workers' Committees* (Comités de Trabajadores del Campo—CTC) beginning in 1976. These committees were organized in conjunction with religious workers influenced by Liberation Theology, a progressive tendency in the Latin American Catholic Church which emphasized social justice. Following a successful strike at the huge San Antonio sugar operations, these committees came together on a national level in 1978 to form the Rural Workers' Association (Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo—ATC). In the factories, the Sandinistas organized Workers' Struggle Committees* (Comités de Lucha de los Trabajadores—CLT). After the Sandinista victory over the Somoza dictatorship in July 1979, the CLT reorganized to form the Sandinista Workers' Central* (Central Sandinista de Trabajadores—CST). These labor organizations participated actively in the Nicaraguan Revolution. The ATC and CST were by far the largest labor confederations of rural and urban workers (respectively) after 1979, reflecting the leading position of the FSLN in the revolutionary struggle.

The Sandinistas began energetically to mobilize the working class into the ranks of the armed opposition in the mid-1970s. Several daring guerrilla operations helped popularize the notion that the dictatorship could be toppled by

force. A 1974 FSLN raid on a Christmas party of the elite of Managua focused international attention on the Sandinistas. After giving in to the Sandinistas' demands in exchange for release of hostages, Somoza declared martial law. Strikes were banned, and the National Guard enjoyed free rein to repress union activism. Nevertheless, strike activity increased, with strikers often demanding release of political prisoners. Following the January 1978 assassination of opposition newspaper editor Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the Democratic Union for Liberation (the opposition coalition led by the anti-Somoza business elite) called a general strike. The FSLN and the leftist unions, particularly those affiliated with the CGT-I, organized the striking workers into more active popular resistance, despite the efforts of UDEL to contain the strike.

Through inaction, the anti-Somoza business elite lost credibility. UDEL was eclipsed by the Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio Opositor—FAO), which included elements that were more sympathetic to the FSLN. In July 1978 the FSLN formed the United People's Movement (Movimiento Pueblo Unido—MPU), which included a number of popular organizations and revolutionary unions. In August 1978 a Sandinista commando team seized the National Palace, holding the entire Congress hostage. The action was followed by a four-week general strike called by FAO. This strike was supported by CGT-I, CTN, and even CUS. By late 1978, however, FAO was divided: One faction bowed to U.S. pressures to negotiate with Somoza, causing a number of organizations, including CTN and CGT-I and most of the middle-class unions (but not CUS), to leave FAO and join the MPU. By the time spontaneous insurrections erupted in late 1978, signaling the beginning of the end for the dictatorship, the momentum of opposition had passed to the Sandinista-led coalition of forces. While the bourgeois opposition wavered, most of the labor movement was won over to the more militant position of the FSLN.

Labor organizations on the left were long divided over whether to ally with the Sandinistas. The Moscow-oriented Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Nicaragüense—PSN) fractured in 1967. Orthodox opponents of guerrilla "adventurism" broke away from the PSN to form the Communist Party of Nicaragua (Partido Comunista de Nicaragua—PCN), which subsequently organized its own labor confederation, the Union Action and Unity Central* (Central de Acción y Unidad Sindical—CAUS). CAUS, like the PSN-affiliated CGT-I, eventually participated in the revolution, joining the MPU coalition which was led by the Sandinistas. Following the 1979 overthrow of Somoza, however, CAUS persistently opposed the Sandinista program with strikes and demonstrations. The CGT-I, by contrast, adopted a critical but basically supportive stance.

A third labor organization on the left, the Workers' Front* (Frente Obrero—FO), grew out of an ultraleft splinter group expelled from the FSLN in the early 1970s. The dissidents formed the Popular Action Movement/Marxist-Leninist (Movimiento de Acción Popular/Marxista-Leninista—MAP-ML), a small far-left party, which organized the FO in 1974. The FO developed a base of support among the cane-cutters of the Monterrosa and San Antonio sugar plantations.

The union operated its own Popular Anti-Somoza Militia* (Milicias Populares Anti-Somocistas—MILPAS), which it refused to disband after the overthrow of Somoza. Following outbreaks of violence at FO-led strikes in early 1980 and a call for sabotage printed in the FO's newspaper, *The People (El Pueblo)*, the Sandinista government closed the newspaper and seized MILPAS arms caches. FO activity subsequently declined.

After taking power in July 1979, the Sandinistas lifted restrictions on labor organizing. Unionization rose from 11 or 12 percent of the salaried work force to over 40 percent in 1983 and an estimated 56 percent in 1986. All the existing labor confederations experienced rapid growth, although the Sandinista-organized CST and ATC clearly took the lead. By 1986 the CST and ATC together represented over 60 percent of organized labor, with the CST claiming about 13,000 members and the ATC, 50,000. The CGT-I came in a distant third with perhaps 20,000.

The dominant position of Sandinista unions reflected the tremendous popularity which accrued to the FSLN through its leadership of the revolutionary struggle. The Sandinistas also enjoyed an organizing advantage in those factories and farms that passed into state hands after the properties of Somoza and his cronies were confiscated. Labor unions, as well as a variety of other "mass organizations," parties, and interest groups, were given functional representation in the new Council of State. The Council of State shared legislative responsibilities with the revolutionary junta from 1980 until 1984, when elections were held for a National Assembly based on proportional representation. Trade union activists were elected to fourteen of the ninety-six seats in the Assembly; the FSLN won the presidential elections and also a majority (sixty-one seats) in the National Assembly.

Aside from formal structures of government, the struggle for real power in post-revolutionary Nicaragua centered around the competing political projects of the FSLN and the private business sector which still controlled 60 percent of the national economy. On this front, the national bourgeoisie possessed economic resources, while the Sandinistas enjoyed the resource of mass mobilization. Each side sought to build up strength in preparation for future confrontation; the Sandinistas, accordingly, worked to mobilize working-class support yet at the same time to exercise discipline over unions and other popular organizations. As with the Allende period in Chile (1970–73), the strategy of the right-wing opposition involved boycotting production and sowing economic chaos, while the leftist government found itself jeopardizing its natural base of support by urging wage austerity. Labor organizing since 1979 has been affected by the special economic and political problems facing the new government.

Economic problems since 1979 have complicated labor relations for the Sandinistas. Somoza had ordered aerial bombing of Nicaraguan cities in the last months of the fighting and left the country with one of the highest foreign debt burdens (total debt/GDP) in Latin America. Decapitalization by the national bourgeoisie, coupled with a U.S.-organized international financial blockade be-

ginning in 1981, slowed economic growth, and in particular, contributed to a serious foreign exchange shortage which shut down numerous industrial firms for lack of spare parts. Workers responded to decapitalization with spontaneous factory takeovers and land invasions in 1980–81. Seeking to maintain production levels, the government bowed to CST demands to pass stricter laws against decapitalization. In late 1981, with a worsening economic situation aggravated by U.S.-backed counterrevolutionary (“contra”) attacks, the Sandinista government decreed a series of Social and Economic Emergency measures which included a ban on strikes and land takeovers. The measures also imposed new luxury taxes and prohibited the publication of “false and destabilizing” economic news (a favorite tactic of the right-wing opposition). Several activists of the Communist-led union CAUS were jailed for violating the strike ban, which remained in force until July 1984; and leaders of the umbrella organization of business groups (COSEP) were jailed briefly for violating the ban on “destabilizing” publications.

Besides decapitalization, several other economic problems complicated labor relations under the Sandinista government. Some productivity problems occurred because many workers felt entitled to a “historic vacation” after the overthrow of Somoza. In the rural sector, labor shortages appeared during the harvest season for cotton and coffee. Among the factors affecting the supply of seasonal agricultural labor were defense mobilizations, low wages, and the agrarian reform (which brought better access to land, credits, and other inputs for small farmers, as well as an end to heavy-handed recruitment and labor practices). Small farmers and landless rural workers were initially grouped together in the ATC, but their interests often diverged. In April 1981 the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers* (Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos—UNAG) was formed. UNAG sought to organize the cooperativized sector which had emerged since the revolution, as well as small farmers who did not feel represented by the ATC.

Political problems also affected labor relations under the Sandinista government. As the U.S. backed counterrevolutionary war escalated, labor became increasingly polarized into three main factions, defined by their degree of support for the revolutionary process. The largest faction included the pro-FSLN CST and ATC. The CST and ATC often pressed for specific policy changes, but their wage demands were often moderated by their acceptance of the need to place top priority on defending the revolution against external attacks. The CGT-I (linked to the Nicaraguan Socialist Party) was more critical of austerity measures but still generally fit in the “supportive” category.

A second faction was composed of right-wing unions. CTN and CUS were both members of the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Group* (Coordinadora Democrática Nicaragüense—CDN), a coalition formed in late 1981 which included the country’s main business associations and anti-Sandinista political parties on the right. CTN and CUS were strongly critical not only of the ban on strikes but also of the overall course of the revolutionary government. These two unions together represented only about 3 percent of organized labor in

Nicaragua in 1986, though they maintained a high international profile. For the Sandinistas, the close links between the right-wing internal opposition and the externally backed armed counterrevolutionary groups created some trade-offs between security and political pluralism. CTN and CUS accused the government of arbitrary harassment and detention of their members and of sowing divisions within opposition unions. The influential Federation of Health Workers* (Federación de Trabajadores de la Salud—FETSALUD) voted in 1980 to disaffiliate from CTN, choosing a new pro-Sandinista executive council. A center-left group within the CTN, aligned with the Popular Social Christian Party (Partido Popular Social Cristiano—PPSC), attempted to take control of the union in 1982, and the CTN subsequently split into two factions.

The ultraleft labor confederations, CAUS and FO, were more confrontational in their opposition to Sandinista government policy. Both rejected the idea of austerity or compromise with the bourgeoisie, and both defied the ban on strikes and land invasions. In practice, a number of strikes occurred during the 1981–84 suspension—led by unions of all three factions—and the usual government response was to send Labor Ministry mediators. The CAUS and FO strikes and land invasions, however, were distinguished by their violence and their unrealistic demands (e.g., CAUS demands for 100 percent wage increases, and FO calls for massive expropriation and banning the right-wing political parties).

Labor policy under the Sandinista government, in sharp contrast to pre-revolutionary policy, encouraged unionization and collective bargaining. The Ministry of Labor also adopted a much more active role in enforcing the provisions of the previously ineffective Labor Code. Worker protections were extended to include new occupational safety and health standards and inspections. Virgilio Godoy, the Minister of Labor in the first years of the Sandinista government, was a member of the Independent Liberal Party (PLI). Godoy stepped down in 1984 to run as a PLI candidate for president in the first national elections since the revolution, but withdrew his candidacy shortly before the election.

Efforts to unite the unions behind the Sandinista program were not entirely successful. A National Inter-Union Commission (Comisión Nacional Intersindical—CNI), formed in January 1980, was stalled within weeks by sharp disputes over wage policy which prompted the Communist-led CAUS to quit the Commission. The successor Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group* (Coordinadora Sindical de Nicaragua—CSN), formed in November 1981, failed to enlist the participation of the right-wing CUS and CTN. Despite these divisions, the support of urban and rural workers was an important element in the Sandinistas' solid victory (67 percent) in the 1984 elections.

While labor organization was encouraged under the Sandinistas, real money wages were not allowed to rise in the first five years of the revolutionary government. Instead, government policies stressed redistributive measures designed to improve the "social wage" of the working class. The government dramatically expanded popular access to such goods as education and literacy skills, health care, and housing. Agricultural credit policy, food subsidies, and other redis-

tributive instruments were designed to soften the austerity program imposed due to the extraordinary military and economic pressures facing the government. By the mid-1980s, however, it was clear that the wartime economy no longer permitted continued improvement of popular living standards.

Faced with growing wartime economic difficulties and accelerating inflation in 1983–84, the Sandinista government reevaluated wage and price policy. A National System for Organization of Labor and Salaries (Sistema Nacional de Organización del Trabajo y de Salarios—SNOTS) introduced standardized occupational categories, work norms, and salary levels, beginning in mid-1984. The suspension of the right to strike was lifted in July 1984. A major economic policy shift in 1985 combined substantial wage increases with elimination of price subsidies and the creation of centralized workers' commissaries in an effort to create incentives for the salaried work force and to squeeze commercial intermediaries. This policy reevaluation seemed designed to reaffirm the political base of support for the revolution among the popular sectors.

By mid-1985, inflation had eroded the purchasing power of wages to 50 percent of 1980 levels, and social spending was virtually frozen. Defense accounted for some 40 percent of government spending, fueling a growing fiscal deficit. The State of Emergency was reimposed in October 1985, and the U.S. Congress voted an open escalation of the war in 1986. In response, the Sandinista government stepped up reserve recruitment and began laying the groundwork for a long-term "economy of war." This included a major drive to increase worker productivity, as well as an expansion of agrarian reform and new incentives for rural small producers. As the U.S.-sponsored war intensified, the latter-day Sandinistas often echoed the observation of Augusto César Sandino, the Nicaraguan nationalist who organized popular resistance against U.S. Marine occupation in the 1920s and 1930s: "Only the workers and peasants will go all the way."

Bibliography

- Black, George. *Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua*. London: Zed Press, 1981.
- Centeno Zapata, Fernando. *Breve cronología de las luchas sociales en Nicaragua, 1523–1975*. Masatepe: Editorial Siglo XX, 1976.
- Deere, Carmen Diana and Peter Marchetti. "The Worker-Peasant Alliance in the First Year of the Nicaraguan Agrarian Reform." *Latin American Perspectives* 8, no. 2 (Spring 1981).
- Gould, Jeff. "Somoza and the Labor Movement, 1944–46." Paper presented at the Twelfth Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Albuquerque, N.M., 18–20 April 1985. Published in expanded form as "Amigos peligrosos, enemigos fatales: Un análisis de Somoza y el movimiento obrero nicaraguense, 1944–1948." *Revista de Historia*. Heredia, Costa Rica: Universidad Nacional Autónoma, 1985.
- Gutiérrez Mayorga, Gustavo. "El reformismo artesanal en el movimiento obrero nicaraguense (1931–1960)." *Revista de Pensamiento Centro-americano*, 1978.
- . "Historia del movimiento obrero de Nicaragua." In Pablo González Casanova,

ed., *Historia del movimiento obrero en América Latina*, Vol. 2. Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1985.

Instituto Histórico Centroamericano (IHCA). "Nicaragua's Labor Unions in the Face of Aggression." *Envío* (Managua), No. 35, May 1984. And "The Trade Union Movement in Nicaragua." *Envío*, Nos. 12 and 14, June and August 1982.

Pérez Bermúdez, Carlos and Onofre Guevara Lopez. *El movimiento obrero en Nicaragua*, Parts I and II. Managua: Editorial El Amanecer, 1985.

Vilas, Carlos M. *The Sandinista Revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986, Chs. 2 and 5.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

AMNLAE. *See* Nicaraguan Women's Association "Luisa Amanda Espinosa."

ANDEN. *See* National Association of Educators of Nicaragua.

ASOCIACIÓN DE MUJERES NICARAGÜENSES "LUISA AMANDA ESPINOSA." *See* Nicaraguan Women's Association "Luisa Amanda Espinosa."

ASOCIACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DEL CAMPO. *See* Association of Rural Workers.

ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE EDUCADORES DE NICARAGUA. *See* National Association of Educators of Nicaragua.

ASSOCIATION OF RURAL WORKERS (Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo—ATC).

The ATC has its origins in the Catholic Church activism which grew out of the 1968 Latin American Bishops' Conference in Medellín, Colombia, where religious workers were urged to involve themselves more actively with concerns of the poor. In 1969, Jesuits in Nicaragua organized the Evangelical Committee for Agrarian Promotion (CEPA) to train peasant leaders to set up self-help projects and make political demands. Lay religious workers known as Delegates of the Word began to organize study groups and spread the "theology of liberation," the new progressive current in the Latin American Catholic Church. Peasant demonstrations and land seizures met harsh repression by the National Guard of the Somoza dictatorship, which had the effect of radicalizing the peasantry and strengthening the ties between the religious movement and the guerrilla forces of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). The FSLN began organizing Committees of Agricultural Workers (CTC) in 1976, in cooperation with Delegates of the Word. Following a successful strike at the huge San Antonio sugar plantation, these Committees were joined together at the national level on 25 July 1978 to form the ATC.

The ATC was active in rural organizing for the insurrection which overthrew

the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle (1967–79). Following the Sandinista revolutionary victory in 1979, the ATC pressed the new government for effective agrarian reform measures. When the courts began to return some lands confiscated from Somoza supporters, ATC staged a demonstration of over 30,000 rural workers in Managua on 17 February 1980, demanding that “not one inch of land be returned.” The government responded by validating the confiscations and paying compensation to those owners who could not be proven to be Somoza associates. A more comprehensive agrarian reform law was passed on 19 July 1981, and the ATC participated in identifying lands to be redistributed and organizing cooperatives among the new owners.

The ATC encompassed rural workers as well as small and medium agricultural producers, until the latter formed a separate organization, the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos—UNAG), in 1981. ATC has enjoyed a virtual monopoly on rural labor organizing since the revolution, except for banana plantation workers (where the Confederation of Union Unification has a traditional base) and some agro-industrial workers allied with the Nicaraguan Workers Confederation* and the Workers’ Front.* With an estimated 40,000 members by the end of 1983, ATC was the second largest union in post-revolutionary Nicaragua, surpassed only by the Sandinista Workers’ Central.*

The ATC has been strongly supportive of the Sandinista government, functioning not only in a variety of other activities, including political education, defense, and enforcement of price controls. The ATC’s newspaper, *Machete*, was the first publication of a Sandinista mass organization.

ATC has no international affiliations. It participates in the Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group,* formed in November 1981 to coordinate labor support for the revolutionary government.

ATC. *See* Association of Rural Workers.

BLUE SHIRTS (Camisas Azules).

Formed in July 1934, the Blue Shirts constituted a fascist organization modeled after Mussolini’s Black Shirts. Although organized by the youth of conservative landowning and bourgeois families, the Blue Shirts movement attracted some working-class following by evoking imagery of a national revival based on a corporatist reordering of society, in which artisans and peasants would live in harmony with intellectuals and landowners. Its leaders included the prominent writers Pablo Antonio Cuadra and José Coronel Urtecho.

The Blue Shirts were promoters of Anastasio Somoza García, the Nicaraguan strongman who was installed by the United States as National Guard Commander in 1927 and seized power in a 1936 coup. The group published a magazine, *Cuadernos de San Lucas*, and a newspaper, *Diario Nicaragüense*. The Blue Shirts engaged in journalistic jousting and street fighting with activists of the Nicaraguan Workers’ Party (Partido Trabajador Nicaragüense—PTN) in the mid-

1930s. Fascist groups enjoyed some protection and encouragement from Somoza until the United States entered World War II on the side of the Allies, prompting Somoza to convert to the anti-fascist cause.

BRIGADA SIMÓN BOLÍVAR. *See* Simón Bolívar Brigade.

CAMISAS AZULES. *See* Blue Shirts.

CAUS. *See* Union Action and Unity Central.

CDN. *See* Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Group "Ramiro Sacasa Guerrero."

CDTS. *See* Sandinista Workers' Defense Committees.

CENTRAL DE ACCIÓN Y UNIDAD SINDICAL. *See* Union Action and Unity Central.

CENTRAL SANDINISTA DE TRABAJADORES "JOSÉ BENITO ESCOBAR." *See* Sandinista Workers' Central "José Benito Escobar."

CGT. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

CGT-I. *See* General Confederation of Workers-Independent.

CLT. *See* Workers' Struggle Committees.

CNI. *See* National Inter-Union Commission.

COMISIÓN NACIONAL INTERSINDICAL. *See* National Inter-Union Commission.

COMITÉ DE LUCHA DE LOS TRABAJADORES. *See* Workers' Struggle Committees.

COMITÉ DE TRABAJADORES DEL CAMPO. *See* Rural Workers' Committees.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE NICARAGUA. *See* Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE NICARAGUA-AUTÓNOMA. *See* Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE UNIFICACIÓN SINDICAL. *See* Confederation of Union Unification.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES-INDEPENDIENTE. *See* General Confederation of Workers-Independent.

CONFEDERATION OF UNION UNIFICATION (Confederación de Unificación Sindical—CUS).

The Confederation of Union Unification had its origins in unions organized in the mid-1960s with assistance from the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), an arm of the AFL-CIO which provides training and assistance for anti-communist labor organizing in Latin America. The AIFLD-inspired movement, initially known as the Council of Union Unity (Consejo de Unidad Sindical), claimed twenty-four unions in 1970 when the Council decided to change its name to the Confederation of Union Unification. The renamed confederation was officially constituted on 6 April 1972.

CUS remained distant from the anti-Somoza (dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle) movement in the 1970s, insisting on its "apolitical" status; it had been the least combative labor federation under the Somoza dictatorship. After Somoza crushed an active dockworkers movement in the early 1960s, CUS moved in to organize dockers and also banana plantation workers, but CUS quickly lost ground after the revolution. CUS maintains a strongly anti-communist ideology and has also adopted an antagonistic stance toward the Sandinista government since 1979.

CUS claims to be independent of political parties, but in fact is tied to the right-wing Social Democratic Party (PSD), many of whose leaders left Nicaragua to join the counterrevolutionary forces in Costa Rica in 1982. CUS was present at the Founding Congress of the Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group* but withdrew shortly afterward. Internationally, it is affiliated with the Central American Workers Confederation (CTCA), the Inter-American Regional Organization of Labor (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). CUS is a member, along with the Nicaraguan Workers Confederation and a number of right-wing business groups and political parties, of the anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Group "Ramiro Sacasa Guerrero."*

CONSEJO DE UNIDAD SINDICAL (Council of Union Unity). *See* Confederation of Union Unification.

COORDINADORA DEMOCRÁTICA NICARAGÜENSE "RAMIRO SACASA GUERRERO." *See* Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Group "Ramiro Sacasa Guerrero."

COORDINADORA SINDICAL DE NICARAGUA. *See* Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group.

COUNCIL OF UNION UNITY. *See* Confederation of Union Unification.

CSN. *See* Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group.

CST. *See* Sandinista Workers' Central "José Benito Escobar."

CTC. *See* Rural Workers' Committees. *See also* Association of Rural Workers.

CTN. *See* Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation.

CTN-A. *See* Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation.

CUS. *See* Confederation of Union Unification.

FASCISTS. *See* Blue Shirts.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA SALUD. *See* Federation of Health Workers.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE MANAGUA. *See* Managua Workers' Federation.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA NICARAGÜENSE. *See* Nicaraguan Labor Federation.

FEDERATION OF HEALTH WORKERS (Federación de Trabajadores de la Salud—FETSALUD).

Founded in 1975, the health workers' union participated in the anti-Somoza (dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle) movement. The union became increasingly pro-Sandinista (Sandinista National Liberation Front), leading it to disaffiliate from the Nicaraguan Workers Confederation* on 2 March 1980 and form a new national executive council, most of whose members were Sandinistas. FETSALUD joined the Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group,* formed in November 1981, and has been supportive of the Sandinista government.

FETSALUD. *See* Federation of Health Workers.

FO. *See* Workers' Front.

FOL. *See* Liberal Workers' Front.

FON. *See* Nicaraguan Labor Federation.

FRENTE OBRERO. *See* Workers' Front.

FRENTE OBRERO LIBERAL. *See* Liberal Workers' Front.

FTM. *See* Managua Workers' Federation.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederación General de Trabajadores—CGT).

The CGT was founded in 1949 as part of a Somoza (Anastasio Somoza García, 1936–56) government effort to promote anti-communist, pro-government labor organizing to undercut the influence of unions linked to the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN). The Socialists nevertheless attempted to work within the CGT until they were expelled in 1951. The CGT was closely tied to Somoza's Nationalist Liberal Party (PLN) and was affiliated with the Peronist International. The CGT was eclipsed by the dissident General Confederation of Workers—Independent* (CGT-I), organized by PSN activists, which split off from the CGT in 1960 and elected its own leadership in 1963; and by other unions not infiltrated by Somoza agents that emerged in the 1960s, in the aftermath of the 1950s cotton boom and 1960s industrialization. The CGT disappeared completely when the Somoza dictatorship was overthrown by the Sandinista Revolution in 1979.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS—INDEPENDENT (Confederación General de Trabajadores—Independiente—CGT-I).

The CGT-I was founded in the early 1960s by labor activists of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), repressed since 1947 by the Somoza dictatorship (Anastasio Somoza García, 1936–56; Luis Somoza Debayle, 1956–67; Anastasio Somoza Debayle, 1967–79). These PSN organizers led a group which split from the Somoza-controlled General Confederation of Workers* (CGT) at the CGT's Seventh Congress in 1960. The dissidents formed the CGT-I and elected a separate leadership in 1963, headed by Domingo Vargas. The Managua Workers' Federation* (FTM), which by the early 1960s was controlled by PSN militants, formed the nucleus of the CGT-I.

The CGT-I's principal strength is in the textile and construction industries. Among its largest affiliates is the construction workers' union (the Union of Carpenters, Bricklayers, Assembly Workers, and Allied Trades*—SCAAS). SCAAS, formed in 1951, is one of the country's largest and most militant unions; it became particularly influential after the 1972 earthquake and 1973 construction workers' strike in Managua.

The CGT-I's sponsoring political party, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), split in 1967, with the smaller faction forming the Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCN). PCN claimed allegiance to the Moscow line, though the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union kept its relations with the PSN. The PCN organized its own union, the Union Action and Unity Central,* in 1976.

The leadership of CGT-I was divided over the appropriate response to Sandinista National Liberation Front guerrilla organizing in the 1960s and 1970s. A major faction of the PSN/CGT-I decided to cooperate with the Sandinistas, joining the Sandinista-led United People's Movement* (MPU) and participating in labor agitation to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship. Following the 1979 Sandinista victory, CGT-I adopted a position critical of austerity measures but generally supportive of the government. CGT-I joined the Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group* (CSN), promoted by the Sandinista Workers' Central.* See General Confederation of Workers.

“JOSÉ BENITO ESCOBAR” SANDINISTA WORKERS' CENTRAL. *See* Sandinista Workers' Central “Jose Benito Escobar”—CST.

LIBERAL WORKERS' FRONT (Frente Obrero Liberal—FOL).

The Liberal Workers' Front was a pro-Somoza labor organization formed in the 1930s. After seizing power in a 1936 coup, Anastasio Somoza García subsequently managed to co-opt leaders of the established labor movement.

“LUISA AMANDA ESPINOSA” NICARAGUAN WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION. *See* Nicaraguan Women's Association “Luisa Amanda Espinosa”—AMNLAE.

MANAGUA WORKERS' FEDERATION (Federación de Trabajadores de Managua—FTM).

The Managua Workers' Federation was formed in August 1944, in a period of rapid growth of the Nicaraguan labor movement. It represented thirty-five trade unions, including important unions of construction workers, teachers, and shoemakers. Many of the FTM's leaders were members of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), and the FTM suffered from the severe repression of Socialist labor organizers by the Somoza (Anastasio Somoza García, 1936–56) dictatorship in 1947–48. Nevertheless, the FTM survived and functioned as a competitor to the Somoza-dominated General Confederation of Workers* (CGT) throughout the 1950s. In the early 1960s, the FTM membership was largely incorporated into the General Confederation of Workers–Independent,* a PSN-led breakaway from the CGT.

MILICIAS POPULARES ANTI-SOMOCISTAS. *See* Popular Anti-Somoza Militia.

MILPAS. *See* Popular Anti-Somoza Militia.

MOSAN. *See* Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation.

MOVIMIENTO PUEBLO UNIDO. *See* United People's Movement.

MOVIMIENTO SINDICAL AUTÓNOMO DE NICARAGUA. *See* Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation.

MOVIMIENTO SINDICAL PUEBLO TRABAJADOR. *See* Working People's Union Movement.

MPU. *See* United People's Movement.

MSPT. *See* Working People's Union Movement.

NACIONAL SINDICALISMO NICARAGÜENSE. *See* Nicaraguan National-Syndicalism.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS OF NICARAGUA (Asociación Nacional de Educadores de Nicaragua—ANDEN).

The teachers union, which is independent of any union federation, participated along with other middle-class unions in the growing anti-Somoza (Anastasio Somoza DeBayle, 1967–79) movement of the 1970s. ANDEN maintained a pro-Sandinista Liberation Front orientation after the Sandinista victory over the Somoza dictatorship in July 1979.

NATIONAL INTER-UNION COMMISSION (Comisión Nacional Intersindical—CNI).

The CNI was set up on 28 January 1980 as a forum for discussion among labor confederations, with the goal of promoting unity. It was created six months after the Sandinista victory over the Somoza dictatorship, in a period of sharp dispute between the Sandinista Workers' Central "José Benito Escobar"* (CST), Workers' Front* (CST), and Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation* over wage increases. Its original members included CST, General Confederation of Workers—Independent* and Union Action and Unity Central* (CAUS); the Association of Rural Workers* joined in May 1980. Three weeks after the formation of the CNI, CAUS struck eighteen Managua factories with demands of 100 percent wage increases. CAUS eventually backed down, but the dialogue stalled as labor discord continued in 1980–81. *See* Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group.

NATIONAL UNION OF FARMERS AND RANCHERS (Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos—UNAG). *See* Association of Rural Workers—ATC.

NATIONAL UNION OF WHITE-COLLAR EMPLOYEES (Union Nacional de Empleados—UNE).

A small independent union, UNE emerged in the 1970s and joined other middle-class unions participating in the anti-Somoza (dictator Anastasio Somoza

Debayle, 1967–79) movement. After the 1972 Managua earthquake, a special reconstruction tax on public employees' pay aroused union protest. Following Somoza's declaration of martial law in 1974, repression of union leaders radicalized even the middle-class unions. In 1978 UNE joined the United People's Movement* coalition, led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front. Following the Sandinista victory, UNE joined the Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group* organized in November 1981 to promote labor unity.

NICARAGUAN AUTONOMOUS UNION MOVEMENT—MOSAN. *See* Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation.

NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC COORDINATING GROUP "RAMIRO SACA GUERRERO" (Coordinadora Democrática Nicaragüense "Ramiro Sacasa Guerrero"—CDN).

The CDN is an umbrella grouping of right-wing anti-Sandinista political parties, business organizations, and trade unions, formed in late 1981 to coordinate opposition activities. Two unions belong, the Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation* and Confederation of Union Unification.* The CDN selected an opposition candidate for president in the November 1984 elections, former junta member and international banker Arturo Cruz, but subsequently decided to boycott the election, failing to register their candidate with the Supreme Electoral Council. The participation of labor confederations with the right-wing CDN helped expand the CDN's audience in centrist West European circles.

NICARAGUAN LABOR COORDINATING GROUP (Coordinadora Sindical de Nicaragua—CSN).

Founded in November 1981 under impetus from the Sandinista Workers' Central,* with the objective of promoting labor harmony, the Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group succeeded the National Inter-Union Commission.* Member confederations and independent unions include the Association of Rural Workers*; Sandinista Workers' Central "José Benito Escobar"*; General Confederation of Workers–Independent*; Union Action and Unity Central*; National Association of Educators of Nicaragua*; Federation of Health Workers*; Workers' Front*; Union of Nicaraguan Journalists*; National Union of White-Collar Employees.* The Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation* refused to join; the Confederation of Union Unification* participated initially but soon quit.

The CSN sought to define a coordinated labor strategy in the context of the special economic and military problems facing the revolutionary government (in particular, the U.S. destabilization campaign). The CSN program explicitly recognized the need to avoid disrupting production and to adjust wage demands downward in accordance with the exigencies of economic reconstruction. CSN activities included campaigns to increase worker participation in the Sandinista Popular Militia and voluntary labor projects, combat "bureaucratism," improve

health and safety conditions in the workplace, and reform the Somoza-era Labor Code.

NICARAGUAN LABOR FEDERATION (Federación Obrera Nicaragüense—FON).

Founded in 1923, the Nicaraguan Labor Federation represented a current of reformist syndicalism which recruited among artisans and the salaried work force that was beginning to appear in large manufacturing workshops. Unlike the Organized Workers' Movement of Nicaragua,* FON attempted to organize on a national scale. FON was influenced by Samuel Gompers' American Federation of Labor and by the Partido Laborista Mexicano (the workers' arm of what was to become the official party of Mexico).

FON was influenced by a mixture of Pan-American and nationalist ideological tendencies. The organization divided over the issue of whether to support the armed struggle of nationalist General Augusto César Sandino against occupying U.S. Marine forces (1927–33), and faded into oblivion in the 1930s.

NICARAGUAN NATIONAL-SYNDICALISM (Nacional Sindicalismo Nicaragüense).

Organized on 8 May 1934 under the direction of Ramón Rostrán Bengoechea, Nicaraguan National-Syndicalism never attracted much of a following. Despite its name, Nicaraguan National-Syndicalism was not a fascist organization. The group was based on a model of "apolitical" syndicates organized within individual enterprises and was less successful than its contemporary, the Nicaraguan Workers' Party (Partido Trabajador Nicaragüense—PTN), which organized unions by craft. It was defunct by 1937.

NICARAGUAN PATRIOTIC UNION (Unión Patriótica Nicaragüense—UPN).

The Nicaraguan Patriotic Union was organized in 1930 by a group of workers and students. Of nationalist orientation, the organization published a weekly newspaper, *Patria*, and organized civic action to denounce the U.S. Marine occupation of the country. The Nicaraguan Patriotic Union organized a demonstration of more than 10,000 people in Managua in 1930 to protest against the U.S. presence and the puppet government of José María Moncada. The group disbanded when the U.S. Marines withdrew from Nicaragua in 1933.

NICARAGUAN WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION "LUISA AMANDA ESPINOSA" (Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses "Luisa Amanda Espinosa"—AMNLAE).

The Nicaraguan Women's Association has its origins in the 1970s protest movement against the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle (1967–79). AMNLAE's forerunner was the Association of Women Confronting the National Problem (Asociación de Mujeres ante la Problemática Nacional—AMPRONAC), an organization formed primarily by middle-class women in September 1977.

AMPRONAC's activities centered around protesting government repression and demanding release of political prisoners. AMPRONAC gradually became radicalized, joining the United People's Movement* in the summer of 1978 and attracting a broader following. By the time of the Sandinista victory over the Somoza dictatorship in July 1979, the organization had 8,000–10,000 members. Women played a major role in the revolutionary struggle and occupied leading positions in the Sandinista National Liberation Front.

After the Sandinista victory, the organization changed its name to honor the first female Sandinista to fall in combat. Although not specifically constituted as a labor union, AMNLAE functions like a national union on issues involving domestic labor and the status of women in the household and workplace. AMNLAE has successfully pressed for the formation of women's production collectives, as well as day-care centers (Centros de Desarrollo Infantil—CDI) to allow equal opportunities for integration into the work force. AMNLAE won changes in child-support and divorce laws; improved working conditions for domestic employees; and a ban on advertising which promotes the image of women as sex objects. AMNLAE also lobbied with less success in the early 1980s for full integration of women into the military.

The membership of AMNLAE expanded from 17,000 in April 1980 to 25,000 in October 1981 and to about 80,000 in November 1984. The organization publishes a magazine, *We Are (Somos)*.

NICARAGUAN WORKERS' CONFEDERATION (Confederación de Trabajadores de Nicaragua—CTN).

The CTN was founded on 6 September 1972. (An organization by the same name operated in the late 1940s.) The CTN had its origins in the Christian Democratic-inspired Nicaraguan Autonomous Union Movement (Movimiento Sindical Autónomo de Nicaragua—MOSAN), formed in 1962 during a period of increasing non-*somocista* (elements not allied to dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle, 1967–79) union activity among the growing urban middle class and proletariat. The CTN participated in work stoppages in the 1970s as a part of the movement to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship.

Although the CTN claims to be independent of any political groups, in fact it is strongly linked to the right-wing Social Christian Party (PSC). Internationally, it is affiliated with the Central American Confederation of Labor (Confederación Centro Americana de Trabajo—CCT), the Confederation of Latin American Labor (Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores—CLAT), and the World Confederation of Labor (WCL).

The CTN is probably the largest anti-Sandinista (the government formed by the victorious Sandinista National Liberation Front—FSLN) union in Nicaragua. Since the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the CTN has clashed with the Sandinista government over wage restraint and the ban on strikes and has filed complaints with human rights organizations alleging government harassment and arbitrary detention of its leaders. Its largest affiliate, the Federation

of Health Workers* (representing more than 8,000 health workers), broke away on 2 March 1980, electing a new pro-FSLN executive council. The CTN split into two factions in 1982—one led by Carlos Huembes which remained linked to the right-wing Social Christian Party, and the other led by Antonio Jarquín and associated with the center-left Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC). The Jarquín faction added the word “Autonomous” to its name (Confederación de Trabajadores de Nicaragua—Autónoma—CTN-A).

The CTN did not participate in the Sandinista-led Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group* (CSN), formed in 1981. The CTN, along with the Confederation of Union Unification,* joined the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Group “Ramiro Sacasa Guerrero”* (CDN), which consists of the country’s major anti-Sandinista political parties, business organizations, and right-wing unions. After the 1982 split in the CTN, the Huembes faction retained its membership in the CDN.

NSN. *See* Nicaraguan National–Syndicalism.

OBRERISMO ORGANIZADO DE NICARAGUA. *See* Organized Workers’ Movement of Nicaragua.

OO. *See* Organized Workers’ Movement of Nicaragua.

ORGANIZED WORKERS’ MOVEMENT OF NICARAGUA (Obrerismo Organizado de Nicaragua—OO).

The Organized Workers’ Movement of Nicaragua had its origins in a study circle of workers, artisans, and intellectuals organized in 1921 by the Liberal historian Sofonías Salvatierra. The organization was formally constituted on 15 March 1923, with stated objectives of promoting “Work, Education, and Savings” among workers. OO attempted to run its founder, Salvatierra, for mayor of Managua in 1929. To forestall this effort, the Moncada government (which had been installed with U.S. blessing) changed Managua into a National District headed by a government minister rather than an elected mayor.

The Organized Workers’ Movement remained closely linked to Liberal ideology, and the organization was badly shaken by the 1936 coup in which Anastasio Somoza García ousted Liberal President Juan Batista Sacasa. By the late 1940s, what was left of OO had been co-opted by the Somoza regime.

POPULAR ANTI-SOMOZA MILITIA (Milicias Populares Anti-Somocistas—MILPAS).

MILPAS represented the armed wing of the ultraleft Workers’ Front* (FO). These militia units continued to operate somewhat clandestinely after the July 1979 Sandinista (Sandinista National Liberation Front—FSLN) victory. They were called in by the FO to enforce a strike at the San Antonio sugar plantation

in January 1980. The MILPAS forces were broken up by the FSLN shortly thereafter. See FO.

“RAMIRO SACASA GUERRERO” NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC COORDINATING GROUP. *See* Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Group “Ramiro Sacasa Guerrero.”

RURAL WORKERS’ COMMITTEES (Comités de Trabajadores del Campo—CTC).

Beginning in 1976, Sandinistas and religious workers influenced by liberation theology began organizing Rural Workers’ Committees. After a long struggle to organize workers at the huge San Antonio sugar plantation and mills, these committees called a successful strike at San Antonio, which led to the formation of a national confederation of rural workers in 1978. See Association of Rural Workers.

SANDINISTA WORKERS’ CENTRAL “JOSÉ BENITO ESCOBAR” (Central Sandinista de Trabajadores “José Benito Escobar”—CST).

The CST was founded in 26 July 1979, just after the Sandinista (Sandinista National Liberation Front—FSLN) victory over the Somoza (Anastasio Somoza Debayle, 1967–79) dictatorship. Its origins lie in the Workers’ Struggle Committees* organized by the FSLN during the revolutionary struggle. The CST is named after a construction worker and member of the FSLN national leadership assassinated by the dictatorship in July 1978. The CST is the largest labor confederation in post-revolutionary Nicaragua. It is organized nationally into twelve departments, with over 500 member unions and over 100,000 members by 1984. In the first year after the Sandinista victory, 79 percent of industrial unions affiliated with CST, compared to 9 percent with the Nicaraguan Workers Confederation,* 5 percent with the General Confederation of Workers—Independent,* and 4 percent with the Confederation of Union Unification.*

The CST generally supported the Sandinista government and recognized the need for austerity measures, although a CST strike at the state-owned plywood factory in October 1980 caused problems for the government. Some CST affiliates also staged factory takeovers in 1980–81, pressuring the government to pass stricter laws against decapitalization by private owners.

The strength of the CST is primarily in the industrial sector, which was hard hit by the foreign exchange shortage after 1981. A number of industrial firms were forced to close for lack of spare parts or inputs. The foreign exchange shortage was aggravated by the U.S. financial blockade, declining terms of trade, problems in the Central American Common Market, attacks by counterrevolutionary groups in the north which disrupted coffee production, and disinvestment by the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie which continued to control important sources of foreign exchange earnings after the revolution.

The CST is affiliated regionally with the Confederation of Union Unity of

Central America and Panama (Confederación de Unidad Sindical de Centro América—CUSCA); hemispherically with the Permanent Congress of Unified Unions of Latin American Workers (Congreso Permanente de los Trabajadores de América Latina—CEPUSTAL); and internationally with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). It is a promoting member of the Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group,* which works to unite labor organizations behind the programs of the revolutionary government.

SANDINISTA WORKERS' DEFENSE COMMITTEES (Comités de Defensa de Trabajadores Sandinistas—CDTS).

The Sandinista-organized Workers' Struggle Committees* and other workers' groups that participated in the revolutionary struggle joined together in July 1979 to form the CDTS. These committees, organized at the national level, became the Sandinista Workers' Central,* the largest union in post-revolutionary Nicaragua.

SCAAS. *See* Union of Carpenters, Bricklayers, Assembly Workers, and Allied Trades.

SIMÓN BOLÍVAR BRIGADE (Brigada Simón Bolívar).

The Brigade was not exactly a union, but rather a Latin American International Brigade which fought in the revolutionary struggle to defeat the Somoza (Anastasio Somoza Debayle, 1967–79) dictatorship. The Brigade was organized by the Colombian Socialist Workers' Party (PST). After the Sandinista (Sandinista National Liberation Front) victory, members of the Brigade called for an immediate transition to socialism, and they began organizing strikes and land seizures by Nicaraguan workers and peasants. These labor activities led to a confrontation with the Sandinista government in August 1979, after which members of the Brigade were deported to Panama. Ultraleft Nicaraguan unions subsequently entered into similar confrontations with the Sandinista government. *See* FO and CAUS.

SINDICATO DE CARPINTEROS, ALBAÑILES, ARMADORES, Y SIMILARES. *See* Union of Carpenters, Bricklayers, Assembly Workers, and Allied Trades.

UNE. *See* National Union of White-Collar Employees.

UNION ACTION AND UNITY CENTRAL (Central de Acción y Unidad Sindical—CAUS).

CAUS had its origins in the Action and Labor Union Committee, formed in 1973 by the Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCN). The Committee was reorganized into a confederation in 1976 and began to organize unions.

The PCN split with the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) in 1967, with the

former opposing cooperation with the guerrilla “adventurism” of the Sandinistas’ (Sandinista National Liberation Front-FLSN). The PCN later decided to cooperate with the FLSN-led armed struggle, with CAUS joining the United People’s Movement,* the anti-Somoza alliance led by the FSLN.

CAUS has no international affiliations, though the union claims to maintain friendly relations with other revolutionary trade union movements. The PCN is ideologically oriented toward Moscow, although the Soviet Union has preferred to maintain relations with the PSN and its labor confederation, the General Confederation of Workers—Independent.*

The PCN and CAUS are part of the left opposition to the Sandinista government. The union’s main strength is in the textile industry. CAUS clashed with the government over austerity measures, the 1981–84 ban on strikes, and the June 1985 elimination of “payment in kind,” which had become a tradition in the textile-clothing industry. Illegal work stoppages by CAUS unions demanding 100 percent wage increases led to the arrest of PCN leader Eli Altamirano (around whom something of a cult of personality had been built) and other CAUS activists in late 1981. CAUS joined the Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group,* organized by the Sandinistas in 1981 to promote labor unity.

UNIÓN DE PERIODISTAS NICARAGÜENSES. *See* Union of Nicaraguan Journalists.

UNIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Nicaraguan Socialist Party—PSN.

UNIÓN NACIONAL DE AGRICULTORES Y GANADEROS (National Union of Farmers and Ranchers). *See* Association of Rural Workers—ATC.

UNIÓN NACIONAL DE EMPLEADOS. *See* National Union of White-Collar Employees.

UNION OF CARPENTERS, BRICKLAYERS, ASSEMBLY WORKERS, AND ALLIED TRADES (Sindicato de Carpinteros, Albañiles, Armadores, y Similares—SCAAS).

Founded in 1951, SCAAS grew out of 1940s organizing in the construction industry by the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN). SCAAS was affiliated first with the Managua Workers’ Federation* and later with the General Confederation of Workers—Independent* (CGT-I) constituted in 1963. The union gained influence after the 1972 Managua earthquake and 1973 construction workers’ strike. It participated in the anti-Somoza (Anastasio Somoza Debayle, dictator, 1967–79) movement.

SCAAS divided into two factions after the 1979 Sandinista (Sandinista National Liberation Front) revolutionary victory: a smaller group wanted to affiliate with the Sandinista Workers’ Central* (CST), while a majority remained loyal

to the CGT-I. Following a dispute in 1980 involving reduced working hours and wages at the Luis Alfonso Velazquez Park construction project, the Sandinista government called mass assemblies of SCAAS workers to explain the government's austerity policies. In January 1980 elections for the SCAAS executive committee, a joint list of CGT-I and CST candidates was voted in.

UNION OF NICARAGUAN JOURNALISTS (Union de Periodistas Nicaragüenses—UPN).

A small independent union, the UPN joined other middle-class unions participating in the anti-Somoza (Anastasio Somoza Debayle, dictator 1967–79) movement of the 1970s. Following the 1979 Sandinista (Sandinista National Liberation Front) victory, the UPN joined the Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group* (CSN), organized in November 1981 to promote labor unity in support of the revolutionary government.

UNIÓN PATRIÓTICA NICARAGÜENSE. *See* Nicaraguan Patriotic Union.

UNITED PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT (Movimiento Pueblo Unido—MPU).

The MPU was a broad-based coalition of political parties, unions, mass organizations, and other groups participating in the movement to overthrow the Somoza (Anastasio Somoza Debayle, 1967–79) dictatorship. It was organized in July 1978 by the Sandinista National Liberation Front to expand the Sandinistas' political base. Participating unions included the General Confederation of Workers–Independent,* Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation,* Union Action and Unity Central,* National Union of White-Collar Employees,* and National Association of Educators of Nicaragua.*

UPN. *See* Union of Nicaraguan Journalists; Nicaraguan Patriotic Union.

WORKERS' FRONT (Frente Obrero—FO).

The FO was founded in 1974 by the Popular Action Movement/Marxist-Leninist (MAP-ML), a small Maoist-leaning group expelled from the (Sandino National Liberation Front—FSLN) in the early 1970s. MAP-ML participated in anti-Somoza (Anastasio Somoza Debayle, 1967–79) activities in the 1970s, including agitation by its affiliated student movement, the Committees of University Student Struggle (CLEUS). During the mid-1970s, when the FSLN split between three tendencies divided by ideological orientation and opposition strategy (Proletarian Tendency, Prolonged Popular War Tendency, and Insurrectional Tendency), MAP-ML and the FO claimed to represent a fourth tendency called the "Authentic FSLN."

FO printed its own newspaper, *The People (El Pueblo)*, and organized its own armed wing, the Popular Anti-Somoza Militia* (MILPAS), which it refused to disband after the Sandinista victory. FO rejected Sandinista calls for worker discipline and austerity, organizing violent strikes at the Monterrosa and San

Antonio sugar mills in 1980, where they had developed a significant base of support since the mid-1970s. (San Antonio, privately owned, is the largest sugar operation in Central America.) FO activities declined after the Sandinista government closed down *El Pueblo* and seized MILPAS arms caches in 1980.

WORKERS' STRUGGLE COMMITTEES (Comités de Lucha de los Trabajadores—CLT).

Organized in the late 1970s by pro-Sandinista (Sandinista National Liberation Front) labor activists, these committees were important parts of the United People's Movement* (CST) coalition working to overthrow the Somoza (Anastasio Somoza Debayle, 1967–79) dictatorship. The CLT and other pro-Sandinista labor groups were reconstituted as the Sandinista Workers' Central* (CST) following the Sandinista victory in July 1979. The CST is the largest labor confederation in post-revolutionary Nicaragua.

WORKING PEOPLE'S UNION MOVEMENT (Movimiento Sindical Pueblo Trabajador—MSPT).

Like the Workers' Struggle Committees,* the MSPT was organized clandestinely in the late 1970s, joining the United People's Movement* coalition led by the Sandinistas (Sandinista National Liberation Front) and participating in the revolutionary struggle. After the Sandinistas came to power in July 1979, the MSPT merged into the new Sandinista confederation of urban workers, the Sandinista Workers' Central.*

Panama

SHARON PHILLIPPS

Located at the lower tip of the Central American Isthmus, Panama has a unique geographical configuration and location, which make it a natural passageway between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. In colonial times, the transit area became the nerve center of the territory that later would be known as the Republic of Panama, while the rest of the country was to lie dormant well into the twentieth century. Panama gained its independence from Spain in 1821 and joined Colombia as a province. Although to Colombia Panama was just a backward and remote territory accessible only by sea, its importance to countries engaged in mercantile endeavors became increasingly obvious. Soon such powers as Great Britain, France, and the United States began vying for the right to build a canal through Panama.

In 1851 a group of New York businessmen financed the construction of a 48-mile railroad across the isthmus. About 7,000 laborers were imported from Europe and Asia for this project. The Trans-Isthmian railroad was the first of three large construction projects undertaken in Panama during the second half of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century for which massive numbers of workers were imported. The second such project was the attempt by Ferdinand de Lesseps and the French Canal Company to build a sea-level canal. This project was started in 1878 and by the time the French gave up in failure, over 100,000 workers had been imported from Europe and the Caribbean. In 1885 alone, more than 12,000 workers were brought in, 9,000 from Jamaica.

After the French Canal Company failed, the United States backed Panama in its effort to gain independence from Colombia, with the assurance of the right to continue the canal construction. The American project, changed in design to a lock canal, took ten years to finish and began operation in 1914. Over 40,000

workers were imported for that project, more than 70 percent from the Caribbean, mainly from Barbados and Jamaica.

The importation of large numbers of laborers and the primacy of the transit area determined the development of Panama's working class and of the societal cleavages that later prevented the rise of a strong labor movement. The emerging work force was split between an indigenous laboring class, racially dark but Spanish-speaking, that shared the Latin heritage and Catholicism of the upper class; and imported Caribbean blacks, English-speaking, Protestant, and made up of former British subjects raised under an Anglo-Saxon value system.

The continued primacy of the transit area has meant that Panama has developed a very strong service sector that caters to the Canal and other transit activities, and has created two large urban agglomerations at either end of the Canal at the expense of the rest of the country. Most of the country's economic activities are based in the cities of Panama and Colon and before the Torrijos government (1968-81), the central government gave very little attention to other areas.

Before the second decade of this century, the only issues raised or incidents related to labor took place in the transit area, and were linked to the foreign labor contingent. The most serious of these was a strike that took place in February 1920 and involved over 17,000 Canal laborers, almost the entire work force. The strike was called by the United Brotherhood of Maintenance Way,* with demands for better salaries and for improved status of workers regarding housing privileges and other benefits. This strike was the first within the Canal Zone in which the government of Panama openly intervened, first by trying to mediate, and then by outright demanding that the U.S. authorities keep the strikers out of Panama. The deportation of 2,000 blacks by the Panama Canal Company was a warning signal to the Canal work force of the precariousness of their situation. They had no legal status in Panama, and all privileges they received—housing, schools, medical attention, and far better pay than in Panama—came from the U.S.-controlled Panama Canal Company and was contingent on their continuous acquiescence to their employer's terms of employment.

At that time labor organizations found in the Republic of Panama were mostly guilds and mutualist societies of a highly incipient nature. One of the most progressive was the Society Sons of Labor (*Sociedad Hijos del Trabajo*), made up of workers and professionals. It claimed to be apolitical and concerned mainly with the conditions of the workingman. Several anarcho-syndicalists who had arrived in Panama during the previous years were prominent members. This society was instrumental in founding the Workers Federation of the Republic of Panama* (*Federación Obrera de la República de Panamá*) in July 1921. The Workers Federation's aim was to give coherence and strength to existing labor groups and to fight for the rights of workers. Three years later, a group within the Federation's Communist Group (*Grupo Comunista*) split and founded the General Union of Workers* (*Sindicato General de Trabajadores—SGT*).

By 1926 the government had decided to curtail any activities in which labor groups were involved. For example, from 1926 to 1929 workers were not allowed

to parade on 1 May. In fact, the years from the early 1930s up to World War I constitute a "dead period," with virtually no labor activities.

The founding of the Workers Federation and the General Union of Workers set the parameters within which organized labor would evolve during the remainder of the century. The Workers Federation considered itself a democratic movement acting in a democratic society and seeking better economic and working conditions for its members. It received the approval of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and adhered to that organization's tenets. The leaders of the SGT were Marxists and socialists who saw organized labor from a different perspective. For them, there were inherent structural problems with the interaction of the economic and societal systems. This posed intense conflicts between the laboring class and the capitalist class for the attainment of even the most basic benefits for workers. Although in the wake of violent governmental repression the Workers Federation and the SGT seem to have merged in 1930 and shortly after dissolved, the organizations that emerged in the 1940s and 1950s maintained their predecessors' ideological perspectives and the concomitant cleavage within the labor movement.

How did the upper classes and the government react to organized labor? And why was organized labor even allowed to exist in a country seemingly so easy to control? The upper classes, who are Panama's capitalists, or commercial and industrial elite, have always been in control of the government except during the Torrijos years (1968–81). They have perceived organized labor as an evil that must be repressed and tightly controlled. The benefits that labor achieved throughout the century have come through struggle and tenacity. It would be very difficult to completely repress labor organizations in Panama, because of the openness of the country and the constant influx of new people and ideas. However, the strongest and best organized labor groups appeared in foreign companies and concerns—for example, the Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company* (SITRACHILCO), and Locals 900 and 907 representing Panamanian workers in the Panama Canal Company and the U.S. Army installations.

By the mid-1940s the labor movement experienced a resurgence, due in part to the effects of World War II, which prompted the development of Panama's industrial sector and caused some of the services to the Canal to expand very rapidly.

This reemergence of the labor movement was reflected in the formation of a number of very militant unions, organized largely through the efforts of the socialist and communist leaders who had begun their careers in the 1920s. These unions included the National Union of Workers of the Clothing Industry of Panama (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria de la Confección de Ropa y Anexos de Panamá), the Furniture Workers Union of Panama (Sindicato del Trabajadores del Mueble de Panamá), the Shoe Industry Workers Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria del Calzado y Similares), and the Typographers and Graphic Arts Workers Union* (Sindicato de Tipógrafos y Trabajadores de las Artes Gráficas).

In addition, in 1945, the Trade Union Federation of the Republic of Panama* (Federación Sindical de la República de Panamá) was formed by the unions mentioned above. This Federation subsequently played a major leadership role in the Panamanian labor movement and developed a style of action which permeated all labor activities for the next three decades. From its inception until 1960, this Federation or one of its member unions, was involved in most of the labor unrest experienced in Panama: primarily two large strikes, and two general movements to protest cost of living increases and low wages. An outcome of the first protest movement in 1950 was the enactment of a renters law and a price control law, plus the sale by the government of basic foodstuff at cost. A second such movement, the Hunger and Desperation March (March del Hambre y la Desesperación) was held in 1959, and resulted in a new renters law, and the first minimum salary law which established hourly wages at forty cents (U.S. dollars) for the cities of Panama and Colon.

In 1946 and 1947, members of the Trade Union Federation were included in the Labor Code Commission named by the government to elaborate Panama's first Labor Code. Female members of the Trade Union Federation were successful in pressuring the Commission for the inclusion of clauses protective of maternity and of women workers with nursing children.

Other activities organized by labor groups, primarily the Trade Union Federation were the formation of neighborhood associations in shantytown areas. In the early 1950s, attempts were made to remove squatters from various parts of Panamá City, where for esthetic or monetary reasons they were considered a nuisance. The efforts of organized labor proved successful in staving off evictions in neighborhoods such as Boca La Caja and Panamá Viejo, and persuading the government to buy land from private owners and subdivide it among the dwellers of San Miguelito.

During the 1950s, for the most part, labor was controlled by a core of highly disciplined and determined leaders. The government, embodied in the figure of José Antonia Remón, chief of police until 1952 and then president, had no qualms in using the full force of the police against demonstrators and brutally persecuting labor organizers. Bolívar Vallarino, who succeeded Remón as chief of police and remained in that position until the Torrijos takeover in 1968, shared Remón's views and continued his policies. Labor leaders were singled out and persecuted, and in the midst of much red-baiting and witch hunting, many were blacklisted and had to go underground or into exile. This was an era of extreme antagonism between a small but feisty labor movement and the government which represented the interests of the upper class.

The only other labor-related event of significance in the 1950s was the founding of the Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama* (Confederación de Trabajadores de la República de Panamá—CTRP) in 1956. This Confederation was formed at the prompting of the U.S. and with the backing of the Panamanian government, to counterbalance the labor groups under the aegis of the Trade Union Federation. The CTRP was the only labor confederation in Panama until

1970, when Torrijos upgraded the Trade Union Federation to a confederation. Apart from government approval, the CTRP enjoyed strong support from the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), an organization sponsored by the U.S. government, organized labor, and private enterprise to promote the growth of democratic labor organizations in Latin America.

During the 1960s the labor movement continued to grow, and the cleavages between the two large groups, the CTRP and the Trade Union Federation, became more pronounced. Interestingly enough, of the four large incidents of labor unrest that took place during that decade, two were started by CTRP unions: the banana workers' strike of 1960, and the cane workers strike of 1965. The government's expectation that the CTRP would kowtow and control its membership, was not realized. If anything, the CTRP has been as militant and ardent as the CNTP in protecting and fighting for its workers' rights.

In 1968 officers of the National Guard (Guardia Nacional) ousted the president and took control of the government. By early 1969 power was consolidated in the hands of Omar Torrijos, who adopted a populist stance in order to secure mass support for his government and lend credibility to the regime. This effort had major implications for the labor movement. Its growth was promoted and mechanisms established to both foster and control its future development. Among other things, a Labor Ministry was established and a new labor code proposed. After naming Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt, a former student activist and controversial political figure as Labor Minister, Torrijos tried to make unionization mandatory and to force labor into one organization, a Sole Workers Central (Central Única de Trabajadores—CUT). This was opposed by most labor groups, but primarily by the Workers Confederation of the Republic of Panama and the Isthmian Workers Central,* and was subsequently abandoned.

Torrijos then concentrated on a new labor code, which was approved in December 1971 and became effective 2 April 1972. Significant changes introduced included: job stability after two years of employment; a thirteenth month salary; collective bargaining at the request of the union; union dues collected from all workers covered by a collective agreement regardless of membership in the union; greater flexibility in declaring the legality of strikes; and a seniority bonus after ten years of service. Perhaps the most important aspect of the labor code was its explicit tone as protector of labor.

By enacting the labor code and showing some preferential treatment to labor, Torrijos tried to fill the political vacuum left by the now outlawed traditional political parties, and their primary social base, the displaced commercial-industrial elite. Organized labor became a sounding board for many of Torrijos' policies and a visible supporter of governmental policies. Useful in this regard were the banana workers, concentrated in two small areas, with a long history of labor militancy and disciplined organization.

The government also encouraged the formation of new labor groups. Whereas before 1970 there was only one labor confederation, the CTRP, in 1970 the Trade Union Federation was upgraded to the National Central of Panamanian

Workers* (Central Nacional de Trabajadores de Panamá—CNTP); the following year the Isthmian Workers Central* (Central Istmeña de Trabajadores—CIT) was formed; and in 1974 the Panamanian Central of Transport Workers* (Central Panameña de Trabajadores del Transporte—CPTT) was organized. Between 1970 and 1977 official recognition was given to 120 new unions with a total membership of 19,700, representing 57 percent of the total number of unions and 30 percent of unionized workers. A further indication of the strengthening of organized labor is the number of collective agreements signed. Before 1970 only 30 such agreements had been negotiated, but between 1970 and 1978 this number rose to more than 800.

By 1974 the Panamanian economy began to deteriorate rapidly, partly due to the world recession caused by the increase in oil prices, and partly due to the end of the easy stage of import substitution industrialization. The economic situation posed a political dilemma for the government, and the curtailment of labor was seen as part of the solution. Thus Law 95 (Ley 95) which took away most of the benefits of the 1972 Labor Code, was enacted in late 1976. Although Law 95 was presented to labor as a necessary measure to bring about national recovery, the expected economic effects did not take place; if anything, the economy deteriorated further in 1977, and only began a modest upswing in 1979.

Although labor never accepted Law 95, actions were not taken against it until after the new treaties affecting the Panama Canal were signed with the U.S. in 1978. Sporadic movements began that year, and through 1979 and 1980 labor kept up the pressure to have the law revoked. After two general strikes and innumerable lesser ones, Law 95 was supplanted by Law 8a (Ley 8a) in April 1981. Although Law 8a did not reinstate some of the more progressive measures of the 1972 Labor Code (for example, stability of employment), it did provide a compromise of sorts. An employer now had to pay a very high indemnization if he dismissed a worker without proving just cause; this ostensibly acted as a deterrent to unjust dismissals.

Since Torrijos' death in 1981, the government has turned against organized labor and has used it as a scapegoat for Panama's continuing precarious economic condition. Labor has had to maintain a war stance in order to preserve some of the benefits it achieved during the 1970s.

Bibliography

- Franco Muñoz, Hernando. *Movimiento obrero panameño 1914–1921*. Panama City: Editorial Panameño, 1979.
- Gandasegui, Marco A. et al. *Las Luchas obreras en Panamá 1850–1878*. Panama City: Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos "Justo Arosemena," 1980.
- Matamoros, Marta. "Cuando las huelgas siempre eran ilegales." Panama City, n.d. Mimeo.
- Mora, Lorenzo. *Síntesis histórica del movimiento obrero panameño*. Panamá. Ministerio de Trabajo y Bienestar Social, Asesoría de Programación Sectorial. *Boletín informativo*. Panamá: MITRAB, 1980.

———. *Estadísticas laborales 1975–1978*. Panama City: MITRAB, 1979.

———. *Las organizaciones sindicales en Panamá*. Panamá: MITRAB, 1978.

Ropp, Steve C. *Panamanian Politics*. New York: Praeger, 1982.

Turner, Jorge. *Raíz, historia y destino de los obreros panameños*. Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, 1979.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ASOCIACIÓN SINDICAL PANAMEÑA (Panamanian Trade Union Association). *See* Isthmian Workers Central.

AUTHENTIC CENTRAL OF INDEPENDENT WORKERS (Central Auténtica de Trabajadores Independientes—CATI).

Organized in 1974 after a split in the Isthmian Worker Central* (CIT), this organization has three federations: Authentic Workers Federation (Federación Auténtica de Trabajadores—FAT), Federation of the Construction, Materials, and Wood Industries (Federación de Trabajadores de la Industria de la Construcción, Materiales, Madera y Afines—FETICOMMS), and the Trade Union Federation of Workers of the Province of Chiriqui (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores de la Provincia de Chiriquí—FESITRACHI). The first two were former members of CIT, and the third was an independent federation. CATI has nineteen unions and approximately 4,000 members. It does not have outside affiliations nor does it follow a particular political line. This Central, although small, is quite militant (it is perceived as Trotskyite in orientation), and the government withheld official recognition until 1981.

CATI. *See* Authentic Central of Independent Workers.

CENTRAL AUTÉNTICA DE TRABAJADORES INDEPENDIENTES. *See* Authentic Central of Independent Workers.

CENTRAL ISTMEÑA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Isthmian Workers Central.

CENTRAL NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DE PANAMÁ. *See* National Central of Panamanian Workers.

CENTRAL PANAMEÑA DE TRABAJADORES DEL TRANSPORTE. *See* Panamanian Central of Transport Workers.

CIT. *See* Isthmian Workers Central.

CNTP. *See* National Central of Panamanian Workers.

CONATO. *See* National Council of Organized Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ. *See* Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama.

CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA (Confederación de Trabajadores de la República de Panamá—CTRP).

Founded in 1956 by the Federation of Free Unions (Federación de Sindicatos Independientes), the Federation of Agricultural Workers of Panama (Federación de Agricultores de Panamá), and the Federation of Maritime Workers (Federación de Trabajadores Marítimos), it represents the “democratic” (i.e., pro-United States) thrust within the labor movement. Its goals, as stated in its statutes, are to defend the socioeconomic rights of its members and to prepare labor leaders through union education.

The CTRP is affiliated with the Confederation of Central American Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Centroamericanos—CTCA) based in San José, Costa Rica; the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) based in Mexico City; and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (Confederación Internacional de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres—CIOSL) based in Brussels, Belgium.

The CTRP has eleven federations and sixty-five unions with approximately 22,000 members. The most important federations at present are the National Federation of Democratic Workers (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Democráticos), which includes Local 907, representing the Panamanian workers in the U.S. Army installations (approximately 1,400 members); the Trade Union Federation of the Central Provinces (Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de las Provincias Centrales), which includes the Industrial Union of Cane Workers* (2,400 members); and the Industrial Federation of Workers of Food, Drink, and Hotels (Federación Industrial de Trabajadores de Alimentos, Bebidas, Hoteles y Afines—FITAHBA), which claims most of the hotel and supermarket workers, as well as laborers in the food-processing industries.

The CTRP has two unions not affiliated with any federations which warrant special mention. One is the National Union of Bank Workers (Sindicato Nacional de Empleados Bancarios) with about 7,000 members. The government refuses to give official recognition to this union; there is said to be a tacit agreement with foreign banks that in order to avoid potential disruptions from strikes, unionization of bank employees will not be allowed. The other independent union is the Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company* (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Chiriqui Land Company—SITRACHILCO). This union had been affiliated with the CTRP in the 1960s; and in the 1970s, with the National Central of Panamanian Workers.* In 1978 the membership voted to reaffiliate with the CTRP.

Several members of the CTRP attained important political positions within

the Torrijos government (1968–81) and in subsequent administrations. José de la Rosa Castillo was Minister of Labor in 1971. Phillip Dean Butcher, CTRP's secretary-general between 1973 and 1981, was named ambassador to Jamaica in the early 1970s and appointed to the board of directors of the Panama Canal Commission in 1982. Luis G. Anderson, secretary-general of CTRP from 1981 to 1984, was appointed Vice Minister of Labor in 1984.

In 1981 the CTRP celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary by announcing that it would abandon its apolitical stance and follow a social democratic line.

CONSEJO NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES ORGANIZADOS. *See* National Council of Organized Workers.

CPTT. *See* Panamanian Central of Transport Workers.

CTRP. *See* Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama.

FEDERACIÓN DE SINDICATOS INDEPENDIENTES (Independent Federation of Unions). *See* Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company.

FEDERACIÓN ISTEMEÑA DE TRABAJADORES CRISTIANOS (Isthmian Federation of Christian Workers). *See* Isthmian Workers Central.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ. *See* Workers Federation of the Republic of Panama.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ (Trade Union Federation of the Republic of Panama). *See* National Central of Panamanian Workers.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE OBREROS Y CAMPESINOS. *See* Trade Union Federation of Workers and Peasants.

GENERAL UNION OF WORKERS (Sindicato General de Trabajadores—SGT).

The General Union of Workers was formed in 1924 by members of the Communist Group of the Workers Federation of the Republic of Panama* who wanted to more forcibly promote ideas emanating from the Russian Revolution and the Third International. Its founders included the noted Spanish anarcho-syndicalist José María Blásquez de Pedro, called by some the “father of Panama’s organized labor,” and such Panamanian labor leaders and intellectuals as Domingo H. Turner, Diógenes de la Rosa, and Jorge E. Brouwer. These same people would later found the Communist Party of Panama (Partido del Pueblo) in 1930 and the Socialist Party two years later. Though short-lived, the General Union was responsible for the first massive labor protest led by Panamanian workers, when in 1925 it organized a Renter’s League (Liga de Inquilinos) to promote a

boycott on rent payments by slum dwellers. The General Union apparently merged with other unions in 1930 to form the Trade Union Federation of Workers and Peasants.*

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF UNIONS. *See* Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company.

INDUSTRIAL UNION OF CANE WORKERS (Sindicato Industrial de Trabajadores del Azúcar, Sus Derivados y Afines).

Officially recognized in 1961, this union represents the workers of the private sugar mills, with a membership of about 2,400, and affiliates with the Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama.* In 1965 the union tried to renegotiate a collective agreement with the Empresa Azucarera Nacional, a private concern, to raise the agreed hourly wage to the level recently approved by law for rural workers. Knowing that two-thirds of the work force had only seasonal employment, the company refused to negotiate until after the harvest. The workers went on strike and walked to Panama City to present their demands to the president. This in turn led to a twenty-four-hour general strike in the City. The union was successful in its wage demands, but 30 percent of the striking workers lost their jobs. Apart from the Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company* which represents the banana workers, this is the only other strong union of rural workers.

INDUSTRIAL UNION OF WORKERS OF THE INDEPENDENT BANANA GROWERS. *See* Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company.

ISTHMIAN FEDERATION OF CHRISTIAN WORKERS. *See* Isthmian Workers Central.

ISTHMIAN WORKERS CENTRAL (Central Istmeña de Trabajadores—CIT).

CIT was originally organized as the Panamanian Trade Union Association (Asociación Sindical Panameña) in 1959, and one year later changed its name to Isthmian Federation of Christian Workers (Federación Istmeña de Trabajadores Cristianos). In 1971 this labor organization, which is considered the Christian branch of organized labor, was upgraded by the government to a confederation and took its present name. CIT follows the Christian Democratic line and is affiliated with the Latin American Workers Confederation (Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores—CLAT) based in Caracas, Venezuela; and with the World Confederation of Workers (Confederación Mundial del Trabajo—CMT) based in Brussels, Belgium. It has six federations, twenty-six unions, and 4,690 members. Since its inception it always has been involved with supermarket and commercial workers, and most of its member unions are in services and commerce. In 1974 it lost a federation to the government-backed Panamanian Central

of Transport Workers,* and CIT officials estimate a loss of about 8,000 members at that time.

NATIONAL CENTRAL OF PANAMANIAN WORKERS (Central Nacional de Trabajadores de Panamá—CNTP).

The CNTP was organized in 1945 as the Trade Union Federation of the Republic of Panama (Federación Sindical de la República de Panamá) and upgraded to a central in 1970 by the Torrijos Government (1968–81), to counter-balance the Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama* (CTRP), which was affiliated with the AFL–CIO and, in various ways, supported by the U.S. government. The Trade Union Federation, on the other hand, was communist. Torrijos, seeing labor as a countervailing force to the commercial-industrial elite he had deposed, viewed the CTRP as a U.S. lackey, and hence an unreliable ally.

The unions that formed the Trade Union Federation included the National Union of Workers of the Clothing Industry of Panama (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria de la Confección de Ropa y Anexos de Panamá), the Furniture Workers Union of Panama (Sindicato de Trabajadores del Mueble de Panamá), the Shoe Industry Workers Union (Sindicato des Trabajadores de la Industria del Calzado y Similares), and the Typographers and Graphic Arts Workers Union* (Sindicato de Tipógrafos y Trabajadores de las Artes Gráficas). These were all very militant unions, organized through the efforts of the socialist and communist leaders who had begun their careers in the 1920s. The Trade Union Federation was responsible for most of the protest actions experienced in Panama between 1945 and the mid-1960s. These included a strike in 1946 called by the National Union of Workers of the Clothing Industry of Panama to protest low wages. This strike was declared illegal after thirty-eight days. Then, in 1955, over 50,000 persons demonstrated against the rising prices of foodstuffs. This resulted in the enactment of a renters law, a price control law, and the setting up of kiosks where the government sold food staples to the poor at cost. Another strike in 1956, called by the Union of Drivers to demand a reduction in the gasoline tax, paralyzed Panama City for four days and resulted in the reduction of the tax from sixteen cents to eleven cents (U.S. Dollars). The last protest of any consequence in the 1950s was the Hunger and Desperation March (Marcha del Hambre y la Desesperación) held in 1959 to protest low wages and high unemployment. Marchers walked from Colón to Panamá and demanded a minimum salary of fifty cents per hour, a rent reduction of 50 percent, and a law to protect subsistence peasants. The results of the march included a new renters law, and the first minimum salary law which established hourly wages at 40 cents for the cities of Panamá and Colón.

Members of the Trade Union Federation formed part of the Labor Code Commission which enacted Panama's first labor code in 1947, and were successful in pressuring the Commission to include clauses protective of maternity and of women workers with nursing children. In the early 1950s, the Trade

Union Federation was also responsible for the organization of neighborhood associations in shantytown areas of Panama City when attempts were made to remove squatters. The Federation was successful in staving off evictions in neighborhoods such as Boca la Caja and Panamá Viejo and in persuading the government to buy land from private owners and subdivide it among the dwellers of San Miguelito.

The CNTP is affiliated with the Trade Union Committee of Central American Workers (Comité Sindical de los Trabajadores de Centro America—CUSCA); the Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of the Workers of Latin America (Congreso Permanente de Unidad Sindical de los Trabajadores de América Latina—CPUSTAL), founded in 1968 and based in Panama City; and the World Federation of Trade Unions (Federación Sindical Mundial—FSM), based in Moscow, USSR. The CNTP has seven federations, thirty-six unions, and 21,500 members. Among the important unions of the CNTP are the original unions of the Trade Union Federation, and all the unions of the banana workers except for that based in Bocas del Toro. It also represents two unions of government workers, the light and the telephone workers unions. Historically, the CNTP—and formerly the Trade Union Federation—has played the most important role in Panama within the labor movement. Very few labor-related incidents have taken place in which it, or one of its member unions, was not directly involved. Some of its leaders, such as Angel Gómez, Marta Matamoros, and Domingo Barría, are synonymous with organized labor in the minds of Panamanians.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ORGANIZED WORKERS (Consejo Nacional de Trabajadores Organizados—CONATO).

CONATO was formed after the passage of the 1972 Labor Code as a consultative body representing labor (as a counterpart to National Council of Private Enterprise, Consejo Nacional de la Empresa Privada) and integrated by the leadership of the confederations and centrals. Its principal function has been a symbolic one, since the ideological divisions among the labor organizations prevent their agreement on issues on which CONATO could act.

PANAMANIAN CENTRAL OF TRANSPORT WORKERS (Central Panameña de Trabajadores del Transporte—CPTT).

Organized in 1974 at the prompting and with the aid of the government, this Central brings together most of the existing federations and unions of public transportation drivers. The latest official figures place its membership at 4,690, while CPTT officials claim to have about 23,000 members. CPTT is not affiliated with any international labor organizations. It does not belong to the National Council of Organized Workers* (CONATO), as some of the rank and file are considered laborers and employers at the same time. This is so because they own their vehicles for which they employ drivers on a part-time basis. The CPTT leadership was prominent in the government's official party, the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), at the time the Confederation was formed.

PANAMANIAN TRADE UNION ASSOCIATION. *See* Isthmian Workers Central.

SGT. *See* General Union of Workers.

SINDICATO DE TIPÓGRAFOS Y TRABAJADORES DE LAS ARTES GRÁFICAS. *See* Typographers and Graphic Arts Workers.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA CHIRIQUI LAND COMPANY. *See* Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LAS BANANERAS INDEPENDIENTES OF CHIRIQUI (Union of Workers of the Independent Banana Farms of Chiriqui). *See* Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company.

SINDICATO GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* General Union of Workers.

SINDICATO INDUSTRIAL DE TRABAJADORES DEL AZÚCAR, SUS DERIVADOS, Y AFINES. *See* Industrial Union of Cane Workers.

SINDICATO INDUSTRIAL DE TRABAJADORES DE PRODUCTORES INDEPENDIENTES (Industrial Union of Workers of the Independent Banana Growers). *See* Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company.

SINDICATO UNICO NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DE LA CONSTRUCCION Y SIMILARES. *See* Singular National Union of Construction Workers.

SINGULAR NATIONAL UNION OF CONSTRUCTION WORKERS (Sindicato Único Nacional de Trabajadores de la Construcción Y Similares—SUNTRACS).

SUNTRACS evolved from one of several unions representing construction workers to become the largest and most important one. In 1974 SUNTRACS negotiated its first collective agreement with the Panamanian Construction Chamber (Cámara Panameña de la Construcción—CAPAC). This has given SUNTRACS considerable power since CAPAC encompasses about 90 percent of construction companies, and all workers hired by these companies are covered by the collective agreement. SUNTRACS was also responsible for two laws that modify the 1972 Labor Code in favor of construction workers. One is for payment of production workers when they are between jobs. This Fund of Guarantee (Fondo de Garantía) represents 6 percent of earnings during the construction project.

SUNTRACS claims a membership of 17,000 workers and shares with the

banana workers the distinction of being the most bellicose labor group. Although Panamanian labor laws do not permit wildcat strikes, SUNTRACS calls wildcat strikes frequently. Between 1978 and the first trimester of 1979, there were fifteen wildcat strikes for which the union was responsible. SUNTRACS leadership claims this to be the only way the union can attempt to redress the most blatant abuses of the construction companies, such as sending workers into work sites without protective equipment and not paying into the *Fondo de Garantía*.

SITRACHILCO. *See* Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company.

SUNTRACS. *See* Singular National Union of Construction Workers.

TRADE UNION FEDERATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA. *See* National Central of Panamanian Workers.

TRADE UNION FEDERATION OF WORKERS AND PEASANTS (Federación Sindical de Obreros y Campesinos).

Founded in 1930 by members of the General Union of Workers* and the Workers Federation of the Republic of Panama* as a joint effort to counterbalance the governmental repression of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Federation was involved in a renters strike in 1932, but after that it seems to have dissolved.

TYPOGRAPHERS AND GRAPHIC ARTS WORKERS UNION (Sindicato de Tipógrafos y Trabajadores de las Artes Gráficas).

This union was organized in 1944 and is one of the founding unions of the Trade Union Federation of the Republic of Panama.* It has successfully brought together all the workers of the publishing industry and has a collective agreement with the National Graphic Arts Chamber (Cámara Nacional de Artes Gráficas) similar to the agreement the Singular National Union of Construction Workers* has with the Panamanian Construction Chamber. From 1945 to 1965 the union had fifteen successful strikes. But in 1965 it called a strike to protest an unjust dismissal which was declared illegal due to procedural violations. The Superior Labor Tribunal upheld the verdict (reflecting, perhaps, both the weakened status of the Trade Union Federation as well as mounting pressures among owners to squelch labor unrest), and over 350 workers lost their jobs. In recent years this typographers' union has suffered financial hardship because industrial arts techniques have changed rapidly and are less labor-intensive.

UNION OF WORKERS OF THE CHIRIQUI LAND COMPANY (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Chiriqui Land Company—SITRACHILCO).

From the mid-1930s the banana workers strove to organize unions in the two plantation areas, Bocas del Toro on the Atlantic Side and Puerto Armuelles, Chiriqui Province, on the Pacific side, lands owned by United Fruit's Chiriqui Land Company. Each time they were about to succeed, the Fruit Company (later

known as United Brands) engaged in massive firings and eliminated all the organizers. One tactic often employed, especially in the Puerto Armuelles area, was to load all “rabble-rousers” with their families and belongings into trains, take them deep into the grasslands of Chiriqui, and abandon them. By early 1950 the Company allowed the formation of a company union, known in Panama as a yellow union (*sindicato amarillo*), and in 1955 and again in 1958 the union signed collective agreements with the Company. Salaries were established at between sixteen and twenty-five cents (U.S.) and the working day ran to between twelve and sixteen hours. The Company preferred to pay by task, which depressed wages even more. These low salaries coupled with terrible working conditions created widespread discontent. In November 1960 a two-week strike resulted in increases in salaries to thirty-six and thirty-seven cents per hour and the freedom to form two independent labor unions: one to represent the workers from Bocas (SITRACHILCO of Bocas and of Puerto Armuelles, Chiriqui) and the other for the Chiriqui and company workers. In 1964 another strike occurred in Puerto Armuelles to protest the indiscriminate use of herbicides. Highly organized and militant, these unions have had an extremely competent and dedicated leadership, and during the 1960s enjoyed the legal advice of the most prominent labor lawyers. Several SITRACHILCO leaders have gone on to hold public office and have served in various official roles.

The SITRACHILCO unions became politically prominent in the early years of the Torrijos (1968–81) regime, as they were used to fill the void left by the traditional parties and to provide the mass support needed by the regime. Many of the labor measures enacted during that time, such as the law decreeing payment of a thirteenth month salary and the 1972 Labor Code, are said to be directly attributable to them.

After the second large strike in the 1960s, the United Fruit Company began leasing land to independent growers who received services from the Company and in turn sold their production back to it. Today, there are six independent growers in Bocas del Toro and fourteen in Chiriqui. The workers of these farms formed two unions, the Industrial Union of Workers of the Independent Banana Growers (*Sindicato Industrial de Trabajadores de Productores Independientes, Bocas*) and the Union of Workers of the Independent Banana Farms of Chiriqui (*Sindicato de Trabajadores de las Bananeras Independientes de Chiriqui*).

A new development emerged after the so-called Banana War of 1975 between the government and the United Fruit Company. The Company sold most of its land back to Panama, which established two corporations to handle the production; COBAPA, or Banana Corporation of the Pacific (*Corporación Bananera del Pacífico*); and COBANA, or Banana Corporation of the Atlantic (*Corporación Bananeras del Atlántico*). The workers of these corporations also formed unions.

After the 1964 strike and up to 1977 there were no major strikes at the plantations. Since 1977 the situation has been very unstable. In Puerto Armuelles, Chiriqui, there have been strikes or declarations of intent to strike every year, sometimes three or four times a year. In Bocas, between 1977 and 1978, thirteen

declarations of intent to strike were submitted to the labor office. These statements usually are in regard to alleged violations of the existing collective agreement. United Brands has threatened to close its plantations, particularly those on the Pacific Coast, due to labor problems. The company almost made good its threat in 1983, after a month-long strike. That possibility weighs heavily on the government, especially after the reverses they suffered with COBANA and COBAPA.

Since the banana workers represent such an asset to organized labor, their affiliation has been highly contested between the National Central of Panamanian Workers* (CNTP) and the Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama* (CTRP). The SITRACHILCO of Chiriqui has always been an affiliate of the Trade Union Federation* and later the CNTP. The SITRACHILCO of Bocas was an affiliate of the CTRP in the 1960s, then changed to the CNTP. Between 1970 and 1978, since all the unions representing banana workers were under the aegis of the CNTP, they formed the Independent Federation of Unions (Federación de Sindicatos Independientes). This Federation dissolved after 1978 when SITRACHILCO Bocas reaffiliated with the CTRP.

UNION OF WORKERS OF THE INDEPENDENT BANANA FARMS OF CHIRIQUI. *See* Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company.

UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE WAY.

This was one of the unions representing laborers during and immediately after the Canal construction. This union called several strikes between 1916 and 1920 to protest low wages and poor living conditions. The most serious of these took place in February 1920 and involved over 17,000 workers, almost the entire labor force. The demands reflected concerns not only with better salaries but also with housing and other benefits.

This strike was the first one within the Canal Zone in which the government of Panama openly intervened, first by trying to mediate and then by demanding that the U.S. authorities keep the strikers out of Panama. The Panama Canal Company deported 2,000 laborers after the strike was over. The remaining workers realized the precariousness of their situation, since they had no legal status in Panama, and all the privileges they received through the Panama Canal Company—housing, schools, medical attention, and far better pay than in Panama—were contingent on their continuing acquiescence in their jobs.

Other unions active among Canal laborers were the Colour Progressive Association and the West Indian Protective League which published a newspaper called *The Workman*.

WORKERS FEDERATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA (Federación Obrera de la República de Panamá).

The Workers Federation was founded in 1921 by members of the Sons of Work Society (Sociedad Hijos del Trabajo) as an apolitical organization to "fight

for the rights of workers'' and for their economic and social well-being. It followed the tenets of the democratic workers organizations and received the strongest support of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), including a visit by Samuel Gompers in 1924.

Soon after the Workers Federation was founded, conflict developed among its members, and in 1924 the Communist Group (Grupo Comunista) split and organized the General Union of Workers.* At that time, members of the Workers Federation decided to continue to adhere to the tenets of the democratic trade union movement. It appears that this union merged in 1930 with the General Union of Workers* to form the Trade Union Federation of Workers and Peasants,* and after 1932 there is no further record of its activities. The Workers Federation is considered a precursor of the Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama,* organized in 1956.

Paraguay ---

RIORDAN ROETT *and*
AMPARO MENENDEZ-CARRIÓN

The level of organization of Paraguay's labor movement has traditionally been low and remains incipient. Several factors account for this, including the structure of the economy and the sociopolitical and cultural environment framing its development.

Paraguay traditionally has been a rural economy and society. Presently, 62 percent of its 3.4 million population is rural, while of the country's economically active population (1.2 million), 44 percent are employed in agriculture, 34 percent in industry and commerce, 18 percent in services, and 4 percent in government. Productive land has been concentrated in the hands of a relatively few owners, and a subsistence economy characterizes the life of practically the entire rural population of small farmers, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, squatters—and even wage laborers, whose work provides little real monetary return.

Traditionally, cattle raising, agriculture, and lumbering have been the basic economic activities, and agricultural commodities account for a large share of the country's exports. The industrial sector is characterized by many small factories and handicraft workshops, and most manufacturing consists of processing agricultural raw materials. The lack of adequate highway infrastructure and transportation facilities has ranked high among the factors hindering economic development. As a result, events in Asunción, the capital, have little impact in the countryside. Furthermore, the minimal benefits that have been granted to urban labor still remain to be applied to rural workers. (This should not be taken to mean that the living conditions of the bulk of the city's population are far better: roughly 80 percent of the population of Asunción is classifiable as poor.)

Paraguay's low level of industrialization has limited the development of effective labor organizations. Economic enterprises are small, workers' politicization is low, and personal relationships between employers and workers prevail, inhibiting the development of more impersonal, professional associations. In

fact, personalism, paternalism, and authoritarianism loom large in Paraguay's history and have constituted intervening factors constraining the development of an autonomous and organized labor force throughout the country's history.

Whenever an authoritarian ruler—José-Gaspar Rodríguez De Francia (1814–40), Carlos Antonio López (1842–62), Francisco Solano López (1862–70), José Félix Estigarribia (1939–40), Higinio Morinigo (1940–48)—exercised power, the nation has prospered. Efforts to move to more democratic processes have all resulted in a collapse of state authority, and often anarchy, as in the 1870–1936 period. This has fostered a personalist tradition in Paraguay whereby people have learned to equate open politics with weakness and authoritarian politics with strength. Such personalism, understood as a tendency to emphasize the individual qualities of the leader and to stress interpersonal trust over ideology or adherence to specific doctrines, has fostered a continuation of authoritarian rule. Also, it has reinforced the idea that the national interest is best served by paternalistic leadership. Furthermore, in the case of Paraguay, minimal labor benefits such as shorter working hours, minimum wages, and so forth have been granted preemptively by a paternal state and did not result from labor organization pressure. Anticipating the demands of an incipient labor force, the state has almost invariably acted first, precluding the formation of strong labor organizations. At the same time, every attempt to mobilize the workers from below has met with severe repression.

Paraguay has historically suffered recurring threats to its territorial integrity on the part of its powerful neighbors, Argentina and Brazil, with devastating results. The Triple Alliance War pitted Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina against Paraguay. The war lasted five years (1865–70), reducing the population of Paraguay from 525,000 in 1865 to about 220,000 in 1871, stripping Paraguay of over 60,000 square miles of territory and forcing it to pay a substantial war debt. As the war ended, the first phase of the country's independent history came to a close, a period that had been characterized by authoritarian rule, paternalism, and state omnipotence. These political realities responded to the conditions under which Paraguay survived—peripheral, landlocked, and vulnerable, surrounded by turbulence and civil strife.

The 1870s were a period of defeat, devastation, and foreign domination. Allied armies occupied Asunción and installed a provisional government which lasted from 1870 to 1876. Partisan politics began in 1876 with the emergence of two parties, the Colorados (Coloreds) and the Liberals, both personalist parties, given to violence, electoral manipulation, and opportunism. Politics became simply a case of the ins versus the outs. The founder of the Colorado Party, war hero General Bernardino Caballero, dominated the country for thirty years (1874–1904), making and unmaking presidents, with the political support of Brazil. In 1904, with the backing of Argentina, the Liberals took over and retained power until 1936.

The 1870–1936 period was one of frequent economic collapse and ongoing financial fraud. The heavy war debt led to an opening of the country to foreign

speculators and the sale of the public patrimony to raise needed capital, ranging from the national railroad system (1874) to state-owned lands. In the case of land sales, territory was sold to Argentine and Brazilian speculators at prices that were cheap for foreign buyers but far too high for the Paraguayan peasants driven from the land many had occupied for generations. The first great wave of emigration took place at that point.

By the first decades of the twentieth century, a modicum of prosperity returned to Paraguay, and a small middle and working class appeared. Some intellectual ferment occurred as well. The first efforts to organize the country's workers date from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The incipient organizers were groups of anarcho-syndicalists. By 1906 they had formed the Regional Workers' Federation of Paraguay* (*Federación Regional Obrera del Paraguay*), with some 2,000 members in sixteen craft unions and mutual benefit societies. In 1917 small groups of artisans (shoemakers, bakers and printers, for the most part) founded the Regional Workers' Central of Paraguay* (*Central Obrera Regional del Paraguay—CORP*), which also fell under anarchist control. These organizational activities continued throughout the 1920s and culminated with the founding of the Naval Federation* (*Federación Naval*) by the maritime workers, who won the first important collective bargaining contract in the nation's history after a twenty-month strike. The strike constituted a milestone in the history of Paraguayan labor.

Meanwhile, the Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP) had become active in the labor movement. By 1930 the PCP had drawn all existing unions into a single organization, the National Confederation of Workers* (*Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT*), which called a nationwide strike shortly before the onset of the Chaco War in 1932. The government responded by repressing almost all of the member unions of the CNT, and many union leaders were imprisoned. In 1931 a governmental decree dissolved all labor organizations.

The Chaco War against Bolivia opened in 1932 and lasted for three years. Bolivian ambitions to secure an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean through the Paraguay-Parana River System were responsible for the conflict. Territorial losses in the War of the Pacific (1879–83) had left Bolivia landlocked and, inevitably, succeeding governments looked east in search of an alternative outlet to the sea for Bolivian trade and commerce. Access to the only feasible alternative lay across the vast Chaco desert and Paraguayan territory.

The bitter war dragged on for three years before a cease-fire was effectively negotiated; a peace treaty signed in 1938 settled the issue, although Paraguay felt cheated of what it believed to be its clear military victory during the war itself. Following the cessation of hostilities, Paraguay experienced a period of unprecedented social ferment and political mobilization. The war had unleashed nationalist passions. A national debate about the country's future raged among students and workers, politicians, war veterans, and intellectuals. The old Liberal Party oligarchy was found wanting and the government of President Eusebio Ayala was overthrown in February 1936.

The new president, Colonel Rafael Franco, led a heterogeneous coalition of military and civilian groups committed to change but very vague about how to go about it. Franco's "Febrerista" government abrogated the 1870 Constitution and banned all political activity; all efforts to organize in social and economic groupings required the formal recognition of the state. However, Franco gave the country its first social legislation, including a labor code, progressive for its time and place. A Department of Labor was created and briefly exercised great power. Labor unions were required to register with the Department, which was empowered to study, review, and approve their statutes. Deprived of much of their freedom of action, unions were forced to accept a paternalistic, corporative framework. During the eighteen months of Febrerista government some 130 unions were recognized, and the old CNT was reestablished as the National Confederation of Paraguayan Workers* (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores del Paraguay—CNTP), dominated by the Febreristas.

With the overthrow of Colonel Franco in August 1937, succeeding Liberal governments further restricted union activity. The hero of the Chaco War, Marshal José Félix Estigarribia, was nominated by the Liberal Party in 1939 elections; the Colorados abstained. Confronted with continued political polarization throughout the country, Estigarribia assumed dictatorial powers in February 1940.

Estigarribia's government wrote a vaguely corporatist constitution in 1940 which sought to harmonize social and economic interests under the tutelage of the state. With Estigarribia's untimely death in September 1940, War Minister Higinio Morinigo became provisional president and quickly moved to consolidate his power. He dismissed the Liberals from the cabinet, exiled Febrerista leaders, dissolved the legislature, and broke up the Febrerista-dominated labor confederation, the CNTP. A pliant Workers' Council of Paraguay* (Consejo Obrero del Paraguay—COP) replaced it. The 1940 Consitution gave Morinigo the authority to subject all social and economic activity to state control, which he did immediately.

As the world war ebbed, and pressures for democracy emerged once again in the hemisphere, a new period of labor agitation opened in Paraguay in 1944. Several hundred labor leaders were imprisoned as a result of the first demonstrations against the Morinigo dictatorship. A truce between the regime and civilian groups was negotiated in November 1944, but all four major political movements—the Liberals, Colorados, Febreristas, and the Communists—proceeded to organize their own labor organizations against the wishes of Morinigo. Stringent controls were reimposed after a year. Another truce was declared in 1947 and by the end of that year a civil war was underway between the Febrerista-dominated navy, supported by labor groups and the Liberals, and Morinigo backed by his predominantly Colorado army. After the defeat of the Febrerista-Liberal coalition, all labor organizations were outlawed, except the Republican Workers' Organization* (Organización Republicana Obrera—ORO) controlled by the Colorado party and led by government loyalists. The ORO constituted

an arm of the government and was set out to dominate the labor movement. It called a workers congress in July 1951 and renamed itself the Paraguayan Confederation of Workers* (Confederación Paraguaya de Trabajadores—CPT). The CPT shortly became the only legally recognized labor confederation in Paraguay and an arm of the government during the next four decades.

During the early 1950s the CPT was closely identified with the Colorado Party, although members of other parties held some posts in its organizational hierarchy. It also was able to establish workable systems of collective bargaining for some of its affiliates, the strongest of them being the maritime and railroad workers' unions, respectively.

On 4 May 1954 General Alfredo Stroessner, commander in chief of the Armed Forces, backed by the majority wing of the Colorado Party, led a coup d'état to become Paraguay's president. Stroessner was elected to office two months later in a single-ticket election. He has remained in power since 1954, in what constitutes the longest rule of any political leader in the Western Hemisphere. Backed by a large and privileged military establishment and the secret police, Stroessner has silenced most of the outspoken critics of his regime and has suppressed more than two dozen internal revolts as well as attacks organized by Paraguayan exiles based in Brazil and Argentina. He has eliminated many of the traditional leaders of the Colorado Party, and those who have remained profess their undivided loyalty to the president. The Colorado Party is the center of government, and the armed forces its guarantor. Stroessner has been reelected chief executive in six consecutive elections.

Stroessner has tolerated union activities as long as they have not interfered with government policies. The only legally recognized labor organization, the CPT functions under strict governmental control. Its membership includes over 90 percent of Paraguay's organized labor, though unionized labor in Paraguay makes up less than 8 percent of the economically active population. The CPT is the single linkage between labor and government in Stroessner's Paraguay.

The CPT was able to hold its fourth congress in August 1955; in 1956 Stroessner's government introduced an IMF (International Monetary Fund) stabilization program that included a wage freeze and a reduction in public subsidies, which led to a drop in real incomes and growing labor unrest. Subsequently, in August 1957 the CPT's fifth congress demanded wage increases, though backing Stroessner's candidacy for the presidency. In the following year the close alliance between the government and the CPT deteriorated further as a consequence of the union's insistent demands for a minimum salary. The administration became inflexible and refused to receive a workers' delegation; a general strike began. The strike was very effective at first, but the government managed to break it and a wave of repression ensued in which several hundred union leaders were arrested. Police officers were placed in key trade union posts. The government managed to control the 1959 labor congress and regain its hold over the confederation.

Unable to create an independent labor movement in Paraguay a group of labor

leaders set up a movement in exile, at first in Montevideo, and later in Buenos Aires. For a while it remained active among the hundreds of thousands of exiled Paraguayan workers who live and work in northern Argentina and in Buenos Aires. (Paraguay has suffered an almost continuous drain in human resources through emigration. According to recent estimates, more than half a million Paraguayans currently live abroad, for political or economic reasons.) Attempts by the Roman Catholic Church and the Christian Democrats to organize peasant leagues also have encountered government repression.

The labor code recognizes labor unions and employers organizations and governs their formation; it also stipulates conditions under which strikes and lockouts are lawful. Before these may take place the code establishes obligatory procedures for the settlement of labor disputes by the permanent board of conciliation and arbitration. The labor code is administered by the National Department of Labor, which is responsible directly to the Ministry of Justice and Labor. The Department is concerned with the settlement of disputes between labor and management and the registration and control of all unions. Its resolutions are binding upon employers and workers alike. It has the power, in addition, to fix minimum wages. Strikes and lockouts are illegal unless authorized by the Department of Labor.

Until recently, Paraguay's economic prospects were viewed as promising because of the continued intensive development of the country's primary sector resources, the construction of the huge Itaipú (the largest dam in the world with 12.6 million kilowatts of installed capacity) and Yacireta dams, and the country's potential for becoming one of the world's largest exporters of hydroelectric energy in the near future. Despite present recessionary strains, linked in great measure to Argentina's and Brazil's economic downturn, such medium to longer term prospects remain unchanged. However, present economic conditions—coupled with the increasing salience of the issue of succession as Stroessner grows old, and is thus unlikely to participate in a seventh bid for the presidential seat—have provided a context favorable to the emergence of new strains in the system. This can be seen in signs of intra-establishment dissent, even within the Colorado Party itself, which have encouraged the press to grow somewhat more vocal and trade unions to call for the formation of organizations free of the tutelage of the government, the church, or the political parties.

At the same time, the CPT has recently come under international criticism. In fact, in November 1979 it was expelled from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions on the grounds of political subservience. Despite promises to adopt a more independent position on the part of its leadership, it has failed to do so thus far. Nonetheless, some interesting developments have taken place within the confederation. In 1979 a reform movement, known as *intersindical* or "Group of Nine," emerged openly within the CPT. It includes the rapidly growing construction workers and metalworkers union, as well as the bank workers, print workers, and the journalists unions, respectively; it publishes its own monthly newsletter, *Labor (Trabajo)* and is seeking for a space of its own

within the country's labor scenario. As a result of the pressures brought to bear by this group, the CPT held a convention in February 1980, for the first time since 1959. Delegates from eighty-five trade unions called on the CPT leadership to press for wage increases to compensate for the drop in real incomes and pressured for greater independence from government interference in union matters. Following his reelection in February 1983, however, President Stroessner responded with a campaign of severe repression against these new groups.

A significant development in the history of the Paraguayan labor movement occurred in May of 1985 when several of these trade unions formed the Independent Workers Movement (MIT), including FETREBAM, the outlawed Journalist's Union, and a dissident sector of SINATRAC. The international trade federation ORIT (the Latin American branch of the ICFTU) recently recognized the MIT, and both the AFL-CIO and the Christian Democratic organization CLAT have sent representatives to express their support for the new movement.

There have also been indications of a resurgence of agrarian league activities in the countryside prompted by the land evictions, which have increased dramatically since 1977 as the frontier of Brazilian migration moves westward across the eastern border region. Mobilization among colonists and squatters in opposition to Brazilian penetration, and the apparent official encouragement behind it, has increased.

It remains to be seen, however, whether these signs of change will develop into new trends leading to an autonomous labor movement of significance in Paraguay. The formation of the MIT may be a step in that direction, but if history is any indication, the signals should be regarded with caution. The system has traditionally shown a remarkable capacity to deal with potential or new power contenders, either through incorporation or repression, and the combined forces of the opposition still appear unable to change that historical inevitability in the foreseeable future.

Bibliography

- Banco Paraguayo de Datos. *Sindicalismo Libre En El Paraguay, Aportes doctrinarios e históricos*, Ciriaco Duarte. Asunción: Cuadernos BPD, 1982.
- Coldas, Roberto. "Structural Change in Paraguay Threatens Old Order." *Washington Report on the Hemisphere* 1, no. 10 (24 February 1981): 1-2, 6.
- Coldrick, A. P. and Philip Jones. *The International Directory of the Trade Movement*. New York: Facts on File, 1979.
- "Hay libertad sindical en nuestro país?" *Sendero, Organo de la Conferencia Episcopal Paraguaya* (Asunción) no. 326 (14 September 1984): 4-6.
- Latin American Bureau. *Paraguay Power Game*. London: The Bureau, 1980.
- Miranda, Anibal. *Apuntes sobre El Desarrollo Paraguayo 1940-1973*. Asunción: Universidad Católica, 1980.
- . *Desarrollo y Pobreza en Paraguay*. Rosslyn, Va.: Inter-American Foundation, and Asunción: Comité de Iglesias para Ayuda de Emergencia, 1982.
- Roett, Riordan and Amparo Menendez-Carrión. "Authoritarian Paraguay: the Personalist

Tradition." In *Latin American Politics and Development*, ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline. 2d ed. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1985.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs. *Directory of Foreign Labor Organizations: Paraguay-141-ARA 36-1984-A*.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

AGRARIAN LEAGUES (Ligas Agrarias).

The Agrarian Leagues are not unions organized for collective bargaining purposes. Their membership is drawn mainly from small farmers and underemployed peasants. Their chief concerns are the unequal system of land tenure and the conditions of poverty and exploitation in the countryside.

This grass-roots movement emerged in 1957 as a multiparty movement based on Christian beliefs. It began receiving substantial support from the Catholic Church during the 1960s. By 1969 the leagues had an estimated membership of over 20,000 peasants, organized in a series of communities throughout the countryside and operating small producer and produce-distribution cooperatives. They provided literacy programs, welfare services, and local entertainment for the peasants.

As the movement began to undermine the Colorado Party's traditional basis of support in the countryside, it became the object of official harassment as an allegedly communist-inspired movement. A wave of repression ensued throughout the country during the 1975-76 period, when some fifty leaders were killed, hundreds fled into exile, and over 5,000 peasants were arrested.

The league's communities were dismembered and families resettled in distant parts of the country to destroy the movement. As a result, the leagues were forced into clandestinity. In the early 1980s they became active again, taking as their rallying cry the defense of peasants in eastern Paraguay from land evictions.

BANK WORKERS FEDERATION OF PARAGUAY (Federación De Trabajadores Bancarios del Paraguay—FETRABAN).

FETRABAN was founded in the mid-1940s. It has been able to achieve, through collective bargaining, outstanding benefits and security for its members. It participates in *intersindical*, the increasingly independent wing of the Paraguayan Confederation of Workers,* and publishes the *Bank Tribune (Tribuna Bancaria)*. With an estimated (1976) 1,500 workers, it is affiliated internationally, with the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, Technical and Professional Employees.

CENTRAL NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES URBANOS. See National Central of Urban Workers.

CENTRAL OBRERA REGIONAL DEL PARAGUAY. *See* Regional Workers' Central of Paraguay.

CHRISTIAN CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederación Cristiana de Trabajadores—CCT).

In 1962 the fledgling Christian Democrat Party founded the Christian Confederation of Workers which concentrated its activities in the organization of church-sponsored agrarian leagues. The CCT has never been legally recognized, and has been the object of government repression since its inception. In December 1977 nineteen trade union and peasant leaders linked to the CCT were arrested during a secret meeting held outside Asunción and several were badly tortured, including Victoriano Centurión, one of the founders of the Agrarian Leagues.* They were released after an unprecedented display of international solidarity that included a visit from AFL–CIO leaders.

In 1978 the CCT merged with the National Central of Urban Workers* to form the National Coordination of Workers.*

CHRISTIAN PEASANT FEDERATION (Federación Cristiana Campesina—FCC).

This federation assumed the leadership of the rural organizational movement in 1970, with twenty-six affiliated agrarian leagues and two national federations. *See* Agrarian Leagues.

CNT. *See* National Coordination of Workers.

CNTU. *See* National Central of Urban Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN CRISTIANA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Christian Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* National Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN PARAGUAYA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Paraguayan Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN PARAGUAYA DE TRABAJADORES-EXILIO. *See* Paraguayan Confederation of Workers—In Exile.

CONSEJO OBRERO DEL PARAGUAY. *See* Workers' Council of Paraguay.

COP. *See* Workers' Council of Paraguay.

CORP. *See* Regional Workers' Central of Paraguay.

CPT. *See* Paraguayan Confederation of Workers.

CPT-E. *See* Paraguayan Confederation of Workers—In Exile.

FEDERACIÓN CRISTIANA CAMPESINA. *See* Christian Peasant Federation.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES BANCARIOS DEL PARAGUAY. *See* Bank Workers Federation of Paraguay.

FEDERACIÓN NAVAL. *See* Naval Federation.

FEDERACIÓN REGIONAL OBRERA DEL PARAGUAY. *See* Regional Workers Federation of Paraguay.

JOURNALISTS SYNDICATE OF PARAGUAY (Sindicato de Periodistas del Paraguay—SPP).

The SPP originated in the Press Club, an informal association of employees of newspapers and radio and television stations. It formally organized itself in 1979 and is part of the reformist *intersindical* within the Paraguayan Confederation of Workers.

It has an estimated membership of 150 journalists.

LIGAS AGRARIAS. *See* Agrarian Leagues.

NATIONAL CENTRAL OF URBAN WORKERS (Central Nacional de Trabajadores Urbanos—CNTU).

Established in 1962, this small trade union merged in 1978 with the Christian Workers' Confederation to form the National Coordination of Workers.* Its international affiliation is with the World Confederation of Labor—Latin American Workers Central (Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores—WCL-CLAT).

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF PARAGUAYAN WORKERS (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores del Paraguay—CNTP).

A subservient labor confederation established during the eighteen month (1936–37) Febrerista government (a heterogeneous coalition of progressive military and civilian groups led by Colonel Rafael Franco), the CNTP was replaced by the Workers' Council of Paraguay* during Higinio Morinigo's government in the 1940s.

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT).

Established in 1930, this confederation was the first to unite all trade unions in the country under the influence of the Communist Party. It called a nationwide strike shortly before the onset of the Chaco War (1932). The government re-

pressed almost all CNT member unions and imprisoned many union leaders. A government decree in 1931 dissolved all labor organizations, thus ending the National Confederation.

NATIONAL COORDINATION OF WORKERS (Coordinación Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT).

In 1978 the Christian Confederation of Workers* merged with the small National Central of Urban Workers* to form the CNT. It is not officially recognized by the government. It is associated with the Christian Democratic Movement and it includes bank workers, rural workers, and construction workers.

NAVAL FEDERATION (Federación Naval del Paraguay).

Founded early in the century (1910s), this federation is important because it was the first labor organization to win a major collective bargaining contract after a twenty-month strike which began in 1920.

ORGANIZACIÓN REPUBLICANA OBRERA. *See* Republican Workers' Organization.

ORO. *See* Republican Workers' Organization.

PARAGUAYAN CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederación Paraguaya de Trabajadores—CPT).

Established in 1951, the CPT is the only legally recognized union and only officially sanctioned means of access for the country's workers to the government. More than 90 percent of Paraguay's organized workers are members of the confederation, although they represent no more than 8 percent of the economically active population of the country. It is strictly controlled by the government and the Colorado Party. Recently, a movement that has openly declared its intent to achieve a more independent stance vis-à-vis the government has emerged in the so-called Group of Nine, or the *intersindical*. The AIFLD (American Institute for Free Labor Development) supports this reform movement.

Formerly affiliated with the ICFTU-ORIT (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions—Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers), its membership was suspended by the ICFTU in 1979 under charges of official subterfuge. It receives annual grants from the Ministry of Justice and Labor, under whose name it is listed in the Asunción telephone directory.

PARAGUAYAN CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS—IN EXILE (Confederación Paraguaya de Trabajadores—Exilio—CPT-E).

The CPT-E was founded in Montevideo in April 1959 by the majority of the leaders of the old Paraguayan Confederation of Workers* (CPT) who were expelled from the country after the general strike of 1958 and the subsequent government intervention of the organization. It has been active since among the

hundreds of thousands of Paraguayan workers who live and work in exile in Uruguay and Argentina, most recently in lobbying activities for human rights causes. There is little information available as to the nature and scope of its present activities.

REGIONAL WORKERS' CENTRAL OF PARAGUAY (Central Obrera Regional del Paraguay—CORP).

Founded in 1917, this artisans organization, mainly composed of shoemakers, bakers, and printers, was short-lived. By 1930 it was drawn into the National Workers' Confederation,* which was under Communist influence and was subsequently suppressed on the eve of the Chaco War.

REGIONAL WORKERS FEDERATION OF PARAGUAY (Federación Regional Obrera del Paraguay).

Formed by anarcho-syndicalists around 1906, this labor organization was short-lived but reached a membership of 2,000 with sixteen craft unions and mutual benefit societies.

REPUBLICAN WORKERS' ORGANIZATION (Organización Republicana Obrera—ORO).

In 1944 all four political groups—the Colorados, the Liberals, the Communists, and the Febreristas—organized labor organizations. The ORO was the arm of the Colorado Party. After the defeat of the Febreristas in the civil war of 1947, all labor movements were outlawed except the ORO, which was then led by officialists. The ORO never gained major influence. In 1951 it renamed itself the Paraguayan Confederation of Workers.*

SINDICATO DE PERIODISTAS DEL PARAGUAY. *See* Journalists Syndicate of Paraguay.

WORKERS' COUNCIL OF PARAGUAY (Consejo Obrero Del Paraguay—COP).

This short-lived labor organization was established during Higinio Moringo's presidency in the 1940s to replace the Febrerista-dominated National Confederation of Paraguayan Workers*.

Peru

WILLIAM BOLLINGER

Peru's organized labor movement has played an important role in the nation's modern history, despite periods of dictatorship when union activity was curtailed or banned entirely. Of 4,790 unions established between 1936 and 1982, some 60 percent survived. The proportion of workers in industrial unions declined somewhat after the mid-1970s, due to the severity and duration of the nation's economic crisis. But this was offset by dramatic growth of union activity among public employees in the 1980s.

The pace and scope of unionization since the 1960s has been especially impressive, given objective limits posed by Peru's high unemployment rate and vast "informal" economy of self-employed vendors, service workers and clandestine sweatshops. In a country of 17.8 million, some 5.6 million Peruvians were economically active in 1980, about 42 percent wage earners. Beyond the traditional industrial and farm worker unions, by the early 1980s labor organizations represented some 450,000 employees of the national government and public agencies, 30,000 local government employees, and 50,000 employees of cooperatives and other worker-owned firms. Thus, over 40 percent of Peru's wage earners were represented by labor organizations—a far higher rate than, for example, in the United States. Indeed, some 66 percent of all Peruvians working in firms or agencies employing over 20 persons were unionized.

Unions are formed at the enterprise level (the *sindicato*, or local), and membership is voluntary under the law, although de facto closed shop has been won by some unions. Few craft unions have been formed since socialists gained leadership of the labor movement in the 1920s. Most Lima-Callao locals affiliate with an industrial federation belonging to one of the competing national confederations, and locals in provinces affiliate with a departmental federation or directly with the central labor body. Confederations provide vital legal, administrative, and educational support, although independent federations and some

larger individual unions also have full-time staffs. Peruvian law and traditional union practice mandated separate locals, working conditions, and social benefit systems for blue-collar workers (*obreros*) and white-collar employees (*empleados*) according to deeply rooted stratification in the working class; but socialists formed unitary unions in some industries in the 1960s, and the nationalist Velasco military regime (1968–75) reversed government policy in the 1970s, including repeal of separate health care systems for *obreros* and *empleados*. The Confederation of Workers of Peru* (Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú—CTP) struggled to retain separate white-collar unions in mining and commerce, partly to forestall complete disappearance of certain CTP locals.

Employers have grouped in powerful lobbies since the 1890s; in 1984 they joined together to form the National Confederation of Private Enterprise Institutions (CONFIEP). Unions obtained industry-wide collective bargaining in only a few sectors, notably textiles and glass manufacture. Peruvian law technically prohibits lockouts by employers, although such actions became commonplace in the 1970s and 1980s. Employers also have made use of bankruptcy laws to break strikes and dismiss workers with seniority.

Peruvian labor law, a patchwork dating back to 1873, circumscribes the right to strike. Unions must give the government notice and cause for each contemplated action; a strike is legal unless the Ministry of Labor declares it illegal. In practice, employers are adept at securing government rulings of “inadmissibility.” In 1982 the Light and Power Workers Federation of Peru* (Federación de Trabajadores en Luz y Fuerza del Perú) presented a formal complaint to the International Labor Organization (ILO).

Peru's first trade unions were established at the turn of the century, during a period of growing foreign investment in mining and petroleum, together with limited development of textile, brewing, baking, and transportation industries. Industrialization had been hampered for decades by liberal importation of foreign manufactures and the predominance of semifeudal social and economic conditions throughout the Andean highlands. Although slavery was abolished in 1854, coastal plantation owners did not rely primarily on wage labor for another half century. In addition to using the traditional *enganche* system of seasonal labor recruitment, exporters of sugar, cotton, guano, and other commodities imported 100,000 Chinese indentured servants.

Small-scale manufacturing was largely limited to the capital, Lima, and its nearby port of Callao. The country's first textile mill was established at Vitarte, just east of Lima, in 1877. A spontaneous strike there in 1896 (see Vitarte Textile Union) was one of several 1890s industrial disputes prior to the formation of unions. Carpenters, leather workers, and other artisans toiled mostly in small workshops (*talleres*), organized mutual associations and held to a guild-type social and political outlook.

Beginning in 1895, development-oriented capitalists passed laws favoring local industry and erected several dozen new factories in the Lima-Callao area. With limited available male wage labor, some industries, particularly textiles, em-

ployed women and children. Anarcho-syndicalist ideology began to take hold among many workers, with the encouragement of Manuel Gonzáles Prada, poet and intellectual founder of revolutionary nationalism in Peru. He delivered his famous speech, "The Intellectual and the Worker," at Peru's first major May Day event, held in Lima in 1905 (see "Estrella del Perú" Bakery Workers Federation). In 1912–13, a series of strikes spread from Lima-Callao to north coast oil fields and sugar estates, with workers demanding an eight-hour day and higher wages. The working day for wage laborers was ten to sixteen hours; living conditions were deteriorating. Industrialists blamed President Guillermo Billinghurst's (1912–15) populist rhetoric for having "aroused" the workers. To control the situation, Billinghurst issued a decree discouraging strike activity and permitting the state to intervene in labor disputes. This law inadvertently recognized workers' right to strike, further damaging Billinghurst's reputation with factory owners and leading to his ouster by the military.

Under anarcho-syndicalist leadership, the fledgling union movement pressed for the eight-hour day. As wartime inflation ate away at wages, a flurry of strikes broke out in 1918. Factory owners tried to stand firm, and the government unleashed Peru's first major repression against organized workers. Union newspapers and progressive magazines were banned, and police fired into the ranks of demonstrators. In January 1919 the Local Workers Federation of Lima* (Federación Obrera Local de Lima—FOL), an anarchist-led organization, called a general strike which was joined by even the relatively conservative federation of artisan guilds. With Lima paralyzed and university students rallying behind the strikers, factory owners agreed to negotiate. On January 15, President José Pardo (1915–19) issued a decree recognizing the eight-hour day, a law honored by employers only to the extent unions forced them to do so.

Two political currents emerged in the Peruvian labor movement in the 1920s; socialism and a Peruvian strain of populism, or social democracy, known as *Aprismo*. Both competed bitterly for influence, with the Aprista current dominating from 1945 to 1968, and socialists thereafter achieving leadership of some 80 percent of organized labor. The socialist current was first led by José Carlos Mariátegui (1894–1930), one of Latin America's most dynamic writers, who met an untimely death at age thirty-five. His best-known work, *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*, became the most influential book ever written about Peru. Mariátegui argued that Peru was a semifeudal country dominated by landowners and foreign firms. Believing that "the moral, political and psychological elements of capitalism apparently have not found a favorable climate here," Mariátegui was dubious of the development potential of Peru's weak industrialists. He argued that workers and peasants, organized in a communist party, were the only social force capable of developing Peru.

Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (1895–1979) led the rival populist current, called Aprismo after his political movement, APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana). Like Mariátegui, Haya de la Torre came to maturity during the 1913–19 period of labor militancy.

Although the two collaborated politically during the early 1920s, and Haya initially adopted an anti-imperialist posture, their paths soon divided. Haya developed an ideology that appealed to middle sectors and explicitly rejected the notion of class conflict. During exile in Mexico he founded APRA in 1924 as a "single international front of manual and intellectual workers." APRA has historic ties to Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional—PRI) and Venezuela's Democratic Action (Acción Democrática) among others.

While Haya searched for a cross-class base of support for Aprismo, Mariátegui geared his work to the labor movement (see Local Workers Federation of Lima). He founded the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Peruano, which later became the Peruvian Communist Party, Partido Comunista Peruano—PCP) in 1928 and the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú—CGTP) the following year. Peru's first national labor confederation, CGTP grouped the principal union federations (textiles, brewery, stevedores, printers, chauffeurs, and railway workers). In addition to its Lima industrial bases, CGTP and PCP also organized mine workers at the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Corporation in the central sierra. These successes were short-lived, however. As the Depression hit Peru, the Leguía government (1919–30) was overthrown by a military regime headed by Luís Sánchez Cerro, which quickly moved to repress the mine workers' congress meeting in La Oroya in November 1930. The government arrested labor organizers, killed many mine workers, and banned the CGTP. The PCP was driven underground.

In the same year Haya transformed APRA into a political party, the Peruvian Aprista Party (Partido Aprista Peruano—PAP), and launched himself as its presidential candidate. Aprista organizers were especially successful among workers on the north coast, university students, and recent migrants to Lima. Haya's drive to power in the 1931 elections was derailed by fraudulent elections, and for the next sixteen months the country teetered on the brink of civil war. A repressive stability was restored only after the military brutally crushed an APRA-led insurrection in the northern province of Trujillo. Although many Peruvian industrialists and the U.S. government would later view APRA as a moderating influence on Peru's labor movement, a historic enmity between the military and APRA endured.

Throughout the 1930s union activity was banned and both of labor's political currents driven underground. In order to depoliticize labor, the dictatorship of General Oscar Benavides (1933–39) established the Ministry of Public Health, Labor and Social Welfare in 1935 and a social security program for permanently employed urban workers in 1936. APRA influenced the textile workers and northern sugar estate workers while the illegal PCP maintained a following among chauffeurs, construction workers, and labor federations in the southern provinces of Cuzco and Arequipa.

Beginning in the 1940s the labor force began to change. Peru's population almost doubled between 1940 and 1972 to 14 million. Displaced peasants and

artisans from the Andean highlands migrated to the cities in large numbers. Shantytowns sprang up around Lima, swelling to 320,000 squatters by 1961, and the population living in urban areas grew from 35 percent in 1940 to 79 percent by 1980. Major sugar and cotton growers moved into the manufacture of metal parts, paint, glass, shoes, and textiles for the growing internal market. Foreign capital, which had been heavily concentrated in the agro-mineral export sectors, also entered industry, especially pharmaceuticals. W. R. Grace & Co. invested in paper and chemicals, Goodyear built Peru's first tire factory, and Carnation developed a canned milk industry in Arequipa.

Industrial expansion revitalized the union movement. Only during the repressive dictatorship of General Manuel Odría (1948–55) was new union formation held in check. Disposed to cooperate politically during World War II, Peru's Aprista and communist labor leaders met in Chile in 1943 and agreed to form a National Committee of Unification. The committee then organized the Confederation of Workers of Peru (CTP) in Lima the following year. While Apristas dominated several federations, its first general secretary was a communist, Juan P. Luna, the only trade union leader in the congress and, therefore, immune from police attack. CTP also affiliated with the leftist Latin American Workers Confederation (Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina—CTAL).

In 1945 APRA's political fortunes rose after the party helped elect the democratic government of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero. APRA launched an effective organizing effort among coastal plantation workers, mine workers, petroleum workers, and white-collar workers, led by the party's most dynamic labor activist, tramway union leader Luis Negreiros. As soon as Negreiros and other Apristas gained the upper hand in a majority of CTP affiliates, APRA routed the Peruvian communists from CTP. Arturo Sabroso, veteran textile workers' leader and devoted follower of Haya de la Torre, was made the new CTP general secretary, and CTP then disaffiliated from CTAL.

At this critical moment of the onset of the Cold War, APRA and CTP came to the attention of leaders of the American Federation of Labor, who were laying plans to reorganize the Latin American labor movement under anti-communist leadership. In August 1946, Haya de la Torre and Aprista labor leaders met in Lima with AFL emissary Serafino Romualdi, establishing an enduring relationship. Romualdi later recalled how Haya introduced him to the term *policlasista* as an alternative to the communists' "class struggle concept." Arturo Sabroso attended the AFL's Chicago convention in October 1946, and CTP offered Lima as the site of the AFL's proposed conference of anti-communist Latin American labor organizations, to form a rival to CTAL. The Inter-American Confederation of Workers, which later became the Regional Inter-American Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), was founded in Lima in January 1948, and CTP thereafter played a leading role in its activities. (For example, the veteran Aprista leader of CTP's Office Employees' Federation of Peru, Arturo Jáuregui, was a founding ORIT staffer and became its general secretary in 1961.)

For the next two decades, the AFL, and later the reunified AFL-CIO and U.S. government agencies, working through CTP, had important influence in the Peruvian labor movement, offering training programs, political orientation, and financial assistance. However, the AFL and U.S. government did not always see eye to eye on APRA. Following an abortive Aprista insurrection in 1948, the United States supported the anti-labor dictatorship of General Manuel Odría, which provided generous terms for expanded U.S. investment in mining. Odría banned APRA and imprisoned Sabroso and other CTP leaders. In 1950 police assassinated Negreiros, CTP's most capable leader. During visits to Peru in 1951 and 1952, AFL representatives negotiated a degree of freedom for CTP, and Sabroso was released.

From 1956 to the mid-1960s CTP was organizationally hegemonic in the Peruvian labor movement, although communist activists held leadership in many locals and influenced federations in the southern departments of Cuzco, Arequipa, and Puno. Arturo Jáuregui succeeded Sabroso as CTP general secretary in 1957. APRA's hegemony in CTP was based upon its ability to deliver relatively high wages and improved benefits for workers with seniority in CTP's key bases, particularly the textile and sugarcane industries, during a time of economic expansion. CTP's Textile Workers Federation of Peru* (Federación de Trabajadores en Tejidos del Perú), for example, was the first Peruvian union to establish industry-wide collective bargaining and win cost-of-living adjustments as a permanent contract feature. In the wake of the Cuban Revolution (1959), the AFL-CIO stepped up its assistance to CTP with financial backing from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). In 1962, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the AFL-CIO's labor arm in Latin America, opened the Labor Studies Center of Peru (Centro de Estudios Laborales del Perú—CELP) in Lima with U.S. government funding and support of Peru's Ministry of Labor. Between 1962 and 1979 over 27,000 workers received AIFLD training in Peru.

AIFLD also backed workers' cooperative and self-help schemes in association with Church agencies and Alliance for Progress programs. Nevertheless, CTP hegemony in the labor movement began to weaken in the 1960s. APRA severely tarnished its reputation among many trade unionists by forming parliamentary alliances (known as the *convivencia*, or cohabitation) after 1956 with representatives of the most conservative oligarchic factions, including former president Odría. A radical faction calling itself Rebel Apra (*Apra Rebelde*) broke away to join a growing Peruvian "new left" movement, which also included pro-Cuba currents, small Trotskyist factions and Maoist defections from the PCP. After abortive rural guerrilla campaigns in the early- and mid-1960s, these new organizations to the left of the PCP began to gain influence in the labor movement. Meanwhile, the PCP, suffering less repression under the elected Prado (1956–62) and Belaúnde (1963–68) regimes, regained considerable influence in many CTP federations, including the construction, bank, and mine worker organizations.

CTP's nonmilitant and economist approach to union administration was effective during the 1950s period of expanding foreign investment and the heady first years of Alliance for Progress–AIFLD assistance, particularly in sectors where APRA had a base of supporters with seniority, job stability, and relatively good wages and benefits. But APRA lost trade union initiative in the 1960s when such pockets of privilege could not be extended beyond a few sectors in a terribly poor country undergoing rapid social and economic change. An aging Aprista bureaucracy drained the party of its dynamic nationalist and populist character, and the generation of CTP labor leaders who replaced Sabroso and Negreiros based their control more on organizational manipulation, strong-armed tactics by Aprista *búfalos* (colorful name of the party's goon squads), influence peddling, and the promise of such rewards as a housing loan or paid trip to the United States. Indeed, the financial support which the AFL–CIO lavished on CTP—perhaps its prime showcase success in all of Latin America—may have inadvertently contributed to corruption and the eventual political demise of CTP leadership.

The first important sign that APRA was losing control of the trade union movement came in 1962. After an inconclusive three-way election between Haya de la Torre, Odría, and liberal architect Fernando Belaúnde, selection of the president was thrown to congress. Haya, comfortable with the political scheming of the *convivencia* and worried about the rising popularity of Belaúnde among middle-class voters, threw APRA's support to ex-dictator Odría. When a military coup frustrated the "unholy" alliance, Haya ordered CTP to call a general strike. The action was, in the words of Romualdi, "a pitiful failure." AFL–CIO officials feared that APRA's own political mistakes, coupled with Kennedy administration hostility toward the new military junta, would help communists regain leadership of CTP. Romualdi flew to Peru to intervene with top military officials and received personal assurance from General Juan Bosio, Minister of the Interior, that "the Communist seizure of the CTP will not be permitted." (See Romualdi, p. 318.) When the military turned over power to Belaúnde in 1963, the AFL–CIO again intervened, with U.S. government assistance, to ensure that the new government would support APRA control of CTP against growing communist influence in key federations. Arturo Jáuregui, ORIT general secretary and Aprista leader, assured Belaúnde that his government would receive support from the AFL–CIO and its allies around the world.

But the general strike debacle exposed APRA's trade union weakness, encouraging leftist trade union activists in late 1962 to form the CTP Reorganization and Unification Committee* (Comité de Reorganización y Unificación de la CTP). The main unions joining the effort were the Bank Employees Federation* (Federación de Empleados Bancarios—FEB), the Lima construction workers local (some 15,000 members strong), and the Callao Longshore Workers Union. The Metal Industry Workers Federation of Peru* (Federación de Trabajadores de la Industria Metalúrgica del Perú), representing many of the most important industrial unions in Lima, also split, with a *clasista* (socialist) majority joining

the leftist Reorganization committee. The Belaúnde regime severely repressed the committee's union bases during a 1964 strike wave, allowing APRA to recreate several parallel federations as the official CTP affiliates. APRA also regained control of the FEB after the government fired 600 striking bank employees. By the mid-1960s APRA and CTP faced growing criticism within the labor movement for their close ties with AIFLD and U.S. government agencies. Revelation of alleged ties between AIFLD, AFL-CIO officials, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency were widely publicized in Peru, and, as a result, CTP general secretary Julio Cruzado and other APRA labor officials increasingly bore a stigma as "stooges" of the CIA—a charge they vigorously denied.

In 1965 the Peruvian Communist Party abandoned efforts to reform CTP from within and began to cooperate with other leftist forces to reestablish the original confederation of José Carlos Mariátegui's socialist current, the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP). To this end, in 1966 they formed the Union Defense and Unity Committee (Comité de Defensa y Unidad Sindical—CDUS). Among the major unions which disaffiliated from CTP to join CDUS were the Construction Workers Federation of Peru* (Federación de Trabajadores en Construcción Civil del Perú, with about 50,000 members), Fishing Industry Workers National Federation (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria Pesqueira Federation (20,000), Arequipa Departmental Workers Federation* (Federación Departamental de Trabajadores de Arequipa, 10,000), Brewery Industry Workers Federation of Peru* (Federación de Trabajadores de la Industria Cervecera del Perú, 6,000), Chauffeurs Federation of Perú* (Federación de Choferes del Perú, 5,000), Cuzco Workers Federation* (Federación de Trabajadores del Cuzco, 4,000), Metal Industry Workers Federation of Perú (2,000) and the Peasants Confederation of Peru* (Confederación Campesina del Perú).

The economic crisis of 1967 deepened the schism between Aprista and clasista workers and further damaged the credibility of the Belaúnde regime. In July 1968 leftists organized a CGTP founding congress with representation from 140,000 workers. Within two years CGTP eclipsed CTP as Peru's largest and most active confederation. Organizational rupture of the labor movement coincided with a more general societal crisis in Peru. In 1963 Belaúnde had come to power with middle-class and military support to launch fundamental reforms designed to bring the semifeudal Andean highlands into the modern era, nationalize the petroleum industry, and spur industrialization. By 1967 reforms had not materialized, and industry was suffering. Traditional agro-mineral exporters—the old oligarchy—still wielded a political veto (through alliances with APRA) and monopolized financial resources. Major interest groups were thus stalemated. Growing labor unrest, and particularly the defection from Aprista to communist-led unions, added an urgency to the crisis. The military intervened.

Belaúnde's mishandling of nationalization of the International Petroleum Company (IPC) provided the pretext for his ouster in a military coup on 3 October 1968. Six days later the army seized IPC's oil fields, the first step in the con-

solidation of a unique nationalist regime led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado. During its First Phase (1968–75), reformist officers brought Peru's exports and finances under state control and undertook one of Latin America's most far-reaching agrarian reforms. Organized labor was the object of co-optation and instances of repression but otherwise enjoyed considerable freedom. The regime turned more anti-labor during its Second Phase (1975–80), led by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez, when a serious economic crisis sparked generalized labor strife and radicalization.

The Peruvian agrarian reform, begun in 1969, broke the political power of the country's traditional landholding oligarchy. Although also intended to stem political ferment among rural workers, the reform process was accompanied by new peasant and farm labor organizing by several leftist groups. The Peasants Confederation of Peru,* originally formed in 1947, was revitalized under left leadership and led important movements in the early 1970s. Government supporters organized the National Agrarian Confederation* (Confederación Nacional Agraria—CNA), based especially among small and medium landholders. Land reform benefited some 200,000 families and affected about 47 percent of the arable land before expropriations were halted in June 1976. However, a majority of Peru's peasants remained landless or on tiny plots, forcing hundreds of thousands to continue to migrate to the cities in search of employment. Nationalization of major portions of the mining, petroleum, utilities, and financial sectors helped redirect investment into manufacturing. Textile, plastics, appliances, and other consumer goods industries expanded. State ownership of nonagricultural production rose to about 26 percent in the early 1970s, and there was considerable growth of employment in services, especially in public administration, health care, and education.

The military regime's relationship to organized labor was fraught with tension and occasional open conflict. While many programs benefited organized workers, most trade unionists resisted government attempts to take over or co-opt the labor movement. The Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) and CGTP leadership at first opposed the regime, but in 1969 offered political support for the reform program. Other left forces within the union movement harshly criticized the PCP for such "reformism" and pursued a more confrontational approach. A split emerged within the *clasista* (socialist) labor current, with key unions and federations moving outside CGTP. The military focused selective repression against left-led strikes, closed leftist publications, and deported several trade union leaders and labor lawyers.

For their part, Apristas were chagrined that the military, in effect, implemented APRA's political and economic program without embracing APRA as an organization. Haya de la Torre and CTP leaders were especially resentful that the military did not back them against the communist forces in the labor movement, attempting instead to set up parallel, government-backed union structures. CTP continued to lose influence, and the military regime declined to renew the Peruvian contract of the American Institute for Free Labor Development. AIFLD's

Labor Studies Center of Peru was closed in 1970, although AIFLD continued to subsidize CTP activities. While there was some APRA-military collaboration against communist forces in specific unions, the military did not turn to APRA until economic crisis and labor radicalization were out of control in the late 1970s.

Some business leaders welcomed military intervention, given the impetus of reforms to the nation's industrial development. Velasco was elected honorary president of the Second Congress of Industrialists held in 1969, and a group of manufacturers and financiers became closely associated with the regime, including Luís Banchero, the fishmeal magnate, and Samuel Drassinower, an assembler of appliances and motor vehicles. They helped the government introduce "Industrial Communities," granting workers profit-sharing and co-management rights designed to undercut union influence generally and the predominant communist leadership in particular. They failed, however, as Industrial Communities became an additional battleground of labor-management strife, and the whole troubled scheme served to alienate much of the business community from the regime. Anti-Velasco industrialists viewed state control of certain economic sectors as an unwarranted intrusion and worried that radical civilian advisers or popular pressure could push the military in a socialist direction.

The military proclaimed it would establish "a pluralistic and humanistic society, neither capitalist nor communist, based on social democracy of full participation." A number of social-democratic intellectuals, mostly ex-Apristas and Christian Democrats, advised the government in establishing new "Peruvian Revolution" trade unions and other corporatist institutions of "full participation." The key agency leading this effort was the Social Mobilization National Support System (SINAMOS), responsible for helping organize the regime's own rural and industrial labor organizations. SINAMOS tried without success to revitalize Peru's weak Christian Democratic labor organization, the National Workers Confederation* (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT). Then, in 1972, SINAMOS and the military formed the Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution* (Confederación de Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana—CTRP), and during the same year the government recognized a record 410 new unions. However, neither CTRP nor other government initiatives were able to displace the communists from hegemony in the labor movement. Instead, primary contention for labor leadership was between the Peruvian Communist Party, sympathetic to the Velasco regime, and the growing number of political forces to its left. The latter included the Revolutionary Vanguard (Vanguardia Revolucionaria—VR), Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR), Red Fatherland (Patria Roja), and various other "new left," Maoist, and Trotskyist offshoots. Though each was small relative to the PCP, their combined influence in the labor movement was considerable. During the 1970s they came to control the Peasants Confederation of Peru*; the national schoolteachers union, Unified Teachers Union of Peru* (Sindicato Único de

Trabajadores en la Educación del Perú—SUTEP); most of the main mine workers federations; and a sizable base within the manufacturing sector. Although targets of police repression, these unions managed to frustrate and finally defeat the military's corporatist challenge in organized labor.

During the first two years of the Velasco regime, many important unions disaffiliated from the Aprista CTP. The key Cerro de Pasco mine workers unions did so in May 1970, followed by the Bank Employees Federation in August. APRA and CTP made repeated overtures to the military regime, but because they were declining in political and trade union strength, they were largely ignored. In January 1971 the government was obliged to give official recognition to the communist-led CGTP. However, a number of union struggles began to directly challenge both CGTP leadership and the military. The central Andean mine workers' Mine and Metallurgical Workers National Federation of Peru* (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos del Perú—FNTMMP) adopted the most militant posture, led by general secretary Víctor Cuadros. Following the Cobriza mine massacre in 1971, hundreds of union activists were jailed. Mine-worker militancy was not supported by CGTP leadership, and FNTMMP withdrew from the confederation in 1973. A major school-teacher strike in September 1971 was also opposed by PCP and CGTP leaders, with the result that the new Unified Teachers Union of Peru* also became part of a growing leftist independent union sector. Meanwhile, the Peasants Confederation of Peru led important land seizures by peasants frustrated at the slow pace of agrarian reform. In 1974 unrest in parts of the central highlands was so generalized that the military was forced to sign a truce agreement with CCP's Andahuaylas Provincial Peasants Federation* (Federación Provincial de Campesinos de Andahuaylas).

While the government's own Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution (CTRP) failed to displace either CGTP or the independent left-led federations, it did organize dozens of smaller factories, expanding the reach of organized labor. Workers who had tried in vain to get weak unions recognized by the Ministry of Labor suddenly discovered that government approval was theirs within days if they would affiliate with CTRP. Yet many of these firms were undercapitalized, inefficient competitors, and some of their owners were notoriously anti-union. Thus, by the mid-1970s the military regime found itself allied with unions which became embroiled in nasty labor disputes that received heavy play in pro-government newspapers.

In 1972 a group of military officers led by Fisheries Minister General Javier Tantaleán Vanini attempted to challenge the left in the trade union movement by sponsoring the Revolutionary Labor Movement* (Movimiento Laboral Revolucionario—MLR), a semi-fascist front based initially in the Fishermen's Federation of Perú* (Federación de Pescadores del Perú—FPP). Tantaleán staffed MLR with corrupt union officials and a group of thugs with alleged ties to APRA. After MLR gangs stormed offices of fishermen's unions and seized control of the FPP, MLR took leadership of the government's CTRP and then began in

1974 to organize violence against the *clasista*-led unions in Lima. Volkswagen and other auto plants were sites of armed attacks on *clasista* rank and file. But in almost every union, the left mustered sufficient forces to defeat the challengers. MLR was thrown out of the Marcona iron mines and the Chimbote steelworks after the press had hailed their capture by Tantaleán's "revolutionaries." By mid-1975 MLR was discredited among most Peruvian workers, and many CTRP unions were themselves moving leftward. The government-backed CNA began to move toward alliance with the *clasista* CCP.

Initially, the military's emphasis on industrialization was remarkably successful. Peru's gross domestic product grew 5.5 percent yearly between 1969 and 1973. Industrialists were able to utilize existing capacity more efficiently, and industrial production increased by a hefty 7.1 percent a year. Profits made a strong recovery, official unemployment declined, and foreign banks provided generous financing. But Peru was on the verge of a devastating crisis. The heavily subsidized industrial sector was consuming large amounts of foreign exchange paid by traditional exports (copper, sugar, fish meal) and foreign loans. Middle-class political support was purchased through expanded white-collar employment and a substantial premium on white-collar wages. And the militant left-led labor movement had won a general improvement in real wages, which peaked in 1972–73.

The crisis was triggered by bankruptcy of the fish meal industry in 1973 and the drop in world commodity prices of 1974–75. Peru's balance of payments, which had begun to turn negative in 1972, worsened severely over the following three years. By 1974 government deficits and the foreign trade imbalance began to seriously affect the cost of living, touching off a battle on the shop floor over who would bear the burden of the crisis. In fighting to keep wages on par with inflation, the *clasista* movement to the left of the PCP began to build, particularly within CGTP's large metalworkers' federation. The Clasista Union Coordination and Unification Committee* (Comité de Coordinación y Unificación Sindical Clasista—CCUSC) was formed in November 1974 by over 100 labor organizations dissatisfied with PCP and CGTP leadership. CCUSC served as a coordinating council uniting *clasista*-led unions of CGTP with independent federations. The next year, the most conflictive in Peruvian labor history, saw nearly one-third of Peru's wage earners out in one of 779 strikes, which cost industry 20.3 million hours of lost labor time. CCUSC, however, was plagued by left differences over trade union strategy. One wing of what the PCP called the "ultra-left," led by Red Fatherland, a Maoist organization influential in the large SUTEP teachers union, wanted to turn CCUSC into a fifth union confederation. The majority of other left groups, such as Revolutionary Vanguard, advocated reconstructing a more militant CGTP from within the existing communist-led confederation.

The onset of economic crisis and the strike upsurge split the military regime. CGTP and PCP leaders hoped to push the government to the left, but more conservative military elements were able to retire Velasco and halt the reform

process. APRA hastened the rightward shift by involvement in a police strike and anti-government riots in February 1975. The military regime, now headed by technocrat General Francisco Morales Bermúdez, became more anti-labor as recession evolved into a full-blown depression in 1977. By 1978 average real wages had fallen to 57 percent of their 1970 level. Price increases, announced in "packages" several times per year, were concentrated on the food, clothing, and transportation of working-class families. Under prodding from the International Monetary Fund, state subsidies on basic necessities were gradually removed. The caloric intake of Lima's lower-income groups dropped 22 percent between 1972 and 1979, to only 62 percent of the minimum recommended nutritional level. In the black humor of the labor movement, "wages climbed the stairway while prices took the elevator." The incidence of typhoid shot up, and by 1979 Peru's infant mortality rate was the second highest in the Western Hemisphere. The shantytowns which housed half the capital city's population were turned into what Church officials called beltways of misery (*cordones de miseria*).

The crisis produced internal conflict in each union confederation. APRA and its CTP sought an opening to the regime, offering to collaborate in establishment of a tripartite commission of labor, management, and the state to oversee wage-price controls and an economic recovery program. But the government knew that CTP had no capacity to moderate radicalization of the labor movement. (Less than 2 percent of time lost to strikes in 1975 was attributed to CTP-affiliated unions.) Telling evidence of CTP weakness came in February, 1976, when APRA attempted its only show of trade union force. CTP declared a two-day work stoppage, denounced by leftist union leaders as a "counterrevolutionary ploy" on behalf of "Yankee imperialism," and the event passed almost unnoticed in Lima and most provinces.

CGTP and Peruvian Communist Party leaders found themselves in a difficult situation. Union rank and file and much of CGTP's local and federation-level leadership demanded forceful action in defense of deteriorating living standards. But the party feared that union militancy would only push the regime farther to the right. This restraint inflamed anti-PCP sentiment among labor and political forces to the left of the party and widened rifts within key CGTP federations.

A similar political crisis broke out within the government's own Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution (CTRP). Once rid of the unsavory MLR elements, CTRP represented a social democratic labor current genuinely devoted to the military's reform programs. Since CTRP was never able to break into major industrial or mining unions, it largely represented workers at small and medium-sized firms most vulnerable to the economic crisis. After the Fishermen's Federation threw out its MLR-linked national leadership in 1975, the military began to lose control. In 1976 most CTRP Lima affiliates, calling themselves the "hundred locals" (*cien bases*), split to form CTRP-Lima and joined with the Fishermen's Federation and the small Christian Democratic National Workers Confederation (CNT) in a Unification Council of Union Orga-

nizations* (Consejo de Unificación de Organizaciones Sindicales—CUOS). Although stressing their “democratic” (i.e., anti-communist) unity, CUOS unions denounced the Aprista CTP and leaned in a *clasista* direction.

Society-wide radicalization was most clearly evidenced in the spontaneous joining of union struggles and mass community resistance to the regime’s economic policies. By a coincidence heavy with historical symbolism, the most dramatic instance occurred in the industrial zone of Vitarte, a few miles east of Lima on the central highway, where the union movement had been born almost a century earlier. A center of textile production, Vitarte was hard hit by the contraction of the economy. Numerous factories tried to cut back their work force in violation of Peru’s labor laws, and workers responded with strikes and plant seizures. The community became involved with each strike action, and residents twice blocked the central highway.

In late May 1976 the Ministry of Labor approved dismissal of 250 workers from the Manufacturas Nylon plant in Vitarte, even though the entire work force was on strike demanding their reinstatement. Owners requested the government end the strike, and on 4 June police units were sent up the highway from Lima to clear the picket line. They were met by 8,000 residents who blocked the road and fought police with rocks and clubs. On 28 June the government announced its most drastic austerity “package” to meet conditions for a loan from a group of U.S. banks, and Vitarte-like mobilizations spread in the shantytowns surrounding Lima. The government retaliated by suspending constitutional guarantees, imposing a nightly curfew, shutting down leftist weekly newspapers, and arresting key labor leaders. On 13 August the government suspended the right to strike and permitted firing of workers who defied the “national emergency.” These measures were renewed on a monthly basis for the next year, reducing the number of strikes during 1976 and 1977 to about half the 1975 level.

Anti-labor attacks drew together CGTP, CCUSC, and CUOS unions, and a proposed national strike became the main topic of debate throughout the labor movement. Although PCP leaders warned of a possible *pinochetazo* (after the hard-line Chilean general Pinochet), the party’s own union and student activists pressed for militant action. In June 1977, after the government implemented another round of IMF-drafted price increases, a wave of mass protests swept through southern Andean provinces. Riots paralyzed several cities and demonstrators burned SINAMOS offices. PCP and CGTP leadership finally agreed to join in replacing the anti-government trade union front. The new Unified Struggle Command* (Comando Unitario de Lucha—CUL) included CGTP, all independent *clasista* federations, CTRP-Lima, and a breakaway sector of the small Christian Democratic CNT. Only APRA’s CTP remained on the sidelines. Although pessimistic about CTP’s prospects, AIFLD rushed additional aid to its Peruvian affiliate, budgeting funds for everything from painting slogans on walls in Lima to a new pro-APRA book on the history of the Peruvian labor movement. AIFLD stated that its effort in Peru was “aimed at the rank and file in key unions

being threatened by communists," especially "publicity assistance" to promote a "democratic trade union image" for CTP.

With PCP support, CUL issued a call for a forty-eight-hour general strike on 19 July. Because striking workers could be fired, the government believed it could undercut the strike by a propaganda blitz and by pressuring private bus owners to run their routes. By early morning on 19 July, however, workers in the major squatter settlements blockaded highways leading into the capital. Plaza Unión, through which hundreds of thousands of workers passed every morning en route to the main factory districts, was deserted. The general strike was a spectacular success—the most important single labor action in Peru since 1919. The military wasted no time in responding, and at least nine workers, including three women, were killed by police and army troops. On 20 June the government arrested hundreds of union leaders and students. The regime then issued Decree Law 10-77, authorizing employers to fire the strikers. Over 5,000 workers were dismissed.

While the firings were a serious blow to the labor movement, they also had the effect of spreading leftist influence in shantytowns by releasing veteran union activists into neighborhood associations and other political activities. Campaigns in support of fired workers became the labor movement's central preoccupation. The regime lost almost all of its remaining mass support, and in November 1977 Morales Bermúdez announced that the military would gradually relinquish power. Elections were scheduled for the following June to seat a Constituent Assembly which would draft a new constitution, to be followed by presidential elections in 1980. Meanwhile, a serious division ripened within Peruvian Communist Party ranks and CGTP leadership. Labor leader and PCP central committee member Ventura Zagarra Araña publicly criticized the party's political commission for conciliating the military regime. Then, after PCP leaders frustrated plans for a new general strike in support of the dismissed workers, the party split in early 1978. Part of the PCP's trade union base, particularly in Lima, broke away to form PCP-Majority (PCP-M).

The government designated 1978 the "Year of Austerity." Workers called it the "Year of Misery." Another general strike on 22-23 May shut factories down and was accompanied by provincial demonstrations in which police killed thirty-two people. Unable to hold an organized base of support after a ten-year rule, the military was obliged to turn to its traditional antagonist, APRA. Although it was badly weakened in the labor movement, Haya de la Torre's mystique and the party's disciplined organization made APRA the only political force capable of picking up the pieces and halting further left advance in unions and other popular sectors. The government-controlled daily press began to provide APRA favorable coverage, even though Haya, at eighty-three, was sliding into senility and ill-health. APRA won 37 percent of the constituent assembly vote, aided in part by the left's division into four separate electoral fronts. But for the first time in Peruvian history, and largely due to the strength of its trade union base, the left became a national electoral force, winning thirty seats in the Assembly.

Leftist deputies used parliamentary immunity to support union struggles and were instrumental in gaining fairly strong provisions in the 1979 constitution in favor of the right to organize (extended to state workers), strike, and have job stability. In addition, the left won illiterates the right to vote, thus enfranchising the peasantry.

These gains came even as the military continued austerity policies and anti-labor confrontation, and CGTP was divided over how to respond. The government had made its most direct challenge to unions when it decreed a new Job Stability law in March 1978, increasing the three-month new-hire probationary period to three years. Workers referred to this as the "Job Instability" law. The following month the Southern Peru Copper Corporation fired 200 strikers. In the face of CGTP disunity, the Mine and Metallurgical Workers National Federation of Peru began a strike of 10,000 mine workers in August, demanding that fired workers be reinstated and the new decree repealed. Miners marched to Lima and set up an encampment in the capital from which to launch daily street demonstrations. Other unions offered solidarity, and the experience further stimulated organizing among public employees, who formed the Intersectoral Confederation of State Workers* (Confederación Intersectorial de Trabajadores Estatales—CITE). When CITE conducted a work stoppage on 6 September, the military rounded up the miners and placed them on trains back to the Central Sierra. The strike was defeated, and the government and mine companies refused to rehire fired union activists.

Although unions initiated almost as many strikes in 1979 as in the 1975 record-breaking year, there were signs the trade union movement was suffering from "exhaustion." Every union weapon, including nationwide general strikes, proved ineffective against government austerity, factory closures, and spreading misery. The labor movement had run up against its own inherent limitations in a country where wage earners were a minority, particularly given leftist rifts which weakened CGTP. The 1980 elections offered an opportunity to begin to overcome this disunity, and the left's prospects rose when Haya de la Torre died at age eighty-four on 2 August 1979, frustrating the military's transition plans and setting off a prolonged power struggle within APRA and CTP. APRA began to lose control of the Textile Workers Federation of Peru*, its last remaining major industrial union base. The left tried to seize the opportunity by converging around the candidacy of the Trotskyist leader, Hugo Blanco, popular at the time among many trade unionists. But the effort turned into a demoralizing debacle when Blanco bolted to run on an exclusively Trotskyist slate. Resentment over left disunity among union rank and file caused a backlash. Disarray of APRA and the left permitted the political resurrection of Fernando Belaúnde and his center-right Popular Action party (Acción Popular—AP). Recognizing the growing strength of organized labor, Belaúnde made the extravagant campaign promise of one million new jobs and assured workers that he would enact a labor "amnesty" on behalf of workers fired for violating the military regime's anti-strike decrees. Although his party was tied to the business community and

monetarist economic policy, Belaúnde was easily elected president with a 42 percent plurality amid a climate of great expectations among long-suffering workers.

Belaúnde's honeymoon with organized labor was short-lived. Immediately after his inauguration, the president backed away from campaign promises, citing the need to control inflation. The promised labor amnesty, enacted in January 1981, was restrictive, and new "free market" policies led to further expansion of the "informal" sector of the economy, with attendant impoverishment of the burgeoning urban population. As it became clear that Belaúnde would not fulfill his pledges, the left, now leading over 80 percent of unionized workers, regrouped. The Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) recanted its earlier support for the military regime, and began to work in concert with other left forces disposed to reincorporation of independent unions into CGTP. On the other hand, leftists advocating formation of a fifth confederation (*quinta centralistas*) in competition with CGTP lost influence.

Independent unions formed a new coordinating body, the National Union Coordinating Committee (CNS) which, unlike the 1970s CCUSC, attempted to work closely with CGTP. Greater unity was also forged in the electoral arena, with the formation of United Left (Izquierda Unida—IU) in September 1980 to contest nationwide municipal elections. Selected as titular head of IU was respected labor attorney Alfonso Barrantes Lingán. A nationwide strike in January 1981 against Belaúnde's economic policies organized jointly by CGTP and CNS (and supported by APRA and CTP) was especially successful in provincial capitals where IU had won control of city halls, providing further evidence of the importance of the political arena in bolstering the trade union movement's fading power. Such action helped workers gain a slight increase in real wages by early 1982, although salary rates still stood at only 75 percent and 66 percent of 1973 levels for blue-collar and white-collar employees, respectively.

CGTP held its Sixth Congress in late January 1982 amid debate in the labor movement over the problem of unification. While PCP maintained hegemony and the meeting was not free from sectarianism, a process was established to begin reincorporation of independent federations. The Centralization Commission formally abolished CGTP's small FENTEP (National Federation of Educational Workers of Peru, Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación del Perú) teachers union and approved membership of the powerful SUTEP (in which the PCP had little influence); and, for the first time, five leaders from other left currents were elected to CGTP's National Council. During the next three years other key independent unions also rejoined CGTP, including CCP and the newly combined mine and steelworkers federation.

The ruling Popular Action party made a highly publicized but unsuccessful attempt to win union influence, especially among public employees, through a network called Labor Commandos (Comandos Laborales). Lacking a base in organized labor, and given APRA's weakened trade union position, Belaúnde was obliged to deal directly with CGTP. In February 1981 he called together a

National Tripartite Commission, including the four labor confederations, and government and business representatives. CGTP complained that the commission was restricted to labor affairs while the problems of workers were rooted primarily in economic policies. So in June the government also convened a National Labor Council "to achieve consensus among government, employers and workers." No agreements could be reached, either on specific labor issues, like job stability, or on broader questions of economic policy. CGTP withdrew in November and was followed shortly by the other union confederations. Unable to enlist unions in holding down wage demands, Belaúnde embarked upon a neo-liberal labor policy, withdrawing the Ministry of Labor from much of its mediator role and extending anti-union devices introduced by the military regime. The 1978 law deferring job stability rights for three years, which Belaúnde had promised to repeal, was kept in place, as was the 1976 decree placing mine workers under a state of emergency which suspended their right to strike.

Belaúnde introduced legislation which would extend a worker's provisional status to twenty years for new hires in decentralized industrial zones and also drafted a new "Strike Law" which would severely curtail job action rights. The Light and Power Workers Federation of Peru protested the proposed law to the International Labor Organization, and leftist deputies succeeded in stalling it in Congress. The government also tried to privatize state-owned industry and fade out the Industrial Community system. Even larger industrial firms closed down shifts, forced senior employees to take severance pay, or used bankruptcy laws to suspend production. Manufacturing employment fell 15 percent between 1982 and 1984, and the official "underemployment" figure for metropolitan Lima shot up from 28 percent to 37 percent. While some of Belaúnde's anti-labor measures were blocked by concerted union and leftist parliamentary opposition, by 1984 some 50 percent of all workers employed in industry were without job stability protection—a substantial extension of "free market" labor competition.

Such neo-liberal policies weakened the labor movement. Many veteran union activists were compelled to find supplementary employment or start small businesses, and fewer qualified union members were willing to devote time to union affairs or stand for election to union office. Union solidarity was undermined as stronger unions concentrated primarily on their own economic goals. The number and duration of strikes declined as they proved ineffective, and demoralization spread. Some unions in the hardest-hit industries concentrated instead on collection of severance pay to enable members to gain a foothold in the burgeoning underground economy.

Meanwhile, APRA's 1980 presidential defeat, together with continued erosion of its trade union influence, produced ferment in Aprista ranks. Under guidance of the AIFLD, old-line APRA union bureaucrats formed an anti-communist Democratic Union Front* (Frente Sindical Democrático—FSD) in 1980, composed of CTP and splinter groupings from the divided CTRP and CNT. This effort was led by CTP general secretary Julio Cruzado, who came under growing criticism within the party for his identification with a noncombative approach to

trade union struggles. Cruzado was also damned for his identification with the United States and the AFL–CIO. The charge that Cruzado had been corrupted by AFL–CIO money and was linked to the CIA—long a refrain of his leftist union antagonists—was now heard within Aprista ranks. His Aprista opponents argued that Cruzado had forsaken the more populist and nationalist Aprista “United Front of Exploited Classes” in favor of pro-U.S. and pro-business devotion to the “free trade unionism” of the AFL–CIO. The opposition to Cruzado in APRA and CTP was led by Luis Negreiros, son of the martyred Aprista union organizer. Cruzado was temporarily expelled from APRA, but was able to barely win reelection as CTP general secretary in the confederation’s 1983 congress. With the more nationalist Negreiros leading their labor forces, APRA began to make modest gains in a few union elections. After flirting with Belaúnde for two years, APRA and CTP joined the left and CGTP in forming a trade union opposition to the government representing over 95 percent of Peru’s organized workers. In 1982 Peru’s four trade union confederations presented Belaúnde a joint list of demands (*Pliego Unico*), which the government ignored.

Faced with purposeful neo-liberal expansion of the unorganized informal sector and unable to achieve their most important objectives through the strike or factory takeover, unions broadened the scope of their opposition to the Belaúnde regime, taking active positions on issues of public policy. Provincial unions joined regional “Defense Fronts.” Unions grouped in coalitions to support industries threatened by free market policies and privatization, forming such organizations as the Siderperu (steelworks) Defense Front and the National Defense Front of State Enterprises, established in 1982. In 1983 CGTP and independent unions formed a new coordinating body, the National Unitary Struggle Command* (Comando Nacional Unitario de Lucha—CNUL), which organized nationwide general strikes in March and September. Belaúnde responded the day before the first of these actions by decreeing a state of emergency and suspending constitutional guarantees, followed two days later by draft legislation introduced in congress which would punish “instigators” of strikes and other labor unrest. CGTP and independent unions responded by solidifying the United Left (IU) electoral front to contest nationwide municipal elections on 13 November, turning the event into a plebiscite against the regime’s policies. Labor attorney and IU leader Alfonso Barrantes was elected mayor of Lima, strengthening the political hand of organized labor. APRA also rebounded, sweeping major northern and central municipalities. Belaúnde’s party lost every departmental capital.

In March 1984 left-led unions began meeting in a broader forum, the National Popular Union Assembly (Asamblea Sindical Popular Nacional), and CNUL coordinated two more general strikes (in March and November). Belaúnde curtailed funds to IU-controlled municipalities, and organized labor began to look to the April 1985 presidential elections as the best hope of gaining relief from repression, austerity, and labor-management anarchy. IU selected Barrantes as its presidential candidate, while APRA bypassed the old guard, going to the voters with a less sectarian, more social democratic leader, Alan García.

For the first time in Peruvian history, all major presidential candidates formally courted organized labor. CGTP and independent federations organized a National Workers Conference in February 1985 at which each candidate laid out his political program before assembled labor leaders. The conservative head of the Popular Christian Party, Luis Bedoya Reyes, was loudly rebuffed when he said that dismissed workers had "a thousand and one opportunities to find new employment in the job market." (See Fernández Prieto, p. 8.) APRA's García acknowledged the left's leadership of the labor movement when he offered to seek an understanding with CGTP. He promised to repeal the 1978 "Job Stability" law, return to a three-month provisional period for new hires, revamp Peru's contradictory labor law labyrinth into a unified code, and revitalize national industry. IU's Barrantes vowed to enforce job stability protections, respect the right to strike, keep wages on a par with inflation, and appoint a Minister of Labor nominated by the union confederations. He called for a debt moratorium and nationalization of foreign mining and petroleum operations, and commended labor leaders for "looking beyond your immediate union concerns to face the great national challenges." The presidential campaign thus echoed the 1920s struggle between Haya de la Torre and Mariátegui, with García pledging his "commitment to all Peruvians," and Barrantes responding that he would serve as president of Peru's impoverished sectors, "who are the majority in our country." (See Fernández Prieto, p. 9.)

García was elected with a 48 percent plurality; Barrantes polled about 24 percent. Never before had Peru's union movement played such a central political role. APRA and IU's combined 71 percent vote was a major shift leftward in Peruvian politics. García assumed office in July 1985 to face enormous expectations in the Peruvian labor movement for relief from deprivation and job instability. He began by boldly repudiating IMF austerity programs and proposing to limit Peru's debt payments to only 10 percent of export revenues. He took immediate steps to reactivate the economy and cool inflation, lowering the annual rate from 300 percent to 40 percent during his first three months in office. In labor policy, García called for a "social pact" with the unions. CTP, CNT, and CTRP signed an initial agreement with major national business associations to enter into APRA's *concertación*, a tripartite negotiation with the government. CGTP declined to sign on, but adopted a conciliatory posture as the left waited for a clearer picture of APRA's economic and social program. With command of the government, APRA continued to make modest gains in union influence, especially in the public sector. But although CTP general secretary Cruzado was readmitted into the party, APRA's union ranks remained divided. Furthermore, García attempted to check union demands that would threaten his economic stabilization program with the populist claim that organized labor comprised part of the nation's "centralist hegemonic bloc," the privileged 25 percent of the population which enjoyed 77 percent of national income. By demagogically counterposing union members against Peru's "poor and forgotten majority," García tried to bypass the labor movement in general, an implicit recognition that APRA lacked the ability to retake control.

Bibliography

- Aranda, Arturo and Maria Escalante. *Lucha de clases en el movimiento sindical cusqueño, 1927–1965*. Lima: G. Herrera Editores, 1978.
- Barba Caballero, José. *Historia del movimiento peruano*. Lima: Ediciones Signo, 1981.
- Blanchard, Peter. *The Origins of the Peruvian Labor Movement, 1883–1919*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1982.
- Bollinger, William. "Peru Today:—The Roots of Labor Militancy." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 14, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1980); 2–35.
- Chaplin, David. *The Peruvian Industrial Labor Force*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- Fernández Prieto, Yaned. "CONADET 85," in *Cuadernos Laborales*, no. 28 (1985).
- Flores Galindo, Alberto. *Los mineros de la cerro de pasco, 1900–1930*. Lima: Departamento Académico de Ciencias Sociales, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1974.
- Flores Gonzales, Demetrio. *Medio siglo de vida sindical en vitarte*. Lima: EETSA, n.d.
- Kapsoli, Wilfredo. *Mariátegui y los congresos obreros*. Lima: Editora Amauta, 1980.
- Lévano, Cesar. *La verdadera historia de la jornada de las ocho horas en el Perú*. Lima: n.p. 1967.
- Pareja, Piedad. *Aprismo y sindicalismo en el Perú*. Lima: Ediciones Rikchay, Lima, 1980.
- Payne, James L. *Labor and Politics in Peru: The System of Political Bargaining*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965.
- Romualdi, Serafino. *Presidents and Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967.
- Santistevan, Jorge and Angel Delgado. *La huelga en el Perú: historia y derecho*. Lima: Centro de Estudios de Perecho y Sociedad-CEDYS, 1980.
- Sulmont Samain, Denis. *Historia del movimiento obrero minero metalúrgico*. Lima: Asociación Trabajo y Cultura-ATC, 1980.
- . *Historia del movimiento obrero peruano, 1890–1977*. Lima: Tarrea, Lima, 1980.
- . *El movimiento obrero peruano, 1890–1980, reseña historica*. Lima: Tarrea, 1980.
- Tejada, Luis. "La influencia anarquista en el APRA." *Socialismo y Participacion* no. 29 (March 1985); 97–110.
- United States Department of Labor. *Labor Law and Practice in Peru*. BLS Report no. 338. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968.
- Yepez del Castillo, Isabel and Jorge Bernedo. *La sindicalización en el Perú*. Lima: Fundación Friederich Ebert, Pontífica Universidad Católica del Perú, 1984.
- Yepez del Castillo, Isabel and Dennis Sulmont Samain. *Trabajo en cifras*. Lima: Programa Académica de Ciencias Sociales, Pontífica Universidad Católica del Perú, 1983.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ANDAHUAYLAS PROVINCIAL PEASANTS FEDERATION (Federación Provincial de Campesinos de Andahuaylas—FEPCA).

Founded in 1973 in response to problems of agrarian reform implementation, the Andahuaylas Provincial Peasants Federation affiliated with the left-led Peas-

ants Confederation of Peru* (CCP). As agrarian reform bogged down in the early 1970s, farm workers in the Andean highlands complained of decapitalization by landowners in anticipation of expropriation. There was also criticism of high prices charged peasants for redistributed land. CCP began mobilizations focused on this discontent, and in January 1974 FEPCA's general assembly voted to initiate land seizures against larger landowners. In the course of confrontations in which some sixty estates were seized, FEPCA and CCP denounced collusion of police and government officials with landowners. As FEPCA mobilizations gained strength, the military regime was compelled to negotiate the "Acta de Huancahuacho" agreement in August 1974, establishing a seven-year grace period on agrarian debt payments in the region. The military later arrested many FEPCA and CCP leaders but was also moved to accelerate distribution of land in Andahuaylas.

AREQUIPA DEPARTMENTAL WORKERS FEDERATION (Federación Departamental de Trabajadores de Arequipa—FDTA).

The Arequipa Departmental Workers Federation was one of the oldest and strongest regional bases of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP). Despite hegemony of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance's (APRA) Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP) over the labor movement in the 1950s, there was significant leftist influence in Arequipa and other southern Andean cities. Arequipa was the country's second largest industrial center, and in 1960 FDFA was independent of CTP, with eight affiliates representing about 1,000 members. APRA and CTP claimed a parallel regional federation, the Arequipa Workers Labor Union (Unión Sindical de Trabajadores de Arequipa—USTA). By 1968 the FDFA had grown to about 10,000 members and was affiliated with the leftist Union Defense and Unity Committee* organized to reestablish CGTP, which became the dominant labor organization in Arequipa.

ARTISANS CONFEDERATION "UNIÓN UNIVERSAL" (Confederación de Artesanos "Unión Universal").

Peru's first important labor organization, the Artisans Confederation, was founded in Lima in 1886 as the Artisans Society "Unión Universal" (Sociedad de Artesanos "Unión Universal"), successor to similar mutual aid societies which had existed prior to the War of the Pacific (1879–82). The organization was a federation of guilds and individual artisan members, some of whom had been members of the Artisans Republican Society (Sociedad Republicana de la "Unión Universal" de Artesanos), founded in 1871. By 1891, when the Artisans Confederation name was adopted, its eleven guilds included tailors, carpenters, cigarette makers, bakery workers, and typographical workers. A modest period of industrialization began in Lima in 1895, and textile workers joined the confederation. The organization displayed a typically conservative guild orientation to labor and political issues. Two confederation affiliates, the bakery workers and the textile workers, were instrumental in establishing Peru's modern trade

union movement (see “Estrella del Peru” Bakery Workers Federation, Vitarte Textile Union, and Textile Workers Federation of Perú). The Artisans Confederation, which published *El Artesano (The Artisan)*, generally shunned political involvement, although beginning in 1905 it pressed for a workers disability law which was finally passed in 1911. The confederation thereafter began to lose influence as anarchists organized trade unions along industrial lines. See Local Workers Federation of Lima.

BANK EMPLOYEES FEDERATION (Federación de Empleados Bancarios—FEB).

Formed in 1924, repressed during the 1930s, and reestablished in 1944, the Bank Employees Federation was Peru's most active and combative service sector union during the 1950s and 1960s. FEB was a primary battleground for American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and leftist control of the labor movement. In 1958 it had a membership of over 7,000 when the Peruvian Communist Party formed a broad alliance with other political forces within FEB to regain control from APRA. Under the leadership of General Secretary Humberto Damonte FEB was the most active and best financed union in Peru. FEB occasionally loaned money to support organizing of other unions, such as the Peasants Confederation of Peru* in 1961. In 1962 FEB led the formation of the CTP Reorganization and Unification Committee* in opposition to APRA's “pro-business” and pro-U.S. mode of leadership of the Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP). After 600 bank employees were fired in a 1964 strike, APRA retook control of the union. Membership in 1968 was estimated at 14,000. In 1970 FEB disaffiliated from CTP to join the newly reestablished General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP)* and has remained left-led since then. Banks fired 220 FEB members after the 19 July 1977 general strike, but the union won back the jobs of most through persistent negotiation and strike action. FEB was one of the most combative unions against the economic austerity policies of the Belaúnde regime (1980–1985), and minister of labor Alfonso Grados Bertorini attacked the union as a “trade union *guerrilla*.” In 1981 the union of the large state-owned Banco de la Nación merged into FEB. Leading the federation as general secretary were Antonio Zuñiga (1972–74 and 1976–80), Eduardo Castillo (1974–76), Manuel Curotto (1980–83), and Edgardo Cuba (1983–). Castillo was CGTP general secretary during 1981–83.

BREWERY INDUSTRY WORKERS FEDERATION OF PERU (Federación de Trabajadores de la Industria Cervecera del Perú).

In 1960 Lima's two largest brewery workers unions were divided in their political orientation, with the 400 members of the Callao Brewery Workers Union independent and left-led, while the 450 members of the “Cristal” Brewery Workers Union at the Backus & Johnson plant were affiliated with the Confederation of Workers of Peru, (CTP)* led by the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA). By 1968, however, the majority (some 6,000) of all brewery

workers belonged to the Brewery Workers Federation of Peru (Federación de Trabajadores Cerveceros del Peru), which was a founding member of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers.* It was later called the Brewery Industry Workers Federation of Peru.

CCP. *See* Peasants Confederation of Peru.

CCUSC. *See* Clasista Union Coordination and Unification Committee.

CDUS. *See* Union Defense and Unity Committee.

CENTRAL SINDICAL DE EMPLEADOS PARTICULARES DEL PERÚ. *See* Office Employees Federation of Peru.

CGTP. *See* General Confederation of Peruvian Workers.

CHAUFFEURS FEDERATION OF PERU (Federación De Choferes del Perú—FCP).

Founded in 1919, this federation was long a battleground between the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and the left. In the mid-1950s the union had 53 affiliates and regularly published its paper, *El Volante*. But by 1961 the federation was divided. The left-led Chauffeurs Federation of Peru broke from the Confederation of Workers of Peru (CTP)* to join the Union Defense and Unity Committee (CDUS)* in the late 1960s and became an independent union. The parallel APRA-led CTP chauffeurs affiliate was called the Chauffeurs and Allied Workers Federation (Federación de Choferes y Anexos del Perú).

CHRISTIAN UNION MOVEMENT OF PERU (Movimiento Sindical Cristiano del Perú—MOSICP).

The Christian Democratic movement did not gain the political importance in Peru which it attained in some other Latin American countries, and its influence in the Peruvian labor movement was also slight. The Christian Democratic Party (PDC), founded in Peru in 1955, organized the Christian Union Movement of Peru the same year. By 1960, MOSICP had only seven affiliates with an estimated membership of 200. MOSICP began a Farmworkers Union Front (Frente Sindical Campesino) in 1960 in alliance with the Cceres brothers in the Puno region, but the latter became independent regional bosses (see Workers and Peasants National Front). By 1968 MOSICP comprised only twenty-five minor unions and was plagued by leadership problems. In 1969 Christian Democrats threw their support behind the reforms of the Velasco military regime (1968–75) and reorganized MOSICP into the National Workers Confederation* (CNT), designed to build a trade union base for the government. The organizing effort, which received aid from the regime's Social Mobilization National Support System (SINAMOS),

concentrated on industries and smaller factories not under the influence of the predominant American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and communist labor currents. CNT was officially recognized in 1971 with twelve small federations. Despite financial backing from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, CNT made no headway. A split in the PDC in 1971 further weakened the Christian Democratic movement, and the government soon abandoned CNT in favor of building its own trade union confederation, the Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution.* CNT split into two factions in 1973, and in 1975 a third group tried to reestablish MOSICP, without apparent success.

CITE. *See* Intersectoral Confederation of State Workers.

CLASISTA UNION COORDINATION AND UNIFICATION COMMITTEE (Comité de Coordinación y Unificación Sindical Clasista—CCUSC).

Formation of CCUSC in 1974 was an important juncture in leftist efforts to reorient and unify the labor movement. *Clasista* (“classist,” or working class-oriented) was the term Peruvian socialist trade unionists historically used to distinguish themselves from their Aprista rivals (followers of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance—APRA). *Clasista* connoted both a more militant disposition and a qualitative difference in political consciousness. *Clasista* unionists tended to be more “political” and less “economist” in their trade union orientation, linking the struggle for their own union’s immediate concerns to broader social and political issues. But in the 1970s *clasista* took on a more specific meaning within the socialist trade union current, as “new left,” Maoist, and Trotskyist forces appropriated the term to characterize themselves against what they charged were more “reformist” trade union activists of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP). This conflict produced alienation of some federations and independent unions, such as that of the Unified Teachers Union of Peru* (SUTEP) from the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP). The conflict was also the source of a schism in the Peruvian Communist Party, which led a substantial portion of its trade union base to form a separate party, PC-Majority, in 1978. *Clasista*-led unions within CGTP joined with independent federations to form the Clasista Union Coordination and Unification Committee (CCUSC) in November 1974. During its most active period, CCUSC claimed to represent over 100 unions. The coalition debated strategy and coordinated strike and protest actions as Peru’s economic crisis deepened. But CCUSC was sharply divided over the issue of trade union unity. Red Fatherland (Patria Roja), a Maoist organization influential in SUTEP, argued in favor of turning CCUSC into a fifth confederation (*quinta centralista*). This tendency was opposed by Revolutionary Vanguard (Vanguardia Revolucionaria) and other leftist groups (some of which later merged into the Unified Mariáteguista Party) who argued for reconstruction of a more militant CGTP from within the confederation. Besides SUTEP, CCUSC’s major organizers came from affiliates of CGTP’s large metalworkers’ federation and from the copper miners of Centromin Peru,

the Cerro de Pasco mining complex nationalized in 1974. Regarding CCUSC's successor organizations which adopted a more unitary posture toward CGTP (see Unified Struggle Command—CUL and National Unitary Struggle Command). Many independent unions which founded CCUSC and CUL later reaffiliated with CGTP, including SUTEP and the mine workers.

CNA. *See* National Agrarian Confederation.

CNT. *See* National Workers Confederation.

CNUL. *See* National Unitary Struggle Command.

COMANDO NACIONAL UNITARIO DE LUCHA. *See* National Unitary Struggle Command.

COMANDO UNITARIO DE LUCHA. *See* Unified Struggle Command.

COMITÉ DE COORDINACIÓN Y UNIFICACIÓN SINDICAL CLASISTA. *See* Clasista Union Coordination and Unification Committee.

COMITÉ DE DEFENSA Y UNIDAD SINDICAL. *See* Union Defense and Unity Committee.

COMITÉ DE REORGANIZACIÓN Y UNIFICACIÓN DE LA-CTP. *See* CTP Reorganization and Unification Committee.

CONFEDERACIÓN CAMPESINA DEL PERÚ. *See* Peasants Confederation of Peru.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE ARTESANOS "UNIÓN UNIVERSAL." *See* Artisans Confederation "Unión Universal."

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA REVOLUCIÓN PERUANA. *See* Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DEL PERÚ. *See* Confederation of Workers of Peru.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES DEL PERÚ. *See* General Confederation of Peruvian Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN INTERSECTORIAL DE TRABAJADORES ESTATALES. *See* Intersectoral Confederation of State Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL AGRARIA. *See* National Agrarian Confederation.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* National Workers Confederation.

CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF PERU (Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú—CTP).

The history of the Confederation of Workers of Peru, Peru's most important confederation from 1944 to 1968, has been closely intertwined with the political evolution of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and its Peruvian Aprista Party. APRA's role in organized labor grew out of the 1920s political split in the trade unions between socialist and anti-Marxist forces. The latter current, a group of veteran anarcho-syndicalists led by Arturo Sabroso of the Textile Workers Federation of Peru,* gravitated toward the radical populism and personal charisma of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, a leader of the student movement at the time of the 1919 general strike and an organizer of the Gonzáles Prada Popular Universities, schools for workers run by radicalized intellectuals. In cultivating a legend for himself among his trade union followers, Haya claimed to have personally negotiated the presidential decree granting the eight-hour day, which ended the general strike. While the political movement Haya built was highly undemocratic, based on a personality cult, and directed ideologically toward the middle class, its economist approach toward each of Peru's social sectors proved attractive to Sabroso and other trade unionists who disagreed with communist insistence on the primacy of political struggle in the labor movement. Taking advantage of the anti-communist fight within the Local Workers Federation of Lima,* Haya overcame syndicalist wariness of his conception of a cross-class political front of "manual and intellectual workers" (an approach known as *policlasista*). This doctrine was later popularized in the labor movement by CTP and Aprista activists as the "United Front of Exploited Classes," in explicit opposition to the *clasista* (working class) line of the socialist current.

The twin pillars of Aprista influence in organized labor were built in the Sabroso-led textile unions in Lima and the sugar workers unions on the large, modern estates in Haya's own home base of Trujillo on the north coast. Although socialists won leadership of the labor movement in the 1920s and established the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP) in 1929, their narrow focus on Peru's small industrial working class permitted Haya to take political initiative when the Depression radicalized a wide spectrum of society, especially in provincial towns. While the Sánchez Cerro military regime (1931–33) was crushing the communist movement and its union activists in 1930 (see Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru), Haya nurtured his mystique, developed a cross-class movement, and prepared his presidential candidacy from exile in Mexico. Returning to Peru in a historic presidential campaign in 1931, Haya convinced followers that APRA was the victim of electoral fraud.

In July 1932 sugarcane workers and other APRA supporters in Trujillo stormed the army barracks and took over the city. The military counterattacked, conducted mass executions of Apristas, and banned all trade union activity. The dictatorship of General Oscar Benavides (1933–39) persecuted APRA labor leaders, and, in an effort to depoliticize labor, established a social security program for permanently employed urban workers. Police murdered Aprista union leader Manuel Arévalo in 1937.

APRA's remarkable ability to reemerge and achieve hegemony over the labor movement was linked to a change in its international outlook. Originally regarded as anti-imperialist, the devout anti-communism of Haya and his trade union followers disposed them to reconsider their view of the United States, and APRA made overtures to the United States during World War II. Although conservative U.S. officials regarded Haya with suspicion (a U.S. ambassador once wrote that he was "in the pay of the Soviets"), the war created political conditions in which even the Peruvian Communist Party desired cooperation with APRA. Peru's Aprista and communist labor leaders met in Chile in 1943 and formed a National Committee of Unification which organized the Confederation of Workers of Peru in Lima the following year. While Apristas dominated key federations, CTP's first general secretary was a communist, and CTP affiliated with the leftist Latin American Workers Confederation (Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina—CTAL). Meanwhile, APRA gained political freedom by helping elect the democratic government of José Luís Bustamante y Rivero in 1945, and, under the leadership of its most dynamic trade union activist, tramway union leader Luis Negreiros, launched an impressive organizing effort among coastal plantation workers, miners, petroleum workers, and white-collar workers.

As soon as Negreiros and other Apristas gained the upper hand in a majority of CTP affiliates, and just as the United States initiated the Cold War in 1946, APRA broke with the Peruvian communists, routing their leaders from CTP. Sabroso was made CTP general secretary, with Negreiros second in command, and CTP disaffiliated from CTAL. APRA's resurgence in Peru came at a crucial moment, when the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was laying plans to reorganize the Latin American labor movement under anti-communist leadership. In August 1946 Haya de la Torre and Aprista labor leaders met in Lima with AFL Latin America representative Serafino Romualdi. This U.S. emissary, who later founded the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), was impressed with Haya's anti-communism and appreciation of Peru's need for foreign investment. "I heard from him, for the first time, the expression *poli-clasista*—meaning a political party based on the concept of a pluralistic society," said Romualdi. (Romualdi, p. 294.) Although concerned about APRA's authoritarian structure and cult of personality, Romualdi was very much taken by the man "worshiped" by his trade union followers, and an alliance between the AFL and APRA-CTP was born. Arturo Sabroso attended the AFL's Chicago convention in October 1946, and CTP offered Peru as host of the AFL's proposed conference of anti-communist Latin American labor organizations to form a rival

to CTAL. The Inter-American Confederation of Workers, which later became the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), was founded in Lima in January 1948, and CTP thereafter played a leading role in its activities. Aprista leader Arturo Jáuregui served as ORIT general secretary during the 1960s. The AFL, ORIT, and AIFLD provided CTP with important political and material support in its struggle to fend off the communist leadership of the Peruvian labor movement. This effort was initially made difficult by U.S. government support for the dictatorship of General Manuel Odría, which came to power in October 1948, on the heels of an abortive Aprista insurrection. CTP was banned, Sabroso and other leaders imprisoned, and Haya de la Torre forced to take a five-year refuge in the Columbian embassy. In 1950, police assassinated Negreiros, CTP's most capable leader. During visits to Peru in 1951 and 1952, AFL representatives helped negotiate a degree of freedom for CTP, and Sabroso was released from jail. While APRA resented U.S. support for Odría, "Haya soon made peace with the United States," recalled Romualdi, "and became one of the strongest voices in support of our policy during the long period of the Cold War." (Romualdi, pp. 309–10.)

From 1956 to the mid-1960s CTP was organizationally hegemonic in the Peruvian labor movement, although communist activists held leadership in some locals and federations, particularly in the southern departments of Cuzco, Arequipa, and Puno. APRA made no secret of the fact that CTP was run by the party's Labor Affairs Bureau (*Buró Sindical*). The most influential party members from labor groupings (*agrupaciones*) within each industry formed a central, which was in turn represented in the Bureau. While in theory representation in the higher bodies was elected and proportional, in practice the structure was informal and dominated by the party's legendary bossism. In the early 1960s the Bureau met weekly in closed party meetings with from forty to eighty Aprista trade union leaders in attendance. When political skill and influence peddling were not sufficient to maintain control of a union, APRA sometimes resorted to strong-arm tactics of party thugs known as *búfalos* (buffalos). APRA hegemony in CTP was based upon its ability to deliver relatively high wages and improved benefits during times of economic expansion for workers with seniority in key CTP bases, particularly the textile and sugarcane industries. The Sugar Workers National Federation of Peru* was the only legally recognized agricultural workers union in Peru, and some of its contracts ran to over 100 pages. The Textile Workers Federation of Peru* was the only union to win an annual cost of living escalator and the only federation which negotiated an industry-wide contract. APRA and CTP also maintained control in industrial and mining sectors by keeping separate unions for white-collar and production workers, a pattern encouraged by the government and consistent with APRA's economist approach to union organizing which reinforced stratification and pockets of privilege. Other important CTP affiliates in the early 1960s included the Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru, the National Federation of Agricultural

Workers of Peru,* the Metal Industry Workers Federation of Peru,* the "Estrella del Perú" Bakery Workers Federation,* the Chauffeurs Federation of Peru,* Office Employees Federation of Peru,* and the Bank Employees Federation.*

Despite impressive accomplishments in the union movement, APRA tarnished its reputation by forming parliamentary alliances (known as the *convivencia*, or "cohabitation") with representatives of the most conservative oligarchic factions, including that of former president Odría. CTP's image was also damaged by close association with U.S. government agencies and the AFL-CIO, particularly as nationalist sentiment grew in the Peruvian labor movement following U.S. attacks on the Cuban Revolution. In 1962 AIFLD opened the Labor Studies Center of Peru (Centro de Estudios Laborales del Perú—CELP) in Lima with U.S. government funding. The project was supported by the Ministry of Labor under the Belaúnde government, and some 27,000 trade unionists received AIFLD training in Peru between 1962 and 1979. Dozens of CTP leaders were brought to the United States for training at its Front Royal (later George Meany) Center. AIFLD and the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) program also developed cooperative and self-help projects to benefit unionists affiliated with CTP unions. Leftist critics viewed such AFL-CIO support for CTP as U.S. bribery to control the Peruvian labor movement. Furthermore, the charge that AIFLD was connected to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency gained wide currency among Peruvian unionists.

In the course of this AFL-CIO relationship, CTP developed what it called a "nonpolitical" approach to trade unionism, a fusion between the AFL-CIO's "free trade unionism" (*sindicalismo libre y democrático*) and APRA's own notion of the "United Front of Exploited Classes." This latter doctrine, inculcated in CTP unionists by Haya de la Torre, held that Peru's small industrial proletariat was, in the context of Peru's underdevelopment, a relatively privileged class capable of negotiating favorable contracts with domestic and, especially, foreign-owned firms, whereas Peru's middle class was more vulnerable to the traumas of capitalist development. Not surprisingly, CTP was most successful during periods of expanding foreign investment, stable employment, and rising real wages. Its textile and sugar industries contracts negotiated during the 1950s and 1960s were model agreements which seemed to verify, at least for a time, Haya's notions about organized labor in Peru. But the "nonpolitical" approach did not serve CTP well after economic conditions began to deteriorate in the late 1960s. CTP dependence on APRA's waning political influence and U.S. financial support weakened the confederation as a national labor organization. In 1961 U.S. political scientist James Payne found CTP finances and leadership structures "disorganized." Most of its budget was provided by ORIT (and later AIFLD), while APRA's Labor Affairs Bureau substituted for its leadership center. CTP's newspaper, *Cetepé*, Payne said, was "almost a complete failure," because APRA preferred to cover union news through its party newspaper, *La Tribuna* (*The Tribune*), even though "the great bulk of rank and file workers (who are not devout Apristas) do not read *La Tribuna* and are therefore cut off

from CTP opinion.” (Payne, pp. 178–79.) APRA also allowed union locals and federations to deteriorate, except where Aprista leadership was challenged by the left.

CTP became even more financially dependent on the AFL–CIO and U.S. government as it lost control of key federations. By 1961 the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) and other leftist groups had gained leadership of several CTP affiliates and breakaway federations, including the Construction Workers Federation of Peru,* and were challenging APRA in the Bank Employees Federation (FEB), Lima’s best organized and financed union. In 1962 left forces won leadership of the Metal Industry Workers Federation of Peru, the largest industrial federation. These unions then formed the CTP Reorganization and Unification Committee,* which worked to wrest control of CTP from APRA. However, in 1964 the Belaúnde government severely repressed the bank and metalworkers federations, allowing APRA to regain control. In 1965 the PCP abandoned efforts to reform CTP and instead worked with other leftist forces to reestablish the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP). Among major unions which disaffiliated from CTP by the time of CGTP’s founding congress in 1968 were the federations of construction, brewery, fishing, and metalworkers, together with the Cuzco and Arequipa departmental federations. In each case, CTP created parallel unions for locals which remained loyal to APRA, but most of these became rather empty shells during the 1970s. CTP was left with only three important unions: the textile and sugar workers federations, and the Office Employees Federation of Peru, a grouping of white-collar employee unions.

APRA and CTP were also hurt by the fact that, after 1968, the military regime headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–75) implemented most of the reforms historically associated with APRA’s nationalist program. Wary of any political party not under its own corporatist control, the military spurned APRA’s overtures during the early 1970s. And consistent with the military’s own nationalist program, which included sending home the U.S. Peace Corps, Velasco declined to renew the AIFLD–CELP contract in 1970—in effect asking the AFL–CIO to cease its activities in Peru. CTP largely sat on the sidelines of the great labor upsurge during the late 1970s, which witnessed four historic nationwide general strikes.

When General Francisco Morales Bermúdez took over from Velasco in 1975, AIFLD made a special effort to revitalize CTP, providing funds for everything from painting slogans on walls to publication of a book favorable to APRA on the history of the Peruvian labor movement. AIFLD reported that its work in Peru would be “aimed at the rank and file in key unions being threatened by communists.” But AIFLD was pessimistic, given the extent of leftward radicalization, and in fact, the effort failed. Telling evidence of CTP weakness came in February 1976, when APRA attempted its only show of trade union force. CTP declared a two-day work stoppage, denounced by leftist union leaders as a “counterrevolutionary ploy” on behalf of “Yankee imperialism,” and the event passed almost unnoticed. In 1975 a study showed that 53 percent of unions

changing their affiliation had left CTP, while none had joined the Aprista confederation. Although CTP claimed to control 29 federations, most contained only small locals and remnants of Aprista organizing in the 1950s. CTP still claimed the Northern Miners Federation, but it was a shell for a few white-collar employee unions at smaller mining companies. In contrast, the left-led Mine and Metallurgical Workers National Federation of Peru represented over 100 locals.

By the time the military regime was in serious crisis in 1978 and turned to APRA for political support, CTP had no capacity to moderate the radicalized trade union movement, its control reduced to about 15 percent. The military boosted APRA's fortunes in the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections, and Haya de la Torre was elected assembly president. But the infirm leader died in 1979 at age eighty-four, triggering a power struggle within APRA and CTP. The confederation's crisis deepened as *clasisistas* challenged APRA in its last two major unions, the textile and sugar workers federations. When APRA was trounced in the 1980 presidential elections, longtime CTP general secretary Julio Cruzado and other pro-U.S. old guard leaders came under attack from the party's social democratic wing. The dissident Aprista campaign to reform CTP was led by Luis Negrieros Criado, son of APRA's martyred union leader. CTP initially offered support to the new Belaúnde government, forming the anti-communist Democratic Union Front,* which Cruzado said represented "responsible democratic trade unionism." But so disastrous were Belaúnde's free market economic policies that CTP joined the leftist CGTP in 1982 in a coordinated trade union opposition to the government. As the social democratic tendency got the upper hand in APRA, Cruzado was expelled from the party, although he managed—barely—to win reelection as general secretary at CTP's 1983 congress.

Despite such divisions, APRA began to make modest gains in union influence, and election of APRA's Alan García as president of Peru in 1985 improved the party's prospects for recovering leadership positions. However, it was doubtful CTP could regain the dominance it once enjoyed. In his first months in office, García was conciliatory toward the left and CGTP, a move reflected in some unusual harmony in certain unions between Aprista and leftist leaders. Furthermore, García created malaise among some Aprista unionists by his populist argument that union members comprised part of Peru's privileged "hegemonic bloc." Critics in the labor movement accused García of demagoguery in trying to counterpose organized workers with Peru's "poor and forgotten majority." At the Eleventh CTP Congress in April 1985, Cruzado retained control as president and continued to enjoy AFL-CIO backing. AIFLD worked with CTP through the Association to Promote Labor Education and Economic and Social Investigation (AFELIES), which claimed to have trained 8,000 union members in 1984. Negreiros and the more social democratic Aprista labor leaders maintained independence from AIFLD, operating their own Center for Advanced Trade Union Studies (CAES), directed by José Linares Gallo.

CONSEJO DE UNIFICACIÓN DE ORGANIZACIONES SINDICALES. *See* Unification Council of Union Organizations.

CONSTRUCTION WORKERS FEDERATION OF PERU (Federación de Trabajadores en Construcción Civil del Perú).

Founded in 1948, the Construction Workers Federation became one of Peru's largest and most active unions. Its estimated membership in 1963 was 20,000, growing to almost 50,000 by 1968, out of a total construction employment of 150,000, during the industrial and urban expansion of the 1960s. Although employment in the industry was unstable and competitive, unions became well established under communist leadership from the 1950s on through a system of temporary "site committees" formed at each construction project. The network of committees were part of regional unions which, together with separate locals at the larger construction firms, comprised the nationwide Construction Workers Federation of Peru. For decades, this union was the strongest, most stable trade union base of the Peruvian Communist Party. It was a founder of the Union Defense and Unity Committee* in 1966 and the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP) in 1968. Federation leader Valentín Pachó was elected general secretary of CGTP in 1982. Rival Confederation of Workers of Perú* construction unions had little influence outside the northern towns dominated by American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA).

CSEPP. *See* Office Employees Federation of Peru.

CTP. *See* Confederation of Workers of Peru.

CTP REORGANIZATION AND UNIFICATION COMMITTEE (Comité de Reorganización y Unificación de la CTP).

This committee reflected the early stages of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance's (APRA) loss of trade union hegemony in the early 1960s. Founded by leftist trade union activists in 1962 after an abortive strike by the Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP) on behalf of APRA's cohabitation (*convivencia*) with the party of ex-dictator General Manuel Odría (1948–55), its most active unions were the Bank Employees Federation* (FEB) and the Metal Industry Workers Federation of Peru.* Both unions suffered severe repression for their new orientation. APRA created a parallel metalworkers federation, and after the government fired 600 bank workers in 1964, APRA regained control of FEB, effectively destroying the Reorganization Committee. The next stage in APRA's loss of union influence to the left began with organization of the Union Defense and Unity Committee* in 1966 and reestablishment of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP) in 1968.

CTRP. *See* Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution.

CUL. *See* Unified Struggle Command.

CUOS. *See* Unification Council of Union Organizations.

CUZCO WORKERS FEDERATION (Federación de Trabajadores del Cuzco—FTC).

Former capital of the Inca empire, Cuzco became the center of one of Peru's most important provincial labor movements, sometimes referred to by workers as Cuzco Rojo, or Red Cuzco, because the communist movement was dominant in its trade unions. Workers had only a few mutual-type societies there until they made contact with Lima's socialist-led union movement in the mid-1920s. A small group of textile factories were organized in the Textile Union (Sindicato Textil) about the same time that the first communist cells were formed in Cuzco in 1927. Other early unions included the Chauffeurs Union (Sindicato de Choferes) and the Construction and Decorative Arts Union (Sindicato de Construcción Civil y Artes Decorativas). The federation was founded as the Cuzco Departmental Workers Federation in 1930. During the 1930s Benavides dictatorship, communists were persecuted and all labor organizations prohibited except for mutual and cultural associations. Thus, workers in 1935 renamed the Cuzco federation "United Societies." In 1942 it was reestablished as the Cuzco Workers Federation with communist unionists dominating their American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) rivals. In 1945 the visit of APRA leader Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre to Cuzco touched off a bloody confrontation between FTC's APRA and communist factions. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Cuzco's La Convención region was center of an important peasant movement organized by the Trotskyist student, Hugo Blanco. This upsurge further fractionalized FTC between the Peruvian Communist Party majority, APRA, Blanco's supporters, and other left currents. In 1964 a "new left" grouping led by former APRA adherents, the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), gained considerable influence in Cuzco's union movement. The following year, MIR initiated a guerrilla movement in the region led by Luís de la Puente Uceda, but was quickly defeated by the Peruvian military. In 1962 FTC was one of the first important federations to disaffiliate from the APRA-controlled Confederation of Workers of Peru,* and in 1966 it joined other communist-led federations in forming the Union Defense and Unity Committee.* In 1968 FTC leaders helped reestablish the communist-led General Confederation of Peruvian Workers.*

DEMOCRATIC UNION FRONT (Frente Sindical Democrático—FSD).

After suffering defeat in the 1980 presidential elections, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) offered the Belaúnde government labor support of its Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP) in return for tripartite negotiations on economic policy and union issues in the government's National Workers Council. CTP general secretary Julio Cruzado formed the Democratic Union Front, with participation of CTP and splinter groupings from the divided Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution* and National Workers Confederation,* to represent the anti-communist or "responsible" union leadership. However, the Front represented probably less than 15 percent of Peru's unions and was unable to win favorable agreements from the government. In addition,

Cruzado came under attack from within his own Aprista party for his pro-business and pro-U.S. leadership of CTP. In 1982 CTP withdrew from the government's National Workers Council to join the left-led General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* in general opposition to Belaúnde's free-market economic policies, and the Democratic Union Front lost its purpose.

"ESTRELLA DEL PERÚ" BAKERY WORKERS FEDERATION (Federación de Obreros Panaderos "Estrella del Perú").

Bakery workers played leading roles in the early development of the Peruvian trade union movement. Their guild, the "Estrella del Perú" Bakery Labor Society (Sociedad Obrera de Panaderos "Estrella del Perú") was founded in 1887 and was one of the first affiliates of the Artisans Confederation* to evolve into a trade union. Under anarchist leadership, bakers broke with the artisans guild orientation in 1905 and changed their union's name from "Society" to "Federation." The Federation was led by Manuel Caracciolo Lévano and his son, Dellín Lévano, who founded the period's most important labor newspaper, the anarcho-syndicalist *The Protest* (*La Protesta*, 1911–26). The Lévanos were allies of the intellectual founder of Peruvian anarchism and revolutionary nationalism, Manuel González Prada (1848–1918). "Estrella del Perú" leaders helped organize the 1905 May Day event at which the goal of the eight-hour day was first made the common focus of workers in Lima. González Prada was keynote speaker, delivering his address on "The Intellectual and the Workers," which appeared in his seminal book, *Hours of Struggle* (*Horas de Lucha*). (See Peruvian Regional Labor Federation and Local Workers Federation of Lima.) Representing "La Estrella," Dellín Lévano spoke on "what labor organizations in Peru are and should be." In 1960 "La Estrella" was affiliated with the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA)–controlled Confederation of Workers of Peru* and had some 2,000 members. By the 1980s it had become an independent union.

FDTA. *See* Arequipa Departmental Workers Federation.

FDTC. *See* Cuzco Workers Federation.

FEB. *See* Bank Employees Federation.

FEDERACIÓN DE CHOFERES DEL PERÚ. *See* Chauffeurs Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN DE EMPLEADOS BANCARIOS. *See* Bank Employees Federation.

FEDERACIÓN DE OBREROS PANADEROS "ESTRELLA DEL PERÚ." *See* "Estrella del Perú" Bakery Workers Federation.

FEDERACIÓN DEPARTAMENTAL DE LOS TRABAJADORES DE LIMA. *See* Lima Departmental Workers Federation.

FEDERACIÓN DE PESCADORES DEL PERÚ. *See* Fishermen's Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES AZUCAREROS DEL PERÚ. *See* Sugar Workers Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES CERVECEROS DEL PERÚ. *See* Brewery Industry Workers Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE CONFECCIONES Y SIMILARES DEL PERÚ. *See* Garment Workers Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE CONSTRUCCIÓN CIVIL DEL PERÚ. *See* Construction Workers Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA CERVECERA DEL PERÚ. *See* Brewery Industry Workers Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA METALÚRGICA DEL PERÚ. *See* Metal Industry Workers Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DEL CUZCO. *See* Cuzco Workers Federation.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES EN LUZ Y FUERZA DEL PERÚ. *See* Light and Power Workers Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES EN TEJIDOS DEL PERÚ. *See* Textile Workers Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN DE YANACONAS Y CAMPESINOS DEL PERÚ. *See* Sharecroppers and Peasants Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN DEPARTAMENTAL DE TRABAJADORES DE AREQUIPA. *See* Arequipa Departmental Workers Federation.

FEDERACIÓN DEPARTAMENTAL DE TRABAJADORES DEL CUZCO. *See* Cuzco Workers Federation.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE CAMPESINOS DEL PERÚ. *See* National Federation of Agricultural Workers of Peru, and Peasants Confederation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE EDUCADORES DEL PERÚ (National Teachers Federation of Peru). *See* Unified Teachers Union of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES MINEROS, METALÚRGICOS Y SIDERÚGICOS DEL PERU. *See* Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES MINEROS Y METALÚRGICOS DEL PERÚ (Mine and Metallurgical Workers National Federation of Peru). *See* Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA LOCAL DE LIMA. *See* Local Workers Federation of Lima.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA REGIONAL PERUANA. *See* Peruvian Regional Labor Federation.

FEDERACIÓN PROVINCIAL DE CAMPESINOS DE ANDAHUAYLAS. *See* Andahuaylas Provincial Peasants Federation.

FEDERACIÓN REGIONAL DE TRABAJADORES MINEROS Y METALÚRGICOS DEL CENTRO (Central Peru Mine and Metallurgical Workers Regional Federation). *See* Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru.

FEDERACIÓN REGIONAL DE TRABAJADORES MINEROS Y METALÚRGICOS DE SUR (Mine and Metallurgical Workers Regional Federation). *See* Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru.

FEDERAL. *See* Lima Departmental Workers Federation.

FENCAP. *See* National Federation of Agricultural Workers of Peru.

FENEP (Federación Nacional de Educadores del Perú National Teachers Federation of Peru). *See* Unified Teachers Union of Peru.

FENTEP (Federación Nacional De Trabajadores De La Educación del Perú, National Federation of Educational Workers of Peru). *See* Unified Teachers Union of Peru.

FEPCA. *See* Andahuaylas Provincial Peasants Federation.

FETIMP. *See* Metal Industry Workers Federation of Peru.

FISHERMEN'S FEDERATION OF PERU (Federación de Pescadores del Perú—FPP).

The Humboldt Current affords Peru's Pacific Coast an abundance of marine resources, from tuna to guano. In the mid-1950s Peru became a major producer of anchovy fish meal, an industry which attracted migrant workers to coastal boom towns. The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) had a fishermen's union in Chimbote in 1947, but organizing was inhibited by a combination of political repression and company treatment of boat crews as independent contractors. In 1956 the Chimbote Fishermen's Union, then affiliated with the APRA-dominated Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP), began a partially successful struggle to obtain basic social benefits for boat crews. In 1958 the Chimbote local had some 3,500 members. The fish meal industry underwent explosive growth, and 160 processing plants employed some 20,000 fishermen and another 10,000 plant workers by 1968. Flush with a quarter of Peru's foreign exchange earnings, fish meal industrialists led by Luís Banchemo were able to corrupt many fishing industry unions. However, communists gained significant influence, helping found the Fishermen's Federation of Peru in 1962, which grouped fishermen organized by port, and the Fishing Industry Workers National Federation (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria Pesquera—FENTIP) in 1965, which grouped plant workers unions. There were important left-led strikes in 1965–67, including an FPP strike in 1966. Both FPP and FENTIP were founders of the communist-led General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP) in 1968, although non-communist officials dominated FPP, including some regarded as "mafia types." Christian Democrats gained a modest foothold in the industry, founding the National Federation of Marine and Fish Oil Industry Workers (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de Harina y Aceite de Pescado—FENTRIHAP) in 1967, affiliated with Christian Union Movement of Peru* (MOSICP). (In 1973 FENTRIHAP merged into the independent Fish Workers Federation of Peru, Federación de Trabajadores Pesqueros del Perú.) The nationalist Velasco military regime, which took power in 1968, established close ties with fish meal magnate Banchemo and provided extensive state support to the fishing industry. In 1969 FPP disaffiliated from CGTP, and its leaders offered to help the government build its own "revolutionary" union movement. Minister of Fisheries General Javier Tantaleán Vanini, with political ties to APRA, hired corrupt fishing union officials as advisers and used FPP to build the nucleus of a semi-fascist Revolutionary Labor Movement (MLR). FPP was a founding union of the government-controlled Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution* (CTRP) in 1972. However, a periodic shift in the Humboldt Current (known as "El Niño") plunged the industry into crisis, forcing government nationalization and sparking left-led rebellion against corrupt CTRP-MLR leadership. The pro-government and "mafia" elements were expelled from FPP in mid-1975. The following year the government fired thousands of workers, reprivatized much of the fish meal industry and tried to dismantle FPP, which reaffiliated with CGTP.

FNTMMP (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos del Perú). *See* Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru.

FNTMMSP. *See* Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru.

FOL. *See* Local Workers Federation of Lima.

FORP. *See* Peruvian Regional Labor Federation.

FPP. *See* Fishermen's Federation of Peru.

FRENATRACA. *See* Workers and Peasants National Front.

FRENTE SINDICAL DEMOCRÁTICO. *See* Democratic Union Front.

FTTP. *See* Textile Workers Federation of Peru.

GARMENT WORKERS FEDERATION OF PERU (Federación de Trabajadores de Confecciones y Similares del Perú).

Originally in the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA)–controlled Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP) in the 1950s, the garment workers federation was later affiliated with the communist-led General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP). Although providing CGTP's main base of women workers, most federation locals were small and did not play a major role in the labor movement until the mid-1970s economic crisis, when many garment producers fired workers with seniority or used bankruptcy laws to set aside union contracts. One of the federation's most celebrated struggles occurred at "Manufacturas Lolas," Peru's largest underwear producer. The union local at Lolas had historically been complacent and cozy with management. At one point it even disaffiliated from the Garment Workers Federation in order to avoid paying dues that, the women complained, were used primarily to benefit less fortunate workers in smaller factories. But in 1977 the firm began cutting the payroll by eliminating higher-paid workers with seniority and denying their severance pay. Lolas also fell ten weeks in arrears in wages and then began a lockout in November. By the time the union won a favorable court ruling in August 1978, the company had reopened under a new name, Textiles Populares. Several hundred women reorganized their union under combative leadership of Asunción Sotomayor, a native of Cuzco and mother of six, and occupied the factory. A month later, the company hired a private police force to storm the factory at night. In a three-hour battle with union members, fifty-two workers were injured, some seriously. The owner's troops recaptured part of the factory, but the women held on in another wing. That confrontation and the union's subsequent defense campaign, which included frequent street demonstrations in

downtown Lima, became an important rallying point for the trade union movement during the conflictive period.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF PERUVIAN WORKERS (Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú—CGTP).

Originally founded in 1929 and reestablished in 1968, the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers became Peru's largest labor organization, representing well over half of the nation's trade union members and encompassing the dominant federations of construction workers, miners, metalworkers, fishing industry workers, schoolteachers, bank employees, and peasants, as well as a wide spectrum of other industrial and service workers unions. CGTP had its genesis in the anarchist-led Local Workers Federation of Lima* (FOL), founded in 1918 and reestablished in 1922 as socialism gained influence in the trade unions. By the time FOL organized the Second Labor Congress in 1927, the main anarchist paper, *The Protest (La Protesta)*, had folded, and the labor movement was divided into socialist and "pure unionism" (anti-Marxist) currents. The former was led by José Carlos Mariátegui (1894–1930), while the latter was led by Arturo Sabrosa, later the foremost American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) labor leader. As socialists consolidated their leadership of the trade union movement, the Leguía regime (1919–30) arrested fifty leaders, including Mariátegui and Sabrosa. Despite an illness that would take his life at age thirty-five, Mariátegui began a period of intense clandestine political and labor organizing. In 1928 he and colleagues founded the Socialist Party, and on 17 May 1929 they transformed FOL into the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers.

The new confederation's most important task was extension of the labor movement into the strategic central Andean mining region, where copper mining was dominated by the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Company. Organizing efforts by Socialist Party activists met with immediate success as the effects of the depression radicalized Peruvian workers. The party changed its name to Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) in May 1930, and a mine workers congress was set for November to establish a miners federation. As union delegates and much of the PCP leadership gathered in the smelter town of La Oroya, they were arrested. CGTP threatened a general strike in Lima, forcing the Sánchez Cerro dictatorship (1931–33) to release them. But days later police opened fire at Malpaso on miners marching to the CGTP meeting at La Oroya, killing twenty-three. The government dissolved CGTP and began a long persecution of all labor leaders and communist activists. Unions were not legalized again until 1945.

Some CGTP affiliates survived, and the PCP maintained a following among chauffeurs, construction workers, and labor organizations in the southern provinces of Cuzco and Arequipa (see Cuzco Workers Federation and Arequipa Departmental Workers Federation). The PCP did not attempt to reconstruct an explicitly socialist-led confederation, but joined with nationalist reformers of the APRA Party to establish the Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP) in 1943–

44. PCP-APRA cooperation was short-lived, however. During the Cold War, APRA formed an alliance with the U.S. American Federation of Labor and managed to rout PCP activists from leadership of CTP. For the next two decades Apristas (followers of APRA) were dominant in the Peruvian labor movement, although several CTP affiliates had communist leadership, including the Construction Workers Federation.* The PCP worked unsuccessfully to change the political orientation of CTP until, in the mid-1960s, the PCP and several smaller left groups were strong enough to reestablish CGTP as a separate, competing federation. Apristas had formed a parliamentary alliance with conservative groups, and there was growing criticism in the labor movement of the pro-business conduct of CTP. In 1966 unions disaffiliated from CTP established the Union Defense and Unity Committee* (CDUS). Members included the Construction Workers Federation of Peru, Metal Industry Workers Federation of Peru* (FETIMP), and the Peasants Confederation of Peru* (CCP). As the 1967 recession pushed more workers to the left, CDUS reestablished CGTP in July 1968. The founding congress included nineteen federations and sixty-six other unions representing some 140,000 workers. The new confederation declared it would end the "pro-business and traitorous monopoly" of CTP over Peruvian workers. Within two years, CGTP eclipsed CTP as Peru's largest and most active confederation.

The leftward shift in the labor movement coincided with a more general societal crisis in Peru which precipitated a reformist military coup on 3 October 1968. Although the nationalist regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–75) declared its intention to reshape Peruvian society, CGTP initially opposed the government and pressed for a 50 percent wage hike for all workers. Strikes by fishermen, bank employees, metalworkers, miners, and other CGTP affiliates continued into the next year. CGTP organized a mass demonstration in Cuzco in early 1969 against the government's repressive labor actions, which had included an attack on 200 peasant families in Cajamarca that left seven dead and twenty-seven wounded. But in June 1969 the military launched a major agrarian reform program, prompting sectors of the left, especially the PCP, to reevaluate their opposition to the government. CGTP adopted a more conciliatory posture toward Velasco and his programs. The Ministry of Labor gave CGTP official recognition in 1971, and by 1972 the confederation had 43 federations and 170 other unions affiliated representing some 400,000 workers. CGTP president Isidoro Gamarra and General Secretary Gustavo Espinoza were both leading PCP members. This pro-government shift by CGTP led to a prolonged conflict in the trade union movement, with groups to the left of the PCP claiming that CGTP leadership had abandoned *clasista* principles. A series of bitter labor disputes led to the estrangement of a number of important left-led unions from the confederation. As CGTP organized its first mass meeting in Lima to support Velasco in April 1970, for example, 16,000 mine workers at Cerro de Pasco were embroiled in a long strike which continued into the following year. In March 1971 the government arrested the leadership of the mine workers' fed-

eration; in September it deported leaders of the newly formed Unified Teachers Union of Peru* (SUTEP); and in November government troops massacred striking miners at the U.S.-owned Cobriza mine. Amid such conflicts, SUTEP-affiliated schoolteachers left CGTP, and the Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru* (FNTMMP) divided in 1973, with the larger federation bloc led by Víctor Cuadros also splitting from CGTP. These and other unions, including the Peasants Confederation of Peru and many affiliates of the Metal Industry Workers Federation of Peru, redefined *clasista* in the mid-1970s to mean a combative, anti-government orientation opposed to the "reformism" of CGTP leadership. Among left organizations active in this union current were Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VR), Red Fatherland, the Revolutionary Communist Party, and Movement of the Revolutionary Left. Most were of "new left" or Maoist origin. In 1974 some 100 *clasista* unions in and outside of CGTP formed the Clasista Union Coordination and Unification Committee* (CCUSC) to coordinate their activities. Red Fatherland led the fifth confederationist (*quinta centralista*) tendency within CCUSC, pushing for its consolidation as a separate confederation. The majority, led by VR, sought to reorient CGTP from within.

Intra-left conflict came to a head after 1975 with the onset of severe economic crisis and the transformation of the military government into a more conservative regime under General Francisco Morales Bermúdez. The Peruvian Communist Party found itself in a difficult situation, with the union rank and file and much of CGTP's local and federation-level leadership demanding forceful defense of deteriorating living standards. But the party feared that militant action would push the regime farther to the right. The party's restraint inflamed anti-PCP sentiment among labor and political forces to the left of the party and widened rifts within key CGTP federations. In June 1976 the government announced its most drastic austerity "package," prompting spontaneous mass mobilizations in shantytowns surrounding Lima. The government arrested key labor leaders, suspended the right to strike, and permitted the firing of workers who defied the "national emergency." These anti-labor attacks drew together CGTP, CCUSC, and other unions to plan a nationwide general strike (*paro nacional*).

Although PCP leaders warned of a possible *pinochetazo* (coup on the 1973 Chilean model), the party's own union and student activists pressed for action. In June 1977 mass protests swept through southern Andean provinces. With support of the PCP, the Unified Struggle Command* (CUL) organized the historic 19 July general strike. The government retaliated, authorizing employers to fire over 5,000 workers, and CGTP leadership was soon shaken by a division in the Peruvian Communist Party. Speaking for many PCP trade union cadre, CGTP leader and PCP central committee member Ventura Zegarra Araña publicly criticized the party's political commission for conciliating the military regime. Then, after PCP leaders balked at plans for a new general strike in support of the dismissed workers, the party split in early 1978. Some of the PCP's trade union base, particularly in Lima, broke away to form PCP-Majority, further

dividing CGTP federations. Disunity was evident at the confederation's Fifth Congress in September 1978. Although the government directly challenged organized labor with a new "Job Stability" law in March 1978, making it easier for employers to trim their work forces, CGTP was too divided to mount an effective response.

For the next three years, left groups active in CGTP unions worked out their differences sufficiently to begin reaffiliating major independent unions with the confederation. PCP leaders expressed a measure of self-criticism for having promoted illusions about the military regime and misled certain union struggles. For their part, VR and some other left groups were also self-critical and began to converge in the "Mariáteguista" trend, eventually forming the Unified Mariáteguista Party (PUM). The fifth confederationist tendency lost all influence. Independent unions formed a new coordinating body, the National Union Coordinating Committee (CNS), which, unlike the 1970s CCUSC, attempted to work closely with CGTP. The growing spirit of unity in the trade union movement contributed to formation of United Left (Izquierda Unida—IU) in September 1980 for the purpose of contesting nationwide municipal elections. A nationwide strike on 15 January 1981 against the Belaúnde regime's economic policies organized jointly by CGTP and CNS (and supported by APRA and CTP) was especially successful in provincial capitals where IU had won control of city halls. Veteran bank employees union leader Eduardo Castillo served as CGTP general secretary during 1981–83.

In late January 1982, CGTP held its Sixth Congress amid debate in the labor movement over the problem of unification. Some 550 delegates gathered representing 22 industrial federations, 24 departmental and provincial federations, and 103 directly affiliated unions. While the PCP maintained hegemony and the meeting was not free from sectarianism, a process was established to begin reincorporation of independent federations. The Centralization Commission formally abolished CGTP's small teachers union and approved membership of the powerful SUTEP (in which the PCP had little influence); and for the first time, five leaders from other left currents were elected to CGTP's National Council. During the next three years, several other major unions rejoined CGTP, including the Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru* and the Peasants Confederation of Peru.

Beginning in 1983 CGTP was led by General Secretary Valentín Pacho Quispe, Assistant General Secretary Pablo Checa Ledesma, and Secretary of the organization Pedro Grilli Miranda. CGTP and independent unions formed a new coordinating body, the National Unitary Struggle Command* (CNUL), which organized nationwide general strikes in March and September 1983. CGTP played a key role in solidifying the United Left (IU) electoral front to contest new municipal elections on 13 November, turning the vote into a plebiscite against the Belaúnde regime's economic policies. Labor attorney and IU leader Alfonso Barrantes was elected mayor of Lima, strengthening the political hand of organized labor. In March 1984 CGTP and other left-led unions began meeting

in a broader forum, the National Popular Union Assembly. CNUL coordinated two more general strikes in March and November 1984, and CGTP began to look to the April 1985 presidential elections as the best hope of defending union members' interests. IU presented a parliamentary slate which included top current or former union leaders of CGTP. CGTP and independent federations organized a National Workers Conference in February 1985 at which presidential candidates laid out their political programs before assembled labor leaders. APRA's Alan García, who won the election with a 48 percent plurality, struck a conciliatory posture toward CGTP. He promised to repeal the "Job Stability" law, return to a three-month provisional period for new hires, revamp Peru's labyrinth of contradictory labor laws into a unified labor code, and revitalize national industry. Prior to assuming office, García asked CGTP and other confederations to join a "social pact," but CGTP declined while awaiting a clearer picture of APRA's economic and social program.

INTERSECTORAL CONFEDERATION OF STATE WORKERS (Confederación Intersectorial de Trabajadores Estatales—CITE).

Government employment grew from some 100,000 in 1950 to about 260,000 in 1968, and then expanded rapidly during the Velasco regime (1968–75) to stand at about 480,000 in 1985. A 1945 law prohibited state workers from organizing unions or striking. Although the 1979 constitution extended them the right to organize, most state employee unions were *de facto*, without legal recognition. Since 1975 public employees had suffered even greater proportional salary erosion from austerity policies than had organized industrial workers. In 1977, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, the government began to dismiss some state workers and induce others to resign. Amid great turmoil in the trade union movement, the dispersed public employee unions formed the Intersectoral Confederation of State Workers (CITE) in 1978. CITE led numerous campaigns to defend public employee interests, working in close coordination with unions of the left-led General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP). A primary CITE focus was defense of public sector jobs against cutbacks. Its first congress was held in March 1981, but the union was unable to gain government recognition or consolidate itself around a coherent program. Both the United Left (IU) coalition and the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) were active in CITE affiliates. In March 1984 the union was reorganized and strengthened at its Second Congress. Its executive board was led by Raúl Caballero Vargas. Faced with runaway inflation and the disastrous economic policies of the Belaúnde government, CITE launched lengthy strikes of almost 400,000 public employees in June 1984 and March and June 1985, forcing the government to conduct *de facto* collective bargaining.

LIGHT AND POWER WORKERS FEDERATION OF PERU (Federación de Trabajadores en Luz y Fuerza del Perú).

Peru's largest electrical workers union was independent and left-led. In 1980

it had some 10,000 members and, after two fifteen-day strikes, was one of the first Peruvian unions to win a cost-of-living escalator and across-the-board raises for all workers regardless of wage level. The federation played an important role during the early 1980s in preventing the Belaúnde government from passing a new "Strike Law" which would have severely curtailed job action rights. The Light and Power Workers Federation presented a formal complaint against the proposed law to the International Labor Organization (ILO), and despite vigorous employer efforts on its behalf, the law died in congress.

LIMA DEPARTMENTAL WORKERS FEDERATION (Federación Departamental de Los Trabajadores de Lima—FEDETRAL).

Founded in 1979 by union forces to the left of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), FEDETRAL was an effort to consolidate a network of combative unions in the nation's capital (where over 70 percent of industry was concentrated). FEDETRAL affiliates were disenchanted with PCP leadership of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP). The founding congress (with 255 delegates representing 106 locals) was marred by intra-left polemics. After 1980, independent unions in FEDETRAL began to reaffiliate with CGTP.

LOCAL WORKERS FEDERATION OF LIMA (Federación Obrera Local de Lima—FOL).

In 1918 Peru was beset by rising inflation and economic crisis prompted by World War I. A group of anarcho-syndicalist labor leaders challenged the traditional guild outlook of the mutualists who controlled the Artisans Confederation.* An earlier attempt to centralize the more combative unions had failed (see Peruvian Regional Labor Federation), but, led by Delfín Lévano, Carlos Barba, Nicolás Gutarra, and Adalberto Fonkén, they established FOL in 1918. Included were all of the major federations (textile, bakery, printing, railway, shoemakers, and port workers). FOL's central goal was the eight-hour day. Textile workers were the first to strike in December. By January 1919 they were joined by bakers and port workers. Facing the first labor-related political crisis in Peruvian history, the government of José Pardo responded with force, further radicalizing the labor movement. FOL, now joined by the Artisans Confederation and the student movement, launched a general strike on 13–15 January, paralyzing Lima and Callao. President Pardo was forced to negotiate and issued a decree recognizing the eight-hour day, although many factory owners did not long observe the new law.

In the wake of the 1919 general strike there was a schism in the Peruvian oligarchy which led to seizure of power by pseudo-populist Augusto B. Leguía (1919–30). The labor movement split over whether to support Leguía, with the more skeptical workers maintaining their independence and reconstituting the Peruvian Regional Labor Federation* (FORP). In 1920 Leguía dropped his populist mask and began repression of the labor and student movements.

FORP held the First Labor Congress (Primer Congreso Obrero Local) in 1921

with twenty-three unions and other labor organizations participating. Among the most important were the Textile Workers Federation of Peru,* "Estrella del Perú" Bakery Workers Federation,* Chauffeurs Federation of Peru,* and the Typographical Workers Federation.* A variety of revolutionary, mostly anarchist conceptions predominated in the debates, with consensus on the need for a unified labor central. The congress led to establishment of a new Local Workers Federation in 1922, which José Carlos Mariátegui later described as Peru's "nucleus and foundation of the organization of the Peruvian working class." It was in this FOL that the socialist current led by Mariátegui gained initiative over the anarchists. By the time FOL organized the Second Labor Congress (Segundo Congreso Obrero) in 1927, the main anarchist paper, *La Protesta*, had folded, and the movement was divided into socialist and "pure unionism" (anti-Marxist) currents. The latter was led by Arturo Sabroso, later the foremost American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) labor leader (see Confederation of Workers of Peru), who was chosen general secretary of the Second Congress. Sabroso argued that Peruvian workers were not ready for the idea of socialism: "The proletariat of this region lacks a revolutionary consciousness; it's not ready to embrace an ideology." Other delegates pointed to the erratic conduct of unions by the veteran anarcho-syndicalists. Said Toribio Sierra, "We need organization, class consciousness and revolutionary discipline." (See Kapsoli, p. 35.)

Meetings extended over several months, with socialists consolidating their leadership of the labor movement, until the Leguía regime clamped down, arresting fifty leaders, including both Mariátegui and Sabroso. Repression further weakened the advocates of a nonpolitical or "pure" unionism. From jail Mariátegui defiantly declared himself a Marxist and took personal responsibility for organizing the meetings which the police had interrupted. Although seriously ill (he would die within three years), Mariátegui worked with socialist colleagues in a period of intense clandestine political and labor organizing. In 1928 Mariátegui and union activists founded the Socialist Party and the paper *Labor*, oriented toward unionists, and on 17 May 1929 transformed FOL into the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers.*

METAL INDUSTRY WORKERS FEDERATION OF PERU (Federación de Trabajadores de la Industria Metalúrgica del Perú—FETIMP).

Founded in 1957, FETIMP was Peru's largest industrial federation. Known commonly as the *metalúrgicos* (metalworkers), the union grouped machinists and assembly line workers in locals at over 100 factories producing appliances, vehicles, and all types of metal products. Originally belonging to the Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP) and dominated by the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), the union had about 3,000 members in twenty-three locals in 1961. The federation adopted a *clasista* (militant and socialist) orientation after 1962, as industry in Lima and Callao expanded and younger workers entered the labor force. In 1964, FETIMP's forty-five member locals attempted to negotiate a single collective agreement with the Metals Committee

of the National Industrial Society. A forty-day strike ensued, with union occupation of many factories. The Belaúnde regime (1963–68) responded with repression, which severely damaged FETIMP and permitted APRA and CTP to reorganize the industry, creating a parallel federation, the Metal, Mechanical and Electrical Materials Industry Workers Federation of Lima and Callao (Federación de Trabajadores de la Industria Metalúrgica, Mecánica y de Materiales Eléctricos de Lima y Callao—FETIMEM), which maintained an influence for about six years. The weakened FETIMP, led by the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) and a variety of other left organizations, participated in the Union Defense and Unity Committee* (CDUS) in 1966 and in founding the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP) in 1968. During the first years of the Velasco military regime (1968–75), there was new industrial expansion. A new generation of *clasista* leadership emerged in FETIMP, organizing new unions and winning back control of locals from CTP's FETIMEM, which had about thirty-five affiliates in 1970. FETIMP expanded from 15 locals in 1970 to some 115 in 1975. These included some of the most combative unions of the 1970s, such as Moraveco (appliances and vehicle assembly) and Chrysler. Both the government-controlled Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution* (CTRP) and the Christian Democratic National Workers Confederation* (CNT) also established metalworkers federations (Federation of Metalworkers of the Peruvian Revolution, Federación de Trabajadores Metalúrgicos de la Revolución Peruana and National Federation of Workers in Metal Products and Allied Branches, Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de Productos Metalúrgicos y Ramas Conexas, respectively), but neither attained much influence. FETIMP's effectiveness in the mid-1970s was limited by serious intra-left differences over trade union strategy and organized labor's relationship with the Velasco regime. Its locals played key roles in organizing the general strikes of July 1977 and May 1978, but they were also among the most affected by the attendant repression. Some 300 FETIMP-affiliated union leaders were fired by companies with government sanction. In addition, FETIMP was affected by the ensuing split within the PCP, and the union's general secretary, Chávez Canales, was removed from his CGTP leadership post. In 1979 CGTP split FETIMP by establishing a small parallel federation with the same name, led by Angel Gallardo. In April 1979 the Chávez-led FETIMP held a three-day congress with 200 delegates representing fifty-two locals, reaffirming its *clasista* orientation, repudiating the "revisionist" leadership of 1970–78, and electing Jaime Cáceres general secretary.

MINE, METALLURGICAL AND STEELWORKERS NATIONAL FEDERATION OF PERU (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalúrgicos y Siderúrgicos Del Perú—FNTMMSP).

The first attempt to build a national mine workers federation was by the newly formed General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP) and Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) in 1930. The major copper mines were U.S.-owned, with

most controlled by the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. As the effects of the depression radicalized workers drawn from peasant communities, communist organizing efforts met with immediate success. A mine workers congress was set for November 1930 to establish the Mining Federation (*Federación Minera*). As union delegates and much of the PCP leadership gathered in the smelter town of La Oroya, they were arrested. CGTP in Lima threatened a general strike, forcing the Sánchez Cerro dictatorship (1931–33) to release them. But days later police opened fire at Malpaso on mine workers marching to La Oroya, killing twenty-three. The government dissolved CGTP the same day and launched all-out repression on communists and the labor movement. Unions were not legalized again until 1945. When new mine workers federations were organized in the late 1940s, they affiliated with Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP), which was under American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) control. The Central Peru Mine Workers Federation (*Federación de Trabajadores Mineros del Centro—FTMMC*) was established in 1947, but the following year APRA and the labor movement were again banned. With unions suppressed, the Odría dictatorship (1948–56) decreed a new Mining Code in 1950 which offered vast incentives to foreign capital. U.S. firms made important new investments, led by the Southern Peru Copper Corporation and Marcona Mining Company.

After APRA made a political pact with Odría, the party was allowed to reconstitute mine workers unions. But APRA and its CTP were often hard-pressed to contain mine worker militancy. A major strike of the Central Peru mine workers in 1962 was harshly repressed, contributing to the political crisis that brought on the 1963 military coup. Meanwhile, the regional mining federations agreed to establish a national mine workers federation, then called National Federation of Workers in Mining, Metals and Similar Fields (*Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalúrgicos y Similares*). Reflecting growth of leftist sentiment among mine activists, this organization escaped APRA's control until it was recaptured by CTP in 1966. By this time, a number of locals were moving with left forces organizing the Union Defense and Unity Committee* (CDUS), and a few smaller mine unions joined in founding the rival communist-led confederation, the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP) in 1968. Within months of the coming to power of the radical Velasco military regime (1968–75), APRA began to lose control of nearly the entire mine workers movement. In September 1969 some 5,000 striking La Oroya workers marched on Lima, won their demands, and then disaffiliated from CTP. In December CGTP convened a national mine workers congress, reconstituting Mine and Metallurgical Workers National Federation of Peru (*Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos del Perú—FNTMMP*). Unions participating included the La Oroya smelter workers, the Cobriza and Toquepala copper miners, and the Marconairon mine workers. The Southern miners federation was reorganized by CGTP in 1970, leaving APRA and CTP with almost no influence among mine workers beyond one small northern federation.

Shortly after joining CGTP, however, major FNTMMP unions, led by General

Secretary Víctor Cuadros, became embroiled in bitter strikes and conflicts with mining companies and the Velasco military regime. During 1971, 69 percent of the hours lost to strikes were in the mining industry, although mine workers represented only 2 percent of the labor force. In the most serious incident of repression, police killed at least five miners at Cobriza, including the union's general secretary. The government suspended constitutional guarantees throughout the central mining region and arrested 100 union activists. Because CGTP was now favorable toward the government and miners felt they were not being supported by the confederation, FNTMMP disaffiliated in 1973 and played a role in developing a bloc of militant left-led independent federations during the mid-1970s (see Clasista Union Coordination and Unification Committee). The government deported Cuadros and the miners' principal attorney and labor advisor, Ricardo Díaz Chávez. They were given amnesty in 1975, but the military imprisoned them and other mine union leaders in 1976. Cuadros was reelected FNTMMP general secretary while in prison during the union's Fourth National Congress. Despite repression, the union was one of the strongest in Peru, representing the majority of the almost 300 miners unions in an industry where 80,000 workers produced half of the country's foreign exchange.

FNTMMP was particularly active in combating the government's austerity programs and curtailment of job stability rights during the late 1970s economic crisis. The miners were primary organizers of the historic nationwide general strike on 19 July 1977. In March 1978 the military government decreed a "Job Stability" law which improved management ability to dismiss employees. The following month, Southern Peru Copper Corporation fired 200 strikers. FNTMMP began a strike of 10,000 mine workers in August, demanding that all fired workers be reinstated and the new decree repealed. Miners marched to Lima and set up an encampment in the capital from which daily street demonstrations were launched. The miners' efforts stimulated unionizing among public employees (see Intersectoral Confederation of State Workers). However, the strike was defeated. During 1978 the miners unions were active in creating regional *Frentes de Defensa* (defense fronts) whose mobilizations were instrumental in convincing the military to plan a return to civilian rule. Some 150 delegates from fifty-two unions attended FNTMMP's Fifth National Congress in 1979. Greater left cooperation around the political program of the United Left (IU) coalition led FNTMMP to decide to reaffiliate with CGTP at its Sixth National Congress in 1982. The federation held a five-day Centralization and Unity National Congress in 1984, with 244 delegates representing eighty unions, in which it merged with the steelworkers union and other mine unions which had remained in CGTP, forming the Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru (FNTMMSP).

MOSICP (Movimiento Sindical Cristiano del Perú). See Christian Union Movement of Peru.

MOVIMIENTO SINDICAL CRISTIANO DEL PERÚ. *See* Christian Union Movement of Peru.

NATIONAL AGRARIAN CONFEDERATION (Confederación Nacional Agraria—CNA).

The Peruvian agrarian reform, begun in 1969, broke the political power of the country's traditional landholding oligarchy. Although doubtless also intended to stem political ferment among rural workers, it was instead accompanied by major new peasant and farm labor organizing efforts. The Peasants Confederation of Peru* (CCP), originally formed in 1956, was revitalized under left leadership and undertook land seizure movements in the early 1970s. To develop its own mass base and to counter CCP influence in the countryside, the government encouraged organization of regional agrarian leagues (Ligas Agrarias) and the National Agrarian Confederation in 1974. Based primarily among small and medium landholders, CNA claimed to represent three million peasants and farm workers (an exaggerated figure) organized in 120 agrarian leagues and 18 departmental federations. Its first president was Eustaquio Maylle Ortega. After 1976 CNA became critical of the increasingly conservative policies of the military regime's "Second Phase." Avelino Mar Arias was elected CNA president in 1977, and he began work in alliance with the *clasista* ("classist," or working class) CCP. In November 1982 CNA collaborated with CCP in organizing Peru's first national agrarian strike, protesting the Belaúnde government's (1963–68) economic policies. In May 1983 CNA joined with forty other rural organizations in holding the First National Unitary Agrarian Congress, with more than 600 delegates attending.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS OF PERU (Federación Nacional de Campesinos del Perú—FENCAP).

This heterogeneous organization was founded by the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) to compete with the left-led Peasants Confederation of Peru* (CCP). At its first congress in 1960, there were representatives of twenty-nine indigenous communities, plus small organizations of sharecroppers, day laborers, and small farmers. Its only solid base was the unions of the Sugar Workers National Federation of Peru,* an APRA bastion on the north coast. FENCAP's weakness was always the inability of APRA, with its middle-class oriented ideology, to gain influence among the Andean highland peasantry (see Confederation of Workers of Peru). A U.S. political scientist once described FENCAP as a "combination of politics, altruism and chaos." (Payne, p. 231.) The organization later had little influence.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF EDUCATIONAL WORKERS OF PERU. *See* Unified Teachers Union of Peru.

NATIONAL TEACHERS FEDERATION OF PERU (Federación Nacional de Educadores del Perú—FENEP). *See* Unified Teachers Union of Peru.

NATIONAL UNITARY STRUGGLE COMMAND (Comando Nacional Unitario de Lucha—CNUL).

A coordinating body formed by the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP) and independent unions in 1983, CNUL organized a series of nationwide general strikes against the Belaúnde regime (March and September 1983, and March and November 1984). Other members included the Intersectoral Confederation of State Workers,* Peasants Confederation of Peru,* student organizations, and regional defense fronts.

NATIONAL WORKERS CONFEDERATION (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT).

This small and divided group was the remnant of Christian Democratic efforts at union organizing in Peru. CNT's predecessor was the Christian Union Movement of Peru* (MOSICP), which by 1968 comprised only twenty-five minor unions and was plagued by leadership problems. In 1969 the Christian Democrats threw their support behind the Velasco military regime (1968–75) and reorganized MOSICP into the National Workers Confederation, designed to build a trade union base for the government. The organizing effort, which received aid from the regime's Social Mobilization National Support System (SINAMOS), concentrated on industries and smaller factories not under the influence of the predominant American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and communist labor currents. CNT was officially recognized in 1971 with twelve small federations. Despite financial backing from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, CNT made no headway. A split in the Christian Democratic Party in 1971 further weakened Peru's Christian Democratic movement, and the government soon abandoned CNT in favor of building its own trade union confederation (see Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution). CNT split into two factions in 1973, and in 1975 a third group tried to reestablish MOSICP. In 1980 the Sánchez Zapata CNT faction offered political support to the Belaúnde regime (1980–85), joining the Democratic Union Front,* while the Segundino Pérez faction was more social democratic, aligning with the small Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democrática) front in the 1985 elections.

OFFICE EMPLOYEES FEDERATION OF PERU (Central Sindical de Empleados Particulares del Perú—CSEPP).

Founded in 1955 and grouping many white-collar employee unions in the capital city, this federation of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA)–led Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP) split in the late 1950s, with some affiliates forming a leftist parallel union of the same name, which lasted only a few years. In 1961 the federation had 92 locals. After major unions defected from CTP to form the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP) in 1968, CSEPP was one of only three important trade unions to remain in the APRA confederation (the other two being the Textile Workers Federation

of Peru* and the Sugar Workers National Federation of Peru*). CSEPP waned during the 1970s with the decline of separate white-collar employee unions.

PEASANTS CONFEDERATION OF PERU (Confederación Campesina del Perú—CCP).

The Peasants Confederation of Peru was organized by the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) in 1947 out of the old Sharecroppers and Peasants Federation of Peru.* Its first general secretary was Juan H. Pévez, veteran leader of the Ica Valley Peasants Federation (Federación de Campesinos del Valle de Ica). CCP was especially strong on the south coast and in the southern Andean region. To compete, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) started its own National Federation of Agricultural Workers of Peru* (FENCAP) in 1960, based primarily among its loyal north coast sugar workers, and the Christian Democrat party began its Peasants Union Front in the Puno region (see Workers and Peasants National Front). CCP was not able to play an important national leadership role during the ferment among the peasantry during the 1960s. When the agrarian reform of the Velasco military regime (1968–75) bogged down in 1973, groups to the left of the PCP, such as Revolutionary Vanguard, reorganized CCP and built it into Peru's most active peasant and farm worker organization. Several of its bases, such as the Andahuaylas Provincial Peasants Federation,* initiated a land seizure movement in 1974. The government attempted to co-opt the peasant movement by encouraging formation of the National Agrarian Confederation* (CNA), but CCP maintained initiative by organizing the poorer peasants and leading protests against state pricing policies which undervalued their crops. By 1975 CNA had begun to move leftward toward a practical coalition with the *clasista* (socialist) CCP. In November 1982 CCP and CNA were principal organizers of Peru's first national agrarian strike, protesting the government's economic policies. In May 1983 CCP joined with CNA and forty other rural organizations in holding the First National Unitary Agrarian Congress, with more than 600 delegates from every rural sector attending. In 1984 CCP rejoined the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP).

PERUVIAN REGIONAL LABOR FEDERATION (Federación Obrera Regional Peruana—FORP).

The original Peruvian Regional Labor Federation was established in Lima in 1913, the earliest attempt to centralize the country's emerging labor movement. FORP was part of the anarcho-sindicalist effort to prevent co-optation of the increasingly militant labor movement by populist President Guillermo Billinghurst (1912–14). FORP did not prosper, and the divided worker's movement was powerless to prevent Billinghurst's overthrow by the military in 1914. In 1918 anarchists made a more successful attempt to centralize the early unions, this time called the Local Workers Federation of Lima* (FOL), which led the fight for the eight-hour day. In the wake of the 1919 general strike there was a political schism in the Peruvian oligarchy which led to seizure of power by

pseudo-populist Augusto B. Leguía (1919–30). The labor movement again split over whether to support the government, with the more skeptical workers remaining independent of Leguía and reconstituting FORP. In 1920 Leguía began repression of the labor and student movements. FORP held the First Labor Congress (Primer Congreso Obrero Local) in 1921 with twenty-three unions and other labor organizations participating. Among the most important were the Textile Workers Federation of Peru,* “Estrella del Perú” Bakery Workers Federation,* Chauffeurs Federation of Peru,* and the Typographical Workers Federation of Peru.* A variety of revolutionary, mostly anarchist conceptions predominated in the debates, with a consensus on the need for unity. The FORP congress led to replacement of FORP by a new Local Workers Federation in 1922 in which the socialist current led by José Carlos Mariátegui gained in initiative over the anarchists.

SHARECROPPERS AND PEASANTS FEDERATION OF PERU (Federación de Yanaconas y Campesinos del Perú).

The communist-organized Sharecroppers Federation was an original founder of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP) in 1929. It was reorganized in 1947 as the Peasants Confederation of Peru* (CCP), the country's most active farm worker and peasant union.

SINDICATO TEXTIL VITARTE. *See* Vitarte Textile Union.

SINDICATO ÚNICO DE TRABAJADORES EN LA EDUCACION DEL PERÚ. *See* Unified Teachers Union of Peru.

SUGAR WORKERS FEDERATION OF PERU (Federación de Trabajadores Azucareros del Perú).

For decades the north coast sugar workers were a loyal American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) union base, and this union remained affiliated with the Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP). Benefiting from APRA's political power in the Trujillo region, the Sugar Workers Federation members were the highest paid agricultural workers in Peru and the only rural laborers whose union was legally recognized. Their contracts were model agreements, running to over 100 pages. The federation's thirteen unions in 1961 were estimated to represent over 30,000 workers. However, the Velasco military regime (1968–75) implemented an agrarian reform which turned large estates over to cooperatives and destroyed APRA's traditional political alliances. During the late 1970s *clasista* (socialist) union leaders were elected on several of the north coast sugar estates, and in 1982 the left won control of the federation.

SUTEP. *See* Unified Teachers Union of Peru.

TEXTILE WORKERS FEDERATION OF PERU (Federación de Trabajadores en Tejidos del Peru—FTTP).

Founded on 16 January 1919, the day after workers in Lima won the eight-hour day in a general strike, FTTP became one of the oldest continually functioning unions in Peru. Textile workers, influenced by anarcho-syndicalist ideology and the radical nationalism of Manuel Gonzáles Prada, were among the first to break with the guild orientation of Peru's mutual associations, grouped in the Artisans Confederation.* Led by the Vitarte Textile Union,* they formed the country's first industrial federation in 1916 and participated in several efforts to create a national labor organization (see Local Workers Federation of Lima and Peruvian Regional Labor Federation). Although some textile workers became socialists, and Vitarte union and FTTP militant Julio Portocarrero was the founding general secretary of the communist-led General Confederation of Peruvian Workers,* the federation came under American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) leadership following the 1930s repression. The anti-communist and leader of the Santa Catalina mill, Arturo Sabroso, edited FTTP's paper, *The Textile Worker* (*El Obrero Textil*), and became a devotee of populist leader Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre and APRA. Sabroso was FTTP's general secretary in 1944 when the Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP) was founded and, with assistance of AFL representatives from the United States, led the expulsion of the communists from the confederation. In 1945 FTTP struck for three days and won a historic cost-of-living adjustment agreement. The following year, textile mill owners formed a committee of the National Industries Society (SNI) to negotiate an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement with FTTP and bring an end to labor unrest in the industry. APRA labor leaders transformed the union into a stable base with a guildlike structure of privileges. With the political cohabitation (*convivencia*) which APRA entered into during the later stage of the Odría regime (1950–56), FTTP tended to conciliate mill owners and allow erosion of certain gains. By 1961 FTTP had some 21,000 members in eighty-two affiliated unions and was considered CTP's strongest union. But in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the industry underwent dramatic changes. New firms were established to produce for the Andean market, and regional competition required new technology and lower labor costs. Newer unions tended to regard FTTP and CTP as pro-business. Rank-and-file discontent grew within FTTP affiliates, producing four major attempts to change the union's direction and reunify the textile industry unions. These included the "Fábrica de Tejidos La Unión" Trade Union Alliance in 1969, the FTTP Unification and Reorganization Committee in 1972, and the Struggle Committee for Guild Unification. Peru's late 1970s economic crisis was particularly damaging to the textile industry. In 1977 the government and textile owners rescinded the automatic cost-of-living adjustment. Layoffs were widespread, and several factories closed or used bankruptcy laws to liquidate veteran textile workers with seniority. FTTP went into crisis, and APRA began to lose control in many unions. The federation finally began concerted strike action in February 1978. Although the government and the Industrial

Society's textile committee granted a 15 percent wage increase in 1979, leftist forces organized in the Textile Coordinating Commission (Comisión Coordinadora Textil) and threatened APRA control of the federation. The left led a forty-two-day strike of 40,000 textile workers in 1980. The federation continued in crisis during the early 1980s, with neither the left nor APRA in secure control.

UNIFICATION COUNCIL OF UNION ORGANIZATIONS (Consejo de Unificación de Organizaciones Sindicales—CUOS).

CUOS was formed in 1976 by pro-government unions which were growing disenchanted with the military regime's increasingly conservative economic policies. Its members included the "hundred locals" of the Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution* grouped in the "CTRP-Lima" and the Christian Democrats' small National Workers Confederation* (CNT). Although CUOS members stressed their "democratic" (i.e., anti-communist) unity, they were sharply critical of the more conservative American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA)-led Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP). As labor opposition to the military regime grew over the next two years, CUOS members tended to lean in a left direction.

UNIFIED STRUGGLE COMMAND (Comando Unitario de Lucha—CUL).

In June 1977, after the military government implemented a new round of austerity measures, a wave of mass protests swept through the southern Andean provinces. Riots paralyzed several cities, and pressure built within the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP) to more forthrightly oppose government policies. CGTP leadership agreed to join with independent unions to form the Unified Struggle Command to coordinate labor's response. CUL also included a breakaway faction of the small Christian Democratic National Workers Confederation.* Only the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance's weakened CTP remained on the sidelines. CUL issued a call for a forty-eight-hour general strike to begin 19 July. The government warned that striking workers would be fired and undertook a campaign to discourage participation. By early morning on 19 July, however, workers in the major squatter settlements which surrounded Lima blockaded highways leading into the capital, threatening to stone and burn any bus attempting to break through. Plaza Unión, through which hundreds of thousands of workers passed every morning on their way to the main factory districts, was deserted. From the mines in the central Andes to the fishing towns on the coast, the general strike was a resounding success on its first day and became regarded in the trade union movement as a historic event. (Thereafter 19 July was commemorated annually by many unions.) On 20 July the government arrested hundreds of union leaders and issued Decree Law 10-77, authorizing employers to fire strikers. At least nine workers, including three women, were killed by police and army troops, and over 5,000 workers were dismissed. CUL organized two other general strikes in January and May 1978.

UNIFIED TEACHERS UNION OF PERU (Sindicato único de Trabajadores en la Educación del Perú—SUTEP).

Early attempts to organize teachers unions in the 1930s and 1940s were complicated by the conflict between the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and the left, together with government pressure to hold teachers associations to a mutualist and nonpolitical level. Like all state employees, teachers did not have the right to unionize or strike. By the early 1950s, however, the two main schoolteachers associations were de facto unions, the National Association of Primary Schoolteachers of Peru (Asociación Nacional de Maestros Primarios del Perú—ANMPP) and the National Association of Professors of Secondary Education (Asociación Nacional de Profesores de Educación Secundaria—ANPES). After 1956, additional associations of technical and physical education teachers were organized, and in 1959 all four joined to form the National Federation of Educators of Peru (Federación Nacional de Educadores del Perú—FENEP), under predominantly APRA leadership. FENEP led Peru's first major teachers strikes in 1960 and 1961, and growing national political ferment led to radicalization of many schoolteachers. By 1964 APRA was losing hegemony of FENEP. The left reorganized primary schoolteachers in the National Union of Primary Education Teachers (Sindicato Nacional de Profesores de Educación Primaria—SINPEP) and assumed leadership of FENEP, which won recognition in 1964. Under the Velasco military regime (1968–75), teachers were alienated by the government's heavy-handed imposition of an educational reform on the U.S. schools model. "New Left" and Maoist currents gained wide influence in teachers unions, and during the 1971 teachers strike some of their leaders were deported. The Communist Party (PCP)-led General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP), with which FENEP was affiliated, ended the strike in a political concession of the reformist Velasco regime. This action inflamed anti-PCP sentiment in teachers ranks, and Maoists led a campaign to reorganize teacher unions. In 1972 the schoolteachers movement split, with the weakened PCP-led FENEP modifying its name to National Federation of Education Workers of Peru (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación del Perú—FENTEPE). In July the Maoist-dominated teachers bloc, led by Red Fatherland, held a National Unification Congress in Cuzco, founding the Unified Teachers Union of Peru, which quickly established itself as Peru's dominant teachers union. APRA, now a minority influence, preferred to work within SUTEP to isolate the PCP, and FENTEPE remained an insignificant organization. Throughout the 1970s SUTEP was one of the most active and militant independent unions, and the PCP later expressed regret at its boycott of the main schoolteachers' struggles. In 1982 the PCP-led CGTP voted at its Sixth Congress to abolish FENTEPE and admit SUTEP, further consolidating CGTP as the nation's hegemonic union confederation.

UNION DEFENSE AND UNITY COMMITTEE (Comité de Defensa y Unidad Sindical—CDUS).

After several failed attempts to win control of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA)–dominated Confederation of Workers of Peru* (CTP), Peru's leftist trade union forces began a movement to disaffiliate from CTP and, in 1966, established the Union Defense and Unity Committee. Its member federations in 1968 included some of the nation's most important unions: the Construction Workers Federation of Peru,* the Fishermen's Federation of Peru,* the Arequipa Departmental Workers Federation,* the Brewery Industry Workers Federation of Peru,* the Chauffeurs Federation of Peru,* the Cuzco Workers Federation,* the Metal Industry Workers Federation of Peru,* and the Peasants Confederation of Peru.* CDUS then reestablished the left-led General Confederation of Peruvian Workers,* which soon became the nation's dominant confederation.

VITARTE TEXTILE UNION (Sindicato Textil Vitarte).

A 1896 strike at Peru's oldest textile mill, located in Vitarte a few miles east of Lima, was generally regarded as marking the tenuous birth of the nation's trade union movement. The conflict coincided with establishment of Peru's first pro-industrialization government, led by Nicolas de Piérola (1895–99) who had taken power with strong artisan and worker support. Vitarte was owned by W. R. Grace & Company, a firm founded in Peru which became an important U.S.-based transportation and agro-industrial company. Workers at Vitarte labored sixteen hours a day, taking both lunch and dinner at the factory. The 1896 strike, organized rather spontaneously in absence of a union, was repressed by the government. De Piérola rejected the workers' resort to force, insisting that wages and working conditions must be set "by mutual accord." The experience radicalized leaders, such as Luis Felipe Grillo, leading them toward an anarchist rejection of participation in national politics. During the conflictive 1913–19 period, the union was variously called the Vitarte Textile Union and the Vitarte Textile Unification (Unificación Textil Vitarte), and was organized by factory section. Vitarte produced some of Peru's most important early trade union leaders, including Julio Portocarrero, later a founder of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* and the Peruvian Communist Party. A strike at Vitarte on 9 January 1916 was repressed with police gunfire. In response, textile workers founded the nation's first industrial federation, the "Ninth of January" Textile Workers Union, predecessor of the Textile Workers Federation of Peru* (FTTP) and universally known as the "Textile Federation" ("Federación Textil"). It was the spinning mill section of the Vitarte union which organized the walkout on 12 December 1918, which sparked the January 1919 general strike that won Peruvian workers the eight-hour day.

WORKERS AND PEASANTS NATIONAL FRONT (Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos—FRENATRACA).

The Workers and Peasants National Front was a nationalist movement based almost exclusively in the Puno region of southern Peru under the personalistic leadership of the Cáceres brothers, Roger and Pedro, merchants in the town of Juliaca. Their movement was originally tied to the Christian Democratic effort to organize a Frente Sindical Campesino in 1960. The Cáceres brothers became regional *caciques* (bosses), controlling the local press and radio stations, and able to mobilize upwards of 100,000 peasants and farm workers. Roger Cáceres built a mass base by covering over his own provincial bourgeois background with radical rhetoric reclaiming an idealized Indian past of the Inca empire. He allied with the reformist Velasco military regime (1968–75), trying to lend it some Incaic mystique and slogans from the native language of Indian peasants.

WORKERS CONFEDERATION OF THE PERUVIAN REVOLUTION (Confederación de Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana—CTRP).

The Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution was established in 1972 by the reformist military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–75) as a corporatist attempt to win leadership of the labor movement away from the left and the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA). Working through its mass-mobilization agency, Social Mobilization National Support System (SINAMOS), the regime first helped Peru's weak Christian Democrats form the National Workers Confederation* (CNT), which did not prosper. SINAMOS, led by social-democratic strategist Carlos Delgado, then promoted development of CTRP, which had greater success, particularly in small and medium-sized firms without much union experience. In 1972 the government recognized 410 new unions, a national record. But CTRP entered into crisis as the economic situation deteriorated in 1974.

Frustrated at their inability to win much influence in the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers* (CGTP)—established industrial unions, a grouping within the military regime, led by Fisheries Minister General Javier Tantaleán Vanini, created the semi-fascist Revolutionary Labor Movement* (MLR) to coerce unions into CTRP. The MLR immediately provoked controversy, and at times violent conflict, in the trade union movement. While most generals opposed forming a pro-government mass political party which might eventually escape their control, they let Tantaleán experiment with the "nonofficial" MLR to try to tame the labor movement and isolate the communists in key unions. Tantaleán first took over the Fishermen's Federation of Peru* (FPP) after an MLR gang stormed its offices and held an impromptu "election." FPP had long been plagued by "mafia" elements in many locals. With this base in a major federation, the MLR seized leadership of CTRP itself and then began to move on *clasista* (socialist) unions in Lima.

MLR quickly acquired a reputation as a "fascist" organization run by thugs. Volkswagen and other auto plants were the sites of MLR armed attacks on

clasista rank and file. But in almost every case, the left was able to muster sufficient forces to defeat MLR in union elections. MLR was also thrown out of the Marcona iron mines and the Chimbote steelworks. By mid-1975 MLR was discredited among most Peruvian workers, and the whole enterprise tended to tarnish the government's reputation in the labor movement on the eve of a major economic crisis. In 1975 CTRP's only large union, the Fishermen's Federation, expelled its MLR-linked national leadership. In 1976 the military lost more control as most of CTRP's Lima affiliates, calling themselves the "hundred locals" (*cien bases*), split to form the "CTRP-Lima." The Fishermen's Federation and CTRP-Lima then joined with the small Christian Democratic National Workers Confederation* (CNT) in a Unification Council of Union Organizations* (Consejo de Unificación de Organizaciones Sindicales—CUOS), collaborating with CGTP during the labor upsurge. The "national" CTRP rump waned throughout the late 1970s. With its main union at the Star Kist processing plant in Chimbote, in 1980 it joined with the AFL-CIO supported Confederation of Workers of Peru* to form the small Democratic Union Front.*

Puerto Rico _____

FRANK P. LEVENESS

The entire experience of Puerto Rico from its European settlement to the mid-twentieth century (independence advocates would argue to the present day) has been one of an unrelenting colonial relationship, with all that such a political existence entails: political and economic dependence, structure of the island's government and means of production in the interests of the metropolitan nation, close cultural ties with that metropolitan country, and in many instances, inappropriate transfer of cultural values. All of this tends to stifle and suppress indigenous cultural as well as economic and political development, and indeed, Puerto Rico has fought desperately and still struggles to seek and maintain its cultural, economic, and political identity.

The Spanish colonial systems, designed to foster mercantilism, were often extremely harsh on the colonists. Such was certainly the case in Puerto Rico. San Juan was constructed as a medieval walled city, intended to be the only center of government, commerce, and cultural life of the island. The Port of San Juan became the only legal access to the island, and trade was restricted exclusively to Spain, and only to designated ports of that nation.

Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, various economic experiments were tried on the island. The gold mining economy was quickly replaced by agriculture, based mainly upon a plantation system. Spain generally lost interest in the island and its rapidly declining revenues, and the island passed through a series of agricultural endeavors, from sugar (particularly encouraged by Spain), to ginger, to tobacco and livestock.

Between the mid-1820s and the mid-1860s, the island suffered under a series of military governors, and despite various efforts toward liberalization on the Iberian Peninsula, Puerto Rico did not fully enjoy the fruits of these reforms. The Spanish revolt of 1868, which ended the reign of Queen Isabella II, brought with it the "liberal" Constitution of 1869; in Puerto Rico this stimulated political

activity and greatly expanded freedom of assembly, speech, and press. Slaves were emancipated on 22 March 1873.

Political parties emerged for the first time and revolved around the issue which remains paramount in insular politics: the island's political status. The liberals, split between those who sought political autonomy and those who favored political assimilation, united in their quest for both political and economic reforms. They were opposed by the conservative elements, who sought the retention of the political status quo, and who benefited from the current economic system; they were also opposed by the revolutionaries, who sought complete independence of Spain.

With the overthrow of the liberal Spanish government in 1875, the island suffered under a period of political oppression. Despite the provision in the Spanish Constitution of 1876 for Puerto Rico's representation in the Spanish *cortes* (Spain's legislative assembly), insular political activity was suppressed, and leaders were imprisoned or sent into political exile. From 1887 the island suffered under what has become known as the *era de los composites*, a period of harsh punishments instituted by the island's new military governor, Lieutenant General Romualdo Palacio Gonzalez, to root out what he saw as liberal subversion. Hundreds of people were arrested and horribly tortured.

Leadership of the liberals fell to Luis Muñoz Rivera, editor of the influential newspaper *The Democracy* (*La Democracia*). In 1897 he signed a pact with Spanish Liberal Party leader Mateo Práxedes Sagasta, which promised Puerto Rican liberal support for Sagasta's party in exchange for autonomy for Puerto Rico once Sagasta's party took power. Sagasta, true to his word, approved the Charter of Autonomy of that same year. For the first time in its history, the island was in a position to have a major voice in its own political future.

Puerto Ricans could now elect representatives to both houses of the Iberian *cortes*, to their own House of Representatives, and to a majority of the insular Administrative Council. Although he was charged with maintaining the laws and good order, could suspend civil rights in cases of necessity, and could refer insular legislation to the Spanish *cortes* for further consideration, the royal governor's powers were significantly reduced. Nevertheless, importantly, most insular internal affairs, and even some limited authority with regard to treaties, now were in the hands of the island's government.

Elections were held the following year (1898), and Muñoz emerged as undisputed leader of the legislature. However, this victory was short-lived, for on 25 July, shortly after the island's new government began its duties, General Nelson A. Miles landed his American troops at Guanica and marched across the island to San Juan. The following month the Spanish formally surrendered, and by the Treaty of Paris, ceded the island to the United States, thus ending some 405 years of Spanish rule.

Following a relatively brief military occupation, the island was returned to civilian rule. However, the Puerto Ricans were not destined to enjoy the auton-

only so recently granted by the Sagasta government. The Foraker Act of 1900 returned the island to what can only be described as colonial status.

The U.S. flag flew over the island, which was incorporated into that nation. The insular government was heavily controlled by Washington. The governor, members of the cabinet, upper house (Executive Council) of the legislature, and the justices of the Supreme Court were all presidentially appointed (although it should be noted that a majority on the Executive Council had to be insular residents). Only the lower house of the legislature (the House of Delegates) and the local governments were popularly elected. All legislation remained subject to U.S. congressional veto. A Resident Commissioner was elected by insular voters to sit in the U.S. House of Representatives (he speaks, sits on the floor, sponsors legislation, serves on committees, and is generally afforded the privileges accorded to Representatives, but cannot vote).

The Foraker Act had positive economic provisions. It established trade between the mainland United States and the island, devoid of tariffs (although retaining quotas, for example, on sugar); declared that all tariffs collected on the island would be turned over for use by the insular government; excluded the island from internal U.S. tax codes; and, as amended, incorporated a section limiting "ownership and control" of land to 500 acres.

A series of U.S. Supreme Court cases, collectively known as the Insular Cases, raised a number of extremely vital issues as to the legal and political status of Puerto Rico. The various court rulings left the island in a precarious and most uncertain position, as Chief Justice Melville Weston Fuller noted in his now-famous dissent in *Downes v. Bidwell* (182 U.S. 244 at 372), "like a disembodied shade in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence." Collectively, these cases ruled that not all portions of the U.S. Constitution were automatically made applicable to lands upon which the U.S. flag flies. Specifically, the Court noted that indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury were not to be construed as necessarily afforded the residents of such areas.

A substantial alteration in the status of Puerto Rico came some years later with the Jones-Shafroth Act (usually called the Jones Act) of 1917. In its most significant and somewhat controversial part, the act provided for automatic U.S. citizenship for all Puerto Ricans who did not specifically refuse it. In addition, it created an elected Senate in the insular legislature and provided the island with an extensive Bill of Rights. It should be noted that with the acquisition of citizenship, the island residents no longer were bound by the decisions of the Insular Cases, but now obtained the full constitutional coverage extended to all citizens of the United States.

Further political gains occurred as a result of continuing interest by U.S. President Harry S. Truman, coming upon the heels of the efforts of his predecessor, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Truman appointed the then Resident Commissioner, Jesús T. Piñero, as the first indigenous governor of Puerto Rico in that island's roughly 450-year history subsequent to Spanish colonization.

The following year, 1947, the U.S. Congress passed the Elective Governor Act, and in 1948 *Puertorriqueños* flocked to the polls to elect, for the very first time, a chief executive of their own choosing. They selected the president of the insular Senate, Luis Muñoz Marín, son of Muñoz Rivera.

Muñoz Marín had created a new party, the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democrático—PPD), during the 1930s and had first been elected to the Senate in 1940. The period of the Great Depression had been particularly devastating for the island. This was exacerbated by the effects of an extremely destructive hurricane of 1936. Despite significant strides in health and education, the island continued to suffer from poverty and neglect. Its economy had developed around the plantation system, and increasingly, these farms were owned by absentee mainland corporations. By the time the island gained relatively free trade, many local farmers had been driven into bankruptcy, their places taken by the larger enterprises. Trade with the U.S. mainland increased rapidly by the 1920s, but profits were often diverted from the island to these mainland entrepreneurs.

It was these problems, in addition to the political issues, which Muñoz sought to address. Under his inspiration and guidance, the Puerto Rican government developed what has become known as Operation Bootstrap, an economic development plan—admittedly tied to the island's relationship with the United States—which literally transformed the economy to one based upon industrialization. Utilizing mainland financial resources, the program sought to neutralize the island's disadvantages, such as lack of mineral resources, high shipping rates, and need for training, by emphasizing and developing the island's positive attributes: its ample supply of less expensive labor, abundance of potential hydroelectric power (which the government took great strides to develop) political stability and democratic system, and geographic position and good harbor. Through its Economic Development Administration (Fomento Económico), the Puerto Rican Industrial Development Corporation (PRIDCO), the Government Development Bank, and other public agencies, the insular government introduced a series of tax-incentive programs, including long-term reductions for new enterprises, plus a host of employee training, financial, infrastructural, and related services. A free trade zone for foreign products was established at Mayagüez, and attention was particularly paid to the development of smaller enterprises, those which offered products which reduced imports, and those which were partially or wholly locally owned and operated.

By March 1967 FOMENTO reported that of 1,426 industrial plants founded under the auspices of its programs, 488 were classified as "local." Those planned for the future were roughly of similar proportions. Additional statistics indicated that from 1950 to 1960, production rose from \$755 million to \$1.681 billion, and that per capita income levels also increased from \$279 to almost \$582. Exports tripled, and industrial positions increased by approximately 26,000.

By the conclusion of the following decade, over 2,600 plants had been

founded, payrolls had increased by over 81 percent, and per capita income had reached \$1,400, unexcelled in all of Latin America.

Politically, the PPD, under the leadership of Governor Muñoz, strove to alter the political relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. As a result of his urgings, and with the full cooperation of President Truman, in 1950, Congress passed Public Law 600, which enabled Puerto Rico's citizens to draft their own constitution and encouraged them to exercise increased control with regard to internal government. This they did, and in 1952 the new document was approved by appropriate governmental bodies on the island and on the mainland, establishing the Free Associated State (*Estado Libre Asociado*), referred to in English as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Under this Commonwealth, the Puerto Rican voters gained virtually complete control over internal affairs. However, they remained subject to all articles of the U.S. Constitution and to all federal laws, regulations, and judicial pronouncements, unless specifically exempted. They retained their freedom from U.S. internal taxation, and they continued to reap the benefits of the tariffs collected on goods entering the nation through their island.

Views of the political reality of this constitutional change varied widely. Pro-independence forces (*Independentistas*) claimed that it was basically a subterfuge, in the sense that its intent was to cloak the continuing colonial, and therefore dependent, relationship between the island and the mainland. They charged further that the Puerto Rican people were becoming the victims of Americanization, losing their own identity, all the while being victimized by the economic system, which independence advocates viewed as inextricably tied to the mainland and exploitative of the island and its people.

Those advocating statehood (*estadistas*) generally seemed pleased with the creation of the new political status. However, they argued that under the American constitutional system, only statehood leads to the enjoyment of the full fruits of citizenship. Only with the achievement of that final status would the island be able to vote for the U.S. president, be adequately represented in the U.S. Congress, and enjoy the forms of federal financial assistance available to the fifty states. They argued, in disagreement with both those who favored Commonwealth as a relatively permanent status and with the independence advocates, that the economic benefits of Commonwealth, such as freedom from taxation, which would be lost with the acceptance of statehood, would be offset by the benefits brought by that status.

In 1967 a formal plebiscite on the status issue was held throughout the island, the only one to this date. Over 60 percent of those voting favored the Commonwealth status, while nearly 39 percent favored statehood, and less than 1 percent indicated a preference for independence. However, these results cannot be taken purely at face value as some independence groups and statehood advocates refused to participate in the balloting.

This political issue continues to the present. In general elections for governor

and the insular legislature, PDD, the Commonwealth advocates, and the statehood parties—the Republican Statehood Party (Partido Estadista Republicano) and its successor, the New Progressive Party (Partido Nuevo Progresista)—have tended to dominate the political scene over their independence advocate opponents.

In his 1984 message to the legislature, then Governor Romero indicated that he expected that during that year, Puerto Rico's employment would exceed 800,000, and personal income would rise by 11 percent during that fiscal year, while inflation would remain quite low. In its seasonally adjusted calculations, PRIDCO reported in October 1984 that unemployment, a serious perennial problem for the island, stood at slightly over 20 percent. At current prices, the Banco Popular de Puerto Rico estimated annual per capita income at \$4,479.

Five major characteristics distinguish the development of organized labor in Puerto Rico: the organized labor movement is essentially a twentieth-century phenomenon; it has suffered from either outright oppression or at least strong control and regulation by the colonial power (whether Spain or the United States); most island-wide organizing has been accomplished by labor organizations headquartered on the American mainland, with relatively few island-based "nationals"; unionization has achieved only limited organizational success, in the sense of the number of workers who have joined unions, and in fact, that number is currently declining rather than expanding. Finally, as the Puerto Ricans have gained increasing control of their own government, the social welfare programs which have been enacted, without the need of union labor actions, have, in a sense, co-opted some of the roles played by these unions' counterparts throughout much of Latin America, and for that matter, North America.

Although professional guilds had been established, there was virtually no organized labor in Puerto Rico prior to the arrival of the American military forces during the last years of the nineteenth century. The Spanish colonial government passed legislation which forbade both the organization of workers and any agitation for betterment of workers' wages and working conditions, a policy based in part upon the experiences Spain continued to have with the radical workers' movements on the Iberian Peninsula.

Even after the abolition of slavery, on 22 March 1873, the workers' plight remained severe. All workers were forced to carry a type of internal passport (*libreta*) on which their work history was recorded, and those without proper employment could be impressed into public service. Wages were low, working conditions often quite poor, and in many instances, public education and health services at best were at minimum levels. Nevertheless, there is significant evidence of clandestine labor organization, and a growing number of strikes permeated the second half of the nineteenth century.

It was in this climate that Puerto Rican organized labor was born. In a very real sense, this movement is personified by one of its founders and greatest leaders, Santiago Iglesias Pantín. This Galician-born Spaniard was forced to seek work as a carpenter at the age of twelve and was organizing workers by the time

he reached his mid-teens. Several times he stowed away on ships bound for Cuba, where he continued his organizational efforts; in late 1896 he escaped the wrath of the colonial governor by landing in San Juan, Puerto Rico, where once again he continued to agitate for labor reform.

Imprisoned for his activities by Spanish authorities, Iglesias was freed by the American troops which occupied the island of Puerto Rico during the Spanish-American war of 1898. The American military commanders were in sympathy with many of the demands of the workers, and enabled Iglesias and his companions to organize throughout the island while they also instituted various labor reforms. In 1899 Iglesias founded the Free Federation of Labor (*Federación Libre de los Trabajadores*—FLT) which, in light of the island's mainland-owned sugar and tobacco agricultural economy, and the inexperience of union organizers and members, he quickly affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL).

The return of civilian rule in 1900 did not bring labor peace. The oppressive Spanish laws were reinstated, the currency suffered a severe loss of value, wages were sharply reduced, and labor unrest, including work stoppages and even a general strike, became common.

Still, some relief was found, as Iglesias and the other labor leaders in Puerto Rico secured some assistance from U.S. Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, as well as from the AFL president, Samuel Gompers. Organization proceeded slowly, often with accompanying violence, but the FLT proved that it was going to be successful.

The interwar years proved very difficult for both the Puerto Rican labor movement and the island's political parties. The Great Depression struck in Puerto Rico, with its agricultural-based economy, much earlier than it did on the U.S. mainland. The somewhat artificially high wages of the period of World War I fell rapidly, and the interwar period was opened by a general strike which lasted for most of the first four months of 1920. Despite relatively low percentages of unionized workers as compared with the total work force, labor unrest and strikes continued throughout the period, and they were often once again accompanied by considerable violence.

In the insular elections of 1920, the Socialist Party, with which Iglesias had affiliated the FLT in 1915, received approximately 2.4 times the vote it received in 1917. During the 1920s the Coalition (dissident Republicans along with the socialists) continued to gain strength both in insular legislative and municipal elections. Iglesias continued to be reelected to the island Senate through the election of 1928, by which time the Coalition had pulled within 10,000 votes of the Alliance, a grouping of Unionists and Republicans.

By the 1932 elections, the political winds had significantly changed. In October 1929 Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., was appointed governor of Puerto Rico, maring the end of virtually automatic gubernatorial cooperation with the Unionists and then the Alliance. Roosevelt became conscious of the extent of the plight of the island's poor and sought to remedy the causes of the widespread and severe poverty. This, coupled with the fact that the Coalition had emerged with over

48 percent of the vote in the 1928 elections, offered them new opportunities to begin to enact their comprehensive social and economic programs. These were further increased in the summer of 1929, when the Unionists split from the Alliance. They changed their name to that of the Liberal Party and became advocates of independence.

Virtually all the Republicans, plus dissident Unionists, joined in a new Union Republican Party, which in 1932 allied with the Socialists in a reactivated Coalition. Their efforts proved successful, as they captured over 54 percent of the popular vote. Santiago Iglesias was elected resident commissioner, socialist vice president Bolívar Pagán was elected to the Senate, and the Coalition captured strong majorities in both houses of the insular legislature.

The socialists, however, as part of the governing body appeared to have lost much of their sense of direction and purpose. As their political successes mounted, they became more and more involved in the process of mounting winning electoral campaigns and then maintaining their newfound positions in politics and in the government. They seemed less than ardent in their quest for new labor legislation. Their agencies failed to meet the expectations of the population they were created to serve. Then there appeared a new political party, the Popular Democrats (*Partido Popular Democrático*), led by don Luis Muñoz Marín.

With Iglesias serving on the mainland, leadership of the socialists was split between Bolívar Pagán, who was the son-in-law of and received the support of Santiago Iglesias, and the insular secretary of labor, Prudencio Rivera Martínez. Rivera was subsequently expelled from the party, and his followers, by forming their own political group, caused an irreparable split among the socialists during the 1940 elections.

By this period the labor movement had benefited significantly from the legislation of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal, which generally applied to the island of Puerto Rico as well as to the mainland United States (for example, the National Industrial Recovery Act and the National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act). However, since Puerto Rico's labor force remained heavily agricultural in nature, an industry whose workers were largely uncovered by the provisions of the Wagner Act, supplemental insular legislation proved necessary. This paved the way, in 1945, for the passage of the Puerto Rican Labor Relations Act, which included all workers except public employees.

The island's organized labor movement also received the assistance of Governor Rexford Guy Tugwell, an economist, educator, and member of FDR's "Brain Trust." Tugwell, who had served in several positions on the island, including chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, was appointed to the office of governor for five years, commencing in September 1941. Governor Tugwell was indefatigable in his efforts to improve economic and social conditions on the island, including working conditions and wages. He was also instrumental in persuading President Harry S. Truman to appoint a Puerto Rican as his successor and in bringing electoral politics to the office which he had held.

With the development of PPD's Operation Bootstrap, agriculture ceased to be the major employer on the island, as significant employment increases occurred in the fields of manufacturing and public service. Puerto Rico's employment picture became increasingly urban-oriented, and the San Juan metropolitan area mushroomed as people moved to the "bright lights" and what they perceived as the opportunities of the city.

PPD development plans included the employment of thousands of additional workers in the manufacturing and other urban sectors. The need for such an intensive employment drive can be seen by a glance at the unemployment rate, which officially generally averaged around 12 to 20 percent, but depending on definitions, may be viewed as much as twice that rate. This chronic unemployment coupled with rapid increases in population, despite significant migration to the mainland (by 1985, the insular population had exceeded 3,250,000), has unquestionably been vital in maintaining unemployment at such high levels.

When seen in light of the attraction of mainland investment and enterprises to the island, the burgeoning increase in industrial employment opportunities, coupled with the fractured indigenous labor movement, constituted an "invitation" to the large mainland international unions to extend their organizational activities to this new and very fertile offshore area. A vacuum had been created, and the mainland internationals were prepared to fill it. Indeed, such has been the basic union picture in Puerto Rico since the early 1950s, and there appears to be relatively little likelihood of change in the foreseeable future, barring significant revision of the island's political status toward the direction of independence.

Mainland international unions rushed to the island during the 1950s and 1960s as industrialization increased under the Bootstrap program of Governor Muñoz. In addition to endeavoring to organize new industries and additional workers, these unions also spent great efforts battling each other, e.g., the defeat of the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) by the International Brotherhood of Longshoremen, AFL-CIO in 1954, or the battles between the Teamsters and various AFL-CIO affiliates, most notably the Seafarers International Union.

Particularly successful were the efforts of David Dubinsky and the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU). In addition to organizing in the garment trades, a major employer in Puerto Rico during the 1950s and 1960s, the ILGWU leadership also developed a close working relationship with Governor Muñoz and the PPD heads, which enabled the union leaders to have important voice in such vital areas as insular minimum wage (then below the U.S. mainland standards) and many other labor issues.

It undoubtedly is true that the initial organizing efforts of the Internationals, coming at a time of local union disintegration and a period of massive industrialization, were highly successful; over time, however, their appeal diminished.

Once again it must be recalled that the government of Puerto Rico, through legislation and its extremely active Department of Labor and Human Resources, established in 1931, and currently provided for in Article IV, Section 6, of the

Free Associated State (*Estado Libre Asociado*) Constitution of 1952, has been a leader in securing benefits for workers that in the United States have only been gained through collective bargaining.

The Department has been noted for its Migration Division, which assists in securing employment and other benefits and entitlements for Puerto Ricans living and working on the mainland, and on the island, for its Mediation and Conciliation Board.

In addition, other agencies functioning by the mid-1960s, a period of considerable union organizational efforts, included the Minimum Wage Board (*Junta de Salario Mínimo*), created in 1956, which set Puerto Rican minimum wage standards at rates below mainland standards; an Industrial Commission (*Comisión Industrial*), established in 1935 to settle labor-related accident awards; and the State Insurance Fund (*Fundo del Seguro del Estado*), a compulsory fund, founded in 1935 to handle claims under the Workmen's Accident Compensation Act.

Furthermore, the 1952 Commonwealth Constitution, in Article II, specifically deals with such issues as wages and hours, worker health and safety, and guarantees the right to organize, bargain collectively, and strike. More recent legislation has authorized the creation of such agencies as the Right to Employment Administration (1968), the Labor Union Services Bureau (1974), and a Puerto Rico Workmen Recreation and Rest Development Corporation (1974).

Other labor legislation covers a vast area from protection of women and children concerning wages and hours and types of employment, health and safety of all workers, regulation of holidays and payments for work beyond the eight-hour day (in excess of those hours stipulated in the Constitution) now set at double-time, special protection for working mothers, guaranteeing the services of the Puerto Rican Labor Relations Board (to those covered by the provisions of the Act of 1945), to the creation of educational and employment opportunities.

In a very real sense, it may be said that workers may perceive that the Commonwealth bureaucrats have taken over many of the functions of the labor leader, and that there is therefore less need to be concerned about the benefits derived from organizing. The inter-union battles, and at times violent and prolonged insular labor disputes, coupled with charges of union and other corruption, may also have discouraged workers from participating in these collective bargaining units. At any rate, a survey of the Economic Development Administration covering unionized salaried employees in major industries, indicated that union membership had declined from a high of 18–20 percent during the 1960s and early 1970s to 13–14 percent by the second half of the 1970s. Figures in the *Industrial Relations Bulletin* (November 1981) indicated that unions had lost a majority of the elections in which they had participated during each of the three preceding years.

Professor Miles Galvin has reported on what he terms the "New Unionism" emerging in Puerto Rico since the latter 1970s. (Galvin, 1979, p. 172.) This movement is identified by a significantly increased labor militancy (met by increasingly militant responses), but perhaps more important, a movement de-

cidedly turned away from support of the mainland internationals, a return to a concept of local, independent unions, and considerable support for political independence. The 1970s also were marked by a return to labor activity by the political organizations of the independence advocates and socialists, particularly through the Movement for Independence (*Movimiento Pro-Independencia*) founded in 1959, and its successor, the current Puerto Rican Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño*) led by Juan Marí Bras.

Clearly, unions will remain an important economic and political force on the island of Puerto Rico. However, the extent of their viability, their composition and leadership, and the degree of their militancy are not so easy to predict. The history of labor organization in Puerto Rico has plainly demonstrated that the movement is based on pragmatism, and not the ideology of so many Latin American labor movements. It has undergone dramatic reorganization in the past and is quite capable of repeating that process as exigencies may require. However, it would appear that among the pressing issues which will determine the future strength and direction of labor organization on the island are these considerations: the island's future political status—whether independence, continued association with the United States in some form similar to the present Commonwealth, or eventual statehood; the ability of the island government to solve its chronic and severe problems of unemployment and underemployment; the success of Puerto Rico in continuing to develop and achieve a more equitable distribution of the wealth of the island; and should independence be the ultimate political choice of the Puerto Rican people, the form of its future economic and social development, and its future relationship with the United States and other leading world powers.

Bibliography

- Anderson, Robert W. *Party Politics in Puerto Rico*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965.
- Bloomfield, Richard J., ed. *Puerto Rico: The Search for a National Policy*. Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1985.
- Carr, Raymond. *Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment*. New York: New York University Press, 1984.
- Farr, Kenneth R. *Personalism and Party Politics: Institutionalization of the Popular Democratic Party of Puerto Rico*. Hato Rey, Puerto Rico: Inter-American University Press, 1973.
- Galvin, Miles. "Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector in Puerto Rico." Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1972.
- . *The Organized Labor Movement in Puerto Rico*. Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1979.
- LeVeness, Frank Paul. "United States-Puerto Rican Relations: A Question of Commonwealth." *Proceedings from SULA Latin American Studies Conference, 1973*, Vol. 2. Special Study no. 2. Buffalo: State University of New York-Buffalo, 1973.
- Lopez, Adalberto. *The Puerto Ricans*. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1980.

- Lopez, Adalberto and James Petras, eds. *Puerto Rico and the Puerto Ricans: Studies in History and Society*. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1974.
- Maldonado Denis, Manuel. *Puerto Rico: A Socio-Historic Interpretation*, trans. Elena Viola. New York: Random House, 1972.
- Morales-Carrion, Arturo. *Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History*. New York: Norton, 1984.
- Nazario, Alfredo. "Public Employee Bargaining in Puerto Rico." In *Public Employee Organizing and Bargaining*, ed. Howard J. Anderson.
- Puerto Rico, Department of Labor and Human Resources, Office of Information and Community Relations. *Labor Laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico*. Annual editions.
- Senior, Clarence. *Santiago Iglesias: Labor Crusader*. Hato Rey, Puerto Rico: Inter-American University Press, 1972.
- Whittaker, William G. "The Santiago Iglesias Case, 1901-1902: Origins of American Trade Union Involvement in Puerto Rico." *The Americas* 24 (April 1968): 378-93.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

AFGE. *See* American Federation of Government Employees.

AFL-CIO. *See* American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES—AFGE.

Headed by International Representative Ismael Rivera, from headquarters in Bayamón, this public employee union has fourteen locals of a variety of workers, including technicians of the Puerto Rico Air National Guard, the Social Security Administration, the National Labor Relations Board; it is affiliated with the AFL-CIO.

This union was founded in 1932 after splits from the National Federation of Federal Employees and that union's rift with the AFL. The AFGE experienced significant periods of growth, particularly after President John F. Kennedy's 1962 executive order recognizing federal employees' right to collectively bargain. Union activities, however, continue to be hampered by lack of a right to strike.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR-CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS—AFL-CIO.

Known in Spanish as the Federación Americana del Trabajo-Congreso de Organizaciones Industriales, this federation grew from the 1955 merger of the AFL and CIO, sparked at least to a significant degree by the results of the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act by the U.S. Congress in 1947.

The AFL was founded in 1886 by the cigar workers' union leader Samuel Gompers, as a result of the reorganization of the Federation of Organized Trades

and Labor Unions, which had been established in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1881. The AFL grew rapidly to become the major federation of American national craft unions.

The goals of Gompers and the AFL leadership are not easily summarized, but certainly they revolved around the significant improvement of the plight of nineteenth-century American workers. The AFL generally sought workers' improvements not through the radical and revolutionary movements of many of its European counterparts, but rather through a much more pragmatic and evolutionary approach, which included working through legitimate constitutional and governmental processes, existing within rather than attempting to overthrow the American system of capitalism, and seeking reform rather than replacement in a spirit of negotiation rather than of violence. Even legitimate labor actions, including strikes, were considered a last resort. The AFL proved to be very nationalistic, expressing pro-American sentiments, though differing with policies considered injurious to the American worker. This union organization tended not to subscribe to particular parties or their specific platforms and often avoided endorsing individual candidates for political office.

Samuel Gompers was succeeded by William Green, who served as president until his death in 1952; Green was in turn succeeded by George Meany. When the AFL and the CIO merged in 1955, the AFL claimed a membership of ten million.

It was to Samuel Gompers and the AFL that Puerto Rican labor leader Santiago Iglesias Pantín turned as he organized his Free Federation of Labor* on the island. Indeed, the AFL, at its 1900 annual convention in Louisville, Kentucky, resolved to extend its organizing efforts to the island of Puerto Rico, undoubtedly not wishing the island to represent a source of cheap labor which would pose a threat to mainland unionized workers.

The following year, at its convention in Allentown, Pennsylvania, the Federation appointed Iglesias as AFL representative for Puerto Rico and Cuba, and designated his Free Federation as the "state" AFL organization. It was Gompers who introduced the Puerto Rican labor leader to President William McKinley and who assisted Iglesias during his period of trial and imprisonment. In 1904 Gompers greatly aided the cause of Iglesias' Free Federation by personally visiting the island, lending his weight to the organizational effort in Puerto Rico.

Puerto Rican labor gained immeasurably from its association with the AFL. The latter supplied nationally known leadership support and invaluable technical assistance, both with regard to organizing activities in general and with regard to operations within the American political, economic, and social context. The AFL also supplied all-important funds for organizational and labor relations activities, and over the years also lent its support to various island political developments. For instance, its 1946 Chicago, Illinois, convention praised the appointment of Jesús T. Piñero as the island's first Puerto Rican governor; the 1947 convention in San Francisco, California, demanded a clear political status for the island and "first-class" citizenship for its people; and the 1952 convention

praised the creation of the current Commonwealth. In addition, the AFL and later the AFL-CIO fought for specific issues which directly affected the island's economy and, therefore, its workers.

Naturally, the national group extracted a price for this support. Puerto Rican union leaders and membership were expected to be loyal to the ideals and goals of the national Federation. They were to conduct their own activities in accord with AFL principles and procedures. Use of Federation funds was closely monitored, and support for the national Federation's positions and activities was anticipated. This, of course, produced charges by many that there was an organized endeavor to "colonize" the Puerto Rican labor movement so as to keep it compatible with the interests of its mainland peer groups. Pro-independence forces (*Independentistas*) and others argue that as colonialism caused Puerto Rico to support American mainland political causes, often at what they would consider the expense of the island and its population, so too the Puerto Rican labor movement supports mainland American economic goals and institutions, often at the expense of what they perceive as the economic well-being of the island. In this view, the movement has been prevented from acting in the best interests of the long-term welfare of the island's workers. The debate over the costs versus the benefits of affiliation with mainland labor organizations and of the penetration by these labor unions of the Puerto Rican labor market continues to rage, and will do so at least until the final resolution of the island's political future.

The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was initially created as a Committee in 1935 by United Mine Workers' President John L. Lewis, who served as an AFL vice president, and other disaffected AFL leaders. As its name implies, the CIO represented the interests of workers of the industrial unions, many of whom believed that the AFL was inadequately representing their interests. The CIO was suspended from AFL membership, and in 1938 the Congress was officially formed. Lewis remained CIO president to 1940; he was succeeded by Philip Murray, who served as president for the next twelve years and was far more politically active than had been Lewis. Murray was in turn succeeded by Walter P. Reuther.

The CIO continued to grow, and its leaders were initially invited into Puerto Rico in 1937 by dockworkers who were dissatisfied with the support they were receiving from the AFL.

The AFL and CIO amalgamated on the U.S. mainland in 1955. The island's regional AFL and CIO organizations did likewise a few years thereafter and have been operating as a single unit since that period. By the late 1960s over eight of every ten workers who had been organized were members of AFL-CIO affiliated unions.

The 1983 official *Directory (Directorio)* lists over twenty-five "internationals" which represent workers in Puerto Rico, and in some instances, in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Recently, there has been a weakening of the power of the internationals on the island. These unions have often concentrated their efforts on winning each others' workers rather than upon organizing new workers. In

addition, there exists a new nationalistic spirit which has led to reinvigorated interest in island-wide organizations, solely operated by Puerto Ricans exclusively in the interests of island workers.

CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL.

The Central Labor Council, founded to serve as the AFL–CIO representative for unions in the San Juan metropolitan area, was organized in 1964 by Keith Terpe, leader of the Seafarers International Union, and AFL regional representative Augustín Benítez. Terpe became its president, and Thomas Martinez of the National Maritime Union was named secretary-treasurer.

The Council was formed to foster cooperation between unions and to bring a halt to the “raiding” of each other’s locals, which in some respects appeared to be a hallmark of that period. Over thirty unions joined the Council, and Terpe was able to leave his presidential post in 1972 claiming that much of the original task had been accomplished. The Council undercut the power of Hipólito Marciano, president of the Workers Federation of Puerto Rico.*

Today the Council is headed by president Rubén Calderón and is headquartered in Santurce, at the same location as the offices of the current AFL–CIO representative, Paul Sánchez.

CGT. *See* General Confederation of Workers of Puerto Rico.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES DE PUERTO RICO. *See* General Confederation of Workers of Puerto Rico.

FEDERACIÓN DEL TRABAJO DE PUERTO RICO. *See* Workers Federation of Puerto Rico.

FEDERACIÓN LIBRE DE LOS TRABAJADORES DE PUERTO RICO. *See* Free Federation of Labor.

FLT. *See* Free Federation of Labor.

FREE FEDERATION OF LABOR (Federación Libre de los Trabajadores de Puerto Rico—FLT).

The Free Federation of Labor was founded by one of the island’s greatest labor leaders, Santiago Iglesias Pantín, in 1899. The last few years of Spanish domination of the island of Puerto Rico saw continued enforcement of the legislation outlawing labor organizations and organized efforts to improve wages and conditions of workers. Iglesias found himself jailed by Spanish authorities for his labor efforts; and although he was set free by American military commanders after U.S. occupation of the island during the Spanish-American War (many of the officers sympathized with the plight of the insular workers), Iglesias

was once again imprisoned with the return of civilian rule, which continued to operate under the old Spanish laws.

This reinstitution of civil rule in 1900 was accompanied by a strong wave of reactionism. Wages were drastically reduced, and conditions were worsened by a severe drop in the value of the peso. Strikes followed and culminated in a general work stoppage during the summer, all of which were broken by the government. Iglesias was arrested and then was urged to move to the U.S. mainland, where he resumed his former trade as a carpenter. Perhaps nothing could have been more fortunate for the Puerto Rican labor movement, for it afforded Iglesias an opportunity to continue organizing and in due course to meet the founder of the American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers.

Iglesias and Gompers became allies and friends. Despite Iglesias' rather basic Marxist socialist ideas, he fell under the influence of the AFL president and quickly adapted his ideas to those of the U.S. labor movement. In 1901 he was introduced to President William McKinley by Gompers, and that same year the FLT became affiliated with the AFL. Iglesias returned to Puerto Rico charged with organizing that island and Cuba for Gompers' Federation.

It was at that point that those who opposed unionization of workers in Puerto Rico took action. Iglesias once again found himself jailed under the old Spanish laws, sentenced to over three years imprisonment. In fact, both he and those imprisoned with him, including labor leader Eduardo Conde, actually served little time in prison. Through the intervention of Gompers, bail was secured and a campaign initiated to overturn the convictions. President Theodore Roosevelt even contacted the Puerto Rican governor, William H. Hunt, who wrote to the insular Supreme Court, which in turn, found that the defendants' constitutional rights had been violated, and overturned the convictions in 1902. A court judgment dissolving the FLT was never executed. Once more Iglesias and the FLT could turn their attention to serious organizing of Puerto Rican workers.

Iglesias and his followers had contact with the U.S. Socialist Workers Party led by Professor Daniel DeLeon. Moreover, Iglesias indicated that his socialist concepts included doctrines of equality of all persons, the need for equity, and the termination of all forms of discrimination. He rejected much traditional Marxist thought, emphasizing a strong belief in the United States, of which he had become a naturalized citizen in 1900, the use of nonviolence in labor disputes, and the necessity of democracy in the political process.

He often addressed his followers concerning the values emphasized by Jesus, and his own belief in the use of private groups, such as labor unions, as well as public agencies to secure the welfare of all members of society. FLT platforms emphasized these goals, and this union may be said to be one of the Latin American groups in the forefront of the effort to secure equal rights for women in the labor market as well as to improve their position within society in general.

Iglesias' beliefs, at least in part, resulted from the influence of Samuel Gompers. However, they also typify the views of many twentieth-century Puerto

Rican political leaders, who sought to secure pragmatic political goals, rather than concentrate on those which might be considered ideal, but impractical.

In the early twentieth century, the economy of Puerto Rico became increasingly dominated by mainland U.S. sugar and tobacco interests. Union organization was extremely difficult for several reasons: the lack of experience of both organizers and workers; the strong opposition of owners and managers, who often employed government agencies, such as the police, in their efforts to break strikes; the high unemployment rates, officially hovering around one-fifth of the labor force but in reality perhaps much higher; and the inability of workers to finance union organizations, labor actions, or prolonged strikes. There was, in the opinion of many within the FLT, sound reason to affiliate with the AFL and reap the financial, organizational, educational, and political benefits which such cooperation would engender.

For its part, the AFL reaped the benefits of organizing additional workers on U.S. soil, while at the same time, endeavoring to ensure that a new pool of inexpensive labor would not be available to the mainland, nor would jobs be exported to the island.

During the 1920s Puerto Rico was the subject of intensive organizational efforts by the FLT and others, and of numerous labor disputes. Violence often occurred, and the police were called in to break strikes. Relatively few gains were made in organizing the workers in the major agricultural businesses.

In one key area the FLT departed from the traditions of the AFL, apparently with the latter's accord. Rather than remaining politically "neutral" and offering support to candidates of various parties who, in turn, assisted the cause of organized labor, the Puerto Rican labor movement found itself virtually without such supporters among the major political parties of the island. Therefore, they felt increasing pressure to run their own candidates for office. In 1915 they formally affiliated with the Socialist Party of Puerto Rico, and in the elections held two years later, Santiago Iglesias Pantín won a seat in the first elected Puerto Rican Senate.

At the request of Samuel Gompers, Santiago Iglesias became very active as a representative of the AFL in Latin America. For example, in 1915 he assisted Gompers in a meeting with Mexican labor leaders, and in 1918 he participated in the Laredo Conference, at which the Pan-American Federation of Labor (Confederación Obrera Pan-Americana) was created. Thus, Iglesias extended his influence throughout much of the region.

The Socialist Party continued to grow in strength, particularly after it joined with others in the Coalition (*Coalición*). Iglesias was reelected to the island Senate in 1920, 1924, and 1928. In 1932 a reactivated coalition captured a majority in the insular legislature, and Iglesias was elected resident commissioner. He was returned in 1936.

However, the Socialists, in becoming part of the ruling coalition, appeared to be moving in new directions. Their main aims appeared to be winning electoral

contests rather than focusing on things important to the electorate, and in due course they were replaced as the governing party by don Luis Muñoz Marín's Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democrático—PPD). This disaffection with socialist politics spread to organized labor.

In 1933 the FLT announced the first island-wide labor contract with the sugarcane growers. However, because the workers believed the agreement was inadequate, they voted a resounding no, the first time workers had risen against their own union leaders. A second strike, that of the stevedores in 1938, was not sponsored by FLT. Instead, the workers rejected the FLT-AFL for what was considered to be the far more militant CIO.

During the late 1930s militant members of FLT, including numbers of communists, became disillusioned with that union and broke away. In 1940 a new organization, in direct competition with the FLT, was formed, the General Confederation of Workers of Puerto Rico* (Confederación General de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico—CGT). It received the support of Muñoz's PPD, which sought to have the new CGT as its labor wing. CGT's membership grew rapidly, replacing the FLT as the island's leading labor union.

Between the death of Iglesias in 1939, the rise of CGT, and the arrival of the mainland "internationals," FLT's popularity waned, and its membership dropped sharply. During the 1950s it lost its AFL affiliation to its rival, the Puerto Rican Federation of Labor. Today, operating from its headquarters in the San Juan suburb of Santurce, it has seventeen affiliates whose workers are mainly employed in cane, sugar mills, canning, baking, or office work.

FTPR. *See* Workers Federation of Puerto Rico.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF PUERTO RICO (Confederación General de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico—CGT).

During the late 1930s a number of militant and communist members of the Free Federation of Labor* (FLT) became disillusioned and split away. In 1940 representatives of over forty local unions gathered in San Juan to form a new island-wide labor organization, which became known as the General Confederation of Workers. CGT aligned itself with the mainland Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) rather than with the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and also with the left-leaning Confederation of Latin American Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de la América Latina—CTAL), which was an affiliate of the World Federation of Trade Unions.

The Popular Democrats Party (PPD) endeavored to have the new CGT serve as their labor wing, and several prominent PPD members held positions of great influence within the union, including Senator Ramón Barreto Pérez and Representative Ernesto Ramos Antonini, who became speaker of the insular House of Representatives.

CGT's membership grew rapidly, and it quickly replaced the FLT as the island's leading labor union. Its organizational efforts spread throughout the

island, and at its height it attracted nearly 400 locals. However, since PPD was introducing new economic life into the island that required continued association with the United States and capital invested by mainland corporations and individuals, there occurred a dramatic upheaval in 1945, with many CGT members supporting independence for Puerto Rico and opposed to such close cooperation with the United States. In March the union split in two, with PPD supporters reorganized into CGT-Authentic (Auténtico), and the more radical and independence-oriented supporters joined together in CGT-CIO. However, the reality proved to be that neither wing captured the support of the adherents to the original CGT, and thus this second major indigenous labor organization tended to drift the way of the FLT.

Today, under the presidency of Jorge Luis Landino, a prominent attorney, it is headquartered in Santurce, and is comprised of some ten local affiliates and seven union affiliates. The workers who are organized in CGT are from such diverse groups as bank employees, electrical workers, those involved in automobile retail, those manufacturing metal furniture, and many others. It is currently independent, and not affiliated with the AFL-CIO.

ILGWU. *See* International Ladies Garment Workers Union.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND HELPERS OF AMERICA.

The Teamsters were founded in 1903 under President Cornelius P. Shea (1903–1907), subsequent to the reorganization of the Team Drivers International Union, which had been founded in 1899 under President George Innis (1899–1903). The union vigorously expanded, often by widening its jurisdiction and incurring the wrath of other internationals; by the 1940s it was the largest mainland union.

Due to charges of corruption during the presidency of Dave Beck (1952–57), the Teamsters were expelled from the AFL-CIO.

Shortly thereafter, under the presidency of James R. Hoffa (1957–71), the Teamsters sent organizer Frank Chavez to Puerto Rico. The Teamsters received strong opposition from the AFL-CIO, and particularly from the Seaman's International Union (SIU) from whom the Teamsters were endeavoring to win shops. The struggle lasted for nine years, with SIU the eventual winner. They, unlike the AFL-CIO "internationals," were also strongly opposed by the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) government of Luis Muñoz Marín, who supported SIU efforts to defeat them.

However, the Teamsters persisted, often winning workers away from other unions (as was the case with the Seafarers in the late 1950s). Today, with headquarters in Santurce, they represent workers in a wide variety of occupations, from hotel workers to chauffeurs, restaurant employees, casino workers, and workers in the food industries and in various manufacturing firms.

INTERNATIONAL LADIES GARMENT WORKERS UNION—ILGWU.

This AFL–CIO “international” union was founded in 1900 in New York City and was almost immediately affiliated with the AFL. Despite splits between radicals and moderates, and conflict with competing union organizations, the ILGWU grew rapidly, and by the conclusion of World War I, was a major U.S. union. Its founding president was Herman Grossman (1900–1903).

During the interwar period, many communist members were driven from the union, and its policies turned far less radical.

The ILGWU was one of the first of the internationals to actively organize on the island of Puerto Rico. This occurred under the leadership of President David Dubinsky (1932–66) and island organizer Robert Gladnick. The union was attracted by Operation Bootstrap, which had encouraged mainland clothing manufacturers to open plants on the island. It continues to operate several locals from its headquarters in Santurce, under the guidance of Regional Director Clifford W. Depine.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER CARRIERS—NALC.

Founded in 1889, this union, with headquarters in the nation’s capital, has been engaged in the struggle to improve the salaries, benefits, and working conditions of our nation’s mail carriers. It works along with several other unions involved with the Postal Service, including those representing postal clerks and railway postal clerks.

NALC was founded by carrier and Civil War veteran William H. Wood in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and has spread across the nation, today representing approximately 90 percent of the carriers, with a membership in excess of 275,000. It affiliated with the American Federation of Labor in 1917.

Among its more significant battles were those with the chair of the Post Office Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, Congressman Eugene F. Lord (R-Calif.), who had supported the “gag rule” which forbade the carriers to lobby for pay increases. The union was an important factor in Congressman Lord’s defeat in 1902, though the rule remained until 1912. It has also been claimed that union president James C. Keller was dismissed from the Post Office because of these activities. The union was instrumental, under President William E. Kelly, in eliminating the “gag rule” through the passage of the Lloyd–La Follette Act of 1912.

In addition, the union fought strenuously for its 1907 pay raise, the first received since 1888, noting the oppressive working conditions and extremely high personnel turnover rate of the service.

Its fortunes varied in succeeding years. During Woodrow Wilson’s presidential administration (1913–21), union leaders were dismissed, and attempts were made to eliminate the unions themselves. However, Postmaster General Will H. Hays, of the Harding administration, was offered honorary NALC membership, which he rejected in favor of regular dues-paying membership status. The Eisenhower administration vetoed four bills during its eight years, which would have granted

significant pay increases to NALC members. In 1962 Postmaster General J. Edward Day, of the Kennedy administration, issued executive order 10988, which required recognition of the unions of the post office workers.

In 1970 NALC supported the first serious work stoppage in the history of the Post Office, in which several hundred thousand workers walked off the job and had to be replaced temporarily by units of the National Guard. Following that labor dispute, Congress reorganized the Post Office as the United States Postal Service, a quasi-public corporation with considerable autonomy. NALC strongly supported this move, in the belief that its power of collective bargaining with the new corporation would be more advantageous to its membership than were its previous abilities to influence the president and Congress. Since that date, this union, in alliance with others, has negotiated successfully.

NALC currently operates three locals on the island of Puerto Rico. The first (#826), in the island's second largest city, Ponce, was organized in 1901, approximately three years after the Americans took jurisdiction over the island. The second (#869), in the island's capital, San Juan, was started the following year; and the third (#6580), far more recent in origin, was started in Abuco in 1969, following various mergers over the years.

SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF PUERTO RICO—SIU-PR.

The SIU was founded as an AFL affiliate in 1938 by President Harry Lundeberg (1938–57), as an outgrowth of the failure of the International Seamen's Union of America, which had been established in 1893. It had, however, suffered from slow growth and severe competition.

The new SIU found itself locked in a struggle with the National Maritime Union, a Congress of Industrial Organizations affiliate. (The merger of the AFL and CIO [1955] has apparently done little to lessen the competitive struggle.)

However, the SIU played a very significant role in the organization of workers in Puerto Rico. An SIU office had been operating on the island as early as the 1940s. However, it was in 1954 when President Keith Terpe of SIU-PR went to the island to organize the workers who were supportive of the maritime industry, for example, truck drivers.

Four years later, through the request of AFL–CIO President George Meany and SIU–North America President Paul Hall, the Puerto Rican affiliate was requested to put a halt to raids on SIU shops by the Teamsters, then under the presidency of James Hoffa. The struggle, at times quite violent, continued for nine years, including a street battle near the offices of the newspaper *The Impartial* (*El Imparcial*), whose SIU-organized workers were being wooed by the Teamsters. Eventually, SIU won, and today relative peace exists between the two unions.

SIU went on to become the largest labor organization in the Caribbean, as it continued to be led by President Hall until his death in 1980. He had also served as a vice president of the AFL–CIO and president of the AFL–CIO Maritime Trades Department.

Today SIU-PR is led by Keith Terpe, one of the labor leaders responsible for the creation of the Central Labor Council* of San Juan, over which he presided until 1972.

The SIU was partially responsible for the passage of the 1970 Merchant Marine Act, signed by President Richard M. Nixon, which had provided for shipping subsidies and the construction of some 300 ships over a decade. However, the hoped-for results of that act were by no means fully achieved, and today the SIU (now Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes, and Inland Waterways District) is still organizing in the troubled merchant marine as well as in other fields.

SIU-PR. *See* Seafarers International Union of Puerto Rico.

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA—USWA.

Originally founded as the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in 1936, aided by the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the United Steelworkers of America officially came into being after its constitutional convention in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1942. Its first president was Philip Murray (1942–52). By absorbing other unions and by organizing outside the steel industry, the union became one of the largest, despite the ailing industry for which it was named.

Its operations in Puerto Rico are typical of its mainland pattern. The island's locals number thirty-five and are grouped in District 36, which comprises the Southern portion of the United States. On the island, USWA has organized in such diverse fields as hospitals, various areas of manufacture, office workers, and a large number of municipal workers from various towns throughout the island.

USWA. *See* United Steelworkers of America.

WORKERS FEDERATION OF PUERTO RICO (Federación del Trabajo de Puerto Rico—FTPR).

The Workers' Federation of Puerto Rico replaced the Free Federation of Labor* as the American Federation of Labor "state" chapter in 1953, and it continues to represent the AFL-CIO in Puerto Rico to this date. It is headed by Hipólito Marciano, a labor lawyer and leading Popular Democratic Party (PPD) political figure who has served for years in the Senate of Puerto Rico and has been extremely active in the island's labor movement as both a legislator and lawyer. The creation of the Central Labor Council* (1964) in San Juan has somewhat undercut the authority of Marciano, who operates the FTPR from its headquarters in the Hyde Park section of Hato Rey.

WORKERS UNITED UNION OF THE SOUTH OF PUERTO RICO (Sindicato Obreros Unidos del Sur de Puerto Rico).

This union was founded in February 1961 by the late José L. "Chepo" Caraballo Negrón, who had previously been active in many aspects of the island's

labor movement, including service as president of the Factoria de la Central Aguirre and vice president in Puerto Rico of the United Packinghouse Workers of America (AFL-CIO). Caraballo also served on the municipal assembly of Yauco, and at the behest of governor Luis Muñoz Marín, he served on the board of Fomento Ocupacional, an employment development bureau. Later, Governor Luis Alberto Ferré appointed Caraballo to the committee on human resources.

Workers United is Puerto Rico's main regional union, serving workers on the southern portion of the island from its headquarters in Salinas. It has had over forty locals with a membership in excess of 17,000, and principally serves workers in sugarcane plantations, sugar mills, candy factories, and the like, though it has also organized workers in pharmacies.

Since the death of Caraballo in February 1978, the union has been led by José L. Caraballo, Hijo.

Suriname _____

WILLIAM L. CUMIFORD

Formerly known as Dutch Guiana, the Republic of Suriname is located on the north coast of South America, bordered by the Republic of Guyana, French Guiana, and Brazil. Its dwindling population numbers roughly 350,000, of whom 100,000 live in the capital district of Paramaribo; the nation embraces an area of 63,036 square miles. The first permanent settlement in Suriname struck root in the mid-seventeenth century under the supervision of Governor Francis Willoughby of Barbados. This new English colony, known as Willoughbyland, soon prospered through the nurturing of a plantation economy based on African slave labor. In the 1600s the principal products were cotton, cocoa, sugar, and coffee.

During the first half century of its existence, Suriname suffered the vicissitudes of international war and accompanying peace arrangements. The Netherlands finally secured permanent control of the colony under the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1815. Eventually, plantation labor shortages created by the abolition of slavery in 1863 prompted the government of the Netherlands to import East Indian workers. Later, additional indentured servants immigrated to Suriname from Indonesia. Today, the country reflects a diversity born of its traditional plantation-colonial status. The Surinamese 1980 census listed a population comprised of 35 percent Hindustani, 31 percent Creole (Black), and 15 percent Indonesian (largely Javanese). Other groups include Bush Negroes, Chinese, Europeans, and Amerindians.

At the turn of the twentieth century, 90 percent of Suriname's agriculture came from plantations. Currently, however, the bulk of this activity derives from small operations. The traditional colonial crops—sugar, coffee, cocoa, and cotton—were eclipsed in the nineteenth century by rice (the most important staple), bananas, and citrus fruits. However, the most critical economic innovation in Suriname was the discovery of bauxite at the close of the nineteenth century. The bauxite industry provided a major impetus for early trade activity. Over the

past fifteen years, Suriname has become one of the world's largest aluminum ore producers.

Union organization in Suriname dates to a Creole-dominated effort during World War II to oppose the repressive policies of Governor Johannes Kielstra. Through radio talks and public meetings, this group, known as the Suriname Union* (Unie Suriname—US), focused on a wide range of social and economic issues. Eliciting sympathy from pro-independence elements in the *Staten*, the Surinamese parliamentary body, the Surinamese labored for the governor's removal in its fight for national autonomy. Following a suspension of the *Staten*, new elections, and the ultimate recall of Kielstra, the union's influence waned somewhat by the late 1940s. Nonetheless, as a forerunner of genuine party politics and trade union activity, the Suriname Union exposed to public view fundamental colonial ills: limited suffrage, apartheid policies, and the absence of due process of law.

At the close of World War II efforts toward party and labor organization produced results when the bauxite workers forged the Suriname Miners' Union (Mijnwerkers Bond—MB) and the Suriname Workers' Union (Suriname Werknemers Bond—SWB). These affiliated organizations dominated trade union affairs, proving instrumental in winning governmental recognition and a collective-bargaining contract in 1946 after a sixty-three-day strike against the Alcoa Company. Though these groups were only indirectly associated with political parties, formation of the Suriname National Party (NPS) grew out of the leadership of previous union figures. Later, in the early 1950s, unionized bauxite workers organized the Suriname Labor Party (LPS) as a political arm of the trade union movement. Leo Eleazer, the guiding light of the MB-SWB coalition, occupied a seat in the *Staten* in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The rapid proliferation of parties, compounded by the intricate interlocking of labor-political relationships, created a proclivity in Suriname for the formation of large union federations. The Suriname Workers' Federation* (Surinaamse Werknemers Moederbond—SWM) initiated this trend in 1947 by bringing twenty separate groups together in a single federation. In the mid-1960s Suriname listed six national trade union federations encompassing approximately 30,000 members. Another significant early federation was the Progressive Workers' Organization* (Progressive Werknemers Organisatie—PWO), a Catholic group formed in 1948.

In 1954 Suriname achieved full internal political autonomy through a series of roundtable negotiations at The Hague. A form of parliamentary democracy characterized by strong party organization evolved as Suriname assumed control over domestic affairs two decades before obtaining full independence. Following complete political separation from the Netherlands in 1975, the Surinamese elected a minister-president, supported by a ceremonial chief executive and a cabinet, who represented the majority element in the *Staten*.

In the 1950s and 1960s the Creoles, under the leadership of Johan Adolf

Pengel and the Suriname National Party, formed an alliance with the United Hindustani Party (VHP) led by Jaggernath Lachmon. This merger, known as ethnic *verbroedering*, enable the two principal racial groups to work constructively for political accord. Disproportionate East Indian representation in the *Staten*, however, effectively ended *verbroedering* in 1967. Political alliances between the two major parties and various splinter groups failed to ease racial strife. In addition, labor unrest in the late 1960s toppled the NPS government and later seriously hampered a new VHP coalition regime.

Until very recently, party and union organization in Suriname did not follow ideological lines or class orientation. In the 1950s, as previously noted, sporadic efforts were made in this direction by the Suriname Labor Party (LPS). But in the following decade workers were increasingly courted by the Nationalist Republican Party (PNR), the only leftist group in Suriname possessing considerable political strength. PNR leader Eddy Bruma, steeped in organized labor experience, spearheaded efforts for party-union coalitions. Bruma advocated the expropriation of foreign firms in Suriname and complete independence from the Netherlands. However, the Communist Party of Suriname (KM), a pro-Soviet body, has never been successful in electing candidates or attracting widespread support among the workers.

The electric, volatile nature of trade unionism in Suriname was vividly portrayed in the political-labor crisis experienced by the VHP (Hindustani) government of the early 1970s. High unemployment, inflation, and protracted racial tension led to a series of Creole-organized strikes of the police, customs officers, and teachers in the fall of 1970. Throughout these episodes, PNR leaders encouraged dissident students who roamed the streets of Paramaribo destroying property. In January 1971 government workers' unions formed a new federation, the Central Organization of State Employees* (Centrale van Landsdienaren Organisations—CLO), with PNR supervision. The government's failure to curb rising prices, accompanied by the union's pressing social demands, precipitated a general strike in September 1971. While half of the Surinamese work force honored the three-day strike, cooperation between the major union federations seemed imminent.

The aggressive nature of the various unions, coordinated by NPS and PNR leaders, fomented another strike by customs' officials in January 1973. When workers' demands were not satisfied, street rioting resumed as other unions staged sympathy strikes. In early February, CLO headquarters launched a special strike paper, the *CLO-Bulletin*, while Dutch labor federations donated over 100,000 guilders to the Suriname trade union cause.

Though strikers marched on government offices, the police maintained decorum by refusing to turn against their employers. In late February administration representatives finally met with labor delegates, while riots and a few cases of arson were reported throughout Paramaribo. This last wave of violence, including two deaths, actually occurred in the aftermath of the general strike. Negotiations

between VHP authorities and the unions continued; the strike did not officially end until April. However, by mid-March most strikers had returned to work, and the schools were beginning to reopen.

Even though the government weathered the storm, these intense union activities, aided and abetted by political parties, set the stage for a new political coalition as the NPS resumed control after the 1973 elections. As East Indian-Creole polarization intensified, the NPS enlisted the support of a Javanese party and two additional Creole groups, sweeping to power under the new banner of the National Party Alliance (NPK). Thus, after years of laboriously constructed political harmony, Suriname fell prey to the bitter racial division characteristic of neighboring Guyana.

Moreover, the racial schism deepened when Henk Arron, the NPK premier, insisted on full and immediate independence from the Netherlands, disregarding Hindustani fears that total Creole domination would follow on the heels of severed ties with the mother country. Lachmon, unwilling to risk dangerous political isolation by opposing independence, reluctantly acquiesced on the conditions that the military be fully integrated and that new elections be held. But the NPK retained its majority in 1977 and postponed the 1979 elections, citing the need for interparty reorganization.

Owing to racial disharmony, constant and confusing political realignments, and reports of government scandal, the Arron regime proved vacillating and vulnerable. Also, even prior to 1975 thousands of East Indians had migrated to the Netherlands, causing a reduction of one-third of the former Surinamese population. From 1973 to 1979 the international oil crisis, followed by inflation and balance of payment problems, further aggravated the despondent NPK government. All of these difficulties set the stage for the 1980 coup d'état.

Political and governmental weaknesses led inexorably to a Surinamese power vacuum, filled in February 1980 by a military regime known as the National Military Council (NMC). Again, issues in organized labor precipitated momentous political changes. Arron's refusal to sanction an army grievance group, the Union of Military Cadre* (Bond van Militair Kader—BoMika, or BMK), followed by his severe mishandling of disciplinary action directed against a few noncommissioned officers, delivered governmental power into the hands of the BoMika cadre. For the first six months after assuming control the sergeants labored for quasi-civilian authority, but by August, Sergeant Desi Bouterse prevailed as the power broker of the new regime.

During his ensuing consolidation of power, Bouterse exhibited a profound ability for political wavering. Pronouncing a nonaligned status for Suriname, he wooed leftist domestic leaders and made friendly overtures to Havana while carefully testing the international political waters. Bouterse's summary execution of fifteen opposition leaders in December 1982 severely damaged Suriname's international relations and greatly encouraged exile opposition. Extreme financial hardship, created largely by the revocation of loans from the Netherlands and

the United States, contributed to the fall of the fourth NMC-dominated cabinet in January 1984.

Throughout 1983 and early 1984 Bouterse persisted in his chameleon habits. His earlier flirtations with Cuba gave way to some minor economic and military arrangements with Brazil and a cabinet purge of pro-Cuban elements. Following the U.S. invasion of Grenada in the fall of 1983, Bouterse ousted the Cuban delegation in Suriname. Through all of this, representative government in Suriname ceased to exist. Traditional political animosities arising from ethnic differences were completely overshadowed by the exigency of prolonged military rule. Suriname, a nation boasting a sophisticated system of party politics and a highly literate society, has conducted only one national election since acquiring independence in 1975.

Since the military takeover, the status of trade union power in Suriname remains a mystery. Full details of labor organization membership have not been disclosed since the early 1970s, and it is doubtful that union or party influence has been very formidable in view of the political domination imposed by Bouterse and his military cohorts.

Bibliography

- Alexander, Robert J. ed. *Political Parties of the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and West Indies*. Vol. 2. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982.
- Coldrick, A. P. and Philip Jones, eds. *The International Directory of the Trade Union Movement*. New York: Facts on File, 1979.
- Dew, Edward. *The Difficult Flowering of Surinam: Ethnicity and Politics in a Plural Society*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.
- Dodge, Peter. "Ethnic Fragmentation and Politics: The Case of Surinam." *Political Science Quarterly* 81 (December 1966): 593-601.
- Gastmann, Albert L. *The Politics of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles*. Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1968.
- Goslinga, Cornelius. *A Short History of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979.
- Hendrickson, Embert. "Surinam and the Antilles: A New Perspective." *The World Today* 40 (June 1984): 261-68.
- Kroes, Rob. "The Small Town Coup: The NCO Political Intervention in Surinam." *Armed Forces and Society* 9, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 115-34.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

BILLITON MIJNWERKERS' BOND (Billiton Mine Workers' Union). *See* Suriname Workers Federation.

BILLITON MINE WORKERS' UNION. *See* Suriname Workers' Federation.

BOMIKA. *See* Union of Military Cadre.

BOND VAN MILITAIR KADER. *See* Union of Military Cadre.

BMK. *See* Union of Military Cadre.

CENTRAL 47 (Centrale 47—C-47).

Central 47 exists as one of the four major federations in Suriname. Comprising 47 separate civil servant and teachers' unions, Central 47 coalesced as a result of the labor leader Eddy Bruma's efforts in the late 1960s in organizing leftist political interests through strong union coordination. The Nationalistic Republic Party, begun by Bruma in 1961, established formidable ties with Surinamese organized labor. In February 1968 Bruma secured the chairmanship of the influential Paramaribo Mine Workers Union* headquartered at the Suralco bauxite plant.

With this strong base of labor support, Bruma launched a drive for multiracial political backing during the 1969 election campaign. He enlisted support among hydroelectric and agricultural laborers, but Paramaribo provided the backbone of PNR strength. Following a series of urban strikes in early 1969, Bruma and the PNR convinced the disparate civil servant and teachers' groups to unite under the aegis of a large leftist federation.

Accordingly, Central 47 formed in January 1970 under the presidency of F. R. Derby, though Bruma remained on the scene as an *ex officio* leader of the body. With offices situated in Paramaribo, the union listed a membership of almost 5,000 in the mid-1970s, and holds international affiliation with the Trade Union Council of Caribbean Workers.

CENTRALE 47. *See* Central 47.

CENTRALE VAN LANDSDIENAREN ORGANISATIES. *See* Central Organization of State Employees.

CENTRAL ORGANIZATION OF STATE EMPLOYEES (Centrale van Landsdienaren Organisaties—CLO).

Forming one year after the inauguration of Central 47* (January 1971), the Central Organization of State Employees represented another concerted effort by Eddy Bruma and the Nationalistic Republican Party (PNR) to organize state workers around a leftist ideological program. This group, therefore, became the nucleus of a new federation comprised of several small unions mobilized during the fervent strike activities of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Current membership numbers of the CLO are undetermined. The union holds headquarters in Paramaribo under the presidency of J. Rusland.

The CLO played an instrumental role in the military takeover of Suriname in 1980. In January of that year, while tension mounted between the government

of Henck Arron and disgruntled noncommissioned army officers, the CLO set up a refuge in a Paramaribo soccer stadium for members of the sergeant's grievance group, the Union of Military Cadre* (BoMika). The stadium in fact became a symbol for general dissatisfaction over Arron and the Suriname National Party (NPS). Christened "Fort BoMike," the soccer field provided a meeting place for planning and executing the military coup of 25 February 1980.

MOEDERBOND (Federation). *See* Suriname Workers' Federation.

PARANAM MINE WORKERS' UNION (Paranam Mijnwerkers Bond). *See* Suriname Workers' Federation.

PROGRESSIVE WERKNEMERS ORGANISATIE. *See* Progressive Workers' Organization.

PROGRESSIVE WORKERS' AND FARMERS LABOR UNION (Progressive Arbeiders en Landbouwers Unie—PALU).

Led by Iwan Krolis, the Progressive Workers' and Farmers Labor Union developed from the trade union and party unrest of the early 1970s. Eventually, this group aligned with the United Democratic Parties coalition, a political faction strongly opposed to Minister-President Henck Arron in the 1977 election. PALU is a small left-wing body with no known international affiliations.

PROGRESSIVE WORKERS' ORGANIZATION (Progressive Werknemers Organisatie—PWO).

Organized in 1948 by Father Josephus Weidmann, a Dutch priest, the Progressive Workers' Organization boasts a legacy of early, highly organized trade union activity in Suriname. A Christian-Democratic union, this federation originally registered more than 2,000 workers through ten affiliated groups. The PWO is affiliated internationally with the World Confederation of Labour and the Trade Union Council of Caribbean Workers.

As one of the four major union federations in the country, the PWO stressed strike action and espoused radical changes in the Surinamese political order throughout its years of grievances. In conjunction with the Central 47* and the Central Organization of State Employees,* the PWO pressed for significant changes in the governmental apparatus of the early 1970s. However, this group avoided the political intrusions of Eddy Bruma and the Nationalistic Republic Party (PNR) during the critical years, 1968 to 1973. The Progressive Workers' Organization maintains headquarters in Paramaribo and at last count (mid-1970s) listed approximately 9,000 members.

SURINAAMSE BAUXIET EN METALWERKERS FEDERATIE (Suriname Bauxite and Metalworkers' Federation). *See* Suriname Workers' Federation.

SURINAAMSE WERKNEMERS MOEDERBOND. *See* Suriname Workers' Federation.

SURINAME BAUXITE AND METALWORKERS' FEDERATION. *See* Suriname Workers' Federation.

SURINAME UNION (Unie Suriname—US).

The Suriname Union, though not a trade union in the strictest sense, deserves immense credit for challenging colonial authority and bringing representative government to Suriname. During World War II this Creole-dominated amalgamation of economic and political interests stridently opposed the heavy-handed policies of the governor, Johannes Kielstra. Through widespread contact with the public, especially via the radio, the Suriname Union protested Kielstra's squelching of civil liberties and independent political thinking, which he justified by invoking wartime emergency decrees.

In 1943 a teachers' magazine, *Onze Gids*, printed an article suggesting that Kielstra's policies were akin to those reflected in Nazi Germany. The governor temporarily removed some of the teachers from their posts. This incident was quickly followed by the individual actions of a teacher and union leader, Wim Bos Verschuur, a member of the *Staten* (the national legislative body), who hurled inflammatory remarks at the administration, followed by the drafting of a petition to have Kielstra removed from office.

Accused of collaboration with the Americans, Verschuur was placed in an internment camp. A heated debate ensued, both in the press and the *Staten*. In the late summer of 1943, all of the elected members of the parliamentary body resigned. After repeated demonstrations in the *Staten*, the Queen finally relented and recalled Kielstra in November. The US then became an important transition element in Suriname for the postwar adjustments ultimately leading to independence. Having exposed fundamental weaknesses in the colonial administration, the US found its role diminished by the late 1940s.

SURINAME WORKERS' FEDERATION (Surinaamse Werknemers Moederbond—SWM).

When Surinamese party and labor factions proliferated after World War II, bauxite employees organized and, in 1946, staged a sixty-three-day strike against Alcoa. Having won recognition and a collective-bargaining contract, the two major trade union groups emerging from this period—the Suriname Miners' Union and the Suriname Workers' Union—controlled the labor movement throughout most of the 1950s. Initially, both groups helped organize the Suriname National Party (NPS), but in the mid-1950s the Suriname Labor Party emerged as the political arm of the bauxite workers. Their principal leader, Leo Eleazer, was elected to the legislature in 1948.

In 1951 Eleazer lost his bid for reelection under the direct sponsorship of the Paranam Mine Workers' Union. Another bauxite labor group, the Billiton Mine

Workers' Union (BMU), also nominated candidates to the legislature in the early 1950s. At this time, Eleazer and his colleagues had recently split from the NPS, and the latter soon organized powerful trade union appendages. Later, organized labor was further politicized by Eddy Bruma's efforts in forging alliances between the Nationalistic Republic Party (PNR) and a variety of agricultural and urban trade union bodies.

SURINAME WORKERS' UNION (Suriname Werknemers Bond). *See* Suriname Workers' Federation.

UNION OF MILITARY CADRE (Bond van Militair Kader—BOMIKA, or BMK).

Ironically, though the Union of Military Cadre never secured official recognition under Surinamese civilian control, this body now stands as the most significant union organization in the country's recent history. In fact, the issue of the army's unionization sparked the military takeover by noncommissioned officers in the early weeks of 1980.

The noncommissioned officers in Suriname represent a unique element in the elite of the nation. Trained for a prolonged period in the Netherlands, the corporals and sergeants who spearheaded the 1980 coup were affected by long months of absence from their homeland, and also cultivated Dutch ideas on the efficacy of military unionization. When the National Party Alliance administration of Henck Arron confronted insurmountable economic problems, aggravated by burgeoning political opposition, the government's vulnerability reached the breaking point. Arron's untimely and ill-advised refusal to recognize the union's legitimacy fomented an altercation between the Surinamese police force and the noncommissioned officers in late 1979.

In January 1980 the sergeants found willing and eager support for their grievances among the leftist union element, especially those federation forces shaped by the handiwork of Eddy Bruma and the Nationalistic Republic Party (PNR) in the early 1970s. The Central Organization of State Employees* invited the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) to take up temporary residence in a Paramaribo soccer stadium to await the outcome of the incarceration of several sergeants placed under arrest by the national police. The soccer field (named "Camp BoMika," for *Bond Militair Kader*) turned into headquarters for the NCO coup that easily toppled the Arron regime on 25 February 1980.

Uruguay

JUAN RIAL ROADE, *translated by Lisa Ebener and Gerald Michael Greenfield*

Uruguay is one of the "little" countries of South America, not in actual physical extent, but in its limited demographic organization. The last national census was completed in 1975, registering a population of almost 2,800,000 inhabitants. This population is peculiarly distributed, with 50 percent located in the capital, Montevideo, and its environs. This constitutes one of the world's most exaggerated cases of macrocephalism (extreme urban primacy) similar to that of Bangkok, and is surpassed only by such city-states as Singapore and Hong Kong. The urban population is 83 percent of the country's total; even at the beginning of the nineteenth century, close to 44 percent of Uruguayans lived in cities. The countryside remains scarcely populated, given the nature of the principal productive capitalist activity: extensive livestock raising. From the beginning of Uruguay's history stock raising has been the major economic activity, supplying the principal export products, meat and wool. It is practiced on large ranches (*estancias*) using the natural vegetation cover, with limited use of modern technologies on artificial pastures.

Since the 1940s the industrial sector has surpassed livestock raising in its contribution to the gross national product (GNP). Largely light industry, essentially import substitution, it requires tariff protection on the part of the state. Given the narrowness of the internal market, this industry had exhausted its possibilities of expansion toward the end of the 1950s, generating a dangerous crisis. Attempts to establish export industry clashed in the mid-1970s after initial success (primarily hides, with morocco leather dressing), with the prevailing protectionist measures in the markets of the "north." Meanwhile, fishery development, also recently initiated, suffers the consequences of the present international recession.

As a result of a transaction between its neighboring countries, Brazil and Argentina, Uruguay, previously a province of the Argentinian confederation,

gained its independence in 1830. The difficulties of establishing a small economy were sidestepped through the utilization of favorable international opportunities. In times when the technology for the production of foodstuffs was primitive, the Uruguayan prairies provided an appreciable quantity of meat and wool for export. The World Wars facilitated its sale at excellent prices.

With this situation, a State of Commitment (*Estado de Compromiso*) was established, constructed during the first three decades of the twentieth century, aimed at providing social assistance to the majority of the subaltern classes of the country, and known generally by the name of the political party that persisted most in promoting it: Batllism (the name derived from the president José Batlle y Ordoñez, 1903–1907, 1911–15).

Since livestock-raising provided very limited employment possibilities, rural-to-urban migration increased. This caused the early incidence of rapid urbanization and disproportionate growth of Montevideo. The provident action of the government, anticipating a limited welfare state, led to Uruguay's being known as the "Switzerland of America." The indicators most commonly used for denoting national developmental levels are, and for a long time have been, relatively favorable. The present average life expectancy is seventy-two years. The literacy rate for the population between ages ten and forty-four is 97 percent. The general birthrate follows the parameters of developed societies—it is low, 18 percent. The general mortality rate also is low: 20.5 percent. The age structure of the population conforms to this situation: a mature population with a relatively high number of older people (27 percent are between the ages of 0 and 15, 63.2 percent are between ages 15 and 60, and 9.8 percent are older than 60).

This imbalance between a primitive productive structure and an advanced social one has been viable due to the strong presence of the state. The intersectorial and interclass compromise succeeded, during the first seven decades of the century, in maintaining social peace and political order. This was disturbed only between 1933 and 1942, because of the crisis of 1930 (the impact of the Depression) which impeded the maintenance of all the terms of the social agreement.

However, one must note that this exceptional regime was led by conservative politicians and not (in accordance with what is common in the rest of Latin America) by members of the armed forces. The management of the state machinery was carried out by two great political parties, which are identified with the very history of the nation since they rose more or less along with: the Colorado (or coloreds, normally the majority) and the National, or Blanco (the national, or whites). These parties lessened the problems arising from the rural-to-urban migration and the lack of a large-scale economy and a consequent limited job market, through a constant promotion of industry by means of diverse protectionist mechanisms, by directly creating state companies, and by favoring an important bureaucratization process.

The crisis of the state of compromise broke this arrangement in 1968. From that point, the constitutional government raised the levels of coercion, rather

than maintain the agreement. The program of economic stabilization initiated that year assumed a price and wage freeze by administrative means and the repression of labor strikes and work stoppages. The pretorianism of the masses was growing parallel to the increase in political violence (the appearance of an urban guerrilla movement, the Tupamaros), which brought to the forefront a new social actor, the armed forces. Uruguay, which had for a long time enjoyed a strong political stability and the maintenance of a liberal democracy, lost that situation in 1973. Since then an authoritarian regime has developed, where the military has become the principal factor for political decision.

The military tended to break the situation of stagnation, by prompting a new style of economic development. It was supposed that a change of direction toward a market economy, in accordance with the neo-liberal orientations predominant in the world during the 1970s, would dynamize the country's stagnant economy. Nevertheless, the application of the model did not go much beyond the financial plans. In the real economy, after the cited intentions of promoting export industry, the opening of the economy to the exterior culminated in a crisis of high proportions that amplified the effects of the international recession. The lack of protection stimulated great losses in the import substitution industry, while the ease in attracting foreign dollars created for some years the belief that the country was embarking on a new stage of development. The process of growth in the years 1974–80 reversed itself, giving way to a lasting economic crisis, at the same time that in the political sector a gradual opening in search of redemocratization was produced. Within this crisis and stagnation, livestock raising remained the principal productive-exporter sector, though now with more processing of prime exportable goods. The state continued to dominate a large part of the activities of the infrastructure and the major companies of the country. The companies employing the majority of the workers remained those of the public sector, a fact accentuated by the redimensioning of private industry, which involved the elimination of plants with a lesser number of the labor force (especially in the meat-packing industry).

The union movement has developed within the frames and limits of a labor market that allowed the perpetuation of the nation's economic structure and, in a more general manner, the influence that the dominant ideologies in the world have had over its work force.

The history of the union movement has been substantially Montevidean—centered in the capital—rather than Uruguayan. Given the concentration of the population and of the economic activities, it was there that the bulk of movement always took place.

The second major point to take into account is the insufficiency of the internal market, the very small scale of the economy, which has caused economic development to be "Malthusian." The consequent narrowness of the labor market has been absorbed by means of policies aimed at alleviating the possibilities of conflict.

Among these measures, the role of the state has been fundamental, favoring

its own bureaucratization as a means of reducing the unemployment that otherwise would be generated by a livestock-raising structure that does not absorb the labor force, but on the contrary expels it; by a very limited agriculture, of a household character, that employs only a few persons; and by an industry and commerce geared toward a reduced internal market.

This situation has characterized the Uruguayan economy for some time. In 1930, 60,000 persons, 8.8 percent of the economically active population (EAP), were civil servants; in Montevideo they represented 16.1 percent of the same. In 1982 civil servants constituted 20 percent of the total national EAP. According to a 1969 census, around 60 percent of the civil servants were concentrated in the capital. This fact has strongly distorted the functioning of the labor market and conditioned the formation of the union movement.

At the same time, the number of workers in the country who are not owners has for a long time been fairly low. In the livestock-raising sector the permanence of backward technologies and the extensive use of land created a pattern of a small and highly spatially dispersed labor force. For 1930 we estimate the permanent labor force for this agrarian subsector to be nearly 5 percent of the EAP. In 1963 this number did not vary. Only 4.9 percent of the economically active population was part of the work force of the livestock ranches. (In both cases, domestic service, performed substantially by women, was not included.) In agriculture, the work of family units combining subsistence farming with production for the market has always predominated. Of 97.43 percent of productive lands in 1970, 80.71 percent were dedicated to livestock raising and only 7.71 percent to agriculture. Agriculture thus accounts for a very limited quantity of land, but agricultural employment nearly equals to that in livestock raising, hovering around 4 percent of the total EAP.

In the industrial sector, state protection was always a basic structural feature, but because of it, few large-scale companies were able to establish themselves. In fact, given the size of the market provided by the country, one factory worthy of the name would have precluded the need for any others. This characteristic holds for commerce, where the tasks of distribution are strongly atomized in small companies.

In 1979 there were 216,000 workers plus 57,000 administrative employees in industry, but 260,000 laborers who worked at home in the new export industries: leather, 70,000; footwear, 37,000; and textiles, 16,000. The 1981 industrial survey, which considered only businesses with more than five laborers or employees, found only 118,000 employed persons. Presumably, some 150,000 additional people are employed in extremely small-scale operations. In sum, the pattern is of an industry at the artisan level, where the average number of employees does not exceed much more than ten persons per locale. In commerce the situation becomes even worse. The 1968 commercial census indicated that of 42,682 registered companies, 41,612 had fewer than nine employees.

The growing deterioration of the labor market, however, gained relief thanks to international migration. Although a new country fundamentally created by

European immigrants (mainly Spaniards and Italians) in the nineteenth century, the predominance of livestock raising and the very early legal occupation of the land in the form of the *latifundia* (large landed estates) did not allow for the settlement of much population. For that reason, there always was a strong emigratory current.

But after World War II when the arrival of immigrants had ceased, the phenomenon of the emigration of Uruguayans to the exterior becomes obvious. Comparison of the census results of 1975 to those of 1963 indicates a trend of strong proportions: emigration represented approximately 15 percent of the total population recorded in the last census. The majority of these emigrants were in the active ages—almost 50 percent were between the ages of 20 and 34—and their level of education slightly exceeded that of the rest of the population, with the majority fluctuating between a level of primary school completion and some secondary school. Some 36 percent of the population between twenty and twenty-nine years of age emigrated, as did 15 percent of the professionals who had graduated from college, and 82 percent of the migrating men had employment. The majority of the emigrants were salaried private sector employees and generally tied to the most productive areas. Highly trained technicians form a powerful component of this migration, a pattern common in countries with small-scale economies.

In Uruguay, high educational levels and pronounced urbanization generate expectations and demands for advanced levels of consumption or life-style, which, however, cannot be satisfied in the prevailing system. This structural tension explains the propensity toward emigration. In turn, that emigratory current, when coupled with the growing radicalism in political expressions, denoted the impossibility of continuing to manage the nation's problems by means of compromise. The substantive effect of this emigration on the job market has been to lessen the potential effects of high unemployment. It presumably favored occupational mobility and stimulated access to the market for the reserve labor force, when the demand for this same force increased upon the launching of labor-intensive export industries. This occurred until 1979, increasing the rate of feminine participation in the work force.

This evolution of the labor market has conditioned that of the union movement, which throughout the nation's history has reflected extremely pronounced ideological orientations.

Immigrants who came to Uruguay in the last third of the nineteenth century created the first artisan workshops and industries. Coming mainly from the Mediterranean world, they introduced European ideologies regarding social change and the necessity of organizing the working class; anarchism was their predominant orientation. In 1865 the first labor union, a printers union, began in Montevideo. In 1872 a branch of the International Association of Workers (*Asociación Internacional de Trabajadores*) appeared in Buenos Aires, which then created one in Montevideo in 1875.

This period of labor union gestation, which lasted until the onset of the

twentieth century, was characterized by small organizations of militants composed almost entirely of foreigners, and evincing an anti-capitalistic orientation. The struggle tended to center itself on exclusively economic points: problems concerning hours, wages, and working conditions. This nascent union movement proved limited in scope; it never enrolled an entire occupational group, the basic organizational modality of that period.

The rapid industrial growth of Montevideo was the background of the movement that nevertheless suffered strongly due to the crisis of 1890, which reduced the growth registered in the previous decade that had allowed the surge of new currents and greater activity. In 1880 the first strike outside of Montevideo occurred; 1884 witnessed the first strike that embraced an entire trade. In 1885 the Catholic Worker Circles (*Círculos Católicos de Obreros*) appeared in Montevideo. In 1896 the first May Day demonstration honoring the Chicago martyrs took place.

From the beginning of the century until the end of the 1930s a new stage occurred, one of consolidation of a "Syndicalism of Opposition." This highly political syndicalism was characterized by the dominance of the anarchist unions and a strong state presence that, through provident legislation, supported the economic demands of the workers. It also saw the appearance of new orientations that would dominate the next stage.

In 1898 the International Center of Social Studies (*Centro Internacional de Estudios Sociales*) was founded, serving as a base for such anarchists as Rafael Burret, Florencio Sanchez, Adrián Troitiño, Francisco Corney, Carlos Balsán, Juana Ruocoo, and María Collazo.

In that organization, whose very name suggests the continued importance of foreigners in this primordial stage, anarchists and socialists debated, with the former always dominating. In 1904 Socialists formed the First of May Socialist Labor Center (*Centro Socialista Obrero Primero de Mayo*), which gave rise to the Socialist Party. This center in 1905 became known as the Karl Marx Center (*Centro Carlos Marx*), organized by Enilio Frugoni, leader of the party until 1959 and the nation's first socialist representative.

Early strike movements focused on the reduction of the working day and on the elimination of piecework. The militants soon abandoned such demands for more revolutionary political objectives. The strikes at the beginning of the century, especially in 1905, enjoyed a certain official tolerance. The newspaper owned by the Republic's president, Batlle y Ordoñez, published an editorial defending the "agitator" strikers. It was a situation that strongly contrasted with that of Argentina, where since 1902 a law of residence allowed the expulsion of foreigners who led such activities. Many such organizers took refuge in Uruguay and ended up supporting the Batllist reformist regimes.

In 1905 a wave of strikes, some of them highly successful, facilitated the creation of the first unifying organization: the Regional Labor Federation of Uruguay* (*Federación Obrera Regional del Uruguay—FORU*), composed of twenty-two trade unions (*gremios*), all of them Montevidean and tied to industry.

At the same time, from both the official level and the opposition came some bills proposing limits on the working day. Invariably these were defeated due to the partisan nature of the political process.

The next administration, however, took a firm hand and repressed the labor movement. In 1909, for example, it crushed a railroad strike and broke the railroad union, the principal one of the period and one of the few that had national scope. But then the second Batlle presidency witnessed in 1911 the first general strike and renewed official tolerance. The government created institutions aimed at reconciling capital and labor—for example, the Office of Labor (*Oficina de Trabajo*)—and promoted protective legislation for the working class. The latter proved especially important given that the economic crisis of 1913 and then World War I left the unions with limited power of response. Also at the legislative level, beginning in 1911, a socialist representation appeared that while lacking in power, made its voice heard.

A law that limited the working day to eight hours was issued in 1915 (fourteen years before similar legislation passed in Argentina). From that point until 1930, attempts to improve the situation of labor assumed the form of a complicated game among the unions, the reformists, and the supporters of conservative solutions. In 1920 Sunday became officially a day of rest; from 1918 to 1920 legislation prohibited or reduced night work in certain areas, and beginning in 1919 some workers gained pension rights. Other improvements were strongly resisted. For example, the setting of minimum wages was introduced only for rural workers in 1923, and for a long time, it remained unenforced.

Reformists also pushed bills requiring binding arbitration between capital and labor so as to eliminate bloody strikes and end anarchist influence. Such reformism was buttressed by repression. During the years 1917 and 1918, in which on a world scale union agitation was very strong, violent strikes predominated. But at that same time, changes within the labor movement began. The Russian Revolution led to a division of the Uruguayan Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*). The minority, with Emilio Frugoni at the head, retained the socialist label. The majority, with Eugenio Gómez, created the Communist Party (*Partido Comunista*) in 1919.

The trade unions, made up of militants, continued to predominate, influenced by tenets of direct action and fundamental political change. The anarchists, however, suffered a schism as some adherents chose to support the Russian Revolution. Thus, the anarchists of the FORU saw a rival organization appear, the Syndical Union of Uruguay* (*Unión Sindical del Uruguay—USU*), formed by anarcho-syndicalists and the adherents of Communist International. The creation of the Maritime Labor Federation* (*Federación Obrera Marítima*) in 1918 opened the path for this latter tendency. Directed by Eugenio Gómez, secretary-general of the Communist Party until 1954, it promoted new ways to mobilize labor. The previous propaganda, holding assemblies, and the search for solidarity were substituted for anarchist spontaneity. The dominance of the anarcho-syndicalists in the USU led the communists to create the United Labor Block* (*Block*

de Unidad Obrera) and in 1929, in accordance with the orientations of the Communist Red International in May 1929, established the General Central of Workers of Uruguay* (Central General de Trabajadores del Uruguay—CEGTU). At the same time, an International Congress was held which created the Latin American Syndical Confederation (Confederación Sindical Latinoamericana—CSLA), at which important members of the international communist movement were present.

These various organizational efforts notwithstanding, the Uruguayan union movement remained highly limited. A 1926 industrial census indicated the existence of 65,000 permanent salaried industrial workers, of whom only 6,200 were dues-paying union members. The USU grouped twenty-three unions and 3,960 dues-paying members, while FORU federated fourteen unions with 2,240 members.

The period came to a close with the crisis of 1930. The controls imposed by reformism ended, along with the tolerance that the union movement had enjoyed, which was of a much higher level than that found in the rest of the Latin American countries. The crisis of industry affected the functioning of both the job market and the union organizations. The problems with the communists in 1932 caused their unions to be hard hit. The institutional rupture of 1933 did not arouse any corollary worker opposition, and in the following year a conflict between graphic workers and newspaper vendors showed the alliance of those who were political opponents of the anti-union dictatorial regime. The old organizations—FORU, CEGTU, and the remainders of the USU, which in practice functioned independently—continued their existence, but they were preparing for the change that would open up a new era. Generational change also affected the old leadership, which like the militants began to disappear. From the 1920s the dominance of natives over foreigners in the union movement was apparent. This same fact testified to the weakening of anarchism as the dominant ideology of the labor movement.

Around 1937 a new period also began to shape political alignments. The Spanish Civil War and the solidarity movement that grew up around it allowed the communists to create a new organization. They dissolved the CEGTU and created the Committee of Labor Organization and Unity* (Comité de Organización y Unidad Obrera—COUO) in an attempt to attract other currents within the labor movement. Simultaneously at the legislative level, communists, socialists, and Christians promoted the creation of a Study Commission to examine the conditions of worker life. As industry received new stimulus, new unions arose. Of these, the most important was that in which the textile workers were grouped.

A new syndicalism with a dualistic character appeared, organized for a long-term political fight and as a permanent base for worker demands. It sought to create organizations with a stable, militant leadership, encompassing a passive mass of adherents whose action would be required only in decisive moments of conflicts. Strikes and other direct actions were not stressed. Rather than im-

mediate confrontation, this new syndicalism stressed the necessity of greater preparation for contests with both capital and the state, and, if possible, securing gains through negotiation. Communists, socialists, and adherents of traditional parties were those who espoused this new form of action, thereby displacing the old anarchists.

Changes in the social composition of the unions also took place. In addition to the old trade unions, there appeared plant-level unions, which ultimately became the dominant industrial form. But the most important innovation was the appearance of white-collar unions among the middle class. The founding of the Association of Bank Workers of Uruguay* (*Asociación de Empleados Bancarios del Uruguay—AEBU*) in 1942 was the major symbol of the incorporation of the middle class into the labor movement, a trend that would continue and grow stronger.

The modalities of organization, especially among the communists, tended to create a small union bureaucracy. Leaders were not ordinary workers; instead they devoted themselves exclusively to union affairs. This bureaucracy's size remained very limited, and its remuneration extremely low. Union leaders debated with the bosses, arranged salary agreements, discussed work conditions, conducted negotiations in situations of conflict, and pressured legislators from the traditional parties to secure governmental protection. The new laws of 1943, which created the Wage Councils (*Consejos de Salarios*), salary complement by family size, and Labor and Unemployment Funds (*Bolsas de Trabajo y Desocupación*) for unions of meat packers and those of the wool exporting warehouses (Uruguay's principal economic activities), clearly enlarged the possibilities of this new dualistic syndicalism.

The new union movement began in 1937 and was consolidated at an anti-Nazi Congress held in 1942, which created the General Union of Workers* (*Unión General de Trabajadores—UGT*). The communists immediately dominated the new organization, a fact which in 1943 would provoke a harsh confrontation with the meat packers. Two of the meat packing houses were owned by North American capital and their workers comprised one of the most numerous and concentrated unions. Its traditional bread-and-butter approach was condemned by the UGT as sabotage of the "allied cause" (the meat packing houses prepared meat for the armies operating in Europe and Africa). From that point on, the fracture of the movement was inevitable, especially when wartime alliances gave way to the Cold War. Thus, two blocks appeared in Uruguayan labor: the communist and the anti-communist.

This division was made worse with the expulsion of dissident communist leaders who went on to create new autonomous organizations. Of these, the most important was the textile union directed by the former representative, Hector Rodríguez. Violence between communists and anti-communists became worse as national alignments reflected affiliations at the world level. The communist-dominated UGT affiliated itself with the World Federation of Trade Unions. Meanwhile, other unions remained completely autonomous. Perhaps most rep-

representative of this category was the Autonomous Meat Federation* (Federación Autónoma de la Carne—FAC), where anarcho-syndicalists, Batllists, socialists, nationalists, and the textile union fought together. In 1951 the Syndical Confederation of Uruguay* (Confederación Sindical del Uruguay-CSU) was founded, and affiliated with the moderate Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT); the socialists initially attempted to dominate the CSU.

At the same time, rural unions formed. After the Catholics' frustrated intention of organizing agricultural workers at the beginning of the 1910s, the new mechanized agriculture introduced in following years facilitated the creation of a rice workers union controlled by the socialists. The communists tried to organize the workers of the "tambos" (the name given to milk-producing establishments) in the environs of Montevideo. Nonetheless, given the situation of agriculture, rural unionism was almost nonexistent. The same held true throughout the interior of the country.

No firm data exist as to numbers of members or the extent of unionization for that time. If it is estimated that in 1947 there were some 110,000 industrial workers, and assuming salaried workers in commerce and private services numbered the same, the maximum possible number of union members would be 220,000. It appears, however, that the union movement had perhaps some 75,000 members.

State civil servants presented one of the major problems for the union movement. Given that the state controlled important public firms and civil servants comprised the largest concentration of salaried workers, the conflicts with these workers always were important. In principle, there has always been debate over whether public employees legally may strike. Although the principle never was clearly elucidated, whenever important public sector labor actions occurred, the governmental reaction generally tended toward harsh repression. In 1952, for example, a strike in the petroleum refinery (which is a state monopoly) and one by employees of the Ministry of Public Health resulted in the application of "Prompt Security Measures" (Medidas Prontas de Seguridad), a mild form of martial law, to terminate the strikes. Such measures were applied again in 1963, 1965, 1967, and 1968; from 1969 on, they were virtually permanent government responses to movements formed by public servants.

The growing incorporation of public servants' unions clearly moved the balance of the union movement toward a form in which the industrial workers constituted a minority. The bulk of the union movement centered in Montevideo, and the middle-class unions began to gain more positions. This fact did not go unperceived by Communist Party labor organizers. In 1955 the party changed its orientation substituting Rodney Arismendi for Eugenio Gómez as secretary general and adopting a politics of fronts. The Cuban Revolution and its influence over the entirety of the left further encouraged and facilitated that trend.

The socialists and other liberal groups tended to favor the policy of unity for which the communist party struggled. Thus began the last stage of the union

movement prior to the 1973 dissolution: the slow construction of the hegemony of the Communist Party over the movement.

The more traditional emphasis of bread-and-butter unionism became less promising, for the stage of import substitution had reached its limits; and the sale of raw materials at high prices, after the Korean War boom in 1951, had totally ceased. Other improvements in the form of social security (illness insurance, for example) were achieved through union pressure. However, its administration, of a mixed type, did not allow the unions to dominate this important financial-bureaucratic apparatus (unlike the case of the Peronists in Argentina). The unions continued to maintain exclusively their directing bureaucracy without creating any parallel institutions for the social well-being of their affiliates. Instead, they dealt with those institutions created by the state, participating on a tripartite advisory board composed of owners, unions, and government representatives. The predominance of a dualistic syndicalism impeded the taking of the next step of total integration into the capitalist system by abandoning the long-standing opposition it had carried out against the system.

The unity of the union movement passed down a long road in the 1960s. In 1961 the Uruguayan Workers Central* (Central de Trabajadores del Uruguay—CTU) was created. (Those who had sponsored the idea had hoped to call it the Single Working Center—Central Unica—but not all unions affiliated with it.) Due to the fact that the 1958 student agitation favored a constitutional law of autonomy for the country's only university and joint union-student meetings, and the fact that the Cuban Revolution greatly increased the prestige of the left, there was resistance among non-communist organizations to joining an institution that clearly promised to be dominated by the Communist Party. Neither the Autonomous Meat Federation nor the Textile Labor Congress* (Congreso Obrero Textil) adhered to the CTU. On the contrary, they began to enter such middle-class organizations as the bank workers' union.

The CSU for its part began to lose, hurt not only by the aloof stance of other important unions but by its own failure to press hard for wage raises. By 1966, already reduced to a decidedly minority condition, it disappeared. The Christians also tried to create a union organization, but the Uruguayan Syndical Action* (Acción Sindical Uruguay—ASU) never became more than a headquarters, without any control of a specific union.

The second big step for unity was taken in 1964 with the provisional creation of the National Convention of Workers* (Convención Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT), a unified organization that grouped adherents of the CSU and the majority of the previously autonomous unions. This process of negotiation and agreement was favored by the worsening of the crisis, the changes in the structure of industry, along with the loss of strength by the large communist-dominated industrial unions to those made up of the middle class and public servants.

In 1965 the People's Congress (Congreso del Pueblo) convened, bringing together unions, student organizations, and others from the left who were searching for a common program. It facilitated the consolidation of the CNT in 1966,

at the same time that the CSU dissolved. The CNT, directed by José D'Elia, an old independent union militant, lasted until June of 1973.

Nevertheless, the advance of the dualistic union movement toward political positions ran into an obstacle when it failed to produce a leftist unity in the political arena. The Communist Party with its electoral front (Leftist Liberation Front, Frente Izquierda de Liberación, whose abbreviation FIDEL exploits the name of the Cuban leader) promoted a constitutional reform through a "Pro-Constitutional Reform Movement of Laborers and Popular Sectors," where the unions controlled by the Party aligned themselves; it received but a scanty popular vote in 1966.

In the last phase of this stage begun in 1968, the unions, provoked by the application of economic stabilization plans, embarked upon a harsh confrontation to carry out a two-pronged fight for economic and political objectives. Conflicts of the first type had a great relevancy to the public servants; when these workers struck, the government responded in some cases with security and military measures. The formation of platforms with clear programmatic frames identified with the left and accompanied by frequent general work stoppages to support such platforms characterized labor's attempt to gain its political objectives. This situation lasted until 1971, during a time when the changes at the industrial level were increasingly weakening the old unions (for example, the meat packers), formerly the foundation of the movement, giving marked predominance to the organizations of public servants and of the middle class.

The 1968 fracture of the state of compromise culminated in 1973 with a change of the political regime. After attempting negotiations with the military between February and June 1973, in the hopes of securing a pro-labor developmentalist policy like that being embraced by the Peruvian military, the CNT changed into the opposition in the face of the June coup. It organized a general strike which fell apart after some two weeks, and represented a terrible defeat. The government outlawed the CNT and ordered the arrest of all its major leaders, a total of fifty-eight people. Of those almost 60 percent were communist members of the electoral front FIDEL, many of them active in both union and political affairs. One of these principal members of the CNT secretariat, Vladimir Turianski, was simultaneously a national representative and the leader of a union of the workers of the electrical generating plants. The vast majority of these leaders (forty) represented organizations confined exclusively to Montevideo. Nineteen came from blue-collar unions (industrial, construction, and transportation), while twenty-two held leadership posts in middle-class organizations.

The measures of repression were applied only against the directing apparatus since, in reality, even though the working mass supported the leadership's economic demands and complied with all calls for strikes or stoppages, at the political level it did not support the left. In 1971 the Leftists' Front received only 18 percent of the popular vote at the national level (almost 30 percent in Montevideo).

The dissolution of the CNT caused the movement to enter a new stage,

characterized by the nonexistence of union organizations. Although some organizations were able to maintain themselves, for example AEBU (which managed a sports club annexed to the union), and such small nonrevolutionary unions as the Christian ASU or the General Confederation of Workers of Uruguay* (Confederación General de Trabajadores del Uruguay—CGTU), they remained essentially powerless. In fact, the military authority took upon itself the defense of the workers in their conflicts with private businesses by means of an Office of Labor Relations (Oficina de Relaciones Laborales), created at the level of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social).

After a period of time in which union activity virtually ceased to exist, in 1981 a Law of Professional Associations (Ley de Asociaciones Profesionales) allowed a carefully regulated resumption of union activity. It provided for the installation of labor (or employee) associations at three levels: first by enterprise, then by type of activity, and at the third level, regional or national organizations. It envisioned associations with free, voluntary affiliation, with leadership chosen by secret ballot voting. Strikes would require a supporting vote (in secret ballot) by the membership. In the second- and third-level associations, given the fact that they were formed by delegates from those of the first level, the vote remained open. International affiliations were allowed according to their nature and activity. Stringent limits were established for leaders of previously outlawed organizations assuming leadership posts in this reorganized system. Public sector workers were barred from forming labor organizations.

The new legal organization came at a moment in which there existed a certain degree of political opening, but also at a time of national economic crisis. As a result, the response by labor proved minimal. At the present time, the union movement still is restructuring itself.

Very few labor associations have established themselves and enjoy a legal authorization to function. And at the moment, no second- or third-level associations exist. Some of those who tried to form such associations were fired, which, in times of acute recession and unemployment, makes the possibility of continuing to form unions very difficult. The existence of the AEBU (which should transform into a second-level association) and the action of other groups such as the ASU, CGTU, or the barely formed National Commission of Union Rights (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Sindicales) is tolerated. Of a total of almost 200 first-level associations that presented themselves before the Ministry, only 15 obtained recognition by October of 1982.

Ideologically, it is difficult to know what orientation this new union movement will have. The National Commission of Union Rights, led by Juan A. Acuña, a former anti-communist social democrat, has espoused an orientation of that style in its monthly publication, *Presence (Presencia)*. The AEBU maintains itself without defining any precise orientation. The ASU corresponds to a social-Christian ideology. As a whole, these three organisms have a certain degree of coordination. On the other hand, the CGTU takes an anti-communist line and has tight contacts with unions in the United States.

At the same time, the new union movement will reflect the changes that have occurred in the labor market. The disappearance of the large meat-packing houses, the closing of large textile factories, the substitution of small-scale for large industries, and concomitant great dispersion of labor, the large incidence of work done at home, and the increase of "secondary" labor, especially make it much more difficult to create new unions. This also causes the unions to lack the power that they were able to have in the earlier stages of Uruguayan union life.

The importance of industry has decreased, and white-collar workers predominate. But here also the atomization of business is very high. Only the existence of second- and third-level organizations with strong ideological coherence can compensate for the weakness of the first-level associations that are able to form in individual enterprises. But neither will be able to risk much in conflicts during times when the job market shows a high rate of unemployment and underemployment and a marked amount of informal sector activities.

Obviously, this union movement will continue to center primarily in Montevideo. The emigration to the exterior and the loss of highly qualified labor will reduce the potential number of possible new militants and leaders to replace those of the previous generation. Young workers' lack of knowledge of the union movement is another of the weaknesses to be confronted.

The state employees present the greatest problem. Representing 24 percent of the total possible work force, they belong to the businesses where the highest possible number of workers is concentrated (as much on the level of workers as that of employers), as in the state petroleum refinery (which also monopolizes the production of alcoholic beverages and has a big part of the cement production), the national electric company, the telephone company, the municipal services of Montevideo, or the railroad employees. They would comprise, should general unionization prove possible, the group with the greatest possible power, because of their numbers, concentration, and the essential character of the productive and service sectors they work in. It is for that reason, then, that the military excluded them from being able to exercise any union rights.

The last few years have witnessed momentous changes in Uruguay, ones in which labor has played an important part. To an extent, 1984 began as the previous year had ended: the military in control and labor attempting to mount protests against repressive government policies. Hard-line army chief Pedro Aranco assumed control and responded to public discontent and a general strike by cracking down hard on participants and banning labor unions. But this time, discontent could not be contained. Uruguayan opposition leader Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, in exile since 1973, returned to Uruguay and immediately was placed under arrest. At that same time, jailed leftist leader Adolfo Wasem was on a hunger strike. In short order, a massive general strike brought Montevideo virtually to a halt, and as demonstrations and public pressure mounted, November elections ended eleven years of military rule, bringing moderate civilian centrist Julio María Sanguinetti to the presidency. Further general strikes forestalled any

possible attempt by the military to annul the election and assured Sanguinetti's inauguration the following year.

The new government quickly freed many political prisoners, and numerous Uruguayans returned from exile. But the government confronted serious issues, including whether to bring military leaders to trial for their role in tortures and "disappearances" of political opponents. Very serious economic problems also demanded attention, for the civilian regime inherited a very difficult cash flow/debt situation. Whether the new leaders could stimulate the economy while attending to the demands of labor and maintaining the broad consensus that kept the military at bay remained an open question.

Bibliography

D'Elía, German. *El movimiento Sindical*. Nuestra Tierra, 1969.

Errandonea, Jorge and Jorge Constabile. *Sindicalismo y sociedad en el Uruguay*. Montevideo: FCU, 1969.

Finch, Henry. *A Political Economy of Uruguay Since 1870*. New York: St Martin's, 1981.

Frugoni, Emilio. *Socialismo, Batllismo y Nacionalismo*. Montevideo: Edición Socialista, n.d.

Pintos, Francisco. *Historia del movimiento obrero del Uruguay*. Montevideo: Gaceta de Cultura, 1960.

Rama, Carlos. *Obreros y anarquistas*. Montevideo: Enciclopedia Uruguaya, 1969.

Rial, Juan and Jaime Klaczko. *Uruguay. El País Urbano*. Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1981.

Rodriguez, Héctor. *El arraigo de los sindicatos*. Montevideo: Editora Uruguay 51, 1969.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ACCIÓN SINDICAL URUGUAYA. *See* Uruguayan Syndical Action.

AEBU. *See* Association of Bank Workers of Uruguay.

ANTI-FASCIST SYNDICAL COMMITTEE (Comité Sindical Antifascista—CSAF).

The signing of the Munich Pact produced a schism within the Committee of Labor Organization and Unity* as all but the communists left that organization in protest against the Stalin-Hitler accord. Thus, socialist and anarcho-sindicalist elements formed the CSAF. The efforts of this group helped lead to the Uruguayan parliament's convoking of a special commission to study the general conditions of working-class life, which suggested forming mixed bodies with representatives of labor, capital, and government to settle wage questions.

ASOCIACIÓN DE EMPLEADOS BANCARIOS DEL URUGUAY. *See* Association of Bank Workers of Uruguay.

ASSOCIATION OF BANK WORKERS OF URUGUAY (Asociación de Empleados Bancarios del Uruguay—AEBU).

Established around 1942, this association was Uruguay's second important white-collar union. Clearly espousing a middle-class mentality, its founders included Germán D'Elia, then national representative of the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista). Its ranks also featured Ariel Collazo and Zelmar Michelini, who would become well-known leftist leaders in the 1970s. Towards the end of the 1950s AEBU adopted a stance approximating that of the autonomous or free unions, calling for improved conditions for labor, but within the confines of the capitalism system. That, however, did not preclude its involvement in harsh conflicts, like that of August 1952, in the private banking sector.

During the 1960s AEBU became radicalized. It joined the National Convention of Workers* (CNT), and in 1968–69 it emerged as a prime mover in a number of strong strikes. The government responded with “prompt security measures” (*medidas prontas de seguridad*), a mild form of martial law, and made the union subject to military discipline and penal jurisdiction (a process known as militarization, or *militarización*). The restructuring of the nation's banking industry, an ongoing process since the crash of 1965, and continuous decline in the bank workers' real wages motivated that new radicalism.

As with all other unions belonging to the CNT, after the military takeover of 1973 the AEBU entered a period of recession. However, it remained the most active of all those unions still allowed to exist. This arose from the fact that it was the only syndical organization that enjoyed a well-developed infrastructure (for example, a sport club and meeting rooms), which in turn was a product of its white-collar members' relatively high salary levels.

At the time of the 1965 crash, it had perhaps some 12,000 members, which reached a maximum of 16,000 in 1973. Its strength, numerically and financially, gave it sufficient power to resist government repression and to lead the process that culminated in the reinstallation of the union movement in 1983. AEBU, then, was one of the principal pillars of the Intersyndical Plenary of Workers,* the extra-legal union coordinating body that worked to bring about the legal reemergence of a Uruguayan labor movement. Its present secretary-general is José Pedro Cigando; he is assisted by Eduardo Fernández.

AUTONOMOUS CENTRAL OF WORKERS OF URUGUAY (Central Autónoma de Trabajadores del Uruguay—CATUD).

Produced by a schism within the General Confederation of Workers of Uruguay* in 1979, this Central brings together sixteen organizations and has an anti-radical orientation. It seems little more than a shadow organization in that it engages in no formal union activities. Indeed, despite the fact that it has no international affiliations, its major action is to petition the Ministry of Labor for travel funds to attend international labor conventions.

AUTONOMOUS MEAT FEDERATION (Federación Autónoma de la Carne—FAC).

Established in 1941, at its height it affiliated the workers (both factory and white collar) of Uruguay's four largest meat-packers: Swift and Artigas (of the U.S. Armour Corporation); Anglo (owned by British capital); and Nacional, a domestic concern with state and private sector ownership). It also had adherents in the smaller packing plants. The fact that three of the four big plants were located in one outlying neighborhood of Montevideo gave the union a concentrated power base, and it was one of the nation's strongest and most combative unions. It was not, however, ideologically radical and in fact had some harsh encounters with the communists. During World War II, for example, the General Union of Workers* (the communist labor central) urged an end to all strikes so as to support the anti-fascist effort headed by the USSR. The FAC, however, ignored this appeal and continued its policy of calling strikes to press for improved conditions for its members. Its leader in that era, Humberto Gómez, was politically oriented toward the traditional parties. During the 1950s and into the early 1960s, the FAC remained apart from any of the labor centrals; in 1966, however, it joined the National Convention of Workers.*

BLOCK DE UNIDAD OBRERO. *See* Labor Unity Block.

CATUD. *See* Autonomous Central of Workers of Uruguay.

CEGTU. *See* General Central of Workers of Uruguay.

CENTRAL AUTÓNOMA DE TRABAJADORES DEL URUGUAY. *See* Autonomous Central of Workers of Uruguay.

CENTRAL DE TRABAJADORES DEL URUGUAY. *See* Uruguayan Workers Central.

CENTRAL GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES DEL URUGUAY. *See* General Central of Workers of Uruguay.

CGTU. *See* General Confederation of Workers of Uruguay.

CNT. *See* National Convention of Workers.

COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE DEFENSO DE LOS DERECHOS SINDICALES. *See* National Defense Commission of Union Rights.

COMITÉ DE ORGANIZACIÓN Y UNIDAD OBRERA. *See* Committee of Labor Organization and Unity.

COMITÉ SINDICAL ANTIFASCISTA. *See* Anti-fascist Syndical Committee.

COMMITTEE OF LABOR ORGANIZATION AND UNITY (Comité de Organización y Unidad Obrera—COUO).

This organization arose in 1937 as one of a number of efforts to support Republican Spain in the crisis of the Spanish Civil War. It brought together communists, socialists, and anarcho-syndicalists, thus supplanting both the anarcho-syndicalist Syndical Union of Uruguay* and the communist General Central of Workers of Uruguay.* It also reorganized the labor movement, which had suffered mightily from effects of the Great Depression and government repression. Only the anarchists of the Regional Labor Federation of Uruguay* remained outside the Committee. Hector Rodríguez, who later would become a prominent communist labor leader, gained his first experience in union activity in the Committee, which helped spark the formation of new labor organizations, for example among the bus and transit workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES DEL URUGUAY. *See* General Confederation of Workers of Uruguay.

CONFEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DEL URUGUAY. *See* Syndical Confederation of Uruguay.

CONFEDERACIÓN URUGUAYA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Uruguayan Confederation of Workers.

CONGRESO OBRERO TEXTIL. *See* Textile Labor Congress.

CONVENCIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* National Convention of Workers.

CSU. *See* Syndical Confederation of Uruguay.

FAC. *See* Autonomous Meat Federation.

FEDERACIÓN AUTÓNOMA DE LA CARNE. *See* Autonomous Meat Federation.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA MARÍTIMA. *See* Maritime Labor Federation.

FEDERACIÓN OBRERA REGIONAL DEL URUGUAY. *See* Regional Labor Federation of Uruguay.

FEDERACIÓN URUGUAYA DE EMPLEADOS DEL COMERCIO Y LA INDUSTRIA. *See* Uruguayan Federation of Commercial and Industrial Employees.

FORU. *See* Regional Labor Federation of Uruguay.

FUECI. *See* Uruguayan Federation of Commercial and Industrial Employees.

GENERAL CENTRAL OF WORKERS OF URUGUAY (Central General de Trabajadores del Uruguay—CEGTU).

This organization was the first wholly communist labor central, supplanting the transitory Labor Unity Block* in 1929. By 1932 it was beginning to experience grave difficulties because of the Uruguayan government's growing hostility toward communism. The CEGTU clearly evidenced a "dualist" syndicalism that on the one hand fought for immediate economic gains for workers, while on the other, envisioning a long-term political fight to destroy capitalism. Its most prominent leaders were Eugenio Gómez, secretary-general of the Uruguayan Communist Party, and Manuel Lazarraga, who had helped establish the Labor Unity Block.* The effects of recession and repression from 1933 on weakened the CEGTU, and it ceased to exist in 1937.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF URUGUAY (Confederación General de Trabajadores del Uruguay—CGTU).

The dissolution of the National Convention of Workers* in 1973 following the military coup signaled the defeat of a leftist class-confrontation style of unionism. The CGTU was then organized, with an orientation of autonomous or free trade unionism. Internationally it affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, but was suspended from that body in 1982. The CGTU has formed part of the authoritarian military regime, and officially represents Uruguayan workers at the International Labor Organization. Directed by Lino Cortizzo and Luis Fernández, it has fifty-seven affiliates. However, it does not enjoy a strong mass base and has undergone schisms which led to the formation of the Autonomous Central of Workers of Uruguay* and the Movement of Independent Syndical Unification.*

GENERAL UNION OF WORKERS (Unión General de Trabajadores—UGT).

World War II facilitated the first unification of the Uruguayan labor movement. An agreement in 1942 between the Committee of Labor Organization and Unity,* then largely dominated by communists, and the Anti-fascist Syndical Committee,* which embraced socialists, anarcho-syndicalists and other reformist groups, established the UGT, which enjoyed official government support. It was formed by sixty-five unions, equally divided between Montevideo and the interior of the country. In 1945 it affiliated with the nascent World Federation of Trade Unions.

The war brought increased prosperity to Uruguay, and tripartite (state, labor, and business) Salary Councils (Consejos de Salarios) were established to set wages. However, disputes between communist and noncommunist factions caused tensions in sugar worker and meat-packer unions. By 1946 a Committee of Syndical Relations (Comité de Relaciones Sindicales) arose to parallel the UGT, which had been increasingly reflecting communist positions.

INTERSYNDICAL PLENARY OF WORKERS (Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores—PIT).

A coordinating body created on May Day 1983 outside the legally approved union structure, the PIT marked the reappearance in Uruguay of a two-pronged revolutionary syndicalism aimed at achieving economic gains for workers and, ultimately, an alteration in the prevailing economic and political system. This so-called dualist unionism had disappeared following the 1973 military coup and concomitant destruction of the National Convention of Workers.* PIT initially affiliated thirty-seven labor organizations, but within five months that number had grown to almost eighty. Essentially it represents an attempt to re-create a unified Uruguayan labor movement, albeit under changed socioeconomic conditions. Commercial and service unions predominate. The individual baseline unions remain small due to the deconcentration of labor resulting from, among other things, automation and decentralization, processes that have marked Uruguay since 1973. The formerly powerful textile and meat-packing plant associations lost much of their clout due to the closing of the former large factories, while legislation prohibits unionization among some 300,000 public employees.

PIT has organized some labor protests, including work stoppages, and has a platform focused on two political objectives: liberty (which means support for a process of liberalization and redemocratization) and amnesty (for many of those arrested by the military regime). The PIT also has espoused three fundamental syndical goals. These include the unionization of public employees, reduction in unemployment, and a rise in real wages (since 1968, real wages have dropped some 50 percent). It also calls for a general recognition of union rights and a return of the headquarters that were lost in the wake of the 1973 coup.

PIT's leaders include José P. Ciganda from the Association of Bank Workers of Uruguay,* Richard Read of the beverage workers, Héctor Seco of the metalworkers, and Andrés Troiani from the health care workers.

LABOR UNITY BLOCK (Block de Unidad Obrero—BUO).

In 1928 communist members of the Syndical Union of Uruguay* left that organization (dominated by anarcho-syndicalists) and established the Labor Unity Block as an exclusively communist organization designed to bring together other unions espousing that ideology. The BUO constituted a preliminary step to the creation the following year of a communist central, the General Central of Workers of Uruguay.* With that organization established, the BUO ceased to exist. At that same time an international organization was created: the Latin American Syndical Confederation (Confederación Sindical Lationamericana—CSLA), which disappeared shortly after the Great Depression.

MARITIME LABOR FEDERATION (Federación Obrera Marítima—FOM).

Appearing early in the twentieth century, this was one of the first unions in Uruguay to use an enterprise or type of business endeavor rather than a specific trade (which had been the standard approach of the anarchist) as an organizational

base. A communist union, it was led by Eugenio Gómez, who became the first secretary-general of the Uruguayan Communist Party. Around the 1940s it changed its name to the Sole Union of Maritime Workers (*Sindicato Unico de Obreros Marítimos*), but always remained under communist control.

MESA OBRERO ESTUDANTIL. *See* Student Labor Board.

MOVEMENT OF INDEPENDENT SYNDICAL UNIFICATION (*Movimiento de Unificación Sindical Independiente—MUSI*).

Created in 1983 as a result of a split in the General Confederation of Workers of Uruguay,* MUSI collaborated with the authoritarian military regime; it thus lost prestige and virtually dissolved. It presently is in the process of reconstituting itself as a viable organization.

MOVIMIENTO DE UNIFICACION SINDICAL INDEPENDIENTE. *See* Movement of Independent Syndical Unification.

NATIONAL CONVENTION OF WORKERS (*Convención Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT*).

Formed in 1964, the National Convention of Workers affiliated almost all leftist unions (which in Uruguay typically constituted the majority), representing the second important instance (the General Union of Workers* provided the first during the 1940s) of a unified national labor situation. It arose from a convergence of the communists, organized in the Uruguayan Workers Central* and such previous associations as the Textile Labor Congress,* Autonomous Meat Federation,* and the anarchist-oriented tire workers at the FUNSA plant. A Congress of the People (*Congreso del Pueblo*) held in 1964 extended union influence to the political field and helped promote grass-roots militance. Two years later the communists dissolved their labor central, the Uruguayan Workers Central, leaving the CNT as the sole leftist central. (The weak Uruguayan Confederation of Workers* remained as a nonleftist labor central.) Other leftist militants, for example the socialists, who did not control any individual unions, also participated in this unification effort.

José D'Elia, a longtime labor militant and former head of the white-collar Uruguayan Federation of Commercial and Industrial Employees,* headed the CNT throughout its existence, and its secretariat included communists, socialists, anarchists, and other leftist radicals. Of forty-eight leaders of affiliated unions, communists accounted for 60 percent; anarchists, 6 percent; and socialists, 3 percent.

As of 1966, an estimated 200,000 workers affiliated with the CNT, representing some 43 percent of the nation's economically active nonfarm labor force. (That figure also excludes informal sector activities and domestic servants.) CNT unions included twenty-two white-collar or middle-class organizations and nine-

teen industrial labor associations, and overwhelmingly, its affiliates concentrated in Montevideo (forty of forty-eight).

From 1968 on, the CNT led strong confrontations with the government, which repeatedly responded by instituting a mild form of martial law known as prompt security measures (*medidas prontas de seguridad*), especially when labor actions involved workers in banking, telephones, electricity, and public transit.

In 1973 relations with the government reached their nadir. Following the military coup of 27 June of that year, the CNT declared a general strike. It managed to maintain that action for ten days, but then succumbed to government repression; the government declared the union illegal and decreed the arrest of its leaders. The disappearance of the CNT spelled the end of militant, revolutionary syndicalism in Uruguay for the next decade.

NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMISSION OF UNION RIGHTS (Comisión Nacional de Defenso de los Derechos Sindicales—CNDDDS).

Led by Juan A. Acuña, a union leader with a social-democratic orientation, this commission was created in 1979 with the specific purpose of reactivating union life which had virtually disappeared under the repression of the military regime instituted by the coup of 1973. It published seventeen editions of a monthly paper *Presence* (*Presencia*) and joined with Uruguayan Syndical Action* and the Association of Bank Workers of Uruguay* in petitioning the government for union rights. With the 1983 creation of the Intersyndical Plenary of Workers,* a stronger organization also working toward freeing up the syndical system, the National Defense Commission, ceased to have importance.

PIT. *See* Intersyndical Plenary of Workers.

PLENARIO INTERSINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Intersyndical Plenary of Workers.

REGIONAL LABOR FEDERATION OF URUGUAY (Federación Obrera Regional del Uruguay—FORU).

In 1905 thirty-eight anarchist "resistance societies" (*sociedades de resistencia*), among them organizations of shipwrights, carpenters, bargemen, mechanics, stokers, and bricklayers, joined together to form Uruguay's first labor central. Urging direct action and seeing confrontation as a means to achieve revolutionary change, the FORU, behind such leaders as Adrián Troitiño, Francisco Corney, and Carlos Balsán, in 1911 mounted the nation's first general strike. The government of José Batlle y Ordoñez (president from 1903 to 1907 and from 1911 to 1915), highly progressive for that era, responded by creating a National Labor Office (Oficina Nacional de Trabajo) and sanctioning a law establishing an eight-hour work day. This and other measures established an "assistance state" (*estado asistencial*), the first step toward a welfare state (albeit limited to Montevideo). This response removed much of the force from the anarchist movement, and

some of its leaders, for example, Carlos Balsán, became supporters of the president's style of reform, known in Uruguay as *batllismo*.

SYNDICAL CONFEDERATION OF URUGUAY (Confederación Sindical del Uruguay—CSU).

In 1946 a Committee of Syndical Relations (Comité de Relaciones Sindicales) arose in response to increasing acrimony between communist and noncommunist factions in the General Union of Workers* (UGT). Designed to bring together noncommunist unions, the Committee functioned for a while in parallel fashion to the UGT, without officially declaring itself a labor central. In 1951, as the Cold War escalated, and following the failure of general strike called by the UGT, the Committee did in fact reconstitute itself as an alternative central, adopting the name Syndical Confederation of Uruguay, and affiliating with the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Some Uruguayan unions, notably the Autonomous Meat Federation* and the Textile Labor Congress,* chose to remain independent from both the UGT and the CSU.

By the beginning of the 1960s, however, unions increasingly adopted either a pro- or anti-communist position, with the anti-communists generally a minority. In 1966 the CSU disappeared, weakened by the defection of some of its unions to the recently formed National Convention of Workers.* It was succeeded by the Uruguayan Confederation of Workers.*

SYNDICAL UNION OF URUGUAY (Unión Sindical del Uruguay—USU).

This union arose in 1923 through the joint efforts of anarcho-syndicalists and communists. It brought together the first unions organized by enterprise, unlike the existing anarchist-oriented Regional Labor Federation of Uruguay* (FORU), which affiliated unions based on a specific trade. In further contrast to FORU, it espoused not only direct action but also political action and bread-and-butter issues. Nonetheless, it joined with FORU in a 1927 work stoppage in solidarity with the Italian anarchist labor organizers Sacco and Vanzetti, then under sentence of death in the United States. At about that time the USU had almost 4,000 members, and the organized labor movement had lost much of its drive due to the progressive, reformist measures begun by Uruguayan President José Batlle y Ordoñez (1903–07 and 1911–15). In 1928 eleven communist unions left the USU to form the Labor Unity Block.*

Though weakened, the USU remained in existence until around 1937, when it merged into the Committee of Labor Organization and Unity.*

SINDICATO ÚNICO DE OBREROS MARÍTIMOS (SOLE UNION OF MARITIME WORKERS). *See* Maritime Labor Federation.

SOLE UNION OF MARITIME WORKERS. *See* Maritime Labor Federation.

STUDENT LABOR BOARD (*Mesa Obrero Estudiantil*).

This organization brought together independent unions and the Federation of University Students of Uruguay (*Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios del Uruguay*). It appeared around 1958, a time of severe economic strain in Uruguay. It coordinated strikes by textile and meat workers with a student strike called to press for autonomy for the University of Montevideo. The students adopted a third-way position (neither pro-U.S. nor pro-Soviet), within which anarchists, socialists, and other "left nationalists" predominated. This ideological stance closely approximated that of the independent unions, thereby facilitating their cooperation.

TEXTILE LABOR CONGRESS (*Congreso Obrero Textil—COT*).

The 1930s witnessed the inception of the Uruguayan textile industry, which produced largely for the domestic market. In 1952 three existing unions—the Textile Labor Union (*Unión Obrera Textil*), which belonged to the communist-dominated General Union of Workers* (*UGT*); the Textile Organization "Cotton" (*Organización Textil Cotton*), affiliated with the anti-communist Syndical Confederation of Uruguay* (*CSU*); and the Labor Center *Alpargatas* (*Centro Obrero Alpargatas*), a major autonomous factory union—agreed to work jointly apart from both the *UGT* and *CSU*. Under the direction of Héctor Rodríguez, who had abandoned the Communist Party, the Textile Labor Congress became a militant, autonomous union. In 1960, for example, the *COT* mounted a successful eighty-day strike. In 1964 the *COT* joined the National Convention of Workers,* which unified virtually the entire spectrum of leftist unions.

UGT. See General Union of Workers.

UNIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES. See General Union of Workers.

UNIÓN SINDICAL DEL URUGUAY. See Syndical Union of Uruguay.

URUGUAYAN CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (*Confederación Uruguaya de Trabajadores—CUT*).

In existence from 1966 until the military coup of 1973, this confederation served as a weaker counterpart of the National Confederation of Workers.* At a time of large-scale labor unrest and militancy, *CUT*'s conservative ideological position caused it to be branded as a "sellout to imperialism," but it in fact had very little influence and tended to remain aloof from the important labor actions of that day.

URUGUAYAN FEDERATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYEES (*Federación Uruguaya de Empleados del Comercio y la Industria—FUECI*).

Created in 1933 at the height of economic recession produced by the Great

Depression, this federation was the nation's first white-collar union. Its founders intended to create an alternative syndicalism with ideological orientations toward corporation and European fascism. It enjoyed official support, and its representatives participated in meetings of the International Labor Office. It later evolved toward the reformist positions common to other middle-class unions. It joined the General Union of Workers* then abandoned it for the more moderate Syndical Confederation of Uruguay* (CSU). However, it did not join the CSU's successor, the Uruguayan Confederation of Workers,* but instead in the 1960s joined the rival National Convention of Workers.* It ceased activities after the military coup of 1973 but has recently begun to revive. However, the contemporary absence of a large-scale commercial sector and the prevalence of informal sector activities impede any dramatic resurgence of this federation.

URUGUAYAN SYNDICAL ACTION (Acción Sindical Uruguaya—ASU).

Created in 1961 by Waldo Warren, a former civil servant of a mixed (state and private) enterprise, Uruguayan Syndical Action promoted a militant union stance within the framework of a Christian-democratic orientation. It had only limited impact within the union movement, and it was therefore allowed to remain in existence after the military coup of 1973, which witnessed the disbanding of most Uruguayan unions. Since 1981 it has worked with the National Defense Commission of Union Rights and with the Association of Bank Workers of Uruguay* to help establish the Intersyndical Plenary of Workers,* an extra-legal union coordinating body. ASU's present Secretary General is ex-textile worker Mitil Ferreira. The union publishes a monthly *Avanzada*.

URUGUAYAN WORKERS CENTRAL (Central de Trabajadores del Uruguay—CTU).

Another of the attempts of the Uruguayan Communist Party to control syndicalism, this central operated between 1961 and 1966. Encouraged by the success of the Cuban Revolution, the CTU attempted to gain adherents from those unions which had remained outside an earlier communist organization, the General Union of Workers.* Its success, however, remained limited since such key unions as the Autonomous Meat Federation* and the Textile Labor Congress* did not join, and instead adhered to the National Convention of Workers,* which formed in 1964. Its most prominent leaders were such Communist Party militants as Enrique Pastorino, Gerardo Cuestas, and W. Turianski, and it affiliated with the Confederation of Workers of Latin America (Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina—CTAL) and the World Federation of Trade Unions.

USU. *See* Syndical Union of Uruguay.

Venezuela ---

STEVE ELLNER

Venezuela remained a backwater region of the Spanish empire until the eighteenth century when it assumed an important role as an exporter of cacao. The nineteenth century was characterized by political instability: regional caudillos posed a constant threat to the authority of the national government. Only under the despotic rule of Juan Vicente Gómez (1908–35) did the central government consolidate its power and restrict local influence. This feat was made possible by the establishment of a well-equipped standing army as well as the construction of a highway system which facilitated the rapid deployment of troops. These developments were in turn related to the steady growth of the oil industry in the state of Zulia in the 1920s and by the following decade, though of lesser importance, in the Oriente region. Migration from the countryside to Caracas and the oil regions undermined landowning interests which had underpinned the authority of the regional caudillos.

Presidents Eleazar López Contreras (1936–41) and Isaías Medina Angarita (1941–45), who had been generals under Gómez, were elected by indirect suffrage. At first the López administration faced an immediate challenge from Gómez' most loyal followers and thus the president allowed popular and leftist organizations to flourish. The two most important parties were led by future leaders of the Venezuelan Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Venezuela—PCV) and Democratic Action (Acción Democrática—AD). Only after the rightist threat was eliminated did López clamp down on the leftists in early 1937. Medina implemented a number of popular reforms and promised a gradual evolution in democratic liberties and institutions. AD, however, considered this transformation insincere and in any case too slow, and on 18 October 1945 participated in the military overthrow of Medina.

The populist government of AD (1945–48) brought with it a backlash from conservative groups and was overthrown by the same officers who had spear-

headed the 1945 coup. The repressive regime of Pérez Jiménez (1948–58) was overthrown by military officers, spurred by general unrest. AD won the elections of December 1958 and set up a coalition government which included the Democratic Republican Union (Unión Republicana Democrática—URD) and the Social Christian Copei, formed in 1945 and 1946, respectively. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR), the result of a division in AD in 1960, and the PCV engaged in guerrilla warfare in the early and mid-1960s. AD's electoral successes were interrupted as a result of a party split in 1967 which gave rise to the left-leaning Electoral Movement of the People (Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo—MEP). Victories in the presidential elections of 1968, 1973, 1978, and 1983 alternated between Copei and AD.

Venezuela's youthful working class in the years prior to the opening of the modern era in 1936 can be divided into three main sectors: service workers in the railroad, trolley car, telephone and telegraph enterprises, which were controlled by foreign capital; petroleum workers; and labor in artisan enterprises, which produced textiles, processed food, beverages, apparel and shoes. In the case of footwear, mechanization began to replace craft labor in part of the operation, though a majority continued to labor in workshops or at home. Cutters, seamstresses, and machine workers in the industry all formed separate unions in Caracas, which were in turn grouped in the Federation of Shoe Workers (Federación de Zapateros).

Due to the meagerness of European immigration and the closed nature of the society, the revolutionary ideologies which penetrated organized labor elsewhere in the continent were largely lacking in Venezuela. Nevertheless, these two factors were not entirely absent. Thus, for instance, a Spanish socialist, José Tastón, led relatively successful strikes against the English-owned Caracas—La Guaira railroad in 1924 and against Caracas' largest footwear firm, Casa Bocardó. Furthermore, shortly after its founding in 1931, the Communist Party sent one of its leaders, Rodolfo Quintero, to Zulia to organize the Petroleum Workers Mutual Aid Society (Sociedad de Auxilio Mutuo de los Obreros Petroleros) in Cabimas, whose demands included removal of despotic foremen and equal treatment for Venezuelan workers. The oil companies, however, immediately removed the members of the union's executive committee, and Quintero was jailed for two years. In addition, religious and literary clubs occasionally deplored the lot of the working poor and, in the process, directly or indirectly influenced workers.

Government repression was responsible for the short duration of worker organizations during this period, with the most notable exception being that of the trolley car workers organization, which lasted until the industry's shutdown in 1947. Union organizing in the petroleum industry was also undermined by the workers' identification with their region of origin and their faith that someday they would return home. Indeed, the few labor conflicts which broke out in the

oil industry helped to overcome such nostalgic aspirations and to erase regional cleavages.

The government's acceptance of democratic freedoms during the first year of the administration of President López Contreras gave rise to an outbreak of strikes by recently formed labor unions. General strikes were launched in February, May, and June of 1936, the latter of which lasted longer in Zulia than in Caracas where the political parties were strongest. The active participation of workers in political struggles helped establish close ties between unions and parties, a salient feature of the labor movement ever since. The government responded to popular pressure by passing such measures as the Labor Law of 1936 which established the forty-eight-hour workweek and recognized the right to form unions. The First Workers Congress in December, which unsuccessfully attempted to launch a confederation of labor unions, called for reforms of the Labor Law. Among the law's major shortcomings were its exclusion of the mass of agricultural workers from benefits and its failure to specify on what grounds the government could refuse to grant legal status to unions.

The forty-three-day oil workers strike in December 1936–January 1937 galvanized support from diverse sectors, including representatives of the nation's elite. National enthusiasm for the strike was stimulated by the campaign to place workers' children with families in other parts of the country for the duration of the conflict. Although the workers in Zulia and Falcón unanimously respected the strike call, it failed to draw a response in the Oriente, which was beginning to develop into an oil-producing region of some importance. The failure of office employees as well as workers in the refineries of the Curaçao to walk out also detracted from the strike's effectiveness. The underground Communist party of Zulia controlled the workers movement in most oil towns in the state, although future members of AD also played a prominent role in Cabimas and elsewhere. Divided sentiment within the López administration became evident when Minister of Interior Régulo Olivares tacitly encouraged striking workers. Nevertheless, López' back-to-work decree granted the workers only a slight wage increase while ignoring other demands including union recognition.

Following the abortive oil workers strike, the government took strict measures against the opposition and in March 1937 exiled forty-seven prominent leftists including labor leaders Rodolfo Quintero, Ramón Quijada, Malavé Villalba—all members of the pro-communist Progressive Republican Party (*Partido Republicano Progresista*)—and Alejandro Oropeza Castillo of the National Employees Association—ANDE, the white-collar workers union. During the remainder of the López administration and even more markedly during the succeeding government of Medina Angarita, the labor movement gradually recuperated, although its strength continued to be concentrated in Caracas and Zulia. Up until 1945 the government's insistence that by law unions had to be led by workers unaffiliated with political parties seriously hampered the labor movement. Thus the government jailed the leaders of the striking Caracas bus workers

union in 1944 on the basis that its president, Luis Miquilena, was a student and not a worker. Miquilena belonged to a group of dissident communists who refused to go along with the PCV's World War II policy of no strikes. In spite of occasional government harshness, leftist and labor forces had enough political influence to pressure Medina into replacing his controversial Minister of Labor and Communications Héctor Cuenca, who avidly opposed "political unionism," with the more pro-labor Julio Díez. In June 1945, Díez proved instrumental in promoting a contractual agreement in the oil industry where for the first time the unions received company recognition.

The government's opposition to "political unionism" also thwarted efforts to establish a national workers confederation, which had been a cherished labor goal ever since the Congress of December 1936. In March 1944, AD and PCV labor leaders, after having established federations in the construction and oil industries, convoked a national congress where the famed Mexican trade unionist Vicente Lombardo Toledano presented an opening address. Delegates of the two parties, however, soon clashed over the issue of representation on the executive committee of the projected confederation. While AD labor leaders demanded parity, PCV adherents insisted that their superior overall strength in the labor movement should be reflected at the leadership level. In the heat of the debate one communist delegate disregarded the tacitly accepted rule of avoiding public mention of party affiliation by speaking out in the name of the PCV. This indiscretion triggered a walkout of the AD delegates, the subsequent closing of the convention, and the outlawing of communist-controlled unions. During the period in which the PCV unions maintained illegal status, AD established its own legal parallel unions and soon displaced the communists as the leading force in organized labor.

During the period of AD rule known as the *trienio* (1945–48), Minister of Labor Raúl Leoni encouraged the establishment of labor organizations throughout the nation especially in the countryside, and as a result the number of legally recognized unions more than tripled. Other labor gains were conferred by law, including the implementation of complementary severance pay (known as *cesantía*) and the increase in the number of annual vacation days to fifteen.

With the exception of the oil workers movement where communist strength was particularly felt, AD refused to accept trade unionists of other parties on the governing slate of the unions and federations which it dominated. All seven executive positions of the Workers Confederation of Venezuela* (Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela—CTV) established in November 1947 were filled by AD labor leaders, and all of its affiliated federations, with the exception of the Communist-led federation of textile and clothing workers, were controlled by AD.

While national AD labor leaders accepted the government's call for "social peace," lower-level party militants encouraged by the success of the unionization drive occasionally led walkouts which the CTV refused to sanction. Real wages increased substantially, partly owing to Minister Leoni's interventionist role. An

agreement between the representatives of the CTV and the main business organization, the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production (Federación de Cámaras de Comercio y Producción—FEDECAMARAS), shortly prior to the 1948 coup reflected AD's recent position on labor peace. The accord called for the establishment of a National Commission of Arbitration to settle worker-management disputes as well as preferential hiring of CTV members and the acceptance of labor contracts of long duration.

The CTV's plans to call a general strike against the military coup of 24 November 1948 failed to take hold due to hesitation and indecision on the part of AD political leaders. AD labor leaders were harshly persecuted from the outset of the new regime; members of the PCV received the same treatment following the abortive oil workers strike of May 1950.

The refusal of the oil companies to renegotiate a wage increase prior to the expiration of the labor contract of 1948, as was stipulated in that agreement, sparked the May 1950 strike. Jesús Faría and other top PCV labor leaders as well as less prominent AD trade unionists who were not subject to government persecution (such as Carlos Piñerua, future president of the Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela* [Federación de Trabajadores Petroleros de Venezuela—FEDEPETROL], and future AD Secretary-General Manuel Peñalver) constituted the leadership core of the movement. The strike committee operated a clandestine radio station. Unlike the 1936–37 strike, the 1950 struggle involved oil workers in the Oriente region. Moreover, the 1950 strike was directed against the government and took on insurrectional overtones. Shortly after the walkout began, government troops occupied the oil installations and cut off supplies of gas, electricity, and water in the workers' quarters. Hundreds of strikers were jailed, and grocery stores were closed. These repressive measures forced the workers back to their jobs, although in some places they held out for over ten days.

In June 1953 a national oil workers' convention launched the Single Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela (Federación Unica de Trabajadores Petroleros de Venezuela) in an effort to achieve unity, and raised such demands as *estabilidad* (job security), the forty-hour workweek, and enforcement of the law whereby at least 75 percent of the employees of all firms had to be Venezuelan. The pro-government labor movement ignored these demands and in September signed a contract which drew protests from opposition labor leaders who were promptly jailed. In the contract, the oil companies in accordance with a hitherto unapplied provision in the 1936 Labor Law furnished the pro-government union with headquarters. During this period, AD labor leaders established the CTV-in-exile, first in Havana and later San José, Costa Rica, which published its own periodical, called the *C.T.V.*, and joined the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT). At first relations between ORIT and Venezuelan labor leaders were strained as a result of its failure to call for a blanket condemnation of the Pérez Jiménez regime at an international labor conference in 1952. Subsequently, however, ex-

CTV president P.B. Pérez Salinas joined the ORIT staff in Mexico, and close ties were established between Serafino Romualdi and other Venezuelan labor leaders in exile.

By mid-decade, the PCV, with most of its labor activists blacklisted, encouraged its youth members to find work in strategic industries and organize from within existing pro-government unions. Hemmy Croes, future head of the Unitary Center of Workers of Venezuela* (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Venezuela—CUTV), and Douglass Bravo, future guerrilla leader, both became workers during this period.

In September 1957 the clandestine Patriotic Junta (Junta Patriótica) headed by the opposition parties set up a Workers' Front led by labor leaders Américo Chacón (AD), Vicente Piñate (Republican Democratic Union—URD), Dagoberto González (Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organization—COPEI), and Eloy Torres (PCV). In one of its manifestos the Workers' Front denounced Minister of Labor Carlos Tinoco Rodil for having broken with the International Labor Organization (ILO) and for controlling the pro-government unions, which in 1954 had established the National Confederation of Workers* (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT).

The Pérez Jiménez administration's encouragement of immigration of Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese workers to fill positions in the booming construction industry was especially resented by Venezuelan workers. Government propaganda harped on construction of worker facilities, especially the showy resort in the coastal town of Los Caracas.

The general strike, which broke out on 21 January 1958 in response to a call by anti-government forces led by the Patriotic Junta, was influential in bringing down the Pérez Jiménez regime two days later. Shortly thereafter trade unionists belonging to the various political parties created the Unified Union Committee (Comité Sindical Unificado—CSU) in order to reconstitute the labor movement. In an effort to consolidate democratic gains in the face of right-wing military threats, CSU leaders reached an agreement with the business community in which they pledged to postpone negotiations over expired contracts and to avoid making excessive demands. The CSU supported Decree 440 issued in November 1958 regarding collective bargaining procedures which opened the possibility for compulsory arbitration once negotiations proved unsuccessful. In addition, several nationwide general strikes were carried out as a warning to discontented military officers.

Since 1958 the Venezuelan labor movement not only has been tied closely to political parties but has been highly dependent upon government paternalism. The federal government, for instance, grants handsome subsidies to the CTV and other confederations based on the periodic submission of a budget of anticipated expenses; it also furnishes labor organizations with headquarters. Various state governments provide additional financial aid to individual unions. This support is especially important since union membership remains optional for workers and some unions lack provisions regarding the checkoff of dues.

Labor's most far-reaching gains during the 1970s were handed down by legislation and executive decrees in a short period immediately following the oil price hikes of 1973–74. The 31 July 1974 Law Against Unjustified Layoffs discourages layoffs by burdening companies with heavy monetary obligations to discharged workers. The measure refers cases of firings to a tripartite commission consisting of labor, company, and government representatives who determine whether the dismissal was due to "just cause," namely worker negligence; in the contrary case, the company is obliged to either rehire the worker or pay him double severance indemnities. The Presidential Decree of 12 April 1975 defines severance payments as "acquired rights," which means that workers are eligible for them regardless of the cause of layoff.

Companies claim that the 1974 law encourages workers to court dismissal in order to collect attractive indemnities and that representation on the tripartite commissions weighs against management. Even the Minister of Labor in the succeeding COPEI administration claimed that the law was a root cause of worker indiscipline. Organized labor has not fully endorsed the law either. Trade unionists point out that the goal of job security is sidetracked by the 1974 law since it allows management to choose between payment of double indemnities and rehiring. Furthermore, the lengthy legal proceedings in these cases have usually encouraged workers to settle out of court, thus providing them with less than double benefits. Some labor leaders have called for the substitution of the tripartite commissions by individual arbiters in order to reduce the duration of the process.

Organized labor has unsuccessfully attempted to lift labor law restrictions against nationwide unions. The national federations which do exist are no substitutes for a centralized union organization. The loose structure which prevails in the federations has given rise to the proliferation of individual unions in the same workplace, many of which are the result of conflicts between partisans of different political parties. In calling for the establishment of nationwide industrial unions (*sindicatos únicos por rama de industria*), the CTV argues that local unions encompassing individual companies or workplaces are characteristic of an incipient industrial stage with its regional economies which Venezuela has already left behind.

In a related position, the CTV favors the signing of industry-wide contracts whenever possible. In the construction sector the companies are represented at the bargaining table by their own association, the Venezuelan Chamber of Construction (*Cámara Venezolana de la Construcción*). In the sugar, textile, and graphic arts industries, meetings between unions and individual companies often precede general discussions at the national level. At the other extreme, the constituent unions of the National Federation of Metalworkers* (*Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Metalúrgicos—FETRAMETAL*), and the white-collar workers National Federation of Employees* (*Federación Nacional de Empleados—FENADE*), sign scores of contracts with individual firms.

Collective bargaining in several industries has been governed by Decree 440 of November 1958 whereby negotiations for a single nationwide contract are

obligatory whenever either the government, the companies, or a majority of workers in a given industry call for them. Under this arrangement all unions regardless of size have a right to participate in the selection of workers' representatives to negotiate with the companies. If a settlement is not forthcoming after sixty days of discussion, the case is submitted to arbitration (unless both parties request an extension). This procedure favors workers in the smaller, less profitable firms since benefits tend to be equalized throughout the industry. Contracts negotiated under the terms of Decree 440 last between two and three years.

Actually, most of the important contracts in Venezuela are for three years. In addition, the majority of contracts are not renewed immediately upon expiration but instead remain in effect during a lengthy period of renegotiation. Over a hundred contracts in the public sector were frozen between 1962 and 1969.

Many trade unionists have called for a reduction in the duration of contracts, arguing that wage benefits are eroded by inflation. Some contracts provide for built-in wage increases or renegotiation of wages at a certain point, as well as special bonuses based on price increases in the produced commodity. Nevertheless, most trade union leaders consider these contractual arrangements inadequate. MEP called on the government to tie wage increases to the rate of inflation (*escala móvil de salarios*). The CTV initially opposed this idea on the grounds that the official index tends to underestimate inflation, although by the early 1980s it modified its position and viewed the proposal as a possible solution to declining real wages.

Bibliography

- Barreto, Morella. *Un siglo de prensa laboral venezolana: Hemerografía obrero-artesanal, 1846-1937*. Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1986.
- Bergquist, Charles. *Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia*. Stanford: Stanford University press, 1986.
- Caicedo, Edgar. *Historia de las luchas sindicales en Colombia*, 4th ed. rev., Bogotá: Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones, 1982.
- Croes, Hemmy. *El movimiento obrero venezolano*. Caracas: Editora San José, 1973.
- De la Pedraja Toman, René. *Historia de la energía en Colombia 1537-1930*. Bogotá: El Ancora Editores, 1985.
- Ellner, Steve. *Los partidos políticos y su disputa por el control del movimiento sindical en Venezuela, 1936-1948*. Caracas: Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 1980.
- Godio, Julio. *El movimiento obrero venezolano, 1850-1980*. 3 vols. Caracas: Editorial Atenco de Caracas, 1980-83.
- Gonzalez, Armando. *Temas Agrosindicales: Grava de una misma Cantera*. Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1977.
- López Maya, Margarita and Nikolaus Werz. *El estado y el movimiento sindical (1958-1980)*. Caracas: Cendes, 1981.
- Lucena, Hector. *El movimiento obrero y las relaciones laborales*. Valencia: Universidad de Carabobo, 1981.

- Pérez Salinas, P. B. *Retrospección Laboral*. Caracas: Prensas Venezolanas de Imprenta Nueva, 1971.
- Pla, Alberto et al. *Clase obrera, partidos y sindicatos en Venezuela, 1936–1950*. Caracas: Ediciones Cantauro, 1982.
- Prieto Soto, Jesús. *Conformación ideológica petrolera*. Bogotá, Colombia: Talleres Gráficos, 1980.
- Quijada, Ramón. *Reforma agraria en Venezuela*. Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1963.
- Tennassee, Paul Nehru. *Venezuela: los obreros petroleros y la lucha por la democracia*. Caracas: EFI Publicacions, 1979.
- U.S. Department of Labor. *Labor Law and Practice in Venezuela*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
- Valente, Cecilia M. *The Political, Economic and Labor Climate in Venezuela*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ANDE. *See* National Employees Association.

ASOCIACIÓN DE LA INDUSTRIA SIDERÚRGICA Y SUS SIMILARES. *See* Single Union of Steel Industry Workers.

ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE EMPLEADOS. *See* National Employees Association.

ASSOCIATION OF WORKERS OF THE METAL INDUSTRY. *See* Single Union of Steel Industry Workers.

ATISS. *See* Single Union of Steel Industry Workers.

BANK WORKERS UNION. *See* National Employees Association.

CENTRAL UNITARIA DE TRABAJADORES DE VENEZUELA. *See* Unitary Center of Workers of Venezuela.

CGT. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

CNT. *See* National Confederation of Workers.

CODESA. *See* Confederation of Autonomous Unions of Venezuela.

COLEGIO DE PROFESSORS (Professors' Guild). *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

COMANDO NACIONAL INTER-GREMIAL. *See* Inter-Union National Command.

COMITÉ SINDICAL UNITARIO DE TRABAJADORES DEL PETRÓLEO. *See* United Union Committee of Petroleum Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE SINDICATOS AUTÓNOMOS DE VENEZUELA. *See* Confederation of Autonomous Unions of Venezuela.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE VENEZUELA. *See* Workers Confederation of Venezuela.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE LOS TRABAJADORES. *See* General Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* National Confederation of Workers.

CONFEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS UNIONS OF VENEZUELA (Confederación de Sindicatos Autonomos de Venezuela—CODESA).

During the *trienio* of 1945–48 (when Democratic Action—AD held power) the Christian Democratic doctrine was spread to workers by the Workers' Circle of Caracas (Círculo Obrero de Caracas—COC), which was sponsored by the Church and closely associated with the nascent Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organization (COPEI). The COC's ideological guide was Padre Manuel Aguirre (a founder of the Jesuit magazine *SIC* in 1938), who held classes throughout the period and into the early years of the dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez (1948–58).

The question of the relations between the Social Christians and the AD-controlled Workers Confederation of Venezuela* (CTV), which was debated during the *trienio*, developed into a source of internal friction after 1958. Padre Aguirre and his followers established their own "autonomous" unions while denouncing the CTV for being an appendage of political parties. This criticism was well received by the Social Christians who as far back as the 1930s had attacked the left in Venezuela for politicizing the labor and student movements. Aguirre also argued that Social Christians should spurn the CTV since that organization reflected a social democratic ideology and was affiliated with the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), a pro-social democratic hemispheric labor body. Nevertheless, COPEI's standard-bearer, Rafael Caldera, and other top party leaders insisted that it made more political sense for COPEI trade unionists to work within the CTV where large numbers of workers were concentrated. Aguirre's group was held back by COPEI's participation in the AD government of 1959–64 which obliged the Social Christians to maintain friendly relations

with AD. In August 1964 the “autonomous” unions confederated into CODESA, while the Copeyano Workers Front (Frente de Trabajadores Copeyanos—FTC), which grouped key Copeyano labor leaders, worked exclusively in the CTV. Until his death in 1969, Aguirre played a consultant rather than active role in CODESA.

CODESA criticizes CTV leaders, including those of COPEI, for their practice of publicly announcing the party identification of the slates which they constitute for union elections. Article 2 of CODESA’s Declaration of Principles stipulates that the confederation will “preserve at all times its liberty and independence vis-à-vis political parties and the government.”

Both CODESA and the FTC belong to the Unitary Committee of Christian Unionists (Comité Unitario de Sindicalistas Cristianos—CUSIC), which represents them in the hemispheric Christian Democratic Latin American Workers Center (Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores—CLAT). The headquarters of CLAT and its predecessor, the Latin American Confederation of Christian Unionists (Confederación Latinoamericana de Sindicalistas Cristianos—CLASC), are located in San Antonio de los Altos outside Caracas. The Democratic Action government in the mid-1960s threatened to expel CLASC from Venezuela if it interfered with internal politics, but since then the organization has steered clear of national affairs.

CODESA has made inroads in organizing workers in areas where the CTV has been traditionally weak, specifically restaurants, gas stations, highway commercial transport, and fishing. In addition, CODESA has large sections of public employees and peasants. Success in these two areas is related to COPEI’s presence in the government since job appointments in the state sector and authorization of agricultural credits are often based on party identification. Under the COPEI governments, CODESA (as well as the CTV) was invited to participate in state commissions as official representatives of the labor sector. Clashes between COPEI and AD peasant followers became particularly pronounced under the COPEI administrations, and in many states the Copeyanos completely withdrew from the CTV’s Peasant Federation of Venezuela* and set up the rival National Peasant Federation (Federación Nacional Campesina—FEDENCA). FEDENCA has called on the National Congress to eliminate those legal provisions which recognize the Peasant Federation of Venezuela as the official representative of the peasantry.

CONSTRUCTION UNION OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT AND STATE OF MIRANDA. *See* Federation of Construction Workers.

CONSUTRAPET. *See* United Union Committee of Petroleum Workers.

CTV. *See* Workers Confederation of Venezuela.

CUTV. *See* Unitary Center of Workers of Venezuela.

FCV. *See* Peasant Federation of Venezuela.

FEDENCA. *See* Confederation of Autonomous Unions of Venezuela.

FEDEPETROL. *See* Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela.

FEDERACIÓN CAMPESINA DE VENEZUELA. *See* Peasant Federation of Venezuela.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES COPEYANOS. *See* Federation of COPEI Workers.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA CAÑA DE AZUCAR. *See* Peasant Federation of Venezuela.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA ENSEÑANZA. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA DE HIDROCARBUROS. *See* Federation of Hydrocarbon Industry Workers.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA DE LA CONSTRUCCIÓN. *See* Federation of Construction Workers.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DEL MAGISTERIO. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES PETROLEROS DE VENEZUELA. *See* Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela.

FEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES TEXTILES. *See* Federation of Textile Workers.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL CAMPESINA—FEDENCA (National Peasant Federation). *See* Confederation of Autonomous Unions of Venezuela.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE EMPLEADOS. *See* National Employees Association.

FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES METALÚRGICOS. *See* National Federation of Metalworkers.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES DE COMUNICACIONES DE VENEZUELA. *See* Union Federation of Communication Workers of Venezuela.

FEDERACIÓN VENEZOLANA DE MAESTROS. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

FEDERATION OF CONSTRUCTION WORKERS (Federación de Trabajadores de la Industria de la Construcción—FETRACONSTRUCCIÓN).

The Construction Union of the Federal District and State of Miranda (Sindicato de la Construcción del Distrito Federal y Estado Miranda) was founded in March 1943 and shortly thereafter federated with other construction workers unions, thus giving impetus to the organization of a nationwide labor confederation. The union's secretary of organization, Democratic Action's Juan Herrera, was chosen president of FETRACONSTRUCCIÓN upon its founding in March 1946, and the following year was elected to the 7 member executive committee of the Workers Confederation of Venezuela.*

After 1958 efforts were made to group all construction workers (including carpenters, electricians, and cement and other construction material workers) into single statewide unions. FETRACONSTRUCCIÓN negotiates an industry-wide contract with the Venezuelan Chamber of Construction (Cámara Venezolana de la Construcción), while a second contract encompasses construction workers in the public sector. FETRACONSTRUCCIÓN, like several other labor federations, publishes its own newspaper, *Andamio*.

FEDERATION OF COPEI WORKERS (Federación de Trabajadores Copeyanos—FTC).

This federation was established in 1947 to group trade unionists who adhered to the Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organization (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente—COPEI). Violent clashes between COPEI workers and those of the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) and Democratic Action (AD) occurred on May Day of the following year.

During the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship (1948–58) the handful of COPEI-controlled unions were among the few worker organizations which enjoyed legal status. In the oil industry Francisco Urquía Lugo and other COPEI trade unionists in November 1948 organized the Union of Organized Petroleum Workers* (STOP) in Punta Cardón, Punto Fijo, El Tigre, Puerto La Cruz, Cabimas, and elsewhere. Although COPEI labor leaders opposed the 1950 oil workers strike, they later stiffened their opposition to the regime and assigned Dagoberto González to represent them in the planning of the general strike which came to fruition on 21 January 1958. The work stoppage in Punto Fijo was organized by STOP.

The FTC, at first undecided as to the type of relations to pursue with the Workers Confederation of Venezuela* (CTV), by the 1960s chose to work exclusively within the confederation. In an informal understanding with the Confederation of Autonomous Unions of Venezuela* (CODESA), it was agreed that the FTC would undertake to gain control of already existing unions while CODESA would attempt to establish new ones.

COPEI's pact with AD was influential in securing positions for the Social Christians in excess of what their influence in labor warranted. In the 1960s COPEI filled posts left vacant by left-wing labor leaders who had withdrawn from the CTV. In 1970 AD leaders, anxious to weaken the Electoral Movement of the People (which they viewed as a natural competitor) offered COPEI the number 2 position of secretary-general as part of a larger inter-party agreement. Within COPEI, FTC head Dagoberto González successfully argued in favor of choosing Rafael León as secretary-general on the grounds that key posts should be opened up to young leaders. León's rival for the position was the veteran trade unionist Urquía Lugo.

Since 1958 the FTC has been able to strengthen its influence in COPEI as demonstrated by the increase in the number of its trade unionists serving as deputies in Congress: one in 1963, 12 in 1968, 19 in 1983.

Following COPEI's victory in the presidential election of 1978, relations between AD and COPEI deteriorated on the labor front. Initially, COPEI hoped to capture control of the CTV. Later, FTC leaders threatened to boycott the CTV's Eighth Congress in 1980 in protest of the selection of delegates to represent the Venezuelan Federation of Teachers* and the Peasant Federation of Venezuela.*

In February 1983, AD's national labor secretary, Antonio Ríos, publicly called on the Social Christians to choose between loyalty to the CTV and to CODESA and questioned his party's decision to allow a COPEI member to occupy the secretary-generalship of the CTV.

The FTC has called for reforms in order to democratize the CTV and provide for government monitoring of the internal affairs of unions. COPEI labor leaders opposed the CTV's call for single nationwide unions for each industry on the grounds that such centralization would further stifle union democracy.

FEDERATION OF HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY WORKERS (Federación de Trabajadores de la Industria de Hidrocarburos—FETRAHIDROCARBUROS).

In the early 1960s the government made a concerted effort to expel leftist trade unionists from the petroleum industry, for which they sought the cooperation of the oil companies and the Democratic Action-dominated Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela* (FEDEPETROL). In October 1962 leaders from the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Republican Democratic Union (URD) left FEDEPETROL to establish FETRAHIDROCARBUROS, though the federation soon became dominated by URD, which modified its radical positions. By the 1970s all eight members of the executive committee were URD followers. The situation in which two rival federations—FETRAHIDROCARBUROS and the much larger Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela*—coexist in the Workers Confederation of Venezuela* has proved embarrassing for that organization.

FEDERATION OF PETROLEUM WORKERS OF VENEZUELA (Federación de Trabajadores Petroleros de Venezuela—FEDEPETROL).

Unlike the situation in other labor bodies at the time, the positions on this federation's executive committee were occupied by Democratic Action (AD) and communist trade unionists at the federation's First Congress in April 1946. At the same time FEDEPETROL called for the establishment of a state petroleum company. The oil companies adamantly opposed FEDEPETROL's demand for a ban on layoffs (*estabilidad absoluta*), which they considered to be an infringement on management prerogatives. In its place they offered double payment of *antigüedad* (a type of severance payment) in order to avert a strike in 1948. The Communist trade unionists were expelled from FEDEPETROL's executive committee for opposing the 1948 settlement, which they claimed represented a deterioration in the terms established in the previous contract of 1946. The oil tanker workers under Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) leadership launched a strike in opposition to the contract, but President Gallegos immediately issued a back-to-work order. The Communists subsequently established their own oil workers federation, the United Union Committee of Petroleum Workers* (CONSUTRAPET), although the decision to withdraw from FEDEPETROL was criticized by several important PCV labor leaders.

FEDEPETROL's president both in 1946–48 and in the 1960s was AD's Luis Tovar. Criticism by left-wing AD leaders of FEDEPETROL's 1960 contract on grounds that it failed to guarantee job security led to their withdrawal from the party and the formation of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). A bloody clash between AD and leftist oil workers in Lagunillas in September 1960 was followed by a struggle within FEDEPETROL in which parallel unions emerged in different locals. In October 1962 the leftists established their own Federation of Hydrocarbon Industry Workers* (FETRAHIDROCARBUROS).

The two AD representatives on FEDEPETROL's executive committee (Manuel Peñalver and Raúl Henríquez) resigned in protest against the minimal representation that their party received at FEDEPETROL's Fourth Congress in November 1969. Nevertheless, the executive committee of the Workers Confederation of Venezuela* (CTV) resolved the conflict by ordering Peñalver and Henríquez to reassume their positions. Throughout most of the 1970s, FEDEPETROL was controlled by a coalition of Electoral Movement of the People (MEP) and Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organization (COPEI) leaders under the presidency of MEP's Carlos Piñerua (who by the latter part of the decade returned to AD). Piñerua's hopes of retaining the presidency at FEDEPETROL's Eighth Congress in 1985 were dashed when AD chose Raúl Henríquez to run for the position. Henríquez pledged himself to maintaining a distance between FEDEPETROL and its financial institutions in order to guarantee their efficient operation.

Both FEDEPETROL and FETRAHIDROCARBUROS avidly supported the nationalization of the oil industry in 1976. FEDEPETROL promised that its previous policy of flexibility and special treatment toward the state-run Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation (founded in 1960) would now be applied to the nationalized industry. At the same time, the federation successfully demanded

that the new state company grant *estabilidad* (job security) and recognize all worker benefits which had been established in the current contract as well as by labor law.

Special company stores (*comisariatos*), where workers could purchase basic items, were recognized in the first FEDEPETROL contract in 1946. By 1983 there were twenty-two company stores in oil camps throughout the nation, with prices which had remained frozen over the years. In that year the state oil company attempted to increase prices and limit the use of the *comisariatos* to lower-level workers. This move was accepted by the AD and COPEI majority on FEDEPETROL's executive board but firmly opposed by the MEP adherents who, as a result, refused to sign the 1983 industry-wide contract. Since their abortive strike of May 1950, petroleum workers have lost much of their militance. Oil workers along with those in the iron industry enjoy higher wages and more attractive fringe benefits (such as access to the *comisariatos*) than their counterparts in other sectors. FEDEPETROL created the Savings and Federal Credit Corporation (Corporación de Ahorro y Crédito Fedepetrol—CACREF) in 1963 to provide credit for union members. CACREF set up the Petroleum Financial Corporation (Corporación Financiera Petrolera—COFIPECA) in 1974, which owns companies of various sizes.

FEDERATION OF SCHOOLTEACHERS. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE WORKERS. *See* Peasant Federation of Venezuela.

FEDERATION OF TEXTILE WORKERS (Federación de Trabajadores Textiles—FETRATEX).

Democratic Action (AD) labor leaders had the major input in negotiations over the six industry-wide contracts signed between 1959 and 1974 by textile workers' organizations. After 1974, however, the AD-dominated FETRATEX (which belongs to the Workers Confederation of Venezuela*) as well as its affiliate the Single Union of Textile Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda (SUTRATEX) lost its dominant position. Parallel unionism is particularly prevalent in the textile industry, and several key unions in the state of Aragua are independent of the nation's four confederations. This was the case of the unions in the important companies Texfin and Kuraven controlled by the Movement Toward Socialism (whose policy elsewhere after 1974 was to work within the Workers Confederation of Venezuela). After the abortive strike of 1980, which was led by leftists, FETRATEX began to recuperate. By 1983, AD held six of the eleven positions in the executive committee of FETRATEX. *See* Union of Textile Industry Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda.

FENADE. *See* National Employees Association.

FETRACADE. *See* Peasant Federation of Venezuela.

FETRACOMUNICACIONES. *See* Union Federation of Communications Workers of Venezuela.

FETRACONSTRUCCIÓN. *See* Federation of Construction Workers.

FETRAENSEÑANZA. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

FETRAHIDROCARBUROS. *See* Federation of Hydrocarbon Industry Workers.

FETRAMAGISTERIO. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

FETRAMETAL. *See* National Federation of Metalworkers.

FETRATEX. *See* Federation of Textile Workers.

FTC. *See* Federation of COPEI Workers.

FVM. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederación General de los Trabajadores—CGT).

A group of Social Christian trade unionists claimed that their election to the executive committee of the Federal District Affiliate of the Confederation of Autonomous Unions of Venezuela* (CODESA) at its Fifth Convention in January 1967 had been overridden by William Franco and other national CODESA leaders. These dissidents criticized CODESA's exclusive ties with the Copeyano Workers' Front (a grouping of key Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organization—COPEI labor leaders) in the form of the National Coordinating Committee of Christian Trade Unionists. They argued that in order to maintain a truly autonomous position, CODESA should seek alliances with all labor organizations, not just those associated with COPEI. CODESA, on the other hand, claimed that the dissidents were secretly aligned with the Democratic Action (AD) labor movement.

This dispute prompted the establishment in 1971 of the CGT. Both the CGT and CODESA have vied to gain official endorsement from the regional Christian Democratic labor organization, the Latin American Workers Central (Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores—CLAT). The two confederations heavily emphasize the ideological formation of their members. The CGT runs the Escuela Sindical Camilo Torres, a union school, and since 1979 has published a labor newspaper, *Labor Force* (*Fuerza Laboral*). The CGT's main influence rests with the food processing, banking, and construction centers in the central states of Carabobo and Aragua, and in the Federal District.

GENERAL UNION OF WORKERS (Unión General de Trabajadores—UGT).

A general workers organization set up in the early months of the government of López Contreras (1936–41), the General Union of Workers called for union autonomy vis-à-vis political parties. In 1936 articles frequently appeared in the conservative press supporting this apolitical approach and attacking the majority of labor unions which were closely linked to leftist parties. The UGT itself, however, developed ties with conservative groups, apparently in contradiction with the type of trade unionism that it was advocating. Government repression against organized labor was directed first against leftist unions in early 1937, but later included organizations not directly associated with the leftists. In March 1939 the governor of the Federal District abolished the UGT, ostensibly because at a recent assembly it had passed resolutions which incited class struggle.

INTER-UNION NATIONAL COMMAND (Comando Nacional Inter-Gremial).
*See Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.***NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT).**

The Pérez Jiménez government (1948–58) set up its own labor organization which in 1954 took the name National Confederation of Workers and affiliated with the Association of Latin American Unionized Workers (Asociación de Trabajadores Latinoamericanos Sindicalistas—ATLAS), the international labor organization established by the trade union movement controlled by Argentina's Juan Domingo Perón. In spite of government funds for the construction of a luxurious Trade Union House and other buildings, the CNT failed to generate significant support. The CNT was used by the Pérez Jiménez administration to collect signatures for petitions in favor of the government. In 1957 the Patriotic Junta's Workers' Front (Frente Obrero) demanded the dissolution of the CNT, which it claimed was directly run by the Ministry of Labor.

NATIONAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (Asociación Nacional de Empleados—ANDE).

This white-collar workers union played a leading role in the early development of the labor movement following the death of the dictator Juan Vicente Gómez (1935). ANDE in Caracas took the initiative in announcing the nation's first general strike on 14 February 1936 in opposition to the press censorship imposed by the governor of the Federal District. In December of the same year ANDE was instrumental in convoking the First National Workers' Congress which established a confederation of labor whose president was Alejandro Oropeza Castillo, ANDE's first head. The Congress raised two demands which ANDE had already succeeded in getting shopkeepers to implement: the "law of chairs," whereby employees were provided with sitting space, and "English Saturday," which limited Saturdays to half a work day.

ANDE was one of the first labor organizations to establish itself on a nation-

wide basis. In 1941 it was legally recognized in seven states including Portuguesa where only one other union existed. In Caracas, where ANDE took in state employees, it called for the promulgation of a law of public administration which would oblige the government to grant union recognition. ANDE's other stronghold was Zulia, where it organized telegraph employees as well as office workers in the oil industry.

ANDE in Zulia was outlawed following the 1950 oil workers strike. After the overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez government in 1958, the various ANDE organizations federated into the National Federation of Employees (*Federación Nacional de Empleados—FENADE*) and campaigned in favor of the five-day workweek. In mid-1959 the bank and insurance company employees in Caracas separated from ANDE and formed the Bank Workers Union (*Sindicato de Trabajadores Bancarios*) and the Union of Insurance Company Workers (*Sindicato de Trabajadores de Compañías de Seguros*). The presidents of ANDE and of the bank employees' union, José Marcano (who also had been president of ANDE in the 1940s) and Américo Chacón respectively, joined the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR); the insurance company employees' first head, Salom Mesa Espinoza, later became a leader in the Electoral Movement of the People (MEP). Several other ANDE officials have been prominent labor leaders, including Ramón Quijada, who was president of ANDE (1940–42) and later became a peasant leader, and Cesar Gil, who in the 1970s and 1980s belonged to the Workers Confederation of Venezuela* executive committee.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF EMPLOYEES. *See* National Employees Association.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF METALWORKERS (*Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Metalúrgicos—FETRAMETAL*).

This federation takes in the iron, steel, and aluminum workers unions of the Guayana region and automobile, rubber, and plastic workers unions of Valencia and Caracas. FETRAMETAL represented 12,000 workers upon its founding in March 1964 and by 1980 claimed 80,000 members.

One of the most important strikes in the post-1958 period broke out in June 1971 in the Guayana region among workers of the Guri Hydroelectric dam project, who were later joined by the iron workers of the Orinoco Mining Company (a subsidiary of U.S. Steel) and finally steelworkers in the state-owned Orinoco Steel Works (SIDOR). During the strike, Ciudad Guayana and its surroundings were virtually taken over by the armed forces while the Ministry of Communications prohibited local transmission of news regarding the conflict. The Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organization (COPEI) government declared the strike illegal while the COPEI–Democratic Action (AD) majority in the Workers Confederation of Venezuela* (CTV) refused to endorse the movement. In addition, AD took disciplinary measures against its labor leaders whose dismissal by the state firm Electrification of the Caroni (EDELCA)

had set off the walkout in Guri. The Electoral Movement of the People (MEP), on the other hand, threatened to leave the CTV and, along with the Movement Toward Socialism—MAS (product of a recent division in The Venezuelan Communist Party), played a leadership role in the strike. FETRAMETAL, led by MEP adherent José Mollegas, threatened to launch a general strike of its workers in the central region in support of the Guayana strikers. After the settlement FETRAMETAL protested that over 1,000 steelworkers were dismissed in reprisal for their participation in the strike, in spite of guarantees to the contrary by the Minister of Labor.

In May 1975 iron workers in Ciudad Piar called a wildcat strike which soon spread elsewhere in protest against the terms of the industry's nationalization, which threatened to deprive workers of accumulated benefits. At the time of nationalization, the unions representing workers at Ciudad Piar, Puerto Ordaz, Palua, and El Pao united to form the Single Union of Iron Workers* (SUTRA-HIERRO), which groups all iron workers in the state of Bolívar. AD labor leaders barely came in first in SUTRAHIERRO's election in 1977 and were closely trailed by rivals from MIR and MAS who together managed to control the union. The leftists pledged themselves to retention of the benefits of the commissary system, an issue which stirred much labor unrest.

Throughout the 1970s none of the political parties succeeded in maintaining a steady following among the steelworkers. Their union took the name Single Union of Steel Industry Workers* (SUTISS) in 1977 and by 1980 claimed 8,000 members, about half the number of SIDOR's work force.

By the end of the decade several miniscule leftist parties won union elections in SIDOR and other metallurgical firms in the area. Nevertheless, by the early 1980s they had failed to achieve any of their most important demands including the establishment of a forty-hour week, the implementation of a cost-of-living escalator clause, and the reduction in the duration of the three-year labor contracts. In SIDOR they activated the system of shop stewards, which for the most part has been nonfunctional in Venezuela. At the same time they attacked the larger political parties, including leftist ones, for placing partisan interests ahead of those of the workers.

FETRAMETAL, whose president José Mollegas returned to AD, and the CTV intervened in SUTISS and several other metallurgical unions by removing the elected leadership. In early 1982 Mollegas was publicly accused of accepting 2 million *bolívars* from SIDOR as a kickback for having signed a labor contract in the face of an impending strike. Mollegas claimed that the payment was intended to cover the union's negotiating expenses.

NATIONAL PEASANT FEDERATION (Federación Nacional Campesina). *See* Confederation of Autonomous Unions of Venezuela.

PEASANT FEDERATION OF VENEZUELA (Federación Campesina de Venezuela—FCV).

Although several peasant leagues were constituted in the late 1930s in the central states of Carabobo and Aragua, the massive organization of peasants got underway in the 1945–48 period. The Peasant Federation of Venezuela was established in November 1947 under the presidency of Ramón Quijada and completely dominated by Democratic Action (AD). Nevertheless, its founding document, in calling for the emancipation of the peasantry through the socialization of agriculture, was to the left of AD's militant rhetoric.

After 1958 Quijada again became president of the reconstituted FCV. Quijada criticized the Agrarian Reform of 1960 for attempting to implant large-scale capitalist agriculture instead of dividing up large estates among the peasants. Quijada also demanded a role for the FCV in the implementation of the reform. In subsequent months Quijada claimed that the government had exaggerated the amount of property received by the peasants under the reform, and that the bulk of distributed land had formerly been state owned rather than private holdings.

These criticisms of official policy soon led to Quijada's separation from AD and the division of the FCV. Quijada joined the left in calling for a boycott of the Workers Confederation of Venezuela's* (CTV) Fourth Congress in December 1961 which was convoked in order to expel Venezuelan Communist Party and Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) trade unionists. A majority of one on the federation's executive committee supported Quijada whereas the minority, led by Armando González, split off and established a parallel FCV. Government credit was channeled through González' group, helping it to consolidate power and eliminate its rival.

The Electoral Movement of the People (MEP) and AD vied for control of the FCV in the late 1960s, and in 1969 MEP threatened to withdraw from the federation on grounds that the AD leadership in several state affiliates refused to call elections. AD clearly reemerged as the dominant force in the FCV at its convention in April 1975 with an overwhelming majority of delegates. Ten years later AD decided to replace Armando González as FCV president in the face of accusations against him for mismanagement of the federation's financial resources.

The FCV claims that its membership constitutes 45 percent of the CTV's rank and file, although the federation receives only about 10–15 percent representation at the CTV national congresses. A large bloc of wage earners employed in the sugar industry decided not to join the reconstituted FCV after 1958 and instead formed the Federation of Sugarcane Workers (Federación de Trabajadores de la Caña de Azúcar—FETRACADE). FETRACADE negotiates two nationwide contracts, one for fieldworkers and the other for workers in the state and private sugar refineries (of which ten are state-owned) and alcoholic distilleries.

The FCV has been primarily interested in the implementation of the agrarian reform, which it claims has still not achieved its stated goal of providing enough land, credit, and facilities to the peasants to substantially increase production.

Two breakthroughs for the FCV were the decree of March 1969, which granted agricultural workers certain rights enjoyed by urban workers, and that of President Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974–79), which absolved peasants of outstanding debts to the public sector.

More than any other labor federation, the FCV depends on government paternalism. Critics of the FCV claim that it has developed inordinately close ties with the government and that many federation employees hold positions in the National Agrarian Institute (Instituto Agrario Nacional—IAN) and other public agencies dealing with agriculture.

In 1964 the FCV received government financial backing to establish the Peasant Supplies Company (Suministros Campesinos C.A.—SUCAM), which imports and repairs agricultural machinery. An agreement between the FCV and government-lending agencies provides for credit to peasants for the purchase of SUCAM equipment. The FCV claims that SUCAM sales help to stabilize prices of agriculture machinery in the national market. Since 1964 the FCV has constituted other companies including the Peasant Industries Company (Industrias Campesinas S.A.—INDUCAM), which operates a rice threshing plant. An agreement with the government's Agricultural and Husbandry Bank (Banco Agrícola y Pecuário) provided an automatic deduction of 2 percent on loans to farmers to be turned over to the FCV, although due to the subsequent increase in government credit outlay the percentage was reduced to 1 percent in 1975.

PROFESSORS GUILD. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

SINDICATO DE FUNCIONARIOS PÚBLICOS DEL MINISTERIO DE EDUCACIÓN (Union of Public Functionaries of the Ministry of Education). *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

SINDICATO DE LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL DISTRITO FEDERAL Y ESTADO MIRANDA (Construction Union of the Federal District and State of Miranda). *See* Federation of Construction Workers.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES BANCARIOS (Bank Workers Union). *See* National Employees Association.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE COMPAÑÍAS DE SEGUROS (Union of Insurance Company Workers). *See* National Employees Association.

SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES ORGANIZADOS DEL PETRÓLEO. *See* Union of Organized Petroleum Workers.

SINDICATO ÚNICO DE TRABAJADORES BANCARIOS DEL DISTRITO FEDERAL Y ESTADO MIRANDA. *See* Single Union of Bank Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda.

SINDICATO ÚNICO DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA SIDERÚRGICA. *See* Single Union of Steel Industry Workers.

SINDICATO ÚNICO DE TRABAJADORES DEL HIERRO. *See* Single Union of Iron Workers.

SINDICATO ÚNICO DE TRABAJADORES TEXTILES DEL DISTRITO FEDERAL Y ESTADO MIRANDA (Single Union of Textile Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda). *See* Federation of Textile Workers, and Union of Textile Industry Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda.

SINGLE TEXTILE UNION OF THE STATE OF ARAGUA. *See* Union of Textile Industry Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda.

SINGLE UNION OF BANK WORKERS OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT AND STATE OF MIRANDA (Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores Bancarios del Distrito Federal y Estado Miranda—SUTRABANC).

Created by the National Employees Union* (ANDE) of Caracas in April 1959 as a separate organization of bank employees, this union had as its president Américo Chacón, a veteran trade unionist who had represented ANDE in the newspaper *Panorama* in Maracaibo in 1936 and subsequently had been elected president of ANDE on two occasions in Zulia.

In 1960 Chacón joined the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (though he later helped found the Popular Democratic Force, which rejected the armed struggle). In November 1960 the police broke into SUTRABANC headquarters and arrested numerous union members. At the same time nonleftists formed parallel unions which to this day are represented in the Workers Confederation of Venezuela* by the National Federation of Bank Workers of Venezuela (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Bancarios de Venezuela—FETRABANCA). SUTRABANC, on the other hand, belongs to the Unitary Center Workers of Venezuela,* of which Chacón was for a long time vice president. SUTRABANC has helped establish over ten other bank employees unions with the aim of creating a nationwide federation. In 1983 SUTRABANC led a group of a dozen unions in threatening to call a general strike to protest possible mass layoffs without due benefits as a result of the closing of one of the nation's largest banks, the National Discount Bank (Banco Nacional de Descuento).

After its founding SUTRABANC carried out a campaign in favor of eliminating the lengthy midday lunch break and negotiating a single industry-wide contract. SUTRABANC has also made a public call in favor of direct elections of labor confederation officers in order to reduce political party influence.

SINGLE UNION OF IRON WORKERS (Sindicato Único de Trabajadores del Hierro—SUTRAHIERRO).

One of the most important worker gains in the iron industry was the estab-

lishment of commissaries in the early 1960s in Puerto Ordaz and Ciudad Piar. For many years individual mining areas were organized into different unions, with strong rivalry prevailing among them. At the time of the nationalization of iron in 1975 the three unions of the Venezuelan subsidiary of the U.S. Steel Corporation and two of the Bethlehem Steel Subsidiary united to form SUTRAHIERRO. The government's offer of a special bonus to compensate for elimination of commissary benefits provoked worker protests. Labor unrest, prodded by small parties of the far left, has not been easily contained or channeled by either Democratic Action (AD) or the main leftist parties. Thus, for instance, workers at El Piar, where the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) controlled the union local, carried out mini-wildcat strikes and slowdowns to force the union leadership to reveal progress over negotiations for the 1977 contract. Nevertheless, throughout the years AD has maintained control of the iron workers union, but other unions in the Guayana region have been taken over by leftist groups. SUTRAHIERRO belongs to the National Federation of Metal Workers* (FETRAMETAL), which in turn is affiliated with the Workers Confederation of Venezuela.*

SINGLE UNION OF STEEL INDUSTRY WORKERS (Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Industria Siderúrgica—SUTISS).

The Association of Workers of the Metal Industry (Asociación de la Industria Siderúrgica y sus Similares—ATISS) changed its name to the Single Union of Workers of the Metal Industry (SUTISS) in 1977 at the time that its parent organization, the Democratic Action (AD)—controlled National Federation of Metal Workers* (FETRAMETAL), had temporarily stepped in to run the union. The federation's intervention was allegedly aimed at drawing up new statutes in order to democratize the organization. In 1980 a coalition of four small parties of the far left headed by Andrés Velásquez won an overwhelming majority of votes in elections in this important union which represents workers at the Orinoco Steel Works (SIDOR). Not only did the Democratic Action slate pull in a small percentage of votes, but the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) contingent (which had controlled the ATISS presidency at the time of the abortive steelworkers' strike of 1971) was practically decimated. Andrés Velásquez (who would later be postulated candidate by his party, the Causa R, for the 1983 presidential elections) had received much publicity as a result of his successful struggle to force SIDOR to rehire him on grounds that he had been unjustifiably laid off. Once elected, however, the slate members failed to remain united. Thus Velásquez was criticized by his associates for agreeing to carry out collective bargaining in Caracas, instead of locally in Ciudad Guayana, as had been done in the iron industry. The union heads adhered to their promise of demanding the reduction of the workweek to forty hours. Indeed, their position on this issue was criticized by other trade unionists, even leftist ones, as inflexible given the obvious room for compromise. FETRAMETAL broke the impasse by again stepping in and replacing the executive committee with its own appointees and

signing a contract with SIDOR which, though representing a substantial improvement over the previous one, did not alter the workweek.

SINGLE UNION OF TEXTILE WORKERS OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT AND STATE OF MIRANDA. *See* Federation of Textile Workers and Union of Textile Industry Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda.

SOCIEDAD VENEZOLANA DE MAESTROS DE INSTRUCCIÓN PRIMARIA. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

STOP. *See* Union of Organized Petroleum Workers.

SUTISS. *See* Single Union of Steel Industry Workers.

SUTRABANC. *See* Single Union of Bank Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda.

SUTRAHIERRO. *See* Single Union of Iron Workers.

SUTRATEX. *See* Federation of Textile Workers and Union of Textile Industry Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda.

SVMIP. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

TEACHERS' FEDERATION. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

UGT. *See* General Union of Workers.

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA TEXTIL DE DISTRITO FEDERAL Y ESTADO MIRANDA. *See* Union of Textile Industry Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda.

UNION FEDERATION OF COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF VENEZUELA (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores de Comunicaciones de Venezuela—FETRACOMUNICACIONES).

At the time of the signing of its first contract in 1964, this federation grouped blue-collar workers of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. In 1978 the postal and telegraph service was separated from the ministry and assigned autonomous status in the Telegraphic Postal Institute (Instituto Postal Telegráfico—IPOSTEL). The Institute's white-collar workers, who as ministry employees had been subject to the Law of Administrative Career with its prohibition of union activity, were now allowed to join FETRACOMUNICACIONES. The federation currently signs four separate contracts covering the following groups: blue-collar workers of the ministry; IPOSTEL employees;

employees of the Autonomous Institute of the Simón Bolívar International Airport, which runs the nation's main airport at Maiquetía; employees of the airlines Aeropostal and Avensa at the other airports throughout the nation.

At the federation's fourth convention at San Cristóbal in March 1975, Milton Carrero of Democratic Action (AD) was reelected president for a third term despite objections by fellow AD delegates who initially threatened to support a slate consisting of Electoral Movement of the People (MEP) and Republican Democratic Union (URD) trade unionists. A similar controversy arose at the next convention in 1980 in Porlamar, where the federation's secretary-general opposed Carrero. In both instances AD's Union Bureau intervened in favor of Carrero; the latter case resulted in the removal of the secretary-general. By the early 1980s all members of the seventeen-man executive committee, with the exception of six followers of the Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organization (COPEI), were AD members. COPEI controlled the Maiquetía airport union (where the Movement of the Revolutionary Left also enjoyed considerable support) as well as a handful of FETRACOMUNICACIONES state-wide unions.

In the early 1980s FETRACOMUNICACIONES threatened on several occasions to call a strike of 30,000 communication workers to prevent mass layoffs which would have resulted from a reorganization of IPOSTEL. In addition, the federation claimed that IPOSTEL lacked sufficient funds to pay for certain fringe benefits stipulated in the contract such as the worker savings program (*caja de ahorro*).

UNIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES. *See* General Union of Workers.

UNION OF INSURANCE COMPANY WORKERS. *See* National Employees Association.

UNION OF ORGANIZED PETROLEUM WORKERS (Sindicato de Trabajadores Organizados del Petróleo—STOP).

Organized by Copeyano (adherents to the Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organization—COPEI) trade unionists in several oil towns in Falcón, Zulia, and the eastern region of Venezuela in the late 1940s, this union was one of the few nongovernment labor organizations which were tolerated by the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship (1948–58), though their offices on various occasions were violently broken into. Francisco Urquía Lugo and other STOP leaders attended international labor conferences in 1954 and 1955 where they denounced government repression of the labor movement in Venezuela.

UNION OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONARIES OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

UNION OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY WORKERS OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT AND STATE OF MIRANDA (Unión de Trabajadores de la Industria Textil de Distrito Federal y Estado Miranda—UTIT).

During the 1970s a number of leftist parties and groups made inroads in different textile unions, some of which, like the Single Textile Union of the State of Aragua (Sindicato Unico Textil del Estado Aragua) were unaffiliated with any national confederation. At the same time, the Democratic Action (AD)—controlled Federation of Textile Workers* (FETRATEX), which belonged to the Workers Confederation of Venezuela* (CTV), lost its dominant position in the textile workers movement. FETRATEX's most important union, the Single Union of Textile Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda (Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores Textiles del Distrito Federal y Estado Miranda—SUTRATEX), was displaced in the federal district in a number of important firms by UTIT, which had a distinctly leftist orientation. UTIT helped promote the United Union Front of Textile Workers (Frente Sindical Unido de Trabajadores Textiles), originally established in February 1972, which grouped all unions in the industry and which was criticized by far-left trade unionists for taking in the pro-AD FETRATEX.

UTIT played a key role in the textile workers strike in August–September 1980, one of the most important in the post-1958 period. The striking unions demanded the rehiring of workers who had been recently laid off in the industry. The CTV at first declared the strike illegal, but in the second month of the conflict the confederation's textile affiliate, FETRATEX, sanctioned the stoppage on the basis that the waiting period established by law had expired. The leftist Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) also at first considered the strike inopportune since a majority of workers had not been sufficiently prepared. The United Union Front of Textile Workers opposed arbitration as a means to resolve the dispute which was governed by Decree 440. During the latter part of September a contract was signed, although the problem of layoffs remained unsolved.

Following the strike, UTIT led various worker takeovers of the Caracas firm Hilanderías Venezolanas, which was at the point of bankruptcy due to debts owed to several public financial institutions as well as to UTIT-administered worker programs. UTIT called for the creation of a new company owned by the creditors and run by the workers.

An assorted group of leftists known as the class tendency (*tendencia clasista*), which emphasized rank and file participation in union affairs, headed UTIT at the time of the 1980 strike, and also played an influential role in SUT in Maracay. As a result of the strike's failure, however, the *tendencia* lost its influence among textile workers while the AD-controlled FETRATEX reestablished its position as the most important labor organization in the industry.

UTIT is affiliated with the pro-communist Unitary Center of Workers of Venezuela.* See Federation of Textile Workers.

UNITARY CENTER OF WORKERS OF VENEZUELA (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Venezuela—CUTV).

The Workers Confederation of Venezuela's* (CTV) Fourth Congress was convoked for December 1961, one year prior to the date for which it had originally been set, in order to remove followers of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) from the confederation's leadership. The leftists boycotted the meeting, after which two separate confederations emerged. The leftists claimed that their opposition to wage cuts for public employees (known as the "law of hunger") was a principle cause for their expulsion. The leftist confederation, known as the "Non-Official" CTV, changed its name to the CUTV at its convention in March 1963 where far-reaching demands were raised including the nationalization of the oil industry. Shortly thereafter, Republican Democratic Union (URD) labor leaders, who had left the CTV with the followers of the PCV and MIR, returned to the CTV fold, while left-leaning URD adherents, including CUTV president Horácio Scott Power, were expelled from their party.

The CUTV and its precursor, the "Non-Official" CTV, supported the insurgent leftist parties and frequently protested against government repression. In January 1962 the "Non-Official" CTV called for a general strike in solidarity with a strike of taxi drivers in San Cristobal, a movement which the leftists tried to transform into an insurrection. The CUTV's commitment to the guerrilla struggle, which occasionally reached the extreme of converting union headquarters into arms depots, severely reduced its support. According to its own statistics, the CUTV represented 180,000 workers in 1983 as opposed to 246,000 at its first convention.

In the late 1960s, some communist labor leaders (such as Eloy Torres and Jesús Urbieto) criticized the CUTV for not making greater efforts to reach a unity agreement with the CTV. These labor leaders joined the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) which split off from the PCV in January 1971. At first MAS trade unionists joined those of the MIR in separating from the CUTV and setting up a rival confederation. In 1974, however, MAS reversed its policy and ordered the unions under its control to enter the CTV.

Since its founding, the CUTV has been identified with the PCV and belongs to the pro-communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). CUTV trade unionists frequently attend seminars and training courses sponsored by the WFTU affiliate in Cuba. After a lengthy period of occupying the CUTV presidency, PCV adherent Cruz Villegas along with Scott Power (who had belonged to a dissident communist group in the 1940s) was replaced by fellow party member Hemmy Croes.

Among the few CUTV unions which still enjoy some influence are the Single Union of Bank Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda,* led by CUTV vice president Américo Chacón; textile workers unions (grouped in the Association of Textile Workers), which are traditional leftist strongholds located in Caracas, Valencia, and Maracay; the National Federation of Press Workers

(Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Imprenta—FENATI), one of whose leaders, Martín J. Ramírez, is an old-time PCV member. In 1982 the secretary-general of the FENATI's central region affiliate (the Professional Union of Typographical Workers, Sindicato Profesional de Trabajadores Tipográficos which publishes the newspaper *Vocero*) attempted to break away from the CUTV in order to promote the unity of labor organizations of different ideological tendencies. The move, however, was opposed by other members of the union's executive committee.

UNITED UNION COMMITTEE OF PETROLEUM WORKERS (Comité Sindical Unitario de Trabajadores del Petróleo—COSUTRAPET).

The Communist members of the executive committee of the Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela* (FEDEPETROL) openly criticized the federation's second contract in 1948 on grounds that its three-year duration was excessive and that it failed to guarantee job security (*estabilidad*). The federation's majority accused the Communists of breach of union discipline and expelled them from the executive committee. The Venezuelan Communist Party responded by withdrawing all its members from the federation and setting up a rival organization, the United Union Committee of Petroleum Workers, CONSUTRAPET. In June 1948 CONSUTRAPET called a strike of its oil tanker workers, but a presidential decree terminated the conflict and applied the FEDEPETROL contract to workers in this sector as well. At the Communist Party's Second Congress in August 1948, labor leaders Eloy Torres and Francisco Arrieti criticized the Party for withdrawing from FEDEPETROL. CONSUTRAPET was outlawed as a result of its role in the oil workers strike in May 1950.

UTIT. *See* Union of Textile Industry Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda.

VENEZUELAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (Federación Venezolana de Maestros—FVM).

Embracing both elementary and high school teachers, this federation is the largest of several educator organizations. In January 1932 teachers formed the Venezuelan Society of Primary School Teachers (Sociedad Venezolana de Maestros de Instrucción Primaria—SVMIP), which served as a center for anti-Gómez (Juan Vicente Gómez, dictator from 1908 to 1935) meetings.

One of SVMIP's founders, Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa, was named president of the Venezuelan Federation of Teachers at its first convention in August 1936. The FVM advocated the abolition of the separate primary and secondary school structures and their replacement by one continuous "unified" school, a concept which was later embodied in the Law of Education of 1948. At its founding, the FVM also elaborated a "List of sanitary school buildings and recreation parks"; at the same time the federation called for appointments to administrative posts in the field of education without regard to political loyalties. In various

articles in *Ahora* (subsequently published in 1938 in the pamphlet "Teachers as Political Eunuchs") Prieto denounced the order from Minister of Education Rómulo Gallegos on 7 May 1936 prohibiting teachers from engaging in political activity.

One delegate at the 1946 convention proposed that the FVM convert itself into a union movement to raise bread-and-butter demands and, if necessary, call strikes. The idea received backing from a handful of Communist delegates at the subsequent FVM conventions of 1947 and 1948. As a result of a walkout of democratic educators at the FVM's fifteenth convention in Trujillo in 1950, the federation was left in the hands of supporters of the Pérez Jiménez regime (1948–58).

Following the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez in 1958, the issue of unionization was thoroughly debated at the federation's annual convention. Some delegates favored the immediate establishment of unions whereas others proposed that such a move await the enactment of federal legislation granting public employees the right to unionize. In 1966 the FVM began sending official delegations to CTV congresses. During the 1960s Democratic Action (AD) urged the FVM and the Professors' Guild (Colegio de Profesores, founded in 1943), which had been hostile to church-run schools, to tone down their anti-clericalism.

The FVM and other educator organizations, supported by the Workers Federation of Venezuela* (CTV), the Unitary Center of Workers of Venezuela* (CUTV), and the Confederation of Autonomous Unions of Venezuela* (CODESA), launched a national strike in 1969 which lasted thirteen days and resulted in a substantial wage increase, the first such raise for teachers and other public employees since the beginning of the decade. Other FVM demands included job security and a graduated decrease in the number of students per classroom to an eventual maximum of thirty.

Article 86 of the Law of Education of 1980 finally applied the Labor Law to teachers, thus recognizing their right to form unions and to strike. The collective agreements signed by teachers organizations and the Ministry of Education, which up until then had been mere "gentlemen's agreements," were made legally binding by the 1980 law. As a result, the FVM established unions known as United Teachers' Unions (Sindicatos Unitarios del Magisterio) which, in turn, affiliated with the Teachers' Federation (Federación de Trabajadores del Magisterio—FETRAMAGISTERIO). The Professors Guild, which by the early 1980s was controlled by the Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organization (COPEI) is limited to high school teachers who are graduates of pedagogic institutes or their equivalents. On several occasions, COPEI-affiliated educators have formed parallel organizations, for example the National Federation of Skilled and Technical Workers (Federación Nacional de Peritos y Técnicos).

Teachers allied with Democratic Action (AD), having lost control of the FVM to the Electoral Movement of the People (MEP), set up the Union of Public Functionaries of the Ministry of Education (Sindicato de Funcionarios Públicos del Ministerio de Educación). In 1981 it became the Federation of School Teach-

ers (Federación de Trabajadores de la Enseñanza—FETRAENSENANZA) an organization whose statutes embody the goal of establishing a single federation embracing all teachers.

Shortly after COPEI assumed power in 1979, the Ministry of Education drew up a voting list for the FVM elections which MEP adherents felt was designed to detract from their support. COPEI teachers insisted on the authenticity of the list and held separate elections in July 1979, thus setting off a division in which both organizations retained the FVM title. One FVM, consisting of COPEI and Republican Democratic Union (URD) teachers, received the checkoff dues collected by the Ministry of Education. Its president was Carlos Andueza (of COPEI); its vice president was Alfredo Cabrera, a non-COPEI teachers leader who strongly attacked the Workers Confederation of Venezuela for replacing individual federations in the collective bargaining process. The other FVM, headed by MEP follower Isaac Olivera and backed by AD and other parties, was denominated "FVM-CTV" since it was recognized by the CTV and represented at its 1980 Congress. The two FVMs struggled to retain control of federation headquarters, but later both agreed to abandon the building. Both federations also laid claim to the 18 million *bolivares* which was deposited in the Workers Bank (Banco de los Trabajadores) in the name of the FVM, a dispute which went to the courts.

In 1982 the two FVMS drew up separate preliminary contracts for negotiation with the Ministry of Education, but the CTV convinced both organizations to fuse the proposals. In 1983 a strike delayed commencement of the school year by several weeks. The struggle was led by the Inter-Union National Command (Comando Nacional Inter-Gremial) which grouped all teacher organizations including the COPEI-led FVM (which nevertheless refused to endorse the walkout). The strike forced the polemical Minister of Education, Felipe Montilla, to grant a wage increase and suspend punitive measures against individual strikers, while both sides agreed to negotiate a new contract.

The FVM has occasionally criticized the administration of the Institute of Social Assistance and Provision for Personnel (Instituto de Previsión y Asistencia Social para el Personal del Ministerio de Educación—IPASME) for mismanaging the teachers' savings fund (*caja de ahorro*). After an extended strike of IPASME medical employees in 1982, the FVM led by Olivera called for the institute's restructuring.

VENEZUELAN SOCIETY OF PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

WORKERS CONFEDERATION OF VENEZUELA (Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela—CTV).

Labor conferences held in December 1936, April 1938, and March 1944 attempted to launch a national confederation, but this goal did not come to fruition until November 1947 with the creation of the CTV. Unity in the labor

movement between 1959 and 1960 reflected the general spirit of inter-party unity in the face of right-wing threats to the nation's fledgling democracy. The winner-take-all norm for union elections which prevailed during the *trienio* of 1945-48 (a period of dominance by Democratic Action-AD) was replaced by a system of proportional representation (which is still in effect) whereby losing slates are represented in the executive committee of unions, federations, and the CTV itself.

In November 1959 the Third Workers Congress reestablished the CTV under the presidency of Democratic Action's José González Navarro and the vice presidency of the Venezuelan Communist Party's (PCV) Martín J. Ramírez. In order to promote labor unity, the Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organization (COPEI) and the Republican Democratic Union were given greater representation in the CTV's direction than was warranted by their modest labor strength. The polarization between an increasingly insurgent leftist opposition and a government which did not hesitate to use force against street protests reflected itself in the labor movement. CTV president González Navarro recommended disciplinary measures against top PCV and Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) leaders on grounds that in pushing for radical demands they had attempted to discredit moderate trade unionists. The leftists were expelled from the CTV leadership at the Fourth Congress in December 1961, a move which was repeated in federations and union locals. AD's control of the CTV was threatened in 1967 when González Navarro and a large number of other labor leaders left the party to join the Electoral Movement of the People (MEP). In the aftermath of the split, AD set up unions to rival those labor organizations which were controlled by MEP adherents.

AD maintained a position of hardened opposition to the COPEI government of Rafael Caldera during his first year in office in 1969 and supported a number of important strikes, including that of the public school teachers. Major labor confrontations occurred also in 1970, including those of the textile workers and workers at the Ford assembly plant. The number of conflicts during the Caldera term by far surpassed the number in previous years, and reached 254 strikes in 1974, all but 4 of which were declared illegal. Nevertheless, by the 1970 CTV Congress AD united with COPEI by forming a ticket which ran against moderate leftists belonging to MEP and URD (and in so doing departed from normal practice whereby all parties agree to a single slate for the confederation's executive committee).

By the mid-1970s González Navarro and other prominent MEP followers (including future CTV president Juan José Delpino) had returned to AD, thus helping it to regain its influence in organized labor. This recuperation was evident at the Seventh CTV Congress in 1975 where AD delegate strength rose to 52 percent, from 34 percent at the previous Congress in 1970. At the time of the 1975 Congress, Aders Carlos Lima and Ismario González, presidents of the graphic arts and health workers federations, criticized the CTV "establishment" for being dominated by older leaders. Luna's bid for the presidency of the CTV

(though enjoying support from the influential Hugo Soto Socorro, AD's secretary-general in Zulia) was overwhelmingly defeated by old-timer José Vargas, who remained president until his death in 1983.

Both Luna and Ismarío González along with peasant leader Armando González were aligned with President Carlos Andrés Pérez, while the overwhelming majority of the CTV heads identified with AD's historic leader Rómulo Betancourt. At the same time COPEI followers in the CTV generally supported Caldera in internal party disputes. Another important rift in both the CTV and individual federations separated labor leaders in Caracas from those of the interior who complained of having secondary status. Several of the announced candidates for the CTV presidency in 1985 purportedly represented the provincial leaders.

The backbone of AD support in the labor movement lies in the powerful Peasant Federation of Venezuela* as well as in worker organizations in those states with traditional economies which depend heavily on government spending. On the other hand, in the industrial and extractive regions of the center states, Zulia and Guayana, AD's strength is less pronounced. At the time of the 1985 CTV Congress, AD made further inroads when the party captured control of the CTV state federations of Lara (which it previously had lost to MEP), and Trujillo and Mérida (both of which had been presided over by an alliance of MEP and COPEI). AD, as the dominant party in the CTV, controls the key departments of finance and international affairs as well as the presidency.

Since the late 1960s the CTV, the Unitary Center of Workers of Venezuela* (CUTV), and the Confederation of Autonomous Unions of Venezuela* (CODESA) have usually marched together on May Day parades and are in agreement, at least in theory, as to the desirability of an eventual fusion. The CTV opposes a merger from above whereby CUTV and CODESA leaders are placed on the CTV executive committee without taking part in a prior electoral process. The CTV leadership, however, has allowed various parties (although not the PCV) with minimum representation in the confederation's 1975 and 1980 congresses to hold executive positions. (Posts in the CTV, as well as in the industrial and regional federations, are chosen indirectly at conventions.) The CTV continues to recognize more than one federation in the oil industry, in the field of education, and elsewhere.

The CTV is internationally minded and usually sends large delegations to meetings of the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the International Labor Organization (ILO). CTV leader Malavé Villalba was a founding member of the ICFTU in London in 1949. Due to the repressive atmosphere in other Latin American nations in the 1970s the CTV played a particularly important role in the hemispheric labor movement, as illustrated by the numerous international trade union conferences held in Venezuela.

The CTV in recent years has urged professionals to unionize at their place of work, though this call has not met an active response. The CTV would have

industrial, technical, and professional workers belong to the same industry-wide unions, without abolishing the professional organizations which presently represent the more educated workers (who often are lumped into the category of "confidential employees" and are thus denied the right to organize).

As a result of the Labor Representation Law (*Ley de Representación Laboral*), passed under the presidency of Raúl Leoni in 1966, CTV unions have enjoyed the right of representation on the board of directors of state-controlled enterprises and government institutes. At its 1980 congress the CTV called for "workers participation" (*cogestión*) in all companies. This concept is designed to go beyond mere representation at the top by giving workers direct input into decision making, although the CTV considers "workers control" (*autogestión*) unrealizable in the foreseeable future. The 1980 document, known as the *Manifiesto de Porlamar*, also called for the institutionalization of labor participation at the municipal and community levels.

The CTV founded the Venezuelan Workers Bank (*Banco de los Trabajadores de Venezuela—BTV*) in 1968, for which it received a loan from the AFL-CIO for 27 million *bolívars*. In the same year the government deposited workers' social security savings in the BTV, thus helping it to become one of the largest banks in the nation. Although the BTV (along with the government) made a substantial contribution to the CTV for the construction of its headquarters, the bank's policy was not to extend preferential treatment to union members. At its 1970 congress the CTV offered to invest BTV money to help create national companies in the crucial sectors of iron and petroleum.

Augusto Malavé Villalba, who was secretary-general of the CTV in 1947–48 and again in the 1960s, was president of the BTV until his death in 1977. CTV affiliate federations (particularly those in the oil, graphic arts, construction, beverage, and agricultural sectors) were important stockholders in the BTV, along with several CTV-controlled holding companies. In 1982 the federal government closed the BTV and accused its president, Eleazar Pinto (a former AD national deputy), of unethical dealings. Although the CTV vigorously called on the succeeding administration of President Jaime Lusinchi to rescue the BTV and reopen the bank, the confederation refused to officially defend Pinto, who was sentenced to several years in jail.

Appendix 1

International Labor Organizations _____

Profound ideological cleavages have obstructed organizational unity in the Latin American labor movement. To a large extent, these differing orientations have reflected formal European political philosophies, for example, socialism, anarchism, syndicalism, communism, and Christian socialism. National and regional Latin American labor organizations long have drawn inspiration from and affiliated with European-based international bodies reflecting these varied orientations; for example, International Federation of Trade Unions* (IFTU, socialist), Red International of Labor Unions* (RILU or Profintern, communist), and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions* (IFCTU). United States interest in Latin American labor issues, increasingly important from the early decades of the twentieth century, saw the creation of the Pan American Federation of Labor* (PAFL) as a vehicle for promoting U.S.-style trade unionism.

In the post-World War II era, competition between East and West added an additional disruptive factor, as Latin American labor became seen as a theater for Cold War rivalries. Attempts to develop an independent regional Latin American labor movement typically have foundered on the unacceptability of such movements to the United States, which since the middle and late nineteenth century has been the most important external factor in Latin American affairs. Working through the American Federation of Labor and such special organizations as the American Institute for Free Labor Development,* the United States has attempted to develop a non-revolutionary Latin American labor movement that would follow the business union orientation of the American system. The most powerful regional Latin American labor group, the Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers* (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT), also has reflected the dominance of U.S. funding and economic and political influence throughout the area. As a result, unions seeking to alter

the status quo have derided ORIT as an agent for U.S. policy and have attempted to form their own international groupings. Typically these regionals have affiliated with socialist or communist internationals, which again have reduced their autonomy or rendered them vulnerable to claims of representing non-hemispheric interests.

The formative power of the socialist-capitalist and East-West conflict has motivated a search for an alternative, a path that would not force labor organizations into either the communist or capitalist orbit. An early example of a "third way" appeared with Argentine dictator Juan Perón's attempt to establish the Grouping of Latin American Syndicalist Workers* (*Agrupación de Trabajadores Latinoamericanos Sindicalistas—ATLAS*). Perón's ouster in 1955 signaled the demise of this organization. More recently, the rise of Liberation Theology and the new importance of a social mission within the Catholic Church has sparked the development of another "Third Approach," that represented by the Latin American Workers Central* (*Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores—CLAT*), which rivals both the ORIT and the Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin American Workers* (*Congreso Permanente de Unidad Sindical de los Trabajadores de América Latina—CPUSTAL*), which is affiliated with the largely communist-dominated World Federation of Trades Unions.* Nonetheless, given the organizational weaknesses besetting the majority of Latin America's national labor movements and the degree to which national governments—whether through repression or cooptation—control its major organizations, as well as the generally dependent position of Latin America within the global economy and international division of labor, the possibilities for authentic and independent regional Latin American Labor organizations remain highly circumscribed.

Bibliography

- Alexander, Robert J. *Organized Labor in Latin America*. New York: The Free Press, 1965.
- Busch, Gary K. *The Political Role of International Trades Unions*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.
- Coldrick, A. P. and Philip Jones. *International Directory of the Trade Union Movement*. New York: Facts on File, 1979.
- Form, William H. and Albert A. Blum, eds. *Industrial Relations and Social Change in Latin America*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1965.
- Lorwin, Lewis L. *The International Labor Movement, History, Policies, Outlook*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953.
- Snow, Sinclair. *The Pan-American Federation of Labor*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1964.
- Sturmthal, Adolf. *Comparative Labor Movements. Ideological Roots and Institutional Development*. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishers, 1972.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ACAT. *See* American Continental Association of Workers.

AGRUPACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES LATINOAMERICANOS SINDICALISTAS. *See* Grouping of Latin American Syndicalist Workers.

AMERICAN CONTINENTAL ASSOCIATION OF WORKERS (Asociación Continental Americana de Trabajadores—ACAT).

A first attempt in 1919 by anarchists to create a continent-wide federation of unions under this name was quickly defeated by government repression. Ten years later, bolstered in part by the recent establishing of the International Working Men's Association,* the ACAT brought together unions of an anarcho-syndicalist orientation. With headquarters in Argentina, it had affiliates in Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, and several of the smaller Latin American nations. By this time, anarchosyndicalism had declined greatly in strength throughout Latin America, a concomitant of the growing power of communism. The ACAT disappeared around 1950.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT—AIFLD (Instituto Americano para el Desarrollo del Sindicalismo Libre—IADSL).

Organized in 1962 by the administration of John F. Kennedy as a means of increasing United States presence in Latin America and combatting what was perceived as an international communist conspiracy that was subverting labor organizations in the region, the AIFLD enjoyed support from the U.S. government, the AFL–CIO, and American business. AFL–CIO President George Meany was its first president, while J. Peter Grace, head of W. R. Grace & Co. (a major owner of shipping companies, sugar plantations, and other business investments in Latin America), served as Chairman of its Board of Directors, which also included representatives from Anaconda Copper, Pan American Airways, and the Rockefeller family. The United States government provided the bulk of the new organization's funding, a practice that continues to the present day. In addition, some ninety-five multinational corporations, including ITT, First National City Bank, Sheraton Corporation of America, United Fruit, and Shell Petroleum, also provide funds for AIFLD.

AIFLD's official mission is to foster democratic trade unionism, a charge which in practice translates into support for U.S.-style business unionism as opposed to more radical forms of labor activity, and collaboration with the Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers.* It also has worked directly to promote United States government foreign policy objectives both overtly and covertly. It receives some of its funding from foundations and institutes that are fronts for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and CIA operatives often have been attached to the Institute and its programs. The Latin American section of

the CIA's International Organizations Division supervised many of AIFLD's programs.

A major activity for AIFLD is educational; it maintains local and regional schools and an advanced training center in Front Royal, Virginia, all designed to train Latin American union leaders. Trainees who have graduated from the Front Royal school remain on the AIFLD payroll for nine months while they engage in labor activities in their native countries. AIFLD runs a variety of seminars and short courses, and publishes materials for use in local training programs established by Latin American unions.

The Institute also engages in social assistance projects that enable Latin American union affiliates to provide needed social services to their members. Typically these have included the establishing of credit unions, cooperatives, and workers' banks, as well as projects for workers' housing.

These various social assistance, educational, and propaganda activities have had an important influence in fostering a business-oriented trade unionism in Latin America, but the most significant impact has been through direct intervention, using a variety of measures against radical and leftist union movements throughout Latin America. For this role of AIFLD, see individual country chapters, especially for Guatemala, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.

ASOCIACIÓN CONTINENTAL AMERICANA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* American Continental Association of Workers.

ATLAS. *See* Grouping of Latin American Syndicalist Workers.

CENTRAL AMERICAN WORKERS CONFEDERATION (Confederación Centroamericana de Trabajadores). *See* Latin American Workers Central.

CENTRAL LATINOAMERICANA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Latin American Workers Central.

CISL. *See* International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

CIT (Interamerican Confederation of Workers). *See* Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers.

CLAT. *See* Latin American Workers Central.

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE AMERICA LATINA. *See* Confederation of Workers of Latin America.

CONFEDERACIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE TRABAJADORES (Interamerican Confederation of Workers). *See* Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers.

CONFEDERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE SINDICALISTAS LIBRES. *See* International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

CONFEDERACIÓN LATINOAMERICANA DE SINDICALISTAS CRISTIANOS (Latin American Confederation of Christian Unionists). *See* Latin American Workers Central.

CONFEDERACIÓN OBRERA PANAMERICANA. *See* PanAmerican Federation of Labor.

CONFEDERACIÓN SINDICAL LATINOAMERICANA. *See* Latin American Syndical Confederation

CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF LATIN AMERICA (Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina—CTAL).

Born at a 1938 labor conference held in Mexico City, this broad united front of labor organizations brought together unions of diverse ideological backgrounds. By this time, the Communist International had adopted its Popular Front policy, which urged the affiliation of communist unions to other central labor organizations rather than the maintenance of a separate parallel structure. At the same time, the powerful Mexican union leader, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, President of the Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de México—CTM), enjoyed strong support from the government of Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas, which had recently nationalized foreign oil holdings, in efforts to establish an independent regional labor base, as opposed to the Pan American Federation of Labor.*

Lombardo Toledano became CTAL's first president, an office he held throughout the organization's twenty-five years of existence. In relatively short order, the CTAL lost its ideological diversity, first with the withdrawal of the Argentine General Labor Confederation (Confederación General de Trabajo—CGT) in 1944, which had come under the control of Juan Domingo Perón, who planned to organize his own regional labor movement (see Grouping of Latin American Syndicalist Workers), then with the progressive growth of Communist influence throughout the labor movements of many Latin American countries during World War II. As Communists gained further ascendancy within CTAL, non-communist elements became increasingly restive. With the creation of the Interamerican Confederation of Workers (which ultimately provided much of the base for the Interamerican Regional Labor Organization*—ORIT) in 1948 most of the non-communist unions withdrew from CTAL.

The American Federation of Labor became a strong critic of CTAL, denouncing its communism as well as its ties to the rival Congress of Industrial Organizations. Persistent anti-CTAL activities also issued from AFL organizer Serafino Romualdi, who had worked with labor groups in both Italy and Latin America during World War II. Believing that a new world labor federation was

imminent, and that such a body would include communist unions, and fearful that CTAL might gain recognition as the sole representative of Latin American labor, Romualdi attempted to foster stronger ties among the AFL and national labor movements in Mexico and Chile. The formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions* and the affiliation of CTAL to that body served as an additional spur to Romualdi's efforts, which ultimately resulted in the 1948 Lima conference establishing the Interamerican Confederation of Workers.

Cold War tensions throughout the 1950s and changing political conditions within Latin America that saw considerable fragmentation and realignments among leftist-oriented unions and political parties, as well as the powerful opposition of the ORIT, weakened CTAL considerably, so that it became little more than a shadow organization. It officially dissolved in 1964.

CONGRESO PERMANENTE DE UNIDAD SINDICAL DE LOS TRABAJADORES DE AMÉRICA LATINA. *See* Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin American Workers.

COPA. *See* PanAmerican Federation of Labor.

CPUSTAL. *See* Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin American Workers.

CSL. *See* Latin American Syndical Confederation.

FEDERACIÓN SINDICAL MUNDIAL. *See* World Federation of Trade Unions.

FSM. *See* World Federation of Trade Unions.

GROUPING OF LATIN AMERICAN SINDICALIST WORKERS (Agrupación de Trabajadores Latinoamericanos Sindicalistas—ATLAS).

Juan Domingo Perón, during his first term as President of Argentina, attempted to develop unions in other Latin American countries that would follow his so-called third way, an approach that humanized capitalism without being communist. By this time, Perón already had consolidated a pro-Peronist labor movement within Argentina, based on the major Argentine central, the Argentine General Labor Confederation (Confederación General del Trabajo—CGT). At the same time, neither the Interamerican Regional Organization of Labor* (ORIT) nor its predecessor, the Interamerican Confederation of Labor,* had accepted the affiliation of the official peronista unions in Argentina. Highly nationalistic, determined to make Argentina a major independent force in Latin America to rival the influence of the United States, and angered by ORIT and American Federation of Labor (AFL) criticisms of his policies, Perón decided to establish his own regional labor organization.

With active collaboration from the Mexican Regional Labor Confederation

(Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana—CROM), at a 1952 conference in Mexico City, the Grouping of Latin American Syndicalist Workers (sometimes referred to as the Association of Latin American Syndicalist Workers) was established, with headquarters in Buenos Aires. Despite some small successes in fostering pro-Peronist labor organizations in other countries and an active propaganda campaign that attacked both the AFL and ORIT as tools of the United States Department of State, Perón's dream of a new major international labor organization for Latin America failed to materialize, largely because of his ouster from the presidency in 1955. The ATLAS remained in existence mostly as a paper organization, maintained by the CROM. When in 1973 Perón once more briefly held power in Argentina, the CGT, which had in fact dropped its own affiliation with ATLAS, announced the reorganization of the Peronist international, but the attempt proved unsuccessful. By this time the idea of a third way between capitalism and communism already existed in the Latin American Workers Central* (CLAT).

IADSL. *See* American Institute for Free Labor Development.

ICFTU. *See* International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

IFCTU. *See* International Federation of Christian Trade Unions.

IFTU. *See* International Federation of Trade Unions.

ILO. *See* International Labor Organization.

INSTITUTO AMERICANO PARA EL DESARROLLO DEL SINDICALISMO LIBRE. *See* American Institute for Free Labor Development.

INTERAMERICAN CONFEDERATION OF LABOR. *See* Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers.

INTERAMERICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores—ORIT).

Sometimes referred to as the Interamerican Regional Organization of Labor, but most commonly known by its acronym, ORIT was formed at a Mexico City congress in 1951 as the regional organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions* (ICFTU). Its origins lay in an earlier organization, the Interamerican Confederation of Workers (Confederación Interamericana de Trabajadores—CIT), founded in 1948 through the efforts of the American Federation of Labor's newly appointed Latin American Representative, Serafino Romualdi of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union. He worked with anti- and non-communist elements in the Latin American labor movement that were displeased by increasing communist domination of the Confederation of Workers

of Latin America*. With the increase in East-West tensions after World War II, the World Federation of Trade Unions* (WFTU), which had represented an international united labor front, suffered the withdrawal of the United States Congress of Industrial Organizations and of various Western European unions. That in turn paved the way in 1949 for plans to establish a new organization to affiliate WFTU defectors and the CIT. Thus, with the founding of ORIT, the CIT ceased to exist.

Throughout the 1950s, ORIT enjoyed great success in fostering unified central labor organizations in Paraguay and Uruguay, and affiliated the majority of Latin America's major unions. It engaged in a wide range of organizational and training activities, and sponsored the establishing of a special institute at the University of Puerto Rico to train Latin American labor leaders in the U.S. brand of trade unionism. This latter function was largely taken over by the American Institute for Free Labor Development* (AIFLD), an organization established in 1962 with backing from the AFL-CIO, the United States government, and powerful international business interests.

Strongly supported by the AFL-CIO and the U.S. government, the ORIT is closely identified with U.S. hemispheric policy interests and the activities of AIFLD, and has actively supported union organization perceived as "democratic." Indeed, a 1968 report to the United States Senate avowed that ORIT "was founded originally with the specific purpose of fighting communism and its infiltration in the labor camp in Latin America." The ORIT generally is acknowledged to have supported the 1954 coup which toppled the regime of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. On occasion, where international communism has not been an issue, the ORIT has taken stands in opposing dictatorial regimes and their repression of organized labor; in some cases it even has objected to U.S. policy. For example, in 1975 it decried a new U.S. commercial law as discriminatory against Latin American interests.

Nonetheless, the overwhelming domination of ORIT by the AFL-CIO, even after this latter organization had withdrawn from the ICFTU, remained a point of concern among some labor leaders, but the importance of ORIT's financial resources to many of the major Latin American central union organizations generally proved decisive. At the 1975 ICFTU Congress in Mexico City, for example, an attempt to exclude non-Latin American unions from the ORIT foundered on the issue of finances, since the ICFTU could not assume the role of principal sponsor.

The ORIT has established the Confederation of Central American Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Centroamericanos—CTCA) as an affiliated regional body, and a special committee, based in Lima, to coordinate labor activities in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. It also cooperates with various of the International Trade Secretariats* (ITS) and their subregional Latin American affiliates.

INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS—ICFTU (Confederación Internacional de Sindicalistas Libres—CISL).

A predominantly Western-oriented global international headquartered in Brussels, the ICFTU was founded in 1949 as a result of a realignment of organized labor in Europe caused by East-West tensions and conflict which saw the withdrawal of pro-Western unions from the World Federation of Trade Unions.* Rivalries in the United States between the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), concerns of the smaller European countries about big-power domination, and the desire of the British Trade Union Council (TUC) formed part of the backdrop for discussions leading to the establishing of the new international labor body. Negotiations, both separate and joint, among these key players resulted in an agreement that the TUC would call a preliminary international meeting in Switzerland that would include the International Trade Secretariats* (ITS). The AFL and CIO agreed to affiliate with the new organization on the basis of proportional representation in the congress, with equal representation on its executive bodies, and without injury to the AFL's status as the sole United States labor representative in the International Labor Organization.* Meanwhile, a trade union conference in Brussels attended by union leaders from Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland supported the call for a new international organization, but demanded equality of representation. This conference also suggested basing the new organization in one of the smaller Western European countries. These various matters discussed, the preliminary organizing session was to occur at the end of the annual session of the International Labor Organization* in Switzerland.

Following that meeting, the formal conference took place in London late in 1949. The principles of the ICFTU were enumerated in a "Charter of the Rights and Privileges of Free Workers in a Free Society," which in addition to supporting the end of race, color, creed, and sex discrimination and the right of workers to form unions as independent bargaining agencies, declared that unions under totalitarian regimes were merely "governmental instruments designed for the organized exploitation of the workers for the benefit of a tyrannical state."

Anxious to sponsor democratic trade union organization throughout the world, the ICFTU established regional centers and secretariats in Europe and Asia. Looking to Latin America in 1951, the ICFTU saw its role as unifying those labor organizations opposed to the Confederation of Latin American Workers,* the regional affiliate of the World Federation of Trade Unions. This resulted in the establishing in 1951 of a new regional body, the Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers* (ORIT), to serve as the ICFTU's regional secretariat for North, Central, and South America as well as for the Caribbean.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF CHRISTIAN TRADE UNIONS— IFCTU.

Founded in 1920 at The Hague, the WFTU remained an almost entirely European organization until the post-World War Two period. The WFTU rep-

resented an alternative for religiously oriented trade unionists who believed in improving the social conditions of the working class but could not accept the secular orientation of anarchist, socialist, or communist labor movements. Following the War, the IFCTU participated in deliberations that organized the World Federation of Trade Unions* (WFTU), but did not want to lose its identity to the new organization. It proposed a parallel system whereby national labor centrals might affiliate with both international labor organizations. When the WFTU organizing committee ultimately rejected this arrangement, the IFCTU refused to affiliate. When non-communist unions withdrew from the WFTU in 1949 to form the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions* (ICFTU), partisan national rivalries again dictated that the Christian International remain aloof.

The IFCTU, thus positioned as a third way in the international struggle between capitalist and communist labor movements, began to extend its activities more aggressively, especially within the developing world. This process worked fundamental change in the nature of the organization. The affiliation of African and Asian trade unions brought in large numbers of Muslims and Buddhists, thereby challenging any exclusively Christian orientation. The powerful impact of Christian socialism and Liberation Theology in Latin America helped promote a more activist position for the IFCTU, a reflection as well of changes prompted by Pope John XXIII's encyclicals *Mater et Magistra* and *Pacem in Terris*. The IFCTU's Latin American affiliate, the Latin American Workers' Central* (CLAT) was behind the move in 1968 that saw the international drop its strictly religious orientation and issue a new Declaration of Principles, stressing the Third World and the need to eliminate existing systems of injustice and repression. This shift also involved adopting a new name: the World Confederation of Labor—WCL.

As concerns with social justice increasingly came to characterize the Catholic Church in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, and given Latin American concerns with U.S. domination, the WCL and CLAT gained considerable strength, and its affiliates often were in the forefront in movements to counter right-wing repression of the labor movement.

The WCL maintains twelve International Trade Union Federations (a counterpart to the International Trade Secretariats* that work with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions). The Latin American Peasant Federation (Federación Campesina Latinoamericana) is a regional affiliate of the agricultural International Trade Union Federation. Similarly, the World Federation for the Metallurgic Industry has a Latin American Coordination of Mine and Metal Workers (Coordinación Latinoamericana de Trabajadores Minero-Metalúrgicos—CLATRAM), which in turn includes several sub-regional divisions.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS—IFTU.

The International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centers, the first international trade union organization that embraced diverse occupational and in-

dustrial categories, appeared in 1901. It was intended to function as an auxiliary body of the Socialist International (known as the Second International, founded in an 1889 congress in Paris called by the German socialists). French syndicalists, seeing the need for a true international trade union organization, opposed the socialists. The American Federation of Labor, which had joined the International Secretariat in 1909, also clashed with the socialists and hoped to establish its own ideas of business unionism. In 1913, the French and American trade unionists pushed successfully for the reorganization of the International Secretariat, thereby establishing the International Federation of Trade Unions.

Membership was restricted to a single national central labor union from any affiliating country. Prior to World War I, IFTU membership totaled 7.4 million, with Germany providing perhaps one third of that number. The American Federation of Labor represented the second largest single block. However, the AFL always felt at odds with the socialist orientation of the European trade union members, and became increasingly uncomfortable with the pacifist and internationalist stance adopted by the IFTU during World War I. In 1919 at a conference in Amsterdam the IFTU reorganized itself in keeping with the altered post-war international political situation and adopted a seemingly more radical orientation that reflected the influence of the Russian Revolution. This prompted the withdrawal of the AFL and other of the more conservative trade unions and led to their establishing a rival body, the International Labor Organization.* A further blow to the IFTU came in 1921 when communist unions, urged by the Communist International to wage war "against the Yellow Amsterdam International," defected and established the Red International of Labor Unions* (Profintern). (The designation yellow was a derisive term indicating that instead of a true proletarian representative, the IFTU was a capitalist tool.)

The IFTU remained in existence throughout the inter-war period, and the AFL, in an attempt to block affiliation by its rival, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), rejoined the International. However, in 1945, after World War II, the CIO, the British Trades Union Council, and the Russian unions established the World Federation of Trade Unions,* and the IFTU officially dissolved.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION—ILO (Organización Internacional de Trabajo—OIT).

In the wake of World War I, the western allies met in 1919 at an international labor conference in Amsterdam which reconstituted the International Federation of Trade Unions* (IFTU). Alarmed by what it viewed as a radical socialist orientation on the part of European labor, the United States' American Federation of Labor refused to join the IFTU. During the Versailles Peace Treaty discussions, a special committee was appointed to discuss issues of labor and social policy. This body, which included the AFL's Samuel Gompers, recommended the creation of a separate international. This resulting International Labor Organization, set up under the Treaty of Versailles, was autonomous but under the umbrella of the League of Nations. Each member had four representatives: two from the na-

tional government of the affiliating country, and two others chosen by that country's government to represent employer and union organizations. Thus, only one national central labor organization was designated as the official representative of organized labor, a position that in the United States went to the American Federation of Labor. Agreements reached at ILO Congresses were to be sent for ratification to the individual national governments. The ILO had three major components: the Annual Conference; the Governing Body; and the International Labor Office.

The ILO essentially functioned in concert with the IFTU, which until the advent of the Great Depression remained the largest and strongest international labor body. Indeed, IFTU-affiliated national labor centrals formed the majority of official labor delegates to the ILO. The International Trade Secretariats* (international associations of workers in a single trade or in a grouping of related industrial or trade occupations) also cooperated with both the IFTU and ILO. This created serious tensions within the organization in reflection of ideological schisms and splits within leftist labor movements and the continuing anti-radical stance of the United States American Federation of Labor. Following the disruptions caused by the Depression and World War II, the ILO was reconstituted in 1946 as a specialized agency of the United Nations. It remains today a major international labor body, gathering and publishing a wealth of data on world labor.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIAT—ITS.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, in part as a result of attending meetings of the First and Second Internationals, European craft unionists began establishing international information clearinghouses to disseminate information about changing labor conditions on the continent. These were called International Trade Secretariats (more commonly known as ITS), each representing an individual craft or cluster of closely associated activities. Some thirty-three such ITS existed by the time of World War I, and each boasted affiliated national craft unions. Generally the activities of the ITS reflected practical rather than ideological concerns.

The International Trade Secretariats cooperated with the socialist-oriented International Federation of Trade Unions* and the International Labor Organization* established by the Treaty of Versailles after World War I. Following World War II, the ITS were represented at a 1945 London conference that led to the creation of the World Federation of Trades Unions* (WFTU). Three years later, perceived communist domination of the WFTU sparked western unions to withdraw and establish a new international body, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions* (ICFTU). The ITS, while retaining their autonomy, joined in an ITS-ICFTU Liaison Committee and began cooperating with the rival organization. Nonetheless, the various International Trade Secretariats have not acted in a monolithic fashion in Latin America. Some have very close ties with the U.S.-backed American Institute for Free Labor Development* and generally endorse and promote United States policy aims. In other cases the ITS have adopted independent stances, as with the Metalworkers who rejected dealings

with Chilean unions so long as they remained under the dictatorial control of Augusto Pinochet after the 1972 coup which toppled the government of Salvador Allende. Among the ITS that are active in Latin America are the International Federation of Free Teachers' Unions, International Graphical Federation, International Metalworkers Federation, International Transport Workers Federation, and the Miners International Federation.

INTERNATIONAL WORKINGMENS' ASSOCIATION.

Better known as the First or Black International, this association was established in 1864 at a London meeting of anarchist and socialist activists. The anarchist followers of Mikhail Bakunin opposed any highly structured authoritarian organizations; the socialists, followers of Karl Marx (who drafted the Association's provisional rules), won control of the International in 1865 when the organization held its first official congress in Geneva. Fearful of an ultimate anarchist take-over, however, Marx in 1872 moved the organizations' headquarters to New York City, where it lingered on until 1879.

ITS. *See* International Trade Secretariat.

LATIN AMERICAN SYNDICAL CONFEDERATION (Confederación Sindical Latinoamericano—CSLA).

Formed at a 1929 conference in Montevideo attended by procommunist and leftist unions from Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States, the CSLA affiliated with the Profintern (the Red International of Labor Unions), and was opposed to both the Pan American Federation of Labor* and the International Federation of Trade Unions.* It disbanded in 1936 in the interest of forming a broader-based labor organization.

LATIN AMERICAN WORKERS CENTRAL (Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores—CLAT).

Originally established in 1956 as the Latin American Confederation of Christian Unionists (Confederación Latinoamericana de Sindicalistas Cristianos—CLASC), CLAT is the Latin American regional organization of the World Confederation of Labor,* the Christian international, and is based in Caracas, Venezuela. The CLASC, with headquarters in Santiago, Chile, represented an attempt by the International Christian union movement, then organized into the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions,* to expand its primarily European-based activities to other world regions.

CLASC organizing did not meet with great success, as the region's major Catholic-oriented national labor organizations retained affiliations with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions* and the Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers* (ORIT). However, it did establish such trade union organizations in Chile, Bolivia and Argentina.

It adopted its present name at its sixth congress, held in Caracas in 1971.

Although the organization often attacks the ORIT as a vehicle for United States imperialism and maintainer of an exploitative status quo, it nonetheless adopts an anti-communist line. Thus, at its inception, CLASC denounced both CTAL and ORIT, and called for a "Third Way" of trade unionism. The CLAT has been active in pushing for agrarian reform and improvements in the social and economic condition of Latin America's rural dwellers, and sparked formation of the Latin American Peasant Federation (*Federación Campesina Latinoamericana*).

CLAT has adopted an aggressive posture calling for a fundamental social revolution to overcome inequality and backwardness in Latin America, and to establish a democratic social order free from foreign and internal domination. In addition to its criticism of United States activity, the CLAT also has denounced Soviet imperialism, and challenged Latin American church leaders to endorse progressive social change. The rise of Liberation Theology and increased social activism in Latin America has contributed to the appeal of CLAT especially in that it is perceived in many quarters as more authentically Latin American and as an alternative to U. S. domination of the labor movement. In many respects, CLAT grew stronger than its international parent body. Indeed, it was CLAT that pushed the IFCTU to delete some of its doctrinal requirements for membership and to adopt as its new name the World Confederation of Labor.

ORGANIZACIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE TRABAJO. *See* International Labor Organization.

ORGANIZACIÓN REGIONAL INTERAMERICANA DE TRABAJADORES. *See* Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers.

PAFL. *See* PanAmerican Federation of Labor.

PANAMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR—PAFL (*Confederación Obrera Panamericana—COPA*).

The first Pan American labor conference took place in 1918 in Laredo, Texas, with United States and Mexico as the dominant powers. This conference established the Pan American Federation of Labor as an instrument to promote the establishing of central labor organizations throughout Latin America and to affiliate such organizations with the PAFL. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), became the organization's first president. The role of Gompers and the AFL derived from conscious U.S. policy which sought to build non-political unionism in Latin America. In fact, the AFL was a key member of the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy, an organization which combined U.S. business, labor, and government, and was dedicated to promoting the U.S. system of free enterprise and business unionism.

The PAFL, almost from its inception, suffered from the difference in orientation between the conservative orientation of Gompers and the more radical

stance of the major Mexican central, the Mexican Regional Labor Confederation (Confederación Regional Obrero Mexicano—CROM). Anti-United States sentiment, fostered by early twentieth century U.S. imperialism and the presence of Marines in Nicaragua and Santo Domingo, further hampered efforts to establish a harmonious interamerican labor organization. Nonetheless, instances of real cooperation did occur and, in fact, the revolutionary regime of Álvaro Obregón won support from Gompers at a time when official U.S. policy favored more moderate leaders.

Still the PAFL never managed to attract many of the region's most important labor centrals; and had no affiliates in such major countries as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Again, negative feelings aroused among Latin Americans by U.S. interventionism and the close association of the PAFL with policy objectives of the United States proved a major impediment to success. Then too, the organization's conservative ideology caused it to reject any association with anarchist, socialist, or communist unions, all of which were common in Latin America at that time. Gompers' death in 1924 and the rise of more militant labor centrals in both the United States—the Congress of Industrial Organizations—and in Mexico—the Confederation of Workers of Mexico (Confederación de Trabajadores de México—CTM) also reduced the influence of the PAFL. Throughout the 1930s, the Pan American Federation of Labor was reduced to a shadow organization. It held an abortive conference in New Orleans in 1940, and then faded away. Its place in the labor movement was largely taken up by the Inter-american Regional Organization of Labor* (ORIT).

PERMANENT CONGRESS OF TRADE UNION UNITY OF LATIN AMERICAN WORKERS (Congreso Permanente de Unidad Sindical de los Trabajadores de América Latina—CPUSTAL).

In a congress held in 1964 in Brasilia, Brazil, which had resulted from a Chilean trade union congress called on the initiative of Chile's Sole Workers Central (Central Unica de Trabajadores) to discuss a successor to the moribund Confederation of Workers of Latin America* (CTAL), representatives agreed to the permanence of the congress as a base to incorporate additional affiliates. Consciously assuming the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist orientation of CTAL, which dissolved in the wake of the Brasilia conference, the CPUSTAL encountered considerable hostility, given the right-wing cast of Latin American politics during the 1960s and 1970s. For example, its 1967 meeting set for Montevideo never materialized, due to its banning by the Uruguayan government. Similarly, following the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, CPUSTAL, which had established its secretariat in that country, was forced to move. It is affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions.

PROFINTERN. *See* Red International of Labor Unions.

RED INTERNATIONAL OF LABOR UNIONS (RILU or Profintern).

In July of 1920, the Communist International (Comintern) held a meeting in Moscow attended by revolutionary trade union organizations from Russia, France, Spain, Italy, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. This meeting established the Profintern, which first convened in Moscow the following year as the international labor arm of the Comintern. Dedicated to realizing the dictatorship of the proletariat and to combating non-revolutionary trade unionism (often styled as reformism), the Profintern opposed both the International Federation of Trade Unions* and the International Labor Organization.*

Profintern strategy called for establishing communist party cells in existing labor organizations so as to dominate them and tie them directly to the Communist Party. In Latin America, Profintern teams engaged in organizational activities, and communists struggled with anarchists and socialists for control of many of the region's major unions. In the main, the communists proved highly successful, both in the labor field and in the political field. By 1930, Latin America had seventeen official national communist parties. A regional Latin American labor organization, the Latin American Sindical Confederation*, established in 1929, became a Profintern affiliate. Successful communist inroads into the labor movement of Latin America proved frightening to the United States, which promoted its own Pan American Federation of Labor.* The Profintern disappeared in 1935, when the Soviet Union abandoned the notion of tying national labor movements to a communist political party. The World Federation of Trade Unions,* established in 1945, ultimately became the successor to the Profintern.

RILU. *See* Red International of Labor Unions.

WCL (World Confederation of Labor). *See* International Federation of Christian Trade Unions.

WFTU. *See* World Federation of Trade Unions.

WORLD CONFEDERATION OF LABOR. *See* International Federation of Christian Trade Unions.

WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS—WFTU (Federación Sindical Mundial—FSM).

As part of the general realignment of international labor following World War II, conferences in London and Paris in 1945 established the World Federation of Trade Unions to replace the International Federation of Trade Unions* (IFTU) and the Red International of Trade Unions* (Profintern). The London gathering included 135 delegates from forty national central labor organizations, and thirty observers. The IFTU, International Trade Secretariats* (ITS), and the Confederation of Latin American Workers* (CTAL) also had representation.

The leading forces behind the new organization included the Soviet Trade

Unions, the British Trades Union Congress, and the U.S. Congress of Industrial Organizations. The rival American Federation of Labor remained apart from all negotiations. The International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions* participated in the entire deliberative process, but then refused to join the new organization.

Despite the generally broad representation at its founding, the WFTU fell victim to the rising East-West tensions that characterized the Cold War. It became increasingly difficult, and then impossible, for cooperation to occur between Soviet- and Western-backed trade unions. In 1949, the British Trades Union Congress and the U.S. Congress of Industrial Organizations engineered a walk-out that led to the founding of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.*

The WFTU, however, retained its base in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It also maintained a presence in France, Italy, Asia, and Latin America. Throughout the 1960s, the organization espoused an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist stance. It supported the Cuban Revolution, and also reacted against the 1968 Soviet-backed invasion of Czechoslovakia, the nation where the WFTU maintained its headquarters.

The Confederation of Latin American Workers* (CTAL) was a WFTU affiliate; its successor, the Permanent Trade Union Congress of Latin America* now holds that position. In addition, various national central trade unions in Latin America affiliate with the World Federation of Trade Unions.

Appendix 2

Chronologies _____

Argentina

- | | |
|---------|---|
| 1857 | First Argentine mutual aid society founded. |
| 1902 | Argentine Regional Labor Federation (Federación Obrera Regional Argentina) founded. |
| 1907 | Rent strike, at its peak, involves 120,000 workers. |
| 1919 | The Semana Trágica (Tragic Week); repression of the working class. |
| 1930 | Founding of General Labor Confederation (Confederación General de Trabajo—CGT). |
| 1943–45 | Juan Perón heads the National Labor Department. |
| 1945 | Perón elected President of Argentina; CGT under Peronist control. |
| 1949 | Peronist party founded. |
| 1955 | Military overthrows Perón. |
| 1973 | Juan Perón returns from exile. |
| 1976 | Isabel Perón overthrown by military. |
| 1983 | Civilian rule restored; Raul Alfonsín elected President. |

Belize

- | | |
|------|---|
| 1859 | Guatemala recognizes British sovereignty over Belize. |
| 1884 | Colonial ties to Jamaica terminated; separate colonial status gained. |
| 1894 | Forest workers riots. |
| 1922 | Establishment of the Civil Service Association. |

- 1934 Boycotts and demonstrations by the Unemployment Brigade and the Labour Unemployment Association.
- 1938 General Workers' Union formed.
- 1941 British Honduras Trade Union receives government recognition.
- 1952 General Workers' Union mounts a forty-nine day strike.
- 1959 Organization of the General Workers' Development Union.
- 1960 Crown colony status granted under a new constitution.
- 1962 National Federation of Christian Trade Unions founded.
- 1968 Democratic Independent Union created.
- 1969 National Federation of Workers formed.
- 1973 Name of colony changed from British Honduras to Belize.
- 1981 Full independence achieved.

Bolivia

- 1870s Expansion of mining sector.
- 1879–83 War of the Pacific; Bolivia loses its Pacific coast to Chile.
- 1884–99 Period of the Conservative Oligarchy.
- 1899–1903 War with Brazil; Bolivia loses territory of Acre.
- 1899 Liberal revolt; power shifts to La Paz.
- 1900 Ascendency of tin over silver in mining sector.
- 1905 National Printers' Union (Unión Gráfica Nacional), first modern union.
- 1906 First May Day celebration, organized by the Workers' Society of El Porvenir (Sociedad Obreros El Porvenir).
- 1914 Formation of Republican Party.
- 1916 Founding of the Federation of Graphic Arts (Federación de Artes Gráficas).
- 1920 Republican revolt ends dominance of Liberal Party.
- 1920–23 Administration of President Bautista Saavedra; passage of first modern labor and social legislation.
- 1921 Railway workers convene the first congress of Bolivian workers.
- 1923 Founding of the Central Labor Federation of Uncía (Federación Obrera Central de Uncía) by miners in the Ouroro-Potosí region.
- 1923–30 Full flowering of anarcho-syndicalist thought.
- 1930 By this time, tin accounted for nearly 75 percent of Bolivia's exports.
- 1932–35 Chaco War; Bolivia suffers 80,000 deaths and loses 215,000 square kilometers of territory.
- 1934 Exiled Bolivian leftists living in Argentina form the Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario).

- 1936 Union Confederation of Bolivian Workers (Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia—CSTB) founded; soon becomes the country's most important labor union.
- 1937 Creation of First Ministry of Labor.
- 1939 Código Busch, a labor code issued under administration of German Busch, mandates an eight-hour day and guarantees the right to strike.
- 1940 Party of the Revolutionary Left (Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—PIR) founded, and allies with the Communist (Third) International.
- 1941 Middle class sectors form the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR).
- 1942 Catavi Massacre
- 1944 Major Gauberto Villarroel issues the Fuero Sindical which guarantees the right to organize.
Huani congress sees founding of Federated Union of Mine Workers of Bolivia (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia—FSTMB), the nation's most important union federation.
- 1946 FSTMB Congress approves the radical Thesis of Pulacayo.
- 1952 MNR Revolt.
Bolivian Workers' Confederation (Confederación Obrera Boliviana—COB) organized.
- 1952–56 Presidency of Víctor Paz Estenssoro.
- 1956 Acceptance of International Monetary Fund stabilization plan challenges workers' strength in the government.
- 1964 Military overthrows Paz Estenssoro.
- 1964–82 Period of military rule.
- 1971–78 Government of Colonel Hugo Banzer; attack on the COB.
- 1977 Two-month general strike in the mines.
- 1982 Military calls on exiled Hernán Siles Zuazo to form a new government; COB regains some of its lost powers.

Brazil

- 1840–1889 The Second Reign, rule of Emperor Pedro II.
- 1850s Rapid emergence of coffee in Southeast.
- 1865–70 Paraguayan War (War of the Triple Alliance).
- 1870s–1920 Mass European immigration to Brazil sparks rise of class-conscious labor organizations.
- 1874–1930 Formative period of labor organization, largely dominated by anarcho-syndicalist doctrines.
- 1888 Abolition of slavery.

- 1889 Inception of the Republic.
- 1906 Anarcho-syndicalists sponsor a general strike and promote the nation's First Labor Congress.
- 1914–17 World War I spurs some import substitution.
- 1917 Union of Textile Factory Workers (União dos Operarios em Fábricas de Tecidos) founded.
- 1922–26 President Artur da Silva Bernardes mounts a “state of siege” against organized labor.
- 1923 Eloy Chaves Law provides for retirement and survivors’ pension funds for railroad workers.
- 1930 Revolution of 1930 led by Getúlio Vargas ends the Republic.
- 1933 Retirement and Pension Institute (IAP) created.
- 1934 Vargas establishes the corporatist New State.
- 1943 Consolidated Labor Laws establish seven national labor confederations.
- 1945 Military removes Vargas.
- 1955–60 Populist period under presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek.
- 1962 General Workers Command (Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores) established.
- 1964 Military leads Revolution of 1964; establishes period of direct military rule.
- 1968 Institutional Act Number 5 allows executive dictatorial powers.
- 1968–74 Rapid economic growth—the “Brazilian miracle.”
- 1974 New president Ernesto Geisel promises a gradual redemocratization.
- 1978 Major wave of strikes led by the metalworkers.
New President João Figueiredo expresses support for move toward democracy—the abertura.
- 1890–81 New wave of metallurgical strikes.
- 1985 José Sarney inaugurated as first civilian president since 1964.

Chile

- 1879–83 War of the Pacific; Chile acquires nitrate fields from Peru and Bolivia.
- 1887 Formation of the Democrat Party, Chile’s first “populist party.”
- 1907 Massacre of workers at Santa María de Iquique.
- 1909 Founding of the Great Chilean Workers Federation (Gran Federación Obrera de Chile—GFOCH).
- 1917 GFOCH assumes a militant stance and becomes the Chilean Workers Federation (Federación Obrera Chilena).
- 1919 Massacre of Workers in Puerto Natales.
- 1920 Massacre of workers in Magallenes.

- 1922 Chilean Communist Party established.
- 1920–24 First administration of Arturo Alessandri ends with military coup, which pushes social and labor legislation through Congress.
- 1927–31 Repression of organized labor by Carlos Ibáñez.
- 1931 Adoption of new labor code; creation of conciliation juntas.
- 1932–38 Legal union movement expands significantly during the administration of Arturo Alessandri.
- 1933 Socialist Party of Chile established.
- 1934 Massacre of peasants at Ranquil.
- 1938–42 Administration of Pedro Aguirre Cerda with support of Popular Front coalition; rural activism sparks agreement among Popular Front parties to “suspend” rural unionism.
- 1942–46 Communists and Socialists dominate the labor movement.
- 1947 New legislation limits rights of rural labor; strife between Communist and Socialist-led unions.
- 1948 Communist party outlawed and labor movement purged.
- 1953 National-level reunification of the labor movement in a Chilean Workers Central (Central Única de Trabajadores).
- 1958–64 Administration of Jorge Alessandri introduces anti-inflation programs.
- 1962 Land reform law.
- 1964–70 Christian Democrat President Eduardo Frei presides over a “Revolution in Liberty.”
- 1970 Election of Salvador Allende on Popular Unity ticket.
- 1972 Politico-economic strikes by truckers, shopkeepers, dockworkers, and professionals.
- 1973 Bloody military coup overthrows Allende; repressive military dictatorship begins.
- 1976 Government sponsors the National Gremialist Secretariat and a National Unity Labor Front to control the labor movement.
- 1978 Creation of new officialist labor organization, the National Union of Chilean Workers (Unión de Trabajadores de Chile).
- 1980 New constitution severely limits labor rights.
- 1983 National Workers Command (Comando Nacional de Trabajadores) created.

Colombia

- 1886 Conservative Rafael Núñez secures adoption of a new constitution establishing a centralized, unitary government.
- 1899 Thousand Days War begins.

1903	Panama breaks away to establish an independent republic.
1906–1918	founding of numerous “proto-unions.”
1906	Founding of the Printers Union of Bogotá (Sindicato de Tipógrafos de Bogotá).
1918	Wave of violent strikes along the Caribbean coast.
1921	United States Senate approves bill granting Colombia \$25 million.
1930	Breaking fifty years of Conservative power, Liberals gain power; end of “heroic age” of labor organizing.
1934	Founding of the first modern central, the Confederation of Colombian Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia).
1945–1970s	Period of intensive industrialization.
1947	Spread of fighting and banditry in the countryside marks beginning of La Violencia.
1948	Assassination of Liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.
1953	Armed forces under Rojas Pinilla seize power.
1957	Inception of the National Front.
1960s	White collar workers enter the labor movement.
1977	National Unionist Council (Consejo Nacional Sindical) established; leads successful nation-wide general strike.

Costa Rica

1830	State-promulgated Mining Ordinance establishes a Miners' Guild (Gremio de Mineros).
1840s–50s	Other guilds organized by government to cover workers and professionals.
1850–70	Rapid expansion of coffee cultivation.
1854	Founding of first mutual society, the Societies for Assistance (Sociedades de Socorros).
1870s–90s	Strikes by foreign workers brought in to work on railroads.
1880s–90s	Cycles of recession and unemployment; rapid proliferation of mutual aid societies.
1888–1902	Period of guild formation involves laborers and artisans more directly in politics.
1890	Formation of Artisans Constitutional Club (Club Constitucional de Artesanos) to promote political unity and influence of workers.
	Formation of Catholic Union Party by Bishop Bernardo Augusto Thiel.
1901	Workers' League (Líga de Obreros) formed.
1913	Founding of General Confederation of Workers (Confederación General de Trabajadores—CGT).

1919	CGT sparks formation of the Socialist Center.
1920	First general strike.
1923	CGT dissolves to form the Reformist Party.
1924	Revised Penal Code outlaws most strikes.
1930s	Rapid escalation of labor unrest in the banana zones.
1931	Formation of Communist Party.
1934	Massive Communist Party-led strike against United Fruit Company; founding of Costa Rican Workers Confederation (Confederación de Trabajadores de Costa Rica).
1941	New Labor Code recognizes right to strike; sweeping social security program established.
1942–48	Apogee of political power for the labor movement, and communist-dominated Popular Vanguard Party.
1945	Founding of Costa Rican Workers Confederation <i>Rerum Novarum</i> (Confederación Costarricense de Trabajadores <i>Rerum Novarum</i>).
1948	National Liberation Revolution led by José Figueres Ferrer breaks power of the communists.
1950s	Decentralization and fragmentation of the Costa Rican labor movement.
1979–80	Attempt to unify the labor movement; Labor Unity Committee sparks formation of the Unitary Workers' Confederation (Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores—CUT).
1982	Unsuccessful sixty-seven day strike against BANDECO (Del Monte), led by CUT.

Cuba

1860s	First unions appear, among the tobacco workers.
1887	First Workers' Congress.
1898	Cuba gains independence from Spain, but becomes subject to U.S. economic and political domination.
1899–1924	Beginning of major worker actions in the rurally based sugar industry.
1899–1902	U.S. military government.
1899	Formation of General League of Cuban Workers (Liga General de Trabajadores Cubanos).
1902	New constitution incorporates Platt Amendment.
1906–23	U.S. troops occupy Cuba for various periods of time.
1920–21	Founding of the Havana Labor Federation (Federación Obrera de La Habana).
1925	Founding of the first genuinely national workers' confederation, the National Labor Confederation of Cuba (Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba—CNOC), and of the Communist Party.

1925–33	Dictatorship of Gerardo Machado severely represses both CNOC and the Communist Party.
1929	By this date, Cuba attracted over one quarter of all U.S. investment in Latin America.
1932	Founding of the National Sugar Industry Workers' Union (Sindicato Nacional de Obreros de la Industria Azucarera—SNOIA).
1933	Successful general strike; Machado flees. New labor code grants extensive worker rights.
1934	Government represses massive general strike.
1939	Under Communist leadership, the Confederation of Cuban Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba—CTC) is founded.
1940–44	Presidency of Fulgencio Batista.
1946–59	Organized labor docile and collaborationist.
1952	Batista stages coup; CTC supports his administration.
1959	Castro and his July 26th Movement triumph.
1959–70	Unions languish in a semi-dormant state.
1970	Process of union revitalization begins.
1970s	Union functions increase; organizational changes occur, and unions begin to operate more autonomously from administrative and political cadres.

Dominican Republic

1875	Birth of modern sugar industry.
1883–84	First labor strikes; isolated actions on sugar plantations.
1899	Assassination of dictator Ulises Heaureaux (Lilis); short-lived growth in the labor movement.
1916–24	United States military occupation; impetus for the development of the modern labor movement.
1916	Nationalist Communal Brotherhood (Hermandad Comunal Nacionalista) founded.
1920	Celebration of First Workers' Congress. Dominican Confederation of Work (Confederación Dominicana de Trabajo) founded.
1930	Remnants of divided Dominican Confederation of Work receive formal recognition from President Rafael Estrella Ureña. Coup brings Rafael Trujillo to power; labor movement is coopted and freedom of association is banned.
1942	Unsuccessful labor strike on sugar plantations in eastern provinces brings retaliation against workers and leaders, with no gains for strikers.

- 1946 Labor strike on sugar plantations in eastern provinces results in average wage increases of over 100 percent.
- 1954–55 Series of strikes on plantations held by U.S. corporations; successfully orchestrated by Trujillo and his agents to pressure sale of operations to Trujillo at bargain prices.
- 1961 Trujillo assassinated; rapid development of labor movement and organizations.
- 1965 Civil War leads to United States and Organization of American States invasion and occupation.
- 1966 Election of U.S.-backed President Joaquín Balaguer; labor movement goes into retreat.
- 1967 Gulf & Western takeover of South Porto Rico Sugar Company plantation, characterized by union busting and disappearances.
- 1972 General Confederation of Workers (Central General de Trabajadores) is founded.
- 1978 Election of Dominican Revolutionary Party candidate to presidency; rapid increase in number of labor organizations.
- 1980 Failed attempt to unite labor organizations under the national Council for Labor Union Unity (CNUS).

Ecuador

- 1874 First recorded mutual aid society, “Lovers of Progress” (Amantes del Progreso) established in Guayaquil by Andres Miranda.
- 1886 “Unity and Progress” Master Tailors Society (Sociedad de Maestros Sastres) established in Quito.
- 1892 Artistic and Industrial Society of Pichincha (Sociedad Artística e Industrial del Pinchicha—SAIP) founded in Quito.
- 1895 Establishing of first Catholic Workers Circle (Círculo Católico de Obreros) in Quito.
Liberal Revolution provides major support for expansion of mutual aid movement.
- 1909 First National Labor Congress takes place in Quito.
- 1920 Second National Labor Congress takes place in Guayaquil.
- 1922 Massacre of workers in Guayaquil.
- 1925 Initiative of Ricardo Paredes and other intellectuals establishes the Ecuadorean Socialist Party.
- 1934 Ezequiel Padilla Cox leads Ecuador’s first major industrial strike; directed against “La Internacional” textile plant.
- 1938 Third National Labor Congress takes place in Ambato.
Lay leaders establish the Ecuadorian Catholic Labor Confederation.

- 1944 Progressive elements in Ecuadorian labor establish the Confederation of Workers of Ecuador (Confederación de Trabajadores del Ecuador—CTE).
- 1962 Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Labor Organizations (Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres—CEOSL) is established in cooperation with the American Institute for Free Labor Development.
- 1971 United Workers Front (Frente Unitario de Trabajadores—FUT) established.
- 1975 FUT organizes important May Day celebration.

El Salvador

- 1918 Workers Congress held in the town of Armenia.
- 1918–27 Meléndez-Quirón dynasty dominates El Salvador on behalf of the coffee oligarchy.
- 1920s Salvadoran communists establish deep roots among farmworkers and in industrial unions.
- 1924 Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador (Federación Regional de Trabajadores de El Salvador) organized.
- 1928 Government formally enacts the eight-hour day.
- 1930 Communist Party of El Salvador founded.
- 1931 Arrest of Farabundo Martí sparks mass protests.
Military coup overthrows President Araujo and installs General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez.
- 1931–44 Dictatorship of Hernández Martínez; union organizing banned.
- 1932 Failed Communist Party revolt; government begins the Matanza.
- 1940s Salvadoran Trade Union Reorganizing Committee (Comité de Reorganización Obrero Sindical Salvadoreño—CROSS) rebuilds the union movement underground.
- 1944 Huelga de Brazos Caidos (Fallen Arms Strike).
- 1945 Major strike by Railway Workers Union (Unión de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros) prompts limited official recognition of the right to strike.
- 1950 New constitution recognizes right to organize industrial unions.
- 1952 General Oscar Osorio outlaws CROSS and institutionalizes anti-communist repressions.
- 1957 General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (Confederación General de Trabajadores Salvadoreños) established under leftist leadership; pro-government unions form the General Confederation of Unions (Confederación General de Sindicatos).
- 1963 New labor code systematizes Ministry of Labor regulation of unions.
ORDEN founded under guidance of U.S. government agencies.

1965	AIFLD begins educational seminars for farmworkers.
1967	“Acero, S. A.” Factory Workers strike.
1970s	Spread of influence of Catholic and left-organized peasant associations. Formation of the Popular Liberation Forces and other revolutionary groups.
1974	Textile union leader Jorge Alberto Morán Conejo assassinated.
1977	Security forces kill Father Rutilio Grande.
1980	Largest protest march in Salvadoran history.
1980–83	Death squad terror.
1984	José Napoleón Duarte wins presidency in U.S.-supervised elections.
1986	Formation of the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers (Unión Nacional de Trabajadores Salvadoreños).

French Guiana

1815	Treaty of Paris returns French Guiana to France.
1848	Slavery abolished.
1852	Penal Colony of Devil’s Island established.
1880s	Mild revival of trade unionism in France.
1895	Formation of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) in France.
1940s	Founding of Union of Guianese Workers (Union des Travailleurs Guyanais) as a union and political party.
1960s–70s	Dominance of Gaullists and Socialists.

Guatemala

1894	Formation of several protective worker associations.
1918	Formation of the Worker Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor (Federación Obrera de Guatemala para la Protección Legal de Trabajo—FOG) under the influence of the U.S. American Federation of Labor (AFL).
1922	The Workers Regional Federation of Guatemala (Federación Regional Obrera de Guatemala—FROG), established by communists, begins organizing at the United Fruit Company.
1931–44	Unions repressed by dictator Jorge Ubico.
1944	October Revolution, backed by unions. Ruling triumvirate includes General Arbenz.
1945	Juan José Arévalo elected president.
1946	Founding of the National Committee of Trade Union Unity (Comité Nacional de Unidad Sindical—CNUS).

- 1947 New Labor Code establishes various labor rights including the right to organize and strike.
- 1948 Union rights extended to agricultural laborers.
- 1950 Jacobo Arbenz elected president by 63 percent of the vote.
- 1951 General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala (Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala—CGTG) unites all labor organizations; 100,000 total membership.
- 1954 CIA-sponsored coup installs Castillo Armas of the National Liberation Movement (MLN), which represents the landed classes; he disbands all unions.
- 1956 Unions affiliated with the pro-U.S. Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) are allowed to organize.
- 1958–62 Presidency of Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes witnesses army revolt, large worker demonstrations, and a rail strike.
- 1963 Military coup brings Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdía to the presidency; he forms the Institutional Democratic Party (PID) and alters the constitution.
- 1968 National Confederation of Workers (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT), affiliated with the Christian-Democrat CLAT, forms as an alternative to ORIT-backed confederations.
- 1973 Major teacher strike involves 20,000 people and promotes other public sector strikes; government accedes.
- 1976 Hunger protest and lockout at Coca-Cola precipitates renewal of the National Committee for Trade Union Unity (CNUS).
- 1978 General Lucas García wins presidency, supported by groups fearful of the growing popular and labor movements.
CNUS is joined by the Committee of Campesino Unity (Comité de Unidad Campesina—CUC), which represent many Indian workers.
Bus fare increases spark massive demonstrations; government begins systematic elimination of union leaders.
- 1980 Following strike wave initiated by cotton and sugar workers, security forces abduct twenty-seven CNT leaders; repression forces most unions underground.
- 1982 Coup brings General Ríos Montt to the presidency; he increases the scorched earth strategy directed against Indians; more than 50,000 die and many flee to Mexico.
- 1984 Coca-Cola declares bankruptcy; workers occupy plant, save union, and eventually win new ownership.
National Coordinator of Trade Union Unity (Coordinador Nacional de Unidad Sindical—CONUS) is formed to help unions facing repression.
- 1985 Mutual Support Group (GAM) gains attention in search for the disappeared.

Strikes and union protest increase; Meñja Victores calls for civilian elections.

- 1986 Vinicio Cerezo, Christian Democrat, elected president with restricted authority; disappearances and killings continue at high levels, but major union confederations continue to operate.

Guyana

- 1831 Formation of colony through consolidation of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo.
- 1834 Emancipation of slaves.
- 1844 Large-scale East Indian immigration begins.
- 1846–54 Abolition of preferential duties for Empire sugar.
- 1905 Georgetown truckers' and sugar packers' strike.
- 1917–18 Dockworkers' strikes and government concessions.
- 1918 Herbert Critchlow organizes the British Guyana Labor Union.
- 1921 First special trade union ordinance.
- 1923 Police strike.
- 1924 Industrial strikes and violence in Georgetown.
- 1928 Revised colonial charter granted.
- 1936 Formation of Man Power Citizens' Association.
- 1939 British Guyana Labor Union and Man Power Citizens' Association receive bargaining status.
- 1941 Trades Union Council created.
- 1942 Labour Department established.
- 1945 Moyne Commission report.
- 1946–47 Bauxite workers strike.
- 1948 Guyana Agricultural Workers Union is formed.
Transport Workers' Union strike; Enmore sugar estate riots.
- 1950 Cheddi Jagan organizes the People's Progressive Party.
- 1952 Revised colonial constitution granted.
- 1961 People's Progressive Party takes office.
- 1963–64 Strikes sponsored by Trades Union Council.
- 1965 Forbes Burnham and the People's National Congress form coalition government.
- 1966 Full independence achieved.
- 1971 Nationalization begins.
- 1974 Declaration of Sophia; increased nationalization.

1978 Burnham postpones national elections.

Haiti

1843–1915 Repeated dictatorships; economic and social stagnation.
 1908–15 Near anarchy and extreme political violence.
 1915 United States Marines land in Haiti.
 1915–34 Period of American military rule.
 1946–50 Presidency of Dumarsais Estime.
 1946 Founding of Federation of Haitian Workers (Fédération des Travailleurs Haitiens).
 1848 Haitian Federation of Labor (Fédération Haitien du Travail) founded.
 1949 Moliere Compas establishes the General Confederation of Workers (Confédération Général des Travailleurs).
 1956 Unrest and a general strike leads to overthrow of Paul Magloire.
 1957 François Duvalier installed as President.
 1971 Jean-Claude Duvalier becomes President-for-Life.
 1986 Duvalier abandons Haiti.

Honduras

1839 First constitution of the Republic of Honduras.
 1876 Marco Aurelio Soto initiates period of Liberal Reform.
 1900–20 Development of large-scale banana holdings; rising importance of United Fruit Company and Standard Fruit Company.
 1906 Invasion by Guatemala.
 1921 First Congress of Workers convenes; organizes Honduran Workers Federation (Federación Obrera Hondureña).
 1926 Federation of Workers Societies of the North (Federación de Sociedades Obreras del Norte) established.
 1929 Founding of the Honduran Syndical Organization (Federación Sindical Hondureña).
 1932–49 Rule of Tiburcio Carías Andino.
 1954 Sixty-nine day banana workers strike.
 Communist Party of Honduras reorganized.
 1955 United Fruit Company workers establish the Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers.
 1958–63 Presidency of Ramón Villeda Morales; promulgation of a Labor Code.
 1959 Police become the Independent Civil Guard.

1962	Agrarian Reform Law.
1969	Short-lived war with El Salvador.
1970s	Strong organizational efforts among peasant cooperatives.
1974	Hurricane Fifi.
1981	Sixty thousand Hondurans march in Tegucigalpa to protest government repression and involvement in Salvadoran and Nicaraguan conflicts.
1982	Constituent Assembly approves Honduras' sixteenth constitution.
1986	Inauguration of José Azcona del Hoyo.

Jamaica

1865	Crown colony status granted.
1867	Final emancipation of slaves.
1884	New colonial constitution implemented.
1890–1920	Employment problems and mass immigration.
1918	Formation of Longshoremen's Unions 1 and 2.
1919	Jamaican Trade Union Act.
1936	Allen George St. Claver Coombs organizes the first "blanket union," the Jamaica Workers and Tradesmens' Union.
1937	Founding of Ken Hill's Motor Omnibus Drivers' Association and Chauffeurs Union.
1938–39	Alexander Bustamante organizes the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union.
1940	Bustamante is jailed by British authorities.
1941	First collective bargaining agreement secured by the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union.
1942	Formation of the Jamaica Government Railway Employees' Union.
1943	Jamaica Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress are organized.
1943–4	Governor jails the "4-H's."
1945	Moyne Commission report.
1949	Trade Union Council assumes blanket union status.
1952	National Labour Party organized.
1953–80	Richard Hart organizes various leftist political-union groups.
1962	Full independence achieved.
1968	Independent Trade Union Council formed.
1972–74	Economic crisis and suspension of IMF funds.
1974	Passage of the Labor Relations and Industrial Disputes Act.
1976	New labor relations code adopted.
1978	Organization of the Workers Party of Jamaica and the University and Allied Workers' Union.

1980 Election of Edward Seaga of the Jamaica Labour Party.

Mexico

- 1865 First industrial strike, at San Ildefonso and La Comena cotton mills near Mexico City.
- 1870 Great Circle of Free Workers (Gran Círculo de Obreros Libres) formed in Mexico City.
- 1876–1911 Rule of dictator Porfirio Díaz.
- 1887 Mexico's first industrial trade union, the Mexican Railroad Society (La Sociedad de Ferrocarril Mexicano) is founded in Nuevo Laredo.
- 1906 Cananea, Sonora copper mine strike.
- 1907 Lockout, strike, and massacre of workers by Mexican soldiers at the Río Blanco textile mill near Orizaba, Veracruz.
- 1912 Department of Labor organized under President Francisco I. Madero.
House of the World's Workers (Casa de Obrero Mundial—CASA) founded.
- 1915 Venustiano Carranza's Constitutionalist army organizes "Red Battalions" composed of urban workers to fight the forces of Emiliano Zapata and Francisco "Pancho" Villa.
- 1916 Carranza crushes general strike in Mexico City.
- 1917 Mexican Constitution; Article 123 governs labor relations.
- 1918 Founding of Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana—CROM).
- 1920–24 Presidency of Álvaro Obregón witnesses considerable labor organizing and conflict.
- 1931 National Federal Labor Law.
- 1934–40 Presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas; era of organized labor's greatest political influence and organizational expansion.
- 1936 Vicente Lombardo Toledano founds the Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de México—CTM).
- 1941 Fidel Velázquez replaces Lombardo Toledano as head of CTM and retains that position into the 1980s.
- 1958 Severe labor conflicts involving railroad, electrical workers, and other unions.
- 1958–64 Mildly pro-labor administration of Adolfo López Mateos introduces profit sharing, but jails dissident railroad leader Demetrio Vallejo.
- 1968 Government massacre of students and young people in Mexico City.
- 1970–76 Presidency of Luís Echeverría witnesses the greatest labor militancy since the Cárdenas era.

- 1973 Electrical Union head Rafael Galván founds the Democratic Tendency (TD) movement.
- 1980s High inflation, fall in oil prices, and crushing debt make this a time of unmitigated disaster for organized labor and Mexico's working people.

Nicaragua

- 1918 First national workers' congress leads to founding of Nicaraguan Labor Federation (Federación Obrera Nicaragüense).
- 1921 Massacre of striking lumber company workers at La Cruz Roja de Río Grande.
- 1922 Massacre of strikers at Cuyamel Fruit Co.
- 1923 Organized Workers' Movement of Nicaragua (Oberismo Organizado de Nicaragua—OO) is founded.
- 1924 First major May Day celebration.
- 1927 Augusto César Sandino forms Army for the Defense of National Sovereignty to wage guerilla warfare against occupying United States Marines.
- 1930 Nicaraguan Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica Nicaragüense) organizes massive demonstration against U.S. occupation and puppet government of José María Moncada.
- 1931 Nicaraguan Workers' Party (PTN) organized.
- 1934 Sandino assassinated; northern agricultural cooperatives he had organized suffer repression.
- 1936 National Guard chief Anastasio Somoza García overthrows government of Juan Bautista Sacasa.
- 1936–79 Somoza dynasty.
- 1944 Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) formally announces its existence and calls for "national unity" against fascism.
- 1945 Somoza García government promulgates long-promised Labor Code.
- 1948 PSN suffers wave of repression; independent union movement is crushed.
- 1949 Somoza-controlled General Confederation of Workers (Confederación General de Trabajadores—CGT) is formed.
- 1950s CGT dominates the labor scene.
- 1951 PSN militants expelled from the CGT form General Union of Labor (Unión General de Trabajo), which operates outside the officialist union structure.
- 1958 Government of Luis Somoza Debayle extends social security in Managua to include private enterprise.
- 1961 Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN) is founded.
- 1963 National minimum wage law passed.

- Agrarian reform law creates resettlement colonies on the agricultural frontier.
- 1967 National Guard repression of anti-Somoza demonstration leaves hundreds dead.
- 1970 Teachers' strike leads to mass firings and destruction of their union.
- 1972 Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation (Confederación de Trabajadores de Nicaragua—CTN) founded.
- Earthquake levels Managua. Somoza graft galvanizes broad-based opposition.
- 1974 Formation of the Democratic Union of Liberation (UDEL), a broad opposition coalition led by editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro.
- Somoza decrees martial law, initiating a three-year period of repression against labor activists and other presumed regime opponents.
- 1977 FSLN organizes worker committees.
- 1978 Pedro Joaquin Chamorro assassinated.
- Growing union involvement in the revolutionary movement as reflected in the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) and United People's Movement (MPU), both integrated by labor groups.
- 1979 Somoza overthrown.
- Sandinista Workers' Central (Central Sandinista de Trabajadores—CST) founded; takes lead in urban labor organizing.
- 1980 National Inter-Union Commission (Comisión Nacional Intersindical—CNI) organized as part of Sandinista drive to promote labor unity.
- Newly established Council of State, a quasi legislative body, includes expanded functional representation for unions and other mass organizations; in protest, bourgeois representatives resign from governing junta.
- 1981 Social and Economic Emergency Decree bans factory takeovers, strikes and land seizures.
- 1982 U.S.-backed contras blow up key bridges; government declares State of Emergency, imposing some restrictions on civil liberties and reaffirming strike ban (extended periodically until late 1984).
- 1984 Ministry of Labor inaugurates new wage policy, a standardized national 28-tier wage table, with work norms and an incentive bonus system.
- Strikes at San Antonio sugar mill, Victoria Brewing Company, and ME-TASA metallurgical plant, fueled by discontent over implementation of new wage policy.
- 1985 State of Emergency, including strike ban, reimposed.
- 1986 Expanded agrarian reform removes size limit on underutilized land subject to compensation; allows redistribution (with compensation) in case of "social necessity."

Panama

- 1821 Panama gains independence from Spain and joins Colombia as a province.
- 1851 New York businessmen finance construction of a forty-eight-mile railroad across the isthmus.
- 1878 Ferdinand de Lesseps and the French Canal Company begin attempt to construct a sea-level canal.
- 1903 In a revolt backed by the United States, Panama gains independence from Colombia.
- 1904 Panamanian constitution grants U.S. rights to the canal zone.
- 1914 Canal begins operation.
- 1920 Strike called by the United Brotherhood of Maintenance Way involves over 17,000 canal workers.
- 1921 Founding of Workers Federation of the Republic of Panama (Federación Obrera de la República de Panamá).
- 1930s–45 Government curtails virtually all labor activity.
- 1945 Reemergence of the labor movement and formation of the Trade Union Federation of the Republic of Panama (Federación Sindical de la República de Panamá).
- 1946–47 Government appoints Labor Code Commission to elaborate Panama's first Labor Code.
- 1956 At prompting of United States and with support from Panamanian government, the Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama (Confederación de Trabajadores de la República de Panamá) is formed.
- 1959 Hunger and Desperation March sparks new renters' law and minimum wage.
- 1968 National Guard officers topple government.
- 1969 Omar Torrijos consolidates power.
- 1970–77 Official recognition given to 120 new unions.
- 1972 New Labor Code becomes effective.
- 1974 Deterioration of Panamanian economy.
- 1976 New Labor Code deletes many of the benefits of the 1972 Code.
- 1978 New Canal Treaties signed.
- 1981 Death of Torrijos; government pressures organized labor.

Paraguay

- 1865–70 War of the Triple Alliance against Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay.
- 1870–1936 Diffuse state authority and periods of anarchy; economic collapse and ongoing financial fraud.

1870s	Defeat, devastation, and foreign domination.
1874–1904	General Bernardino Caballero dominates the country.
1876	Beginning of partisan politics; Liberals and Colorados.
1904	With Argentine backing, Liberals take power.
1906	Regional Workers Federation of Paraguay (Federación Regional Obrera del Paraguay) founded.
1930	National Workers Confederation (Confederación Nacional de Trabajo) founded.
1931	Governmental decree dissolves all labor organizations.
1932–35	Chaco War with Bolivia.
1936–37	Febrerista government of Colonel Rafael Franco.
1940	New constitution brings all economic and social activity under state control.
1947	Civil War.
1954	Alfredo Stroessner becomes president.
1962	Founding of Christian Confederation of Workers (Confederación Cristiana de Trabajadores).
1978	Founding of National Workers Coordination (Coordinación Nacional de Trabajadores).
1983	Alfredo Stroessner sworn in for seventh presidential term.
1985	Formation of the Independent Workers Movement (Movimiento Independiente de Trabajadores).

Peru

1896	Strike at Vitarte textile mill.
1911	Anarcho-syndicalists initiate union organizing.
1913	Peruvian Regional Labor Federation (Federación Obrera Regional Peruana—FORP) leads strikes; eight-hour day won in port of Callao.
1919	New federations organized; Lima general strike leads to eight-hour day.
1920s	Leguía regime promotes limited reform, and mild repression of labor organizers; anti-feudal peasant mobilizations occur.
1924	Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre initiates APRA from exile in Mexico.
1928	Socialist Party forms and begins organizing Andean mineworkers.
1929	Socialists establish General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú—CGTP).
1930–36	Harsh repression of the labor movement.
1930–1	Socialist Party becomes the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) and leads CGTP's trade union struggles.
1936	CGTP dissolved.

- 1936–44 PCP seeks anti-fascist front; continued repression of labor movement and APRA.
- 1944 PCP and APRA establish the Confederation of Workers of Peru (Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú—CTP); labor movement revived.
- 1948 Odría dictatorship represses and co-opts labor movement; APRA works with the American Federation of Labor to take control of unions from PCP.
- 1950s APRA is hegemonic in organized labor; CTP embraces “free trade” unionism of AFL–CIO.
Left-led labor mobilizations in Arequipa and Cuzco against Odría.
- 1951 APRA labor leaders play major role in organization of the Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT).
- 1955–59 Several unions break away from APRA-CTP control.
- 1958–68 Resurgence of the labor movement.
- 1958 Economic crisis stimulates greater labor militancy; peasant organizing and general strike in Cuzco.
- 1960s Strikes increase; radicalization and formation of new left organizations threaten APRA’s labor hegemony.
- 1964 Repression of bank employee and metalworkers unions; majority of metalworkers break from CTP.
- 1968 Leftist forces reestablish CGTP as an organizational and political alternative to the CTP.
Reformist military coup ousts Belaunde.
- 1969–71 Many CTP unions desert to CGTP; trade union movement expands, and major mineworker and schoolteacher strikes occur.
- 1971–73 Military regime attempts to coopt labor; organizes “revolutionary” unions and establishes the CTRP confederation and SINAMOS.
- 1975 Strikes spread; military replaces Velasco and begins IMF-guided austerity program.
CGTP and independent left-led unions hegemonic in labor movement.
- 1977 Historic July 19 general strike; mass mobilizations sweep provinces; 5,000 union leaders fired.
- 1978–79 Four general strikes; society-wide radicalization; military prepares to abandon power.
- 1983 Nationwide general strike.
- 1985 APRA gains presidency of Peru and attempts to reactivate the economy; the left and CGTP adopt a “wait and see” posture.

Puerto Rico

- 1869 New Spanish constitution sparks increased political freedom in Puerto Rico.
- 1873 Emancipation of slaves.

1887–97	Era de los compontes; harsh punishments under conservative military governor.
1897	Spanish Liberal Party leader approves Charter of Autonomy for Puerto Rico.
1898	Puerto Rico ceded to United States in Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish American War.
1899	Santiago Iglesias founds the Free Federation of Labor (Federación Libre de los Trabajadores.)
1900	Foraker Act establishes a new colonial status.
1917	Jones-Shafroth Act provides U.S. citizenship status for all Puerto Ricans not specifically refusing it.
1931	Department of Labor and Human Resources established.
1932	Union Republican Party unites Republicans and dissident Unionists, and allies with Socialists to capture control of government.
1940	Founding of General Confederation of Workers of Puerto Rico (Confederación General de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico).
1941–46	Governorship of Rexford G. Tugwell.
1945	Puerto Rican Labor Relations Act, covers all except public employees.
1946	Jesús T. Piñero, first indigenous governor.
1948	First directly elected governor, Luís Muñoz Marín.
1950s–60s	Industrialization sparked by Operation Bootstrap prompts rush to Puerto Rico by mainland international unions.
1952	New constitution establishes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
1956	Minimum Wage Board created.
1959	Movement for Independence founded.
1964	Central Labor Council organized.
1970s	Emergence of a more militant “New Unionism.”

Suriname

1815	Peace of Paris gives Dutch permanent control.
1863	Slavery abolished.
1870–1910	Large-scale importation of East Indian and Indonesian workers.
1946	Organization of the Suriname Workers' Union (Suriname Werknemers Bond), and Suriname National Party.
1947	Formation of Suriname Workers Federation (Surinaamse Werknemers Moederbond).
1948	Creation of the Progressive Workers' Organization (Progressive Werknemers Organisatie—PWO).
1954	Internal political autonomy acquired.

1958–67	Era of ethnic <i>verbroedering</i> .
1970	Formation of Central 47 (<i>Centrale 47</i>).
1971	Consolidation of the Central Organization of State Employees (<i>Centrale van Landsdienaren Organisaties—CLO</i>). General Strike.
1975	Full independence achieved.
1980	Takeover of government by non-commissioned officers.

Uruguay

1870–1900	Gestation of the labor movement.
1896	First May Day celebration.
1900–30	State of Commitment: <i>Batllism</i> .
1903–7	First presidency of José Batlle y Ordóñez.
1905	Founding of first labor central, Regional Labor Federation of Uruguay (<i>Federación Obrera Regional del Uruguay</i>). Emilio Frugoni organizes the Karl Marx Center.
1911	First General Strike.
1915	Law establishes eight-hour day.
1919	Creation of Communist Party.
1923	Founding of the anarcho-syndicalist Union of Uruguay (<i>Unión Sindical Uruguaya</i>).
1929	Founding of Communist General Central of Workers of Uruguay (<i>Central General de Trabajadores del Uruguay</i>).
1931	Economic recession.
1933	President Gabriel Terra dissolves Congress.
1934	New constitution concentrates power in the executive.
1937	Onset of new dual-purpose unionism.
1940s	Industrial sector surpasses livestock-raising as percentage of GNP.
1942	Founding of Association of Bank Workers of Uruguay (<i>Asociación de Empleados Bancarios del Uruguay</i>) symbolizes incorporation of middle class into the labor movement.
1943	Creation of Wage Councils and Labor and Unemployment Funds.
1955	Growing hegemony of communists over the labor movement.
1964	Provisional creation of the National Convention of Workers (<i>Convención Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT</i>).
1968	Fracture of the state of commitment.
1973	Military takes over government; CNT outlawed.

- 1981 Law of Professional Associations allows a carefully regulated resumption of union activity.
- 1985 Julio María Sanguinetti assumes the presidency, ending more than a decade of military rule.

Venezuela

- 1928 Student protests against dictator Juan Vicente Gómez triggers a strike among trolley car workers of Caracas.
- 1931 Rodolfo Quintero founds Petroleum Workers Mutual Aid Society in Cabimas.
- 1936 Oil Workers mount a 43-day strike.
Founding convention of the Workers' Confederation of Venezuela (Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela—CTV).
- 1938 National Workers Conference held secretly in Caracas.
- 1941 Democratic Action (AD) founded.
- 1944 National Workers Convention closed by government of President Medina Angarita; 93 pro-Communist labor organizations declared illegal.
- 1945 Oil companies recognize unions and sign first labor agreement. Military coup brings AD to power.
- 1946 Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela (Federación de Trabajadores Petroleros de Venezuela—FEDEPETROL) founded.
- 1947 CTV is reestablished at its Second Congress.
- 1948 Communist leaders' refusal to sign labor contract leads to their expulsion from FEDEPETROL.
Military coup overthrows AD government.
- 1950 Nation-wide oil workers strike takes on insurrectional overtones; main leaders, including Jesús Fariá, are jailed.
- 1958 Two day general strike succeeds in overthrowing Pérez Jiménez government.
- 1959 CTV is reconstituted at its Third Congress.
- 1961 Leftists expelled from CTV executive committee and from other major unions, resulting in their forming the Non-officialist (No Oficialista) CTV.
- 1962 Transportation strike in Táchira spreads to rest of country and takes on insurrectionary overtones.
- 1967 A split in AD produces the Electoral Movement of the People (MEP) which attracts numerous labor leaders, including CTV president González Navarro.
- 1971 Steel workers strike at SIDOR results in militarization of the Guayana region and numerous layoffs.

- 1974 Recently elected President Carlos Andrés Pérez decrees numerous reforms beneficial to labor, including double severance pay in cases of unjustified layoffs.
- 1980 Textile workers strike results in massive layoffs.
- 1985 Ninth Congress of CTV at Porlamar calls for workers' participation in management.

Appendix 3

Glossary of Terms, People, and Events _____

Argentina

Montoneros. Peronist-oriented resistance organization.

Perón, Juan Domingo. President of Argentina, 1946–52 and 1952–55, then again briefly in 1973, he is a transcendent figure in Argentine political and labor history, noted especially for mobilizing the working classes in support of his regime.

Saladero. Meat salting plant.

La Semana Trágica. The Tragic Week, the 1919 repression of Argentine workers.

Unidades Básicas. Peronist-oriented community organizations formed in Argentina in the late 1960s.

Belize

Belize-Billboard. Pro-independence weekly newspaper.

Belize Estate and Produce Company. British concern that controlled most private land holdings before independence.

Belmopan. Capital city in 1970 following transfer of governmental headquarters from Belize City.

Caribs. Belizean immigrants from the West Indies.

Chicle. Gum substance extracted from the sapodilla trees; important early twentieth-century agricultural resource.

Goldson, Philip. One of the key organizers of the General Workers' Union and the People's United Party; helped form the Honduras Independence Party and the People's Democratic Movement.

Logwood. Important economic resource in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Mahogany. Timber resource critical to the economy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Martínez, Thomas. President of the General Workers' Development Union.

"People's Committee." Political action group organized in early 1950 by key union officials; forerunner of the People's United Party.

Pollard, Nicholas. Early official of the People's United Party; formed the Democratic Independent Union; founded the National Confederation of Christian Trade Unions.

Price, George. Most influential labor and political leader of the twentieth century; early officer of the General Workers' Union; long-time prime minister and leader of the People's United Party.

Richardson, Leigh. Veteran trade union leader; co-founder of the Honduras Independence Party.

Soberanis, Antonio. Unemployed log cutter who spearheaded the labor boycotts of the mid-1930s.

Stann Creek. District known for large citrus production.

Bolivia

Banzer, Hugo. General who came to power in a 1971 coup and ruled until 1978, he sought conservative, civilian middle class support and tried to destroy the Bolivian Workers' Confederation (COB).

Busch, Germán. A lieutenant colonel who along with Colonel David Toro seized power in 1934, he became President in 1937, and in 1939 passed a comprehensive labor code known as the Código Busch (Busch Code).

Catavi Massacre. Simón Patiño's Catavi mine, one of Bolivia's largest tin mines, employing some 10,000 workers, witnessed a strike in 1942 in which troops opened fire on demonstrators, killing hundreds of miners and their relatives. It became a major political scandal, exploited by the MNR to gain power.

Chaco War. War with Paraguay from 1932–35 that saw Bolivia suffer 80,000 deaths and the loss of some 215,000 square kilometers of territory.

Código Busch (Busch Code). Passed in 1939 during the presidency of German Busch, this comprehensive new labor code mandated an eight hour day and guaranteed the right to strike.

Cogestión. Demand by the Sole Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) put forth in the 1980s that called for peasants to share administrative control in the operations of state-run industries in the agricultural sector.

Co-gobierno (Co-government). Formal participation of organized labor in national political power through the right to name the cabinet ministers for Labor, Mines and Petroleum, Peasant Affairs, and Transportation, a demand of the Bolivian Workers' Confederation (COB) on the newly-empowered (1952) MNR government.

COMIBOL. Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Bolivian Mining Corporation), the state tin mining monopoly established during the first MNR government of Víctor Paz Estenssoro following expropriation of that sector, in order to operate the mining industry in the interest of the nation.

Control obrero (Workers' control). Demand made by the Bolivian Workers' Confederation on the new (1952) MNR government that officials named by the Federated

Union of Mine Workers of Bolivia (FSTMB) have an absolute veto in all save technical matters over decisions made by the new state mining corporation, COMIBOL. Granted at first, but then abrogated in 1963.

Fuero Sindical. A basic labor bill of rights which legitimized union organizing, issued in 1944 by the government of Major Gaulberto Villarroel.

Lechín, Juan. Leftist leader of the miners, he participated in the movement that brought the MNR to power in 1952. A founder and head of the Federated Union of Mine Workers of Bolivia (FSTMB) and head of the Bolivian Workers Confederation (COB) since its founding, he remains a major political figure in contemporary Bolivia.

Liberal Revolt. The 1899 movement that shifted power from the silver-producing regions of Potosí and Sucre to La Paz, where it remained throughout most of the twentieth century.

MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario). The Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, formed in 1941 among middle-class sectors and supporting a non-socialist, nationalist approach to Bolivian development. It remains a major political force in Bolivia to the present day.

Patiño, Simón. One of the major mine owners, with vast holdings at Llallagua and Uncía, including the famous Catavi mine.

Paz Estenssoro, Víctor. The major figure in the MNR, which came to power in 1952 and carried out the so-called national revolution from that date until 1964, Paz has been a dominant figure in Bolivian political life, serving as president on four separate occasions, beginning in 1952, and most recently in 1985. Once something of a middle-class nationalist radical whose early administration witnessed nationalizations of the tin mines and formation of powerful union confederations, his stance now emphasizes the need for austerity measures to control inflation, cuts in state spending, scaling down COMIBOL, inviting private and foreign investment, and using states of siege to combat general strikes.

Rosca. Literally, the screw, a term applied to the new class of professional politicians who operated the nation in the interests of the tin producers, remaining in or close to power throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

Saavedra, Bautista. President from 1920–23, he attempted to win labor support to buttress his regime, which allowed the passage of the first modern labor and social legislation in Bolivian history.

Thesis of Pulacayo. Approved in 1946 at the First Extraordinary Congress of the Federated Union of Mine Workers of Bolivia (FSTMB), this radical statement of labor militancy asserted that the goal of the workers' movement was the conquest of state power for the proletariat and the destruction of imperialism and capitalism in Bolivia.

Toro, David. A colonel who seized power with Lieutenant Colonel Germán Busch in 1934, he created the first Ministry of Labor.

Villarroel, Gaulberto. A major who came to power in a 1943 coup, and remained until overthrown in 1946, he issued the Fuero Sindical, a basic labor bill of rights.

Brazil

ABC Suburbs. Three cities—Santo André, São Bernardo, and São Caetano—ringing São Paulo, in which major automobile plants are located; strongholds of the metalworkers, the most powerful segment of contemporary Brazilian labor.

Abertura. Literally, opening, the term for Brazil's gradual move toward democracy pledged early by the military after the 1964 coup, and which culminated with elections in 1984.

April Revolution. Also known as the Revolution of 1964, it saw the military topple the elected regime of João Goulart, and inaugurated a period of repressive direct military rule that lasted until 1985.

Arrocho Salarial (Wage Squeeze). A complex index established by the military government in the 1960s to set acceptable wage levels, and cynically manipulated by the Ministry of Labor to reduce labor's compensation sparked the 1978 strikes that brought Lula his first notoriety.

Bernardes, Artur da Silva. President of Brazil from 1922–26, he so harshly repressed organized labor that his administration is noted as a time when labor endured a "state of siege."

Campista, Ary. Became head of the National Confederation of Industrial Workers following the military coup of 1964, and retained that position, acting cooperatively with the government until 1983 when, amid allegations of embezzlement and fraud, he resigned.

CAP (Caixa de Aposentadoria e Pensões). Retirement and Pension Funds, first established for railroad workers in 1923 under the Eloy Chaves Law, then extended in 1926 to dock and maritime workers; replaced by a new social insurance institution, the IAP, in 1933.

Comunidades de base (Base-line communities). Refers to community organization carried out in the 1970s by priests and Catholic lay workers inspired by Liberation Theology.

Consolidated Labor Laws. Codified in 1943 during Vargas' New State, established parallel structures of worker and employee associations, and subordinated labor to the government, while legitimizing union activity.

Decompressão. Literally, decompression, a term to describe the easing of repressive governmental measures as part of an ultimate return to democracy announced by President Ernesto Geisel in 1974.

Eloy Chaves Law. Passed in 1923, this legislation established retirement and survivors' pension funds for railroad workers.

Fazendeiros. Planters, a term applied to owners of coffee or sugar estates (*fazendas*).

Goulart, João. Labor minister under Vargas, then successor to the presidency when in 1961 Jânio Quadros resigned, his radical stance and attempt to appeal to organized labor threatened Brazilian centrists and rightists who ultimately responded by overthrowing his regime.

Holanda Cavalcanti, Deocleciano. Leader of the largest of Brazil's labor organizations, the National Confederation of Industrial Workers (CNTI), he retained this position until 1964, having maintained throughout that time a pliant, pro-government stance.

IAP (Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões). Established in 1933, the Retirement and Pension Institute was a social insurance institution that covered employees by specific occupational groupings, and remained under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor.

Imposto sindical. A payroll tax collected by the government, and distributed to the unions. Established during Vargas' New State, this tax provided the major funding source for union activity and was available only to officially recognized organizations, thereby providing a powerful weapon for government control.

Joaquimzão. The nickname of Joaquim dos Santos Andrade, leader of the São Paulo Metalworkers Union since 1965, generally in an accommodationist fashion, and an important political actor in contemporary Brazil.

Kubitschek, Juscelino. Populist president from 1955–60 who promoted Brazilian industrialization, relaxed some of the rigorous controls on ideology and organization that has marked preceding regimes, and allowed labor a greater measure of autonomy.

Leuenroth, Edgard. German-born journalist espousing anarcho-syndicalist ideology, he was a major figure in the early Brazilian labor movement and headed the Brazilian Labor Confederation (COB), established in 1908.

Lula. Nickname of José Inácio da Silva, leader of the São Bernardo Metalworkers in the 1970s and symbol of a new wave of Brazilian syndicalism that challenged the existing system on behalf of the workers. He became a major political actor, establishing a new Workers Party (PT).

New State (Estado Novo). The dictatorial regime established by Vargas in 1937 which created a corporatist structure embracing organized labor.

Old Republic. Period running from the fall of the Empire (1889) to the 1930 Revolution, characterized by decentralization and the "politics of the governors."

Parallel organizations. Term applied to labor organizations that are illegal under existing labor legislation.

Pelego. Derisive term applied to labor leaders who act in the interests of the government rather than of the workers.

Renovadores. Name applied in the early 1960s to those elements wishing to implement major reforms to promote union autonomy.

Second Reign. Period of rule by Emperor Pedro II, 1840–1889.

Social Question. Term applied especially in the early twentieth century to issues of labor organization and protest.

Tribunal Superior do Trabalho. Established in 1946 under Vargas' New State, this Higher or Superior Labor Court was at the apex of a system of regional and local tribunals, all part of a system that attempted to place all relations between labor and capital into the context of state administrative agencies.

Vargas, Getúlio. Gaining power through the Revolution of 1930, dominating national politics until 1945, and then gaining an elected term as president in 1950 which ended with his suicide, Vargas is a transcendent figure in Brazil's modern history. Responsible for the corporatist New State which gave Brazilian labor the organizational configurations it retains to this day.

Chile

- Arcos, Santiago.** Co-founder with Francisco Bilbao of the Equality Society in 1849–50, his famous Open Letter to Francisco Bilbao is credited with introducing the class struggle concept into the Chilean political lexicon.
- Blest, Clotário.** A heroic figure in the Chilean labor movement, in the 1940s he served as the first president of the National Association of Public Employees (ANEF), and in the 1950s of the Chilean Workers Central (CUT).
- Frei, Eduardo.** Christian Democrat elected president in 1964, he presided over a serious reformist initiative that brought greatly increased popular mobilization among shanty town dwellers, rural villagers, peasant proprietors, and poor women.
- Gremios (Guilds).** In keeping with Spanish tradition, these associations were formed by artisans and skilled tradesmen during the colonial period.
- Group of 10.** Basically composed of high ranking Christian Democratic union leaders who in May, 1976 signed an extremely critical open letter directed at the military government concerning union rights. Despite opposing the 1980 constitution, following its promulgation the group adopted a pragmatic view and attempted to represent the workers within the existing system.
- Ibáñez, Carlos.** General who ruled from 1927–31 and attempted to subordinate the labor movement to the central government and use it as a base of support. In 1952 he won election to the presidency on a populist platform that drew support from an array of personalist, centrist, and socialist elements.
- INDAP.** The Institute for Agrarian Development established under the Christian Democrat administration of Eduardo Frei, 1964–70, which along with Promoción Popular (Popular Promotion) stimulated rural labor organizations and peasant committees to political action.
- Jiménez, Tucapel.** Leader of the National Association of Public Employees (ANEF) who in the 1980s assumed a prominent role in efforts to unify the labor movement. As labor-government relations deteriorated in 1982–4, he joined a long list of labor leaders “disappeared” and assassinated from 1973 on.
- Juntas de Conciliación (Conciliation Juntas).** Specialized administrative agencies created by the Labor Code of 1931 to oversee mandatory collective bargaining and arbitration, review labor petitions by organized workers, and regulate strike votes and strike actions.
- Labor Code of 1931.** This legislation provided the basic framework for the Chilean industrial relations system until the military coup of 1973, establishing substantial government participation in regulation of the labor movement.
- Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy.** Issued under the presidency of Gabriel González Videla, this internal security legislation outlawed the Communist party and Communist participation in the labor movement.
- Mancomunal.** Labor brotherhoods, the first of which was formed in 1900 among maritime workers in Iquique, and which played a leading role in labor conflicts during the first decade of the twentieth century.
- Pinochet, Augusto.** General who came to power in the 1973 coup which toppled the

government of Salvador Allende, and has presided over a brutal and repressive military dictatorship.

Plan Laboral (Labor Plan). Beginning in 1978, the military government, which came to power in a 1973 coup, rewrote the Chilean industrial relations system to destroy labor autonomy, repress the movement, and negate rural unionization.

Popular Front. A coalition formed in 1936 among political parties of the left and center that sponsored formation of a unified national labor organization, the Confederation of Chilean Workers (CTCH).

Recabarren, Luís Emilio. Along with others who would become prominent politico-labor leaders, in 1912 he split from the Democrat Party (PD) to form the Socialist Labor Party (POS).

Relegación. A state of internal exile applied against Communist and suspected Communists in the labor movement following the passing of the 1948 Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy.

Sindicatos Libres (Free Unions). Those unions not officially sanctioned by the government.

Social Laws. A package of social legislation pushed through in 1924 by a military coup, that provided for a wide range of worker rights within an institutionalized framework for industrial relations.

Sociedades de Resistencia (Resistance Societies). These arose in the late nineteenth century outside the framework of the legal system; influenced by anarchist and socialist ideals, they engaged in confrontations with employers and the government in defense of the class interests of their members.

Unidad Popular (Popular Unity). A left-center coalition that supported the candidacy of Socialist Salvador Allende, who won a narrow victory in the 1970 presidential elections.

Zapata, Emilio. A Trotskyist congressman who in 1935 created the National League for the Defense of Poor Peasants, which then was largely absorbed by the Socialists when Zapata joined the Socialist Party.

Colombia

Antioquía. With Medellín as its main urban center, the importance of this region is second only to that of Bogotá.

Barranquilla. The nation's fourth largest city, and central metropolis of the Atlantic Coast region, it has been an important scene for labor organizing and actions related to shipping.

Cuevas, Tulio. Elected President of the Unity of Colombian Workers in 1963, he led the union away from its traditional policy of nonpartisanship, and deeply involved it with the Conservative Party.

El Obrero (The Laborer). Beginning publication in 1912, the first regularly appearing labor paper in Colombia.

Frente Nacional (National Front). A political agreement in 1958 as an attempt to end the long period of political violence that had gripped the nation. Under the agreement,

the presidency alternated between the Liberal and Conservative parties for a period of sixteen years.

Giradot Labor Directorate (El Directorio Obrero de Girardot). The first known union of dockworkers, it was established in 1919 and disappeared shortly thereafter.

Heroic Age. Period from early twentieth century to 1930 during which the labor movement witnessed bloody clashes and charismatic leaders.

Lleras Camargo, Alberto. The inauguration of this Liberal president in 1958 marked the definitive end of military intervention and initiated the National Front which for a period of sixteen years alternated the presidency between the Liberal and Conservative parties.

Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo. Authoritarian president from 1953–57, his actions prompted a national strike that joined workers and businessmen.

Serpa, Gustavo. President of the Confederation of Colombian Workers throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, he closely allied with the Liberal Party.

Torres Giraldo, Ignacio. Secretary General of the leftist-influenced National Workers' Confederation, in the mid-1920s he toured the country in proselytizing campaigns that caused widespread fear among the ruling circles.

Voz (Voice). Formerly the *Voz Proletaria* or *Proletarian Voice*, this is the widely-read newspaper of the Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers.

Costa Rica

Aguineldo. A "thirteenth month" end-of-year salary bonus.

ARCO (Alianza Revolucionaria de Cultura Obrero). The Revolutionary Association of Worker Culture was a Marxist circle formed in 1929 that helped promote the establishing in 1931 of the Communist Party.

Calderón Guardia, Rafael Angel. President from 1940–44, and leader of the Republican Party, with support from the Communist Party he implemented a 1941 Labor Code that recognized the right to organize, minimum wage, and collective bargaining.

Centro Germinal. This Center for Social Studies, established in 1909 by intellectuals influenced by European leftists, was designed to promote class consciousness among the workers. It proved instrumental in the formation of the General Confederation of Workers.

Golcher, Victor J. A member of the board of the Workers' League, in 1902 he became the first labor representative to Congress.

Montero, Aniceto. Known as the "first great Marxist leader of the Costa Rican labor movement, in 1919 he headed the Socialist Center which helped organize and support new unions and a series of strikes.

Mora Valverde, Manuel. As a law student in 1931 he assumed leadership of the new Communist Party, and remained at its head through the 1980s.

Núñez, Benjamin. A priest who for several years led the Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation and who following the 1948 civil war became Minister of Labor.

Sanabria, Archbishop Victor Manuel. A reformist who sparked the 1940s effort by

Catholic Action to organize Christian labor unions, which resulted in the formation of the Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation.

Thiel, Bishop Bernardo Augusto. Founder of the Catholic Union Party around 1890, his demands for improving labor conditions brought him into conflict with the government.

Volío, Jorge. In the early 1900s he helped establish the social Christian newspaper *Social Justice*, and later as an ex-priest in 1923 founded the Reformist Party which drew its strength from the General Confederation of Workers.

Cuba

Batista, Fulgencio. President of Cuba from 1940–44, he had established close ties with both the Communists and the labor movement in the late 1930s. He seized power in a 1952 coup and maintained dictatorial rule until the 1959 Castro revolution.

Huelga de Aprendizices (Apprentice's Strike). Begun by tobacco workers in 1902 in protest against hiring practices which discriminated against native born workers, it soon took on the character of a general strike in Havana.

July 26th Movement. Refers to the student-worker attack on the Moncada army barracks led by Fidel Castro in 1959. The attack failed, and Castro was imprisoned, but then pardoned by Batista.

Machado, Gerardo. Dictator from 1925 to 1933, he unleashed a reign of terror against the newly formed National Labor Confederation of Cuba.

Menéndez, Jesús. The most famous leader of the powerful National Federation of Sugar Workers (FNTA), he was assassinated in the late 1940s.

Mujal, Eusebio. Installed as head of the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) by the Authentic (Auténtico) Party in 1949, he remained in the post of Secretary General until Castro's revolution in 1959. Under his leadership, organized labor lost almost all its autonomy and became a pliant appendage of the government.

Mujalistas. Followers of Eusebio Mujal, Secretary General of the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) from 1949–59.

Platt Amendment. Incorporated into Cuba's first constitution in 1902 under pressure from the United States, and remaining in effect until 1934, the amendment granted the United States the right to intervene militarily in Cuba, and made any treaties or loan agreements entered into by Cuba subject to U.S. approval.

Popular Revolution. Refers to the 1934–35 period following the end of the Machado dictatorship marked by two major general strikes, both of which were brutally repressed.

El Salvador

Acefalía. State of inactivity when a union is unable to present its required membership roster and certification of election of union officers by the union assembly.

Ant Work. Underground union organizing carried out by progressive union activists during the 1980–83 terror.

Asociación. Civic association legally constituted through an appropriate government

ministry, often functioning as a de facto union to circumvent restrictions of the Ministry of Labor.

BPR (Bloque Revolucionario Popular). The Popular Revolutionary Block emerged in 1975 as a mass revolutionary organization and came to be in the forefront, along with the United Popular Action Front (FAPU) of labor movement realignment.

Cayetano Carpio, Salvador. Leader of the Bakery Industry Workers Union and a General Secretary of the Communist Party of El Salvador, he later founded the Popular Liberation Forces organization which had broad influence during the 1970s trade union radicalization.

Colono. Farmworker or peasant living on an estate.

FAPU (Frente de Acción Popular Unida). The United Popular Action Front was a left alternative to the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN) instrumental in reorienting the Salvadoran labor movement during the late 1970s.

Grande, Rutilio. A Jesuit priest who embraced Liberation Theology's "preferential option for the poor" and was active in organizing rural laborers in the 1970s for the Christian Peasants Federation (FECCAS), he denounced El Salvador's "feudal system". He was killed by security forces in 1977.

Hammer, Michael. Veteran U.S. representative of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) to El Salvador, he was assassinated in 1981 along with Rodolfo Viera, head of the Salvadoran Agrarian Transformation Institute (ISTA), by a death squad acting on behalf of prominent Salvadoran business interests.

Hernández Martínez, Maximiliano. A general who came to power in a 1930 coup and ruled as dictator until 1944, he was responsible for the infamous Matanza of 1932 and the persecution of union activists, including the execution of Farabundo Martí.

Huelga de Brazos Caídos. The "Fallen" or "Folded Arms Strike" of April–May 1944, a work stoppage (as opposed to a walkout) led by the newly formed National Union of Workers (UNT) and directed against the attempt by dictator Maximiliano Hernández Martínez to change the constitution to perpetuate himself in power.

Law for the Defense and Guarantee of Public Order. A sedition act passed as part of the crackdown on labor carried out by the government of General Carlos Humberto Romero (1977–79), it criminalized most union activity.

Másferrer, Alberto. A journalist who espoused social welfare doctrines and in the early 1920s attempted to build a Salvadoran Labor Party on the British model.

Matanza. A massacre in 1932 carried out by the army under the government of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, which had come to power in a military coup. Directed especially against Indian peasants in the Ahuachapán and Sonsonate regions, it destroyed the Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador (FRTS) and killed an estimated 10,000–25,000 union activists and farmworkers.

Medrano, José Alberto "Chele". Military officer who carried out the 1952 purge of the labor movement as part of an institutionalized anti-communist repression led by Oscar Osorio. He later was associated with the joint Salvadoran National Security Agency (ANSEAL) and United States CIA effort to establish ORDEN in 1963.

Meléndez-Quinónez Dynasty. Jorge Meléndez and his brother-in-law Alfonso Quinónez dominated El Salvador on behalf of the coffee oligarchy from 1918 to 1927.

Morán Cornejo, Jorge Alberto "El Beatle". Veteran Unified Trade Union Federation of El Salvador (FUSS) and textile union leader, in 1974 he was assassinated by the regime of Colonel Arturo Rivera.

National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador. Formed in 1981 by the heads of several U.S. unions to oppose aspects of the AFL-CIO's Central American policies. Its pressure caused the AFL-CIO to withdraw its support of military aid to El Salvador.

ORDEN. Established in 1963 with the joint support of the Salvadoran national Security Agency (ANSEAL) and the United States CIA, and headed by Colonel José Alberto "Chele" Medrano, the mission of this organization, whose acronym means order, was to build a pro-government peasant organization and monitor leftist union organizing in the countryside.

Oreja. Literally, ear—a term for stool pigeon (government, boss, or police informer).

Romero Bosque, Pío. President from 1927 to 1931, his administration witnessed a brief period of democracy and concessions toward organized labor, including the legalization of trade unions, the eight-hour day, and creation of arbitration commissions to resolve labor-management disputes.

Viera, Rodolfo. General Secretary of the Salvadoran Communal Union (UCS), in 1980 he became head of the Salvadoran Agrarian Transformation Institute (ISTA) as part of the military junta's three-phase agrarian reform program. He was assassinated, along with Michael Hammer, veteran Salvador representative of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in 1981 by a death squad acting on behalf of prominent Salvadoran business interests.

Zaldívar, Felipe. Centrist leader of the Construction Workers Union (SUTC), he was a key leader in the 1980 formation of the Democratic Popular Unity (UPD) coalition backing the moderate reform program of the Christian Democratic Party and José Napoleón Duarte. He was assassinated in 1981.

Guatemala

Alfano, Antonio. Trade union leader and attorney, founded CUSG in 1983.

Ángel Albizuques, Miguel. Trade Union Leader, Head of CNT, 1976–78.

Arana Osorio, Carlos. Guatemalan President, 1970–74; general who has led anti-guerrilla campaign and held much power in 1970s.

Arbenz, Jacobo. Guatemalan President, 1951–54; former general, progressive liberal, overthrown in CIA-backed coup.

Arévalo, Juan José. Guatemalan President, 1945–51; liberal democrat.

Armas, Castillo. Guatemalan President, 1954–57; came to power through CIA-backed coup; repressed unions.

CAN. Central Auténtica Nacionalista (Nationalist Authentic Center), party begun by Arana supporters, legalized in 1979.

Cerezo, Vinicio. Guatemalan President 1986– ; Christian Democrat.

- Cifuentes, Miguel.** Trade Union Leader, Secretary General of Tobacco Workers, 1976–8; CNUS representative.
- Colom Argueta, Manuel.** Founded FUR party, murdered by army in 1979.
- DCG.** Democrática Cristiana Guatemalteca (Guatemalan Christian Democrats) was founded in 1955, and represented reformist positions appealing to middle sectors and some Indian groups.
- ESA.** Ejército Secreto Anti-Comunista (Secret Anti-Communist Army), a death squad supported by the Lucas García government.
- Fuentes Mohr, Alberto.** Congressman and leader of PSD, killed by army in 1979.
- FUN.** The Frente de Unidad Nacional (National Unity Front), begun in 1979, split from the MLN. Its leader, Roberto Alejos Arzu, founded the new right Freedom Foundation.
- FUR.** United Revolutionary Front, founded in 1970, legalized in 1979 just before death of leader Manuel Colom Argueta.
- Gloria Torres, Marta.** Trade Union Attorney for CNT, 1976–78.
- Larue, Frank.** Trade Union Attorney for CNT, 1976–79; representative for RUOG.
- Laugerud, Kjell.** A general who was Guatemalan President, 1974–78.
- López Larrave, Mario.** Trade Union Attorney, Dean of USC Law School, represented many unions until murdered in 1977.
- Lucas García, Romeo.** Guatemalan General, President, 1978–82; severely repressive.
- Márquez, Israel.** Trade union leader, Secretary General of Coca-Cola Union and CNT, 1978–9, CNUS representative.
- Meija Victores.** Guatemalan President, 1983–85; a general, repressive toward unions and Indians.
- Menchu, Rigoberta.** CUC leader and writer.
- Méndez Montenegro, Julio César.** Guatemalan President, 1966–70, supported U.S. investments and modernization.
- MLN.** Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (right wing National Liberation Movement Party begun by Castillo Armas). It has been headed by Mario Sandoval Alarcón.
- Ortiz, Silverio.** Tailor and trade union leader during the rule of Estrada Cabrera; helped mobilize a large labor federation and demonstration that led to the President's downfall in 1919.
- Peralta Azurdia, Enrique.** Guatemalan President, 1963–66, General PID-Partido Institucional Democrático (Institutional Democratic Party) begun by Peralta Azurdia.
- PNR.** Partido Nacional Renovador (National Renovation Party) formed in 1979, a split-off from the MLN.
- PR.** Partido Revolucionario (Revolutionary Party); begun in 1957 in memory of Arevalo, it later became a small center-right party.
- PSD.** Partido Social Demócrata (Social Democratic Party); it grew out of the PR in 1978 under Fuentes Mohr.
- Ríos Montt, Efraín.** Guatemalan general and President, 1982–83; began scorched earth policy toward Indians.

Romualdi, Serafino. U.S. labor representative who set up ORIT/company based unions after 1954 coup.

Ubico, Jorge. Guatemalan President, 1931–44; repressed unions.

Urizar, Yolanda. Labor lawyer for CNT, 1976–80. She continued to give labor courses and was eventually abducted in 1981.

Ydígoras Fuentes, Miguel. Guatemalan President, 1958–63; continued policies of Castillo Armas.

Guyana

Berbice. District known for cotton and coffee production.

Bhagwan, Moses. Former leader of the People's Progressive Party Youth Program; formed the Indian Political Revolutionary Association in 1973; helped in the organization of the Working People's Alliance.

Bookers Company. Liverpool merchant house that consolidated plantation agriculture in the nineteenth century.

Burnham, Forbes. Founder of the People's National Congress and premier from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s.

"Cooperative Republic". Early 1970s political program devised by Burnham as a form of economic sharing of national resources by the public and private sectors.

Critchlow, Hubert. Organizer of the first genuine labor union, the British Guyana Labor Union, in 1918.

"Critical Support". Promise of support given to the Burnham regime by Jagan and the People's Progressive Party in return for governmental recognition of the Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union (1976–78).

Declaration of Sophia. 1974 program espoused by Burnham with strong emphasis on socialist aims, land reform, education, trade, and the drafting of a new constitution.

Demarara. Largest bauxite-producing district in the country.

Edun, Ayube. Organizer of the Man Power Citizens' Association in 1936.

Enmore Riots. Large-scale sugar strikes in 1948 prompting the Venn Commission Report of the following year.

Georgetown. Capital and most important urban center of the nation.

Jagan, Cheddi. Founder of the People's Progressive Party; influential force in the independence movement; guiding force in the Guyana Industrial Workers' Union. The most important twentieth-century East Indian personality in the country.

Kwayana, Eusi. African nationalist leader of the African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa; co-founder of the Working People's Alliance.

Lachmansingh, J. Co-organizer of the Guyana Industrial Workers' Union.

Lenora Plantation Riots. Event in 1939 which sparked the recognition of the Man Power Citizens' Association by the Sugar Producers' Association.

Philadelphia, Birchmore. General-Secretary of the Clerical and Commercial Workers' Union.

Pomeroon Colony. First sugar growing region in the nation (mid-seventeenth century).

Rangela, Amos. Co-founder of the Guyana Industrial Workers' Union.

Thorne, A. A. Organizer of the British Guyanese Workers League in 1939.

Working People's Alliance. 1978 Ethnic fusion of the African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA) and the Indian Political Revolutionary Association (IPRA).

Honduras

Banana Republic. The dominance of the United Fruit Company and the Standard Fruit company and their intervention in Honduran affairs led to North Americans' applying this derisive term.

Calix Matute, Felipe. One of Honduras' first Communist leaders, in 1926 he helped found the Federation of Workers Societies of the North.

Cariás Andino, Tiburcio. Elected President in 1932, he remained in power for sixteen years by persuading the Congress to amend the Constitution, and brought a measure of stability and personal liberty to Honduras.

Chinchilla, José Enrique. An army major, he led an attack on June 12, 1975 at the Horcones Ranch in Juticalpa, Olancho, site of the Santa Clara Leadership Training Center, a Church-sponsored agrarian organizing program. The attack resulted in twelve deaths and brought pressure on the Church to abandon its rural literacy and community development programs.

Comisión del Decreto 91. The Decree 91 Commission is a policy group chaired by the Minister of Economy which controls prices of such critical items as rice and beans as well as transportation costs.

Finqueros. Owners of coffee plantations or fincas.

Great Banana Strike. Lasting from May to July of 1954, this action testified to the resurgence of the Honduran labor movement and sparked formation of the Federation of National Workers of Honduras and Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers.

INA. The National Agrarian Institute which in the 1970s was active in promoting the Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives.

Liberal Reform. A period initiated in 1876 by the Liberal Marco Aurelio Soto, which involved an ambitious program of improvements in communications and juridical-legal reforms that welcomed foreign capital.

Personería jurídica. The status of legal recognition as a labor union granted by the government.

Sandoval, Rigoberto. Director of the National Agrarian Institute (INA), who sparked an aggressive program of agrarian reform in the early 1970s.

Tiendas de raya. Company stores, also known as comisariatos, at which banana workers were forced to shop in the early twentieth century.

Zelaya, Lorenzo. A peasant leader involved in the National Federation of Honduran Peasants who was killed, along with eleven companions, by army troops in 1965.

Zúñiga Augustinius, Ricardo. Leader of the National Party, and long-time *eminence gris* of Honduran politics.

Nicaragua

AIFLD. American Institute for Free Labor Development. A branch of AFL–CIO, it provides training and advice for anti-Communist labor organizing and has a long history of being used by CIA in Latin America; assisted in formation of CUS in 1960s in Nicaragua after Somoza repressed independent dockworkers' organization.

Altamirano, Eli. Organized Sindicato de Mecánicos y Metalúrgicos de Managua in 1960. In August 1968, he became Secretary General of Partido Obrero Socialista de Nicaragua, a 1967 breakaway from the PSN, renamed PCdeN in December 1970. The preeminent personality of PCdeN in 1970s and 1980s, he was jailed in 1981 after CAUS led strikes in violation of Social-Economic Emergency laws.

Asambleas de Reactivación Económica (ARE). Assemblies convened at the enterprise level in 1980 to promote worker awareness and participation in production decisions. In practice, the ARE generally failed to provide an effective mechanism for worker participation and therefore fell into disuse by 1981.

Avance. Newspaper of PCdeN; devotes extensive coverage to CAUS.

Calificadores. Classification of occupational categories by degree of complexity, responsibility, and training required, as part of the National System of Organization of Labor and Salaries (SNOTS), introduced in 1984. Each occupational category was assigned a ranking on a 28–point standardized national wage table.

Castro Wassmer, Andres. Founding member and Secretary General of PTN; exiled to Honduras in 1932.

CAT. Centros de Abastecimiento de los Trabajadores, centralized worker commissaries where basic goods are sold at controlled prices. Introduced in 1985 as part of an economic policy package designed to provide incentives to salaried workers. Point of contention in late 1985 as CST criticized Ministry of Internal Commerce for failure to adhere to accords signed earlier in the year regarding supply of basic wage goods.

Causa Obrera. Succeeded *El Germen* in 1934 as official organ of PTN. Briefly replaced by *El Proletario* in 1935. Taken over by collaborationist faction and financed by Somoza in June 1938. Shut down in October 1938 when the collaborationists were expelled from the editorial board.

Código del Trabajo. Labor Code in effect since 1945, liberal on paper but seldom enforced during Somoza dictatorship.

Convención Colectiva. Collective bargaining, leading to formal contracts (*convenios*) negotiated with advice from union centrals. Since 1980, Ministry of Labor approval is required for all *convenios*.

Coronel Urtecho, José. Literary figure, dabbled in Camisas Azules in 1930s; later joined Sandinista cause.

Cuadra, Carlos. FO leader, National Assembly Deputy for MAP-ML in 1980s. Editor of *El Pueblo* and *Prensa Proletaria*.

Cuadra, Pablo Antonio. Literary figure, edited magazine of the fascist Camisas Azules in 1930s; later became member of Partido Conservador de Nicaragua and Director of *La Prensa* in 1980s.

Cuyamel Fruit Company. Site of massacre of striking workers in 1922.

De La Selva, Salomón. (1893–1959.) Poet, active in FON in 1920.

Descapitalización. Illegal capital flight. Focus of labor capital clashes in 1980–81, with factory takeovers and land seizures organized by CST and ATC. These conflicts were suspended in 1981 with the passage of new sanctions against decapitalization and bans on spontaneous worker takeovers.

Eco Obrero. Labor newspaper of the Conservatives of the 1930s, taken over by *somocistas* in the 1940s.

El Germen. Began as political-literary journal edited by Emilio Quintana and Jesús Maravilla Almendárez, became official organ of PTN when the editors joined in 1932.

El Machete. Newspaper of the ATC.

El Popular. Newspaper of PSN since January 1985; extensive coverage of CGTI.

El Proletario. Replaced *Causa Obrera* as official organ of PTN from July to September 1935.

El Pueblo. Newspaper of MAP-ML, closed in 1980 after violent strikes led by FO and calls in *El Pueblo* for economic sabotage.

El Socialista. Weekly publication of left-wing faction of FON, mid-1920s. A completely different newspaper by the same name appeared in the 1980s, published by the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores, a small Trotskyist party which engaged in organizing urban industrial workers.

El Trabajador. Newspaper of the CST.

Escobar, José Benito. Construction worker and labor organizer of the 1970s, killed by Somoza's National Guard. The CST was named after him.

García, Edgardo. Secretary General of ATC in 1980s.

Godoy Reyes, Virgilio. First Minister of Labor under Sandinista government. Resigned in 1984 to become presidential candidate of Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI).

Gómez Mejía, Julio. First Secretary of Organization and Propaganda of FTM, 1945; founder of Sindicato de Maestros de Managua.

González, Absalon. First Secretary General of the Somoza-controlled CGT, 1950.

González Morales, Roberto. Born 1907; mechanic, migrated to El Salvador and became active in labor movement and Communist Party Youth. Returned to Nicaragua in August 1934, became PTN leader. Coopted by Somoza into collaborationist faction of PTN. Secretary General of the somocista CGT in 1950s.

Guevara, Onofre. Socialist labor leader in 1950s. National Assembly Deputy, columnist for FSLN newspaper *Barricada*, and radio commentator in 1980s. Co-authored *El movimiento obrero en Nicaragua* with Carlos Pérez Bermúdez, focusing on history of PTN and PSN through 1948.

Guthrie, Alvin. Secretary General of CUS in 1980s.

Gutiérrez, Francisco. Secretary General of FO.

Hernández Segura, Francisco. First Secretary General of Communist Party (organized in exile in Costa Rica in 1940, known as PSN after its public announcement of the party's existence in Nicaragua in July 1944). Succeeded in 1945 by Juan Lorío García.

Hoy. Short-lived publication by PTN-independents who formed Confederación de Trabajadores de Nicaragua (CTN) in 1938, disbanded by Somoza repression in 1939. Revived in July 1941 by Socialists returning from exile in Costa Rica, including Francisco Hernández Segura, Efraím Rodríguez, Carlos Pérez Bermúdez, and Augusto Lorío. Espoused Brauderist/national unity line. Closed down in January 1942, replaced in April by *La Verdad*, which was closed by the National Guard in August.

Huembes, Carlos. Leader of right-wing (PSC-affiliated) faction of CTN since 1982.

Índice. Weekly publication of independent labor activists following dissolution of PTN in 1939. Absorbed in 1941 by *Hoy*, published by Socialists returning from exile in Costa Rica.

Jarquín, Antonio. Leader of PPSC-affiliated faction of CTN, renamed CTN-A, since 1982.

Jiménez Lucio. Secretary General of CST in 1980.

Jornada laboral. Length of the workday. The Sandinista government launched a major campaign in 1986 to recover the historical *jornada* of six hours for rural laborers, which had dropped to approximately four hours since the 1979 revolutionary victory. ATC cooperation and increased wage incentives were crucial components of the campaign.

La Acción Obrera. Weekly publication of FON, 1920s.

La Evolución Obrera. 1922–36, weekly publication of CO. Consistently opposed U.S. Marine occupation of Nicaragua (1927–33).

Lorío García, Augusto. Labor leader of PTN, exiled to Costa Rica in 1939. Founding member of what would become PSN. Brother of Juan Lorío.

Lorío García, Juan. PTN activist in 1930s, Secretary General of PSN 1945–48. Brother of Augusto Lorío.

Maravilla Alméndarez, Jesús. Born 1902. Active in 1920s, later became PTN leader, organized Tailors' Union in 1933. Leading figure in PTN collaborationist faction. With Roberto González Morales, headed PTN delegation that met with Sandino in 1934.

Martí, Augustin Farabundo. Salvadoran Communist Party leader, did political organizing with Sandino, met with Nicaraguan workers in Northern mining town of San Albino and inspired the creation of PTN in 1931.

Miranda Bengoechea, Bonifacio. Secretary General, Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT)—small Trotskyist party which made some inroads in organizing urban industrial workers in the 1980s.

Navárez López, Eduardo. Last Secretary General of PTN, presided over its dissolution in February 1939.

Normación. Setting of work norms as part of a payment-by-results scheme (SNOTS) introduced in 1984 to increase wartime production.

Ortega, Marvin. Non-conformist Marxist intellectual, founding member of MAP-ML in 1970s, later rejoined FSLN and headed study on popular participation at Center for Research on the Agrarian Reform, CIERA.

Pago en especies. Literally "payment in kind," the practice generally involved sale-at-

cost of fixed quantities of goods to workers; became common in factories in the 1970s. The practice came to represent a major component of some workers' incomes in the 1980s, as shortages and price controls widened the gap between official and market prices. Elimination of *pago en especies* in June 1985 as part of a series of economic policy reforms triggered opposition by textile workers organized by CAUS.

Pegue. Nicaraguan slang for work or job.

Pérez Bermúdez, Carlos. Barber, PTN activist, and Secretary General, leading figure in PTN independent tendency. Exiled to Costa Rica in 1939, returned in 1941 to play a leading role in the labor movement and in the foundation of the PSN. Co-author, with Onofre Guevara, of *El movimiento obrero en Nicaragua*.

Pérez Estrada, Manuel. Labor leader of PTN, became Secretary General of PSN (1948–67).

Planilla Nacional de Pagos. Standardized national payroll form, introduced in 1984 as part of National System of Organization of Labor and Salaries (SNOTS).

Prensa Proletaria. Newspaper of MAP-ML (renamed Partido Marxista-Leninista de Nicaragua, PMLN, in 1986), published since Mar. 1979; extensive coverage of FO.

Prestaciones sociales. All legally required worker benefits (including vacation pay, social security, etc.).

Quintana, Emilio. Leading figure in PTN collaborationist faction in late 1930s. Shoemaker and poet. Together with Jesús Maravilla Alméndarez, edited *El Germen*, which became official organ of PTN. Later edited *Causa Obrera*, financed by Somoza after 1938.

Rojinegro. Day of volunteer labor. Organized periodically by Sandinista unions after the 1979 revolutionary victory, to increase production and consciousness.

Rostrán Bengoechea, Ramón. Founder of Nacional Sindicalismo Nicaragüense (8 May 1934).

Salgado, Carlos. Secretary General of CGTI in 1980s.

Salvatierra, Sofonías. Liberal historian, founder of Obreroismo Organizado, author of *Obreroismo y nacionalidad* (1928). Ran school for workers in Managua, 1916–21. January 1933, appointed Minister of Agriculture and Labor in Liberal government of Juan Bautista Sacasa; supported peace talks with Sandino. Went into exile after 1934 assassination of Sandino, after which he faded.

Sánchez, Domingo “Chaguitillo”. Old-time Socialist activist. Leader in UGT in 1950s, president of SCAAS-Managua in 1970s, Secretary General and presidential candidate of PSN in 1980s. Famous for long-winded discourses.

Sandinismo. Revolutionary nationalist movement, first organized around Gen. Augusto César Sandino's guerrilla warfare against occupying U.S. Marines (1927–33); later revived by the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN), which was founded in 1961 and led the revolution that overthrew the Somoza dictatorship in 1979. Sandino had organized an agricultural cooperative movement and recruited workers and peasants to his cause, which was brutally repressed by Somoza's National Guard following Sandino's assassination in 1934. The latter-day Sandinistas engaged in rural and urban labor organizing in the 1970s, and controlled the largest union confederations (CST, ATC) after 1979.

Semiproletariado. Stratum of workers whose economic reproduction depends on a combination of wage-labor and subsistence self-employment. The cotton boom of the 1950s created a huge agricultural semiproletariat, squeezed onto marginal plots of land and therefore obliged to seek seasonal employment as harvest workers.

Séptimo día. Continuously cumulative vacation pay, written into law in 1962.

Sindicato blanco. Union that represents the interests of (and is often created by) management. Such unions were promoted by the Somoza regime, via the CGT in the 1950s and CUS in the 1960s and 1970s.

Snots. *Sistema Nacional de Organización del Trabajo y los Salarios.* National wage system designed in 1983 and introduced in 1984. Includes designation of occupational categories (*calificadores*) which are incentives set by joint union-management commissions at the enterprise level; and a standard national payroll form (*planilla nacional de pagos*). The new system was accompanied in 1985–86 by a phasing out of price subsidies and a series of calibrated wage hikes, and was aimed at increasing production.

Somocismo. Support for Somoza family rule (1936–79) and/or the political and economic model it represented. The model included alternating repression and cooptation to obstruct independent labor organizing.

Subsidio. Sick leave. May also refer more generally to employer subsidies of food, transportation, etc.

Tellez, Isidro Ignacio. Construction worker, founding member of MAP-ML and FO, presidential candidate of MAP-ML in 1984.

Treceavo mes. “Thirteenth month” end-of-year bonus, also known as the *aguinaldo*, initiated in 1978 as part of Somoza’s efforts to quell worker unrest in the face of mounting crisis. Partially canceled by special tax to finance Fund to Combat Unemployment in 1979. The wage ceiling for exemption was raised in 1980, 1984, and on 15 October 1985. This last change, supported by the CST and ATC, sparked heated debate in the National Assembly; the Socialist and Communist Party unions called for restoration of the entire *treceavo mes*, while the FO proposed a higher ceiling for exemption from the tax.

Unidad. PSN Weekly of the 1950s.

Vargas Domingo. PSN activist of 1950s. Led CGTI, 1963.

Vivas Garay, Manuel “El Coto”. Student from Masaya, founding member of PTN. Jailed in wave of repression following Sandino’s assassination in February 1934. Died two days after his release from prison in May 1934, presumably poisoned while in prison.

Zambrana Salmeron, Allan. Secretary General of CAUS, representative in Council of State (1980). Arrested for organizing illegal work stoppages in March 1980 and October 1981. Presidential candidate of PCdeN in 1984. Became National Assembly Deputy, 1985.

Zancudismo. The Somoza dynasty’s practice of creating or entering pacts with token (“mosquito”) parties and organizations to foster the illusion of liberal democracy.

Panama

Blásquez de Pedro, José Maria. Spanish anarcho-syndicalist who helped found the General Union of Workers in 1924; sometimes referred to as the “father of Panama’s organized labor.”

Hunger and Desperation March (*Marcha del Hambre y la Desesperación*). This 1959 protest resulted in a new renters’ law and the nation’s first minimum salary law.

Remón, José Antonio. A former chief of police who became President of Panama in 1952; brutally persecuted labor organizations.

Torrijos, Omar. Came to power in 1968 National Guard coup and established a populist stance with much new legislation concerning organized labor. Died in a plane crash in 1981.

Paraguay

Caballero, Bernardino. A general and war hero who founded the Colorado political party and dominated the nation from 1874 to 1904.

Chaco War. A war against Bolivia that lasted from 1832–35, and which unleashed nationalist passions and a period of unprecedented social ferment and political mobilization.

Colorados. Literally, the coloreds; one of Paraguay’s major political parties, the other being the Liberals.

Febrerista. Refers to the government of Colonel Rafael Franco, which came to power in a February 1936 coup. Franco’s administration lasted only a year, but it was responsible for the country’s first social legislation, including a labor code. The Febreristas remained a political force throughout the 1940s.

Solano López, Francisco. Authoritarian ruler from 1862 to 1870 who led Paraguay into the disastrous 1865–70 war against Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.

Stroessner, Alfredo. Commander-in-chief of the armed forces who came to power in a 1954 coup and has ruled Paraguay ever since.

War of the Triple Alliance. Also known as the Paraguayan War, this conflict pitted Paraguay against Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina. Lasting from 1865 to 1870, it stripped Paraguay of some 60,000 square miles of territory and reduced the nation’s population by nearly 60 percent.

Peru

APRA. Founded in 1924 by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre while he was in exile in Mexico, this populist political movement is known as the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*).

Benavides, Oscar. A general whose dictatorship spanned the years 1933–39. In an attempt to depoliticize labor, he established the Ministry of Public Health, Labor and Social Welfare and a social security system for permanently employed workers.

Billinghurst, Guillermo. President from 1912 to 1915, his decree discouraging strike activity inadvertently recognized the right to strike.

Búfalos. Literally, buffalos, a term applied to the APRA’s goon squads in the 1950s.

- Cien bases** (hundred locals). Refers to the Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution (CTRP) Lima affiliates which in 1976 split to form CTRP-Lima and joined with the Fisherman's Federation (FFP) and the Christian Democratic National Workers Confederation (CNT) in a Unification Council of Union Organizations (CUOS).
- Clasista.** Classist or working-class oriented, a term used by socialist trade unionists to distinguish themselves from followers of APRA. Connoting a more political orientation, in the 1970s, the term was appropriated by "new Left" forces to distinguish themselves from the more "reformist" orientation of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP).
- Cordones de miseria.** Literally, beltways of misery, a term Church officials in the 1970s applied to the shantytowns which housed half of Lima's population.
- Defense Fronts.** Formed in the 1980s by unions to support industries threatened by free market policies and privatization instituted by the new government of Fernando Belaúnde.
- Enganche.** A traditional system of seasonal labor recruitment used by landowners.
- Gonzáles Prada, Manuel.** Poet and intellectual founder of revolutionary nationalism in Peru, in the early nineteenth century he promoted anarcho-syndicalist ideology, and in 1905 at Lima's first major May Day event he delivered a famous speech, "The Intellectual and the Worker."
- Haya de la Torre, Víctor Raúl.** Developer and leader of a Peruvian strain of populism or social democracy known as Aprismo, he came to political maturity during the 1913–19 period of labor militancy, and remained arguably the major political and labor figure in Peru until his death in 1979.
- Industrial Communities.** Introduced during the Velasco regime in 1969 with the aid of a group of financiers and industrialists, these granted workers profit-sharing and co-management rights designed to undercut union influence and, especially, its predominant communist leadership.
- Jaureguí, Arturo.** An APRA leader in the 1950s and 1960s who served as general secretary of the Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT).
- Luna, Juan P.** A communist who was in 1944 the first general secretary of the Confederation of Workers of Peru (CTP), and the only trade union leader in the national congress.
- Mariátegui, José Carlos.** Author of the most influential book ever written about Peru, *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*, founder of the Peruvian Socialist Party (PSP) in 1928, and in 1929 of Peru's first national labor confederation, the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP).
- Morales Bermúdez, Francisco.** General who presided over the "Second Phase" of Peru's nationalist military regime, 1975–80, during which a serious economic crisis sparked generalized labor strife and radicalization.
- National Confederation of Private Enterprise Institutions (CONFIEP).** A powerful employers' lobby formed in 1984.
- Negreiros, Luís.** Tramway union leader and APRA's most dynamic labor activist in the 1940s, he was assassinated in 1950 by police.
- Odria, Manuel.** A general whose repressive dictatorship from 1948 to 1955 held new

union formation in check, banned APRA, and imprisoned leaders of the Confederation of Workers of Peru (CTP).

Policlasista. Literally, multiclass; this concept stressed a cross-class political front of "manual and intellectual workers" and was presented by APRA and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre as an alternative to the communists' concept of class struggle.

Sabroso, Arturo. Leader of the Textile Workers Federation of Peru (FTTP), he led a group of anarcho-syndicalists who gravitated toward the radical populism and personal charisma of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. The textile unions of Lima formed one of the mainstays of APRA's influence in organized labor. As general secretary of FTTP, in 1944 he led the movement which expelled communists from the newly founded Confederation of Workers of Peru (CTP).

SINAMOS. Key agency established during the Velasco administration to implement a new "Peruvian Revolution," the Social Mobilization National Support System was responsible for helping the regime organize its own rural and industrial labor organizations. In 1972, with the military, SINAMOS formed the Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution (CTRP).

Tantaleán Vanini, Javier. A general and Fisheries Minister who in 1972 led an attempt to challenge the left in the trade union movement by sponsoring the Revolutionary Labor Movement (MLR), a semi-fascist front, which took over the Fishermen's Federation of Peru (FFP) and the Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution (CTRP), and began in 1974 organized violence against Lima's leftist unions.

Velasco Alvarado, Juan. General who presided over the "First Phase" of Peru's nationalist military regime, 1968-75, which witnessed one of Latin America's most far-reaching agrarian reforms.

Vitarte. An industrial zone a few miles east of Lima which witnessed mass community resistance and strikes in the mid-1970s sparked by the military's economic policies and anti-labor stance.

Puerto Rico

Caraballo Negrón, José L. "Chepo". An active labor leader since the 1950s, in 1961 he founded the Workers United Union of the South of Puerto Rico. He died in 1978.

Constitution of 1869. The "liberal" Spanish constitution resulting from the 1868 revolt which ended the reign of Queen Isabella II. In Puerto Rico it stimulated political activity and greatly expanded freedom of assembly, speech, and press.

Cortes. Spain's legislative assembly.

Era de los compontes. Beginning in 1887, a period of harsh punishments directed against "Liberal subversion" instituted by the military governor, Lieutenant General Romualdo Palacio González.

Foraker Act. The 1900 U.S. legislation that structured the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States.

Free Associated State (Estado Libre Asociado). The 1952 constitution creating the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Iglésias Pantín, Santiago. A Galician-born Spaniard who began labor organizing in Puerto Rico in 1896. He founded the Free Federation of Labor.

Independistas. Those who support independent nation status for Puerto Rico.

Jones Act. Passed in 1917, the Jones-Shafroth Act provided U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans.

Libreta. A type of internal passport used in the late nineteenth century, listing a laborer's work history.

Muñoz Marín. The son of Muñoz Rivera, he created the Popular Democratic Party in the 1930s; following the Elcctive Governor Act, in 1948 he became the island's governor, and helped establish Operation Bootstrap.

Muñoz Rivera, Luis. Editor of *The Democracy (La Democracia)*, an influential newspaper, and leader of the Liberals, he signed a pact in 1897 with Spanish Liberal Party leader Mateo Praxades Sagasta which promised autonomy to Puerto Rico once Sagasta's party took power.

Operation Bootstrap. An economic development plan begun around 1948 which sought to create an industrialized economy.

Suriname

Aaron, Henck. Prime Minister under the National Party Alliance from 1973 to 1980; ousted when the non-commissioned officers assumed control of the government in February 1980.

Alcoa Strike. A 63-day walkout of bauxite workers staged in 1946 which forced a strong collective-bargaining contract and prompted government recognition of the bauxite unions.

Bouterse, Desi. Sergeant who emerged as the undisputed leader of the military-controlled government by the late summer of 1980.

Bruma, Eddy. Veteran trade union organizer and leftist leader of the Nationalist Republican Party; formed the Central 47 in 1970 and the Central Organization of State Employees in 1971.

CLO-Bulletin. Central Organization of State Employees strike newspaper issued in February 1973.

Derby, F. R. President of Central 47.

Eleazer, Leo. Forged the coalition of the Suriname Miners' Union and the Suriname Workers' Union in 1946; elected to the Staten in 1948.

Kielstra, Johannes. World War II governor, pressured from office by the Suriname Union and pro-independence advocates in the Staten.

Krolis, Iwan. Leader of the Progressive Workers' and Farmers Labor Union.

Lachmon, Jaggernath. Head of the United Hindustani Party in the 1950s and 1960s.

Moederbond. "Mother Union" or federation of workers.

Onze Gids. Teachers' magazine that levelled charges in 1943 against Governor Kielstra, accusing him of engaging in Nazi political tactics.

Paramaribo. Capital and largest city in the country.

Pengel, Johan Adolf. Creole leader of the Suriname National Party in the 1950s and 1960s.

Rusland, J. President of the Central Organization of State Employees.

Staten. Parliamentary body of the nation.

Verbroedering. “Merger” or political accommodation reached between the Hindustani and Creole factions of the country for the purpose of forming an electoral coalition (1958–1967).

Verschuur, William Bos. Teacher and Staten member jailed by Governor Kielstra in 1943, prompting mass parliamentary resignations and the governor’s recall.

Weidmann, Father Josephus. Dutch priest and organizer of the Progressive Workers’ Organization in 1948.

“Willoughbyland.” Name of the original colony; established in 1651 by Governor Francis Willoughby.

Uruguay

Batlle y Ordóñez, José. Uruguayan President (1903–07; 1911–15), who established a system of generalized social assistance or welfare, including many national institutions and much legislation important to labor.

Batllismo. Following the orientation and system established by Uruguayan President José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903–07; 1911–15).

Blancos. Literally, white; one of Uruguay’s two national political parties, it also is known as the Nacional (national).

Colorados. Literally, colored; one of Uruguay’s two national political parties, generally enjoying majority status.

Consejos de Salarios (Salary or Wage Councils). Established after World War II, and with representation from the state, labor, and business, they were established to set wages.

D’Elia, José. Long-time labor militant and former head of the white-collar Uruguayan Federation of Commercial and Industrial Employees (FUECI), he helped establish the National Convention of Workers (CNT) in 1964 and headed it until its dissolution by the military government in 1973.

Dualistic syndicalism. A labor strategy stressing long-term political action as well as mass organizing, associated with communists, socialists, and adherents of traditional parties, it gained prominence in the mid-1930s, displacing anarchism.

Estancias. Large ranches devoted to stockraising.

Frugoni, Emilio. Organizer in 1905 of the Karl Marx Center and leader of the Socialist Party until 1959, he also was the nation’s first socialist representative.

Gómez, Eugenio. The leader of a majority within the Socialist Party which split in 1919 to create the Communist Party. He remained its secretary general until 1954. In the 1930s he was a leader of the General Central of Workers of Uruguay (CeGTU).

Lei de Asociaciones Profesionales (Law of Professional Associations). Passed in 1981, it provided for a carefully regulated resumption of union activity.

Medidas Prontas de Seguridad (Prompt Security Measures). A mild form of martial law frequently used to terminate strikes.

Oficina de Relaciones Laborales (Office of Labor Relations). Created by the military following the 1973 coup at the level of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to substitute for unions as defenders of the workers.

Oficina Nacional de Trabajo (National Labor Office). Established during the second presidency of José Batlle y Ordóñez (1911–15) as part of a general attempt to reconcile the interests of labor and capital.

Sanguinetti, Júlío María. Assumed the presidency in 1984, marking Uruguay's return to civilian rule from the military regime established in 1973.

Syndicalism of Opposition. Refers to the period of the first few decades of the twentieth century marked by the dominance of anarchist unions.

Tupamaros. Urban guerilla movement that arose around 1969 and practiced political violence.

Venezuela

Faria, Jesús. Oil workers' leader since 1936 and secretary general of the PCV for four decades.

González Navarro, José. Shoe workers' leader since 1936 and president of the CTV from 1959 to 1970. Member of CTV Executive Committee until 1985.

Olivo, Francisco. Wood Workers' leader with anarchist leanings. CTV president from 1970 until his death in 1975.

Oropeza Castillo, Alejandro. President of ANDE and first president of the CTV in 1936.

Pérez Salinas, Pedro Bernardo. President of the CTV, 1948–1974. Headed the "CTV-in-Exile" in the 1950s in Mexico. A member of AD, he withdrew from political activity at the time of the MEP split in 1967.

Quijada, Ramón. President of the FCV until the organization divided in 1962.

Quintero, Rodolfo. Played leading role in the 1936 oil workers' strike and later formed part of a Communist splinter group in the 1940s. Rejoined the PCV during the Pérez Jiménez period of the 1950s.

Villegas, Cruz. A member of a splinter Communist group in the 1940s and rejoined the PCV in the 1950s. Long-time head of the CUTV.

Index

- ABC Metalworkers (Brazil), 88
ABC Suburbs (Brazil), 105, 123
Abertura(Brazil), 82, 109
AcBin, Gonzalo, 426
ACC (Colombia). *See* Catholic Colombian Action
Acción (Mexico), 540
Acción Católica Colombiana. *See* Catholic Colombian Action
Acción Sindical Chilena. *See* Chilean Union Action
Acción Sindical Uruguaya. *See* Uruguayan Syndical Action
ACEB. *See* Colombian Association of Bank Employees
ACEM (Guatemala). *See* Capital's Municipal Employees Association
Acero Factory Strike, 1967 (El Salvador), 327
"Acero, S. A." Factory Workers Union (El Salvador), 313, 326, 327, 334, 350, 356, 382
Acevedo, Disnardo Gladys, 337
ACGH. *See* Association of Chauffeurs Guides of Haiti
ACOPAI (El Salvador). *See* Integrated Agrarian Production Cooperative Association
Acricasa (Guatemala). *See* Union of ACRICASA Workers
ACRICASA Textiles, 404, 411, 421, 426
Acrylic Thread Company, 426
Acta de Huancahuacho, 628
Acuña, Juan A., 713
AD. *See* Democratic Action
ADE (Mexico). *See* Electrical Workers Democratic Action
Adolfo Gordo Law, 88, 103
AEBU. *See* Association of Bank Workers of Uruguay
AFGE (Puerto Rico). *See* American Federation of Government Employees
AFL, 259, 266, 284, 311, 349, 398, 401, 402, 430, 431, 451, 456, 568, 579, 593, 611, 634, 647, 673, 679, 682, 684, 686, 687, 688
AFL-CIO, 9, 142, 181, 183, 195, 206, 208, 269, 279, 282, 293, 299, 307, 312-15, 319-23, 339, 340, 341, 342, 347, 349, 350, 352, 353, 355, 358, 363, 367, 368, 370, 372, 373, 379, 384, 410, 477, 485, 492, 506, 513, 528, 552, 562, 587, 601, 603, 636, 637, 638, 665, 675, 676, 680, 681, 688, 689, 760
African Society for Cultural Relations

- with Independent Africa (ASCRIA) (Guyana), 439
- Agarante, Henri, 390
- AGECH. *See* Chilean Educators Gremialist Association
- Agency for International Development. *See* United States Agency for International Development
- AGEUS (El Salvador). *See* General Association of Salvadoran University Students
- Agrarian Federation of Argentina, 8
- Agrarian Leagues (Paraguay), 601, 602, 603
- Agrarian Leagues (Peru), 655
- Agrarian Reform, 42, 167, 195, 305, 314, 318, 334, 338–39, 353, 360, 369–71, 399, 401, 464, 477, 485, 538, 556, 558, 614, 617, 628, 655, 747
- Agricultural Workers National Association (ANTA) (El Salvador), 327–28
- Agricultural Workers Union of El Salvador (SITAS), 323, 327, 328, 334, 343–44, 362, 364, 372, 376
- Agrupaciones* (Pcru), 635
- Agrupación Nacional de Empleados Fiscales* (Chile). *See* National Association of Public Employees
- Aguiar, Peter D', 437
- Aguilar, Efraín, 494
- Aguinaldo* (Costa Rica), defined 237
- Ahora* (Venezuela), 756
- AID. *See* United States Agency for International Development
- Aid Union (Colombia), 266
- AIFLD, 98, 183, 191, 195, 206, 208, 269, 278, 279, 222, 226, 230, 302, 312, 314, 315, 317–24, 333, 335, 336, 339, 340–42, 347–55, 360, 361, 363, 367–74, 379, 382, 384, 402–4, 407, 412, 421, 425, 452, 475, 528, 552, 562, 581, 605, 612, 614, 615, 620, 624, 634, 636, 637
- Alas, Father José, 331
- Albuquerque, Miguel de, 300, 301, 304
- Alcaine, Leonidas Rodríguez, 544
- ALCOA, 692
- ALCONH. *See* Peasant Alliance of National Organizations of Honduras
- Aleman, Miguel, 547
- Alessandri, Arturo, 134, 137–39, 160, 161
- Alessandri, Jorge, 136, 139
- Alfaristas* (Ecuador), defined, 291
- Alfaro, Antonio, 412
- Alfaro, Eloy, 290, 291, 300
- Alfonsín, Luis, 8
- Aliança dos Trabalhadores em Calçado (Brazil). *See* Shoemakers Alliance
- Alianza Campesina de Organizaciones Nacionales de Honduras. *See* National Alliance of Honduran Peasant Organizations
- Alianza Ciabeña, La (Colombia). *See* Ciabeña Alliance
- ALIPO (Honduras). *See* Popular Liberal Alliance
- Allende, Salvador, 136, 137, 139, 145, 555
- Alliance for Progress, 552, 612
- Alliance of Workers, Peasants, and Intellectuals (Costa Rica), 220
- Alliance (Puerto Rico), 673, 674
- Altamirano, Eli, 573
- Altos Hornos, 522–23, 539
- Alvarado, Juan Velasco, 614, 617, 630, 637, 644, 647, 650, 655, 658, 662, 664
- Alvarado, Modesto Rodas, 464
- Alvares, Domingos, 120, 124
- Alvarez, Luís Alberto Monge, 230
- Alvarez, Luís Echeverría, 521
- Alvarez, Waldo, 42, 61
- Alvizurez, Miguel Angel, 404, 421
- Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (U.S.), 321
- America Fabril (Brazil), 126
- American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), 678
- American Federation of Labor (United States). *See* AFL
- American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (United States). *See* AFL-CIO

- American Federation of Teachers (El Salvador), 320
- American Institute for Free Labor Development. *See* AIFLD
- American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) (Peru), 220, 609, 610, 611, 613, 616, 617, 619, 620, 622, 625, 626, 628–30, 633, 636, 637, 639–41, 644, 650, 652–63
- American Project (Panama), 577
- American-Mexican War, 516
- Amnesty International, 369
- AMNLAE, 568–69
- AMPRONAC (Nicaragua), 568–69
- ANACH. *See* National Association of Honduran Peasants
- Anarchism, 73, 87, 526
- Anarcho-syndicalism, 40, 72–74, 365, 596–97, 606
- ANC (El Salvador). *See* National Peasants Association
- ANDA (El Salvador). *See* Water and Sewage National Administration
- Andahuaylas Provincial Peasants Federation (FEPCA) (Peru), 617, 627, 658
- Andamio* (Venezuela), 739
- ANDE. *See* National Educators Association (Costa Rica); National Employees Association (Venezuela)
- ANDEN. *See* National Association of Educators of Nicaragua
- Anderson, Luis G., 585
- ANDES. *See* National Association of Salvadoran Educators
- ANDI (Honduras). *See* National Association of Industry
- Andino, Tiburcio Carias, 463, 468, 472
- Andrade, Auro de Moura, 97
- Andrade, Joaquim dos Santos (Joachimzao), 119, 120, 122
- Andueza, Carlos, 757
- ANEF (Chile). *See* National Association of Public Employees
- ANEP (Peru). *See* National Public Employees Association
- Angarita, Isaias Medina, 727, 729
- Anglo Company (Uruguay), 716
- Anglo-Ecuadorian Oil Company, 302
- ANIS. *See* Salvadoran National Indigenous Association
- ANOC (Chile). *See* National Association of Peasant Organizations
- ANPOS (Bolivia). *See* Permanent National Assembly of Union Organizations
- ANSESAL. *See* Salvadoran National Security Agency
- ANTA (El Salvador). *See* Agricultural Workers National Association
- Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas (Cuba), 257
- Anti-Fascist Syndical Committee (CSAF) (Uruguay), 715, 719
- Antimilitarist League (Brazil), 88
- Antioquian Unionist Association (ASA) (Colombia), 185, 207
- Antiquedad* (Venezuela) defined, 741
- ANTMAG (El Salvador). *See* Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Workers National Association
- Antonini, Ernesto Ramos, 684
- ANUC (Colombia). *See* National Agrarian Union
- AOT (Argentina). *See* Association of Textile Workers
- AP (Brazil; Peru). *See* Popular Action
- Apprentice's strike (Cuba), 263
- APRA (Peru). *See* American Popular Revolutionary Alliance
- Apra Rebelde* (Peru). *See* Rebel Apra
- April and May Revolutionary Party (PRAM) (El Salvador), 312, 348
- Aprismo*, 220; defined, 609
- APSE (Costa Rica). *See* Association of Secondary Education Professors
- Aquirre, Padre Manuel, 736
- Araña, Ventura Zegarra, 621, 648
- Aranco, Pedro, 714
- Araújo, Arturo, 308, 309, 385
- Araújo, Manuel Enrique, 365
- Arbenz, Jacobo, 398, 418, 423, 426, 429
- Arce, Aniceto, 37
- ARCO (Costa Rica). *See* Revolutionary Association of Worker Culture
- Arcos, Santiago, 157

- ARENA (El Salvador), 318, 320, 322, 333, 338, 339, 361, 370
- Arenas, Juan Ortega, 535
- Arequipa Departmental Workers Federation (FDTA) (Peru), 614, 628, 646, 663
- Arequipa Workers Labor Union (USTA) (Peru), 628
- Arévalo, José Orlando, 341
- Arévalo, Juan José, 398, 420, 426, 451
- Arévalo, Manuel, 634
- Arévalo, Reyes Rodriguez, 485, 486
- Argentina, 596, 600, 606: Catholic Church in, 6; Communist Party in, 5, 11, 15, 16, 19; General Confederation of Labor (CGT), factions, 5, 16-17; immigration to, 2, 4, 13; International Monetary Fund (IMF) in, 8; labor publications, *El Obrero Panadero* ("The Bakery Worker"), 10; National Labor Department, 5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18, 23; strikes in, 7, 9, 15 (general, 8, 14, 20, 23, 24; meat workers, 15; sugar workers, 21-23, 24)
- Argentine Labor Party, 6, 17
- Argentine Syndical Union (US), 4, 9, 11, 16, 20
- Argentine Trade Union Unity, 14
- Argentine Workers Committee of Independent Unions (COASI), 9
- Argueta, Ernesto Sorto, 346
- Argueta, Manuel Colom, 405
- Arismendi, Rodney, 710
- Armas, Colonel Castillo, 400, 401
- Armour Corporation, 716
- Arns, Dom Paulo Evaristo, 107
- Arrellano, Oswaldo López, 464, 477, 485
- Arrieros* (Costa Rica), defined, 214, 234
- Arrieti, Francisco, 755
- Arron, Henck, 694, 697, 699
- Artiles, Andres Victor, 477, 486, 493, 494
- Artisan Confederation (Peru), 651, 660
- Artisan-Labor Congress of Pernambuco (Brazil), 85, 115
- Artisans Club (Colombia), 265
- Artisans Confederation "Unión Universal" (Peru), 628
- Artisans Constitutional Club (Costa Rica), 215, 224, 227, 238
- Artisans Federation (Costa Rica), 238
- Artisans Republican Society (Peru), 628
- Artisans Society (Chile), 146
- Artisans Society of San José (Costa Rica), 215
- Artisans Society of Sonsón (Colombia), 180, 199
- Artistic and Industrial Society of Pichincha (Ecuador), 296, 299, 301, 305
- Artistic Industrial Society (Mexico), 516, 525, 526, 533
- Arze, José Antonio, 43
- ASA (Colombia). *See* Antioquian Unionist Association
- ASCRIA (Guyana). *See* African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa
- ASI. *See* Salvadoran Industrialists Society
- ASICH. *See* Chilean Union Action
- ASICOL. *See* Colombian Union Action
- ASIES. *See* Independent Union Association of El Salvador
- Associação de Artes Gráficas (Brazil). *See* Association of Graphic Arts
- Asociación Campesina Social Cristiana de Honduras. *See* Social Christian Peasant Association of Honduras
- Asociación Colombiana de Empleados Bancarios. *See* Colombian Association of Bank Employees
- Asociación de Empleados Bancarios del Uruguay. *See* Association of Bank Workers of Uruguay
- Asociación de Empleados de Tributación Directa (Costa Rica). *See* Association of Tax Office Employees
- Asociación de Maestros de Primaria (Chile). *See* Primary Teachers Association
- Asociación de Profesores de Segunda Enseñanza (Costa Rica). *See* Association of Secondary Education Professors
- Asociación de Tabaqueros de la Habana

- (Cuba). *See* Havana Tobacco Workers' Association
- Asociación General de Maestros (Chile). *See* General Association of Teachers
- Asociación Gremial del Astillero (Ecuador). *See* Astillero Association
- Asociación Gremialista de Educadores de Chile. *See* Chilean Educators Gremialist Association
- Asociación Nacional de Educadores (Costa Rica). *See* National Educators Association of Salvadoran Educators
- Asociación Nacional de Educadores Salvadoreños. *See* National Association of Salvadoran Educators
- Asociación Nacional de Empleados (Venezuela). *See* National Employees Association
- Asociación Nacional de Empleados Públicos (Costa Rica). *See* National Public Employees Association
- Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (Colombia). *See* National Agrarian Federation
- Asociación Obrera Textil (Argentina). *See* Association of Textile Workers
- Asociación Salvadoreña de Trabajadores de Telecomunicaciones. *See* Salvadoran Telephone Workers Association
- Asociación Sindical Antioqueña (Colombia). *See* Antioquian Unionist Association
- Asociación Sindical de Trabajadores de Agua y Acantarrillados (Costa Rica). *See* Union of Water and Sewer Institute Workers
- Asociación Sindical Panameña. *See* Panamanian Trade Union Association
- Asociación Tipográfico (Costa Rica). *See* Typographers Association
- Asprides, Ernesto Kury, 384
- Asociación Nacional Indígena Salvadoreña. *See* Salvadoran National Indigenous Association
- Associated Peasant Enterprises of Guaymas (Honduras), 488
- Associated Peasant Enterprises of Isletas (Honduras), 488
- Association of Bank Employees of Colombia, 186
- Association of Bank Workers of Uruguay (AEBU), 708, 713, 715, 716, 720, 722, 725
- Association of Chauffeurs Guides of Haiti (ACGH), 452, 453
- Association of Graphic Arts (Brazil), 86
- Association of Latin American Unionized Workers (ATLAS) (Venezuela), 744
- Association of Retired Persons (Chile), 168
- Association of Rural Workers (ATC) (Nicaragua), 555, 556, 559–60, 566, 567, 571
- Association of Secondary Education Teachers (COPEMH) (Honduras), 489
- Association of Secondary Education Professors (APSE) (Costa Rica), 224, 225
- Association of Tax Office Employees (Costa Rica), 225
- Association of Technical and Commercial Teachers (Chile), 157
- Association of Textile Workers (AOT) (Argentina), 5, 22
- Association of Women Confronting the National Problem (AMPRONAC) (Nicaragua), 568–69
- Association of Workers of the Metal Industry (ATISS) (Peru), 750
- Association to Promote Labor Education and Economic and Social Investigation (AFELIES) (Peru), 638
- Astillero Association (Ecuador), 296, 303
- ASTTEL. *See* Salvadoran Telephone Workers Association
- ASU. *See* Uruguayan Syndical Action
- ATACES. *See* Farm Workers and Peasant Associations of El Salvador
- ATC (Nicaragua). *See* Association of Rural Workers
- ATCEL (El Salvador). *See* Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission Workers and Employees Union
- ATISS (Venezuela). *See* Association of Workers of the Metal Industry
- Atlantic Banana Workers Union (UTBA) (Costa Rica), 226, 242

- Atlantic Railroad (Costa Rica), 241
 ATLAS. *See* Association of Latin American Unionized Workers
 ATRAMSA (El Salvador). *See* Santa Ana Municipal Workers Association
 Augustinius, Ricardo Zúñiga, 464, 486
 Austerity policies, 45, 50, 377, 558
 Authentic Central of Independent Workers (CATI) (Panama), 583
 Authentic Confederation of Democratic Workers (CATD) (Costa Rica), 222, 223, 226, 228, 231–32, 235, 242
 Authentic Labor Front (FAT) (Mexico), 522, 526, 530
 Authentic Party (Cuba), 248, 249, 262
 Authentic Syndical Federation of Honduras (FASH), 487
 Authentic Workers Federation (FAT) (Panama), 583
Autogestión (Peru), defined, 760
 Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers (CATH), 452, 453
 Autonomous Central of Workers of Uruguay (CATUD), 716–17, 719
 Autonomous Confederation of Christian Labor Unions (CASC) (Colombia), 269–74, 279, 283
 Autonomous Labor Union of the Pharmaceutical Industry (SADIF) (Colombia), 274
 Autonomous Meat Federation (FAC) (Uruguay), 710–11, 716, 721, 723, 725
 Autonomous Syndicate of La Lima Mechanics (Honduras) 474, 475, 493
 Autonomous Union Federation (FAS) (Guatemala), 409
 Autonomous Union Federation of Guatemala (FASGUA), 404, 406, 409–10, 414, 416, 420, 427, 430
 Auxiliary Union of Shoemakers (Brazil), 86, 122
Avanzada (Uruguay), 725
 Avella, Aida, 198
 Avila, Ricardo Antonio, 379
Voz do Trabalhador, A (Brazil), 88
 Ayala, President Eusebio, 597
 Azcona, José Simon, 467, 486
 Azúcar Salvadoreña, S.A. Refinery Workers Union, 329, 346, 382
 Azurdia, Peralta, 402
 Baby Doc (Haiti). *See* Duvalier, Jean-Claude
 Baéz, Danilo Brito, 268
 Baéz, Mauricio, 268, 285
 Bakers Unity Society (Ecuador), 296
 Bakery Industry Workers Union (El Salvador), 329, 346, 349, 382
 Bakery Workers Resistance Society (Argentina), 10
 Balaguer, Joaquín, 268, 270, 272, 275, 278, 282–83, 286
 Balam, Manuel Lopez, 428
 Ballivián, José, 37
 Balsán, Carlos, 706, 722, 723
 Banana Corporation of the Atlantic (COBANA) (Panama), 591–92
 Banana Corporation of the Pacific (COBAPA) (Panama), 591–92
 Banana industry, 213, 242, 463, 469
 Banana War of 1975 (Panama), 591
 Banchero, Luís, 616
 Banco Commercial y Agrícola. *See* Commercial and Agricultural Bank
 Banco de Crédito Popular, 329
 Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 672
 Banco Salvadoreño, 329
 BANDECO. *See* Del Monte
 Bank Employees Federation (FEB) (Peru), 613, 636
 Banking and Savings and Loan General Industry Employees Union (El Salvador), 329, 375
 Bank of America, 551
Bank Tribune (Paraguay), 602
 Bank Workers Confederation (Bolivia), 49
 Bank Workers Federation (Chile), 167
 Bank Workers Federation of Paraguay (FETRABAN), 602
 Bank Workers Union (Venezuela), 745
 Banzer, Hugo. *See* Suarez, Colonel Hugo Banzer
 Baptista, Mariano, 38
 Barba, Carlos, 651

- Barbados, 691
 Barrantes, Alfonso, 625, 626, 649
 Barrera, Hugo, 333
 Barreto, José Campos, 105
 Barria, Domingo, 588
 Barrientos, General René, 46, 54, 56
 Barrion, Justo Rufino, 468
 Barrios, José Emilio Escobar, 428
 Barrios, José Réma, 397
 Barrios, Justo Rufino, 396, 397
 Bata Shoe Company, 457
 Batista, Fulgêncio, 247, 249, 250
Batillismo (Uruguay) defined, 702, 723
 Battle, José (Uruguay). *See* Ordoñez, José Battle y
 Bauxite industry, 433, 497, 506, 691
 Belaúnde, Fernando, 612, 613, 622, 623, 624, 625, 636, 638, 649, 650, 651, 652, 657
 Belisle, Edwin, 34
 Belize: boundary disputes, 25, 26, 28, 32, 34; Catholic radicalism in, 31; civil service, 28, 34; labor publications (*Belize Billboard*), 27; riots in, 26, 33; strikes in, 28, 29, 32, 34, 35
Belize Billboard, 27
 Belize Estate and Produce Company, 26
 Belize National Teachers Union (BNTU), 30, 34, 35
 Bellosio, Julio César Castro, 327
 Benavides, General Oscar, 610, 634
 Beneficial Circle of Civil Construction Workers (Brazil), 86, 117
 Bengoechea, Ramon Rostran, 568
 Benítez, Adan Ignacio, 476
 Benítez, Agustín, 681
 Berbice Mineworker's Union (Guyana), 444
 Bermúdez, Francisco Morales, 615, 619, 621, 637, 648
 Bernard, Pat, 34
 Bernardes, Artur da Silva, 74, 116, 117, 118, 124, 126
 Bertorini, Afonso Grados, 629
 Betancur, Belisario, 198, 202
 Bethaneort, Rómulo Escobar, 581
 Bethlehem Steel, 750
 BGLU. *See* British Guyana Labor Union
 BGWL. *See* British Guyanese Workers League
 BHDU (Belize). *See* British Honduras Development Union
 Bich, Dave, 685
 Big Joaquim (Brazil). *See* Andrade, Joaquim dos Santos
 Bilbao, Francisco, 157
 Billingham, Guillermo (Peru), 609, 658
 Billiton Mijkwerkers Bond (Suriname). *See* Billiton Mine Workers Union
 Billiton Mine Workers Union (Suriname), 695, 698
 BITU (Jamaica). *See* Bustamante Industrial Trade Union
 Blanco (Mexico), defined, 511; (Uruguay), defined, 702
 Blanco, Hugo, 622
 Block de Unidad Obrero (Uruguay). *See* Labor Unity Bloek
 Bloco Textil (Brazil). *See* Textile Bloek
 Bloque de Unidad Obrera (Mexico). *See* United Worker Bloek
 Blue Shirts (Nicaragua), 560
 Blum, Léon, 391
 BMK. *See* Union of Military Cadre (Suriname)
 BNTU (Belize). *See* Belize National Teachers Union
 Bogotá Bank, 196
 Bogotá Employees' Federation (Colombia), 184, 186
 Bográn, Luís, 468
Boletim (Brazil), 95
 Bolivia, 597; agrarian reform in, 42; austerity measures, 45, 50; Central Bank of, 42; Chaco War, 41, 42, 43, 58; eight-hour day in, 42; Great Depression, impact on, 41; International Monetary Fund and, 45, 48, 54; labor leaders, repression of, 50, 56; labor legislation in, Código Busch ("Busch Code"), 1939, 42; massacre, miners, 39, 40, 43, 47; repression in, 39, 40, 43, 47, 56; Revolution of 1952, 41, 44, 46, 50, 54, 56; right-to-strike in, 42; strikes, bank workers, 49; strikes, general, 40, 42, 46, 48, 50, 55, 56;

- strikes, miners, 54, 55; United States and, 40, 43, 45; War of the Pacific, 41; World War II and, 43
- Bolivian Railway Company, 57
- Bolivian Workers Confederation (COB), 44–47, 49–51, 53–54, 56, 58, 60;
- Fifth National Congress (1979) 56, 59
- Bolivian Worker's Confederation of Revolutionary Unity (COBUR), 51, 56
- BOMIKA (Suriname), 696
- BoMika (Suriname). *See* Union of Military Cadre
- Bonaventure, Lyderic, 459
- Bond Van Militair Kader (Suriname). *See* Union of Military Cadre
- Bonilla, Dario, 493
- Bonilla, Policarpo, 469
- Booker, McConnell and Company, 438
- Booker Brothers, 434, 435
- Bosch, Juan, 269, 275, 280, 282, 284
- Bosio, Juan, 613
- Bosque, Pío Romero, 309, 386, 387
- Boundary disputes, 25, 26, 28, 32, 34, 219, 235
- Bourtevse, Desi, 694, 695
- BPR (El Salvador). *See* Popular Revolutionary Bloc
- Braggman Bluff Lumber Company, 550
- Bras, Juan Mari, 676
- Bravo, Douglas, 732
- Brazil, 596, 600; AIFLD in, 98; Catholic church in, 71, 82, 83, 87, 106, 107, 113; eight-hour day in, 103, 115, 118, 122; enterprises in (América Fabril, 126; Cobrasma Company, 104, 113; Ford, 105; Great Western Railroad, 116; Light and Power Company, 119; Perus Cement Company, 113; São Paulo Gas Company, 119; Volkswagen, 106); Great Depression, impact on, 75; immigration to, 64, 72, 73, 93; International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, 71, 98, 120; labor congresses, 127 (First Brazilian Labor Congress (1906), 73, 88, 100, 103, 118; First National Catholic Labor Congress, 87, 89; Fourth Brazilian Labor Congress, 87, 95, 103; Fourth National Union Congress (1962), 97; National Congress of the Working Class (1981), 121; National Labor Congress, 92, 97, 116; Second Brazilian Labor Congress (1913), 88, 115; Second National Conference of Peasants and Agricultural Workers, 1985, 125; Third Brazilian Labor Congress (1920), 86, 88, 89, 95, 99, 117; Third National Union Congress (1960), 124); labor leaders, repression of, 73, 83, 88, 100, 107, 124; labor legislation in, 75–76, 90, 101, 125 (Adolfo Gordo Law, 88, 103; anti-strike law, 105; Consolidated Labor Laws, 1943, 75; Eloy Chaves Law, 77; Lei do Arrocho Salarial (Law to Roll Back Salaries), 101; Rural Labor Law, (1960) 125); labor publications (*A Tribuna do Povo* ["Tribune of the People"], 117; *O Internacional* ["The International"], 100; *O Trabalhador* ["The Worker"], 100; *O Trabalhador Gráfico* ["The Graphic Worker"], 100; *A Voz do Trabalhador* ["The Worker's Voice"], 88; *Voz Cosmopolitana* ["Cosmopolitan Voice"], 94; *Voz do Povo* ["The People's Voice"], 99; migration, internal, 73; minimum wages in, 77, 101, 102, 109, 112, 117; Ministry of Labor, 66, 75–78, 86, 102; ORIT in, 98, 110, 111, 112, 124; Peace Corps (U.S.) in, 125; peasant leagues in, 108; racial tensions in, 72, 118; repression in, 70, 73, 74, 92, 93, 99, 114, 122, 124; Retirement and Pension Fund, 77; Retirement and Pension Institute, 77; right-to-strike in, 81; slavery, abolition of, 64, 65, 72; slaves, African, 63; Social Security System, 77, 79–80, 109; states of siege in, 117, 124, 126; strikes in, 73, 81, 82, 88, 93, 102, 103, 105, 113, 114 (cement, 113; Cobrasma strike, 113; construction workers, 82; maritime, 79, 124, 128; metalworkers, 71, 81, 82, 99, 107, 113, 122; printers, 100; railroad, 79, 100, 116, 118; shoemakers, 86, 100;

- textile, 99, 122, 126; tramway, 1919, 117); United States and, 69; United States Agency for International Development and, 125; United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and, 125; wage policy in, 82, 83, 104, 113; World War I and, 88, 89, 103, 116, 119, 122, 126
- Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers (CBTC), 86, 87
- Brazilian Confederation of Labor, 87
- Brazilian Cooperative Syndicalist Confederation (CSCB), 88
- Brazilian Cooperativist Union Confederation, 126
- Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), 69, 70
- Brazilian Labor Confederation (COB), 88, 119, 121, 127
- Brazilian Labor Congress, 103
- Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), 67, 78, 92, 98, 102, 111, 114, 125
- Brazilian Lloyd Shipping Company, 99, 128
- Brazilian Regional Labor Federation, 103
- Brentano, Father Leopoldo, 86, 87
- Brewery Industry Workers Federation of Peru, 614, 629, 630, 663
- Britain, 577
- British Colonial Office (Guyana), 435
- British Guyana Labor Union (BGLU), 435, 443, 445
- British Guyanese Workers League (BGWL), 436
- British Honduras Development Union (BHDU), 30, 31, 32
- British Honduras Trade Union, 30, 31
- British Honduras Trade Union Congress, 30
- British Honduras Union of Teachers, 30
- British Labour Party, 385, 443, 497
- Broad Opposition Front (FAO) (Nicaragua), 554
- Brochado, Francisco de Paula, 97
- Brotherhood, The (Argentina), 3, 10, 16, 19
- Brotherhood of Cuban Railway Workers, 257
- Brotherhood of Labor (Argentina), 10
- Brotherhood of Workers of Iquique (Chile), 147
- Brouwer, Jorge E., 585
- Bruma, Eddy, 693, 696, 697, 699
- Búfalos* (Peru), defined, 613, 635
- Bulletin* (Brazil), 95
- BUO. *See* United Workers Block (Mexico); Labor Unity Block (Uruguay)
- Burnham, Forbes, 438, 439, 441, 442, 443, 444, 446
- Burret, Rafael, 706
- Busch, Lt. Colonel Germán, 42, 43, 58
- Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) (Jamaica), 496, 497, 499, 501, 502, 503, 504, 506, 508
- Bustamante, William Alexander, 496, 497, 498, 501, 502, 504, 506, 508
- Bustillo, Judge Augusto, 487
- Butcher, Phillip Dean, 585
- C-47. *See* Central 47
- Caballero, General Bernardino, 596
- Caballero, Marrial, 488
- Cabinetmakers and Carpenters Union (Costa Rica), 226
- Cabrera, Alfredo, 757
- Cabrera, Manuel Estrada, 396, 431
- Cáceres, Jaime, 653
- Cáceres, Pedro, 664
- Cáceres, Roger, 664
- CACREF (Venezuela). *See* Savings and Federal Credit Corporation
- Caixa de Aposentadoria e Pensões (Brazil). *See* Retirement and Pension Fund
- Caja de ahorros* (Costa Rica), defined, 215
- Caldera, Rafael, 736, 758
- Calderón, Rubén, 681
- Calindres, Vincente Mejia, 471
- Callao Longshore Workers Union (Peru), 613
- Calles, Plutarco Elías, 518, 537, 540
- Calvo, Father Francisco, 215
- Camacho, Jorge Alberto Ruiz, 353
- Camacho, Manuel Avila, 520
- Camargo, Alberto Lleras, 182
- Camp BoMika (Suriname), 699

- Campesino Federation of Guatemala (FCG), 402, 409
Campesinos (Chile), defined, 143
 Campista, Ary, 112, 120, 122
 Canal Zone (Panama), 578, 592
 Canelas, Antonio Bernardo, 117
 CAP (Brazil). *See* Retirement and Pension Fund
 CAPAC. *See* Panamanian Construction Chamber
 Capital's Municipal Employees Association (ACEM) (Guatemala), 411
 Caraballo, José L., Hijo, 689
 Carazo, Rodrigo, 223, 237, 240
 Carazo, Salvador, 336, 341
 Cárdenas, Lázaro, 133, 519, 520, 522, 528, 535, 537, 538, 545, 546
Cargadores (Costa Rica), defined, 214
 Caribbean Bauxite and Mineworkers Federation (Jamaica), 507
 Caribbean Congress of Labor (CCL), 439, 446, 507, 508
 Caribbean Labour Solidarity (Jamaica), 505
 Carnation, 611
 Carpenters Guild (Costa Rica), 227
 Carpenters Union (Brazil), 98; (Costa Rica), 226
 Carpio, Salvador Cayetano, 327, 329, 366, 373, 379
 Carr, Barry, 540
 Carranza, Colonel Nicolas, 315
 Carranza, Mariano, 335
 Carranza, Rafael Agüñada, 316, 346, 382
 Carranza, Venustiano, 534
 Carrero, Milton, 750
 Carrillo, Jorge Rojas, 202
 Casa (Mexico). *See* House of the World's Workers
 Casa Bocardo (Venezuela), 728
 Casa de Obrero Mundial (Mexico), 532, 534
 Casalengo, Eugénio, 486
Casas comerciales (Honduras), defined, 475
 CASC (Dominican Republic). *See* Autonomous Confederation of Christian Labor Unions
 Castillo, Alejandro Oropeza, 729, 744
 Castillo, Bernardino, 169
 Castillo, Carlos, 387
 Castillo, Eduardo, 629, 649
 Castillo, Fabio, 348
 Castillo, José de la Rosa, 584
 Castle and Cooke, 475
 Castro, Colonel Juan Melgar, 464, 468
 Castro, Fidel, 249, 252, 277
 Castro, General Salvador Castañeda, 310, 311, 373
 Castro, Manuel Inacio de, 126
 Castro, Tito, 353, 370, 372
 Catavi Massacre (Bolivia), 43, 54
 Catavi-Siglo XX Mines (Bolivia), 54
 Catayée, Justin, 390
 CATD (Costa Rica). *See* Authentic Confederation of Democratic Workers
 CATH. *See* Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers
 Catholic Action (Chile), 149; (Costa Rica), 228
 Catholic Action Workers Movement (Chile), 176
 Catholic Association of Mexican Youth, 537
 Catholic centers (El Salvador), 331
 Catholic church: 6, 71, 82, 83, 87, 106, 107, 113, 180, 186, 187, 191, 192, 201, 205, 207, 208, 221, 229, 290, 291, 293, 294, 296, 297, 314, 315, 330, 331, 396, 401, 487, 488, 553, 559, 578, 600, 602, 612, 710
 Catholic Colombian Action (ACC), 186, 187, 205
 Catholic Education Association (Belize), 30
 Catholic Labor (Ecuador), 292
 Catholic Labor Centers (Brazil), 90
 Catholic Labor Confederation (Ecuador), 293, 296, 297
 Catholic National Labor Front (FNT) (Brazil), 104–5, 113
 Catholic Union Party (Costa Rica), 216
 Catholic Unions and Workers Centers (Brazil), 86
 Catholic University Youth (Brazil), 104, 125

- Catholic Worker Circle (Ecuador), 297–98
- Catholic Worker Circles (Uruguay), 705
- Catholic Workers' Centers and Circles (Ecuador), 291
- Catholic Worker Youth (Brazil), 104, 125; (Chile) 176
- Catholic Workers National Union (El Salvador), 312, 330, 382
- Catholic Workers Union (Mexico), 526
- Catholic Workers Youth (JOC) (Costa Rica), 223, 229
- Catholic Workmen's Circles of São Paulo (Brazil), 125
- Catholic Youth of Cartago (Costa Rica), 217
- CATI (Panama). *See* Authentic Central of Independent Workers
- CATUD. *See* Autonomous Central of Workers of Uruguay
- CAUS (Nicaragua). *See* Union Action and Unity Central
- Cavalcanti, Deocleciano de Holanda, 111
- Caven, Hopeton, 508
- Cayo Labour Union (Belize), 30, 34
- CBTC. *See* Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers
- CCL. *See* Caribbean Congress of Labor
- CCP. *See* Peasants Confederation of Peru
- CCS (El Salvador). *See* Trade Union Coordinating Committee
- CCT (Paraguay). *See* Christian Confederation of Workers
- CCTD. *See* Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation
- CCTEM (El Salvador). *See* State and Municipal Workers Coordinating Council
- CCTRN. *See* Costa Rican Workers Confederation "Rerum Novarum"
- CCUSC (Peru). *See* Clasista Union Coordination and Unification Committee.
- CCWU (Guyana). *See* Clerical and Commercial Workers Union
- CDN. *See* Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Group "Ramiro Sacasa Guerrero"
- CDT. *See* Dominican Confederation of Work
- CDTS (Nicaragua). *See* Sandinista Workers' Defense Committees
- CDU (Belize). *See* Christian Democratic Union
- CDUS (Peru). *See* Union Defense and Unity Committee
- CEDOC. *See* Ecuadorian Confederation of Catholic Workers
- CEGTU. *See* General Central of Workers of Uruguay
- CEL (El Salvador). *See* Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission
- CELP (Peru). *See* Labor Studies Center of Peru
- Cement Products Industry Workers National Union (El Salvador), 374
- Centeno, Humberto, 372
- Centeno, Miguel Angel, 354
- Center for Advanced Trade Union Studies (CAES) (Peru), 638
- Center for Social Studies (Costa Rica), 218, 232
- Central American Beer Factory Workers Union (Guatemala), 422
- Central American Common Market, 400, 464, 571
- Central American Workers Confederation (COCA), 386, 410, 471, 562
- Central Auténtica de Trabajadores Independientes (Panama). *See* Authentic Central of Independent Workers
- Central Autónoma de Trabajadores del Uruguay. *See* Autonomous Central of Workers of Uruguay
- Central Christian Workers of Guiana (CTCG), 392
- Central de Trabajadores de Cuba. *See* Confederation of Cuban Workers
- Central de Trabajadores del Uruguay. *See* Uruguayan Workers Central
- Central de Trabajadores Democráticos (El Salvador). *See* Democratic Workers Central
- Central de Trabajadores Federados (Guatemala). *See* Central of Federated Workers

- Central de Trabajadores Salvadoreños.
See Salvadoran Workers Central
- Centrale Autonome des Travailleurs Haïtiens. *See* Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers
- Centrale des Travailleurs Chrétiens de la Guyane. *See* Central Christian Workers of Guiana
- Centrale Van Landsdienaen Organisaties (Suriname). *See* Central Organization of State Employees
- Central Federation of Free Unions of Honduras (FECESITLIH), 466, 475, 485
- Central Federation of Workers of Guatemala (FECETRAG), 402, 410, 419, 421
- Central 47 (C-47) (Suriname), 696, 697
- Central General de Trabajadores (Dominican Republic). *See* General Confederation of Workers
- Central General de Trabajadores del Uruguay. *See* General Central of Workers of Uruguay
- Central Istmeña de Trabajadores (Panama). *See* Isthmian Workers Central
- Centralization and Unity National Congress (Peru), 655
- Central Labor Council (Puerto Rico), 681, 688
- Central Labor Federation of Uncia (Bolivia), 40, 51
- Central Nacional de Trabajadores (1974) (Chile). *See* National Workers Central (1974)
- Central Nacional de Trabajadores de Panama. *See* National Central of Panamanian Workers
- Central Nacional de Trabajadores Dominicanos. *See* National Confederation of Dominican Workers
- Central Nacional de Trabajo (Mexico). *See* National Labor Central
- Central Obrera Regional del Paraguay. *See* Regional Workers' Central of Paraguay
- Central of Federated Workers (CTF) (Guatemala), 403, 409-10, 413, 416, 420, 425, 430
- Central Organization of State Employees (CLO) (Suriname), 693, 696, 697, 699
- Central Panameña de Trabajadores del Transporte. *See* Panamanian Central of Transport Workers
- Central Peru Mine Workers Federation, 654
- Central Regional Federation of Workers (FRCT) (Guatemala), 399
- Central Romana Plantation, 267, 270, 278, 286
- Central Sindical de Empleados Particulares del Perú. *See* Employees Federation of Peru
- Central Sindical de Trabajadores Dominicanos. *See* Labor Union Confederation of Dominican Workers
- Central Única de Trabajadores. *See* Chilean Workers Central; Sole Central of Workers (Mexico)
- Central Union of Municipal Workers (SCTM) (Guatemala), 410-11
- Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (Dominican Republic). *See* Unitary Confederation of Workers
- Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Venezuela. *See* Unitary Center of Workers of Venezuela
- Central Workers Union of Colombia, 187, 210-11
- Centro Cosmopolita (Brazil). *See* Cosmopolitan Center
- Centro das Classes Operárias (Brazil). *See* Working Class Center
- Centro de Estudios Laborales del Perú. *See* Labor Studies Center of Peru
- Centro Feminista "La Aurora" (Ecuador). *See* "La Aurora" Women's Center
- Centro Germinal (Costa Rica). *See* Center for Social Studies
- Centro Internacional (Brazil). *See* International Center
- CENTROMIN (Peru), 631
- Centros Católicos Operários (Brazil). *See* Catholic Labor Centers

- Centro Social de Obreros (Bolivia). *See* Workers' Social Center
- Centro Socialista (Costa Rica). *See* Socialist Center
- Centro Tipográfico Paulistano (Brazil). *See* São Paulo Typographic Center
- Centurión, Victoriano, 603
- CEOSL. *See* Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Labor Organizations
- CEPCH (Chile). *See* Confederation of Private Sector Employees
- Cerda, Pedro Agirre, 135, 139, 153
- Cerezo, Vinicio, 409
- Cerney, Franasco, 706
- Cerqueira, Benedito, 98
- Cerro, Luís Sánchez, 610, 633, 654
- Cerro de Pasco Company, 610, 632, 646, 654
- Cerzo, Vinicio, 419
- Cesantía* (Venezuela), defined, 730
- CESITRADO. *See* Labor Union Confederation of Dominican Workers
- CETE (Guatemala). *See* Council of Organizations of State Workers
- Cetepé* (Peru), 636
- CFDT (France). *See* Confederation of Democratic French Workers
- CFTC (France). *See* Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens
- CGG (Brazil). *See* General Strike Command
- CGOCM. *See* General Confederation of Mexican Workers and Peasants
- CGS (El Salvador). *See* General Confederation of Unions
- CGT-Independent (CGT-1) (Nicaragua), 552, 553, 554, 555, 564–67, 571, 573, 574
- CGT. *See* General Confederation of Labor (Argentina; Chile; Colombia; El Salvador); General Confederation of Workers (Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Haiti; Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Venezuela); General Confederation of Workers of Puerto Rico; General Council of Workers; General Labor Command; General Labor Confederation of Brazil
- CGT-Authentic (Puerto Rico), 685
- CGTC. *See* General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers
- CGTF (Bolivia). *See* General Confederation of Factory Workers
- CGT-FO (France). *See* General Confederation of Labor, Workmen's Force
- CGTG. *See* General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala
- CGT-I (Nicaragua). *See* CGT-Independent
- CGTP. *See* General Confederation of Peruvian Workers
- CGTS. *See* General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers
- CGTU. *See* General Confederation of Workers of Uruguay
- Chacón, Américo, 732, 745, 749, 754
- Chaco War (1932), 41–43, 58, 597, 598, 604, 606
- Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin, 553
- Charran, Cleveland, 445
- Charrismo* (Mexico), 523, 530, 543, 546; defined, 513, 547
- Chauffeurs and Allied Workers Federation (Peru), 630
- Chauffeurs Federation of Peru (FCP), 614, 630, 631, 636, 640, 652, 659, 663
- Chaves, Aureliano, 71
- Chavez, Frank, 685
- Chávez, Ricardo Díaz, 655
- Cheyne, Manuel, 384
- Chile, 41, 555; AFL-CIO in, 142; agrarian reform in, 167; Agrarian Reform Law, 167; Cold War and, 135, 153; collective bargaining in, 177; Communist Party in, 130, 131, 133, 151, 172, 173; eight-hour day in, 132, 177; labor congresses, Workers Social Congress, 133, 172, 178; labor legislation, 133, 134, 142, 143, 151, 160, 165, 173 (Copper Workers Statute, 155); Labor Department, 134; labor leaders, repression of, 143–45, 151, 153, 154, 157, 161–64, 168, 172, 173; labor publications (*El Pizarrón*, 157; *Labor*, 147; *Tierra*, 167); massacre, Santa Maria de

- Iquique, 147; repression in, 140, 145, 150, 158; Social Laws, 132, 160; Social Security Law, 172; strikes in, 138, 144 (copper workers, 155; general, 131, 136, 161, 173, 177); United States Central Intelligence Agency, 168; War of the Pacific, 146; World War I and, 170
- Chilean Educators Gremialist Association (AGECH), 146, 148, 149, 157, 160
- Chilean Popular Front, 153
- Chilean Section of the International Maritime League, 163
- Chilean Social Christian Movement, 149
- Chilean Union Action (ASICH), 136, 138–39, 146, 151, 152, 162
- Chilean Workers Central (CUT/CUTCH), 132, 136, 138–39, 149–51, 154, 155, 156, 159, 162–64, 166–68, 171, 172, 175
- Chilean Workers Federation (FOCH), 131–33, 150, 151, 153, 161, 176, 177
- Chilean Workers Union (UTRACH), 151, 177
- Chimbote Fisherman's Union (Peru), 644
- Chimbote steelworkers, 618
- Chimbote steelworks, 618, 665
- China, 194
- Chinchilla, Major, 487
- Chiriqui Land Company, 590
- Christian base communities, 71, 331, 367
- Christian Confederation of Workers (CCT) (Paraguay), 603, 605
- Christian Democratic National Workers Confederation (CNT) (Peru), 619, 661
- Christian Democratic Party (Belize), 28
- Christian Democratic Party (PDC) (El Salvador), 316, 318, 321, 330, 331, 335, 336, 338, 340–41, 353–54, 361, 363, 367, 370, 374
- Christian Democratic Party (Paraguay), 603
- Christian Democratic Party (PCD) (Peru), 630, 657
- Christian Democratic Union (CDU) (Belize), 30, 33
- Christian Democratic Workers' Christian Front (Guatemala), 410
- Christian Democrats, 137, 139, 140, 143, 144, 145, 151, 154, 155, 156, 162, 168, 175, 269, 318, 320, 333, 335, 339–40, 348, 402, 407, 465, 473, 475, 487, 489, 569, 586, 600, 616, 644, 657–58, 661, 664
- Christian Labor Federation of Pernambuco (Brazil), 86, 89, 90
- Christian Peasant Federation (FCC) (Paraguay), 603
- Christian Peasants Federation (FECCAS) (El Salvador), 315–19, 327, 330–32, 342, 343, 367
- Christian Peasants Federation and Rural Workers Union (El Salvador), 369
- Christian Rural Union Federation (Chile), 152
- Christian Union Movement of Peru (MOSICP), 630, 644, 655, 657
- Christian Workers Confederation (Chile), 149; (Paraguay) 604
- Christian Workers Union (CWU) (Belize), 31, 33, 34
- Chupinga, Colonel German, 405
- CIA. *See* United States Central Intelligence Agency
- Ciabeña Alliance, 266, 273, 275
- CICB (Bolivia). *See* Independent Confederation of Bolivian Peasants
- Cien bases* (Peru), 665; defined, 619
- Cifuentes, Miguel, 421
- Cigando, José Pedro, 716, 720
- CIO. *See* Congress of Industrial Organizations
- CIOSL. *See* International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
- CIRCA Workers Union (El Salvador), 332, 337, 388
- Círculo Beneficente dos Operários em Construção Civil (Brazil). *See* Beneficial Circle of Civil Construction Workers
- Círculo Católico de Obreros (Ecuador). *See* Catholic Workers' Circle
- Círculo dos Operários em Construção Civil (Brazil). *See* Civil Construction Workers Circle

- Círculos Operários (Brazil). *See* Workers Circles
- CIT. *See* Inter-American Confederation of Workers; Isthmian Workers Central
- CITE. *See* Intersectoral Confederation of State Workers (Peru); International Committee of State Workers (Colombia)
- Civil Construction Workers Circle (Brazil), 117
- Civil Service Association, Belize, 31, 34; Guyana, 440–41
- Civil Unity (Argentina), 3
- Civil Wars, 221, 230, 270, 277, 322, 329, 332, 334, 340, 348, 358, 364, 367, 369, 370, 388, 606, 686
- CL (Mexico). *See* Congress of Labor
- CLASC (Latin American Confederation of Christian Unions), 31, 223, 229, 273, 330, 487, 526, 737. *See also* CLAT
- Clasista Union Coordination and Unification Committee (CCUSC) (Peru), 618, 631
- Class tendency (Venezuela), defined, 753
- CLAT (Latin American Workers Central), 33, 97, 330, 338, 347, 374, 392, 398, 400–402, 405, 407, 419, 421, 426, 473, 569, 586, 601, 604, 611, 635, 708, 725, 737, 743. *See also* CLASC
- Clerical and Commercial Workers Union (CCWU) (Guyana), 441, 446
- Clermont, Kesler, 460
- CLO. *See* Central Organization of State Employees
- CLO-Bulletin* (Suriname), 693
- CLT (Nicaragua). *See* Workers' Struggle Committees
- CLTC. *See* Latin American Confederation of Communications Workers
- CLU (Belize). *See* Cayo Labour Union
- Club Constitucional de Artesanos (Costa Rica). *See* Artisans Constitutional Club
- CNA (Peru). *See* National Agrarian Federation
- CNC. *See* National Campesino Confederation (Guatemala); National Peasant Central (Mexico); National Peasant Commission (Chile)
- CNCG. *See* National Campesino Confederation of Guatemala
- CNCT (Mexico). *See* National Catholic Labor Confederation
- CNDDDS (Uruguay). *See* National Defense Commission of Union Rights
- CNI (Nicaragua). *See* National Inter-Union Commission
- CNM (Guatemala). *See* National Council of Teachers
- CNNUS (Dominican Republic). *See* National Council of Labor Union Unity
- CNOC. *See* National Labor Confederation of Cuba
- CNS (Peru). *See* National Union Coordinating Committee
- CNSC. *See* National Confederation of Chilean Unions
- CNT. *See* National Confederation of Workers (Guatemala; Paraguay; Venezuela); National Convention of Workers (Haiti); National Labor Central (Mexico); National Workers Central (Chile; El Salvador); National Workers Confederation (Peru)
- CNTC (Brazil). *See* National Confederation of Commercial Workers
- CNTCB. *See* National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia
- CNTD. *See* National Confederation of Dominican Workers
- CNTD (Guatemala). *See* National Council of Democratic Workers
- CNTEEC (Brazil). *See* National Confederation of Educational and Cultural Workers
- CNTI (Brazil). *See* National Confederation of Industrial Workers; National Central of Panamanian Workers
- CNTP. *See* National Confederation of Paraguayan Workers
- CNTT (Brazil). *See* National Confederation of Land Transport Workers
- CNTTMFA (Brazil). *See* National Seamen and Air Transport Workers Confederation

- CNTU (Paraguay). *See* National Central of Urban Workers
- CNT-21 (Guatemala). *See* National Confederation of Workers-21.
- CNUL (Peru). *See* National Unitary Struggle Command
- CNUS (Guatemala). *See* National Committee of Trade Union Unity
- COA. *See* Confederation of Argentine Workers
- COACES. *See* Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El Salvador
- COASI. *See* Argentine Workers Committee of Independent Unions
- COB. *See* Bolivian Workers Confederation; Brazilian Labor Confederation
- COBANA (Panama). *See* Banana Corporation of the Atlantic
- COBAPA (Panama). *See* Banana Corporation of the Pacific
- Cobrasma Company, 104, 113
- Cobrasma mine massacre (Peru), 617
- Cobrasma Workers Commission (Brazil), 104, 105
- COBUR. *See* Bolivian Worker's Confederation of Revolutionary Unity
- COCA. *See* Central American Workers Confederation
- Coca-Cola (Guatemala), 404, 406, 420, 428
- Coca-Cola strike, 1976 (Guatemala), 403, 421
- Coca-Cola Workers Union (Guatemala). *See* Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca
- COCC. *See* Confederation of Costa Rican Workers
- COCTN (Nicaragua). *See* Organizing Committee of the Workers Confederation
- CODESA. *See* Confederation of Autonomous Unions of Venezuela
- COES. *See* Workers Confederation of El Salvador
- Coffee Industry Union (SICAFE) (El Salvador), 346, 357
- Cogestión* (Peru), 760
- Co-gobierno* (Bolivia), defined, 45
- COJ (Mexico). *See* Labor Confederation of Jalisco
- Cold War, 135, 153, 248, 437, 505, 551, 611, 634-35, 647, 709, 723
- Colegio de Abogados (Costa Rica). *See* College of Lawyers
- Colegio de Farmaceúticos (Costa Rica). *See* College of Pharmacists
- Colegio de Médicos y Cirujanos (Costa Rica). *See* College of Physicians and Surgeons
- Colegio de Periodistas (Costa Rica). *See* College of Journalists
- Colegio de Profesores de Educación Médica de Honduras. *See* Association of Secondary Education Teachers
- Colegio Profesional de Superación Magisterial Hondureño. *See* Professional Association for the Improvement of Teachers
- Collazo, Ariel, 716
- Collazo, Maria, 706
- Collective bargaining, 177, 221, 250, 512, 532, 546, 581, 597, 602, 605, 608, 612, 650, 676, 678
- Collectivist Socialist Party (Brazil), 128
- College of Journalists (Costa Rica), 228
- College of Lawyers (Costa Rica), 228, 235
- College of Pharmacists (Costa Rica), 214, 228, 232
- College of Physicians and Surgeons (Costa Rica), 228, 232
- Colombia, 577; AFL-CIO in, 181, 183, 195, 206, 208; agrarian reform in, 195; AIFLD in, 183, 191, 195, 206, 208; banks in, Bogota Bank, 196; Catholic Church in, 180, 186, 187, 191, 192, 201, 205, 207, 208; Communist Party in, 192, 195, 199; enterprises in (Standard Oil of New Jersey, 180, 192, 203, 208, 210; Suramericana, 196; Tropical Oil Company, 203, 208, 210; United Fruit Company, 180, 202, 203); Great Depression, impact on, 186; labor publications (*Vanguardia Obrera* ["Labor Vanguard"], 208; *Vanguardia*

- ['Vanguard'], 192; *El Obrero* ['The Worker'], 209; *La Unión Obrera*, 211; massacres in, 181, 202, 210; racial tensions in, 210; strikes in, 181, 202, 205, 210 (banana workers, 199; dock workers, 196; general, 184, 198, 199, 202; petroleum workers, 199, 203; railroad, 194; United Fruit Strike, 1928, 210); United States and, 193, 201, 206, 208; U.S. oil companies, 191, 205, 210; World War II and, 186
- Colombian Association of Bank Employees (ACEB), 188
- Colombian Federation of Teachers (FED-CODE), 184, 187-88, 197, 198, 201
- Colombian Peasant Action, 194
- Colombian Social Action, 186
- Colombian Union Association (ASICOL), 185
- Colon* (El Salvador), defined, 328
- Colorado (Uruguay), defined, 702
- Colorado Party (Paraguay), 596, 598, 599, 600, 602, 605, 606
- Colour Progressive Association (Panama), 592
- COLPROSUMAH (Honduras). *See* Professional Association for the Improvement of Teachers
- COLPUERTOS (Colombia), 197
- COMACH. *See* Maritime Confederation of Chile
- Comando Geral da Greve (Brazil). *See* General Strike Command
- Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (Brazil). *See* General Workers Command
- Comando Nacional de Trabajadores (1983). *See* National Workers Command (1983)
- Comando Nacional Inter-Gremial (Venezuela). *see* Inter-Union National Command
- Combinación Mancomunal de Obreros de Iquique (Chile). *See* Brotherhood of Workers of Iquique
- COMIBOL, 45, 46, 48, 54, 55
- Comisariatos* (Venezuela), defined, 742
- Comisión Nacional Campesina (Chile). *See* National Peasant Commission
- Comisión Nacional de Defenso de los Derechos Sindicales (Uruguay). *See* National Defense Commission of Union Rights
- Comisión Obrera Nacional (Cuba). *See* National Labor Commission
- Comissão Permanente das Organizações Sindicais (Brazil). *See* Permanent Commission of Trade Union Organizations
- Comité Coordinator de Sindicatos "José Guillermo Rivas" (El Salvador). *See* Trade Unions Coordinating Committee
- Comité de Coordination Syndicale (Haiti). *See* Committee of Trade Union Coordination
- Comité de Organización y Unidad Obrero (Uruguay). *See* Committee of Labor Organization and Unity
- Comité de Reorganización Obrero Sindical Salvadoreño. *See* Salvadoran Trade Union Reorganizing Committee
- Comité de Unidad Campesina (Guatemala). *See* Committee of Campesino Unity
- Comité de Unidad Intersindical (Honduras). *See* Committee of Intersyndical Unity
- Comité de Unidad Sindical (Costa Rica). *See* Labor Unity Committee
- Comité de Unidad Sindical Clasista (Argentina). *See* Committee of Class-Based Trade Union Unity
- Comité Emergencia de Trabajadores de Estado (Guatemala). *See* Emergency Committee of State Workers
- Comité Nacional de los Trabajadores (Ecuador). *See* National Workers Committee
- Comité Nacional de Unidad Sindical (Guatemala). *See* National Committee of Trade Union Unity
- Comité Obrero Argentino de Sindicatos Independientes. *See* Argentine Workers Committee of Independent Unions
- Comité Obrero Nacional Independiente (Cuba). *See* National Independent Labor Committee

- Comité Operário de Organização Sindical (Brazil). *See* Labor Committee of Syndical Organization
- Comité Pro-Confederación Única (Dominican Republic). *See* Committee for Unitary Confederation
- Comités de Defensa de las Demandas Obreras (Cuba). *See* Committees in Defense of Labor Demands
- Comité Sindical Antifascista (Uruguay). *See* Anti-Fascist Syndical Committee
- Comité Sindical Unitario de Trabajadores del Petróleo (Venezuela). *See* United Union Committee of Petroleum Workers
- Comité Unitario Sindical Salvadoreño. *See* Salvadoran Trade Union Unity
- Command for the Defense of Union Rights (Chile), 164
- Commercial and Agricultural Bank (Ecuador), 291
- Committee for Unitary Confederation (Dominican Republic), 275
- Committee of Campesino Unity (CUC) (Guatemala), 404–5, 414, 420
- Committee of Class Based Trade Union Unity (Argentina), 4, 11, 16
- Committee of Inter-Syndical Unity (CUI) (Honduras), 492
- Committee of Labor Organization and Unity (COUO) (Uruguay), 708, 715, 717, 719, 723
- Committee of Labor Unity (CUL) (Honduras), 494
- Committee of Syndical Relations (Uruguay), 719
- Committee of Syndical Unity (CUS) (Honduras), 494
- Committee of Trade Union Coordination of Haiti, 457
- Committee of University Student Struggle (Nicaragua), 574
- Committee to Defend Democratic Liberties (Bolivia), 46
- Committees for Justice and Peace (Guatemala), 428
- Committees in Defense of Labor Demands (Cuba), 258
- Communications, Telephone and Telegraph Workers International, 302
- Communist (Third) International (Bolívia), 41
- Communist Group of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 117
- Communist Group of the Workers Federation of the Republic of Panama, 578, 585, 593
- Communist Party, 5, 11, 15, 16, 19, 130, 131, 133, 151, 172, 173, 192, 195, 199, 220–21, 232, 234, 238, 242, 246–48, 250–51, 253, 262, 391, 431, 455, 604
- Communist Party of Brazil (PCB), 67, 74, 78, 88, 94, 96, 100, 108, 109, 111, 114, 116, 119, 122, 125, 127–28
- Communist Party of Central America, 397
- Communist Party of Ecuador, 294, 299
- Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS), 309, 310, 313, 315, 329, 331, 335, 351, 357, 362, 373, 379, 386–87
- Communist Party of Honduras (PCH), 465, 466, 473, 474, 475, 476, 491, 492–94
- Communist Party of Honduras–Marxist-Leninist, 466, 485
- Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCN), 554–72
- Communist Party of Panama, 585
- Communist Party of Suriname (KM), 693
- Communists' Central Union (Mexico), 535
- Compas, Molière, 455
- Compoamor, José Maria, 209
- Composta, Ari, 98
- CON (Colombia). *See* National Workers' Confederation
- CONATO (Panama). *See* National Council of Organized Workers
- CONATRAL (Dominican Republic). *See* National Confederation of Free Workers
- Concertación (Peru), defined, 626
- Conde, Eduardo, 682
- CONELCA. *See* Phelps-Dodge copper wire factory

- Conelca Workers Union (El Salvador), 332
- Confections and Pasta Industry Union (SIDPA) (El Salvador), 332-33
- Confederação Brasileira de Trabalhadores Cristãos. *See* Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers
- Confederação Brasileira do Trabalho. *See* Brazilian Confederation of Labor
- Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil. *See* Confederation of Brazilian Workers
- Confederação Nacional de Círculos Operários (Brazil). *See* National Confederation of Workers Circles
- Confederação Nacional de Círculos Operários Católicos (Brazil). *See* National Confederation of Catholic Workers
- Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores (Brazil). *See* National Confederation of Workers
- Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Comunicações e Publicidade (Brazil). *See* National Confederation of Communications and Advertising Workers
- Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Transportes Terrestres (Brazil). *See* National Confederation of Land Transport Workers
- Confederação Sindical Latino Americana. *See* Latin American Sindical Confederation
- Confederación Auténtica de Trabajadores Democráticos (Costa Rica). *See* Authentic Confederation of Democratic Workers
- Confederación Autónoma de Sindicatos Cristianos (Dominican Republic). *See* Autonomous Confederation of Christian Labor Unions
- Confederación Costarricense de Trabajadores Democráticos. *See* Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation
- Confederación Costarricense de Trabajadores "Rerum Novarum." *See* Costa Rican Workers Confederation "Rerum Novarum"
- Confederación Cristina de Trabajadores (Paraguay). *See* Christian Confederation of Workers
- Confederación de Asociaciones Cooperativas de El Salvador. *See* Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El Salvador
- Confederación de Círculos Obreros Católicos (Mexico). *See* Confederation of Catholic Workers Circles
- Confederación de Empleados del Sector Privado (Chile). *See* Confederation of Private Sector Employees
- Confederación de Obreros de El Salvador. *See* Workers Confederation of El Salvador
- Confederación de Sindicatos Autónomos de Venezuela. *See* Confederation of Autonomous Unions of Venezuela
- Confederación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores Bancarios (Bolivia). *See* Bank Workers' Confederation
- Confederación de Trabajadores Costarricenses. *See* Confederation of Costa Rican Workers
- Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina. *See* Confederation of Latin American Workers
- Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile. *See* Confederation of Chilean Workers
- Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia. *See* Confederation of Colombian Workers
- Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba Revolucionaria. *See* Confederation of Workers of Revolutionary Chile
- Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala. *See* Confederation of Workers of Guatemala
- Confederación de Trabajadores de Honduras. *See* Confederation of Honduran Workers
- Confederación de Trabajadores de la República de Panamá. *See* Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama
- Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre (Chile). *See* Copper Workers Federation

- Confederación de Trabajadores del Ecuador. *See* Confederation of Workers of Ecuador
- Confederación de Trabajadores de México. *See* Confederation of Mexican Workers
- Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela. *See* Workers Confederation of Venezuela
- Confederación de Trabajadores Dominicanos. *See* Confederation of Dominican Workers
- Confederación de Unificación Sindical (Nicaragua). *See* Confederation of Union Unification
- Confederación Dominicana de Trabajo. *See* Dominican Confederation of Work
- Confederación Ecuatoriana de Obreros Católicos. *See* Ecuadorian Confederation of Catholic Workers
- Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Clasistas. *See* Ecuadorian Confederation of Class-Based Organizations
- Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres. *See* Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Labor Organizations
- Confederación Ferrocarrilera (Argentina). *See* Railroad Workers Confederation
- Confederación General de los Trabajadores (Venezuela). *See* General Confederation of Workers
- Confederación General de Obreros y Campesinos de México. *See* General Confederation of Mexican Workers and Peasants
- Confederación General de Sindicatos (El Salvador). *See* General Confederation of Unions
- Confederación General de Trabajadores. *See* General Confederation of Labor (Argentina; Chile; El Salvador)
- Confederación General de Trabajadores. *See* General Confederation of Workers (Costa Rica; Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua)
- Confederación General de Trabajadores Costarricenses. *See* General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers
- Confederación General de Trabajadores de Colombia. *See* Confederation of Colombian Workers
- Confederación General de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico. *See* General Confederation of Workers of Puerto Rico
- Confederación General de Trabajadores del Uruguay (CGTU). *See* General Confederation of Workers of Uruguay
- Confederación General de Trabajadores Fabriles (Bolivia). *See* General Confederation of Factory Workers
- Confederación General de Trabajadores-Independent (Nicaragua), 562
- Confederación General de Trabajadores Salvadoreños. *See* General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers
- Confederación Independiente de Campesinos de Bolivia. *See* Independent Confederation of Bolivian Peasants
- Confederación Marítima de Chile. *See* Maritime Confederation of Chile
- Confederación Nacional Agraria (Peru). *See* National Agrarian Confederation
- Confederación Nacional Campesina. *See* National Campesino Confederation (Chile; Guatemala; Mexico)
- Confederación Nacional Católica del Trabajo (Mexico). *See* National Catholic Labor Confederation
- Confederación Nacional de Campesinos de Guatemala. *See* National Confederation of Campesinos of Guatemala
- Confederación Nacional de Sindicatos Chilenos. *See* National Confederation of Chilean Unions
- Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores. *See* National Confederation of Workers (Dominican Republic; Paraguay; Venezuela)
- Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores. *See* National Workers Confederation (Costa Rica; Peru)
- Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia. *See* National

- Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia
- Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Dominicanos. *See* National Confederation of Dominican Workers
- Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Libres (Dominican Republic). *See* National Confederation of Free Workers
- Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba. *See* National Labor Confederation of Cuba
- Confederación Obrera Argentina. *See* Confederation of Argentine Workers
- Confederación Obrera Boliviana. *See* Bolivian Workers' Confederation
- Confederación Obrera Boliviana de Unidad Revolucionaria. *See* Bolivian Worker's Confederation of Revolutionary Unity
- Confederación Obrera de Jalisco (Mexico). *See* Labor Confederation of Jalisco
- Confederación Obrera del Guayas (Ecuador). *See* Guayas Labor Confederation
- Confederación Obrera en Puebla (Mexico). *See* Worker Confederation in Puebla
- Confederación Obrera Nacional. *See* National Labor Confederation (Ecuador); National Workers Confederation (Colombia)
- Confederación Obrera Revolucionaria (Mexico). *See* Revolutionary Workers Confederation
- Confederación Paraguaya de Trabajadores. *See* Paraguayan Confederation of Workers
- Confederación Paraguaya de Trabajadores—Exilio. *See* Paraguayan Confederation of Workers—In Exile
- Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana. *See* Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers
- Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (Mexico). *See* Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants
- Confederación Revolucionaria de Trabajadores (Mexico). *See* Revolutionary Confederation of Workers
- Confederación Sindical de Guatemala. *See* Union Confederation of Guatemala
- Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia. *See* Union Confederation of Bolivian Workers
- Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia. *See* Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers
- Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala. *See* Union Confederation of Workers of Guatemala
- Confederación Sindical del Uruguay. *See* Syndical Confederation of Uruguay
- Confederación Sindicalista de Trabajadores Organizados (Dominican Republic). *See* Labor Union Confederation of Organized Workers
- Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia. *See* Sole Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia
- Confederación Sindical Unitaria de México. *See* Union Centralist Confederation of Mexico
- Confederación Unidad de Sindicatos de Guatemala. *See* Confederation of Guatemalan Trade Union Unity
- Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores (Costa Rica). *See* Unitary Workers Confederation
- Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores Salvadoreños. *See* Unitary Confederation of Salvadoran Workers
- Confederación Uruguaya de Trabajadores. *See* Uruguayan Confederation of Workers
- Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens. *See* French Confederation of Christian Workers
- Confédération Générale du Travail (France), 73, 88, 103, 390, 393
- Confederation of Argentine Workers (COA), 4, 10, 11, 16
- Confederation of Autonomous Unions of Venezuela (CODESA), 736, 737, 739, 743, 756

- Confederation of Brazilian Workers (CTB), 78, 92–94, 122, 128
- Confederation of Catholic Workers Circles (Mexico), 526, 528
- Confederation of Central American States (Guatemala), 397
- Confederation of Central American Workers (CTCA) (Panama), 584
- Confederation of Chilean Workers (CTCH), 132, 135, 149, 151, 153, 154, 161, 164–65, 167, 170
- Confederation of Classist Labor Unions (Dominican Republic), 274
- Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC), 182–84, 187–89, 191–93, 196–98, 201–2, 204, 205, 207, 209, 211
- Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El Salvador (COACES), 323, 332–34, 338, 343, 363, 371, 378
- Confederation of Costa Rican Workers (CTCR), 220–23, 230–32, 234
- Confederation of Cuban Workers, 248, 250, 252–55, 258, 261–63, 267; national congress, 254–55
- Confederation of Democratic French Workers (CFDT), 391
- Confederation of Dominican Workers (CTD) 268, 276–77, 288
- Confederation of Guatemalan Trade Union Unity (CUSG), 406, 407, 410, 412, 425
- Confederation of Guatemalan Workers, 413, 426
- Confederation of Honduran Workers (CTH), 473, 475, 477, 489, 492, 494
- Confederation of Industrial and Craft Unions of Santiago (Chile), 166
- Confederation of Latin American Workers. *See* CLAT, CLASC
- Confederation of Mexican Railway Workers, 534
- Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), 511, 513, 519–23, 528–32, 540–41, 543, 545–47
- Confederation of Plant and Craft Unions of Santiago (Chile), 170
- Confederation of Private Sector Employees (Chile), 148, 153, 165, 169, 171, 176
- Confederation of Union Unification (CUS) (Nicaragua), 552–53, 556–57, 562, 567, 570–71
- Confederation of Workers and Peasants in Mexico, 540
- Confederation of Workers of Ecuador (CTE), 292–95, 298–99, 302, 304
- Confederation of Workers of Guatemala (CTG), 398, 413, 417, 418, 420, 426, 430
- Confederation of Workers of Latin American (CTAL), 398, 684
- Confederation of Workers of Peru (CTP), 608, 611–13, 616, 619, 621, 624–26, 628–30, 633–39, 641, 645–47, 652, 654, 657, 659–61, 663, 665; 11th congress, 638
- Confederation of Workers of Revolutionary Cuba (CTC-R), 258
- Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama (CTRP) 580–81, 584–85, 587, 592–93
- CONFIEP (Peru). *See* National Confederation of Private Enterprise Institutions
- Confiño, Angel, 261
- Congestión* (Bolivia), defined, 59
- Congreso del Trabajo (Mexico). *See* Congress of Labor
- Congreso Obrero Regional Argentino. *See* Regional Argentine Labor Congress
- Congreso Obrero Textil (Uruguay). *See* Textile Labor Congress
- Congress of Industrial Organizations, (CIO) 680, 684, 687–88
- Congress of Labor (CT) (Mexico), 521, 529, 532, 538, 539, 541, 546, 547
- Congress of the People (Uruguay), 721
- Congress of Union Unity (Chile), 165
- Congresso Artístico-Operário de Pernambuco (Brazil). *See* Artisan-Labor Congress of Pernambuco
- Congresso del Trabajo (Mexico). *See* Congress of Labor
- Congresso Sindical Regional (Brazil). *See*

- Regional Union Congress of Rio de Janeiro
- CONI (Cuba). *See* National Independent Labor Committee
- Consejo Coordinador de Trabajadores Estatales y Municipales (El Salvador). *See* State and Municipal Workers Coordinating Council
- Consejo de Entidades de Trabajadores del Estado (Guatemala). *See* Council of Organizations of State Workers
- Consejo de Unidad Sindical. *See* Confederation of Union Unification
- Consejo de Unificación de Organizaciones Sindicales (Peru). *See* Unification Council of Union Organizations
- Consejo Nacional de Consulta Sindical (Guatemala). *See* National Council of Labor Consultation
- Consejo Nacional de Magistros (Guatemala). *See* National Council of Teachers
- Consejo Nacional de Trabajadores Democráticos (Guatemala). *See* National Council of Democratic Workers
- Consejo Nacional de Trabajadores Organizados (Panama). *See* National Council of Organized Workers
- Consejo Nacional de Unidad Sindical. *See* National Committee of Trade Union Unity (Guatemala); National Council for Labor Unity (Dominican Republic)
- Consejo Nacional Sindical (Colombia). *See* National Unionist Council
- Consejo Obrero del Paraguay. *See* Workers' Council of Paraguay
- Consejo Sindical de Guatemala. *See* Union Council of Guatemala
- Conselho Sindical dos Trabalhadores no Estado de São Paulo (Brazil). *See* Union Council of Workers in the State of São Paulo
- Conservative party. 180–81, 189, 206, 296, 298–99
- CONSIGUA. *See* Union Confederation of Guatemala
- Construction and Decorative Arts Union (Peru), 640
- Construction Industry and Transport Trade Union Federation (El Salvador), 312, 341
- Construction Industry Workers General Union (SGTICES) (El Salvador), 335, 336, 349, 382
- Construction Union of the Federal District and State of Miranda (Venezuela), 739
- Construction Workers Federation (FIE-MEC) (Chile), 154, 163, 175
- Construction Workers Federation of Peru, 614, 637, 639, 647, 663
- Construction Workers Union (SUTC) (El Salvador), 312, 335–36, 350, 378
- CONSUTRAPET (Venezuela). *See* United Union Committee of Petroleum Workers
- CONTAG (Brazil). *See* National Confederation of Agricultural Workers
- CONTCOP (Brazil). *See* National Confederation of Communications and Advertising Workers
- CONTEC (Brazil). *See* National Bank Workers Confederation
- CONTRAGUA. *See* Confederation of Guatemalan Workers
- Contreras, Eleazar López, 727, 729, 744
- Contreras, Lionel Oswaldo, 427
- Control obrero* (Bolivia), 46, 48, 54; defined, 45
- CONUS (Guatemala). *See* National Coordinator of Trade Union Unity
- Convencion Nacional de Trabajadores (Uruguay). *See* National Convention of Workers
- Conventillos* (Chile), defined, 174
- Convivencia* (Peru), 613, 639, 660; defined, 612, 636
- Coombs, Allen George St. Claver, 506
- Cooperatives, 314, 315, 323, 330, 333, 338, 350, 378, 459, 602
- COOR (El Salvador). *See* Workers Committee of Revolutionary Orientation
- Coordinadora de Empleados del Estado

- (El Salvador). *See* State and Municipal Workers Coordinating Council
- Coordinadora Democrática Nicaragüense "Ramiro Sacasa Guerrero." *See* "Ramiro Sacasa Guerrero" Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Group
- Coordinadora de Solidaridad de los Trabajadores (El Salvador). *See* Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee
- Coordinadora Nacional Sindical (Chile). *See* National Union Coordinating Committee
- Coordinador Nacional de Unidad Sindical (Guatemala). *See* National Coordinator of Trade Union Unity
- COOS (Brazil). *See* Labor Committee of Syndical Organization
- COP. *See* Workers' Council of Paraguay
- COPA (Guatemala). *See* Pan-American Confederation of Workers
- COPEI (Venezuela), 733, 736, 739, 740–742, 745, 752, 756–58
- COPEMH (Honduras). *See* Association of Secondary Education Teachers
- Copeyano Workers Front (FTC) (Venezuela), 737
- Copper Workers Confederation (CTC) (Chile), 155–56, 169
- Coquard, Timocles, 459
- COR (Mexico). *See* Revolutionary Workers Confederation
- CORA. *See* Regional Argentine Labor Congress
- CORDE (Dominican Republic). *See* National Corporation of State-Owned Business
- Cordones de miseria* (Peru), defined, 619
- Cordones industriales* (Chile), defined, 139
- Cordova, Arnaldo, 519
- Cordova, Roberto Suazo, 463, 465, 467, 478, 489
- Cornejo, Jorge Alberto "El Beate" Moran, 316, 346, 382
- Corney, Francisco, 722
- CORP. *See* Regional Workers' Central of Paraguay
- Corrientes* (Honduras), defined, 465
- Cortizzo, Lino, 719
- COSA (Honduras). *See* Central American Workers Confederation
- Cosmopolitan Center (Brazil), 93
- Cosmopolitan Union (Brazil), 117
- Cosmopolitan Voice* (Brazil), 94
- Costa, Bezerra da, 109
- Costa Rica, 466, 468, 493, 550, 584; AIFLD in, 222, 226, 230; banana zones of, 220, 222; boundary war with Panama, 219, 235; Catholic Church in, 221, 229; Civil War (1948), 221, 230; coffee industry in, 213; Communist Party in, 220, 221, 232, 234, 238, 242; Costa Rican Central Bank, 236; enterprises in (Monte de Aguacate mines, 214; National Liquor Factory, 218; Northern Railroad, 235; Northern Railway Company, 241; United Fruit Company, 219, 222, 235); immigration, Chinese, 216; labor legislation in (labor code [1941]), 221; labor law [1857] 214; labor publications (*El Demócrata* ["The Democrat"], 224; *El Obrero* ["The Worker"], 240; *Hoja Obrera* ["Workers Page"], 217; *La Gaceta*, 218; *La Justicia Social* ["Social Justice"], 217; *Revolución* ["Revolution"], 220); minimum wage, 221; ORIT in, 222, 226, 230; racial tensions in, 216, 220; right-to-strike in, 219, 221; social security system in, 217, 221, 237; strikes (banana workers, 220, 224, 232, 241; general, 218, 234, 235; teachers [1955], 236); United States and, 230; United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in, 230; World War II and, 219
- Costa Rican Christian Workers and Peasants Front, 229
- Costa Rican Democratic Workers Confederation (CCTD), 222, 223, 226, 230–31, 235–37
- Costa Rican Educators Union (SEC), 226, 231, 236, 240
- Costa Rican Musical Union, 231, 236

- Costa Rican Workers and Peasants Front (FOCC), 223
- Costa Rican Workers Central (CTC), 230
- Costa Rican Workers Confederation "Re-rum Novarum" (CCTRN), 221, 222, 223, 229–32
- COSTO (Dominican Republic). *See* Labor Union Confederation of Organized Workers
- COT (Uruguay). *See* Textile Labor Congress
- Cotton and Synthetics Textile Industry Workers Union (STITAS) (El Salvador), 337, 347, 378
- Council of Organizations of State Workers (CETE) (Guatemala), 414
- Council of the Center (Honduras), 471
- Council of the North (Honduras), 471
- Council of the West (Honduras), 471
- Council of Union Unity (Nicaragua), 562
- COUO (Uruguay). *See* Committee of Labor Organization and Unity
- COYDES. *See* Dismissed and Unemployed Workers Committee of El Salvador
- CPOS (Brazil). *See* Permanent Commission of Trade Union Organizations
- CPT. *See* Paraguayan Confederation of Workers
- CPT-E. *See* Paraguayan Confederation of Workers—In Exile
- CPTT. *See* Panamanian Central of Transport Workers
- CPUSTAL, 268, 588
- CRAC (Chile). *See* Republican Confederation of Civil Action
- Criado, Luis Negrieros, 638
- "Cristal" Brewery Workers Union (Peru), 629
- Critchlow, Hubert, 435, 443
- Critchlow, Stanton, 444, 445
- Critchlow Labor Institute (Guyana), 446
- CRM (El Salvador). *See* Revolutionary Mass Coordinating Committee
- CROC (Mexico). *See* Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants
- Crocs, Hemmy, 754
- CROM. *See* Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers
- CROSS. *See* Salvadoran Trade Union Reorganizing Committee
- CRT (Mexico). *See* Revolutionary Confederation of Workers
- Cruz, Ramón Ernesto, 464
- Cruzado, Júlio, 624, 625, 638, 640
- CSA (Guyana). *See* Civil Service Association
- CSAF (Uruguay). *See* Anti-Fascist Syndical Committee
- CSCB. *See* Brazilian Cooperativist Syndicalist Confederation
- CSEPP. *See* Office Employees Federation of Peru
- CSG. *See* Union Council of Guatemala
- CSLA. *See* Latin American Syndical Confederation
- CSN. *See* Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group
- CSO (Bolivia). *See* Workers' Social Center
- CST. *See* Sandinista Workers' Central "José Benito Escobar" (Nicaragua); Union Council of Workers in the State of Sao Paulo (Brazil); Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee (El Salvador)
- CSTB. *See* Union Confederation of Bolivian Workers
- CSTC. *See* Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers
- CSTG. *See* Union Confederation of Workers of Guatemala
- CSU. *See* Syndical Confederation of Uruguay
- CSU (Venezuela). *See* Unified Union Committee
- CSUM. *See* Union Centralist Confederation of Mexico
- CT (Mexico). *See* Congress of Labor
- CTAL. *See* Confederation of Workers of Latin America
- CTB. *See* Confederation of Brazilian Workers
- CTC. *See* Confederation of Colombian Workers; Confederation of Costa Rican

- Workers; Confederation of Cuban Workers; Copper Workers Confederation (Chile); Rural Workers' Committees (Nicaragua)
- CTCG. *See* Central Christian Workers of Guiana
- CTCH. *See* Confederation of Chilean Workers
- CTCR. *See* General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers
- CTC-R. *See* Confederation of Workers of Revolutionary Cuba
- CTD. *See* Confederation of Dominican Workers; Democratic Workers Central (El Salvador)
- CTE. *See* Confederation of Workers of Ecuador
- CTF (Guatemala). *See* Central of Federated Workers
- CTG. *See* Confederation of Workers of Guatemala
- CTH. *See* Confederation of Honduran Workers
- CTM. *See* Confederation of Mexican Workers
- CTN. *See* Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation
- CTN-Autonomous. *See* Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation—Autonomous
- CTP. *See* Confederation of Workers of Peru, 608, 611, 612, 613, 616, 619, 621
- CTRP-Lima (Peru), 619, 661
- CTRP. *See* Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama; Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution
- CTS. *See* Salvadoran Workers Central
- CTU. *See* Uruguayan Workers Center
- CTV. *See* Workers Confederation of Venezuela
- Cuadernos de San Lucas* (Nicaragua), 560
- Cuadra, Pablo Antonio, 560
- Cuadros, Victor, 648, 655
- Cuba, 69, 194, 320, 494; AFL in, 259; Church Committee, 244; Cold War and, 248; collective bargaining in, 250; Communist Party in, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 253, 262; eight-hour day in, 245, 247, 262; Great Depression, impact on, 244, 247; labor congresses (First Worker's Congress, 245; Third Worker's Congress [1925], 257; Workers Congress [1929], 261); labor leaders, repression of 246, 261; labor legislation, 247; minimum wage, 247; racial tension in, 245, 263; strikes, dockworkers, 246; strikes, general, 247, 258, 260, 261, 263; strikes, sugar, 246; United States and, 243, 257, 259; World War II and, 244, 248
- Cuba, Edgardo, 629
- Cuban Federation of Labor (FCT), 257, 259, 401
- Cuban Revolution, 182, 195, 249–50, 316, 368, 710, 725
- Cuban Socialist Party, 246
- Cuban Sugar Workers Union, 506
- Cuban Workers Central, 258
- CUC (Guatemala). *See* Committee of Campesino Unity
- Cuéllas, Diego Montaña, 206
- Cuéllas, Nicolás Olivas, 543
- Cuenca, Héctor, 730
- Cuestas, Gerardo, 725
- Cuevas, Tulio, 194, 206, 207
- CUI (Honduras). *See* Committee of Inter-syndical Unity
- CUL. *See* Committee of Labor Unity (Honduras); Unified Struggle Command (Peru)
- CUOS (Peru). *See* Unification Council of Union Organization
- Curatto, Manuel, 629
- CUS. *See* Committee of syndical Unity (Honduras); Confederation of Union Unification (Nicaragua); Labor Unity Committee (Costa Rica); Union Unity Committee (El Salvador)
- CUSCA. *See* Trade Union Committee of Central American Workers
- CUSG. *See* Confederation of Guatemalan Trade Union Unity
- CUSIC (Venezuela). *See* Unitary Committee of Christian Unionists

- CUSS. *See* Salvadoran Trade Union Unity Committee
- CUT. *See* Chilean Workers Central; Single Confederation of Workers (Colombia); Sole Central of Workers (Mexico; Panama); Sole Workers Central (Brazil; Panama); Unitary Confederation of Workers (Dominican Republic); Unitary Workers Confederation (Costa Rica); Uruguayan Workers Central
- CUTCH. *See* Chilean Workers Central
- CUTS. *See* Unitary Confederation of Salvadoran Workers
- CUTV. *See* Unitary Center of Workers of Venezuela
- Cuyamel Fruit Company, 469, 550
- Cuzco Rojo (Peru), 640
- Cuzco Workers Federation (FTC) (Peru) 614, 640, 646
- CWU (Belize). *See* Christian Workers Union
- Cyrille, Albert, 392
- D'Aguiar, Peter, 437
- Damonte, Humberto (Peru), 629
- Dantas, San Tiago, 97
- D'Aubuisson, Major Roberto, 318, 320, 322, 338, 339, 353, 361, 370
- Davis, Cyril, 31
- D'Elia, German, 716
- D'Elia, José, 712, 721
- Death squads, 315, 318, 319, 321, 322, 331, 337, 339, 340, 353, 358, 359, 360, 361, 369, 379, 405, 406
- Debayle, Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza, 404, 555–56, 560–66, 568–69, 571–74
- Debayle, Luis Somoza, 550, 564
- Declaration of Sophia (1974), 438
- Decompressão* (Brazil), 70, 109
- De empresa* (Mexico), defined, 511
- Defense Fronts (Peru), 625, 644
- De Gaulle, Charles, 391
- Delegates of the Word (El Salvador), 331
- DeLeon, Daniel, 682
- Delgado, Carlos (Peru), 664
- Del Monte, 224, 232, 242, 426
- Delpino, Juan José, 758
- Demerara Bauxite Company, 436, 438
- Democratic Action (AD) (El Salvador), 374; (Venezuela), 727, 729, 730, 736, 739–43, 745, 747, 750, 752, 753, 756, 758
- Democratic Alliance (Brazil), 84
- Democratic Christian League (Argentina), 13
- Democratic Federation of Unions of Workers of Honduras (FEDESINTRABH), 493
- Democratic Front Against Repression (FDCR) (Guatemala), 405, 412, 414, 421
- Democratic Independent Union (DIU) (Belize), 30, 31
- Democratic National Alliance (Bolivia), 59
- Democratic Nationalist Action (ADN) (Bolivia), 57
- Democratic Popular Union (UDP) (Bolivia), 48
- Democratic Popular Unity (UPD) (El Salvador), 319–21, 324, 333, 335, 336, 339–42, 353, 363, 365, 369, 374, 383
- Democratic Republican Union (URD) (Venezuela), 728, 732, 747, 752, 754, 757
- Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) (El Salvador), 319, 338, 352, 358, 369, 376, 379
- Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) (Panama), 588
- Democratic Tendency (TD) (Mexico), 523, 529–30, 541, 544, 546–47
- Democratic Union (FSD) (Peru), 624
- Democratic Union for Liberation (UDEL) (Nicaragua), 553–54
- Democratic Union Front (Peru), 624, 638, 640, 641, 657, 665
- Democratic Union Movement (MSD) (Brazil), 87, 94, 95, 97, 98, 102, 110, 120
- Democratic Workers Central (CTD) (El Salvador), 322, 330, 341, 342, 354, 370, 379
- Democratic Workers Union (UDT) (Chile), 144–45, 156, 164, 169, 175–76

- Democrat Party (Chile), 131, 147, 149, 151, 163, 170, 173, 177-78
- Denbigh, Jeffrey, 28
- Depine, Clifford W., 686
- Derby, F. R., 696
- Devandas, Mario, 237, 238
- Devil's Island, 389
- Diário Nicaragüense*, 560
- Díaz, Abdon, 147
- Díaz, Porfirio, 516, 517, 528, 533
- Diez, Julio, 730
- DIFOCOOP (Honduras). *See* Director General of Cooperative Development
- DINA (Chile). *See* Secret police
- Diniz, José Alves, 117
- Director General of Cooperative Development (DIFOCOOP) (Honduras), 486
- Directorio Obrero del Litoral Atlántico (Colombia). *See* Workers' Directorate of the Atlantic Coast
- Discua, Adalberto, 491
- Dismissed and Unemployed Workers Committee of El Salvador (COYDES), 385
- DIU (Belize). *See* Democratic Independent Union
- Doherty, William, 320, 324, 340, 341
- Dominican Communist Party (PCD), 272
- Dominican Confederation of Work (CDT), 267, 276, 277, 281
- Dominican Republic, 454; AFL in, 266, 284; AFL-CIO in, 269, 279, 282; civil war in (1865, 270; 1965, 277); democratic opening (*apertura democrática*) in, 272; enterprises in, Gulf & Western, 270, 271, 278-79, 286, 287; foreign labor in, 265-66; Great Depression, impact on, 267; immigration to, 281, 284; labor leaders, repression of, 268, 270; minimum wage in, 272; National Police, 270, 286; ORIT in, 268, 269, 282; strikes in, sugar workers, 267, 285; sugar industry in, 265, 286; United States and, 282 (invasion of, 266; occupation of, 284, 285); United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in, 282; United States Central Intelligence Agency and, 269
- Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), 269, 271, 272, 274, 275, 277, 281-83, 286-88
- Dominican Union of Workers, 269-70, 277, 280
- Draeta, Ubadora Arriaga, 465
- Drassinower, Samuel, 616
- Duarte, José Napoleón, 320, 321, 323, 328, 330, 333-41, 347, 348, 351, 353, 359, 361, 363, 369, 370, 372
- Dubinsky, David, 675, 681
- Dunkley, C., 507
- Dutch East India Company, 433
- Dutch Guiana, 691
- Dutra, General Eurico Gaspar, 66, 78, 92, 110, 111, 128
- Duvalier, Dr. Francois ("Papa Doc"), 450, 453, 456, 458, 459
- Duvalier, Jean-Claude ("Baby Doc"), 450, 452, 460
- Eastern Region Farmers' Front (FARO) (El Salvador), 331
- Economic Development Administration (Puerto Rico), 670, 676
- Ecuador: AFL-CIO in, 293, 299; agrarian reform in, 305; AIFLD in, 302; Anglo-Ecuadorian Oil Company, 302; banks in, Commercial and Agricultural Bank, 291; Catholic Church in, 290, 291, 293, 294, 296, 297; Communist Party of Ecuador, 294, 299; Guayaquil and Quito Railroad Company (Ecuador), 291; Great Depression, impact on, 292; International Monetary Fund and, 305; labor congresses (First National Catholic Labor Congress, 299; First National Labor Congress (1909), 296, 302; National Labor Congress (1920), 300); labor publications (*La Mujer Ecuatoriana* ["The Ecuadorian Woman"], 296; *El Obrero* ["The Laborer"], 304; *El Tipógrafo* ["The Typographer"], 304); massacre, Guayaquil, 1922, 291, 299, 300, 303; migration, internal, 290; minimum

- wage in, 305; ORIT in, 303; social security system in, 292; strikes in, 291, 296, 304; strikes, general, 291; United States and, 293, 294, 295; United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 294, 299; World War II and, 296
- Ecuadorian Confederation of Catholic Workers (CEDOC), 292–95, 298–99
- Ecuadorian Confederation of Class Based Organizations (CEDOC), 293, 297–99, 304
- Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Labor Organizations (CEOSL), 293–95, 298–99, 302
- Ecuadorian Regional Labor Federation (FORE), 299
- Education Workers Union (SUTE), 148, 156, 157, 159, 160, 174
- Edun, Ayube, 445
- Eight-hour day, 42, 103, 115, 118, 122, 132, 177, 218, 245, 247, 262, 309, 386, 435, 445, 609, 633, 658, 660, 663, 707
- Eisenhower Administration, 686
- Ejidatarios* (Mexico), defined, 538
- Ejidos*, 371, 487, 519
- El Artesano* (Peru), 629
- “El Beatle” (El Salvador). *See* Cornejo, Jorge Alberto “El Beatle” Moran
- El Demócrata*, 224
- “El Dorado” Edible Oil and Fats Factory Workers Union (El Salvador), 342, 346
- Eleazer, Leo, 692, 698
- Electoral Movement of the People (MEP) (Venezuela), 728, 740
- Electrical Industry Workers Union (SIES) (El Salvador), 342, 375
- Electrical Workers Democratic Action (ADE) (Mexico), 530
- El Hijo de Trabajo* (“The Son of Labor”) (Mexico), 533, 542
- El Imparcial* (Puerto Rico), 687
- El Mayorazgo* (Mexico), 548
- El Obrero* (Colombia), 209
- El Obrero* (Costa Rica), 240
- El Obrero* (“The Laborer”) (Ecuador), 304
- El Obrero Panadero* (Argentina), 10
- El Obrero Textil* (Peru), 660
- El Pizzarón* (Chile), 157
- El Pueblo* (Nicaragua), 555, 574, 575
- El Salvador, 465, 468; AFL in, 311, 349; AFL-CIO in, 307, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317, 319, 320, 321–24, 334–36, 338–42, 347, 349, 350, 352–53, 355, 358, 363, 367, 368, 370, 372, 373, 379, 384; agrarian reform, 314, 318, 330, 332, 338, 339, 353, 360, 369–71 (Land to the tiller program, 339, 369; Phase Two, 334; Phase Three 339); Agricultural Development Bank, 371; AIFLD in, 312, 314–15, 317–24, 333, 335–36, 339–41, 347, 348, 350–55, 360, 361, 363, 367–69, 371–72, 374, 379, 382, 384; austerity policies in, 377; Catholic Church in, 314, 315, 330, 331; Civil War, 322, 329, 332, 334, 340, 348, 358, 364, 367, 369, 370, 388; Cuban Revolution, influence of, 316, 368; death squads in, 315, 318, 319, 321–22, 331, 337, 339, 340, 353, 358–61, 369, 379; demonstrations in, 308, 310, 337, 356, 360, 365, 381; eight-hour day in, 309, 386; enterprises in (Phelps-Dodge factory, 355, 379; Texas Instrument Plant, 366; Tropical, 346); human rights in, 320, 322, 340, 360, 361; labor congresses (Workers Congress (1918), 308, 385; National Labor Congress (1957), 311, 348–49); labor legislation, 310, 312–13, 334, 348–49, 350, 372, 373, 382; massacre (Las Hojas, 372; Matanza (1932), 307, 310, 387); May Day demonstration, 1985, 274, 323, 388; minimum wages in, 321, 327, 328; Ministry of Labor, 312, 317, 319, 326–27, 329, 331, 334, 336, 347, 349, 352, 357–58, 367–68, 379, 384; ORIT in, 311, 314, 317, 335, 346, 348–51, 373, 379; peasant leagues, 315, 330, 386; repression in, 308–11, 314, 317–23, 329–37, 339, 344–46, 353, 354, 356, 359, 361–67,

- 373, 376, 377, 379, 380, 384; right-to-strike in, 308, 310, 313, 326, 373; Social Security System (ISSS), 376; state of siege in, 310, 318, 332, 338, 369; strikes in, 308, 313, 317, 319, 322, 322–23, 327, 329, 337, 342, 352, 354, 358, 362, 365–66, 372–73, 377, 385–86, 342, 350, 352, 365, 384–86 (bakery workers, 311; coffee workers, 309, 387; general, 309, 310, 313, 319, 325–27, 338, 348, 354, 362, 373, 380; postal workers, 323, 355, 378; railway workers, 1945, 310; teacher, 1968, 382; textile workers, 311, 313; transportation, 313); United States and, 312, 314, 317–22, 335–36, 338, 340–41, 345, 347, 354, 366, 370 (policy toward, 314, 320, 321, 339, 347, 350, 369, 370, 372, 377); United States Army Special Forces, 314, 360; United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and, 314–15, 360–61, 370 (Operation Phoenix, 369); United States Embassy in, 342, 347, 352, 353, 361, 370, 371; United States Government agencies, 307, 314, 326, 336, 353, 368
- El Socialista* ("The Socialist") (Mexico), 533, 542
- El Sol* ("The Sun") (Mexico), 540
- El Tipógrafo* ("The Typographer") (Ecuador), 304
- El Trabajo* (Chile), 147
- El Valle Nacional (Mexico), 533
- El Volante* (Peru), 630
- Emergency Committee of State Workers (Guatemala), 414
- Empleados* (Peru), defined, 607
- Employees Society of Santiago (Chile), 147
- Employers Merchant Association (Chile), 161
- Empresa Azucarera Nacional (Panama), 586
- Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica (ENEE) (Honduras), 475
- ENDESA (Chile). *See* National Electricity Industry
- Enganche* system (Peru), 608
- Enríquez, Alberto, 292
- Equality Society (Chile), 157
- ERP (El Salvador). *See* People's Revolutionary Army
- ESA (Guatemala). *See* Secret Anticomunist Army
- Escuela Sindical Camilo Torres, 743
- ESOPETROL (Colombia), 203
- Espinoza, Gustavo, 647
- Espinoza, Salom Mesa, 745
- Esquirroles* (Mexico), defined, 517
- Estabilidad* (Venezuela), 742; defined, 731, 755
- Estaing, Valéry Giscard d', 390
- Estenssoro, Victor Paz, 44–48, 50, 51, 54, 56, 59
- Estigarribia, José Félix, 596, 598
- Estimé, Dumarsais, 449, 450–51, 454–57, 459
- "Estrella de Peru" Bakery Workers Federation, 608, 629, 636, 641, 652, 659
- Estudios Marxistas* (Colombia), 201
- Evangelical Committee for Agrarian Promotion (CEPA) (Nicaragua), 559
- Expejel, Ernesto Hernández, 534
- "Fábrica de Tejidos La Unión" Trade Union Alliance (Peru), 660
- FAC (Uruguay). *See* Autonomous Meat Federation
- Facey, F. W., 447
- Facultad de Medicina, Cirugía, y Farmacia (Costa Rica). *See* Faculty of Medicine, Surgery and Pharmacy
- Faculty of Medicine, Surgery and Pharmacy (Costa Rica), 228, 232, 239
- FAG (Bolivia). *See* Federation of Graphic Arts
- Falkland Islands (Malvinas), 8
- Fallen Arms Strike, 1944 (El Salvador), 310, 348, 362
- FANAL (Colombia). *See* National Agrarian Federation
- FAO (Nicaragua). *See* Broad Opposition Front
- FAPU (El Salvador). *See* United Popular Action Front

- Faria, Jesús, 731
- Farm Worker and Peasant Association of El Salvador (ATACES) 315, 327–28, 342–43, 353, 380
- Farmworkers Union Front (Peru), 630
- FARO (El Salvador). *See* Eastern Region Farmers' Front
- FAS (Guatemala). *See* Autonomous Union Federation
- Fascism, 43, 66, 561
- FASGUA. *See* Autonomous Union Federation of Guatemala
- FASH. *See* Authentic Syndical Federation of Honduras
- FAT. *See* Authentic Labor Front (Mexico); Authentic Workers Federation (Panama)
- FCC (Paraguay). *See* Christian Peasant Federation
- FCG. *See* Campesino Federation of Guatemala
- FCP. *See* Chauffeurs Federation of Peru
- FACT. *See* Cuban Federation of Labor
- FCV. *See* Peasant Federation of Venezuela
- FDR (El Salvador). *See* Democratic Revolutionary Front
- FDRC (Guatemala). *See* Democratic Front Against Repression
- FE (Argentina). *See* Federation of Longshoremen
- FEASIES. *See* Federation of Independent Union Associations of El Salvador
- FEB (Peru). *See* Bank Employees Federation
- FEBTRABTAS (Guatemala). *See* Federation of Foodworkers
- FECCAS (El Salvador). *See* Christian Peasants Federation
- FECESITLITH. *See* Central Federation of Free Unions of Honduras
- FECETRAG. *See* Central Federation of Workers of Guatemala
- FECORAH. *See* Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives
- FECORASAL. *See* Salvadoran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives
- FECUAPETROL (Ecuador). *See* National Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers
- FEDACAMH (Honduras). *See* Federation of Associated Peasant Enterprises
- FEDCODE. *See* Colombian Federation of Teachers
- FEDENAL (Colombia). *See* National Federation of Maritime, River, Port and Air Transport
- FEDENCA (Venezuela). *See* National Peasant Federation
- FEDEPETROL. *See* Federation of Petroleum Workers of Colombia; Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela
- FEDEPUERTOS. *See* National Federation of Maritime Dockworkers of Colombia
- Federação de Resistência das Classes Trabalhadores de Pernambuco (Brazil). *See* Resistance Federation of the Pernambucan Working Classes
- Federação dos Operários em Fábricas de Tecido (Brazil). *See* Textile Factory Workers Federation
- Federação do Trabalhadores do Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). *See* Federation of Workers of Rio de Janeiro
- Federação Operária Cristã de Pernambuco (Brazil). *See* Christian Labor Federation of Pernambuco
- Federação Operária de São Paulo (Brazil). *See* São Paulo Labor Federation
- Federação Operária do Pernambuco (Brazil). *See* Labor Federation of Pernambuco
- Federação Operária do Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). *See* Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro
- Federação Operária Regional Brasileira. *See* Brazilian Regional Labor Federation
- Federação Operária Regional de Pernambuco (Brazil). *See* Regional Labor Federation of Pernambuco
- Federação Operária Regional do Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). *See* Regional Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro
- Federação Sindical Regional do Rio de

- Janeiro (Brazil). *See* Regional Union Federation of Rio de Janeiro
- Federación Agrária Argentina. *See* Agrarian Federation of Argentina
- Federación Agrária Nacional (Colombia). *See* National Agrarian Federation
- Federación Autónoma de la Carne (Uruguay). *See* Autonomous Meat Federation
- Federación Autónoma Sindical de Guatemala. *See* Autonomous Union Federation of Guatemala
- Federación Campesina de Guatemala. *See* Campesino Federation of Guatemala
- Federación Campesina de Venezuela. *See* Peasant Federation of Venezuela
- Federación Central de Sindicatos Libres de Honduras. *See* Central Federation of Free Unions of Honduras
- Federación Central de Trabajadores de Guatemala. *See* Central Federation of Workers of Guatemala
- Federación Colombiana de Educadores. *See* Colombian Federation of Teachers
- Federación Cristiana Campesina (Paraguay). *See* Christian Peasant Federation
- Federación Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoreños. *See* Christian Peasants Federation
- Federación Cubana del Trabajo. *See* Cuban Federation of Labor
- Federación de Artes Gráficas (Bolivia). *See* Federation of Graphic Arts
- Federación de Asociaciones Católicas de Empleados (Argentina). *See* Federation of Catholic Employees Associations
- Federación de Asociaciones Sindicales Independientes de El Salvador. *See* Federation of Independent Union Associations of El Salvador
- Federación de Cooperatives de Reforma Agrária de Honduras. *See* Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives
- Federación de Educadores de Chile. *See* Federation of Chilean Educators
- Federación de Empleados de Bogotá (Colombia). *See* Bogota Employees' Federation
- Federación de Empresas Asociativas de Campesinos de Honduras. *See* Federation of Associated Peasant Enterprises
- Federación de Estibadores (Argentina). *See* Federation of Longshoremen
- Federación del Trabajo de Puerto Rico. *See* Workers Federation of Puerto Rico
- Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado (Mexico). *See* Federation of Civil Service Unions
- Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de Alimentos, Bebidas y Similares (El Salvador). *See* Food and Beverage Workers Federation of Trade Unions
- Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores Salvadoreños. *See* Salvadoran Workers Trade Union Federation
- Federación de Sindicatos Independientes (Panama). *See* Independent Federation of Unions
- Federación de Sindicatos Industriales de Santiago (Chile). *See* Plant (Industrial) Union Federation of Santiago
- Federación de Sindicatos Textiles, Similares y Conexos y Otras Actividades (El Salvador). *See* Textile Union Federation
- Federación de Sociedades Obreras del Norte (Honduras). *See* Federation of Workers Societies of the North
- Federación de Trabajadores Bancarios del Paraguay. *See* Bank Workers Federation of Paraguay
- Federación de Trabajadores Copeyanos (Venezuela). *See* Federation of COPEI Workers
- Federación de Trabajadores de Alimento, Bebida, Tobacco y Asociados Sindicatos (Guatemala). *See* Federation of Foodworkers
- Federación de Trabajadores de Antioquia (Colombia). *See* Federation of Workers of Antioquia
- Federación de Trabajadores de Cundinamarca (Colombia). *See* Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca

- Federación de Trabajadores de Guatemala. *See* Federation of Guatemalan Workers
- Federación de Trabajadores de la Caña de Azúcar (Venezuela). *See* Federation of Sugarcane Workers
- Federación de Trabajadores de la Enseñanza (Venezuela). *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers
- Federación de Trabajadores de la Industria de la Construcción (Venezuela). *See* Federation of Construction Workers
- Federación de Trabajadores de la Industria de Hidrocarburos (Venezuela). *See* Federation of Hydrocarbon Industry Workers
- Federación de Trabajadores de Limón (Costa Rica). *See* Limon Federation of Workers
- Federación de Trabajadores del Magisterio (Venezuela). *See* Teachers' Federation
- Federación de Trabajadores del Valle (Colombia). *See* Federation of Workers of the Valley
- Federación de Trabajadores Libres del Valle (Colombia). *See* Federation of Free Workers of the Valley
- Federación de Trabajadores Petroleros de Colombia. *See* Federation of Petroleum Workers of Colombia
- Federación de Trabajadores Petroleros de Venezuela. *See* Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela
- Federación de Trabajadores Textiles (Venezuela). *See* Federation of Textile Workers
- Federación de Trabajadores Textiles y del Cuero (Guatemala). *See* Federation of Textile and Leather Workers
- Federación de Trabajadores Textiles y del Vestuario (Chile). *See* Textile and Clothing Workers Federation
- Federación de Trabajadores Unidos de la Industria Azucarera (Guatemala). *See* Federation of United Workers in the Sugar Industry
- Federación Ferroviaria (Bolivia). *See* Railroad Workers' Federation
- Federación General de Uniones de Protección al Trabajo de Sudamerica (Chile). *See* General Federation of Unions for the Protection of Labor of South America
- Federación Gráfica (Costa Rica). *See* Graphic Workers Federation
- Federación Industrial Ferroviaria de Chile. *See* Railway Workers Industrial Federation
- Federación Istemeña de Trabajadores Cristianos (Panama). *See* Isthmian Federation of Christian Workers
- Federación Laboral Autónoma de Guatemala. *See* Guatemalan Autonomous Labor Federation
- Federación Libre de los Trabajadores de Puerto Rico. *See* Free Federation of Labor
- Federación Minera (Chile). *See* Federation of Miners
- Federación Nacional Campesina (Venezuela). *See* National Peasant Federation
- Federación Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras. *See* National Association of Honduran Peasants
- Federación Nacional de Choferes (Ecuador). *See* National Federation of Professional Drivers
- Federación Nacional de Comunidades Agrícolas e Indígenas (Guatemala). *See* National Federation of Agricultural and Indigenous Communities
- Federación Nacional de Empleados (Venezuela). *See* National Employees Association
- Federación Nacional de Empleados de Telecomunicaciones (Ecuador). *See* National Federation of Telecommunications Employees
- Federación Nacional de Empleados Públicos e Institutos Autónomos (Dominican Republic). *See* National Federation of Employees of Public Sector and Autonomous Institutions
- Federación Nacional de Ferrovias (Col-

- ombia). *See* National Federation of Railways
- Federación Nacional de la Industria Textil, del Vestido y Similares (Guatemala). *See* National Federation of Textile, Apparel and Related Industry Workers
- Federación Nacional del Transporte Marítimo, Fluvial, Portuario y Aéreo. *See* National Federation of Maritime, River, Port and Air
- Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas de Bolivia. *See* National Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women
- Federación Nacional de Obreros del Transporte (Guatemala). *See* National Federation of Transport Workers
- Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas. *See* National Federation of Campesino Organizations
- Federación Nacional de Sindicatos Independientes (Mexico). *See* National Federation of Independent Unions
- Federación Nacional de Torcedores (Cuba). *See* National Federation of Rollers
- Federación Nacional de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado (Colombia). *See* National Federation of State Workers
- Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Azucareros (Cuba). *See* National Federation of Sugar Workers
- Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de los Servicios Públicos (Costa Rica). *See* National Federation of Public Service Workers
- Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de Salud (Chile). *See* National Health Workers Federation
- Federación Nacional de Trabajadores del Petróleo (Ecuador). *See* National Federation of Petroleum Workers
- Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Metalúrgicos (Venezuela). *See* National Federation of Metalworkers
- Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Portuarios de Colombia. *See* National Federation of Maritime Dockworkers of Colombia
- Federación Nacional Obrera Azucarera (Cuba). *See* National Sugar Labor Federation
- Federación Nacional Sindical Metalúrgica (Chile). *See* Metallurgical and Iron Workers Union Federation
- Federación Naval (Paraguay). *See* Naval Federation
- Federación Obrera Central de Uncía (Bolivia). *See* Central Labor Federation of Uncía
- Federación Obrera Chilena. *See* Chilean Workers Federation
- Federación Obrera de Guatemala para la Protección Legal del Trabajo. *See* Worker Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor
- Federación Obrera de la Habana (Cuba). *See* Havana Labor Federation
- Federación Obrera de la Industria Textil (Argentina). *See* Textile Workers Union
- Federación Obrera de La Paz (Bolivia). *See* Workers' Federation of La Paz
- Federación Obrera de la República de Panamá. *See* Workers Federation of the Republic of Panama
- Federación Obrera del Litoral Atlántico (Colombia). *See* Workers' Federation of the Atlantic Coast
- Federación Obrera de Trabajo (Bolivia). *See* Workers' Federation of Labor
- Federación Obrera Feminina (Bolivia). *See* Women's Labor Federation
- Federación Obrera Ferrocarrilera (Argentina). *See* Federation of Railroad Workers
- Federación Obrera Hondureña. *See* Honduran Workers Federation
- Federación Obrera Internacional (Bolivia). *See* International Workers' Federation
- Federación Obrera Local de La Paz (Bolivia). *See* Local Workers' Federation of La Paz

- Federación Obrera Marítima (Argentina). *See* Federation of Maritime Workers
- Federación Obrera Marítima (Uruguay). *See* Maritime Labor Federation
- Federación Obrera Nacional de la Construcción (Argentina). *See* National Federation of Construction Workers
- Federación Obrera Nacional del Cuero y Calzado (Chile). *See* National Federation of Leather and Shoe Workers
- Federación Obrera Poligráfica Argentina. *See* Federation of Argentine Typesetters
- Federación Obrera Regional Argentino. *See* Regional Argentine Labor Federation
- Federación Obrera Regional Chilena. *See* Regional Federation of Chilean Workers
- Federación Obrera Regional de Guatemala. *See* Regional Labor Federation of Guatemala
- Federación Obrera Regional del Uruguay. *See* Regional Labor Federation of Uruguay
- Federación Obrera Regional Ecuatoriana. *See* Ecuadorian Regional Labor Federation
- Federación Obrero de la Alimentación (Argentina). *See* Food Workers Federation
- Federación Obrero de la Industria de Carne (Argentina). *See* Federation of Workers in the Meat Industry
- Federación Provincial de Trabajo de la Romana (Dominican Republic). *See* Provincial Work Federation of la Romana
- Federación Regional Obrera del Paraguay. *See* Regional Workers Federation of Paraguay
- Federación Salvadoreña de Cooperativas de la Reforma Agraria. *See* Salvadoran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives
- Federación Sindical Cristiana de la Tierra (Chile). *See* Christian Rural Union Federation
- Federación Sindical de Empleados Bancarios (Guatemala). *See* Union Federation of Bank Employees
- Federación Sindical de Guatemala. *See* Federation of Unions of Guatemala
- Federación Sindical de la República de Panamá. *See* Trade Union Federation of the Republic of Panama
- Federación Sindical del Centro (Honduras). *See* Syndical Federation of the Central Part of the Country
- Federación Sindical de Obreros y Campesinos (Panama). *See* Trade Union Federation of Workers and Peasants
- Federación Sindical de Trabajadores de Comunicaciones de Venezuela. *See* Union Federation of Communication Workers of Venezuela
- Federación Sindical de Trabajadores de Cundinamarca (Colombia). *See* Unionist Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca
- Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia. *See* Federated Union of Mine Workers of Bolivia
- Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Nacionales de Honduras. *See* Federation of National Workers of Honduras
- Federación Sindical Revolucionaria (El Salvador). *See* Revolutionary Trade Union Association
- Federación Unitaria de Trabajadores del Transporte (Colombia). *See* Unitary Federation of Transportation Workers
- Federación Unitaria Sindical de El Salvador. *See* Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador
- Federación Unitario de Trabajadores de Honduras. *See* Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers
- Federación Venezolana de Maestros. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers
- Federated Union Front (FFS) (Guatemala), 403, 416
- Federated Union of Mine Workers of Bolivia (FSTMB), 43–45, 47, 48, 50, 53–55, 60; First Extraordinary Conference, 44, 53

- Federation, The (Argentina), 13
- Fédération des Ouvriers de Cayes (Haiti).
See Federation of Workers of Cayes
- Fédération des Ouvriers du Nord (Haiti).
See Federation of Workers of the North
- Fédération des Ouvriers du Volant d'Haiti. *See* Federation of Drivers of Haiti
- Fédération des Syndicats Chrétiens d'Haiti. *See* Federation of Christian Trade Unions of Haiti
- Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor (Guatemala), 431
- Federation of Agricultural Workers (Chile), 172
- Federation of Agricultural Workers of Panama, 584
- Federation of Argentine Typesetters (FOPA), 12, 13, 15
- Federation of Associated Peasant Enterprises (FEDACAMH) (Honduras), 479–81
- Federation of Catholic Employees Association (Argentina), 13
- Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production (FEDECAMARAS) (Venezuela), 731
- Federation of Chilean Educators (FEDECH), 157, 159, 160
- Federation of Christian Trade Unions of Haiti (FSCH), 452, 456
- Federation of Citizens Association (Jamaica), 496
- Federation of Civil Service Unions (FSTSE) (Mexico), 530–31, 539
- Federation of Construction Materials and Wood Industries (FETICOMMS) (Panama), 583
- Federation of Construction Workers (FETRACONSTRUCCION) (Venezuela), 739
- Federation of COPEI Workers (Venezuela), 737, 739, 740, 743
- Federation of Cundinamarca (Colombia), 188, 192
- Federation of Drivers of Haiti, 454, 459
- Federation of Employees of Bolivar (Colombia), 186
- Federation of Foodworkers (FETRAB-TAS) (Guatemala), 416
- Federation of Free Unions (Panama), 584
- Federation of Free Workers of the Valley (Colombia), 190, 193
- Federation of Graphic Arts (FAG) (Bolivia), 38, 55
- Federation of Guatemalan Workers (FTG), 401–2, 404, 416–18, 420, 427
- Federation of Haitian Workers (FTH), 451, 454–56, 458, 459, 460
- Federation of Health Workers (FETSA-LUD) (Nicaragua), 557, 563, 567, 570
- Federation of Hydrocarbon Industry Workers (FETRAHIDROCARBUROS) (Venezuela), 740, 741
- Federation of Independent Union Associations of El Salvador (FEASIES) 343, 344, 355
- Federation of Longshoremen (Argentina), 13
- Federation of Magdalena Workers (Colombia), 203
- Federation of Male and Female Shoemakers (Chile), 159, 174
- Federation of Maritime Workers (Panama), 584; (Argentina), 4, 14, 15
- Federation of Metalworkers of the Peruvian Revolution, 653
- Federation of Miners (Chile), 155, 159, 168
- Federation of Mine Workers (Chile), 163
- Federation of National Workers of Honduras, 467, 473–77, 485, 491, 492, 494
- Federation of Northern Workers of Honduras, 492
- Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions (Puerto Rico) 678–79
- Federation of Petroleum Workers of Colombia (FEDEPETROL), 191, 203, 205, 206
- Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela (FEDEPETROL), 731, 740–42, 755
- Federation of Railroad Workers (FOF) (Argentina), 14, 19

- Federation of School Teachers (Venezuela), 742, 756–57
- Federation of Ship Builders (Argentina), 21
- Federation of Shoe Workers (Venezuela), 728
- Federation of Sugarcane Workers (FE-TRACADE) (Venezuela), 742, 747
- Federation of Sugar Workers of Tucuman (Argentina), 15, 16
- Federation of Teachers of Primary Instruction (Chile), 170
- Federation of Textile and Leather Workers (TEXTILYCUERO) (Guatemala), 417
- Federation of Textile Workers (FETRA-TEX) (Peru), 742, 753
- Federation of Unions of Guatemala (FSG), 399, 400, 416–17, 426, 430
- Federation of United Workers in the Sugar Industry (Guatemala), 417
- Federation of Workers in Chile (FTCH), 159, 173, 177
- Federation of Workers in the Meat Industry (Argentina), 15
- Federation of Workers in the Textile Industry (Argentina), 15, 22
- Federation of Workers of Antioquia (FEDETA), 191, 192, 201, 207
- Federation of Workers of Cayes (Haiti), 456
- Federation of Workers of Rio de Janeiro (FTRJ) (Brazil), 88, 99, 103–4
- Federation of Workers of the North (Haiti), 456, 459, 460
- Federation of Workers of the Valley (FEDETAV) (Colombia), 183, 188, 191–93, 201, 207
- Federation of Workers Societies of the North (FOSN) (Honduras), 471
- Fédération Syndical des Travailleurs du Département de la Artibonite (Haiti). *See* Trade Union Federation of the Department of Artibonite
- FEDESINTRABH. *See* Democratic Federation of Unions of Workers of Honduras
- FEDETA (Colombia). *See* Federation of Workers of Antioquia
- FEDETAV (Colombia). *See* Federation of Workers of the Valley
- FENACH. *See* National Federation of Honduran Peasants
- FENADE (Venezuela). *See* National Federation of Employees
- FENAPES (El Salvador). *See* National Federation of Small Businesses
- FENASTRAS. *See* National Federation of Salvadoran Workers
- FENATEX (Chile). *See* Textile and Clothing Workers Federation
- FENATI (Venezuela). *See* National Federation of Press Workers
- FENATRAP (Costa Rica). *See* National Federation of Public Service Workers
- FENCAIG (Guatemala). *See* National Campesino Confederation
- FENCAP. *See* National Federation of Agricultural Workers of Peru
- FENELTRACONCEM (Colombia). *See* National Federation of Construction and Cement Workers
- FENELTRASE (Colombia). *See* National Federation of State Workers
- FENEMA (Dominican Republic). *See* National Federation of Teachers
- FENEP. *See* National Federation of Educators of Peru
- FENEPIA (Dominican Republic). *See* National Federation of Employees of Public Sector and Autonomous Institutions
- FENETEL (Ecuador). *See* National Federation of Telecommunications Employees
- FENOCAM (Guatemala). *See* National Federation of Campesino Organization
- FENOT. *See* National Federation of Transport Worker
- FENSIMET (Chile). *See* Metallurgical and Iron Workers Union Federation
- FENTEP. *See* National Federation of Education Workers of Peru
- FENTIP (Peru). *See* Fishing Industry Workers National Federation

- FENTRIHAP (Peru). *See* National Federation of Marine and Fish Oil Industry Workers
- FENTROP (Costa Rica). *See* National Public Works Federation
- FEPKA (Peru). *See* Andahuaylas Provincial Peasants Federation
- Fernández, Eduardo, 716, 719
- Ferré, Luis Alberto, 689
- Ferreira, Mitil, 725
- Ferrer, José "Pepe" Figueras, 221
- Ferrera, José Fernando, 475
- FERROVIAS (Colombia). *See* National Federation of Railways
- Ferry, Jules, 390
- FESEB (Guatemala). *See* Union Federation of Bank Employees
- FESICENTRO (Honduras). *See* Syndical Federation of the Central Part of the Country
- FESINCONSTRANS (El Salvador). *See* Construction Industry and Transport Trade Union Federation
- FESINTEXSICA (El Salvador). *See* Textile Union Federation
- FESINTRABS (El Salvador). *See* Food and Beverage Workers Federation of Trade Unions
- FESITRACHI (Panama). *See* Trade Union Federation of Workers of the Province of Chiriqui
- FESITRANH. *See* Federation of National Workers of Honduras
- FESITRISEVA (El Salvador). *See* Industry and Services Workers Federation of Trade Unions
- FESTIAVTSCES (El Salvador). *See* Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union
- FESTRAC (Colombia). *See* Unionist Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca
- FESTRALVA (Colombia). *See* Federation of Free Workers of the Valley
- FESTRAS. *See* Salvadoran Workers Trade Union Federation
- FETICOMMS (Panama). *See* Federation of Construction Materials, and Wood Industries
- FETIMP. *See* Metal Industry Workers Federation of Peru
- FETRABAN. *See* Bank Workers Federation of Paraguay
- FETRACADE. *See* Peasant Federation of Venezuela
- FETRACOMUNICACIONES. *See* Union Federation of Communication Workers of Venezuela
- FETRACONSTRUCCIÓN. *See* Federation of Construction Workers
- FETRAENSE \pm NANZA (Venezuela). *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers
- FETRAHIDROCARBUROS. *See* Federation of Hydrocarbon Industry Workers
- FETRAMAGISTERIO. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers
- FETRAMETAL (Venezuela). *See* National Federation of Metalworkers
- FETRATEX (Venezuela). *See* Federation of Textile Workers
- FETREBAM (Paraguay). *See* Journalist Union
- FETSALUD (Nicaragua). *See* Federation of Health Workers
- FETULIA (Guatemala). *See* Federation of United Workers in the Sugar Industry
- FFS (Guatemala). *See* Federated Union Front
- FHT. *See* Haitian Federation of Labor
- Fiallos, Alma de Rodas, 489, 490
- FIDEL (Uruguay). *See* Leftist Liberation Front
- FIEMEC (Chile). *See* Construction Workers Federation
- Fignoles, Daniel, 450, 451, 456–57, 460
- Figueiredo, João, 71, 82, 106, 107
- Figuero, Fábio Castillo, 362
- Figueroa, Luis Beltrán Prieto, 755–56
- First Honduran Professional College of Teachers (PRICOPROMAH), 489
- First of May Socialist Labor Center (Uruguay), 706
- Fishermen's Federation of Peru (FFP), 617, 619, 644, 663, 664, 665

- Fishing Industry Union (SIP) (El Salvador), 320, 345, 346, 350, 357, 376
- Fishing Industry Workers General Union (El Salvador), 322
- Fishing Industry Workers National Federation (FENTIP) (Peru), 614, 623, 644
- FITAHBA (Panama). *See* Industrial Federation of Workers of Food, Drink and Hotels
- FITITVC (Guatemala). *See* National Federation of Textile, Apparel and Related Industries Workers
- FLAG. *See* Guatemalan Autonomous Labor Federation
- Flores, Alfredo González, 218
- Flores, C. Manuel Fernández, 536
- Flores, Oscar, 475, 477
- Flores, Sara Cabrera, 426
- FLT (Puerto Rico). *See* Free Federation of Labor
- Fluvial Subsistence Union of Barranquilla (Colombia), 196
- FMLH. *See* Morazanista Front for the Liberation of Honduras
- FNAP (Mexico). *See* National Front for Common Action
- FNCH (Ecuador). *See* National Federation of Professional Drivers
- FNM (Guatemala). *See* National Teachers Front
- FNMCB. *See* National Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women
- FNOA (Cuba). *See* National Sugar Labor Federation
- FNSI (Mexico). *See* National Federation of Independent Unions
- FNT (Brazil). *See* Catholic National Labor Front
- FNTA (Cuba). *See* National Federation of Sugar Workers
- FNTMMP. *See* Mine and Metallurgical Workers National Federation of Peru
- FNTMMSP. *See* Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru
- FNTP (Ecuador). *See* National Federation of Petroleum Workers
- FO (Nicaragua). *See* Workers' Front
- FOCC. *See* Costa Rican Workers and Peasants Front
- FOCH. *See* Chilean Workers Federation
- FOF (Argentina). *See* Federation of Railroad Workers
- FOF (Bolivia). *See* Women's Labor Federation
- FOG (Guatemala). *See* Worker Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor
- FOH. *See* Honduran Workers Federation; Havana Labor Federation (Cuba)
- FOI. *See* International Workers' Federation (Bolivia); Printers Federation (Chile)
- FOL. *See* Liberal Workers' Front (Nicaragua); Local Workers Federation of Lima (Peru)
- FOL-La Paz (Bolivia). *See* Local Workers' Federation of La Paz
- FOM. *See* Federation of Maritime Workers (Argentina); Maritime Labor Federation (Uruguay)
- FON. *See* Nicaraguan Labor Federation
- FONC (Argentina). *See* National Federation of Construction Workers
- Fonkén, Adalberto, 651
- Fonseca, Mario da, 87
- Fonseca, Marshal Hermes da, 87, 103
- FONU (Cuba). *See* United National Labor Front
- Food and Beverage Workers Federation of Trade Unions (FESINTRABS) (El Salvador), 344–47, 350
- Food, Garment and Textile Workers Trade Union (FESTIAVTSCS) (El Salvador), 314, 316, 319, 329, 342, 345–47, 350, 357, 381–83
- Food Workers Federation (Argentina), 15
- FOPA. *See* Federation of Argentine Typesetters
- FORA. *See* Regional Argentine Labor Federation
- FORA V (Argentina), 20
- FORA IX (Argentina), 4, 9, 17, 20
- Foraker Act (1900), 669
- FORE. *See* Ecuadorian Regional Labor Federation
- Foreign labor, 216, 265–66, 546, 691

- FORG. *See* Regional Labor Federation of Guatemala.
- FORJ (Brazil). *See* Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro
- FORP. *See* Peruvian Regional Labor Federation
- Fort BoMika (Suriname), 697
- FORU. *See* Regional Labor Federation of Uruguay
- Forum for Peace and Survival of the Salvadoran People, 364
- FOT (Bolivia). *See* Workers' Federation of Labor
- FOTIA (Argentina). *See* Federation of Sugar Workers of Tucuman
- FOUPSA (Dominican Republic). *See* United Workers' Front for Autonomous Labor Unions
- FOUPSA-CESITRADO (Dominican Republic). *See* National Confederation of Workers
- FOUPSA-Libre. *See* Free United Workers Front for Autonomous Labor Unions
- Fourth (Trotskyist) International, 41
- FP-31 (Guatemala). *See* Popular Front of July 31
- FPL (El Salvador). *See* Popular Liberation Forces
- FPP. *See* Fisherman's Federation of Peru
- France, 452, 577
- Francia, José Gaspar Rodríguez, 596
- Franco, Colonel Rafael, 598, 604
- Franco, William, 743
- FRAP (Chile). *See* Popular Action Front
- FRCT (Guatemala). *See* Central Regional Federation of Workers
- Free Federation of Labor (FLT) (Puerto Rico), 673, 681, 683, 684
- Free Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana (SL) (Dominican Republic), 271, 278, 287
- Free United Workers Front for Autonomous Labor Unions (FOUPSA-Libre), 268, 279, 282
- Fregoso, José Melecio, 475
- Frei, Eduardo, 137, 139, 149, 162, 164, 168
- French Confederation of Christian Workers, 391-92
- French Guiana: Communist Party in, 391; labor publications, *La Voie des Travailleurs*, 393; slavery, African in, 389; United States and, 389; World War I and, 391; World War II and, 391
- Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (Mexico). *See* Authentic Labor Front
- Frente Cristiana de Trabajadores de Guatemala. *See* Christian Workers Front of Guatemala
- Frente Democrática Contra Represión (Guatemala). *See* Democratic Front Against Repression
- Frente de Obreros y Campesinos Cristianos. *See* Costa Rican Christian Workers and Peasants Front
- Frente Federativa Sindical (Guatemala). *See* Federated Union Front
- Frente Nacional Acción Popular (Mexico). *See* National Front for Common Action
- Frente Nacional de Obreros del Transporte (Guatemala). *See* National Front of Transport Workers
- Frente Nacional Magisterial (Guatemala). *See* National Teachers Front
- Frente Nacional (Colombia). *See* National Front
- Frente Obrero (Nicaragua). *See* Workers' Front
- Frente Obrero Liberal (Nicaragua). *See* Liberal Workers' Front
- Frente Obrero Nacional Unido (Cuba). *See* United National Labor Front
- Frente Obrero Unidos pro Sindicatos Autónomos Libre (Dominican Republic). *See* United Workers' Front for Autonomous Labor Unions
- Frente Sindical Independiente. *See* Independent Syndical Front (Honduras); Independent Union Front (Mexico)
- Frente Unitario de Trabajadores. *See* Unitary Workers Front (Chile); United Workers Front (Ecuador)
- Frentes de Defensa* (Peru), defined, 655

- FROG. *See* Workers Regional Federation of Guatemala
- Frondizi, Arturo, 17
- Front of Independent Peasant Associations (Honduras), 488
- Front Royal Center (AFL-CIO), 350, 636
- FRTS. *See* Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador
- Frugoni, Emilio, 706–7
- FSB. *See* Socialist Falangist Party of Bolivia
- FSCH. *See* Federation of Christian Trade Unions of Haiti
- FSD (Peru). *See* Democratic Union Front
- FSEB (Guatemala). *See* Union Federation of Bank Employees
- FSG. *See* Federation of Unions of Guatemala
- FSH. *See* Honduran Syndical Organization
- FSI. *See* Independent Syndical Front (Honduras); Independent Union Front (Mexico)
- FSLN (Nicaragua). *See* Sandinista National Liberation Front
- FSM. *See* World Federation of Trade Unions
- FSO (Honduras). *See* Federation of Workers Societies of the North
- FSR (El Salvador). *See* Revolutionary Trade Union Federation
- FSRR (Brazil). *See* Regional Union Federation of Rio de Janeiro
- FSTMB. *See* Federated Union of Mine Workers of Bolivia
- FSTSE (Mexico). *See* Federation of Civil Service Unions
- FTC. *See* Cuzco Workers Federation (Peru); Federation of COPEI Workers (Venezuela); Rural Workers Federation (El Salvador)
- FTCH. *See* Federation of Workers in Chile
- FTG. *See* Federation of Guatemalan Workers
- FTH. *See* Federation of Haitian Workers
- FTM (Nicaragua). *See* Managua Workers' Federation
- FTPR. *See* Workers Federation of Puerto Rico
- FTRJ (Brazil). *See* Federation of Workers of Rio de Janeiro
- FTTP. *See* Textile Workers Federation of Peru
- FUECI. *See* Uruguayan Federation of Commercial and Industrial Employees
- Fuentes, Miguel Ydígoras, 401
- Fuero sindical* (Bolivia), defined, 43
- Fuerza Laboral* (Venezuela), 743
- Fuller, Chief Justice Melville Weston, 669
- FUMH (Honduras). *See* Teacher Unity Front
- FUNACAMH. *See* National Unity Front of Honduran Peasants
- Furniture Industry Workers Union (SI-MAS) (El Salvador), 375
- Furniture Workers Union of Panama, 579, 587
- FUSS. *See* Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador
- FUT. *See* Unitary Workers Front (Chile); United Workers Front (Ecuador)
- FUTH. *See* Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers
- FUTT (Colombia). *See* Unitary Federation of Transportation Workers
- FVM. *See* Venezuelan Federation of Teachers
- Galeas, Efraín Díaz, 485
- Galicia, Joaquin Hernández, 546
- Gallardo, Angel, 653
- Gallegos, José Sánchez, 350, 366
- Gallegos, Rómulo 741, 756
- Gallo, José Linares, 638
- Galván, Rafael, 523, 530, 544
- Galván, Ursulo, 537
- Galvez, Juan Manual, 463
- Galvin, Miles, 676
- GAM (Guatemala). *See* National Support Group
- Gamarra, Desidero, 647
- Gamon, Pascual, 57
- García, Alan, 625, 626, 638, 650
- García, General Policarpo Paz, 464, 491

- García, Germán Dario, 346
 García, Gracúla, 471
 García, Kjell Laugerud, 404
 García, Lucas, 404, 405
 Garment Workers Federation of Peru, 644, 645
 Garment Workers General Union (El Salvador), 347
 Gasspole, Florizel, 500, 503, 506
 GAWU. *See* Guyana Agricultural Workers Union
 GCOL (Mexico). *See* Great Circle of Free Workers
 Gebon, William, 33
 Geisel, Ernesto, 70, 106
 General Association of Salvadoran University Students (AGEUS), 310, 325, 348, 362
 General Association of Teachers (Chile), 160, 170
 General Central of Workers of Uruguay (CEGTU), 708, 717, 719, 723–25
 General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers (CGTC), 230, 232–33, 222–24, 227–28, 230, 232–33, 235, 241, 242
 General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers (CTCR), 220, 221, 222, 230, 231, 232
 General Confederation of Factory Workers (CGTF) (Bolivia), 56
 General Confederation of Labor (CGT) (Argentina), 4, 5, 16, 17, 20; (Chile), 135, 160, 172; (Colombia), 183, 185, 187, 193–94, 198; (El Salvador), 322, 330, 333, 347–48
 General Confederation of Labor, Workmen's Force (CGT-FO) (France), 391
 General Confederation of Mexican Workers and Peasants (CGOCM), 519, 528, 531
 General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP) 610, 614–15, 617, 620–31, 633, 637–39, 644–50; Eighth Congress, 623, 649, 662
 General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (CGTS), 311, 312, 329–30, 333, 345–50, 373, 382
 General Confederation of Unions (CGS) (El Salvador), 311–13, 316–17, 325–26, 330, 332–35, 337, 341, 345–46, 348, 350–53, 357, 373–74, 379, 381, 382, 384
 General Confederation of Workers (CGT) (Chile), 153; (Costa Rica), 217–18 (Dominican Republic), 271–72, 275, 279–80, 283, 287; (Haiti), 451, 455; (Honduras), 473, 475, 477, 487, 489, 490–92; (Mexico), 518, 531; (Nicaragua), 551, 552, 562, 564–65, 574; (Venezuela), 743
 General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala (CGTG), 400, 407, 413, 417–20, 426
 General Confederation of Workers of Puerto Rico (CGT), 681, 684–85
 General Confederation of Workers of Uruguay (CGTU), 713, 716–17, 719–21, 723
 General Coordinator of Guatemalan Workers (CGTG), 400, 407, 410, 419, 420
 General Council of Workers (CGT) (Brazil), 96, 99
 General Federation of Unions for the Protection of Labor of South America (Chile), 161
 General Labor Command (CGT) (Brazil), 79
 General Labor Confederation (CGT) (Brazil), 100
 General League of Cuban Workers, 246, 260
 General Mine Workers' Union (GMWU) (Guyana), 439
 General Strike Command (El Salvador), 326, 327
 General Strike Command (CGG) (Brazil), 69, 112, 114
 General Strikes. *See* strikes, general
 General Union of Dominican Workers (UGTD), 271, 286
 General Union of Mexican Workers and Peasants (UGOCM), 532, 535, 545
 General Union of Seamstresses (El Salvador), 347

- General Union of Workers (SGT) (Panama), 578, 579, 585, 590, 593
- General Union of Workers (UGT) (Argentina), 17, 19, 22; (Brazil), 103–4, 122; (Costa Rica), 220; (Uruguay), 709, 717, 719, 723–25; (Venezuela), 744
- General Workers Congress of the Mexican Republic, 533, 542
- General Workers Development Union (GWDU) (Belize), 30, 31–32
- General Workers Union (GWU) (Belize), 27, 28, 29, 31, 32
- Genovez, Juan Editio, 383
- Germarra, Guillermo, 51
- GFOCH. *See* Great Chilean Workers Federation
- Gianelli, Juan, 157
- Giraldo, Ignacio Torres, 199, 202, 210
- Girardot Labor Directorate (Colombia), 196
- GIWU (Jamaica). *See* Guyana Industrial Workers Union
- Gladnich, Robert, 681
- GLU. *See* Guyana Labor Union
- GMU. *See* Guyana Mineworkers' Union
- GMWU (Guyana). *See* General Mine Workers' Union
- Godoy, Virgilio, 557
- Golcher, Victor J., 216, 242
- Goldson, Philip, 27, 28, 32
- Gómez, Angel, 588
- Gómez, Eugenio, 707, 710, 719, 721
- Gómez, Humberto, 717
- Gómez, Juan Vincente, 727, 744, 755
- Gompers, Samuel, 246, 266, 568, 593, 678, 679, 682, 683
- González, Armando, 747
- González, Celeo González y, 492, 494
- González, Dagoberto, 732, 739, 740
- González, Dário Gómez, 531
- González, María Adela, 428
- González, Rodríguez, 327
- González, Romualdo Palacio, 668
- Goodleigh, L., 507
- Goodwyn, Jack, 278
- Granados, Frederico Tinoco, 218
- Granados, Napoleón Azevedo, 491, 493, 494
- Gran Círculo de Obreros de México. *See* Great Circle of Mexican Workers
- Gran Círculo de Obreros Libres (Mexico). *See* Great Circle of Free Workers
- Grande, Father Rutilio, 315, 317, 331, 361
- Gran Liga de Torcedores de Tabacos (Mexico). *See* Great League of Tobacco Workers
- Gran Liga Mexicana de Empleados de Ferrocarril. *See* Great League of Mexican League of Railroad Employees
- Granman, Herman, 686
- Gran Unión Marítima de Valparaíso (Chile). *See* Maritime Workers Society of Valparaíso
- Graphic and Press Workers Union (Costa Rica), 241
- Graphic Worker* (Brazil), 100
- Graphic Workers Federation (Costa Rica), 218, 241
- Graphic Workers Union, Bolivia, 55; Brazil, 96, 99
- Grau San Martín, Ramón. *See* Martin, Ramon Grau
- Great Banana Strike (1954) (Honduras), 468, 469, 493
- Great Chilean Workers Federation (GFOCH), 131, 150
- Great Circle of Free Workers (GCOL) (Mexico), 517, 532, 533
- Great Circle of Mexican Workers, 516, 526, 533, 542
- Great Depression, 41, 75, 186, 219, 244, 247, 267, 292, 435, 472, 496, 523, 610, 633, 646, 654, 670, 673, 702, 718, 725
- Great League of Tobacco Workers (Mexico), 532, 533
- Great Mexican League of Railroad Employees, 533
- Great Socialist Party of the West (Mexico), 519
- Green, William, 456, 679
- Gremiales* (Mexico), defined, 511

- Gremio de Abogados (Costa Rica). *See* Lawyers Guild
- Gremio de Albriles (Costa Rica). *See* Plasterers Guild
- Gremio de Carpinteros (Costa Rica). *See* Carpenters Guild
- Gremio de Conductores y Caragadores de Mercaderias (Costa Rica). *See* Guild of Drivers and Handlers of Merchandise
- Gremio de la Marina del Golfo de Nicoya (Costa Rica). *See* Guilds of the Gulf of Nicoya Fleet
- Gremio de Mincros (Costa Rica). *See* Miners Guild
- Gremio de Obreros (Costa Rica). *See* Workers League
- Gremio de Tipografos (Costa Rica). *See* Typographers Guild
- Gremios* (guilds), defined, 129, 706
- Gremios del Puerto de Puntarenas (Costa Rica). *See* Guilds of the Port of Puntarenas
- Grenada, United States invasion of, 695
- Grillo, Luis Felipe, 663
- Group of Nine (Paraguay), 600, 602, 605
- Group of 10 (Chile), 156, 164, 168, 169, 171, 176
- Guanabara Commercial Employees Union (Brazil), 110
- Guanabara Metallurgical Workers (Brazil), 98
- Guardado, Facundo, 367
- Guardado, Ricardo, 358
- Guardia, Rafael Angel Calderón, 221, 228, 230
- Guatemala, 365, 468; AFL and, 398, 401, 402, 430, 431; AFL-CIO and, 410; agrarian reform in, 399, 401; AIFLD in, 402, 403, 404, 407, 412, 421, 425; Catholic Church in, 396, 401; death squads in, 405–6; enterprises in (Del Monte, 426; San Bernardino Bottling, 416; United Fruit Company, 396–97, 399–401, 412, 423, 426, 430); immigration to, 396; labor congresses, Second Congress of Guatemalan Workers, 399; labor leaders, repression of, 401, 402, 404–6, 414, 421, 426–28; labor legislation, Labor Code (1947), 399, 402–3; labor publications, *Voz Obrera y Campesino*, 406; massacres in, 404, 416; minimum wages in, 399, 405, 417; October Revolution, 362; ORIT in, 399, 402–3, 406, 409–10, 413, 416, 419, 423, 425, 430–31; racial tensions in, 399; right-to strike in, 399; state of seige in, 409; strikes in, 404, 405, 417, 421, 426 (general, 398; miners, 428; teachers, 403, 423, 430; transport workers, 423, 430); United States and, 396, 400
- Guatemalan Autonomous Labor Federation (FLAG), 400, 418
- Guatemalan Committee of Patriotic Unity, 412, 414
- Guatemalan Communist Party, 431
- Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), 399, 402, 406
- Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, 414
- Guatemalan Revolution, 398–400, 410
- Guatemalan Trade Union Unity, 420
- Guatemalan Workers Confederation (CONTRAGUA), 401, 403, 410, 419
- Guatemalan Workers Unions, 421
- Guayas Labor Confederation (Ecuador), 296, 299, 300, 301
- Guayas Labor Union (Ecuador), 301
- Guerra, Luíz Felipe, 492
- Guevara, Ché, 68
- Guianese Socialist Party (PSG), 390
- Guild of Drivers and Handlers of Merchandise (Costa Rica), 214, 234
- Guild of the Gulf of Nicoya Fleet (Costa Rica), 214, 235
- Guild of the Port of Puntarenas (Costa Rica), 235
- Guilds, 100, 129, 146, 214, 215, 216, 217, 224, 225, 232, 234, 235, 238
- Gutarra, Nicolas, 651
- Gutiérrez, Victor Manuel, 399
- Guyana: agrarian reform in, 438; Cold War and, 437; eight-hour day, 435; enterprises in (Booker, McConnell Company, 438; Demerara Bauxite Company, 436, 438; Lenora Planta-

- tion, 436; Reynolds Bauxite Company, 438); Great Depression, impact on, 435; immigration, Indian, 434–35; labor leaders, repression of, 439; labor legislation in (minimum wage, 436; trade union ordinance, 435); labor publications, *Labour Advocate*, 445; ORIT in, 439, 446; racial tension in, 434, 437, 439, 440, 441; riots in, 435; slavery in, 433, 434; strikes in, 435, 436, 441, 444 (dockworkers 435; general, 442; police, 435; sugar workers, 433, 437, 443); United States and, 438; World War I and, 435; World War II and, 445
- Guyana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU), 438, 439, 441, 442, 443, 446
- Guyana Bauxite Miner's Union, 444
- Guyana Bauxite Miners' Union, 443
- Guyana Industrial Worker's Union, 436, 437, 442, 443
- Guyana Labor Union (GLU), 443, 444, 446
- Guyana Mineworker's Union (GMU), 444, 446
- Guyana Trades Union Council, 444
- Guyanese Labour Department, 436
- Guyanese Timber, Sawmill, and Quarry Worker's Union (GTSQWU), 444
- Guzman, Antonio, 271
- GWDU (Belize). *See* General Workers Development Union
- GWU (Belize). *See* General Workers Union
- Hacendados*, 39, 46
- Hacienda system, 37, 39, 41
- Hague, The, 692
- Haiti: AFL in, 451, 456; American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in, 452; Communist Party in, 455; enterprises in (Bata Shoe Company, 457; Standard Fruit Company, 459, 460); human rights in, 452; labor leaders, repression of, 454; labor publications (*Lutte Ouvrier* ["Workers Struggle"], 454; *La Voix du Chauffeurs* ["The Voice of the Chauffeurs"], 454); ORIT in, 451, 457; repression in, 452, 454, 456; Revolution of, 1946, 454, 459–60; state of siege in, 452; strikes in, 460; United States and, 449, 452, 453, 456
- Haitian Communist Party, 451
- Haitian Federation of Labor (FHT), 451, 454, 455, 456, 457, 459, 460
- Haitian National Guard, 450
- Hall of the Masons' Union (Honduras), 470
- Hall, Paul, 687
- Hammer, Michael, 314, 317, 319, 339, 340, 370
- Hart, Frank, 497
- Hart, Richard, 497, 504, 505, 508
- HASCO. *See* Union of Workers of Haitian American Sugar Company
- Hatmakers Union (Brazil), 118
- Havana Circle (Cuba), 263
- Havana Labor Federation (FOA) (Cuba), 246, 260, 261
- Havana Tobacco Worker's Association (Cuba), 245, 260
- Haya de la Torre. *See* Torre, Victor Raúl
- Haya de la
- Hays, Will H., 686
- Heder, Léopold, 390
- Heleno Plastic Factory (Guatemala), 404
- Heme, Cardinal Sebastião, 86
- Henríquez, Raúl, 741
- Henry, Arthur, 504, 508
- Hermanidad Comunal Nacionalista (Dominican Republic). *See* Nationalist Communal Brotherhood
- Hermanidad Ferroviaria de Cuba. *See* Brotherhood of Cuban Railway Workers
- Hernández, Clemente, 342
- Hernández, General Fidel Sanchez, 346, 356, 368, 384
- Hernandez, Hernando, 285
- Hernández, Rigoberto Menéndez, 374
- Hernández, Santiago, 321, 381, 383
- Hernández, Victor Manuel, 492
- Herrera, Alsimiro, 230
- Herrera, Juan, 739

- Herrera, Manuel Cálix, 471, 484, 485
 Hertzog, Enrique, 44
 Heureaux, Ulises, 266, 281
 Hidalgo, Manuel, 131
 Hill, Frank, 500, 504, 505, 508
 Hill, Ken, 497, 499, 504, 505, 508
 Hitler, Adolf, 398
 Hoffa, James R., 685
Hoja Obrera, 217
 Honduran Cement Corporation, 493
 Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives (FECORAH), 485, 486, 488
 Honduran Social Security Institute (IHSS), 478
 Honduran Syndical Organization (FSH), 471, 472, 485
 Honduran Workers Federation (FOH), 470, 471, 472
 Honduras: AFL-CIO in, 477, 485, 492; agrarian reform laws, 464, 477, 485; AIFLD in, 475; banana industry in, 463, 469; Central Bank of, 464, 473, 494; enterprises in (Castle and Cooke, 475; Cuyamel Fruit Company, 469; Honduran Cement Corporation, 493; Rio Lindo Textile Factory, 466, 475; Standard Fruit Company, 463, 467, 469, 477, 491, 493; Trujillo Railway Company, 470; United Brands, 464; United Fruit Company, 463, 464, 469–70, 472, 475, 476, 493; Vacearo Brothers Company, 470); Great Depression, impact on, 472; Honduran Social Security Institute (IHSS), 478; immigrants in, 468; labor congresses, First Congress of Workers, 470; labor leaders, repression of, 469, 472; massacre, Santa Clara, 487; minimum wage in, 467, 486, 490; ORIT in, 473–76, 485, 491, 493; racial tensions in, 470; strikes in, 466, 470, 493 (banana, 464, 472, 491, 492; general, 475; teachers, 490); United States and, 467, 492
 Honduras Independence Party, 28
Horas de Lucha ("Hours of Struggle") (Peru), 641
 House of the World's Workers (Casa) (Mexico), 517, 532, 534
 Hoya, José Azoecona de, 463, 466
 Huayñapaco, Dionisio, 56
 Huembes, Carlos, 570
 Huerta, Carmen, 542
 Human rights, 320, 322, 340, 360, 361, 452, 606
 Hummes, Bishop Claudio, 82
 Hunger and Desperation March (1959) (Panama), 580, 587
 Hunt, William H., 682
 Hurtado, Father Alberto, 149
 Hurtado, Manuel Felipe, 189
 IAM. *See* International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
 IAN (Venezuela). *See* National Agrarian Institute
 IAP (Brazil). *See* Retirement and Pension Institute
 Ibáñez, General Carlos, 133–34, 139, 149, 151, 155, 160, 161, 170, 172, 176, 178
 Ibarra, Ascención Esquivel, 216, 242
 Ibarra, José Maria Velasco, 292, 298
 Ibarra, Pedro Velasco, 293, 299
 Ibrahim, José, 105
 Ica Valley Peasants Federation (Peru), 658
 ICFTU. *See* International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
 IFCCTE. *See* International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, and Technical Employees
 IFEDDEC (Dominican Republic). *See* Institute for the Formation of Christian Democracy
 IFPCW. *See* International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers
 Iglesias, Santiago. *See* Pantin, Santiago Iglesias
 IHSS. *See* Honduran Social Security Institute
 IJ-4 (Dominican Republic). *See* June Revolutionary Movement
 ILA. *See* International Longshoremen's Association

- ILGWU. *See* International Ladies Garment Workers' Union
- ILO. *See* International Labor Organization
- Ilopango Diverse Trades Union (El Salvador), 351
- Ilopango Workers, Peasant and Fishermen's Society (El Salvador), 351, 386
- ILWU. *See* International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union
- IMF. *See* International Monetary Fund
- Immigration, 2, 4, 13, 64, 72, 93, 281, 284, 396, 468, 577–78, 728; Chinese, 216, 608; European, 705; East Indian, 434–35
- Imposto sindical* (Brazil). *See* Union tax
- INA (Honduras), 485, 486
- INCA plant union (El Salvador), 379
- INCASA (Guatemala). *See* Union of Workers at INCASA
- INDAP (Chile). *See* Institute for Agrarian Development
- INDEGUA (Guatemala). *See* Union of Workers at INDEGUA
- Indentured servants, 434, 608, 691
- Independent Campesino Central, 534
- Independent Campesino Movement (MCI) (Guatemala), 420
- Independent Confederation of Bolivian Peasants (CICB), 56–57
- Independent Federation of Unions (Panama), 586, 592
- Independent Liberal Party (PLI) (Nicaragua), 557
- Independent Revolutionary Workers Movement (MOIR) (Colombia), 183, 194, 195
- Independent Syndical Front (FSI) (Honduras), 485
- Independent Trade Union Action Council (ITUAC) (Jamaica), 503, 505
- Independent Union Association of El Salvador (ASIES), 328, 344, 352, 355, 367, 377
- Independent Union Front (FSI) (Mexico), 522, 534
- Independent Worker Unit (UOI) (Mexico), 535, 548
- Independent Workers Movement (MIT) (Paraguay), 601
- Independentistas* (Puerto Rico), defined, 671, 680
- Indonesia, 691
- INDUCAM (Venezuela). *See* Peasant Industries Company
- Industrial Federation of Workers of Food, Drink, and Hotels (FITAHBA) (Panama), 584
- Industrial Union of Cane Workers (Panama), 584, 586
- Industrial Union of Leatherworkers (Chile), 174
- Industrial Union of the Antioquia Railroad (Colombia), 191, 194, 199
- Industrial Union of Workers of the Independent Banana Growers (Panama), 586, 591
- Industrial Workers of the World, Chile (IWW, Chile), 132, 161, 175
- "Industrias Unidas, S. A." Textile Workers Union (El Salvador), 313, 379, 380
- Industry and Services Workers Federation of Trade Unions (FESITRISEVA) (El Salvador), 344, 350
- INES (Dominican Republic). *See* National Institute of Labor Union Studies
- Innis, George, 685
- Institute for Agrarian Development (INDAP) (Chile), 138, 175
- Institute for Economic and Social Development of Central America (Guatemala), 401
- Institute for National Development (Chile), 162
- Institute for the Formation of Christian Democracy (IFEDEC) (Dominican Republic), 273, 274
- Institute of Social Research and Studies (Brazil), 125
- Institutional Democratic Party (PID) (Guatemala), 402
- Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) (Mexico), 511, 513, 521, 523, 529–32, 537–41, 544–47, 610
- Insular Cases (Puerto Rico), 669

- Integrated Agrarian Production Cooperative Association (ACOPAI) (El Salvador), 327, 333, 338, 341, 353
- Inter-American Confederation of Chauffeurs, 454
- Inter-American Confederation of Workers (CIT) (Haiti), 451, 454, 456, 457
- Inter-American Foundation, 315, 368
- Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers. *See* ORIT
- Interiano, Oscar Armando, 358
- International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 685
- International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), 320
- International Association of Public Employees, 171
- International Center (Brazil), 101
- International Center of Social Studies (Uruguay), 705
- International Committee of State Workers (CITE) (Colombia), 198
- International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), 31–32, 110, 268, 446, 457, 460, 473, 503, 507, 508, 528, 562, 584, 600, 601, 605, 719
- International Confederation of Commercial, Clerical, and Technical Workers, 507
- International Confederation of State Workers (CITE), 622
- International Federation of Builder's and Woodworker's Union, 444
- International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, Technical and Professional Employees (IFCCTE), 441, 602
- International Federation of Labor, 266
- International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW), 302
- International Federation of Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers, 445, 507
- International Labor Conference (1919), 284
- International Labour Organization (ILO), 267, 401, 455, 457, 608, 624, 719, 732
- International Ladies Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), 675, 685–86
- International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU), 320
- International Longshoremen's Association (ILA), 675
- International Metalworker's Federation, 444
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 8, 45, 48, 54, 71, 98, 120, 305, 498, 500, 523, 599, 619, 620, 626, 650
- International Teacher's Federation, 539
- International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), 441, 443, 447, 507
- International Union of Food and Allied Workers Associations (IUF), 441
- International Union of Shoemakers, 118
- International Workers Federation (FOI), 39
- International Workingmen's Association, 532
- Intersectoral Confederation of State Workers (CITE) (Peru), 622, 631, 650, 655, 657
- Intersyndical Plenary of Workers (PIT) (Uruguay), 716, 720, 722, 725
- Inter-Trade Union of Haiti (ISH), 452, 456
- Inter-Union National Command (Venezuela), 744, 757
- Inter-Union Unity Pact (PUI) (Brazil), 101–2, 114, 115, 123
- Irigoyen, Hipolito, 3, 16
- ISH. *See* Inter-Trade Union of Haiti
- Ishmael, Richard, 445, 446
- ISTA (El Salvador). *See* Salvadoran Agrarian Transformation Institute
- Isthmian Federation of Christian Workers (Panama), 586
- Isthmian Workers Central (Panama), 581–84, 586–87
- ITF. *See* International Transport Workers Federation.
- ITUAC (Jamaica). *See* Independent Trade Union Action Council
- IU (Peru). *See* United Left.
- IUF. *See* International Union of Food and Allied Workers Associations

- Jacome, Inocêncio, 299
- Jado, Francisco Urbina, 291
- Jagan, Dr. Cheddi, 436, 438, 441, 442, 443, 444, 446
- JALGO. *See* Jamaica Association of Local Government Officers
- Jalibois, M., 456
- Jamaica: AFL-CIO in, 506; Cold War and, 505; Great Depression, impact on, 496; International Monetary Fund in, 498, 500; labor legislation (Jamaica Trade Union Act of 1919, 500; Labor Code (1976), 501); labor publications, *Jamaica Labor Weekly*, 499; ORIT in, 507; repression in, 502; riots in, 1938, 506; slave trade and, 495; slavery, abolition of, 495; strikes, transport, 505; World War I and, 497, 500; World War II and, 506
- Jamaica Association of Local Government Officers (JALGO), 504
- Jamaica Civil Service Association, 504
- Jamaica Communist Party, 503
- Jamaica Congress of Labour, 503
- Jamaica Federation of Labor, 504, 505
- Jamaica Government Railway Employees' (JGREU) Union, 504, 505
- Jamaica Labour Party, 496, 503, 505
- Jamaica Labour Weekly*, 499, 500
- Jamaica Maritime Union, 503
- Jamaica Omnibus Service Workers Association (JOSWA), 503, 505
- Jamaica Progressive League, 496
- Jamaica Radical Workers Union, 506
- Jamaica Trade Union Act of 1919, 500
- Jamaica Workers and Tradesmens Union (JWTU), 496, 506
- Jáuregui, Arturo, 611, 612, 613, 635
- Jesús, Mário Carvalho de, 113
- JGREU. *See* Jamaica Government Railway Employees Union
- Jiménez, Pérez, 728, 731, 732, 736, 739, 752, 756
- Jiménez, Tucapel, 144, 164
- Joaquín, José, 218
- JOC (Costa Rica). *See* Catholic Workers Youth
- Jones-Shafroth Act, 669
- Josue, Milien, 454, 456
- JOSWA. *See* Jamaica Omnibus Service Workers Association
- Journalist Union (FETREBAM) (Paraguay), 601
- Journalists Syndicate of Paraguay (SPP), 604
- Jovel, Ricardo Antonio, 345
- Juarez, Francisco Hernández, 547
- Julião, Francisco, 125
- July Revolution (Ecuador), 292
- JUNECH. *See* National Employees Association of Chile
- June Fourteenth Movement (Dominican Republic), 277, 287–88
- June Revolutionary Movement (IJ–4), 269
- Junta Nacional de Empleados de Chile. *See* National Employees Association of Chile
- Juntas de conciliación* (Chile), 140; defined, 133, 134
- JWTU (Jamaica). *See* Jamaica Workers and Tradesmens Union
- Kechi Indians, 404
- Keith, Minor, 468
- Keller, James C., 686
- Kelly, William E., 686
- Kennedy, John F., 678
- Kessler, Donald, 352
- Kielstra, Governor Johannes, 692, 698
- Kimberly Clark, 346, 366
- Kimberly Clark Workers Union (El Salvador), 353
- Kirkland, Lane, 320, 321, 322, 339, 340
- Kissinger National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 321, 339
- KM. *See* Communist Party of Suriname
- Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 657
- Korean War, 710
- Krolis, Iwan, 697
- Kubitschek, Juscelino, 67, 68, 79, 109, 111, 114, 124
- Kundhart, José Eugenio, 266
- La Aurora Women's Center (Ecuador), 296

- La Casa del Obrero* ("The House of the Worker") (Mexico), 534
- La Democracia* (Puerto Rico), 668
- La Federación (Argentina). *See* the Federation
- La Federación Obrera de Río Gallegos (Argentina). *See* Workers Federation of Río Gallegos
- "La Fraternidad" (Argentina), 3, 10, 16, 19
- "La Internacional" (Ecuador), 301
- La Justicia Social* (Costa Rica), 217
- La Liga Democrática Cristiana (Argentina). *See* Democratic Christian League
- La Mujer Ecuatoriana* ("The Ecuadorian Woman"), 296
- La Prensa* (Guatemala), 427
- La Protesta* (Peru), 641, 646, 652
- La Semana Trágica, 1919 ("The Tragic Week") (Argentina), 3
- La Social (Mexico). *See* The Social
- La Sociedad Tipográfica Bonarense (Argentina). *See* Typographical Society of Buenos Aires
- La Tribuna* (Peru), 636
- La Unión (El Salvador), 326, 364
- La Unión Obrera* (Colombia), 211
- "La Vanguardia" (Society of El Progreso) (Honduras), 471, 482, 484
- La Voie des Travailleurs* ("The Voice of the Workers") (French Guiana), 393
- Labor brotherhood (Chile), 147
- Labor Center Alpargatas (Uruguay), 724
- Labor Codes. *See* labor legislation
- Labor Commandos (Peru), 623
- Labor Committee of Syndical Organization (COOS) (Brazil), 102, 119
- Labor Confederation of Jalisco (COJ) (Mexico), 535
- Labor congresses, 56, 59, 73, 85, 86, 88, 89, 95, 99, 100, 103, 115, 117, 118, 124, 125, 245, 254-55, 257, 261, 266-67, 292, 296, 298, 299, 302, 308, 330, 381, 382, 385, 399, 470, 540, 623, 638, 646, 649, 651, 652, 659, 662, 729
- Labor courts, 75, 77, 94, 131, 312, 348, 513
- Labor Federation of Haiti, 456
- Labor Federation of Pernambuco (Brazil), 102
- Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 73, 88, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105
- Labor leaders, repression of, 50, 56, 73, 83, 88, 100, 107, 124, 143-45, 153-54, 161-64, 168, 172-73, 246, 261, 268, 270, 322, 387, 401-2, 404-6, 414, 421, 426-28, 439, 454, 517, 521, 533, 547, 556, 571-73, 587-80, 598, 602, 603, 605, 612, 620, 634, 646-47, 652, 654, 655, 660-62, 673, 682, 714, 722, 728, 729, 731, 749, 760
- Labor League (Ecuador), 301
- Labor legislation, 5, 42, 75-76, 90, 101, 105, 125, 133-34, 142-43, 151, 160, 165, 172-73, 214, 221, 247, 310, 312-13, 334, 348-50, 372-73, 382, 399, 402-3, 501, 551-52, 557, 568, 580, 587-89, 591, 598, 600, 624, 651, 674, 729, 731, 748
- Labor organizations: anarcho-syndicalist, 57, 60, 88, 93, 95, 119, 124, 160, 172, 174, 245-46, 260, 262, 518, 532, 539, 550, 641, 658, 660, 707; anti-communist, 86, 98, 101, 111, 149, 162, 169, 208, 307, 314, 360, 373, 562, 624; Catholic, 80, 90, 108, 136, 149, 152, 168, 176, 205, 207-8, 221, 223, 228, 297-98, 401, 411, 422, 518, 526, 537, 559; Christian, 391-92, 713; Christian Democrat, 136, 176, 223, 489, 491, 586, 657, 736, 743; Communist, 4, 5, 9, 18, 88, 93, 96, 99, 112, 116, 127, 132, 169, 172, 176, 192-93, 195, 201-2, 220, 223, 238, 261-62, 268, 336, 347, 398, 475, 485, 491, 545, 557, 640, 659-60, 706, 712, 719-20, 741; government-controlled, 58, 84, 110, 111, 112, 114, 117, 124, 172, 193, 195, 197-98, 202, 206, 214-15, 223, 228, 236-37, 283, 399, 411, 530, 552, 591, 719, 733; ideological conflict, 57, 116, 119, 125, 153, 161, 163, 173, 176, 183, 188, 201, 280, 288, 315, 410-11, 471-72, 537-38, 570, 614, 631, 633, 658, 662; left-

- ist, 80, 114, 163–64, 208, 227, 234, 316–17, 319–23, 330–31, 336, 338–41, 345–46, 378, 504, 523, 628–29, 650, 662; mutualist, 55, 58, 151, 174, 208, 234, 470, 526, 528; parallel, 5, 10, 18, 22, 50–51, 75, 79, 81, 86, 101, 122, 132, 134, 135, 138, 153, 162, 163, 165–66, 169, 171, 176, 182, 191–92, 194, 209, 221, 223, 252, 270, 283, 307–8, 316, 323, 336, 347, 352, 372, 381, 384, 397, 413, 423, 484, 538, 580, 613, 628, 630, 637, 639, 658, 662, 719, 723, 741–42, 749, 753; peasant, 57, 125, 149, 162, 167–68, 172, 175, 195, 307, 314–15, 323, 328, 330, 332, 400, 465, 477, 486, 627, 640, 656, 658, 748; Peronist-oriented, 17; socialist, 5, 17, 18, 166, 550, 554; Trotskyist, 44, 100, 260, 583
- Labor Party (Argentina), 6
- Labor publications, 10, 27, 94, 95, 99, 100, 117, 147, 157, 167, 192, 208, 209, 211, 217–18, 220, 224, 240, 296, 304, 349, 382, 393, 406, 445, 454, 499, 533, 540, 541, 555, 560, 568, 592, 600, 602, 629, 630, 636, 641, 646, 660, 687, 693, 698, 713, 722, 725, 739, 743, 755
- Labor Studies Center of Peru (CELP), 612, 615, 636
- Labor Union Confederation of Dominican Workers (CESITRADO), 269, 280–81, 283, 288
- Labor Union Confederation of Organized Workers (COSTO) (Dominican Republic), 272, 277, 281–83
- Labor Union Movement of Workers Unity (MOUSO) (Dominican Republic), 281–82, 286
- Labor Unity (Ecuador), 301
- Labor Unity Block (BUO) (Uruguay), 717, 719–20, 723
- Labor Unity Committee (CUS) (Costa Rica), 228, 230, 232, 235, 242
- Labor Unity of Ciénaga (Colombia), 202
- Labour Advocate* (Guyana), 445
- Labour and Unemployment Association (LUA) (Belize), 26, 27, 32, 35
- Labra, Ernesto Ordaz, 539
- Lachmansingh, Dr. J., 436, 442
- Lachmon, Jaggermath, 693, 694
- Ladino* (Guatemala), 418; defined, 395; movement, 420
- Landing, Jorge Luís, 685
- Lara, Alejandro Molina, 320, 345
- Laredo Conference, 683
- Larrey, Theodoro, 546
- Lasa, Joaquín Galleyos, 296
- Las Cruces Sobre el Agua*, 296
- Las Truchas Mill (Mexico), 523, 539
- Latin American Confederation of Christian Unionists. *See* CLASC
- Latin American Congress of Campesino Leaders (1974) (El Salvador), 368
- Latin American Studies Association, 361
- Latin American Syndical Confederation (CSLA), 97, 708
- Latin American Workers Central. *See* CLAT
- Laugerud, Kjell, 423
- Lawrence, Chris, 503
- Lawyers Guild (Costa Rica), 214, 235
- Lazarraga, Manuel, 719
- League of Primary Teachers (Chile), 170
- League of Railway Workers and Employees (Bolivia), 39, 57, 59
- League of Socialist Agricultural Workers, (Mexico), 535
- League of Workers and Artisans (Dominican Republic), 265, 281, 284
- Lechín, Juan, 45, 46, 50, 53
- Ledesma, Pablo Checa, 649
- Left Book Club, 499, 508
- Leftist Liberation Front (FIDEL) (Uruguay), 712
- Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR) (Chile), 139
- Leguía, Augusto B., 659
- Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission Workers and Employees Union (STEC-CEL) (El Salvador), 319, 328, 342, 357, 378
- Lemus, Colonel José María, 312, 348, 349
- León, Jesús Díaz, 547
- León, Rafael, 740

- Leoni, Raul, 730, 760
- Lescot, Elie, 449, 450, 451
- Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 577
- Letter Carrier and Postal Employees Union Society of El Salvador (SU-CEPES), 323, 341, 354, 378
- Leuenroth, Edgard, 88, 100
- Lévano, Delfin, 641, 651
- Lévano, Manuel Caracciolo, 641
- Lewis, John L., 680
- Liberal Party (Bolivia), 38, 39, 58, 61; (Colombia), 182, 189; (Ecuador), 291, 296, 298, 300, 301; (Honduras), 464–66, 475, 477, 490; (Paraguay), 597–98
- Liberal Reform (Honduras), 468–69
- Liberal Workers Front (FOL) (Nicaragua), 565
- Liberation theology, 106, 315, 331, 553, 559
- Liberta* (Puerto Rico), defined, 672
- Libertarian Worker Groups of Jalisco (Mexico), 518
- Liberty Confederation (Chile), 156, 162, 168
- “Lido, S.A.” Workers Union (El Salvador), 344
- Liga Antiimperialista de las Américas (Cuba). *See* Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas
- Liga de Agrónomos Socialistas (Mexico). *See* League of Socialist Agricultural Workers
- Liga de Obreros of Empleados de Ferrocarril (Bolivia). *See* League of Railway Workers and Employees
- Liga de Obreros y Artisanos (Dominican Republic). *See* League of Workers and Artisans
- Liga dos Operários em Calçado (Brazil). *See* Shoemakers League
- Liga Ferroviaria (Argentina). *See* Railroad Workers League
- Liga General de Trabajadores Cubanos (Cuba). *See* General League of Cuban Workers
- Liga Nacional Campesina (Mexico). *See* National Campesino League
- Liga Nacional de Defensa de Campesinos Pobres (Chile). *See* National League for the Defense of Poor Peasants
- Liga Obrera (Ecuador). *See* Labor League
- Liga Obrera de Guatemala. *See* Worker’s League of Guatemala
- Liga Roja (El Salvador). *See* Red League
- Ligas Agrarias (Paraguay). *See* Agrarian Leagues
- Ligas de Arrendatarios (Chile). *See* Tenants Leagues
- Ligas Operárias (Brazil). *See* Workers Leagues
- Light and Power Workers Federation of Peru, 608, 624, 650–51
- Light/Power and Telecommunications Workers Union (Guatemala), 402
- Lights of the Yaque (Dominican Republic), 266, 281, 282
- Lima Departmental Workers Federation (FEDETRAL) (Peru), 651
- Limon Federation of Workers (Costa Rica), 219, 235
- Línea Proletaria (Mexico), 535
- Lingán, Alfonso Barrantes, 623
- Lizco, Adrian Esquino, 371, 372
- Lloyd-LaFollette Act (1912), 686
- LNC (Mexico). *See* National Campesino League
- Local Federation (Dominican Republic), 285
- Local Workers Federation of La Paz (FOL-LaPaz) (Bolivia), 40, 41, 42, 57, 61
- Local Workers Federation of Lima (FOL) (Peru), 609, 628, 633, 646, 651, 652, 658, 659, 660
- López, Carlos Antonio, 596
- López, Francisco Solano, 596
- López, Jacinto, 532
- López, José Alberto, 348
- López, Robinson Ruiz, 288
- Lord, Eugene F., 686
- Lorenzini, Emilio, 152
- Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary Command (Honduras), 466
- Los Circulos de Trabajadores (Cuba). *See* Workers’ Circles
- Lott, General Henrique Teixeira, 67

- "Lovers of Progress" Artisan Society (Ecuador), 301
 LP-28 People's Leagues (El Salvador), 318
 LPS. *See* Suriname Labor Party
 LUA (Belize). *See* Labour and Unemployment Association
 Lucero, General Antonio Claramount, 351
 Luces del Yaque (Dominican Republic). *See* Lights of the Yaque
 Lugo, Francisco Uguia, 739, 740, 752
 Luis, Washington, 119
 Luisa Amanda Espinosa Nicaraguan Women's Association (AMNLAE) (Nicaragua), 565
 Lula (Brazil). *See* Silva, José Inacio da
 Luna, Aders Carlos, 758
 Luna, Rigoberto, 494
 Lundeberg, Harry, 687
 Lusinchi, Jaime, 760
Lutte Ouvrier (Haiti), 454

 Macedo, Murilo, 82
 Machado, Antonio Augusto Pinto, 87, 127
 Machado, Gerardo, 246, 257, 259, 261, 262
Machete (Nicaragua), 560
 Machuca, Lorenzo Valdepeñas, 532
 McKinley, William, 673, 682
 Maestros Unidos (Costa Rica). *See* Teachers United
 Magaldi, Antonio Pereira, 94, 110
 Magloire, General Paul, 449, 450–51, 457, 460
 Magri, Antonio Rogério, 122
 Mahecha, Raúl E., 202, 210
 Majority CGT (Dominican Republic), 280
 Malatesta, Enrique, 10
 Maldonado, Samuel, 340, 341, 370, 371
 Malvinas Islands (Falklands), 8
 Managua Workers Federation (FTM) (Nicaragua), 564–65
Mancomunal (Chile), defined, 131, 147
 Manley, Michael, 498, 500, 504
 Manley, Norman, 502, 506, 507, 508

 Man Power Citizens Association (MPCA) (Guyana), 436, 438, 439, 442–46
 MAP-ML (Nicaragua). *See* Popular Action Movement/Marxist-Leninist
 Marcano, Hipólito, 681
 Marchena, Isaias, 232, 242
 Marcona Mining Company, 618, 654
 Mariátegui, José Carlos, 609, 626, 646, 652, 659
 Marín, Luis Muñoz, 670, 671, 674, 675, 684, 685, 689
 Marín, Paulo, 131, 150
 Mariona Prison, 345, 346, 354, 367
 Maritime Confederation of Chile (COM-ACH), 156, 162–63, 169
 Maritime Federation (Haiti), 456
 Maritime Labor Federation (FOM) (Uruguay), 707, 720
 Maritime Workers Society of Valparaíso (Chile), 163
 Market Provisioners Mutual Aid Society (Ecuador), 301
 Market Vendors Society (Ecuador), 302
 Mármol, Miguel, 309, 310, 351, 386
 Márquez, Elsy, 333
 Márquez, Israel, 428
 Marroquin, Alejandro Dagoberto, 362
 Marroquin, Jesús Pérez, 336
 Martí, Farabundo, 308–10, 386
 Martín, Ramón Grau, 247, 248
 Martín, Ramón Martínez, 539
 Martineli, Rafael, 112
 Martínez, Carlos Alberto, 173
 Martínez, General Maximiliano Hernández, 309, 310, 362, 387
 Martínez, Gustavo Alvarez, 491
 Martínez, Pastor Pérez, 201
 Martínez, Prudencio Rivera, 674
 Martínez, Thomas, 681
 Martínez, Victor Manuel, 354
 Maryknoll Center for Integral Development (Guatemala), 428
 MAS (Venezuela). *See* Movement Toward Socialism
 Masferrer, Alberto, 308, 365, 385
 Massacres, 24, 39–40, 43, 47, 147, 181, 202, 210, 291, 299, 300, 303, 372,

- 404, 416, 487, 550, 617, 621, 647, 648, 654, 655
- Masses, The* (Jamaica), 500
- Master Shoemaker's Association (Haiti), 459
- Matamoros, Maria, 588
- Matanza (1932) (El Salvador), 307, 310, 387
- Mateos, Alfredo López, 521, 537
- Matute, Felipe Cáliz, 471
- Maximilian, Emperor, 516
- MB. *See* Suriname Miners Union
- MDB. *See* Brazilian Democratic Movement
- Meany, George, 410, 687
- Mecano, José, 745
- Mechanics and Metal Industry Workers Union (STIMMES) (El Salvador), 344, 355, 388
- Mediation and Conciliation Board (Puerto Rico), 676
- Médici, Garrastsazu, 70
- Medrano, Colonel José Alberto "Chele," 311, 314, 318, 327, 360, 361, 373
- Mejía, Justo, 367
- Meléndez, Jorge, 308, 365, 386
- Meléndez, Sergeant Rigoberto, 330
- Melo, Brigadeiro Corrêia de Melo, 69
- Mendez, Antonio Julín, 486, 488
- Mendez, José María, 340, 341
- Mendezabal, Marlon, 428
- Mendoza, Ramón Aristides, 323, 324, 340, 371
- Meneghelli, Jair, 107, 108
- Menéndez, Jesús, 261
- Menezes, Carlos Alberto de, 89, 90
- MEP (Venezuela). *See* Electoral Movement of the People
- Mercado, José Raquel, 189, 191
- Mesa Obrero Estudiantil (Uruguay). *See* Student Labor Board
- Mestizo, defined, 396
- Metal Industry Workers Federation of Peru (FETIMP), 613, 614, 636, 639, 647, 648, 652, 653
- Metal, Mechanical and Electrical, Materials Industry Workers Federation of Lima and Callao (FETIMEM) (Peru), 653
- Metallurgical and Iron Workers Union Federation (FENSIMET) (Chile), 154, 163
- Metallurgical, Mechanical, and Electrical Workers Union of Osasco (Brazil), 104, 113
- Metallurgical, Mechanical, and Electrical Workers Union of Sao Bernardo and Diadema (Brazil), 105
- Metals Committee of the National Industrial Society (Peru), 652
- Mexican Central Railroad, 534, 546
- Mexican Communist Party (PCM), 518–19, 532, 534–36
- Mexican Electrical Workers Union (SME) (Mexico), 535–36, 544, 545
- Mexico: AFL-CIO in, 513, 528; agrarian reform in, 538; AIFLD in, 528; collective bargaining in, 512, 532, 546; enterprises in (Altos Hornos Steelworks, 522, 523, 539; General Electric, 522; General Motors, 522; Mexican Central Railroad, 534; Nissan-Mexicana, 535; Shell Oil Company, 546; Standard Oil Company, 546; Volkswagen de Mexico, 512, 522, 535); Great Depression, impact on, 523; International Monetary Fund and, 523; labor congresses, Third Labor Congress, 540; labor leaders, repression of, 517, 521, 533, 547; labor legislation in, National Federal Labor Law, 511; labor publications (*El Hijo de Trabajo*, 533; *Pro Paria*, 540; *Acción* ["Action"], 540; *Solidaridad* ["Solidarity"], 541; *El Socialista* ["The Socialist"], 533); minimum wages in, 513, 521; ORIT in, 528; repression in, 517, 521, 522, 533; strikes in, 516, 517, 519, 522, 523, 535, 536, 543, 548 (general, 521, 531, 534, 536; petroleum workers, 520; rail workers, 534; telephone, 513, 547; tobacco workers, 533); United States and, 514, 523; World War II and, 520
- Meza, General Luís García, 48
- Meza, Victor, 470

- Michelin, Zelmair, 716
- Michelsen, Alfonso López, 184, 198
- Migration, 675, 704, 727
- Mijangos, Juan Francisco Alfaro, 416
- Miles, General Nelson A., 668
- Milicias Populares Anti-Somocistas (Nicaragua). *See* Popular Anti-Somoza Militia
- MILPAS (Nicaragua). *See* Popular Anti-Somoza Militia
- Minas de Guatemala, 429
- Mine and Metallurgical Workers National Federation of Peru (FNTMMP), 617, 622, 633, 638, 648, 654, 655
- Mine, Metallurgical and Steelworkers National Federation of Peru (FNTMMSP), 649, 653–54
- Miners Guild (Costa Rica), 214, 236
- Minerva Textile Union (El Salvador), 346
- Mineworker's Union (Guyana), 444, 445
- Minimum wage, 77, 101, 102, 109, 112, 117, 221, 247, 272, 305, 321, 327, 328, 399, 405, 417, 467, 486, 490, 513, 521, 552, 580, 587, 596, 599, 600
- Minority CGT (Dominican Republic), 280
- Miquilena, Luis, 729
- MIR. *See* Left Revolutionary Movement (Chile); Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Venezuela); Revolutionary Left Movement (Peru)
- Miranda, Andres, 301
- MIT (Paraguay). *See* Independent Workers Union
- Mitford, Jessica, 367
- MLN (Guatemala). *See* Movement of National Liberation
- MLR (Peru). *See* Revolutionary Labor Movement
- MNR (Bolivia). *See* Nationalist Revolutionary Movement
- MODACU (Jamaica). *See* Motor Omnibus Drivers Association and Chauffeurs Union
- MOEC (Colombia). *See* Movement of Workers, Students, and Peasants
- Moederbond (Suriname), 697
- MOIR. *See* Independent Revolutionary Workers Movement
- Molina, Colonel Arturo, 315, 316, 346, 360, 368, 382
- Molina, Salvador "Bobby" Jiménez, 350
- Mollegas, José, 746
- Moncada, José Maria, 568, 570
- Moncaleano, Juan Francisco, 534
- Monroe Doctrine, 549
- Montenegro, Mendez, 402
- Montero, Aniceto, 218
- Montes, Ismael, 39
- Montes, Mélida Anaya, 356
- Montes, Roberto Nuñez, 476
- Montoneros (Argentina), 7
- Montt, Efraín Ríos, 412, 416
- MOR (El Salvador). *See* Revolutionary Workers Movement
- Mora, Ernesto Ortiz, 226
- Morales, Elba Esther Gordillo, 539
- Morales, José, 533
- Morales, Ramón Villeda, 464, 477, 485
- Morazanista Front for the Liberation of Honduras (Honduras), 466
- Moreira, Delfim, 99
- Morena, Roberto, 98
- Moreno, García, 290, 291
- Moringo, Higínio, 596, 598, 604, 606
- Morones, Luis, 518, 519, 540
- MOSAN. *See* Nicaraguan Autonomous Union Movement
- MOSCIP. *See* Christian Union Movement of Peru
- Mosquera, Fidel, 296
- Motor Omnibus Drivers Association and Chauffeurs Union (MODACU) (Jamaica), 499, 505, 506
- MOUSO (Dominican Republic). *See* Labor Union Movement of Workers Unity
- Movement of Independent Syndical Unification (MUSI) (Uruguay), 719, 721
- Movement of National Liberation (MLN) (Guatemala), 401
- Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Venezuela), 728, 741, 745, 747, 754, 758

- Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) (Venezuela), 742, 746, 750, 753
- Movimento de Unidade dos Trabalhadores. *See* Workers Unitary Movement
- Movimento Sindical Democrático (Brazil). *See* Democratic Union Movement
- Movimiento de Unificación Sindical Independiente (Uruguay). *See* Movement of Independent Syndical Unification
- Movimiento Obrero Independiente Revolucionario (Colombia). *See* Independent Revolutionary Workers Movement
- Movimiento Sindical Christiano del Perú. *See* Christian Union Movement of Peru
- Movimiento Sindical Revolucionario (Mexico). *See* Revolutionary Union Movement
- Movimiento Unitario de Trabajadores de Chile. *See* Unitary Movement of Chilean Workers
- Moyne Commission (Guyana), 436
- MPCA (Guyana). *See* Man Power Citizens Association
- MPU (Nicaragua). *See* United People's Movement
- MRM (Mexico). *See* Revolutionary Movement of Teachers
- MRS (Brazil). *See* Union Renewal Movement
- MSD (Brazil). *See* Democratic Union Movement
- MSR (Mexico). *See* Revolutionary Union Movement
- Mujal, Eusebio, 249, 250, 258, 261, 262
- Mujia, Mario "Wiwi" (Guatemala), 428
- Multipesca (El Salvador), 345
- Municipal Workers Union (Argentina), 11; (Guatemala), 428
- Munroe, Trevor, 500, 509
- Murray, Philip, 680, 688
- MUSI (Uruguay). *See* Movement of Independent Syndical Unification
- Musicians Mutual Assistance Society (Costa Rica), 218, 235
- MUSYGES (El Salvador). *See* Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador
- MUT (Brazil). *See* Workers Unitary Movement
- MUTCH. *See* Unitary Movement of Chilean Workers
- Mutual aid societies, 3, 22, 39, 55, 61, 72, 89, 90, 122, 130, 146, 150, 163, 172, 178, 181, 187, 199, 209, 214, 215, 225, 235, 239, 241, 245, 265-66, 275, 291, 296, 301-8, 305, 308, 330, 385-86, 398, 431, 469, 470, 525, 536, 542-43, 578, 597, 606, 608, 640, 660, 662. *See also* Labor organizations, mutualist
- Mutualist Society of Spinners and Weavers of the Valley of Mexico, 536
- Mutual Support Group (GAM) (Guatemala), 406, 422
- Namphy, Lt. General Henri, 452
- Napoleon III, 516
- National Agrarian Confederation (CNA) (Peru), 615, 618, 633, 655, 656, 658
- National Agrarian Federation (ANUC) (Colombia), 187, 195, 205
- National Agrarian Institute (IAN) (Venezuela), 748
- National Alliance of Honduran Peasant Organizations, 488
- National Assembly (Nicaragua), 555
- National Association of Educators of Nicaragua (ANDEN), 566-67, 574
- National Association of Employees (Chile), 165
- National Association of Honduran Peasants (ANACH), 477, 485-88, 491, 492
- National Association of Industry (ANDI) (Honduras), 488
- National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC) (Puerto Rico), 686
- National Association of Peasant Organizations (ANOC), 162, 168
- National Association of Primary School Teachers of Peru, 662
- National Association of Professors of Secondary Education (ANPES) (Peru), 662
- National Association of Public Employees (ANEF) (Chile), 144, 146, 162-64

- National Association of Salvadoran Educators (ANDES), 317, 319, 328, 355–56, 364, 382
- National Autonomous University (Honduras), 475
- National Autonomous Water and Sewer Service Workers Union (Honduras), 494
- National Bank of Costa Rica Employees Union, 236
- National Bank Workers Confederation (CONTEC) (Brazil), 76, 109
- National Basic Reform Week (Brazil), 115, 121
- National Campesino Confederation of Guatemala (CNCG) (Guatemala), 399, 400, 418, 420
- National Campesino Confederation (CNC) (Guatemala), 400, 403, 410, 420
- National Campesino League (LNC) (Mexico), 519, 535–37
- National Catholic Congress of Work (Mexico), 537
- National Catholic Labor Confederation (CNCT) (Mexico), 518, 521, 528, 537–38
- National Central of Panamanian Workers (CNTP), 581, 582, 584, 587–88, 592
- National Central of Urban Workers (CNTU) (Paraguay), 603–5
- National Civic Union (UCN) (Dominican Republic), 280, 285, 287–88
- National College of Physicians and Surgeons (Costa Rica), 237
- National Commission for the Sole Workers Central (Brazil), 121
- National Commission of Arbitration (Venezuela), 731
- National Committee of Trade Union Unity (CNUS) (Guatemala), 399, 404, 410–11, 414, 416, 417, 420–21, 427–28, 430
- National Committee of Unification (Peru), 611, 634
- National Conciliation Party (PCN) (El Salvador), 312, 315, 317, 327, 334, 349, 350, 354, 360, 379, 384
- National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) (Brazil), 108–9, 125–26
- National Confederation of Bank Insurance Workers (Brazil), 97
- National Confederation of Catholic Worker Circles (Brazil), 109
- National Confederation of Catholic Workers (Brazil), 109
- National Confederation of Chilean Unions (CNSC), 164, 166
- National Confederation of Chilean Workers, 153
- National Confederation of Commercial Workers (CNTC) (Brazil), 76, 94, 110
- National Confederation of Communications and Advertising Workers (CONT-COP), 76, 110
- National Confederation of Dominican Workers (CNTD), 272, 282–83
- National Confederation of Educational and Cultural Workers (Brazil), 76, 111
- National Confederation of Electricians and Allied Workers (Mexico), 536
- National Confederation of Free Workers (CONATRAL) (Dominican Republic), 269, 270, 275, 279, 281–83
- National Confederation of Industrial Workers (CNTI) (Brazil), 76, 79, 97, 109–114, 121–22
- National Confederation of Land Transport Workers (CNTT) (Brazil), 76, 110, 112, 114–15
- National Confederation of Paraguayan Workers (CNTP), 598, 604, 606
- National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CNTCB), 57
- National Confederation of Popular Organizations (Mexico), 538
- National Confederation of Private Enterprise Institutions (CONFIEP) (Peru), 608
- National Confederation of Seamen and Air Transport Workers (Brazil), 76
- National Confederation of Teachers (FENEMA) (Dominican Republic), 269–70, 284
- National Confederation of Workers

- (CNT): (Brazil), 93, 113; (Chile), 167; (Guatemala), 401, 406, 409–10, 414, 416–17, 420–22, 427–28 (Paraguay), 597, 604–5; (Uruguay), 724; (Venezuela), 732, 744
- National Confederation of Workers (FOUPSA-CESITRADO) (Dominican Republic), 269
- National Confederation of Workers Circles (Brazil), 87, 113
- National Confederation of Workers–21 (CNT–21) (Guatemala), 421
- National Congress of the Working Class (1981) (Brazil), 121
- National Convention of Workers (CNT) (Uruguay), 711
- National Coordinating Committee of Christian Trade Unionists (Venezuela), 743
- National Coordination of Workers (Paraguay), 603, 604
- National Coordinator of Trade Union Unity (CONUS) (Guatemala), 406, 421–22, 427–28
- National Coordinator of Workers in Education (Mexico), 539
- National Corporation of State-Owned Business (CORDE) (Dominican Republic), 280
- National Council of Christian Peasants, (El Salvador), 330
- National Council of Democratic Workers (CNTD) (Guatemala), 407, 422
- National Council of Labor Union Unity (CNNUS) (Dominican Republic), 272
- National Council of Organized Workers (CONATO) (Panama), 584, 588
- National Council of Private Enterprise (Panama), 588
- National Council of Teachers (CNM) (Guatemala), 422–23, 430
- National Defense Commission of Union Rights (CNDD) (Uruguay), 713, 722, 725
- National Defense Front of State Enterprises (Peru), 625
- National Democratic Organization (El Salvador). *See* ORDEN
- National Democratic Union (Brazil), 98
- National Development Bank Workers Union (SITRABANAFOM) (Honduras), 475
- National Educators Association (ANDE) (Costa Rica), 223–25, 231, 236
- National Electricity Industry (ENDESA) (Chile), 142
- National Employees Association (ANDE) (Venezuela), 729, 744, 745, 749
- National Employees Association of Chile (JUNECH), 165
- National Factory Workers Union (Bolivia), 56
- National Federal Labor Law (Mexico), 511
- National Federation of Agricultural and Indigenous Communities (FENCAIG) (Guatemala), 420, 422
- National Federation of Agricultural Workers of Peru (FENCAP), 635, 656, 658
- National Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women (FNMCB), 58
- National Federation of Campesino Organizations (FENOCAM) (Guatemala), 420, 422
- National Federation of Christian Trade Unions (NFCTU) (Belize), 33
- National Federation of Construction and Cement Workers (FENALTRACONCEM) (Colombia), 195–96
- National Federation of Construction Workers (FONC) (Argentina), 5, 15, 18, 23
- National Federation of Democratic Workers (Panama), 584
- National Federation of Education Workers of Peru (FENTEPE), 623, 644, 662
- National Federation of Educators of Peru, 662
- National Federation of Employees (FENADE) (Venezuela), 733, 745
- National Federation of Employees of Public Sector and Autonomous Institutions (FENEPIA) (Dominican Republic), 269, 284

- National Federation of Federal Employees (Puerto Rico), 678
- National Federation of Honduran Peasants (FENACH), 466, 487, 492, 493
- National Federation of Independent Unions (FNSI) (Mexico), 537
- National Federation of Leather and Shoe Workers (FONACC) (Chile), 166
- National Federation of Marine and Fish Oil Industry Workers (FENTRIHAP) (Peru), 644
- National Federation of Maritime Dockworkers of Colombia, 197, 204
- National Federation of Maritime, River, Port, and Air Transport (FEDENAL) (Colombia), 179, 196–97
- National Federation of Metalworkers (FETRAMETAL) (Venezuela), 733, 745, 746, 750
- National Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (FECUAPETROL) (Ecuador), 302
- National Federation of Petroleum Workers (FNTP) (Ecuador), 302
- National Federation of Press Workers (Venezuela), 754
- National Federation of Professional Drivers (FNCHE) (Ecuador), 302
- National Federation of Public Service Workers (Costa Rica), 237, 238
- National Federation of Railroad Workers (Brazil), 112
- National Federation of Railways (FERROVIAS) (Colombia), 194, 197, 199, 203, 204
- National Federation of Rollers (Cuba), 261
- National Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS), 316–17, 319–20, 322, 324, 333, 346, 351, 365, 379, 380–81
- National Federation of Small Businesses (FENAPES) (El Salvador), 364
- National Federation of State Workers (FENELTRASE) (Colombia), 184, 186
- National Federation of Sugar Workers (FNTA) (Cuba), 261
- National Federation of Telecommunications Employees (FENETEL), (Ecuador), 302
- National Federation of Textile, Apparel and Related Industries Workers (Guatemala), 422
- National Federation of Textile, Clothing and Related Industries Workers (FEN-OIT, FITIVE) (Guatemala), 422
- National Federation of Transport Workers (FENOT) (Guatemala), 402, 422
- National Federation of Unions and Labor Organizations of Chile, 165, 166, 170
- National Federation of Workers (NFW) (Belize), 30, 31, 33, 34, 35
- National Federation of Workers in Metal Products and Allied Branches (Peru), 653–54
- National Federation of Workers in Mining, Metals and Similar Fields (Peru), 654
- National Federation of Workers of the Electrical Industry (Mexico), 545
- National Front (Colombia), 182, 184
- National Front for Common Action (FNAP) (Mexico), 537, 541
- National Front of Popular Unity (Guatemala), 403
- National Front of Transport Workers (Guatemala), 422
- National Graphic and Press Workers Union (Costa Rica), 237
- National Gremialist Secretariat (Chile), 142
- National Guard (El Salvador), 327, 352, 354, 367, 384; (Panama), 581
- National Health Service (Chile), 165
- National Health Workers Federation (Chile), 167
- National Independence Party (NIP) (Belize), 28, 31
- National Independent Labor Committee (CONI) (Cuba), 258, 261–62
- National Industries Society (SNI) (Peru), 660
- National Institute of Labor Union Studies (INES) (Dominican Republic), 273
- National Inter-Union Commission (CNI) (Nicaragua), 557, 566–67

- Nationalist Communal Brotherhood (Dominican Republic), 266, 281, 284
- Nationalist Democratic Organization (El Salvador). *See* ORDEN
- Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN) (El Salvador), 316, 318, 342, 357
- Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) (Bolivia), 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 53, 56
- Nationalist Revolutionary Movement Alliance (AMNR) (Bolivia), 57, 59
- Nationalistic Republican Party (PNR) (Suriname), 693, 696–97, 699
- National Labor Central (CNT) (Mexico), 521, 540, 541
- National Labor Commission (Cuba), 261
- National Labor Committee (Argentina), 16
- National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador, 321, 354
- National Labor Confederation (Ecuador), 298
- National Labor Confederation of Cuba (CNOC) (Cuba), 246–47, 260–62
- National Labor Council (Peru), 624
- National Labor Departments: Argentina, 5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18, 23; El Salvador, 311; Paraguay, 600; Uruguay, 707, 722
- National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 674
- National Labour Party (NLP) (Jamaica), 505
- National League for the Defense of Poor Peasants (Chile), 167
- National Liberal Party (PLN) (Nicaragua), 551, 564
- National Liberation Party (PLN) (Costa Rica), 219, 222
- National Liberation Party of Costa Rica (Honduras), 477
- National Liberation Revolution (Costa Rica), 221
- National Liquor Factory (Costa Rica), 218
- National Maritime Union (Puerto Rico), 681, 687
- National Medical Union (Costa Rica), 228, 237
- National Military Council (NMC) (Suriname), 694–95
- National Party (NP) (Belize), 28
- National Party (PN) (Honduras), 463, 464, 465, 466, 486
- National Party Alliance (NPK) (Suriname), 694, 699
- National Peasant Commission (CNC) (Chile), 167
- National Peasant Confederation (Chile), 162, 168, 175
- National Peasant Confederation (CNC) (Mexico), 519, 537, 538
- National Peasant Federation (FEDENCA) (Venezuela), 737, 746
- National Peasant Movement (Chile), 172
- National Peasants Association (ANC) (El Salvador), 327–28
- National Peasants Union (UNC) (El Salvador), 328, 334, 362, 364
- National Peasant Union (UNC) (Honduras), 486, 487, 488, 497
- National Planning Office (Chile), 139
- National Police: El Salvador, 345, 367, 372, 377; Dominican Republic, 270–80
- National Popular Union Assembly (Peru), 625, 649
- National Printers Union (UGN) (Bolivia), 38, 55, 58–59
- National Public Employees Association (ANEP), 224, 237
- National Public Works Federation (FENTROP) (Costa Rica), 231
- National Railroad Workers Council (Mexico), 534
- National Railway State Agency (Colombia), 197
- National Reform Association (Jamaica), 496
- National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) (Brazil), 69
- National Republican Alliance (El Salvador). *See* ARENA
- National Sandinista Popular Militia (Nicaragua), 567
- National Seamen and Air Transport

- Workers Confederation (CNTTMFA) (Brazil), 97, 114
- National Social Security Employees Union (Costa Rica), 238
- National Stevedores Federation (Brazil), 114
- National Subsistence Administration (Chile), 177
- National Sugar Industry Worker's Union (SNOIA) (Cuba), 247, 261–62
- National Sugar Labor Federation (FNOA) (Cuba), 261–62
- National System for Organization of Labor and Salaries (SNGTS) (Nicaragua), 558
- National Teachers Federation of Peru (FENEP), 656, 662
- National Teachers Front (FNM) (Guatemala), 422, 423
- National Teachers Union (Belize), 34
- National Union Coordinating Committee (CNS) (Chile), 142–45, 154–55, 159, 163–64, 166, 168–69, 171, 175–76
- National Union Coordinating Committee (CNS) (Peru), 623, 649
- National Union Front (Chile), 165
- National Union of Authentic Peasants of Honduras (UNCAH), 488
- National Union of Bank Workers (Panama), 584
- National Union of Chilean Workers (UNTRACH), 142, 169, 177
- National Union of Construction, Wood, and Building Materials Workers (Costa Rica), 227, 238
- National Union of Electrical Workers (SNESC) (Mexico), 530, 538, 545
- National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG) (Nicaragua), 556, 560, 566
- National Union of Female Needle Workers (Colombia), 198
- National Union of Free Workers (UNITRAL) (Guatemala), 399, 418, 430
- National Union of Haitian Workers (UNTH), 451, 456–57, 460
- National Union of Independent Unionized Drivers (UNACHOSIN) (Dominican Republic), 275
- National Union of Mining (Mexico), 526
- National Union of Mining, Metallurgical and Similar Workers of the Mexican Republic, 512, 526, 538–39
- National Union of People's Cooperatives (Honduras), 488
- National Union of Primary Education Teachers (Peru) (SINPEP), 662
- National Union of Railroad Workers (Colombia), 195, 197
- National Union of Shoe and Leather Workers (Costa Rica), 232, 238, 239
- National Union of Teachers (SNTE) (Mexico), 530, 539
- National Union of University Workers (Mexico), 539
- National Union of White-Collar Employees (UNE) (Nicaragua), 566–67, 572
- National Union of Workers (UNT) (El Salvador), 310, 348, 362, 372
- National Union of Workers and Peasants (UNOC) (El Salvador), 314, 324, 329–30, 342, 348, 362–63, 371, 374
- National Union of Workers of Haiti (UNOH), 451, 457–60
- National Union of Workers of the Clothing Industry of Panama, 579, 587
- National Unionist Council (Colombia), 184, 194, 198, 201
- National Unitary Struggle Command (CNUL) (Peru), 625, 632, 649, 650, 657
- National Unity Front of Honduran Peasants (FUNCAMH), 488
- National Unity Labor Front (Chile), 142
- National Unity of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS) (El Salvador), 323–24, 334, 337, 340–42, 344, 348, 359, 363, 364, 372, 374, 377–78, 383, 388
- National Workers Central (CNT) (Chile), 140, 142, 144–45, 169 (El Salvador), 322
- National Workers Central (Mexico), 536, 547
- National Workers Command (Chile), 148, 166, 169
- National Workers Committee (Ecuador), 298

- National Workers Confederation (Costa Rica), 230, 238; (Paraguay), 606
- National Workers Confederation (CNT) (Peru), 633, 640, 657
- National Workers Confederation (CON) (Colombia), 187, 188, 198–99, 202, 210, 211
- National Workers Conference (Peru), 626, 650
- National Workers Council (Peru), 640
- National Workers Union (NWU) (Jamaica), 498, 503, 505, 506, 508
- Native Workers (Cuba), 263
- Naula, Juan E., 301
- Naval Federation (Paraguay), 597, 605
- Navarro, José Gonzalez, 758
- Nazi Germany, 698
- NCWU (Belize). *See* Northern Cane Workers Union
- Negreiros, Luis, 611, 612, 613, 625, 634, 635
- Negrón, José L. “Chepo” Caraballo, 688
- NEMTEX (El Salvador), 337
- Netherlands, 691
- Nethersole, Noel N., 506, 508
- Neves, Tancredo (Brazil), 71, 84
- New Deal, 674
- New Progressive Party (Puerto Rico), 672
- New Republican Party (Bolivia), 39
- New State (Estado Novo) (Brazil), 66, 75, 78, 86, 92, 109, 110–12, 114, 127, 128
- NFCTU (Belize). *See* National Federation of Christian Trade Unions
- NFW (Belize). *See* National Federation of Workers
- Nicaragua, 317, 404, 468; AFL in, 568; AFL-CIO in, 552, 562; agrarian reform in, 556, 558; AFLD in, 552, 562; Alliance for Progress and, 552; austerity program, 558; banks in (Bank of America 551; Nicaraguan Bank 551); Catholic Church in, 553, 559; Cold War and, 551; enterprises in, Cuyamel Fruit Company, 550; labor leaders, repression of, 556, 571–73; labor legislation, 551–52, 557, 568; labor publications (*El Pueblo* [“The People”], 555; *Machete*, 560; *Patria*, 568); massacre, banana workers, 550; minimum wages in, 552; ORIT in, 562; Sandinista Revolution, 564; strikes in, 550, 555, 557, 571–72 (agricultural, 550; construction, 553; general, 554; sugar, 553, 570, 574); United States and, 555, 571 (occupation of, 550, 558, 568); United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and, 552; World War I and, 550; World War II and, 551, 561
- Nicaraguan Agrarian Institute, 552
- Nicaraguan Autonomous Union Movement (MOSAN), 552, 565–67, 569
- Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Group (CDN), 556, 562, 567, 572
- Nicaraguan Labor Coordinating Group (CSN), 557, 560, 562, 563, 565, 566, 567, 570, 572, 573, 574
- Nicaraguan Labor Federation (FON), 564, 567–68
- Nicaraguan National-Syndicalism, 568, 570
- Nicaraguan Patriotic Union (UPN), 568
- Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), 551–52, 554, 564–65, 572–73
- Nicaraguan Women’s Association “Luisa Amanda Espinosa” (AMNLAE), 568–69
- Nicaraguan Worker’s Party (PTN), 550, 560, 568
- Nicaraguan Worker’s Confederation (CTN), 552, 553, 557, 560, 567, 570–72, 662–63
- Nicaraguan Revolution, 553
- Ninth of January Textile Workers Union (Peru), 663
- NIP (Belize). *See* National Independence Party
- Nissan-Mexicana, 535
- Nixon, Richard, 688
- NLP (Jamaica). *See* National Labor Party
- NMC (Suriname). *See* National Military Council
- Northern Cane Workers Union (NCWU) (Belize), 34
- Northern Miners Federation (Peru), 638
- Northern Railroad (Costa Rica), 235

- Northern Railway Company (Costa Rica), 241
- NP (Belize). *See* National Party
- NPK (Suriname). *See* National Party Alliance
- NPS. *See* Suriname National Party
- NSN. *See* Nicaraguan National-Syndicalism
- NWU (Jamaica). *See* National Workers Union
- Obrajes*, defined, 37, 515
- Obrégón, Álvaro, 518, 519, 540
- Obrerismo Organizado de Nicaragua. *See* Organized Workers' Movement of Nicaragua
- Obreros de la Pátria (Cuba). *See* Native Workers
- Obreros de San José* (Ecuador), 297
- Oca, Zoroastro Motnes de, 471
- Odio, Rodrigo Carazo, 235
- Odria, General Manuel, 611, 612, 635, 636, 639, 654, 660
- Office Employees Federation of Peru (CSEPP), 611, 636, 637, 639, 657
- Ofícios vários* (Mexico), defined, 512
- O Internacional* (Brazil), 100
- Oliveira, Dom Jorge Marcos de, 113
- Oliveira, José Pereira de, 126
- Oliveira, Mario Lopes de, 112
- Oliveira, Minervino de, 97
- Onze Gids* (Suriname), 698
- OO. *See* Organized Workers' Movement of Nicaragua
- Open Letter to Francisco Bilbao*, 158
- Operation Bootstrap (Puerto Rico), 670, 675, 686
- ORDEN (El Salvador), 315, 317, 318, 327, 332, 342, 353, 360, 361, 364, 367–69, 373–82
- Ordóñez, José Battle y, 702, 706, 723
- Organización Democrática Nacionalista (El Salvador). *See* ORDEN
- Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores. *See* ORIT
- Organization of American States, 270
- Organized Committee of Workers Confederation of Nicaragua (COCTN), 551
- Organized Worker's Movement of Nicaragua (OO), 551, 568, 570
- Orinoco Mining Company, 745
- Orinoco Steel Works (SIDOR), 745
- ORIT, 98, 110, 111, 112, 124, 222, 226, 230, 268, 269, 282, 303, 311, 314, 317, 335, 346, 348, 349, 350, 351, 373, 379, 399, 402, 403, 406, 409, 410, 413, 416, 419, 423, 425, 430, 431, 439, 446, 451, 457, 473–76, 485, 491, 493, 507, 528, 562, 584, 601, 605, 611, 635, 710, 723, 731, 736
- ORO (Paraguay). *See* Republican Workers' Organization
- Ortega, Eustaquio Maylle, 656
- Ortiz, Silvero, 431
- Osario, Gustavo, 196
- Osorio, Carlos Arana, 409
- Osorio, Colonel Oscar, 311, 348, 349, 373
- Oticica, José, 99
- O Trabalhador* (Brazil), 100
- O Trabalhador Gráfico* (Brazil), 100
- Ovando, General Alfredo, 46, 56
- Pacheco, Gregorio, 37
- Packer, Bernard, 322, 340, 341, 342, 370, 371
- Pact of National Unity (16), 464
- Pacto de Unidade Intersindical (Brazil). *See* Inter-union Unity Pact
- Pact of Unity and Action (PAU) (Brazil), 80, 97, 113–15, 122
- Paéz, Enrique, 292
- Pagán, Bolívar, 674
- PAISA (El Salvador), 347
- PALU (Suriname). *See* Progressive Workers and Farmers Labor Union
- Panama: AFL in, 579, 593; AFL-CIO in, 587; AIFLD in, 581; Catholic Church in, 578; collective bargaining in, 581; enterprises in (Chiriqui Land Co, 590; United Brands, 591–92; United Fruit Company, 590, 592); Hunger and Desperation March (1959), 580, 587; immigration to, 577–78; labor legislation in, Labor Code (1972), 580–82, 588, 589, 591; labor leaders, repression of,

- 578, 579, 580; Labor Ministry in, 581; labor publications in, *El Obrero*, "The Workman," 592; minimum wages in, 580, 587; ORIT in, 584; strikes in (banana workers, 581; canal workers, 578; general, 582, 586; sugar workers, 581, 586); United States and, 577–78, 580, 587 (Army, 579, 584; Canal Treaty, 582); World War I and, 579; World War II and, 579
- Panama Canal, 181, 468
- Panama Canal Commission, 585
- Panama Canal Company, 578, 592
- Panamanian Central of Transport Workers (CPTT), 582, 586, 587–88
- Panamanian Construction Chamber (CA-PAC), 589
- Panamanian Trade Union Association, 586
- Panama Railroad, 181
- Pan-American Airways, 459
- Pan-American Confederation of Workers (COPA), 266, 397, 431, 683
- Panorama* (Venezuela), 749
- Pantín, Santiago Iglesias, 672, 674, 679, 681, 682, 683, 684
- PAP (Peru). *See* Peruvian Aprista Party
- Papa Doc (Haiti). *See* Duvalier, Dr. Francois
- Paraguay, 41; AFL-CIO in, 601, 603; agrarian leagues in, 601–3; AIFLD in, 605; Catholic Church in, 600, 602; Chaco War (1932) and, 597, 598, 604, 606; Civil War (1947), 606; collective bargaining in, 597, 602, 605; communism in, 598, 604, 606; cooperatives in, 602; Department of Labor, 598; emigration from, 597, 600; human rights in, 606; International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, 599; labor legislation, 598, 600; labor leaders, repression of, 598, 602, 603, 605; labor publications (Trabajo, 600; *Tribuna Bancaria*, 602); minimum wage in, 596, 599, 600; National Department of Labor, 600; ORIT in, 601, 605; peasant leagues in, 600; repression in, 599–604; squatters in, 595, 601; strikes in, 597, 599, 604, 605; War of the Pacific (1879–1883), 597; War of the Triple Alliance, 596
- Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP), 597
- Paraguayan Confederation of Workers (CPT), 598–601, 604–6
- Paraguayan Confederation of Workers—In Exile (CPT-E), 605
- Paraguayan War, 64
- Paranam Mine Workers (Suriname), 697
- Paranam Mine Workers Union (Suriname), 696, 698
- Partido Comunista de El Salvador. *See* Communist Party of El Salvador
- Partido Comunista do Brasil. *See* Communist Party of Brazil
- Partido dos Trabalhadores (Brazil). *See* Workers Party
- Partido Laborista Argentino. *See* Argentine Labor Party
- Partido Nacional (PN) (Honduras). *See* National Party
- Partido Peronista Argentina. *See* Peronist Party
- Partido Social Democrático (Brazil). *See* Social Democratic Party
- Partido Socialista Revolucionario (Ecuador). *See* Revolutionary Socialist Party
- Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro. *See* Brazilian Labor Party
- Party of Guatemalan Workers, 418, 431
- Party of Innovation and Unity (PINU) (16), 465
- Party of National Conciliation (PCN) (El Salvador), 315, 317, 334, 346, 349–50, 354, 360, 379, 384
- Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM), 519, 528, 539
- Party of the Revolutionary Left (PIR) (Bolivia), 41–44, 60
- PASO (Costa Rica). *See* Socialist Action Party
- Passarinho, Jarbas, 101
- Pastorino, Enrique, 725
- Patiño, Simon, 40
- Pátria* (Nicaragua), 568
- Pátria Roja* (Peru). *See* Red Fatherland
- Patriotic Junta (Venezuela), 732, 744

- PAU (Brazil). *See* Pact of Unity and Action
- Paulo Maluf, 84
- Payne, James, 636
- Pazzianotto, Almir, 71, 84
- PCD. *See* Dominican Communist Party
- PCH. *See* Communist Party of Honduras
- PCH-FUTH (Honduras), 490
- PCH-ML. *See* Communist Party of Honduras—Marxist-Leninist
- PCM. *See* Mexican Communist Party
- PCN (El Salvador). *See* Party of National Conciliation
- PCN. *See* Communist Party of Nicaragua
- PCP-majority (PCP-M) (Peru), 621, 631, 648
- PCP. *See* Peruvian Communist Party; Paraguayan Communist Party
- PCS (El Salvador). *See* Communist Party of El Salvador
- PCV. *See* Venezuelan Communist Party
- PDC (El Salvador). *See* Christian Democratic Party
- PDM. *See* People's Democratic Movement
- Peace Corps (U.S.), 125, 637
- Pearlman, Mark, 319, 339, 370
- Peasant Alliance of National Organizations of Honduras (ALCONH), 486, 488
- Peasant Congress (El Salvador), 330
- Peasant Federation of Venezuela (FCV), 737, 740, 747–48
- Peasant Industries Company (INDUCAM) (Venezuela), 748
- Peasant leagues, 108, 315, 330, 386, 488, 600, 747
- Peasants Confederation of Peru (CCP), 614–18, 623, 628, 630, 640, 648, 649, 655, 657–59, 663
- Peasants Supplies Company (SUCAM) (Venezuela), 748
- Peasants Union Front (Peru), 658
- Peasant Worker Unity (Chile), 163
- Pedro, José María Blásquez de, 585
- Pelego* (Brazil), 81, 94, 99, 111, 112, 124
- PEMEX (Mexico), 546
- Pena, Lázaro, 249
- Peñalver, Manuel, 731, 741
- Peñaranda, General Enrique, 43
- Pengel, Johan Adolf, 693
- People's Congress (Uruguay), 711
- People's Freedom Movement (Jamaica), 505
- People's National Party (PNP) (Jamaica), 496, 498, 500, 503, 504, 506, 507, 508
- People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) (El Salvador), 316
- People's Revolutionary Bloc (El Salvador), 380
- People's United Party (PUP) (Belize), 27–29, 31, 33, 34
- Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM) (Belize), 28, 31
- Peoples' National Congress (PNC) (Guyana), 437, 446
- Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP) (Guyana), 436, 437, 438, 439, 441–44, 446
- Pepe Figueras. *See* Ferrer, José "Pepe" Figueras
- Perdomo, Ricardo, 384
- Pereira, Astrogildo, 94
- Pereira, José Jeremias, 367
- Pérez, Carlos Andrés, 748
- Pérez, Juan H., 658
- Pérez, Ramon Barreto, 684
- Pérez, Roberto Reyes, 535
- Permanent Congress of Unified Unions of Latin American Workers, 572
- Permanent Commission of Trade Union Organizations (CPOS) (Brazil) 80, 94, 97–98, 114–15
- Permanent Fiscal Commission (Bolivia), 40
- Permanent National Assembly of Union Organizations (ANPOS) (Bolivia), 42, 49, 58, 60
- Perón, Isabel, 7, 17
- Perón, Juan Domingo, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 23, 133, 222, 230–31, 451, 454, 744
- Peronist Construction Labor Union of the Argentine Republic, 18
- Peronist Party Argentina, 6, 17

- Peronist Women's Party Argentina, 6
Personería jurídica defined, 148, 475
 Peru: AFL and, 611, 634, 647; ALF-CIO and, 636–38, 665; agrarian reform in, 614, 617, 628, 655; AIFLD, 612, 614, 615, 620, 624, 634, 636, 637; Alliance for Progress, 612; Catholic Church in, 612; Cold War and, 611, 634, 635, 647; collective bargaining in, 608, 612, 650; eight-hour day in, 609, 633, 658, 660, 663; enterprises in (Carnation, 611; CENTROMIN, Peru, 631; Cerro de Pasco Company, 610, 632, 646, 654; Chrysler, 653; International Petroleum Company (IPC), 614; Marcona Mining Company, 618, 654; Southern Peru Copper Corporation, 622, 654, 655; Volkswagen, 617; W. R. Grace & Co, 611, 663); Great Depression, impact on, 610, 633, 646, 654; immigrants to, Chinese, 608; labor congresses (First Labor Congress 1921, 651, 659; First National Agrarian Congress, 656; First National Unitary Agrarian Congress, 658; National Workers Conference, 626, 650; Second Labor Congress, 646, 652); labor leaders, repression of, 612, 620, 634, 646, 647, 652, 654–55, 660–62; labor legislation (Job Stability Law, 622, 649, 650; "Strike Law," 624, 651); labor publications (*Cetepé*, 636; *El Artesano* ["The Artisan"], 629; *El Obrero Textil* ["The Textile Worker"], 660; *El Volante*, 630; *La Protesta* ["Protest"], 641, 646; *La Tribuna* ["The Tribune"], 636); massacres in, 617, 621, 647, 648, 654, 655; ORIT in, 611, 635; right-to-strike in, 609; riots in, 619, 661; slavery, abolished in, 608; strikes in, 609, 613, 620, 622, 647, 649, 650, 653–55 (agrarian, 658; general, 621, 625, 629, 633, 637, 648–51, 658, 660–61, 663; teachers, 617; textile, 645, 661, 663); United States and, 613, 625, 634, 637, 641, 653, 660; United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 612; United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 614, 625, 636; War of the Pacific, 628; World War I and, 651; World War II and, 611, 634
 Perus Cement Company, 113
 Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP), 610, 633
 Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), 610, 612, 614–15, 619–21, 623, 629, 631, 634, 637, 639–40, 646–49, 651, 653, 658, 662–63
 Peruvian Regional Labor Federation (FORP), 651, 658, 660
 Petroleum Federation (Colombia), 191
 Petroleum Workers Mutual Aid Society (Venezuela), 728
 PGT. *See* Guatemalan Labor Party
 Phelps-Dodge factory, 355, 379
 Phelps-Dodge Workers Union (El Salvador), 364
 Picado, Teodoro, 221
 PID (Guatemala). *See* Institutional Democratic Party
 Piérola, Nicolas de, 663
 Pimenta, João da Costa, 93, 100, 116
 Pina, Fausto de, 459
 Piñate, Vincinte, 732
Pincochetazo (Peru), 648; defined, 620
 Pinella, General Gustavo Rojas, 133, 182, 183, 193, 206, 208
 Piñero, Jesus T., 669, 679
 Piñerua, Carlos, 731, 741
 Pinochet, General Augusto, 144, 145, 150, 155, 157
 Pinto, Eleazar, 760
 PINU (Honduras). *See* Party of Innovation and Unity
 PIR (Bolivia). *See* Party of the Revolutionary Left
 PIT (Uruguay). *See* Intersyndical Plenary of Workers
 PL. *See* Liberal Party
Plan Laboral (Chile), 155, 164; defined, 142–43
 Plant (Industrial) Union Federation of Santiago (Chile), 170
 Plasterers Guild (Costa Rica), 238
 Plasterers Union (Costa Rica), 218
 Plata, Benjamin, 487

- Platt Amendment, 244, 257
 Plaza, General Leónidas, 291
 PLD. *See* Dominican Revolutionary Party
 Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores (Uruguay). *See* Intersyndical Plenary of Workers
 PLI (Nicaragua). *See* Independent Liberal Party
 PLN (Costa Rica). *See* National Liberation Party
 PLS (El Salvador). *See* Salvadoran Labor Party
 Plumbers Union (Argentina), 21
 PN (Honduras). *See* National Party
 PNC (Guyana). *See* Peoples' National Congress
 PNP (Jamaica). *See* People's National Party
 PNR (Suriname). *See* Nationalistic Republican Party
Policlasista (Peru), 634; defined, 611, 633
 Pollard, Nicholas, 28, 31, 33, 34
 Pollydore, Joseph, 446
 Pope John XXIII, 113
 Pope Leo XIII, 297
 Popular Action (AP) (Brazil), 108, 125; (22), 622, 633
 Popular Action Front (FRAP) (Chile), 132, 135, 136
 Popular Action Movement/Marxist-Leninist (MAP-ML) (19), 554, 574
 Popular Anti-Somoza Militia (MILPAS) (Nicaragua), 555, 565, 570–71, 574
 Popular Assembly (Bolivia), 46, 47, 54, 55
 Popular Christian Party (Peru), 626
 Popular Democratic Party (PPD) (Puerto Rico), 670, 674, 675, 684, 685, 688
 Popular Front of 31 January (FP-31) (Guatemala), 406, 412
 Popular Liberal Alliance (Honduras), 466, 475
 Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) (El Salvador), 316, 329, 332, 356, 366, 373, 379
 Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BRP) (El Salvador), 316–18, 331, 333, 355–58, 367, 383
 Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (Brazil), 104, 113
 Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC) (Nicaragua), 557, 570
 Popular Socialist Party (Haiti), 451
 Popular Socialist Party (PPS), 520, 532, 568
 Popular Socialist Party (PSP) (Cuba), 248
 Popular Unity (Chile), 139, 140, 155, 164, 168, 172, 175
 Popular Vanguard (Costa Rica), 232
 Popular Vanguard Party (Costa Rica), 221, 222
 Populism (Brazil), 79–80, 292, 609
 POR (Bolivia). *See* Revolutionary Workers Party
 Port Industry Union (El Salvador), 358
 Port of Santo Domingo Laborers Union (Dominican Republic), 284
 Portillo, José López, 530, 543
 Portillo, Julio César, 356
 Portocarrero, Julio, 660, 663
 POS (Chile). *See* Socialist Workers Party
 Postal Employees Union (El Salvador), 364
 Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International (PTTI), 441, 445, 507
 POU (Belize). *See* Public Officers Union
 Power, Horacio Scott, 754
 PPD (Puerto Rico). *See* Popular Democratic Party
 PPP (Guyana). *See* Peoples' Progressive Party
 PPSC (Nicaragua). *See* Popular Social Christian Party.
 PPS (Mexico). *See* Popular Socialist Party
 Prada, Manuel Gonzáles, 301, 609, 641, 660
 Prado, Germán Parra, 531
 PRAM (El Salvador). *See* April and May Revolutionary Party
 PRD (Dominican Republic). *See* Dominican Revolutionary Party
 PRD. *See* Democratic Revolutionary Party

- Presencia* (Uruguay), 713
- Preza, José Luis Grande, 347
- PRI (Mexico), 513, 521, 523, 529, 530, 531, 532, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 544, 545, 546, 547
- Price, George, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34
- PRICOPROMAH. *See* First Honduran Professional College of Teachers
- PRIDCO. *See* Puerto Rican Industrial Development Corporation
- Primary Teachers Association (Chile), 160, 170
- Primer Colegio Profesional Hondureño de Maestros. *See* Professional Association for the Improvement of Teachers
- Printers and Allied Workers' Association (Jamaica), 503
- Printers Center (Bolivia), 38, 55
- Printers Federation (FOI) (Chile), 170–71, 173
- Printers Union (Haiti), 457
- Printers Union of Bogota (Colombia), 180, 186, 199, 209
- Printing Trades Union of Port-Au-Prince (Haiti), 457
- Prisons and Fire Brigade Workers Union (Jamaica), 505
- PRM (Mexico). *See* Party of the Mexican Revolution.
- Pro Paria* (Mexico), 540
- Professional Association for the Improvement of Teachers (Honduras), 489, 490
- Professors Guild (Venezuela), 756
- Progressive Party (Belize), 27
- Progressive Republican Party (Venezuela), 729
- Progressive Werknemers Organisatie (Suriname). *See* Progressive Workers' Organization
- Progressive Workers and Farmers Labor Union (PALU) (Suriname), 697
- Progressive Workers Organization (PWO) (Suriname), 692, 697
- Prosterman, Roy, 318, 319, 339, 369
- Protective associations (Guatemala), 431
- Protector of the Artisan Society (Ecuador), 303
- Protomedical Society of the Republic (Costa Rica), 214, 232, 238
- Protomedicato de la Republica (Costa Rica). *See* Protomedical Society of the Republic
- Provincial Work Federation of La Romana (Dominican Republic), 285
- Pro-Workers Confederation Committee (El Salvador), 373
- PRSC (Dominican Republic). *See* Social Christian Revolutionary Party
- PSC (Nicaragua). *See* Social Christian Party
- PSD. *See* Social Democratic Party (Brazil); (Nicaragua)
- PSG (French Guiana). *See* Guianese Socialist Party
- PSI (Guyana). *See* Public Services International
- PSP (Cuba). *See* Popular Socialist Party
- PSUM. *See* United Socialist Party of Mexico
- PT (Brazil). *See* Workers Party
- PTB. *See* Brazilian Labor Party
- PTN. *See* Nicaraguan Workers' Party
- PTTI. *See* Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International
- Public and Municipal Employees United Union Federation (El Salvador), 380
- Public Cleansing Workers Union (Jamaica), 503
- Public Employees in Rural Education (SINEPUDERH) (Honduras), 489
- Public Officers Union (POU) (Belize), 28, 29, 30, 31, 34
- Public Services International (PSI), 34, 441, 504
- Puerto Rican Federation of Labor (Puerto Rico), 684
- Puerto Rican Industrial Development Corporation (PRIDCO), 670, 672
- Puerto Rican Labor Relations Act (Puerto Rico), 674
- Puerto Rico: AFL in, 673, 679, 682, 686–88; AFL-CIO, 675–76, 680–81, 688, 689; banks in, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 672; CIO in, 680, 684, 687, 688; Civil War, 686; collective

- bargaining in, 676, 678; Great Depression, impact on, 670, 673; labor leaders, repression of, 673, 682; slavery, abolished, 672; strikes, 684; United States, 670, 673, 676, 681, 685; World War I and, 673, 686
- Puerto Rico Workmen Recreation and Rest Development Corporation, 676
- PUI (Brazil). *See* Inter-union Unity Pact
- PUM (Peru). *See* Unified Mariateguista Party
- Pumarejo, Alfonso López, 191, 203
- PUP (Belize). *See* People's United Party
- PWC (Guyana), 443
- PWO (Suriname). *See* Progressive Workers Organization
- Quadros, Jânio, 97, 124
- Quevedo, Pedro, 428
- Quijada, Ramón, 729, 747
- Quiñónez, Alfonso, 308, 365, 386
- Quinta centralista* (Peru), 631, 648; defined, 623
- Quintero, Rodolfo, 728, 729
- Quispe, Valentin Pacho, 649
- Racial tensions, 72, 118, 210, 216, 220, 245, 263, 399, 434, 437, 439–41, 470, 693–94
- Radamonthe, Turenne, 393
- Rademaker, Admiral Augusto, 69
- RADEPA (Bolivia). *See* *Razon da Patria*
- Radical Party (Argentina), 3; (Bolivia), 39; (Chile), 135, 154, 164, 170
- Railroad Labor Center (Colombia), 199
- Railroad Labor Front (Chile), 171
- Railroad Unions of the Pacific (Colombia), 199
- Railroad Workers Alliance (Mexico), 547
- Railroad Workers Confederation (Argentina), 19
- Railroad Workers Federation (Bolivia), 57–59
- Railroad Workers League (Argentina), 19
- Railroad Workers Union (UF) (Argentina), 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 22
- Railway Workers Industrial Federation (Chile), 156, 165, 171
- Railway Workers Union (UTF) (El Salvador), 310, 316, 342, 364, 380, 382, 383
- Ramírez, Alvaro, 194, 207
- Ramírez, Francisco Prats, 276
- Ramírez, Martín J., 755, 758
- “Ramiro Sacasa Guerrero” Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Group, 562, 571
- Rangel, Amos, 436
- “Ranquil” Confederation (Chile), 162, 163, 168, 171, 172
- Raposo, Sarandi, 88, 126
- Razón de Patria* (Bolivia), 43
- Read, Richard, 720
- Rebel Apra (Peru), 612
- Recinos, Héctor Bernabé (El Salvador), 319, 322, 354, 359
- Recinos, Mercedes (El Salvador), 358
- “Red Battalions” (Mexico), 518, 534
- Red Cross (El Salvador), 345
- Red Fatherland (Peru), 616, 618, 648, 662
- Red International of Labor Unions (RILU), 131, 151
- Red League (El Salvador), 308, 355, 365
- Reformist Party (Costa Rica), 217, 219, 220, 234; (Dominican Republic), 275
- Regional Argentine Labor Congress, 18, 19
- Regional Argentine Labor Federation (FORA), 3, 14, 18, 19, 20
- Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM), 518, 519, 528, 531–32, 535, 539, 540
- Regional Federation of Chilean Workers, 159, 172
- Regional Inter-American Organization of Workers. *See* ORIT
- Regional Inter-American Workers Organization. *See* ORIT
- Regional Labor Court (Brazil), 82, 83, 106, 107
- Regional Labor Federation (Brazil), 116
- Regional Labor Federation of Guatemala (FORG), 418, 431
- Regional Labor Federation of Pernambuco (Brazil), 115

- Regional Labor Federation of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 103, 116
- Regional Labor Federation of Uruguay (FORU), 706
- Regional Union Federation of Rio de Janeiro (FSRR) (Brazil), 97, 116–18, 127
- Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers (UROCC) (Brazil), 86, 97, 116, 125
- Regional Workers Congress (Honduras), 471
- Regional Workers' Central of Paraguay (CORP), 597, 606
- Regional Workers Federation of Paraguay, 597, 606
- Registrar of Trade Unions (Guyana), 439
- Regulation for the Gulf of Nicoya (1865), 235
- Reina, Jarge Arturo, 475
- Reis, Hercules Correia dos, 98, 115
- Relegación* (Chile), defined, 135, 153
- Remón, José Antonio, 580
- Renovadores* (Brazil). *See* Renovators
- Renovators (Brazil), 111, 114, 124
- Renters League (Panama), 585
- Repression, 39, 40, 43, 47, 56, 70, 73, 74, 92, 93, 99, 114, 122, 124, 140, 145, 150, 158, 308–11, 314, 317–23, 329–37, 339, 344, 346, 353, 354, 356, 359, 361–67, 373, 376, 377, 379, 380, 384, 452, 454, 456, 502, 517, 521, 522, 533, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 731
- Republican Confederation of Civic Action (CRAC) (Chile), 133, 134, 172–73, 176, 178
- Republican Party (Costa Rica), 221
- Republican Social Union of Wage Earners of Chile (USRACH), 173
- Republican Statehood Party (Puerto Rico), 672–73
- Republican Workers' Organization (ORO) (Paraguay), 598, 606
- Rerum Novarum* (1891), 90, 216, 297
- Resistance Federation of the Pernambuco Working Classes (Brazil), 117
- Resistance Society (Chile), 130, 172, 173, 177
- Resistance Society of Garment Workers (Chile), 173
- Resistance Society of Waterfront Warehouse and Coffee Workers (Brazil), 117
- Reuther, Walter P., 680
- Revolutionary Association of Worker Culture (ARCO) (Costa Rica), 220
- Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Farm Laborers (Mexico), 521
- Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants (CROC) (Mexico), 540
- Revolutionary Labor Movement (MLR) (Peru), 616, 644
- Revolutionary Left Movement (MLR) (Peru), 616, 617, 618, 619, 640, 644, 648, 664, 665
- Revolutionary Mass Coordinating Committee (CRM) (El Salvador), 318, 358
- Revolutionary Movement of Teachers (MRM) (Mexico), 539
- Revolutionary Party (Guatemala), 399, 430
- Revolutionary Party of Honduras (PRH), 477
- Revolutionary Socialist Party (Ecuador), 294
- Revolutionary Trade Union Federation (FSR) (El Salvador), 317, 319, 337, 344, 347–48, 353, 355, 357, 366–67, 379–81, 387
- Revolutionary Union Movement (MSR) (Mexico), 523, 530, 536, 541, 544–45, 547
- Revolutionary Vanguard (VR) (Peru), 616, 648–49, 658
- Revolutionary Workers Confederation (COR) (Mexico), 540, 541
- Revolutionary Workers Movement (Colombia), 187; (El Salvador), 366
- Revolutionary Workers Nucleus (Guatemala), 412
- Revolutionary Workers Party (POR) (Bolivia), 41, 44
- “Revolution in Liberty” (Chile), 137
- Revolution 1895 (Ecuador), 290–91

- Revolution of 1910 (Mexico), 534
 Revolution of 1930 (Brazil), 74, 86, 94, 97, 116
 Revolution of 1946 (Haiti), 454, 459–60
 Revolution of 1952 (Bolivia), 41, 44, 46, 50, 54, 56
 Reyes, Carlos, 494
 Reyes, General Walter López, 465
 Reyes, Luis Bedoya, 626
 Reynolds Bauxite Company, 438
 Rhodakanaty, Plotino C., 516, 526, 542, 543
 Riani, Clodschmidt, 109, 112, 121
 Richard, Yves-Antoine, 452
 Richards, A. F., 504
 Richardson, Leigh, 28, 32
 Right-to-strike, 42, 81, 219, 221, 373, 399, 609
 RILU (Chile), *See* Red International of Labor Unions
 Río, Carlos Arroyo del, 292
 Rio de Janeiro Union of Hotel Workers (Brazil), 110
 Rio Lindo Textile Factory, 466, 475
 Rios, Antonio, 740
 Rios, Francisco Pérez, 530, 538, 544, 545
 Riots, 26, 33, 435, 506, 619, 661, 693
 Rivas, José Guillermo, 317
 Rivera, Colonel Julio Alberto, 312–14, 326, 327, 349, 350, 355, 368
 Rivera, Ismael, 678
 Rivera, Luis Muñoz, 668
 Rivero, José Luis Bustamante y, 611, 634
 Riviérez, Hector, 390
 Robalino, Dr. Isabel, 293
 Rodegno, Edgardo Zuñiga, 486
 Rodil, Carlos Tinoco, 732
 Rodríguez, Augusto A., 288
 Rodríguez, Hector, 709, 718, 724
 Rodríguez, Modesto, 346
 Rodríguez, Silvino, 546
 Rodríguez, Reyes, 488
 Rojas, Guillermo, 323, 377
 Rojas, Jorge Carillo, 184
 Roldos, Jaime, 305
 Romero, Archbishop Oscar, 317, 331, 343, 358
 Romero, Arturo, 310, 362
 Romero, General Carlos Humberto, 317, 331, 358, 369
 Romualdi, Serafino, 311, 312, 349, 400, 401, 416, 451, 457, 611, 634–35, 732
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 398, 669, 674
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 673, 682
 Rosa, Diógenes de la, 585
 Rosa, Ramón, 468
 Rosales, Adolfo, 31
 Rosario Resource Mining Corporation, 467, 469
 Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 2
 Rosell, Teobaldo, 286
 Ruíz, Donald Alvarez, 405
 Ruocoo, Juana, 706
 Rural Orientation Service of Pernambuco (Brazil), 125
 Rural Worker's Committee, (CTC) (Nicaragua), 553, 559, 571
 Rural Workers Federation (FTC) (El Salvador), 331, 367
 Rural Workers Union (UTC) (El Salvador), 315, 316, 317, 319, 331, 367, 383
 Rusland, J., 696
 Russian Revolution, 181, 365, 585, 707
 Saad, Pedro, 294
 Saavdra, Bautista, 39, 40, 51
 Sabrosa, Arturo, 611, 613, 634, 646, 652, 660
 Sacasa, Juan Batista, 570
 Sacco and Vanzetti, 723
 Sacos Cuscatlán Factory Workers Union (El Salvador), 337, 358, 367
 Sada, Napoleón Gómez, 539
 SADIF (Dominican Republic). *See* Autonomous Labor Union of the Pharmaceutical Industry
 Saénz Peña Law, 1912, 3
 Sagasta, Mateo Práxedes, 668
 SAIP (Ecuador). *See* Artistic and Industrial Society of Pinchincha
 Salamanca, Daniel, 41
 Salazar, Dina, 301

- Salenas, P. B. Pérez, 731
- Salgado, Salustio, 547
- Salvador, David, 263
- Salvadoran Agrarian Transformation Institute (ISTA), 318, 339, 347, 353, 369, 370–71
- Salvadoran Association of Democratic Indians, 372
- Salvadoran Communal Union (UCS), 314–15, 317–19, 322, 332, 336, 338–42, 350, 360–61, 363, 367–71, 380
- Salvadoran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives (FECORASAL), 341, 343
- Salvadoran Industrialists Society (ASI), 326
- Salvadoran Labor Party (PLS), 308, 309, 365, 385
- Salvadoran National Indigenous Association (ANIS), 328, 338, 341, 364, 369, 371–72
- Salvadoran National Security Agency (ANSESAL), 314–16, 318, 353, 360–61, 382
- Salvadoran Teachers Federation, 355
- Salvadoran Telephone Workers Association (ASTTEL), 328, 344, 372–73
- Salvadoran Trade Union Reorganizing Committee (CROSS), 311, 337, 348, 360, 372, 373
- Salvadoran Trade Union Unity Committee (CUSS), 312, 332, 373, 382
- Salvadoran Workers Central (CTS), 330, 338, 341, 364, 374
- Salvadoran Workers Trade Union Federation (FESTRAS), 330, 345, 374, 381
- Salvadoran Workers Union, 385
- Salvatierra, Sofonias, 570
- SAMF (Guatemala). *See* Union for Action and Betterment of Railway Workers
- SAML (Honduras). *See* Autonomous Syndicate of La Lima Mechanics
- Sanabria, Archbishop Victor, Manuel, 221, 229–32
- Sánchez, Florêncio, 706
- Sánchez, Rafael, 372
- Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) (Nicaragua), 549, 552, 554–56, 559, 563, 565–66, 569–75
- Sandinista Revolution (Nicaragua), 564
- Sandinista Workers Central José Benito Escobar (CST) (Nicaragua), 553, 555–56, 560, 565, 567, 571–75
- Sandinista Workers Defense Committees (CDTS) (Nicaragua), 572
- Sandino, Augusto César, 219, 308, 550, 557, 568
- Sandoval, Rigoberto, 485
- Sandys, Duncan, 437
- Sanguinetti, Julio Maria, 714, 715
- Sanjinés, Juna, 50
- San José Artisans Society, 239
- Santa Ana Municipal Workers Association (ATRAMSA) (El Salvador), 344
- Santa Clara massacre (Honduras), 487
- Santa Maria de Iquique massacre (Chile), 147
- Santa Mercedes (El Salvador), 337
- Santos-Jundiaí Railroad Workers Union (Brazil), 98
- São Paulo Bank Workers, 101
- São Paulo Electricians Union (Brazil), 122
- São Paulo Gas Company, 119
- São Paulo Labor Federation (Brazil), 73, 103, 118
- São Paulo Metalworkers, 104, 120, 122, 124
- São Paulo Metalworkers Union (Brazil), 107, 119
- São Paulo Proletarian Defense Committee (Brazil), 119
- São Paulo Typographic Center (Brazil), 120
- São Paulo Typographic Guild (Brazil), 120
- Saravia, Rafael "Chele" Fernández (El Salvador), 312, 349
- "Sargento Candelaria" Federation, 156, 158
- Sarnay, José, 68, 71
- Sawmill and Forest Worker's Union (Guyana), 444, 445
- SCAAS (Nicaragua). *See* Union of Car-

- penters, Bricklayers, Assembly Workers and Allied Trades
- SCTM (Guatemala). *See* Central Union of Municipal Workers
- SCU (Belize). *See* Southern Christian Workers Union
- Seafarers International Union (SIU), 675, 681, 685, 688
- Seafarers International Union of Puerto Rico (SIU-PR), 687, 688
- Seaga, Edward, 498
- SEC. *See* Costa Rican Educators Union
- Seco, Héctor, 720
- Second National Conference of Peasants and Agricultural Workers, 1985 (Brazil), 125
- Secret Anticommunist Army (ESA) (Guatemala), 405
- Secret police (DINA) (Chile), 140
- Secuestro y Capucha*, 373
- Segebath, Herman, 468
- SELSA (El Salvador). *See* "Lido, S.A." Workers Union
- Serpa, Gustavo, 189
- Serrano, Apolinario "Polin," 331
- Service Employees International Union (El Salvador), 367
- Service Station Attendants Union (Jamaica), 503
- SETAS (El Salvador). *See* Water and Sewage National Administration Workers Union
- Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*, 609
- SGT (Panama). *See* General Union of Workers
- SGTICES (El Salvador). *See* Construction Industry Workers General Union.
- Shanker, Albert, 320
- Shanty towns, 580, 611
- Sharecroppers and Peasants Federation of Peru, 658–59
- Shea, Cornelius P., 685
- Sheinkman, Jack, 321
- Shell Oil Company, 546
- Shipyards' Labor Association of Astillero (Ecuador), 303
- Shoe Industry Workers Union (Panama), 579, 587
- Shoemaker's Alliance (Brazil), 85, 86, 120
- Shoemakers Federation (Chile), 174
- Shoemakers League (Brazil), 86, 104, 120
- Shoemakers Union (Costa Rica), 238, 239
- SIC (Venezuela), 736
- SICAFA (El Salvador). *See* Coffee Industry Union
- SIDELCA (Colombia). *See* Union of Workers of Catatumbo
- Siderperu Defense Front (Peru), 625
- SIDPA (El Salvador). *See* Confections and Pastas Industry Union.
- Sierra, Toribio, 652
- SIES (El Salvador). *See* Electrical Industry Workers Union
- SIGEBAN (El Salvador). *See* Banking and Savings and Loan General Industry Employees Union
- Siles Zuazo, Hernán (Bolivia). *See* Zuazo, General Hernán Siles
- Silva, General Artur da Costa e, 69, 101, 104, 113
- Silva, José Inácio da ("Lula"), 82, 105, 106, 107
- Silva, Lindolfo, 109, 125
- Silva, Osvaldo Pacheco da, 114
- SIMAS (El Salvador). *See* Furniture Industry Workers Union
- SIMCOS (Guatemala). *See* Union of Media and Newspaper Workers
- Simeon Corrales, 475
- Simón Bolívar Brigade (Nicaragua), 572
- SINAMOS (Peru). *See* Social Mobilization National Support System
- Sindicato Autónomo de Mecánicos de la Lima (Honduras). *See* Autonomous Syndicate of La Lima Mechanics
- Sindicato Central de Trabajadores Municipales (Guatemala). *See* Central Union of Municipal Workers
- Sindicato Central Obrero de Colombia. *See* Central Workers' Union of Colombia

- Sindicato de Bavaria (Colombia). *See* Union of Bavaria Breweries
- Sindicato de Braceros de Buenaventura (Colombia). *See* Union of Dock Laborers of Buenaventura
- Sindicato de Carpinteros, Albañiles, Armadores, y Similares (Nicaragua). *See* Union of Carpenters, Bricklayers, Assembly Workers, and Allied Trades
- Sindicato de Ebanistas y Carpinteros (Costa Rica). *See* Cabinetmakers and Carpenters Union
- Sindicato de Educadores Costarricenses. *See* Costa Rican Educators Union
- Sindicato de Empresa de Trabajadores de la United Fruit Company (Guatemala). *See* Union of Workers at United Fruit Company
- Sindicato de Empresa Trabajadores Refinería Azúcar Salvadoreña, S.A. *See* "Azucar Salvadoreña" Refinery Workers Union
- Sindicato de Funcionarios Públicos del Ministerio de Educación (Venezuela). *See* Union of Public Functionaries of the Minister of Education
- Sindicato de la Construcción del Distrito Federal y Estado Miranda (Venezuela). *See* Construction Union of the Federal District and State of Miranda
- Sindicato de la Industria Eléctrica de El Salvador. *See* Electrical Industry Workers Union
- Sindicato de la Industria Pesquera (El Salvador). *See* Fishing Industry Union
- Sindicato de Obreros Agrícolas (Colombia). *See* Union of Agricultural Workers
- Sindicato de Obreros Albñiles, Cemento Armado y Anexos (Argentina). *See* Union of Building, Cement, and Excavation Workers
- Sindicato de Obreros Panificadores de El Salvador. *See* Bakery Industry Workers Union
- Sindicato de Telefonistas de la República Mexicana. *See* Union of Telephone Workers of the Mexican Republic
- Sindicato de Tipógrafos (Costa Rica). *See* Typographers Union
- Sindicato de Tipógrafos de Bogotá (Colombia). *See* Printers' Union of Bogota
- Sindicato de Tipógrafos y Trabajadores de las Artes Gráficas (Panama). *See* Typographers and Graphic Arts Workers Union
- Sindicato de Trabajadores Agropecuarios, Similares y Conexos Salvadoreño. *See* Agricultural Workers Union of El Salvador
- Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros de Izabel (Guatemala). *See* Union of Banana Workers of Izabel
- Sindicato de Trabajadores Bancarios (Venezuela). *See* Bank Workers Union
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de Compañías de Seguros (Venezuela). *See* Union of Insurance Company Workers
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de Empresa Comisión Ejecutiva Hidroeléctrica. *See* Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission Workers and Employees Union
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de INCASA (Guatemala). *See* Union of Workers at INCASA
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de INDEGUA (Guatemala). *See* Union of Workers at INDEGUA
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Chiriqui Land Company (Panama). *See* Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación en Guatemala. *See* Union of Workers in Education in Guatemala
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Embotelladora Central (Union of Workers at the Embotelladora Central) (Guatemala). *See* Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Embotelladora Guatemalteca (Guatemala). *See* Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Frontino

- Gold Mines (Colombia). *See* Workers' Union of the Frontino Gold Mines
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria del Pan, Similares y Conexos de El Salvador. *See* Bakery Industry Workers Union
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Standard Fruit Company (Honduras). *See* Standard Fruit Company Workers Union
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Tela Railroad Company (Honduras). *See* Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad de San Carlos (Guatemala). *See* Union of Workers at the University of San Carlos
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de las Bananeras Independientes de Chiriqui (Panama). *See* Union of Workers of Independent Banana Farms of Chiriqui
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de Licorera y Esfuerzo (Guatemala). *See* Union of Light and Power Workers
- Sindicato de Trabajadores del Catatumbo (Colombia). *See* Union of Workers of Catatumbo
- Sindicato de Trabajadores del Ferrocarril at Atlántico (Costa Rica). *See* Union of Atlantic Railroad Workers
- Sindicato de Trabajadores del Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social (Guatemala). *See* Union of Social Security Workers
- Sindicato de Trabajadores de los Medios de Comunicación Social (Guatemala). *See* Union of Media and Newspaper Workers
- Sindicato de Trabajadores Electricistas de la República Mexicana. *See* Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic
- Sindicato de Trabajadores Electricistas de la República Mexicana. *See* Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic
- Sindicato de Trabajadores Fábrica de Aceites y Grasas El Dorado (El Salvador). *See* "El Dorado" Edible Oil and Fats Factory Workers
- Sindicato de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros de la República Mexicana. *See* Union of Railroad Workers of the Mexican Republic
- Sindicato de Trabajadores Organizados del Petróleo (Venezuela). *See* Union of Organized Petroleum Workers
- Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la República Mexicana. *See* Union of Petroleum Workers of the Mexican Republic
- Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de São Paulo (Brazil). *See* São Paulo Metal Workers Union
- Sindicato dos Trabalhadores na Indústria Gráfica (Brazil). *See* Union of Graphic Industry Workers
- Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e de Material Elétrico de São Bernardo (Brazil). *See* Metallurgical, Mechanical, and Electrical Workers Union of São Bernardo
- Sindicato Ferroviario del Pacífico (Colombia). *See* Railroad Union of the Pacific
- Sindicato General de Costureras (El Salvador). *See* Garment Workers General Union
- Sindicato General de Trabajadores (Panama). *See* General Union of Workers
- Sindicato Industrial de Dulces y Pastas Alimenticias (El Salvador). *See* Confections and Pastas Industry Union
- Sindicato Industrial del Ferrocarril de Antioquia (Colombia). *See* Industrial Union of Antioquia
- Sindicato Industrial de Trabajadores de Productores Independientes (Panama). *See* Industrial Union of Workers of the Independent Banana Growers
- Sindicato Industrial de Trabajadores del Azúcar, sus Derivados, y Afines (Panama). *See* Industrial Union of Cane Workers
- Sindicato Libre de Trabajadores del Cen-

- tral Romana (Dominican Republic). *See* Free Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana
- Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas. *See* Mexican Electrical Workers Union
- Sindicato Nacional de Electricistas, Similares y Conexos (Mexico). *See* National Union of Electrical Workers
- Sindicato Nacional de la Educación (Mexico). *See* National Union of Teachers
- Sindicato Nacional de Obreras de la Aguja (Colombia). *See* National Union of Female Needle Workers
- Sindicato Nacional de Obreros de la Industria Azucarera (Cuba). *See* National Sugar Industry Workers' Union
- Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores del Calzado, Cuero, y Similares (Costa Rica). *See* National Union of Shoe and Leather Workers
- Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalúrgicos, y Similares de la República Mexicana. *See* Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic
- Sindicato Obrero (Colombia). *See* Workers' Union
- Sindicato Obrero de la Industria Metalúrgica (Argentina). *See* Union of Workers in the Metallurgic Industry
- Sindicato Obrero del Guayas (Ecuador). *See* Guayas Labor Union
- Sindicato Obrero "La Internacional" (Ecuador), 301
- Sindicato de Talleres (Argentina). *See* Union of Workshops
- Sindicatos libres* (Chile), defined, 132
- Sindicato Textil de Trabajadores "Industrias Unidas, S.A." (El Salvador). *See* "Industrias Unidas, S. A." Textile Workers Union
- Sindicato Textil Vitarte (Peru). *See* Vitarte Textile Union
- Sindicato Único de Obrera en Madera (Argentina). *See* Sole Union of Wood Workers
- Sindicato Único de Obreros Marítimos (Uruguay). *See* Sole Union of Maritime Workers
- Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Industria Siderúrgica (Venezuela). *See* Single Union of Steel Industry Workers
- Sindicato Único de Trabajadores del Hierro (Venezuela). *See* Single Union of Iron Workers
- Sindicato Único de Trabajadores en la Educación de Perú. *See* Unified Teachers Union of Peru
- Sindicato Único de Trabajadores Textiles del Distrito Federal y Estado Miranda (Venezuela). *See* Single Union of Textile Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda
- Sindicato Único Nacional de Trabajadores de la Construcción y Similares (Panama). *See* Singular National Union of Construction Workers
- Sindicato Unión de Trabajadores de la Construcción (El Salvador). *See* Construction Workers Union
- SINEPUDERH (Honduras). *See* Public Employees in Rural Education
- Single Confederation of Workers (CUT) (Colombia), 185, 202
- Single Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela, 731
- Single Textile Union of the State of Aragua (Venezuela), 753
- Single Union of Textile Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda (SUTRATEx) (Venezuela), 742, 753
- Single Union of Bank Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda (Venezuela), 749
- Single Union of Iron Workers (SUTRA-HIERRO) (Venezuela), 746, 749, 750
- Single Union of Steel Industry Workers (SUTISS) (Venezuela), 746, 750
- Single Working Center (Uruguay), 711
- Singular National Union of Construction Workers (SUNTRACS) (Panama), 589-90
- SIP (El Salvador). *See* Fishing Industry Union
- Siqueiros, David Alfaro, 545

- SITAS. *See* Agricultural Workers Union of El Salvador
- SITRABANAFOM (Honduras). *See* National Development Bank Workers Union
- SITRABE (Guatemala). *See* Union of Banana Workers of Izabel
- SITRACHILCO (Panama). *See* Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company
- SITRATEL (Honduras). *See* Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers
- SIU. *See* Seafarers International Union
- SIU-PR. *See* Seafarers International Union of Puerto Rico
- SL (Dominican Republic). *See* Free Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana
- Slavery, 63, 389, 433–34, 691; abolition of, Brazil, 64, 65, 72; Guyana, 434; Jamaica, 495; Peru, 608; Puerto Rico, 672
- SLF (Guatemala). *See* Union of Light and Power Workers
- SME. *See* Mexican Electrical Workers Union
- Smith, Edward, 508
- Smith, Ferdinand, 505
- SNESC (Mexico). *See* National Union of Electrical Workers
- SNI (Peru). *See* National Industries Society
- SNOIA (Cuba). *See* National Sugar Industry Workers' Union
- SNTE (Mexico). *See* National Union of Teachers
- SNTMMSRM. *See* National Union of Mining, Metallurgical, and Similar Workers of the Mexican Republic
- Soberanis, Antonio, 26, 27, 33
- Social Christian Party (PSC) (Nicaragua), 569–70
- Social Christian Peasant Association of Honduras, 491
- Social Christian Revolutionary Party (PRSC) (Dominican Republic), 269, 273
- Social Democratic Party (PSD) (Brazil), 67, 97, 98; (Nicaragua), 562
- Social Hour* (Brazil), 117
- Socialist Action Party (PASO) (Costa Rica), 232
- Socialist Center (Costa Rica), 218
- Socialist Democratic Party (Guatemala), 414
- Socialist Falangist Party of Bolivia (FSB), 47
- Socialist International (Jamaica), 497
- Socialist Labor Party (Cuba), 246
- Socialist Party: (Argentina), 3, 18; (Chile), 130, 136, 139, 153; (Ecuador), 299; (Panama), 585; (Peru), 610, 646, 652
- Socialist Party of Puerto Rico, 673, 683
- Socialist Revolutionary Party (Honduras), 471
- Socialist Worker Party (POS) (Chile), 150
- Socialist Workers Party (POS, 1912) (Chile), 151
- Socialist Workers Party (United States), 682
- Socialist Worker Unification (Guatemala), 431
- Social Mobilization National Support System (SINAMOS) (Peru), 616, 620, 630, 657, 664
- Social Security Institute Workers Union (El Salvador) (STISSS), 319, 344, 364, 376–78, 380
- Social security systems, 79, 80, 109, 217, 221, 237, 292
- Sociedad “la Union” (Ecuador). *See* “Unity” Society
- Sociedad “Union de Panaderos” (Ecuador). *See* “Bakers’ Unity” Society
- Sociedad Artística e Industrial del Pichincha (Ecuador). *See* Artistic and Industrial Society of Pichincha
- Sociedad Artística Industrial (Mexico). *See* Artistic Industrial Society
- Sociedade de Resistência dos Trabalhadores em Trapiche e Café (Brazil). *See* Resistance Society of Waterfront Warehouse and Coffee Workers

- Sociedades de resistencia* (Chile); defined, 130
- Sociedades de Socorros (Costa Rica). *See* Societies for Assistance
- Sociedades mutualistas* (Chile), defined, 130
- Sociedad de Artesanos "Amantes del Progreso" (Ecuador). *See* "Lovers of Progress" Artisans Society
- Sociedad de Artesanos de San José (Costa Rica). *See* San José Artisans Society
- Sociedad de Artesanos de Sonsón (Colombia). *See* Artisans' Society of Sonson
- Sociedad de Auxilio Mutuo Ferrocarrilero (Guatemala). *See* Union for Action and Betterment of Railway Workers
- Sociedad de Carpinteros (Ecuador). *See* Society of Carpenters
- Sociedad de Empleados de Comercio (Chile). *See* Society of Commercial Employees
- Sociedad de Igualdad (Chile). *See* Equality Society
- Sociedad de Maestros Sastres "Unión y Progreso" (Ecuador). *See* "Unity and Progress" Master Tailors Society
- Sociedad de Obreros (Dominican Republic). *See* Society of Workers
- Sociedad de Protección Recíproca de Abastecedores del Mercado (Ecuador). *See* Market Provisioners Mutual Aid Society
- Sociedad de Resistencia de Obreros Panaderos (Argentina). *See* Bakery Workers Resistance Society
- Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de la Música (Costa Rica). *See* Musicians Mutual Assistance Society
- Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos, Instrucción y Recreo "Hijos del Trabajo" (Ecuador). *See* "Sons of Labor" Mutual Aid, Instruction and Recreation Society
- Sociedad de Tipógrafos del Guayas (Ecuador). *See* Typographers Society of Guayas
- Sociedad de Vivanderos (Ecuador). *See* Market Vendors Society
- Sociedad Obreros El Porvenir (Bolivia). *See* Workers Society of El Porvenir
- Sociedad Protectora del Artesano (Ecuador). *See* Protector of the Artisan Society
- Sociedad Tipográfica Bonarense (Argentina). *See* Typographical Society of Buenos Aires
- Sociedad Unión Obreros (Colombia). *See* Unity Society of Workers
- Sociedad Venezolana de Maestros de Instrucción Primaria. *See* Venezuelan Society of Primary School Teachers
- Societies for Assistance (Costa Rica), 215
- Society for Individual Self-Help (Mexico), 536
- Society for Mutual Aid (Mexico), 543
- Society of Artisans (Dominican Republic), 266
- Society of Artisans of Valparaiso (Chile), 146
- Society of Arts and Trades (Costa Rica), 215
- Society of Carpenters (Ecuador), 304
- Society of Commercial Employees (Chile), 174
- Society of Laborers and Artisans (Colombia), 209
- Society of Mutual Aid Among Instructors and Instructresses (Chile), 146
- Society of Workers (Dominican Republic), 281, 285
- Society Sons of Labor (Panama), 578, 592
- SOIM (Argentina). *See* Union of Workers in the Metallurgic Industry
- Sole Central of Workers (CUT) (Mexico), 520, 528, 530, 539, 543, 545-46
- Sole Confederation of Workers (Mexico), 540
- Sole National Union of University Workers (SUNTU) (Mexico), 543
- Sole Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), 57-59
- Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the

- Mexican Republic (SUTERM), 538, 541, 544–45
- Sole Union of Maritime Workers (Uruguay), 721, 723
- Sole Union of Wood Workers (Argentina), 21
- Sole Workers Central (CUT) (Brazil), 84, 94, 120–122; (Panama), 581
- Solidaridad* (Mexico), 541
- Solis, Angel Olivo, 541
- Solomayor, Asunción, 645
- Solorzano, Richard Martínez, 427
- Somos* (“We Are”) (Nicaragua), 569
- Somoza, Anastasio (Nicaragua). *See* De-bayle, Anastasio “Tachito” Somoza
- “Sons of Labor” Mutual Aid, Instruction and Recreation Society (Ecuador), 296, 301, 304
- SOT (Haiti). *See* Union of Laborers and Workers
- Soto, General Bernardo, 215
- Soto, Marcos Aurelio, 468, 469
- Southern Christian Workers Union (SCU) (Belize), 34, 35
- Southern Peru Copper Corporation, 622, 654, 655
- South Porto Rico Sugar Company, 270, 286
- Souza, Vincente Ferreira de, 128
- Soviet Union, 320, 494, 588
- Spalding, Hobart, 520
- Spanish-American War, 257, 673, 681
- Spanish Center (Brazil), 103
- Spanish Civil War, 718
- Spanish Liberal Party, 668
- SPAUNAM (Mexico). *See* Sole National Union of University Workers
- SPP. *See* Journalists Syndicate of Paraguay
- Squatters, 580, 595, 601, 621
- Standard Fruit Company, 459, 460, 463, 467, 469, 477, 491, 493
- Standard Fruit Company Workers Union (SUTRASFCO) (Honduras), 472, 491, 492, 493
- Standard Oil of New Jersey, 180, 192, 203, 208, 210, 546
- Stanley, Norman, 496
- State and Municipal Workers Coordinating Council (CCTEM) (El Salvador), 323, 330, 334, 336, 363, 377–78
- States of siege, 117, 124, 126, 310, 318, 332, 338, 369, 409, 452
- Statem (Suriname), 692, 698
- STECCEL (El Salvador). *See* Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission Workers and Employees Union
- Steel Workers Organizing Committee (Puerto Rico), 688
- Steelworkers National Federation of Peru, 635
- STEG. *See* Union of Workers in Education in Guatemala
- STEGAC (Guatemala). *See* Union of Workers at Embotelladora Guatemalteca
- Sterling, Kenneth, 506
- STERM. *See* Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic
- STEUFECO (Guatemala). *See* Union of Workers at United Fruit Company
- STEUNAM (Mexico). *See* Sole National Union of University Workers
- STFRM. *See* Union of Railroad Workers of the Mexican Republic
- STIGSS (Guatemala). *See* Union of Social Security Workers
- STIMMES (El Salvador). *See* Mechanics and Metal Industry Workers Union
- STISSS (El Salvador). *See* Social Security Institute Workers Union
- STITAS (El Salvador). *See* Cotton and Synthetics Textile Industry Workers Union
- STOP (Venezuela). *See* Union of Organized Petroleum Workers
- STPRM. *See* Union of Petroleum Workers of the Mexican Republic
- Strasma, John, 368
- Street, Jorge, 90, 126
- Strikes, by country: Argentina, 7, 9, 15; Belize, 28, 29, 32, 34, 35; Bolivia, 49; Brazil, 73, 81, 82, 88, 93, 102, 103, 105, 113, 114; Chile, 138, 144; Colombia, 181, 202, 205, 210; Ecuador, 291, 296, 304; El Salvador, 308,

- 311, 313, 317, 319, 322–23, 327, 329, 337, 342, 350, 352–62, 365–66, 372–73, 377, 384–86; Guatemala, 404, 405, 417, 421, 426; Guyana, 435, 436, 441, 444, 460; Honduras, 466, 470, 493; Mexico, 516, 517, 519, 522, 523, 526, 535, 536, 543, 548; Nicaragua, 550, 555, 557, 571–72; Paraguay, 597, 604, 605; Puerto Rico, 684; Peru, 609, 613, 620, 622, 647, 649, 650, 653, 654, 655; Suriname, 696; Uruguay, 705; Venezuela, 731, 742
- Strikes, general: Argentina, 8, 14, 20, 23, 24; Chile, 131, 136, 161, 173, 177; Bolivia, 40, 42, 46, 48, 50, 55, 56; Colombia, 184, 198, 199, 202; Costa Rica, 218, 234, 235; Cuba, 247, 258, 260, 261, 263; Ecuador, 291; El Salvador, 309, 310, 313, 319, 325–27, 338, 348, 354, 362, 373, 380; Guatemala, 398; Guyana, 442; Honduras, 475; Mexico, 521, 531, 534, 536; Nicaragua, 554; Panama, 582, 586; Paraguay, 599, 605; Peru, 621, 625, 629, 633, 637, 648, 649, 650, 651, 658, 660, 661, 663; Suriname, 693; Uruguay, 714, 722; Venezuela, 729, 731, 732, 749
- Strikes, types of: agrarian (Nicaragua), 550, (Peru), 658; aluminum (Venezuela), 745; bakery workers (El Salvador), 311; banana workers (Colombia), 199, (Costa Rica), 220, 224, 232, 241, (Honduras), 464, 472, 491–92, (Panama) 581; canal workers (Panama), 578; cement (Brazil), 113; civil service (Belize), 28, 34; coffee workers (El Salvador), 309, 387; construction workers (Brazil), 82, (Nicaragua), 553; customs officers (Suriname), 693; dockworkers (Colombia) 196, (Cuba) 246, (Guyana), 435; maritime (Brazil), 79, 124, 128; meat workers (Argentina), 15; metal workers (Brazil), 71, 81, 82, 99, 107, 113, 122, (Suriname), 692; miners (Bolivia), 54–55, (Chile), 155–56, (Guatemala), 428, (Suriname), 698; petroleum workers (Colombia), 199, 203, (Mexico), 520, (Venezuela), 729, 731, 755; police (Guyana), 435, (Suriname), 693; postal workers (El Salvador), 323, 355, 378; printers (Brazil), 100; railroad (Brazil), 79, 100, 116, 118, (Colombia), 194, (El Salvador), 310, (Mexico), 534, (Uruguay), 707; shoemakers (Brazil), 86, 100, (Venezuela), 728; steel (Venezuela), 746; sugar workers (Argentina), 21, 22, 23, 24, (Cuba), 246, (Dominican Republic), 267, 285, (Guyana), 433, 437, 443, (Panama), 581, 586, teachers (Costa Rica), 236, (El Salvador), 382, (Guatemala), 403, 423, 430, (Honduras), 490, (Nicaragua), 553, 570, 574, (Peru), 617; telegraph (Venezuela), 745; telephone (Mexico), 513, 547; textile (Brazil), 99, 122, 126, (El Salvador), 311, 313, (Peru), 645, 661, 663, (Uruguay), 724; tobacco workers (Mexico), 533; transport workers (Brazil), 117, (El Salvador), 313, (Guatemala), 423, 430, (Jamaica), 505
- STRM. *See* Union of Telephone Workers of the Mexican Republic
- Stroessner, General Alfredo, 599, 601
- Struggle Committee for Guild Unification (Peru), 660
- STTIUSA (El Salvador). *See* “Industrias Unidas, S.A.” Textile Workers Union
- STUSC (Guatemala). *See* Union of Workers at the University of San Carlos
- SU (Dominican Republic). *See* United Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana
- Suárez, Colonel Hugo Banzer, 40, 47, 48, 49, 55, 56, 57, 59
- Suárez, Mario, 540
- SUCAM (Venezuela). *See* Peasants Supplies Company
- SUCEPES (El Salvador). *See* Letter Carrier and Postal Employees Union Society of El Salvador
- Sugar industry, 243, 265, 286, 436, 438, 442–43, 445, 502

- Sugar Refinery Workers Union (El Salvador), 378
- Sugar Workers Federation of Peru, 635, 656, 658, 659
- SUNTRACS (Panama). *See* Singular National Union of Construction Workers
- SUNTU (Mexico). *See* Sole National Union of University Workers
- Suralco bauxite plant, 696
- Suramericana, 196
- Surinaamse Bauxiet En Metalwerkers Federatie. *See* Suriname Bauxite and Metalworkers Federation
- Surinaamse Werknemers Moederbond. *See* Suriname Workers' Federation
- Suriname, 433; aluminum industry in, 691–92; enterprises in (ALCOA, 692; Suralco bauxite plant, 696); labor publications in, *CLO-Bulletin*, 693; racial tensions in, 693, 694; riots in (1973), 693; slavery in, 691; strikes in, 696 (customs officers, 693; general, 693; metal workers, 692; miners, 698; police, 693); World War II and, 698
- Suriname Bauxite and Metalworkers Federation, 698
- Suriname Labor Party (LPS), 692–93, 698
- Suriname Miners Union (MB), 692, 698
- Suriname National Party (NPS), 692, 693, 697–98
- Suriname Union (US), 691, 698
- Suriname Workers Federation (SWM), 692, 698
- Suriname Workers Union (SWB), 692, 698, 699
- SUTC (El Salvador). *See* Construction Workers Union
- SUTE (Chile). *See* Education Workers Union
- SUTEP. *See* Unified Teachers Union of Peru, 616–17, 623, 631, 648, 659, 661
- SUTERM. *See* Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic
- SUTISS (Peru). *See* Single Union of Steel Industry Workers
- SUTRABANC (Venezuela). *See* Single Union of Bank Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda
- SUTRAHIERRO (Venezuela). *See* Single Union of Iron Workers
- SUTRASFCO (Honduras). *See* Standard Fruit Company Workers Union
- SUTRATEx (Venezuela). *See* Single Union of Textile Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda
- SVMIP. *See* Venezuelan Society of Primary School Teachers
- SWB. *See* Suriname Workers Union
- SWM. *See* Suriname Workers Federation
- Syndical Confederation of Uruguay (CSU), 710, 712, 718, 723, 725
- Syndical Federation of the Central Part of the Country (FESICENTRO) (Honduras), 475
- Syndical Federation of the Valley (Colombia), 192
- Syndical Union of Uruguay (USU), 707, 708, 723–25
- Syndical Union of Workers (UST) (Brazil), 94, 95, 97, 98, 120–21
- Syndicat des Chauffeurs de Cap Haitien (Haiti). *See* Union of Chauffeurs of Cap Haitien
- Syndicat des Chauffeurs de Port-Au-Prince (Haiti). *See* Union of Chauffeurs of Port-Au-Prince
- Syndicat des Marins des Batiments de Commerce Haitien. *See* Union of Sailors of Haitian Commercial Vessels
- Syndicat des Marins et Débardeurs de Cap Haitien (Haiti). *See* Union of Sailors and Longshoremen of Cap Haitien
- Syndicat des Travailleurs de la HASCO (Haiti). *See* Union of Workers of the Haitian American Sugar Company (HASCO)
- Syndicat des Travailleurs des Débardeurs et Agences Maritimes (Haiti). *See* Union of Workers of Longshore and Shipping Agencies
- Syndicat d'Imprimerie de Port-Au-Prince (Haiti). *See* Printing Trades Union of Port-Au-Prince
- Syndicato des Ouvriers et Travailleurs

- (Haiti). *See* Union of Laborers and Workers
- Taft-Hartley Act, 678
- Talleres (Peru), 608
- Tambos (Uruguay), defined, 710
- Tastón, José, 728
- Taxi Drivers Union of Buenos Aires (Argentina), 21
- Tax Office Employees Association (Costa Rica), 218
- Taylor, E. L., 504
- TD (Mexico). *See* Democratic Tendency
- Teacher Unity Front (FUMH) (Honduras), 489, 490
- Teachers Association (Chile), 157
- Teachers Union (Chile), 157
- Teachers United (Costa Rica), 236
- Teachers Unity Front (Costa Rica), 225, 231, 237, 240
- Team Drivers International Union, 685
- Teamsters (United States), 687
- Tejada, Julio César, 336
- Telecommunications Workers Syndicate (SITRATEL) (Honduras), 475, 476
- Telegraphic Postal Institute (IPOSTEL) (Venezuela), 751, 752
- Tenants League (Chile), 174, 175
- Tendencia Democrática (Mexico). *See* Democratic Tendency
- Terpe, Keith, 681, 688
- Texas Instruments Workers Union (El Salvador), 366, 378
- Textile and Clothing Workers Federation (Chile), 154, 163, 168, 175
- Textile Block (Bloco Textil) (Brazil), 126
- Textile Coordinating Commission (Peru), 661
- Textile Factory Workers Federation (Brazil), 122
- Textile Industry Union (El Salvador), 346, 379
- Textile Industry Workers Union of El Salvador, 348
- Textile Labor Congress (COT) (Uruguay), 711, 721, 723, 725
- Textile Union (Peru), 640
- Textile Union Federation (FESIN-TEXSICA) (El Salvador), 312, 341, 344, 350, 352, 378-79
- Textile Workers Federation of Peru (FTTP), 612, 622, 635, 652, 657, 659, 660-61, 663
- Textile Workers Union (UDT) (Argentina), 5, 10, 21, 22
- "The International" Labor Union (Ecuador), 301
- Thesis of Pulcayo (Bolivia), 54; defined, 44, 53
- Thiel, Bishop Bernardo Augusto, 216
- Third International, 94, 117, 585
- Thorne, A. A., 435
- Tiendas da raya (Honduras), defined, 470
- Tierra (Chile), 167
- Tobacco industry (Cuba), 243
- Toledano, Vincente Lombardo, 188, 519, 520, 528, 531, 532, 546, 547, 730
- Ton-Tons Macoutes, 452
- Toro, Colonel David, 42, 58, 59, 61
- Torre, Victor Raul Haya de la, 609, 611, 613, 622, 626, 633-36, 638, 640, 653, 660
- Torres, Eloy, 732, 755
- Torres, General Juan José, 46, 47, 54
- Torrijos, Omar, 578, 580, 581, 582, 585, 587, 591, 592
- Tosta, Ignacio, 90
- Trabajo (Paraguay), 600
- Trade Federation of Workers and Peasants (Panama), 593
- Trade Union Advisory Council (Jamaica), 507, 508
- Trade Union Committee of Central America (Panama), 588
- Trade Union Congress (Belize), 35
- Trade Union Coordinating Committee (CCS), 317, 355, 366, 379
- Trade Union Council (TUC) (Jamaica), 497-99, 503-6, 508
- Trade Union Council of Caribbean Workers, 33, 392, 696-97
- Trade Union Federation of the Central Provinces (Panama), 584
- Trade Union Federation of the Republic of Panama, 580, 587, 588, 590

- Trade Union Federation of Workers and Peasants (Panama), 586, 590
- Trade Union Federation of Workers of the Department of Artibonite (Haiti), 456
- Trade Union Federation of Workers of the Northwest (Haiti), 456
- Trade Union Federation of Workers of the Province of Chiriqui (FESITRA-CHI) (Panama), 580, 583
- Trade Union of Confederation of Guatemala (CONSIGUA), 402
- Trade Unions International of Agricultural, Forestry and Plantation Workers, 393, 444, 393
- Trades Union Council (TUC) (Guyana), 436–38, 441–42, 444–47
- Trans-Isthmian Railroad (Panama), 577
- Transportation Worker's Union (Guyana), 446
- Treasury Ministry Employees General Association (El Salvador), 364
- Treasury Police (El Salvador), 315, 329, 335, 337, 354, 372
- Treaty of Paris (Puerto Rico), 668
- Tribune Bancaria* (Paraguay), 602
- Trienio* (Venezuela), 730, 736, 758
- Trigo, Miguel, 57
- Tripartite Strike Command (El Salvador), 313, 326
- “Triumphant Peasant” Confederation, The (Chile), 156, 162, 168, 175
- Troiani, Andrés, 720
- Troitiño, Adrian, 706, 722
- Troncoso, Father José Maria, 526
- Tropical Oil Company, 203, 208, 210
- Trujillo, Rafael, 267, 268, 276, 277, 281, 284, 285, 287
- Trujillo Railway Company, 470
- Truman, Harry S., 669, 674
- TUC. *See* Trade Union Council (Jamaica); Trades Union Council (Guyana)
- Tugwell, Rexford Guy, 674
- Tupamaros, 702
- Turbay, Julio César, 198
- Turianshi, Vladimir, 712, 725
- Turner, Domingo H., 585
- TWU. *See* Transport Worker's Union
- Typographers and Graphic Arts Workers Union (Panama), 579, 587, 590
- Typographers Association (Costa Rica), 240
- Typographers Confederation (Mexico), 534
- Typographers Guild (Costa Rica), 240
- Typographers Mutual Aid Society (Costa Rica), 240
- Typographers Society of Guayas (Ecuador), 304
- Typographers Society of Santiago (Chile), 146
- Typographers Society of Valparaiso (Chile), 146
- Typographers Union (Costa Rica), 232, 240–41
- Typographical Society of Buenos Aires (Argentina), 3, 22
- Typographical Union (Argentina), 22
- Typographical Workers Federation of Peru, 652, 659
- UAWU (Jamaica). *See* University of Allied Workers Union
- Ubico, Jorge, 396, 398, 430, 431
- Uceda, Luis de la Puente, 640
- UCN (Dominican Republic). *See* National Civic Union
- UCS. *See* Salvadoran Communal Union
- UDEL (Nicaragua). *See* Democratic Union for Liberation
- UDN (El Salvador). *See* Nationalist Democratic Union
- UDP (Bolivia). *See* Democratic Popular Union
- UDT (Argentina). *See* Textile Workers Union
- UECH. *See* Union of Chilean Employees
- UF (Argentina). *See* Railroad Workers Union
- Ugalde, Antonio, 512
- UGN (Bolivia). *See* National Printers Union
- UGOCM. *See* General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico
- UGT. *See* General Union of Workers

- (Argentina; Brazil; Costa Rica; Uruguay; Venezuela)
- UGTD. *See* General Union of Dominican Workers
- ULTAB. *See* Union of Farmers and Agricultural Workers of Brazil
- UMAGUA. *See* Unity of Guatemalan Teachers
- UNACHOSIN. *See* National Union of Independent Unionized Drivers
- UNAG (Nicaragua). *See* National Union of Farmers and Ranchers
- UNC (Honduras). *See* National Peasant Union (Honduras); National Peasants Union (El Salvador)
- UNCAH. *See* National Union of Authentic Peasants of Honduras
- UNE (Nicaragua). *See* National Union of White-Collar Employees
- Unemployment Brigade (Belize), 26, 32, 33
- União Auxiliadora dos Artistas Sapateiros (Brazil). *See* Auxiliary Union of Shoemakers
- União dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores Agrícolas do Brasil. *See* Union of Farmers and Agricultural Workers of Brazil
- União dos Operários em Construção Civil. *See* Union of Civil Construction Workers
- União dos Operários em Engenho de Dentro (Brazil). *See* Union of Workers in Engenho de Dentro
- União dos Operários em Fábricas de Tecidos (Brazil). *See* Union of Textile Factory Workers
- União dos Pintores e Anexos (Brazil). *See* Union of Painters and those in Related Trades
- União dos Trabalhadores Gráficos (Brazil). *See* Graphic Workers Union
- União Geral dos Trabalhadores (Brazil). *See* General Union of Workers
- União Geral dos Trabalhadores em Calçado (Brazil). *See* General Union of Shoemakers
- União Operária e Camponesa (Brazil). *See* Worker and Peasant Unity
- União Regional dos Operários em Construção Civil (Brazil). *See* Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers
- Unidad de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de Guatemala. *See* Union of Guatemalan Workers Unions
- Unidad Magisterial (Costa Rica). *See* Teachers Unity Front
- Unidad Obrero Independiente (Mexico). *See* Independent Worker Unit
- Unification Council of Union Organization (CUOS) (Peru), 619, 620, 638, 639, 661, 665
- Unified Mariateguista Party (PUM) (Peru), 649
- Unified Struggle Command (CUL) (Peru), 620–21, 632, 639, 648, 661
- Unified Teachers Union of Peru (SU-TEP), 616–17
- Unified Union Committee (CSU) (Venezuela), 732
- Unión, La. *See* Dominican Union of Workers
- Union Action and Unity Central (CAUS) (Nicaragua), 554, 557, 564, 566, 567, 572, 573, 574
- Unión Católica Obrera (Mexico). *See* Catholic Worker's Union
- Union Centralist Confederation of Mexico (CSUM), 518, 545
- Unión Cívica Radical (Argentina). *See* Radical Party
- Unión Comunal Salvadoreña. *See* Salvadoran Communal Union
- Union Confederation of Bolivian Workers (CSTB), 42, 53, 57, 59
- Union Confederation of Colombia, 188
- Union Confederation of Guatemala (CONSIGUA), 402, 403, 409, 410, 413, 425, 430
- Union Council of Guatemala (CSG), 401, 425
- Union Council of Workers in the State of Sao Paulo (CST) (Brazil), 88, 94, 102, 115, 123–24
- Unión de Braceros del Puerto de Santo

- Domingo. *See* Port of Santo Domingo Laborers Union
- Unión de Empleados de Chile. *See* Union of Chilean Employees
- Unión de Mecánicos Mexicanos. *See* Union of Mexican Mechanics
- Unión de Obreros Textil (Argentina). *See* Textile Workers Union
- Unión de Periodistas Nicaragüense. *See* Union of Nicaraguan Journalists
- Unión de Trabajadores Bananeros del Atlántico (Costa Rica). *See* Atlantic Banana Workers Union
- Unión de Trabajadores de Antioquia (Colombia). *See* Unity of Workers of Antioquia
- Unión de Trabajadores de Chile. *See* National Union of Chilean Workers
- Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia. *See* Unity of Colombian Workers
- Unión de Trabajadores de Cundinamarca (Colombia). *See* Unity of Workers of Cundinamarca
- Unión de Trabajadores de Golfito (Costa Rica). *See* Union of Workers of Golfito
- Unión de Trabajadores del Petróleo (Colombia). *See* Unity of Petroleum Workers
- Unión de Trabajadores del Valle (Colombia). *See* Unity of Workers of the Valley
- Unión de Trabajadores Estatales de Colombia. *See* Unity of Government Workers of Colombia
- Unión de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros (El Salvador). *See* Railway Workers Union
- Union Defense and Unity Committee (CDUS) (Peru), 614, 628, 630, 639, 647, 653–54, 663
- Unión Democrática de Trabajadores (Chile). *See* Democratic Workers Union
- Union des Ouvriers et Travailleurs (Haiti). *See* Union of Laborers and Workers
- Union des Travailleurs Guyanais. *See* Union of Guianese Workers
- Unión Dominicana de Trabajadores. *See* Dominican Union of Workers
- Union Federation of Bank Employees (FESEB) (Guatemala), 403, 425, 427
- Union Federation of Communication Workers of Venezuela (FETRACOMUNICACIONES), 751, 752
- Unión Federativa Obrera (Cuba). *See* Union of Federated Labor
- Unión Ferroviaria (Argentina). *See* Railroad Workers Union
- Union for Action and Betterment of Railway Workers (SAMF) (Guatemala), 398, 401, 413, 417, 426, 430
- Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de México. *See* General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico
- Unión General de Trabajadores. *See* General Union of Workers (Argentina; Uruguay; Venezuela)
- Unión General de Trabajadores Dominicanos. *See* General Union of Dominican Workers
- Unión Gráfica Nacional (Bolivia). *See* National Printers Union
- Unión Médica Nacional (Costa Rica). *See* National Medical Union
- Unión Musical Costarricense. *See* Costa Rican Musical Union
- Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos (ATC) (Nicaragua). *See* Association of Rural Workers
- Unión Nacional de Campesinos (Honduras). *See* National Peasant Union
- Unión Nacional de Empleados (Nicaragua). *See* National Union of White Collar Employees
- Unión Nacional de Empleados del Seguro Social (Costa Rica). *See* National Social Security Employees Union
- Unión Nacional de Obreros Católicos (El Salvador). *See* Catholic Workers National Union
- Unión Nacional Obrero-Campesina (El Salvador). *See* National Union of Workers and Peasants
- Unión Obrera (Ecuador). *See* Labor Unity

- Unión Obrera Metalúrgica (Argentina).
See Union of Metalworkers
- Unión Obrero de la Construcción de la República Argentina. *See* Construction Labor Union of the Argentine Republic
- Union of Academic Personnel (SPAUNAM) (Mexico). *See* Sole National Union of University Workers
- Union of Agricultural Workers (Colombia), 202–3
- Union of Argentine Trade Unions, 9
- Union of Artisans (Chile), 146
- Union of Atlantic Railroad Workers (Costa Rica), 241
- Union of Banana Workers of Izabal (Guatemala), 426, 430
- Union of Bavaria Breweries (Colombia), 204
- Union of Building, Cement, and Excavation Workers (Argentina), 18, 23
- Union of Carpenters, Bricklayers Assembly (SCAAS) (Nicaragua), 552, 564, 572–73
- Union of Chauffeurs of Cap Haitien (Haiti), 459
- Union of Chauffeurs of Port-Au-Prince (Haiti), 459
- Union of Chilean Employees (UECH), 133, 173, 176
- Union of Civil Construction Workers (UOCC) (Brazil), 74, 88, 104, 116, 124
- Union of Dockworkers of Buenaventura (Colombia), 204
- Union of Drivers (Panama), 587
- Union of Electrical Workers of the Mexican Republic (STERM), 529–30, 538, 541–45
- Union of Farmers and Agricultural Workers of Brazil (ULTAB), 108, 109, 122, 125
- Union of Federated Labor (Cuba), 259
- Union of Graphic Industry Workers (Brazil), 100, 126
- Union of Guatemalan Workers Unions (UNSITRAGUA), 407, 411, 419, 421, 422, 426, 428, 430
- Union of Guianese Workers (UTG) (French Guiana), 392
- Union of Haitian Workers, 451
- Union of Hotel and Restaurant Workers (Argentina), 20
- Union of Insurance Company Workers (Venezuela), 745, 752
- Union of Laborers and Workers (Haiti), 451, 456, 460
- Union of Light and Power Workers (SLF) (Guatemala), 416, 427
- Union of Media and Newspaper Workers (SIMCOS) (Guatemala), 427
- Union of Metalworkers (Argentina), 23
- Union of Mexican Mechanics, 545, 546
- Union of Military Cadre (BMK) (Suriname), 694, 696, 697, 699
- Union of Nicaraguan Journalists, 567, 573
- Union of Organized Petroleum Workers (STOP) (Venezuela), 739
- Union of Painters and Those in Related Trades (Brazil), 117, 126
- Union of Petroleum Workers of the Mexican Republic, 546
- Union of Public Functionaries of the Ministry of Education (Venezuela), 752
- Union of Railroad Workers of the Mexican Republic (STFRM), 512, 521, 543, 546, 547
- Union of Sailors and Longshoremen of Cap Haitien (Haiti), 460
- Union of Sailors of Haitian Commercial Vessels, 460
- Union of Social Security Workers (STIGSS) (Guatemala), 419, 427
- Union of Tela Railroad Company Workers (SITRATERCO) (Honduras), 474, 491, 492, 493
- Union of Telephone Workers (Guatemala), 416
- Union of Telephone Workers of the Mexican Republic (STRNM), 547
- Union of Textile Factory Workers (UOFT) (Brazil), 73, 88, 96, 122, 126
- Union of Textile Industry Workers of the

- Federal District and State of Miranda (Venezuela), 753, 755
- Union of the Barco Concession Workers (Colombia), 204
- Union of Water and Sewer Institute Workers (Costa Rica), 241
- Union of Workers and Employees of UNAM (UNAM-STEUNAM) (Mexico), 534, 543
- Union of Workers and United Fruit Company (Guatemala), 398, 419
- Union of Workers at Embotelladoro Guatemalteca (STEGAC) (Guatemala), 398, 405, 427, 428
- Union of Workers at Incasa (INCASA) (Guatemala), 428
- Union of Workers at Indegua (INDE-GUA) (Guatemala), 428
- Union of Workers at the Ixtahuacan Mines (Guatemala), 429
- Union of Workers at the University San Carlos (STUSC) (Guatemala), 429–30
- Union of Workers at United Fruit Company (STEUFÇO) (Guatemala), 398, 402, 423, 426, 430
- Union of Workers in Education in Guatemala (STEG) (Guatemala), 398, 430
- Union of Workers in Engenho de Dentro (Brazil), 127
- Union of Workers in the Metallurgic Industry (SOIM) (Argentina), 23
- Union of Workers of Catatumbo (SIDELCA) (Colombia), 191, 199, 203, 204, 205
- Union of Workers of Golfito (Costa Rica), 242
- Union of Workers of Haitian American Sugar Company (HASCO), 452, 457, 460
- Union of Workers of Independent Banana Farms of Chiriqui (Panama), 591–92
- Union of Workers of Longshore and Maritime Agencies of Port-Au-Prince (Haiti), 457
- Union of Workers of Longshore and Shipping Agencies (Haiti), 46
- Union of Workers of the Chiriqui Land Company (SITRACHILCO) (Panama), 579, 584, 586, 590–91
- Union of Workers of the National Electrical Energy Company (Honduras), 494
- Union of Workshops (Argentina), 14, 19
- Union Patriótica Nicaragüense. *See* Nicaraguan Patriotic Union
- Union Renewal Movement (MRS) (Brazil), 102, 124
- Union Republican Party (Puerto Rico), 674
- Union Sindical Argentina. *See* Argentine Syndical Union.
- Union Sindical del Uruguay. *See* Syndical Union of Uruguay
- Union Sindical Obrera (Colombia). *See* Unionist Workers' Unity
- Union Sindical Trabajadores Magdalena (Colombia). *See* Unionist Unity of Workers of Magdalena
- Union Social Republicana de Asalariados (Chile). *See* Republican Social Union of Wage Earners of Chile
- Union tax (*imposto sindical*) (Brazil), 75, 76, 81, 110, 124
- Union Tipografica (Argentina). *See* Typographical Union
- Union Unity Committee (CUS) (El Salvador), 318–19, 332, 338, 366, 380, 381
- Unionist Confederation of Colombian Workers (CSTC), 183–84, 187–88, 191–94, 196, 198, 201–2, 205
- Unionist Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca (FESTRAC) (Colombia), 201–2
- Unionist Unity of Workers of Magdalena (USTM) (Colombia), 202–3
- Unionist Workers Unity (USO) (Colombia), 179, 182, 191, 196, 198, 202–4, 210
- Unitary Center of Workers of Venezuela (CUTV), 732, 737, 749, 754–56
- Unitary Committee of Christian Unionists (CUSIC) (Venezuela), 737
- Unitary Confederation of Workers (CUT) (Dominican Republic), 272, 275, 277, 281, 286

- United Teachers' Unions (Venezuela), 756
- United Union Committee of Petroleum Workers (COSUTRAPET) (Venezuela), 741, 755
- United Worker Block (BUO) (Mexico), 521, 526, 538, 547
- United Workers Front (FUT) (Ecuador), 295, 298, 304, 305
- United Workers' Front for Autonomous Labor Unions (FOUPSA) (Dominican Republic), 268, 269, 279
- UNITRAL (Guatemala). *See* National Union of Free Workers
- UNITS. *See* National Unity of Salvadoran Workers
- Unity and Force Workers Society (Colombia), 202
- "Unity and Progress" Master Tailors Society (Ecuador), 305
- Unity of Colombian Workers (UTC), 182-84, 187, 189, 192, 194, 196-98, 204-7, 209
- Unity of Government Workers of Colombia (UTRADEC), 206
- Unity of Guatemalan Teachers (UMAGUA), 423
- Unity of Industrialists and Workers (Colombia), 180
- Unity of Petroleum Workers (UTRAPE-TROL) (Colombia), 206
- Unity of Workers of Antioquia (UTRAN) (Colombia), 191, 207
- Unity of Workers of Cundinamarca (UTRACUN) (Colombia), 184, 194, 206, 209
- Unity of Workers of the Valley (UTRAVAL) (Colombia), 191, 193, 207
- "Unity" society (Ecuador), 305
- Unity Society of Workers (Colombia), 208, 210
- Universal suffrage (Guyana), 437
- University and Allied Workers Union (UAWU) (Jamaica), 500, 508, 509
- University of El Salvador, 362
- Unitary Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (CUTS), 316, 338, 346, 357, 381, 382
- Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers (FUTH), 473, 474, 478, 493
- Unitary Federation of Transportation Workers (Colombia), 201, 205
- Unitary Movement of Chilean Workers (MUTCH), 138, 149, 163, 176
- Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador (MUSYGES), 321, 346, 347, 352, 379, 381, 387
- Unitary Trade Union Federation of El Salvador (FUSS), 312, 335, 347, 365, 374, 380, 381, 384
- Unitary Union Confederation of Brazil, 127
- Unitary Workers Confederation (CUT) (Costa Rica), 224, 226, 230, 232, 238, 242
- Unitary Workers Front (FUT) (Chile), 145, 164, 169, 171, 176
- United Brands, 464, 591-92
- United Brotherhood of Maintenance Way (Panama), 578, 592
- United Democratic Parties (Suriname), 697
- United Front of Exploited Classes (Peru), 633
- United Fruit Company, 180, 202-3, 219, 222, 235, 396, 397, 399, 400, 401, 412, 423, 426, 430, 463-64, 469, 470, 472, 475, 476, 493, 590, 592
- United Fruit Strike, 1928 (Colombia), 210
- United Hindustani Party (VHP) (Suriname), 693, 694
- United Labor Block (Uruguay), 707
- United Labor Union of Workers of Central Romana (SU), 270, 278-79, 285-87
- United Left (IU) (Peru), 623, 625, 649, 650, 655
- United Mine Workers (Puerto Rico), 680
- United National Labor Front (FONU) (Cuba), 263
- United Nations, 460
- United Packinghouse Workers of America (Puerto Rico), 689
- United People's Movement (MPU) (Nicaragua), 554, 565-66, 569, 573-74

- United Popular Action Front (FAPU) (El Salvador), 316, 317–18, 331, 333, 356, 357, 358, 383
- United Revolutionary Front (Guatemala), 414
- United Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM), 539, 541, 544
- United States, 9, 40, 43, 45, 69, 135, 162, 193, 201, 206, 208, 230, 243, 257, 259, 266, 282, 293, 294, 295, 314, 317, 320, 321, 335, 336, 338, 340, 345, 347, 354, 366, 370, 389, 438, 452–53, 467, 492, 514, 523, 555, 571, 577–78, 580, 587, 613, 625, 634, 637, 641, 653, 660, 670, 676, 685; interventions and occupations (Dominican Republic), 266, 284–85, (Guatemala), 396, 400, 420, (Haiti), 449, 456, (Nicaragua), 550, 558, 568, (Panama), 579, 584, (Puerto Rico), 673, 681; “invisible blockade” (Chile), 139
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 125, 230, 282, 294–99, 612
- United States and El Salvador, 312, 314, 317–18, 319–22, 339, 341–42, 347, 350, 352–53, 361, 369–72, 377
- United States Army Special Forces, 360
- United States Central Intelligence Agency, 269, 614, 625, 636
- United States Peace Corps, 637
- United States Oil Companies, 191, 205, 210
- United States Steel, 745, 750
- United Steelworkers of America (USWA), 688
- University of the West Indies (Jamaica), 500, 509
- UNOC (El Salvador). *See* Catholic Workers National Union/National Union of Workers and Peasants
- UNOH. *See* National Union of Workers of Haiti
- UNSITRAGUA. *See* Union of Guatemalan Workers Unions
- UNT (El Salvador). *See* National Union of Workers
- UNTH. *See* National Union of Haitian Workers
- UNTRACH. *See* National Union of Chilean Workers
- UNTS. *See* National Unity of Salvadoran Workers
- UOCC (Brazil). *See* Union of Civil Construction Workers
- UOFT (Brazil). *See* Union of Textile Factory Workers
- UOI (Mexico). *See* Independent Worker Unit
- UPD (El Salvador). *See* Democratic Popular Unity
- UPN. *See* Nicaraguan Patriotic Union
- URD (Venezuela). *See* Democratic Republican Union
- Ureña, Rafael Estrella, 267, 277
- Urizar, Yalanda, 406
- Urmaneta, Francisco, 476
- UROCC (Brazil). *See* Regional Union of Civil Construction Workers
- Urriolagotia, Mamerto, 44
- Urrutia, Carlos Alberto, 486
- Urticho, José Coronel, 560
- Uruguay, 596, 606; Catholic Church in, 710; Cold War in, 709, 723; communism in, 709; eight-hour day in, 707; enterprises in (Anglo Company, 716; Armour Corporation, 716); Great Depression, impact on, 702, 718, 725; immigration, European, 705; labor leaders, repression of, 714, 722; labor publications (*Avanzada*, 725; *Presencia* [“Presence”], 713, 722); National Labor Office, 707, 722; ORIT in, 710, 723; strikes in, 705 (general, 714, 722; railroad, 707; student, 723; textile, 724); Student Labor Board, 723; World War I and, 707; World War II and, 705, 719
- Uruguayan Communist Party, 710–12, 719, 721, 725
- Uruguayan Confederation of Workers, 721, 723
- Uruguayan Federation of Commercial and Industrial Employees (FUECI), 719, 721, 724

- Uruguayan Socialist Party, 707, 716
 Uruguayan Syndical Action (ASU), 711, 713, 715, 722, 725
 Uruguayan Workers Central (CTU), 711, 721, 725
 US. *See* Suriname Union
 USAID. *See* United States Agency for International Development
 USO (Colombia). *See* Unionist Workers Unity
 USRACH. *See* Republican Social Union of Wage Earners of Chile
 UST (Brazil). *See* Syndical Union of Workers
 USTA (Peru). *See* Arequipa Workers Labor Union
 USTM (Colombia). *See* Unionist Unity of Workers of Magdalena
 USU. *See* Syndical Union of Uruguay
 UTBA (Costa Rica). *See* Atlantic Banana Workers Union
 UTC. *See* Rural Workers Union (El Salvador); Unity of Colombian Workers
 UTF (El Salvador). *See* Railway Workers Union
 UTG. *See* Graphic Workers Union (Brazil); Union of Guianese Workers
 UTIT (Venezuela). *See* Union of Textile Industry Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda
 UTRACH. *See* Chilean Workers Union
 UTRACUN (Colombia). *See* Unity of Workers of Cundinamarca
 UTRADEC (Colombia). *See* Unity of Government Workers
 UTRAN (Colombia). *See* Unity of Workers of Antioquia
 UTRAPETROL (Colombia). *See* Unity of Petroleum Workers
 UTRAVAL (Colombia). *See* Unity of Workers of the Valley
 Vaccaro Brothers Company, 470
 Valdez, Humerto, 293
 Valdez, Julio de Peña, 279
 Valencia, José, 354
 Valenzuela, José, 61
 Vallarino, Bolívar, 580
 Vallejo, Demetrio, 521, 530, 547
 Valverde, Manuel Mora, 220, 221, 232
Vanguardia Obrera (Colombia), 208
 Vanini, Javier Tantaleán, 617, 644, 664
 Varela, Oscar Gale, 492
 Vargas, Domingo, 564
 Vargas, Getúlio, 65, 66, 72–80, 86, 92, 97, 98, 100, 109–12, 114, 116, 118, 127, 133
 Vargas, Marcos de, 277
 Vargas, Raúl Caballero, 650
 Vascenez, José, 301
 Vásquez, Jorge Oropeza, 547
 Vásquez, Miguel Angel, 341, 363, 374
 Vásquez, Tránsito, 332
 Vaughan, Desmond, 33
 Veintimilla, Ignacio de, 290
 Velasco, General Juan (Peru). *See* Alvarado, General Juan Velasco
 Velásquez, Andrés, 750
 Velásquez, Febe Elizabeth, 337
 Velázquez, Fidel, 520, 522, 529, 546
 Venezuela, 273; AFL-CIO in, 760; reform in, 747; banks in (Agricultural and Husbandry Bank, 748; National Discount Bank, 749; Venezuelan Workers Bank, 757, 760); enterprises in (Bethlehem Steel, 750; Orinoco Mining Company, 745; Orinoco Steel Works (SIDOR), 745; United States Steel, 745, 750); immigration to, 728; labor congresses, First Workers Congress, 729; labor leaders, repression of, 728–729, 731, 749, 760; labor legislation (Decree of March, 1969, 748; Labor Law of 1936, 729, 731; Labor Representation Law, 760; Law Against Unjustified Layoffs (1974), 733; Law of Administrative Career, 751); labor publications (*Andamio*, 739; *Fuerza Laboral*, 743; *Vocero*, 755); migration in, 727; repression in, 731; ORIT in, 731, 736; peasant leagues in, 747; strikes in, 731, 742 (aluminum, 745; general, 729, 731–32, 749; oil, 729,

- 731, 755; shoemakers, 728; steel, 746; telegraph, 745); World War II and, 730
- Venezuelan Chamber of Construction, 733
- Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), 727, 730, 732, 739, 741, 747, 758
- Venezuelan Federation of Teachers (FVM), 740, 755–56, 757
- Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation, 741
- Venezuelan Society of Primary School Teachers (SVMIP), 755, 757
- Venezuelan Workers Bank, 757, 760
- Venn Commission Report, 437
- Ventura, Gregorio Aguillon, 329
- Vera, Felix C., 534
- Vera, Nestor, 109, 125
- Veracruz Peasant League (Mexico), 519, 536
- Verbroedering* (Suriname), defined, 693
- Verschuur, Wim Bos, 698
- VHP (Suriname). *See* United Hindustani Party
- Videla, Gabriela González, 135, 149
- Viera, Rodolfo, 318, 319, 339, 369, 370
- Vietnam, 369
- Vietnamese revolution, 316
- Vilanova, José Vicente, 327
- Villa, Francisco “Pancho,” 518, 534
- Villalba, Augusto Malavé, 729, 760
- Villalta, Jorge Alberto, 329
- Villanueva, Santiago, 526, 533, 542
- Villaruel, Major Gualberto, 43, 44, 53, 60
- Villavicencio, Hermengildo, 526, 542
- Villegas, Cruz, 754
- Vincent, President Sténio, 449
- Vitarte Textile Union (Peru), 660, 663
- Vivaceta, Fermin, 146
- Vocero* (Venezuela), 755
- Volio, Jorge, 219, 234
- Volkswagen, 106, 512, 522, 535, 617
- Voz* (Colombia), 201
- Voz Cosmopolitana* (Brazil), 94
- Voz do Povo* (Brazil), 99
- Voz Obrero* (El Salvador), 349, 382, 383
- VR (Peru), 616, 648–49, 658
- Wage Councils, 709
- Wage policy, 82, 83, 104, 113, 323, 338, 377
- Wainwright, Juan Pablo, 471
- War of the Pacific (1879–1883), 41, 146, 597, 628
- War of the Triple Alliance, 596
- Warren, Waldo, 725
- Wasem, Adolfo, 714
- Water and Sewage National Administration (ANDA) (El Salvador), 383, 384
- Water and Sewage National Administration Workers Union (SETA), 316, 357, 378, 383, 384, 385
- WCL. *See* World Confederation of Labor
- Weidmann, Father Josephus, 697
- West Indian Federation (Jamaica), 498
- West Indian Protective League (Panama), 592
- WFTU. *See* World Federation of Trade Unions
- White Warriors Union (El Salvador), 331
- Willoughby, Governor Francis, 691
- Willoughbyland, 691
- Wilson, Woodrow, 686
- Winpisinger, William, 320
- Women’s Division of Labor Assistance (Argentina), 6
- Women’s Labor Federation (FOF) (Bolivia), 40, 60
- Wong, Miguel, 30
- Wood, William H., 686
- Worker and Peasant Union (Brazil), 12
- Worker Confederation in Puebla (Mexico), 548
- Worker Federation for the Legal Protection of Labor (FOG) (Guatemala), 397–98, 413, 430
- Worker-Peasant Forum on Dialogue and Peace in El Salvador, 328
- Worker-Peasant Movement (Haiti), 456
- Worker Unification (Guatemala), 431
- Worker’s Circle (Cuba), 263
- Worker’s Front (FO) (Nicaragua), 554–55, 557, 560, 564, 567, 571–72, 574
- Workers and Peasants Bloc (Costa Rica), 221, 232

- Workers and Peasants National Front (FRENATRACA) (Peru), 630, 664
- Workers Assembly of National Nutrition (Chile), 177
- Workers Circle of Caracas (COC) (Venezuela), 736
- Workers Circles (Brazil), 86; (Colombia), 180, 186, 205, 208–9
- Workers Committee of Revolutionary Orientation (COOR) (El Salvador), 366, 379
- Workers Confederation of El Salvador (COES), 308, 332–33, 385–86
- Workers Confederation of the Peruvian Revolution (CTRP), 616–17, 619, 624, 626, 631, 639–40, 644, 653, 657, 661, 664–65
- Workers Confederation of the Republic of Panama, 581
- Workers Confederation of Venezuela (CTV), 730, 731, 732, 736, 737, 739, 741, 747, 753, 754, 756, 757, 758
- Workers Constitution* (Honduras), 471
- Workers Directorate of the Atlantic Coast (Colombia), 209
- Workers Federation of Labor (FOT) (Bolivia), 40, 42, 57, 60
- Workers Federation of La Paz (Bolivia), 56
- Workers Federation of Puerto Rico, 681
- Workers Federation of Rio Gallegos (Argentina), 24
- Workers Federation of the Chilean Region, 177
- Workers Federation of the Republic of Panama, 578, 579, 581, 590, 592–93
- Workers Front (Venezuela), 732, 744
- Workers Guadalupanos of the Federal District (Mexico), 526
- Workers League (Costa Rica), 216, 242
- Workers League of Guatemala, 397, 431
- Workers Leagues (Brazil), 119
- Workers Party (PT) (Brazil), 83, 107, 120–22
- Workers Party of Jamaica (WPJ), 500, 509
- Workers Regional Federation of El Salvador (FRTS), 308, 310, 330, 347, 351, 362, 366, 371, 385, 386, 387
- Workers Regional Federation of Guatemala (FROG), 397, 431
- Workers Social Center (CSO) (Bolivia), 38, 59, 61
- Workers Social Congress, 133, 172, 178
- Workers Society (Costa Rica), 217
- Workers Society of El Porvenir (Bolivia), 38, 59, 61
- Workers Solidarity Coordinating Committee (CST) (El Salvador), 323, 336–37, 346, 359, 363, 377, 378, 383, 387–88
- Workers Struggle Committees (CLT) (Nicaragua), 557, 566, 571–72, 575
- Workers Union (Colombia), 199, 202, 208, 210
- Workers Union of the Frontino Gold Mines (Colombia), 210
- Workers Unitary Movement (MUT) (Brazil), 78, 111, 128
- Workers United Union of the South of Puerto Rico, 688–69
- Workers Unity of Colombia, 210–11
- Workers' Council of Paraguay (COP), 598, 604, 606
- Workers' Institute (El Salvador), 382
- Workers' Liberation League (Jamaica), 500
- Working Class Center (Brazil), 128
- Working Class Federation of Pernambuco, 116
- Working Peoples Union Movement (MSPT) (Nicaragua), 575
- World Confederation of Labor (WCL), 33, 392, 409, 473, 503, 569, 586, 697
- World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), 286, 393, 503, 505, 572, 588, 684, 709, 719, 725, 754
- World War I, 88, 89, 103, 116, 119, 122, 126, 170, 391, 435, 497, 500, 550, 579, 651, 673, 686, 707
- World War II, 43, 186, 219, 244, 248, 296, 391, 445, 506, 520, 551, 561, 579, 611, 639, 698, 705, 710, 730
- WPJ. *See* Workers' Party of Jamaica
- W. R. Grace & Co., 611, 663

- Xocop, Florencia, 404
- Year of Austerity (1978) (Peru), 621
- Year of Misery (1978) (Peru), 621
- Yglesias, Rafael, 216
- Young Communist Youth League (Jamaica), 500
- Zalacosta, Francisco, 542
- Zaldivar, Felipe Antonio, 314, 325, 327, 334, 335, 336
- Zapata, Emiliano, 518, 534
- Zapata, Sánchez, 657
- Zavaleta, Alvaro Jiménez, 226
- Zelaya, Gustavo, 475
- Zelaya, José Santos, 549, 550
- Zelaya, Lorenzo, 466
- Zelaya, Manuel "Mel," 487
- Zemurray, Samuel, 470
- Ziller, Armando, 109
- Zometa, Carlos, 359, 384
- Zuazo, General Hernan Siles, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 59
- Zuñiga, Antonio, 629
- Zuniga, Fredy Alberto Aragon, 428
- Zuniga, Ricardo, 465
- Zuno, José Guadalupe, 535

About the Editors and Contributors _____

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER has been Professor of Economics and Political Science at Rutgers since 1947. His many books include *The Lovestoneites and the International Right Opposition of the 1930s*; *Communism in Latin America*; and *Trotskyism in Latin America*. He also served on the National Committee of the Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation from 1957–1966.

RODNEY D. ANDERSON is Professor of History at Florida State University. He received his Ph.D. from American University and is the author of *Outcasts in Their Own Land: Mexican Industrial Workers, 1906–1911*; *Guadalajara a la consumación de la Independencia: estudio de su población según los padrones de 1821–22*; and articles in such journals as *Hispanic American Historical Review*, *Historia Mexicana*, *Relaciones*, and *American Labor in the Southwest*. He currently is working on a social history of the city of Guadalajara in the nineteenth century.

WILLIAM BOLLINGER, a historian, is director of the Interamerican Research Center in Los Angeles. His essays include “The AFL–CIO in Central America: An Analysis of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD),” “Latin America and U.S. Presidential Elections,” and “A Critique of Nuclear Politics in Latin America.” He serves on the Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom of the Latin American Studies Association and is an editor of *Latin American Perspectives*.

JOHN A. BOOTH is Professor and Chairperson of the Department of Political Science at North Texas State University. He is the author of numerous articles and chapters in anthologies on the Costa Rican political system and political participation in Costa Rica. He is the author of *The End and the Beginning: The*

Nicaraguan Revolution and coeditor (with M. Seligson) of *Political Participation in Latin America*.

NORMA CHINCHILLA is Associate Professor of Women's Studies and Sociology at California State University, Long Beach. She has written several articles on labor and women in Guatemala.

WILLIAM L. CUMIFORD, Curator of Business, Industry, and Technology in the History Division of the Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History, received his Ph.D. in Latin American Studies and American Diplomatic History at Texas Tech University in 1977. He has published articles on engineering history of the American Southwest and on nineteenth-century United States–Latin American diplomacy.

STEVE ELLNER received his Ph.D. in Latin American history from the University of New Mexico in 1979 and has taught economic history at the Universidad de Oriente in Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela since 1977. Currently Associate Professor, he has written *Los partidos politicos y su lucha por el control del movimiento sindical en Venezuela, 1936–48*, and the forthcoming *From Guerilla Warfare to Electoral Politics: Venezuela's Movement Toward Socialism*.

HANK FRUNDT for the last seven years has served as president or state council delegate for the American Federation of Teachers local 2274, Ramapo College, New Jersey, where he also convenes the Sociology program. He studied trade unions in Guatemala under a fellowship sponsored by the Organization of American States and the Centro Ecodesarrollo in Mexico, and he continues to research Latin American labor organizations in collaboration with NACLA. In the past, Dr. Frundt has served as a consultant to the United Nations Centre on Corporate Responsibility, and the Mexican government's Sistema Alimentario Mexicano.

LINDA FULLER received her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of California, Berkeley and is an Assistant Professor at the University of Southern California. She has lived and worked in Latin America for a number of years, most recently in 1982 and 1983 when she conducted research on the politics of workers' control in post-revolutionary Cuba. Portions of that research have appeared in *Latin American Perspectives* and *World Development*. Currently she is co-editing a volume on Central America and the United States in the first half of the 1980s.

GERALD MICHAEL GREENFIELD received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, Bloomington and currently is Director of International Studies and Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Parkside. He has co-edited two bibliographies for Gale Research Company and is preparing a reference work on urbanization in Latin America for Greenwood Press. His articles have appeared

in such journals as *The Americas*, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, *Journal of Urban History*, and *Luso-Brazilian Review*.

LISBETH HAAS has a Ph.D. from the University of California, Irvine, and has taught at UC Irvine and UC Santa Cruz.

FRANK P. LEVENESS is Chairman of the Department of Government and Politics at St. John's University in New York. He specializes in Caribbean Studies, and has published several articles in that field.

BRIAN LOVEMAN received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, Bloomington, and is Professor of Political Science at San Diego State University. His publications include *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism*; *El mito de la marginalidad: participación y repressión del campesinado chileno*; and, with Tom Davies, *The Politics of Antipolitics*, as well as numerous articles in scholarly journals.

SHELDON L. MARAM is Professor of History at California State University, Fullerton. His publications include a book on the early Brazilian labor movement, *Anarquistas, imigrantes e o movimento operário brasileiro, 1890–1920*. He has published articles on this same topic in the *Luso-Brazilian Review*, *Hispanic American Historical Review*, and *Proceedings of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies*. He also has written monographs on the impact of Hispanic immigrant labor on the United States. In 1977 he received the James Robertson memorial prize of the American Historical Association/Conference on Latin American History.

AMPARO MENENDEZ-CARRIÓN received her Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University. She is a Senior Fellow at the Quito, Ecuador, headquarters of FLASCO and a Visiting Scholar at the Institute of Peruvian Studies in Lima, Peru. Her book on voting behavior by the urban poor in Ecuador was published in 1986. She has co-authored (with Riordan Roett) "Authoritarian Paraguay: the Personalist Tradition," in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline (eds.), *Latin American Politics and Development*.

RICHARD LEE MILK received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, Bloomington, and currently teaches at Texas Lutheran College. He has published in the *Revista Lingüística Metodológica*, and is the author of "Growth and Development of Catholic Labor Organizations in Ecuador," in *The Church and Society in Latin America*.

MARTIN F. MURPHY, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Notre Dame, received the Licenciatura degree from the Universidad de las Americas in Mexico and the Ph.D. from Columbia University. He has been a

Visiting Assistant Professor at the Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida, Gainesville, and Profesor Especial at the Universidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo. He has written on various aspects of the Dominican and Haitian societies.

NEALE J. PEARSON is Professor of Political Science at Texas Tech University. He has published articles on peasant groups and agrarian reform in Brazil, Guatemala, and Honduras as well as an article, "Peasant and Worker Sindicatos and Democracy," in Howard Wiarda (ed.), *The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America*. He is a long-term student of Democratic and Marxist parties in Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Chile, and Peru. He currently is comparing the delivery of health care, primary education, and water/sanitation services to rural areas in Honduras and Panama as a follow up to an article on Honduras in Richard E. Lonsdale and Gyorgy Enyedi (eds.), *Rural Public Services, International Comparison*.

RENÉ DE LA PEDRAJA TOMAN received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1977 and is Assistant Professor of History at Kansas State University. He resided in Colombia for eleven years and taught at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá. He is the author of *Historia de la energía en Colombia, 1527-1930*, *FEDEMETAL y la industrialización de Colombia*, and numerous articles. Currently he is writing a book in English on energy development in Colombia since 1930.

SHARON PHILLIPPS received her Ph.D. from the University of New Mexico. A sociologist, she currently is at the Center for Latin American Studies at Stanford University.

JUAN RIAL ROADE, historian at the Centro de Informaciones y Estudios del Uruguay (CIESU) has published widely on socio-political aspects of Uruguayan national life. Among these are *Las reglas del juego electoral en Uruguay y sus implicaciones*; *El discreto encanto de la social-democracia en el Uruguay*; *Población y desarrollo de un pequeño país: Uruguay 1830-1930*; and (with J. Klaczko) *Uruguay: el país urbano*.

RIORDAN ROETT is Professor and Director of the Latin American Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. He co-edited and co-authored (with Wolf Grabendorff) *Latin America, Western Europe, and the U.S.: Reevaluating the Atlantic Triangle*, and his *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society* has gone through several editions.

RICHARD STAHLER-SHOLK is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Since 1984 he has been a Research Associate at the *Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Economicas y So-*

ciales (CRIES) in Managua. He has written a number of articles and chapters on Nicaraguan political economy since the Revolution.

STEVEN S. VOLK is Assistant Professor at Oberlin College. Formerly Research Associate with the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), he has published widely on Bolivian affairs.



